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Armstrong's Just-so story about Consciousness* Daniel Stoljar, ANU 1. Introduction D. M. Armstrong's A Materialist Theory of the Mind is a prime source of many ideas that are still widely discussed in contemporary philosophy of mind (see Armstrong 1968). Among these are: • The causal or functionalist analysis of belief as a state apt to cause a certain sort of behaviour; and the correlative analysis of a purpose (i.e., an intention or desire) as an information sensitive mental cause; • The analysis of perception in terms of belief: perception as the getting of belief about one's immediate surroundings; • The analysis of other mental states in terms of perception, and so ultimately in terms of belief: sensation as a sort of perception of one's own body, introspection a sort of perception of one's own mind; • The analysis of a conscious mental state as a state that is the target of a certain sort of introspection, or inner perception; and • The distinctive two-premise argument for the identity of mental states with physical states of the central nervous system. The first premise of the argument, which follows from his causal analysis, is that mental states are states apt to produce a certain sort of behaviour. The second, empirical, premise is that cfibers firing and other neurophysiological states are in fact states apt to produce that sort of behaviour. The conclusion is that mental states are physical states. Perhaps less well known is Armstrong's claim that his book provides "an answer to the question asked again and again by so many biologists and psychologists 'What is the biological function of consciousness'?" (1968, 162) In particular, he suggests at several points *Acknowledgments: I presented an earlier version of this paper at the 2018 conference on A Materialist Theory of the Mind: 50 Years On held at The University of Sydney. I thank all the members of the audience their for their help, particularly W.G.Lycan. Thanks also to Peter Anstey, David Braddon Mitchell, Justin D'Ambrosio and Frank Jackson for extremely helpful comments as I was writing the paper. 2 that his views about purpose and about introspection may be combined to provide a "just-so story about introspective consciousness," as W.G. Lycan later described it (see Lycan 1996). My topic here is this just-so story-Armstrong's account of the function of consciousness, as I will usually say. After providing an interpretation of the account (sections 2–3), I will develop two critical points about it. The first (section 4) is that appreciating this aspect of Armstrong's view blurs the difference between his own perceptual model of introspection, and the anti-perceptual models advanced by such critics as Sydney Shoemaker. The second (section 5) is that the account is implausible since it conflates two interpretations of its central idea, namely, that "a purpose is an information-sensitive mental cause." In section 6 I will bring these two criticisms together by noting a connection between Armstrong's position and an apparently different argument by Shoemaker; both fail, I will argue, for the same reason. Section 7 is a brief conclusion. 1 2. Armstrong's Account Armstrong's account is contained in two main chapters of A Materialist Theory of the Mind (hereafter MTM), chapter 15 and chapter 6. Chapter 15 summarizes his overall attitude to introspection, which he says is crucial for the argument in the proceeding chapters. The summary concludes with this passage: If there are to be purposive trains of mental activity, then there must be equally some means by which we become apprised of our current mental state. Only so can we adjust mental behaviour to mental circumstances. For instance, if we are doing a calculation 'in our head' we will need to become aware of the current stage in the mental calculation that we have reached. Only if we do become so aware will we know what to do next. So there must be a way of becoming aware of our current mental state, which means that there must be introspection. (1968, 327) Similar passages occur earlier, in chapter 6, which sets out his account of purposes: 1 It goes without saying that the contemporary literature relevant to the evolutionary function of consciousness is much bigger and more sophisticated now than when Armstrong was writing. Some examples are: Barron and Klein 2016, Godfrey-Smith, 2017, 2019, LeDoux 2019, Polger 2017, Polger and Flanagan 2002, Robinson, Maley, and Piccinini 2015, Rosenthal 2008. Beyond a few comments, I will concentrate here on Armstrong's own view, and the way it interacts with other parts of his philosophy of mind, rather than attempt to connect what he says with this literature. 3 If the train of mental states between stimulus and response is to be a purposive affair... there is some method whereby information about the current state of affairs can be fed back to the driving force behind the teleological sequence. But if the teleological sequence in question is a sequence of events in the mind, this means that the agent must become informed of what is currently going on in his mind. (1968, 163) Introspection is therefore a logical precondition of teleological mental behaviour. So we have given a 'teleological deduction' of the existence of introspection. (1968, 163) It is reasonable to assume that Armstrong's account of the function of consciousness, whatever it is, is contained in these passages. So what is that account exactly? I think it is fair to summarize the account as an argument for the conclusion that consciousness has a biological function. The argument may be formulated this way: P1. Purposive mental activity has a biological function. P2. Consciousness is necessary for purposive mental activity. C. Ergo, Consciousness has a biological function. Let me begin by making some comments about the constituent notions here and about the initial plausibility of both the premises and the inference. 3. Commentary Comment 1. By 'a purpose', as we have seen, Armstrong means an "information-sensitive mental cause" (1968, 139). To illustrate, suppose that my purpose is to get a drink, or, as we might say more readily these days, I desire to get a drink. This desire is a mental cause, for Armstrong, because it is a state apt to bring about, i.e. cause, certain behaviours: the desire for a drink will usually cause me to get a drink. The desire is information sensitive, in that its existence and nature will be influenced by what other information I have, that is, by what other beliefs and desires I have. Suppose I learn, and so come to know, that I have a drink, for example, and for some reason hadn't noticed this before. Then my desire to get a drink will, other things being equal, go away or be extinguished. Being extinguished by the knowledge that it is satisfied is one way for a desire to be information sensitive. 4 Of course not all desires are sensitive in this simple way. Suppose I desire to be warm; that is, suppose I desire to be in some persistent state-a "continuing condition" Armstrong calls it (1968, 140)-rather than for some event to occur. This desire will not go away if I learn that I am warm. Nevertheless the desire is still sensitive to information in a more general sense. If I desire to be warm, and learn that I am, I will normally be disposed to form new desires: the desire to remain warm, for example.2 Comment 2. By 'purposive activity', Armstrong means a series of actions initiated and sustained by a purpose, in the sense just introduced. As we will see, it is crucial for him that such activity comes in two varieties: purposive mental activity and purposive physical activity. Purposive physical activity is a series of physical actions initiated and sustained by a purpose. As an example of purposive physical activity, Armstrong gives a case in which, as he says (1968, 143), "I set my face toward the public house"-that is, I decide to go out to the pub, the Nag's Head Hotel, for example. In such a case, my desire causes a series of physical actions-leaving my front door, walking down Glebe Point Road, turning right on St John's Road, and so on. Purposive mental activity is a series of mental actions initiated and sustained by a purpose. As an example of mental purposive activity, he gives a case of mental arithmetic, in which "we are doing a calculation 'in our head'" (1968, 327). In such a case, my desire, for example, to arrive at the product of two other numbers, requires me to focus first on certain operations, then remember the outcome of one operation, while performing another, and so on. A different case Armstrong gives is one in which we go through various possible actions in imagination, in order to work out their consequences and so their desirability (see, e.g. 1968, 158ff). I may know there are two routes to the Nag's Head, for example, and consider in imagination first taking one, then the other. To the extent that the first route is imagined to lead to a negative outcome-e.g. running into a certain moustachioed logician outside the Habit Wine Bar-I may decide on the second. 2 Armstrong emphasizes the information sensitivity of purposes or desires, but presumably this is a feature of mental states in general. Take the belief that I have a drink in my hand. If I learn that I do not have a drink in my hand, this belief will normally go away. In that sense, beliefs are information sensitive too, since they are usually affected by whatever else I know. 5 Comment 3. When he speaks of the 'biological function' of consciousness and other mental states, I take Armstrong to be committed to a kind of adaptationism about the mind, i.e., he is assuming that (e.g.) consciousness is a trait whose current presence in a population has a quite specific historical explanation in terms of natural selection. Admittedly Armstrong is not terribly explicit on this point, and MTM predates the contemporary discussion of adaptationism.3 But this is nevertheless the most plausible interpretation of what he says. After all, whether consciousness is an adaptation is "the question asked again and again by so many biologists and psychologists." And it is adaptations, and not functions of other sorts, about which people tell just-so stories.4 Comment 4. Putting comments 1–3 together, P1 makes an empirical claim about the biological past, since it claims that purposive activity played a distinctive role in the evolutionary history of conscious creatures. What is Armstrong's evidence for such a claim? The only relevant passage I know of in MTM is this: Let us begin by considering what is the biological function of mind. Mental processes biologically speaking are those that fall between stimulus and response. Their biological function is to make the response more sophisticated, and so more efficient. Now, if what goes on in the mind has a directed or purposive character, this may well aid the agent to make the best response...For instance, in a problem situation, various possible responses may be tried out 'in the imagination' in order to see which response will best fulfill the agent's purposes. As a causal result the response may be more efficient. (1968, 163) Unfortunately, this passage raises more questions than it answers. Make the response more sophisticated than what? Sophisticated in what way? Why does increased sophistication generate greater efficiency? Did greater efficiency in fact play any role in the biological past of human beings? And greater efficiency than what exactly? Without an answer to these 3 The classic paper here is Gould and Lewontin 1979; see also Orzack and Forber 2017. 4 This is certainly true of the work referred to in footnote 1, for example. 6 questions, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the passage, and MTM more generally, provides no support at all for P1. If MTM offers no support for P1, one might be tempted to dismiss the argument set out above. One might also be tempted to suppose that the argument can't possibly capture the account presented in MTM. But I think both reactions are mistaken. First, while I have presented Armstrong's account as an argument, I don't mean that he offers an explicit defence of its first premise. On the contrary, I am sure he is not trying to provide an account of the function of mental activity or of the mind in general; rather he is providing an account of the function of consciousness given the premise that purposive mental activity has a function. Second, while Armstrong does not defend that premise, one might think it fair enough to assume that it is true, especially if we go along with the adaptationism I am assuming Armstrong is working with. After all, adaptationism presumably entails that if we have a thing of sufficient complexity, we may provisionally suppose it to have some biological function, even if we don't know what that function is. Moreover, as we will see later, by purposive mental activity, Armstrong means something similar to what other writers refer to as rationality or reasoning, and it is not at all implausible that rationality or reasoning has a biological function.5 I propose therefore not to reject Armstrong's argument simply because he himself provides no argument for P1.6 Comment 4. By "consciousness" Armstrong means, as he says, "the awareness of our own state of mind" (1968, 85). He goes on: "the technical term for such awareness of our own mental state is 'introspection' or 'introspective awareness.'" It is in this sense that consciousness and introspection come together for Armstrong, and this is why he is happy to move back and forth from one to the other. For him, one is in a conscious mental state if and only if one is introspectively aware of one's being in that state; to put it differently, one is in a conscious mental state if and only if one is conscious in a certain sort of way of one's being in that state. 5 A recent prominent recent discussion of this issue is Mercier and Sperber 2017. 6 In this sense, Armstrong's account is an instance of what Robinson, Maley and Piccinini (2015) have recently called the 'strong reading' of an adapationist account. They characterize an account of this sort as follows: "On a strong reading...consciousness is necessary for certain mental processes. That is, the relevant mental processes cannot take place without consciousness. If so, then it is impossible to have nonconscious functional duplicates of conscious beings. Instead, there must be functions performed by conscious beings that a nonconscious being could not perform. In order for such claims to stand, a nonconscious organism must be unable to perform the same function; otherwise consciousness would not be needed to obtain the adaptive advantage" (2015, 368). 7 The notion of consciousness Armstrong adopts here is what Norman Malcolm in this later debate with Armstrong (see Armstrong and Malcolm 1984) called the 'transitive sense', in which one is conscious of something. But Armstrong also uses 'conscious' in an intransitive sense to apply to the state in question. In this sense, a state is (intransitively) conscious if and only if the subject of the state is aware in some way (i.e., conscious in the transitive sense in some way) of being in that state. Since these notions are inter-defined, for most purposes it makes no difference which one we have in mind. Comment 5. Armstrong focuses on a notion of consciousness tied to introspection- introspective consciousness, as Lycan says-but he does not deny that there are other notions of consciousness; indeed his later work on this topic prefigures the pluralism about consciousness that is dominant in the literature today (see Armstrong 1981; see Block 1997 and for more recent discussion, see Pautz and Stoljar 2019). In that later work, for example, Armstrong distinguishes perceptual consciousness, in which you are conscious of what you perceive, i.e., physical objects and their perceptually available properties, and introspective consciousness, in which you are conscious of (e.g.) your perceiving something. Nevertheless, introspective consciousness is in his view the central or basic case, the sort of consciousness that explains the rest. This is supposed to follow from reflection on the case of the long-distance truck driver, who figures prominently in Armstrong's later discussions of consciousness (see Armstrong 1981, 1984), but who makes his first oblique appearance in MTM: This is something that can happen when one is driving very long distances in monotonous conditions. One can 'come to' at some point and realize that one has driven many miles without consciousness of the driving, or perhaps of anything else. One has kept the car on the road, changed gears even, or used the brake but all in a state of 'automatism'. (1968, 93) As I understand it, Armstrong's reasoning concerning this example is as follows: consciousness in the central sense is what is missing before the truck-driver comes to; what is missing before the truck-driver comes to is introspective consciousness; hence introspective consciousness is consciousness in the central sense. I think-unoriginally; see Lycan and Ryder 2003-that this reasoning is unpersuasive. While introspective or second-order consciousness is missing in the truck driver case so too is 8 consciousness in a first-order sense. Armstrong is right that, prior to coming to, the truck driver fails to be introspectively aware of his own mental states. But the driver also fails to attend to the road or the gears or the breaks, even though presumably he was aware of such things. If you think, as many do, that attention, or attention to a sufficient degree, is one of the factors that turns mere awareness into consciousness in at least one good sense, the truck driver example does not show the centrality of Armstrong's introspective notion, as opposed to an alternative first-order attention-based one. Comment 6. While Armstrong overreaches on the centrality of introspective consciousness, I think we should ignore this too in our investigation of the argument presented above. For suppose introspective consciousness as Armstrong defines it is merely one of several different varieties of consciousness, rather than the main or basic one; it is still reasonable to focus on the function of consciousness of this variety. The reason is that this version of consciousness raises in a very straightforward way the very question that Armstrong says is asked again and again, namely the question of the function of consciousness. What prompts that question is the apparent possibility that various cognitive functions can go on in the absence of consciousness: on the face of it, one can believe, remember, want, perceive and act, and yet one does not consciously believe, remember, want, perceive or act. This concern is just as urgent in the case of introspective consciousness as in the case of varieties.7 In sum, what Armstrong is trying to establish is the interesting conclusion that consciousness in his sense does not come apart from some other cognitive functions; it does not detract from the interestingness of that conclusion that there are analogous issues about consciousness in other senses. Comment 7. 'Necessity' as it occurs in P2 is intended to capture Armstrong's repeated use of modals in the passages above. Take his remark, "if there are to be purposive trains of mental activity, then there must be equally some means by which we become apprised of our current mental state" (1968, 327, emphasis added). I take 'must' here to have wide-scope over the conditional; hence what is being said is that, necessarily, if there is purposive mental activity, there is a means by which we become apprised of our current mental state, i.e., there is 7 Contemporary work is often focused, not on introspective consciousness but on phenomenal consciousness (as Block 1997 calls it). Nevertheless, questions about the evolution of consciousness are still prompted by the idea that consciousness in this sense may be removed or altered even though the function may remain. 9 consciousness. Further, I take 'necessarily' here to be logical or metaphysical necessity, i.e., necessity in the widest sense-it is hard to interpret Armstrong's use of words like 'deduction' in any other way. Hence what is being said is that, in all possible worlds, if there is purposive mental activity, so too there is consciousness.8 Comment 8. Putting comments 4–7 together, P2 has nothing to do with the contingent causal history of the world, and a fortiori nothing to do with the evolutionary past of conscious creatures. Rather it is a modal claim: necessarily, if you undergo purposive mental activity, the states in question must be conscious in the introspective sense. Why does Armstrong believe P2? The basic idea, as I understand it, concerns the distinction between purposive mental activity and purposive physical activity introduced above. In the case of purposive physical activity, we need to keep track of what is going on in the world, and adjust our mental states accordingly. In the case of purposive mental activity, by contrast, we need to keep track of what is going on in the mind. But keeping track of what is going on in the mind is a matter of being introspectively aware of what is going on in the mind, and this in turn requires consciousness. Later we will consider whether the contrast between purposive physical activity and purposive mental activity is really as Armstrong says it is. Comment 9. We have seen the reasons for supposing that both premises of this argument are true; do they entail the conclusion? The answer is no. Suppose the heart has a biological function, to pump blood say; and suppose that, necessarily being located in space is necessary for pumping blood. It does not follow that being located in space has a biological function: being located is a precondition of something that has a function, but does not have the relevant function itself. More generally, A can have a biological function, and B can be necessary the existence of A, and yet B might fail to have any function. Hence Armstrong's premises do not entail their conclusion. In view of the fact that the argument is invalid one might yet again be inclined to reject it. But again I am not going to make this criticism in what follows. For one thing, it may be that, while the premises do not entail the conclusion, they nevertheless support it; for example, perhaps the best explanation of the two premises is that consciousness has a 8 I will consider later whether a weaker notion of necessity would suit Armstrong's purposes. 10 function. Moreover, it may be that the premises can be enriched in such a way that the conclusion does follow; for example, it might be that what is true is not simply that being conscious is necessitated by purposive mental activity but that it explains why purposive mental activity has the function it has. 4. Perceptual and Non-perceptual Theories of Introspection So far I've set out Armstrong's just-so story as an argument for the conclusion that consciousness has a biological function. And I've noted that, while one might question both the first premise of that argument and its passage to the conclusion, this will not be my approach. For the rest of the paper, therefore, I will focus on Armstrong's second premise- i.e. P2-the premise that consciousness is necessary for purposive mental activity. In a moment I will consider whether P2 is persuasive on its own terms. But first, I want to point out that Armstrong's commitment to it creates difficulties for what has become the standard way of drawing the distinction between perceptual and non-perceptual theories of introspection. We have seen that the notion of consciousness for Armstrong is introspective consciousness: a state is conscious in this sense if and only if the subject of the state is aware of being in it in the introspective way. But what is the introspective way? Armstrong himself offers a distinctive answer to this question. For him, the subject needs to be aware of the state in a perceptual way. It is for this reason that Armstrong holds an inner sense view of introspection. What is it for a person to be aware of something in a perceptual way? For Armstrong, to perceive something in general is to be disposed to form a certain belief about it. This is quite different from other theories of perception that tend to see perception as a state related to but distinct from belief. On relational views, for example, perception is a relation between a person and a physical object. And on contemporary representational views, even when they trace their origins to MTM, perception is often thought of as a state whose functional role is distinct from that of belief.9 In light of the fact the relevant notion of perception is so belief-like for Armstrong, one might suspect that the distinction between his own perceptual view of introspection and a non-perceptual view will not be worth drawing. But that is not true to Armstrong's rhetoric, 9 See Siegel 2016 and the references therein for some discussion on these distinctions between theories of perception. 11 which continually emphasizes the notion of inner sense. Nor is it true to the literature surrounding Armstrong's book (and indeed other literature on introspection), which often classifies his view as an inner sense view, and draws a distinction between it and other views. How then is the distinction to be drawn? The main suggestion here is due to Sydney Shoemaker (1996), who draws the distinction in terms of the following thesis, which he calls the impossibility of self-blindness. (1) Necessarily, if you are in a mental state M, and various background conditions obtain, and you are rational, you will believe you are in M. To illustrate the idea behind (1), take the mental state of being in extreme pain. If (1) is true of extreme pain, it is a necessary truth-using again the widest sense of necessity-that if you are in that state, and you are rational and various background conditions obtain, you will believe that you are in that state. What does Shoemaker mean by 'rationality' and what background conditions does he have in mind? By 'rationality' I take him to be talking about a property of an agent whose combinations of mental states at a time, and whose sequences of mental states over time, conform to the requirements of rationality, where these requirements are understood in a relatively well-known way: other things being equal, do not have overtly contradictory beliefs; other things being equal, believe the obvious consequences of your beliefs; other things being equal, desire to F if you believe that F is how to do G, and you desire to G; and so on. As regards background conditions, Shoemaker I think has in mind the following: (a) being psychologically capable of forming the belief that you are in pain, that is, understanding the proposition that you are in pain, and being able to believe it; (b) being such that it matters to you that you are in pain-sometimes you might be in pain and be psychologically capable of forming the belief, but it just doesn't matter to you that you are, for example, because you are too busy doing or thinking about other things; (c) having no counter-evidence (provided, for example, by testimony from a friend or a doctor). Putting all this together, it is plausible (whether or not it is ultimately correct) that (1) is true of extreme pain: necessarily, given these conditions, if you are in extreme pain you will believe that you are, so long as you are rational. While (1) is plausible in the case of extreme pain, it is not plausible in case of logically analogous conditions. Consider, for example, extreme debt. Even if counterparts of Shoemaker's background conditions hold, and you are rational, it does not follow that you 12 will believe you are in extreme debt if you are. You might be on your way to meet your accountant, for example, and have not yet heard the bad news. If so, (1) is not true of extreme debt. (Remember that (1) asserts that something is necessarily true, and 'necessity' here is to be understood, again, in the widest sense.) Extreme debt is not a psychological condition, but there are psychological states that behave more like it than like extreme pain. Consider the state of knowing when and how to contract 'want' and 'to' to 'wanna' in English. According to linguists, speakers of English know when and how to do this. They know it is appropriate, for example, in the sentence 'Who does Mary want to go to the game with?' but they will resist it in the (superficially similar but structurally different) sentence 'Who does Mary want to go to the game with her?' (The sentence 'Who does Mary wanna go to the game with?' is a normal part of speech, but 'Who does Mary wanna go to the game with her?' seems ungrammatical.)10 Presumably there is a rule that captures when and how speakers do this, a rule they both know and abide by. But it is not plausible that speakers of English know that they know this rule, nor is it plausible that they are able to attend to the rule or to formulate it in words. Likewise, it is not plausible that they can teach it to each other, since that would require knowing, attending to, and formulating the rule. (Third parties such as linguists may know the rule, of course, or at least may hope one day to figure it out; a classic paper is Lasnik and Maito 1984; see also Boeckx 2000) But suppose now you are an English speaker and thereby abide by the rule in question-call it R, whatever it is. It may be that you know R, that variations of Shoemaker's background conditions may obtain, and that you are rational, and yet you may nevertheless not believe that you know R-you may lack certain crucial pieces of evidence that you know to be relevant, for example. If so, (1) is not true of knowing rule R. How does the thesis of the impossibility of self-blindness-that is, (1)-serve to distinguish anti-perceptual theories from perceptual theories of introspection? Shoemaker's suggestion, I think, is that anti-perceptual theories entail that (1) is true with respect to a range of mental states, whereas perceptual theories entail it is false for all. In other words, perceptual theories want to say that there is a sense in which every psychological state behaves like extreme debt or knowing the rule of 'wanna'-contraction in English: we can 10 The main structural difference between these sentences might be brought out as follows. 'Who does Mary want to go to the game with?' has the form, 'Who is the x such that Mary wants to go to the game with x?' while, 'Who does Mary want to go to the game with her?' has the form, 'Who is the x such that Mary wants x to go to the game with her'. In the first case, Mary is the implicit subject of the infinitive 'to go to the game'; in the second, she isn't. 13 come to know about them alright, but from an epistemological point of view the way in which we do so is not different from the way in which we know many other things. Shoemaker motivates this suggestion in part by contrasting (1) with various stronger theses that Armstrong himself criticizes in chapter 6 of MTM. One such thesis is: (2) Necessarily, if you are in a mental state M, you will believe you are in M. If (2) is true of extreme pain, then, if you are in extreme pain you will believe that you are. Armstrong argues against this by pointing out that the realizer of extreme pain is modally distinct from the realizer of the belief that you are in extreme pain. Like many others I find this argument unpersuasive. Suppose S1 is physical state that is the realizer of extreme pain, and S2 is a physical state that is the realizer of believing that you are in extreme pain. It may be that S1 and S2 are modally distinct in the sense that it is possible that you are in S1 and not in S2. But it does not follow (even if it is true) that it is possible to be in extreme pain and not believe that you are. After all, it may be that, in the situation in which you are in S1 and not in S2, S1 is no longer the realizer of pain! Conclusion: that the realizers of various states are modally distinct does not entail that the realized states are modally distinct.11 Even if Armstrong's specific argument against (2) is unpersuasive, he is nevertheless right to reject it, even for the case of extreme pain. If (2) is true, any agent who is in extreme pain will believe that they are. But this is implausible: the cognitive requirements of being in pain and of believing that one is in pain are quite different, which strongly suggests that the first may be met without the second being met. If so, (2) is not true even in the case of extreme pain. But of course, even if (2) is false, it might be that a weaker thesis, such as (1), is true in that case. That is in fact Shoemaker's suggestion. In summary, it is plausible that Shoemaker has drawn a clear distinction between perceptual theories and non-perceptual theories of introspection. But now the problem that I want to identify for Armstrong's account of the biological function of consciousness emerges. For look again at Armstrong's second premise, P2. That premise says that if you engage in purposive mental activity, you will need to be conscious of the constituent states of that activity, at least in certain cases. The problem is that, on the face of it, Armstrong's purposive mental activity includes Shoemaker's rationality. When Armstrong talks, for example, of 11 The classic presentation of this point is the last few paragraphs of Lewis 1972; see also Shoemaker 1996. For some more recent discussion, see Stoljar 2018. 14 adjusting "mental behaviour to mental circumstances", it is hard to understand what he says, unless he is talking about rational chains of mental states, rational combinations of mental states unfolding over time. But this is precisely what Shoemaker has in mind when he talks of 'rationality'. However, if it is the case that such rational adjustment of mental behavior to mental circumstances requires consciousness, and if consciousness is just the belief that you are in the relevant state, then it would seem that according to Armstrong (1) is true of the purposes involved in mental activity: they are such that, if you are rational, and if various background conditions apply, you must believe that you have them if you do. But if (1) is true of purposes, then Armstrong stands revealed as holding a non-perceptual theory of introspection. Despite what he says, Armstrong is not an inner sense theorist, at least if we operate with Shoemaker's test for being an inner sense theorist. There are various ways that one might respond to this result. First, one might suggest that the distinction between perceptual and non-perceptual models is without foundation and that properly understood there is no opposition here: Armstrong wants to reject (2) or something like it, Shoemaker wants to reject (1) or something like it. However, while there is certainly some truth to this, it is hard to see it as an attractive response for Armstrong who as I have noted continually emphasizes the perceptual character of introspection. Second, one might suggest that what is really important to Armstrong in this part of his work is his well-known hypothesis of the self-scanner, that is, the idea that, as a matter of fact, there is a causal system instantiated the brain that reliably permits it to record its own states. However, while Armstrong certainly is committed to this, it is not all he is committed to. For by itself the existence of a self-scanner is consistent with a denial of a perceptual theory-at least if we operate with Shoemaker's account of the perceptual/non-perceptual distinction.12 But as we have seen, Armstrong repeatedly emphasizes that is own account is a perceptual one. Third, one might draw the distinction between perceptual and non-perceptual theories of introspection in a way different from Shoemaker. For example, one might argue that perceptual theories portray introspection as like perception, not on a representational theory of perception, but instead on a relational theory. However, even if this can be done, it is again unclear that it will help Armstrong. The reason this time is that it is probable that Armstrong 12 Indeed, as I read him Shoemaker makes this point himself in this discussion of Armstrong's broad perceptual model, particular when he separates what he calls the 'causal condition'-roughly the idea of a self-scanner- from the 'independence condition'-roughly the idea that self-blindness is possible; see Shoemaker 1996, 224. 15 will turn up on the wrong side of the divide. So once again we seem to confront the uncomfortable truth that Armstrong is not the perceptual theorist he claims to be. Finally, one might try to respond to the point by downplaying it, that is, by suggesting that purposive mental activity is an unusual phenomenon. I suspect this would be Armstrong's own response to the issue, but the problem with it is that purposive mental activity is not unusual. In fact, any sort of purposive activity at all will include purposive mental activity of some sort or another. However, this point will emerge more naturally when we turn to the second criticism of Armstrong's position that I want to develop. 5. Two Notions of Information Sensitivity We have seen that Armstrong's argument about the function of consciousness has a surprising side effect: its second premise entails that he does not hold an inner sense theory of introspection, at least on Shoemaker's understanding of what it is to hold such a theory. But of course, this point is merely ad hominem; it does not by itself say much about whether the premise is true. So that is question I want to consider now. As we saw earlier, the consideration Armstrong offers for P2 is that purposes are information-sensitive mental causes, and that information sensitivity requires consciousness. However, the problem with this line of thought is that there are two ways to interpret the notion of information-sensitivity, a first-order way and a second order way. To illustrate, consider again the desire to get a drink. On the first-order interpretation, this state is information sensitive just in case if you learn you have a drink, the desire to get a drink will go away, other things being equal-we may put by saying the state has first-order information sensitivity. On the second order interpretation, by contrast, the state is information sensitive just in case if you learn that you have a drink, and if you are introspectively aware of learning this, the desire will go away, other things being equal. Or consider a non-purposive state that is presumably also information sensitive, such as the belief that p. This state is first-order information sensitive (as we may say) just in case, if you learn that p is false, the belief that p will go away, other things being equal. By contrast, the state is second-order information sensitive just in case, if you learn that p is false, and if you are introspectively aware of learning this, the belief that p will go away, other things being equal. Once we have this distinction before us, however, the problem for P2 is straightforward. If we understand information sensitivity in the first-order way, P2 is false: it is not true that introspective consciousness is necessary for purposive mental activity, for one can engage in such activity without being aware of the relevant states. If we understand it in 16 the second-order way, however, then P2 is unjustified, since none of Armstrong's examples motivate the idea that mental states are information sensitive in this second-order way. In the case of mental arithmetic, for example, it is true that one's next step depends in an information sensitive way on the step before, but there does not need to be introspective consciousness at any point; on the contrary, in such a case one seems firmly focused on mathematical rather than psychological issues. The same thing is true in the case in which I imagine two routes to the Nag's Head. I might consider taking the first route, which leads past the Habit Wine Bar, and resolve after deliberation to take the longer route via Ross St. No introspection need occur here at all. It is true that there needs to be information sensitivity in the sense that the mental states will fall into a rational sequence, but nothing beyond that is required. Indeed, the point that nothing in these examples demonstrates the need for secondorder information sensitivity can be strengthened if we bring to the surface what seems to be a false presupposition in Armstrong's entire discussion of the distinction between mental and physical purposive activity. As we have noticed, Armstrong does not think that consciousness is necessary for physical purposive activity; it is only necessary for mental purposive activity. But this betrays a misunderstanding of this distinction. There are trains of purposive activity concerning many different things: mathematics, pubs, logicians, moustaches, and so on. Some issue in physical activity, some don't. But almost all of these involve mental activity of some sort, and none of them require the mental activity or the states that constitute this activity to be conscious. If not, there is no support here for P2. At certain points, Armstrong himself comes close to seeing the basic problem with his account. In response to his own discussion, for example, he points out that "[o]n occasion we can solve quite complex problems during sleep, or while our mind seems to be otherwise occupied. If this is possible, where is the need for awareness of our own mental state in purposive mental activity?" (1968, 164). That is a good question, but Armstrong's response is implausible. What he says is that in such cases we are aware, but not aware that we are aware. In other words, his claim is that in such cases we have a lack of third-order awareness but not a lack of second-order awareness. But while it is indeed plausible that in deep sleep we do not have third-order awareness, this does little to undermine the very plausible suggestion that we lack second-order awareness too.13 13 Might it be insisted on Armstrong's behalf that, since second-order awareness is part of the functional role of purposive mental activity, if you don't have awareness of that sort you don't have the activity in question? I 17 I have argued that P2 as Armstrong formulates it, and therefore his argument in general, is unpersuasive. Is it possible to adjust the premise so that it becomes more plausible? One possibility is to focus on the strength of the necessity claim in P2. Above I interpreted it widely, as involving all possible worlds. But one might try to interpret it more weakly. On this interpretation, P2 says not that consciousness is metaphysically necessary for purposive mental activity but only that it is empirically necessary for it. However, the problem with this proposal is that, if Armstrong's account is developed in this way, the speculative ('just-so') element in his position becomes extreme. Earlier I said that Armstrong's account was premised on the empirical assumption the mental activity had a function, noting that this was a reasonable assumption in the circumstances. But if his account is premised on the speculation that consciousness is required for mental activity to perform its function whatever it is, we lose the sense in which he has an answer to the question of the evolution of consciousness at all. A different possibility is to adjust the notion of 'purposive mental activity' so that what is intended is purposive conscious activity: a series of conscious states initiated and sustained by a purpose. However, the problem with this proposal is that while P2 is now plausible, P1 begs the question. From this point of view, Armstrong's P1 amounts to the claim that conscious mental activity has a function, and that is precisely the thing the argument aims to establish. 6. The McGinn-Shoemaker Argument In a certain sense the problem for Armstrong's account we have just been looking at was predictable from the beginning. As I noted above, the reason that people are interested in the evolution of consciousness is because of the apparent possibility that various mental states, events and process can occur without being conscious. What Armstrong is trying to do is rule out that possibility. His idea is that there is a particular sort of mental process that cannot go on without consciousness as a matter of necessity, namely, purposive mental activity. But the problem is that this does not seem to be true; we seem to be able to engage in purposive mental activity whether or not we are conscious in Armstrong's sense. For all Armstrong has said, therefore, the question asked again and again remains unanswered. think the problem with this suggestion is two-fold. First, it is hard to see it as attractive to Armstrong, who in general insists on the point that introspective awareness can come apart from first-order states. Second, it is not plausible on its own terms, since it remains the case that there is no justification for building this into the functional role of purposive mental activity in the way that he does. I am indebted here to David Braddon Mitchell. 18 At this point, various avenues are open to us. One is to leave Armstrong aside and focus for its own sake on what the function of consciousness is. It goes without saying that I am not going to attempt that here. Instead, let me close the discussion by bringing together the two critical points I have made about Armstrong's account: that it undermines his claim to be an inner sense theorist; and that it conflates two notions of information sensitivity. The connection between these points come into sharper relief if we compare Armstrong's discussion with a more contemporary issue in philosophy of introspection. The issue I have in mind returns us to Shoemaker's thesis of the impossibility of selfblindness, namely (1): necessarily, if you are in a mental state M, and various background conditions obtain, and you are rational, you will believe you are in M. As I noted Shoemaker argues for this thesis in various ways-partly on the basis of examples, and partly by comparing it with other stronger principles that are implausible. But he also presents an argument for the thesis that is striking in its similarity to Armstrong's discussion. The main idea of this argument, which is based on a suggestion due to Colin McGinn, is that in order to abide by principles of rationality it must be that one knows what belief states one is in (see McGinn 1982, 20, and Shoemaker 1996, 2009). Suppose that for purposes of illustration we focus on what might be called a 'no-contradiction rule'-viz., it is rationally required that if one believes p, one will not also believe not-p, other things being equal. Then we may present the argument as follows. (3) If you are rational you abide by rules such as the no-contradiction rule. (4) If you abide by rules such as the no-contradiction rule, you must know (and so believe) what belief states you are in. From these premises it is reasonable to infer that (1) is true of any state that falls within the purview of the no-contradiction rule, at least if the premises themselves are necessary. But the weakness in this argument is that (4) is unconvincing. If one abides by the nocontradiction rule, it is true that what belief states one is in need to be changed over time, revised, regulated and so on. However, it seems perfectly possible that such revision goes on, as Richard Moran puts it in an important critique of this line of thought, at a sub-personal level: "the purposes of belief-regulation do not require that the person get involved here at all" (Moran 2001, p. 110). Now, in response to Moran, Shoemaker has suggested that, while this might be true in some cases, it is not true in all: 19 But I think that in an important class of cases the revision and updating does require that that there be second-order beliefs about what the contents of the belief system are. These are cases in which the revision of the belief system requires an investigation on the part of the subject, one that involves conducting experiments, collecting data relevant to certain issues, or initiating reasoning aimed at answering certain questions. Such an investigation will be an intentional activity on the part of the subject, and one motivated in part by beliefs about the current contents of the belief system. These will include the belief that there are certain apparent inconsistencies or incoherencies in the system, the belief that there are gaps in how the system represents the world, and the realization that the system represents the existence of certain states of affairs for which it provides no explanation. (2009, p. 244). However, a version of Moran's objection applies here too. It is true that if one embarks on the sort of investigation Shoemaker describes it is irrational to believe the relevant proposition. But that implies only that a rational agent who undergoes this sort of investigation must somehow or other fail to believe that proposition-either they never did believe it at all, or else they will suspend belief in it for the course of the investigation. But this failure to believe is something that on the face of it could be brought about in the way Moran suggests, i.e. subpersonally. If so, there is no reason to accept Shoemaker's claim that this sort of investigation is motivated by beliefs about the current content of the belief system. No doubt there is more to say about the dispute between Shoemaker and Moran on that point. I will not discuss it further here, except to note that my sympathies are with Moran. My main point is to notice that Shoemaker's argument here is strikingly similar to Armstrong's and yet is used in the service of a non-perceptual theory rather than a perceptual one; further evidence, then, that the lines between these two are starting to blur. Likewise, the problem with Shoemaker's argument is extremely similar to the problem we isolated for Armstrong's. Moran himself says that the 'person need not get into the picture'. That's one way to put it. Another is that abiding by the no-contradiction rule requires first-order but not second-order informational sensitivity. If so, both Shoemaker's and Armstrong's position are mistaken and for the same reason. 7. Conclusion 20 Our overall discussion may now be summarized as follows. (i) Armstrong's just-so story about the function of consciousness is a revealing and under-noticed part of MTM. (ii) Its second premise, P2, undermines the distinction between perceptual and non-perceptual theories of introspection. (iii) P2 is false since it neglects the possibility of a first-order approach to information sensitivity. Finally, (iv) further support for the previous two points can be found by noticing that Armstrong's discussion is strikingly similar to Shoemaker's discussion. References Armstrong, D.M. 1968. A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London: Routledge. Armstrong, D.M. 1973. Belief, Truth and Knowledge, London: Routledge. Armstrong, D.M. (1980) The Nature of Mind and Other Essays, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Armstrong, David and Malcolm, Norman 1984: Consciousness and Causality: A Debate on the Nature of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell. Barron Andrew B. and Klein Colin 2016 "What insects can tell us about the origins of consciousness" PNAS May 3, 2016 113 (18) 4900–4908; first published April 18, 2016 Block, Ned. 1997. "On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness." In The Nature of Consciousness, edited by N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Guzeldere. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Boeckx, Cedric 2000 'A Note on Contraction', Linguistic Inquiry 31: 357–366 Godfrey-Smith, P 2017 Other Minds: The Octopus, the Sea and the Deep Origins of Consciousness. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2016, and Harper-Collins UK, 2017. Godfrey-Smith, P 2019 'Evolving Across the Explanatory Gap' Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology (2019) 11:1. Gould, S. J., and R. C. Lewontin, 1979. "The spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian paradigm: a critique of the adaptationist programme," Proceedings of the Royal Society London, Series B, 205: 581–598. Lasnik, H. and M. Saito 1984 'On the nature of proper government', Linguistic Inquiry 15, pp. 235–289 LeDoux, Joseph 2019 The Deep History of Ourselves Penguin Lewis, D. 1972. 'Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications' Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50: 249–258, repr. in his Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology 21 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 248–261. All references are to the reprinted version. Lycan, William G. 1996: Consciousness and Experience Cambridge MA: MIT Press. Lycan, William G and Ryder, Zena 2003 'The Loneliness of the Long-distance Truck Driver' Analysis Vol. 63, No. 2 (Apr., 2003), pp. 132–136 . McGinn, Colin. 1982. The Character of Mind Oxford: Oxford University Press Mercier H and Sperber D 2017 The Enigma of Reason: A New Theory of Human Understanding Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP. Moran, Richard. 2001 Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Orzack, S.H. and Forber, P, 2017 'Adaptationism', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/adaptationism/ Pautz, A. and Stoljar, D. (2019) Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block's Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness Cambridge MA: MIT Press. Polger, Thomas 2017 'Rethinking the Evolution of Consciousness', in Susan Schneider and Max Velmans (eds) The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, 2nd edn., Oxford: Blackwell, 77–92. Polger, Thomas W., and Owen J. Flanagan. (2002) 'Consciousness, Adaptation and Epiphenomenalism'. In James H. Fetzer (ed.) Consciousness Evolving (Amsterdam: John Benjamins), 21–42. Robinson, Zach, Maley, Corey.J and Piccinni, Gualtiero (2015) 'Is Consciousness a Spandrel?', Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 1: 365–383. Rosenthal, David. (2008) 'Consciousness and its function' Neuropsychologia 46: 829–40 Siegel, Susanna, "The Contents of Perception", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/perception-contents/>. Shoemaker, Sydney (2009) 'Self Intimation and Second Order Belief', Erkenntnis 71: 35–51. Reprinted in Smithies, D. and Stoljar, D. (eds) 2012 Consciousness and Introspection New York: Oxford University Press pp 239–257. References are to the reprinted version. Shoemaker, Sydney. 1996. The First Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stoljar, D. 2018 'Introspection and Necessity', Nous, 52: 389–410

LA DE MOCRACIA DE ARISTÓTELES Enrique Morata Senar 1 COMENTARIO DE "LA POLÍTICA " de Aristóteles 1263 b - El egoísmo no consiste en amarse sino en amarse más de lo debido. Se puede ser moderadamente egoísta para poseer bienes propios privados y gracias a poseer estos bienes privados se puede luego practicar la generosidad en la ciudad . En una ciudad comunista donde todo estuviera unificado, los ciudadanos no poseerían bienes propios y no podrían practicar la generosidad. En el comunismo no se puede ser generoso porque todo es común entre todos los ciudadanos. Los bienes en la ciudad tienen que ser en parte privados y en parte comunes , son privados porque están en manos de cada ciudadano pero son comunes cuando cada ciudadano practica la virtud de la generosidad para con los otros ciudadanos. Al afirmar este punto, Aristóteles está observando un comportamiento que se da en todo el universo, tanto en los seres vivos como en las fuerzas físicas y quimicas: todos los seres mantienen un margen de egoísmo para procurar por su bien pero también comparten parte de sus propiedades , para que sean posibles el comercio, la relación y los intercambios. La ciudad debe tener una unidad pero no en exceso, porque entonces deja de darse una multiplicidad de individuos en ella, como hay en una sinfonía una multiplicidad de instrumentos y de sonidos, para NO reducir la ciudad y la música a ser una melodía que suena siempre igual . La ciudad debe ser múltiple en tipos distintos de ciudadanos pero a la vez debe aspirar a tener una unidad, y esta unificación se logra mediante la educación ( no olvidemos que Aristóteles cree que cada régimen politico debe adoctrinar a los ciudadanos mediante la educación para que ese régimen político pueda mantenerse ) . El problema platónico de la unidad contra la multiplicidad es resuelto por Aristóteles con esta fórmula donde en la ciudad debe darse tanto la multiplicidad como la unidad ( pues una ciudad sin unidad no tiene una dirección y no avanza en sus logros sociales y una ciudad demasiado llena de ciudadanos extranjeros se disuelve en las luchas por el poder de cada grupo étnico y en sus incompatibilidades raciales). 1265 a Igualar las propiedades y controlar la población, o traduciéndolo al lenguaje cósmico, igualar las partes de los seres y controlar su crecimiento , estos dos parámetros deben mantenerse iguales para la felicidad de la ciudad , deben existir siempre las mismas casas y los mismos habitantes aunque vayan pasando las generaciones. 1265 b - Menciona el sistema político que es una mezcla de democracia y de oligarquía, de donde se supone que los fundadores de los Estados Unidos sacaron la inspiración para su sistema politico. O bien el sistema político que es una mezcla de oligarquía , de monarquía y democracia. Menciona "las Leyes " de Platón donde se dice que el mejor régimen es una mezcla de democracia y de tiranía, donde los magistrados surgen de entre los más ricos , que se sienten obligados a servir a la ciudad y que primero son elegidos pero luego son sorteados entre los elegidos para sus cargos. Aristóteles ya habla de que la clase más baja no tiene interés en votar y por ello las clases alta y media son las que proporcionan más magistrados y más votos. 1266 b Faleas de Calcedonia creía que se podía lograr la igualdad en una ciudad si los ricos regalaban una parte de su riqueza a los pobres. El mayor peligro para la ciudad es que los ricos tengan muchos hijos empobrecidos,porque de allí surgen los revolucionarios. Solón prohibió adquirir tierra ilimitadamente, cada persona debía comprar solamene la tierra que pudiera cultivar. Entre los locrios estaba prohibido vender la tierra de tu propiedad , a menos que se tratara por una gran desgracia que precisara de dinero rápido. En una ciudad igualitaria, si hay demasiada riqueza la gente degenera en la molicie pero si la ciudad es pobre, degenera en la miseria. Por eso Aristóteles pide un término medio en la riqueza que deba tener una ciudad igualitaria. Pero Aristóteles cree que lo que se tienen que igualar no son las propiedades y las riquezas sino las ambiciones y que esto solamente se puede conseguir con la educación. La educación debe ser realmente igualitaria, la misma para todos, pero no lo es la educación que sigue produciendo algunos hombres ambiciosos, unos de riqueza y otros de honores . Las revueltas no solamente llegan por la desigualdad en las riquezas sino también por la desigualdad en los honores . 1267 a Los ciudadanos que se saben más dotados, se revuelven porque se ven obligados a ser iguales que los demás , cuando aspiran a tener más cargos y honores que los otros o ven que en una ciudad igualitaria, hay algunos que tienen más honores que los demás y los envidian. Los hombres delinquen cuando sus necesidades básicas ya están cubiertas, por satisfacer sus deseos y gozar , pues se aficionan a disfrutar de los placeres y a no sufrir dolor. El remedio para estos excesos es tener una propiedad y estar ocupado en trabajarla y en cultivar la templanza. Los filósofos ya tienen cubiertas sus necesidades porque gozan con sí mismos y no dependen de nadie más para alcanzar placeres ( se refiere a que el filósofo es feliz pensando y filosofando) . Los hombres se hacen tiranos porque sufren grandes apetitos. En asuntos militares, la defensa de la ciudad debe estar dispuesta de modo que al invasor le resulte muy caro en dinero y vidas su ataque ( aquí Aristóteles también relaciona un fenómeno cósmico con un fenómeno humnano, en todos los hechos del universo existe un mecanismo de defensa por el cual a un atacante o elemento activo puede que no le resulte interesante empezar un ataque o bien puede que le resulte muy beneficioso porque el otro elemento pasivo es muy débil, es la dialéctica entre fuerte y débil que observamos por todo el universo ). Los ciudadanos más dotados en inteligencia, talento , fuerza u otra excelencia siempre consideran injusto que otros ciudadanos sin esas excelencias consigan lo mismo que consiguen ellos, en nombre de una igualación. Este tipo de ciudadano excesivo siempre se pone del lado de los revoltosos . Lo mismo ocurre en el universo entre los seres que tienen más potencia o más energía que siempre tienden a romper un estado de igualación en el universo . 1267 b La ambición de los hombres es insaciable, infinita , ilimitada ( y divina por lo tanto). Siempre quieren más de todo, sea dinero, derechos , libertades, placeres. La vida humana consiste en la búsqueda de la satisfacción de esta ambición ilimitada, y los hombres aceptan en algún momento de su vida una satisfacción aceptable de todo lo que ambicionaban en la vida. Dios es la ambición infinita , el hombre participa de esa misma ambición pero no puede satisfacerla nunca, así que tarde o temprano tiene que conformarse con los logros que haya conseguido en su vida. 1268 a En el modelo de ciudad de Hipódamo , los mlitares esclavizan a los que no tienen armas, y de entre los militares, los que tienen las armas más pesadas. Los que inventen algo útil para la ciudad deben recibir honores por ello. En la ciudad , hay un delicado equilibrio dentro de la misma clase dominante, pues los que tienen las armas además quieren participar en el gobierno, en caso contrario pierden su interés por los asuntos de la ciudad. La ciudad de Hipódamo es una ciudad de diseño y algo extravagante como el mismo Hipódamo, un personaje al que le gustaba llamar la atención con su ropa. La ciudad de Hipódamo es una ciudad de decorados curiosos como la misma ropa de Hipódamo. 1269 aAhora Aristóteles estudia si hay que mantener las tradiciones, tanto en las leyes como en los otros asuntos de la vida, por ejemplo en el arte , en la medicina, en la gimnasia. Cree que lo tradicional es antiguo y demasiado simple, vulgar , necio e incluso bárbaro, pues así eran los hombres antiguos. Dice que no hay que mantener lo tradicional por sí mismo sino que hay que buscar lo más bueno aunque no sea una tradición. La escritura se muestra insuficiente para poner por escrito todos los detalles de las leyes y su aplicación en muchos asuntos particulares, y lo mismo ocurre en las otras artes cuyas técnicas y procesos no pueden ponerse totalmente por escrito. Por ello no hay que aferrarse a los textos clásicos o antiguos de una manera fanática porque en esos escritos es imposible que consten todos los casos . Si se cambian mucho las leyes, la gente se acostumbra a desobedecerlas. Y no es lo mismo la técnica de un arte, que tiene fuerza por sí misma porque funciona siglo tras siglo, que una ley que no tiene fuerza por sí misma excepto por el paso de muchos años y la costumbre. 1269 b Los esclavos siempre son problemáticos, si pasan miseria se sublevan y si se les da dinero y propiedaes, piden más hasta tener tanto como los ricos. ¿ Este fenómeno se observa también en el universo ? Las mujeres, si son esclavas de los hombres , viven sin leyes y caen en el libertinaje y la molicie. Y las mujeres acabaman dominando a los hombres y promoviendo un estilo de vida lujoso y desmedido , que a su vez estimula a que los hombres de esas ciudades sean belicosos y mlitaristas para conseguir las riquezas que reclaman sus mujeres. Esto no ocurre, dice Aristóteles, entre los celtas que practican la homosexualidad. Dice Aristóteles que los guerreros, sean homosexuales o heterosexuales, son propensos a la actividad sexual y este es el significado del mito de Ares y Afrodita. Pero si las mujeres dominan a los hombres , se pierde la facultad de la audacia, que las mujeres no poseen , no sirven y hacen más daño que los enemigos con la confusión que esparcen. Además, las mujeres heredan más que los hombres y como consecuencia de ello, gran parte de las tierras de la ciudad están en manos de mujeres. N o puede ser una ciudad donde cada parte de su población está descontenta y en guerra contra las otras partes, donde una parte de la población vive en la relajación y otra parte vive en un estilo de vida muy duro e incluso insoportable , las medidas draconianas no pueden ser seguidas mucho tiempo porque incluso los más fuertes se escapan a escondidas para gozar de los placeres prohibidos por la ley. 1271 a Los ancianos no deben tener excesivo poder porque a pesar de haber acumulado a lo largo de su vida muchos conocimientos, su cuerpo y su mente son viejos y defectuosos. Además se dejan sobornar y son aficionados a favoritismos y no aceptan formar parte de consejos de ancianos si no ven que se les van a dar honores. Los ancianos deben ser controlados y deben rendir cuentas. Aristóteles cree que es mejor elegir un rey de entre los mejores hombres, sin que su hijo herede el cargo. Pero ni siquiera el mejor hombre del ciudad es digno de la confianza del pueblo como rey y se le debe controlar mediante asesores enemigos suyos y mediante otros reyes que estén enfrentados con él. El límite tradicional que diferencia un ciudadano de un don nadie es si tiene dinero suficiente para pagar su contribución a la ciudad. Los reyes son como generales vitalicios y los generales son como reyes. Los lacedemonios estaban entrenados para vivir en una guerra perpetua pero en tiempo de paz no sabían hacer nada . 1272 b en Creta, la homosexualidad estaba promovida para evitar que la gente tuviera demasiados hijos. En Creta, los cargos o "kosmoi" se eligen de entre los mejores linajes y luego los ancianos del consejo se eligen de entre los "kosmoi" envejecidos. A pesar de no tener control sobre los "kosmoi", el pueblo cretense estaba en calma y quizás era porque Creta era una isla y los enemigos que pudieran sobornar a los "kosmoi" estaban lejos y los extranjeros se podían expulsar fácilmente. Sim embargo, Creta no estaba libre de tumultos, a veces se expulsaba a los "kosmoi" de sus cargos y otras veces renunciaban ellos mismos. Aristóteles da la culpa a la debilidad de las leyes cretenses, sustituidas muchas veces por decisiones de las personas , por lo que no se puede decir que los cretenses posean una Constitución y dependen de las invasiones de extranjeros para que se pongan en evidencia las deficiencias de sus leyes. El caso de Creta es el de un organismo aislado que se beneficia de esa condición de alejamiento respecto a sus enemigos y que no se molesta en desarrollar una constitución firme sino que improvisa leyes y decisiones , hasta que un ataque de un enemigo le hace ver sus defectos. Los cartagineses tienen un consejo de 104 elegidos entre los mejores hombres, y sus reyes y consejos de ancianos se eligen tambien de entre los mejores. 1273 a Una mezcla de democracia para el pueblo y de oligarquía para la aristocracia era Cartago, una oligarquía en la clase dirigente que se elegía entre los miembros de ella misma, que tenían que ser los mejores y además los más ricos. Las leyes cartaginesas daban más honor al dinero que a ninguna otra cosa y toda la ciudad iba tras el dinero. La clase dirigente da el modelo de actuación al resto de la población pero pierde su condición de aristocracia o mejores hombres , al referirse al dinero y no a la virtud como su supremo valor. Los gobernantes aspiran a enriquecerse en su puesto y controlan al pueblo obligándolo a emigrar periódicamente a alguna de las colonias cartaginesas. 1274 a Solon estableció una democracia donde los mejores hombres tuvieran un poder , el de las magistraturas elegidas, y los más ricos tuvieran también poder como consejo y el pueblo tuviera una parcela de poder al formar parte de los tribunales. 1276 b La ciudad puede ir perdiendo sus ciudadanos y ganando otros, por las defunciones y los nacimientos , como el agua en los ríos , con los ríos siempre iguales pero el caudal del agua aumentando o disminuyendo según los años. O bien se puede decir que la ciudad cambia constantemente pero los hombres siempre son los mismos aunque mueran y nazcan otra vez. La ciudad es distinta cuando cambia su régimen político aunque la población siga siendo la misma, como son los mismos los actores aunque ahora interpreten una comedia y antes estuvieran actuando en una tragedia. Si en una ciudad se mantiene el mismo régimen político aunque la población cambie, la ciudad dice que es la misma. Cualquier compuesto en el universo es diferente cuando es diferente su composición aunque siga poseyendo los mismos elementos . Una melodía puede tener los mismos sonidos pero pertenece a una escala o a otra . Podemos encontrar muchos fenómenos en el universo donde se da este mismo proceso entre unas partes que cambian y un todo que se mantiene igual, con su constitución propia. Los hombres se mueren, la ciudad permanece. Es una prueba para Aristóteles de que la ciudad o estado es un ser vivo que tiene una función en el universo. 1277 a Aristóteles se pregunta si es imposible conseguir que todos los hombres de la ciudad sean iguales en bondad. Cree que esto es imposible porque la ciudad está llena de tipos humanos de toda clase. La ciudad se compone de elementos desiguales, como todos los cuerpo del universo ( el mismo hombre formado de alma y cuerpo, el alma formada de instinto y razón, la famila compuesta de padre y madre donde el hombre adquiere y la mujer conserva , cualquier ser vivo está compuesto de elementos iguales y de elementos desiguales) . Cada régimen tiene su virtud y la virtud del bueno perfecto no puede darse en ningún régimen politico porque todos ellos están llenos de gente de muchas clases distintas que siguen su propio concepto de virtud. El bueno perfecto solo lo puede ser fuera de la ciudad, que por definición es una mezcla y un negociado de muchas partes distintas, cada una de ellas con su virtud. En una ciudad se da un toma y daca entre todos los ciudadanos por el cual cada ciudadano manda y a su vez acepta ser mandado por otro, según la situación. Aristóteles llega a decir que el ciudadano es virtuoso en cuanto que se deja mandar y manda a su vez a otros. Además todo ciudadano cuando quiere aprender algo, necesita dejarse mandar para aprenderlo. 1277 b los artesanos no fueron considerados ciudadanos y no podían accedir a los cargos publicos, hasta que llegó la democracia extrema. El que gobierna es como el flautista que toca las flautas que son los gobernados y para tocarlas bien necesita tener opiniones verdaderas. 1278 a no son ciudadanos los individuos que no son necesarios para que exista la ciudad, por ejemplo los niños , que son ciudadanos incompletos hasta que crecen. Lo mismo se puede decir de los inmigrantes que todavía no se han integrado en la ciudad. 1279 a La belleza surge en la ciudad cuando la vida de los ciudadanos es dulce, sin dificultades , cuando se vive por amor a la misma vida y es lo que hacen también los ciudadanos que sufren padecimientos porque a pesar de ello quieren seguir viviendo pues en el mismo vivir hay una belleza. Una ciudad bella es una ciudad donde todos sus elementos y todas sus partes, diferentes como son, crean una armonía en la ciudad que se traduce en su riqueza y en su bienestar, así como en la música los distintos instrumentos, graves y agudos, suaves y rudos, de metal o de cuerda, consiguen crear una armonía . Hay varios tipos de poder: el poder del señor sobre el esclavo , que dura mientras vive el esclavo; el poder del piloto o del maestro de gimnasia sobre sus dependientes donde el piloto y el maestro de gimnasia también participan de sus actos de poder porque el piloto va en el mismo barco y el maestro de gimnasia también practica la gimnasia. Otro tipo de poder es el que ejerce un magistrado elegido por un sorteo. Este magistrado procura cumplir bien su trabajo como lo hicieron los magistrados anteriores también elegidos por sorteo . Pero este tipo de poder degenera cuando los magistrados intentan perpetuarse en el poder aun cuando son ya viejos y enfermos. Cuando persiguen con ansiedad esos cargos se comportan también como si estuvieran enfermos. Los gobernantes que solo procuran por su bien particular simbolizan al árbol que ha crecido desviado. Cuando una minoría intenta imponer su tiranía, como ocurre con los independentistas catalanes, se trata de una desviación respecto al régimen modélico recto. El gobierno aristocrático es también entendido por Aristóteles como el gobierno de quienes quieren lo mejor para la ciudad ( por lo tanto hay regímenes que no quieren lo mejor para la ciudad y que son enemigos de los aristócratas bien intencionados , no tanto por ser aristócratas sino por creer que deseando lo mejor para la ciudad todos sus problemas ya se van a resolver, así lo vemos tantas veces en partidos de izquierdas o de la chusma que se oponen a gobiernos aristocráticos no tanto por ser aristócratas sus miembros sino por creer éstos que con procurar por lo mejor para la ciudad ya estaba todo solucionado, mientras que estos tipos de izquierdas o de la chusma no quieren reducir la vida a un mero asunto de técnicos que resuelven los problemas de la ciudad buscando las mejores soluciones, sino que quieren que la vida en una ciudad sea una lucha política bronca y siempre llena de crispación, como hemos visto en España desde la Transición hasta la actualidad . Por ello problemas en la ciudad que se podrían resolver fácilmente con buena voluntad, no se resuelven nunca o se eternizan sin solución porque una parte de la población no cree que la vida deba ser un gobierno de tecnócratas bien intencionados que buscan lo mejor para la ciudad ). En un régimen donde la mayoría gobierna, como en una república, también es difícil que todos los ciudadanos sean iguales y piensen lo mismo, es decir, que todos los ciudadanos sean virtuosos, excepto los militares, porque la masa suministra los efectivos para el ejército y los militares son virtuosos en el sentido de que son eficaces en su trabajo, y tienen las armas , por eso dice Aristóteles que los militares son el sector más poderoso en las repúblicas. La masa no es virtuosa excepto en la guerra, excepto cuando sirve como soldados y por eso los militares son mayoría en las repúblicas. La república degenera en una democracia y se desvía del régimen recto , cuando el interés de todos es sustituido por el interés de los pobres, que controlan el gobierno . 1279 b Aristóteles se encuentra con una dificultad. ¿ Existen los regímenes en que la mayoría de la población es rica o donde la población es pobre y minoritaria pero detenta el poder ? Del primer tipo podríamos mencionar esos países riquisimos gracias al petróleo que existen en nuestro tiempo. 1280 a En este universo, todos los seres tienen libertad pero solo unos pocos son ricos , de este hecho surgen todos los conflictos por el poder , según Aristóteles. El concepto de justicia pura no coincide con el concepto de justicia que se tiene en una oligarquía o en una democracia. En una democracia, se considera que lo justo es lo que conviene a los que son iguales mientras que en una oligarquía se considera que es justo lo que hace desiguales a los desiguales. Ni la democracia ni la oligarquía están interesadas en un concepto absoluto de justicia. Igualdad es justicia en una democracia e injusticia en una oligarquía. La mayoría de los hombres juzga sobre qué es lo justo atendiendo a su interés propio y así está dispuesto a aceptar que las cosas puedan ser iguales para todos pero no acepta que todos sean iguales. Los ricos se saben desiguales respecto a los que son pobres mientras que los demócratas se saben que son todos iguales en libertad. Se supone que en el universo también se da este juego entre ricos contra libres , entre unos que tienen mucha libertad y otros que tienen mucha riqueza. Los oligarcas consideran que no es justo que quien aporta poco a la ciudad se beneficie mucho de ella, especialmente si ven que ese aprovechado busca vivir bien a costa de la ciudad, y que no lo hace porque quiera vivir solo ( es decir, en la austeridad) o porque tenga una gran necesidad por estar en peligro su vida o para comerciar o hacer transacciones y para la relación económica de utilidad . 1280 b Los etruscos y los cartaginenses , como grandes comerciantes , serían justos en ese caso porque además se dotaban de pactos de no agresión entre ellos y es como si ellos pertenecieran a una misma ciudad, una ciudad internacional de mercaderes. Aristóteles acepta que estos tratados existan entre ciudades como alianzas para facilitar el comercio y que las leyes en este tipo de tratados no son más que pactos de no agresión para proteger los derechos de cada parte en esta alianza de ciudades, pero Aristóteles no admite que una ciudad pueda llegar a ser justa y virtuosa con este tipo de alianzas y pactos entre sus distintas partes de ciudadanos. Aristóteles exige que las leyes de una ciudad hagan buenos y justos a los ciudadanos y no los conviertan solamente en mercaderes. Es posible unir ciudades alejadas para formar un nuevo país, y unir a todos sus ciudadanos por matrimonios pero no se conseguirá de esta manera que una ciudad sea buena y virtuosa. Tampoco acepta una ciudad donde los distintos ciudadanos coexistan mediante pactos de no agresión para no perjudicarse a sí mismos, con libertad de comercio y para darse ayuda mutua , sin otro asunto para el que relacionarse. Una ciudad perfecta debe estar unida por la amistad de todos sus ciudadanos, para el vivir bien y en la autosuficiencia . El Estado del Bienestar ya existía en la Grecia antigua pues Aristóteles dice que en todos los regímenes políticos se considera que lo más importante y lo primero es que la ciudadanía tenga comida. Deben haber ejemplos de comunidades perfectas como quiere Aristóteles en el universo, ya sean de corales o de pólipos o de astros . En una ciudad así, no solo se existe en común sino que se vive para hacer acciones buenas. No es un mero agregado de materia como hay tantos por el universo, es creador de actos buenos. Los ciudadanos más importantes de la ciudad son los que contribuyen más a ella, independientemente de si son de clase alta o ricos o de clase baja y pobres , o de si son más o menos virtuosos o más o menos libres. 1281 a En una ciudad podría mandar cualquiera, el mejor, el más rico, el más guapo, el más alto, el primero que pasara por la calle, el más brutal y criminal, o la masa . La extrema injusticia es que los pobres roben su dinero a los ricos porque los que son más se reparten lo que tienen los que son menos y destruyen la dinámica de la ciudad en el proceso. La masa es una tirana que impone su fuerza , cuando se comporta así. Los ricos tampoco deben acaparar todo el dinero . Si mandan los más dotados, el resto de la población nunca podrá mandar ni participar en la ciudad porque siempre mandarán los más dotados. Y si manda solo uno de los dotados, todavía será peor porque menos ciudadanos todavía podrán acceder alguna vez a un cargo en la ciudad ya que todos los ocupa el más dotado. Y la misma ley se puede convertir en una tirana cuando se comporta como el ciudadano más dotado, que siempre manda segun lo que a él le conviene y según sus pasiones humanas. Cuando una ley es elegida solamente por ser la mejor ( la más dotada) entonces fácimente degenera en una imposición sobre la población , imponiendo su voluntad según sus propias pasiones de esta ley y su alma ( es decir, según los intereses de los legisladores que impusieron esa ley y los legisladores podían ser o demócratas o oligárquicos , todos ellos con sus defectos humanos que proyectan en sus leyes ). 1281 b El gobierno de muchos mediocres puede que resulte en una mayoría de buenos por la unión de muchos mediocres, pues al ser muchos cada uno aporta un poco de virtud, y la masa se convierte en un hombre de muchos pies, de muchas manos y de muchas ideas , de muchos sentidos, caracteres e inteligencias ( de donde viene el modelo de estado como un cuerpo donde cada miembro y órgano está formado por una parte de la pobalción, cada uno con su función propia en ese cuerpo y que encontramos tanto en Hobbes como en los teóricos políticos musulmanes ). Por eso , dice Aristóteles , la masa juzga mejor a la música y el teatro, porque cada parte de la masa se fija en una parte de la obra y al final toda la masa dedice un juicio sobre la totalidad de la obra . Pero Aristóteles advierte que la masa no es capaz de juzgar qué es lo bello y artístico, porque para eso se necesita ser un ciudadano instruido que es como muchos hombres a la vez, y que puede ver muchas partes de la obra . La masa muchas veces admira obras que no son ni bellas ni artísticas. Cada miembro de la masa juzga la obra según su propio cuerpo y mente, así uno verá el ojo de la pintura como más bello o más feo que el suyo propio y otro miembro de la masa verá cualquier otra parte de la pintura de una manera u otra al compararla con él mismo o con su manera de ser o de escribir teatro o música. Pero el hombre instruido que es como varios hombres a la vez, no juzga al comparar la obra consigo mismo, sino que lo hace de una manera mas amplia , pues cada parte de este hombre juzga una parte de la obra y al final su juicio es como el juicio de varias personas y por eso puede decidir qué es bello y que és artístico, mientras que cada miembro de la masa no puede saberlo al referir la obra a sí mismo, a su cuerpo o a su mente y a sus experiencias en ese campo. El mejor hombre es el que tiene mas "hombres " dentro de él, el que puede juzgar y percibir de más maneras distintas y , por ello , el que posee más información diferente sobre los hechos y desde más puntos de vista. Aristóteles se pregunta si la misma esencia de la ciudad no es la dialéctica entre la masa contra los selectos, y supone que en todos los seres vivos, en las fieras, se da la misma lucha de contrarios entre una masa y unos selectos, y de paso menciona que hay ciudadanos que no se distinguen de las fieras... Aristóteles se pregunta luego qué hay que hacer con la chusma, una pregunta eterna de todo político hasta el día de hoy, como sabemos si se la instruye , se vuelve engreída con sus nuevos adquiridos conocimientos y titulaciones universitarias, y se pelea sin piedad contra los otros miembros de la chusma para conseguir un puesto de trabajo ahora que tiene una formación universitaria, que es lo que estamos viviendo ahora mismo en España con la enorme cantidad de licenciados y doctores que hay ahora en el país, Aristóteles acepta que la chusma sea libre pero no cree que sea virtuosa ni rica y se debe decidir qué puede hacer la chusma en la ciudad: si no puede acceder a puestos en la ciudad, sin opciones ni oportunidades ( como les pasa a cientos de miles de actuales españoles con titulaciones que no pueden conseguir más que trabajos mal pagados sin relación con sus estudios) , entonces esa chusma se vuelve enemiga de la ciudad y dispuesta a cualquier revuelta. Pero si se deja participar a la chusma en los asuntos de la ciudad, siempre los miembros de la chusma cometen errores, injusticias y corrupciones por su misma falta de virtud, que es también lo que hemos vivido en España en estos 38 años de democracia donde una cantidad enorme de ineptos procedentes de la chusma han accedido a cargos de poder o a puestos donde se administraba mucho dinero ... y se han corrompido. Aristóteles dice que para tener controlada a la chusma, hay que dejar que al menos participe en las deliberaciones y en los juicios ( en nuestra época, se deja que la chusma opine lo que quiera en internet y en televisión y se desahogue, aunque lo que diga no importe a nadie ). Solon dejaba a la chusma que participara en grupos en las elecciones como vigilantes pero no dejaba que ningún miembro de la chusma tuviera poder individualmente. Cada miembro de la chusma es imperfecto por separado y juzga mal, pero mezclado con los buenos hace una mezcla más aceptable . Estos métodos de mezclar la chusma con los buenos y de no darla poder , se han aplicado miles de veces desde hace siglos para tener controlada a la chusma. 1282 a Todos los que son iguales deben rendir cuentas de sus actos con sus iguales. Así el médico con los otros médicos . Pero hay curanderos y hay médicos , como en la chusma hay gente con más conocimiento y gente con menos. Hay quienes piensan, como Jorge Luis Borges, que las personas sin instrucción no deberían votar en las elecciones y solamente podrían hacerlo los expertos. Pero Aristóteles observa que a veces es mejor el juicio de alguien que no es experto, por ejemplo es mejor la opinión del piloto del barco que la del carpintero que ha construido el barco, o la del inquilino de la casa que la del constructor de la casa o el invitado a un banquete que el cocinero del banquete. Cree que el conjunto de la chusma es mejor juez que una sola persona. Pero duda que los mediocres deban decidir sobre los grandes asuntos de la ciudad, como su hacienda. Cree que los ricos deben decidir sobre estos asuntos por conocer el asunto de manejar grandes sumas de dinero. Pero como la masa forma parte de los tribunales, de las asambleas y de los consejos, la suma del dinero de todos los miembros de la masa supone una cantidad de dinero mucho mayor que la que pueda presentar un rico de la ciudad. Todos estos conceptos los podemos encontrar detrás de la invención de los bancos, las sociedades anónimas, la bolsa y las cajas de ahorros, por lo que podemos decir que el sistema cpaitalista de Adam Smith es un desarrollo de ideas de Aristóteles sobre el poder de la masa. Y, en esto también , en el universo encontramos agrupaciones de "masas" que son más poderosas que seres individuales . Cada régimen político posee sus leyes propias y estas leyes serán justas si el régimen politico es recto y serán injustas si el régimen es desviado. Lo justo es el bien común y es el mejor fin para la ciudad y para la actividad politica. Nada que ver con lo justo en sí de Platón que no se refiere a un bien común en este mundo sino a una idea inteligible de bien puro que debe ser el modelo de actuación para los hombres de este mundo. Aristóteles es ya un utilitarista, pues quiere que lo justo sea lo que beneficia a la mayoría de los ciudadanos, y a eso lo llama el bien común. Pero qué ocurre cuando en una ciudad todos son iguales pero se distribuyen los cargos según alguna diferencia entre cada ciudadano, como su estatura, el color de su piel o cualquier otra característica suya. Entre los músicos , es mejor músico no el que venga de familia de músicos o de familia rica y noble sino el que toque mejor, aunque venga de mala familia y sea feo. Y a este músico que toca mejor hay que darle las mejores flautas. 1283 a Aristóteles no acepta que algunas excelencias sean iguales que otras: no es lo mismo ser más alto que ser más rico o ser más libre. Tampoco si uno es más rápido o más lento, porque esto se deja para las competiciones atléticas. La política no es un deporte donde se juzgan diferencias superficiales entre los hombres, como quién es más fuerte o menos. En la política se juzga quién es más rico, quién es más digno y quién es más libre. Aristóteles no cree que pueda existir una ciudad de pobres o de esclavos. En los regímenes políticos desviados, gobiernan los que son iguales entre sí pero con una ligera diferencia por parte de los gobernantes respecto a los demás , o bien gobiernan entre los que son desiguales entre sí , aquellos que son desiguales con una superioridad , a pesar de que estas desigualdades sean mínimas. El más rico siempre reclamará ser el gobernante y lo mismo harán los más nobles o los más libres ( por ejemplo los filósofos , en cuanto que son los hombres más libres por sus conocimientos). Y la masa tambien reclama el poder, por ser en su conjunto más fuerte que ningun ciudadano. Y en ocasiones la masa es más rica y más virtuosa , aunque esté compuesta de mediocres. Ciudadano es quien manda y se deja mandar, en una cadena de mandos que constituyen la esencia de la ciudad y las relaciones que se dan dentro de ella. El mejor régimen es aquel donde cada ciudadano ha elegido libremente mandar y ser mandado, de acuerdo con la virtud. 1284 a En un régimen igualitario, y Aristóteles cree que lo justo es la igualdad de todos los ciudadanos, si aparece un individuo superdotado, se le debe excluir de la ciudadanía porque nunca podrá ser feliz en esa ciudad igualitaria, ya que se estaría cometiendo injusticia contra él por no dejarle ser libre en el ejercicio de sus mayores talentos, por ejemplo no se le dejaría ser el rey de la ciudad. Entonces es mejor que este individuo no sea ciudadano y se vaya al ostracismo, porque es como un dios entre los otros ciudadanos iguales y las leyes de la ciudad no le sirven porque él mismo es la ley. Sería como si las leyes de las liebres se quisieran aplicar sobre los leones. NO SE PUEDE MANDAR SOBRE UN HOMBRE ASÍ, SERÍA COMO QUERER MANDAR A ZEUS, LA ESENCIA DE LA CIUDAD ES LA RELACIÓN ENTRE LOS CIUDADANOS POR MANDAR Y SER MANDADO. Las monarquías nacen cuando la masa decide libremente obedecer solo a un individuo y lo convierte en su rey. En cierto sentido pues, un rey impide que la vida en la ciudad se pueda realizar, ya que él manda, pero nadie lo manda a él. Se consideraba un ciudadano superior, a todo aquel que era rico, que tenía muchos amigos e influencia politica, que tenía poder. En nuestra época, la mayoría de los famosos de ahora entrarían en esta categoría de superdotados que habría que expulsar de la ciudad , unos explotan su superioridad física, otros su superioridad mental, otros su mayor cultura, otros sus mejores contactos , otros su belleza o su encanto , otros sus influencias y todos son superdotados que deberían ser condenados al ostracismo en nombre de la igualdad en la ciudad. Son espigas que sobresalen del campo de trigo y hay que pasar la cosechadora por encima para nivelar todo el campo a la misma altura. Pero en las tiranías también se eliminan o expulsan a los que sobresalen porque el tirano tiene miedo de ellos . En las democracias el tirano es la masa y expulsa a los que sobresalen porque la masa tiene miedo que alguno de los que sobresalen se convierta en rey o su tirano. Si este proceso en natural, es decir, si se encuentra por todo el universo, entonces se puede entender que se da siempre un proceso sin fin de igualación entre las fuerzas del universo, seguido por otro proceso de desigualación de estas fuerzas por la aparición de otras fuerzas más poderosas, y este ciclo se repite constantemente. Aristóteles considera que la política de humillación que siguen los reyes de imperios respecto a ciudades conquistadas, que son destruidas , sigue el mismo esquema: el rey del imperio es más fuerte y somete a las ciudades extranjeras pequeñas y luego las arrasa para evitar que se le rebelen algún día cuando recuerden un pasado mejor y más glorioso. Es el problema de la justificación de las invasiones por parte de los invasores, una justificación que siempre gira en torno al concepto de la ley del más fuerte , que siempre está del lado del invasor . En la ciudad igualitaria y en la tiranía, la masa y el tirano eliminan a los que sobresalen y en las guerras de invasión, el rey del imperio elimina a las ciudades conquistadas. Y dice Aristóteles que esto es beneficioso para las ciudades (?) quizás quiere decir que es beneficioso para los imperios que no quede una ciudad conquistada que se pueda rebelar en el futuro por sobresalir en algo, aunque sea por recordar un pasado grandioso . En todo caso, se impone la voluntad de la masa o del tirano o del rey imperial , siempre por la fuerza. Además, en las ciudades se empezó a usar el ostracismo para eliminar a los enemigos de otro partido, con lo cual el régimen se desvió. Las monarquías vitalicias son muchas veces un generalato y se ocupan solo de la guerra. Las monarquías pueden ser por elección o por herencia. Las monarquías bárbaras se benefician de que los pueblos bárbaros son dóciles y soportan las monarquías, que se parecen mucho a una tiranía larga y estable ( un ejemplo clarísimo fue la monarquía vitalica pero no hereritaria de Franco , tirano que se aprovechó de la docilidad de los españoles para imponer una larga y estable dictadura militar ). Otra diferencia entre un rey y un tirano es que la gente elige al rey pero no al tirano, por eso los guardias del rey surgen del mismo pueblo mientras que el tirano se ve obligado a contratar a guardias mercenarios extranjeros porque nadie lo quiere en su ciudad. El rey gobierna con el permiso de su pueblo y sus guardias surgidos del pueblo lo protejen mientras que el tirano gobierna contra sus ciudadanos. Otro tipo de monarquía que se encuentra entre los bárbaros es la " aysimnetas" que consiste en un tirano elegido y no hereditario. La duración de esta tiranía electiva podía ser de unos meses, de unos años o vitalicia, según la empresa a acometer ( el ejemplo clásico de " aysimnetas" es Julio César que fue elegido dictador de Roma por cuatro años para acabar con las guerras civiles , y menciona Aristóteles a Pitaco, tirano elegido en Mitilenia para luchar contra los exiliados de la ciudad ) . Nos encontramos pues, con un tipo de tiranía que se parece a la monarquía porque es aceptada por el pueblo y elegida. 1285 b Otro tipo de monarquía es la que deciende de los pirmeros fundadores de ciudades que repartieron las tierras , por haber sido grandes guerreros o artesanos o por haber juntado a la gente en una nueva ciudad se convirtieron en reyes hereditarios aceptados por su pueblo . Ahora Aristóteles habla otra vez de la masa y dice que es más difícil de corropmer , como es más difícil de corromper el agua abundante que el agua en pequeñas cantidades. Dice que el individuo solitario es presa fácil de la ira y de las pasiones y de los errores mientras que en la masa, estas pasiones y errores están más repartidas y no se dan a la vez entre todos los individuos de la masa ( excepto en las revoluciones). Cree que la masa se corrompe menos que un individuo que gobierna solo, y que la masa todavía se corrompe menos cuando está formada por gente buena . Asimismo cree que es mejor el gobierno de unos cuantos buenos e iguales entre sí antes que el gobierno de uno solo. Esta podría ser la solución para el problema actual que padecemos en España de la corrupción general, según Aristóteles hay que repartir más los cargos y los puestos para que en vez de un solo ministro o secretario del ministro o directivo o gobernador o mandamás que se corrompe fácilmente, esos cargos estén repartidos entre mucha más gente que así es más difícil de corromper, no solamente porque más gente es más difícil de poner de acuerdo para cometer ilegalidades sino porque más gente quiere decir más pensamientos y más percepciones que las que tiene una sola persona. Asi lo hacen los reyes cuando nombran como sus consejeros a sus amigos, porque necesitan tener muchos ojos y oídos y pies para saber lo que pasa en su ciudad. 1286 b En la época arcaica era difícil encontrar hombres buenos porque las ciudades eran pequeñas y no se daba en ellas la relación aristotélica entre distintas personas que llevaba a la aparición de los hombres vituosos ( por eso todavía en la actualidad en los pequeños pueblos del interior de España la gente tiene mala fama de ser malvada ). En los pueblos pequeños aparecía espontáneamente alguna gente que era buena y se sabía porque hacía obras buenas para el pueblo. Estos hombres buenos acababan gobernando esos pequeños pueblos pero luego aparecieron más hombres buenos que no soportaban ser gobernados por otros y llegó el concepto de la república. Pero con la república llegaron los que se enriquecieron con la política y a costa de la hacienda pública y aparecieron las oligarquías donde solo se valoraba al dinero. Luego llegaron las tiranías y finalmente las democracias. Ese es el proceso histórico que siguen todos los pueblos del mundo a lo largo de su historia. Los ricos cada vez eran más ricos y menos gente y la masa creció mucho en número , y cada vez eran más los pobres de la ciudad marginados por los ricos y sin oportunidades. Entonces la masa adquirió mucho poder debido a su gran número e impuso la democracia. Ahora las ciudades son grandes y la masa es abundante por lo que es difícil que la democracia desaparezca . Cuando aumenta la población de un lugar, llega la democracia . Aristóteles no cree que ningún rey quiera trasmitir su poder a sus hijos pues eso es propio de un dios y no de la deficiente naturaleza humana. Solo un dios posee esa virtud, de querer que sus hijos tengan todos sus poderes y sus talentos. El rey siempre necesita tener un ejército que obligue a cumplir las leyes, pero ese ejército debe ser lo suficientemente grande como para imponer por la fuerza el cumplimiento de la ley a cada individuo o facción, pero al mismo tiempo tiene que ser un ejército limitado para que no tenga más poder que la masa en su conjunto. Es un equilibrio difícil que pocas veces se ha conseguido en la historia, limitar el poder militar y , al mismo tiempo, mantener su eficacia como poder en la ciudad. ¿ Encontramos también ejemplos en la naturaleza donde los seres tengan una fuerza para imponer sus intereses pero que al mismo tiempo esa fuerza no sea excesiva como para destruir a estos mismos seres ? Ahora Aristóteles admite que una democracia pueda elegir un generalato vitalicio o pueda poner a un solo individuo al frente de su ciudad, en ocasiones especiales . Aristóteles critica a la monarquía absoluta donde un solo individuo posee todo el poder sobre todos los asuntos de la ciudad, ya que cada ciudadano es distinto en su ropa o en la comida que le gusta y aspira a ser igual que los otros ciudadanos, a pesar de sus diferencias, igual en derechos y en dignidad y a pesar de que su naturaleza sea algo distinta de los demás. Un solo individuo que gobierne a todos los ciudadanos, necesariamente no va a respetar las diferencias en la naturaleza de cada ciudadano. Para resolver este problema Aristóteles propone su fórmula de que en la ciudad todos los ciudadanos manden y sean mandados a la vez, alternativamente, con lo cual el daño a la naturaleza y a la libertad y la dignidad de cada ciudadano es mínimo, comparado con el daño que se ejerce a cada ciudadano si solo gobierna un solo individuo. Llama orden y ley a esta relación de los ciudadanos entre sí y cree que hay que obedecer a esta ley antes que al gobierno de un solo idividuo. La educación en este respeto a la ley de " mandar y ser mandado" permite que puedan aparecer rectificaciones a esta ley en el futuro, según lo que muestre la experiencia, mientras que en un régimen tiránico no aparece ninguna mejora ni reforma de esta ley ni hay educación de los ciudadanos. Este gobierno de todos los ciudadanos sobre todos los ciudadanos , propuesto por Aristóteles, es más cercano a la divinidad, entendida como la inteligencia, porque el gobierno del tirano es más animal en tanto que está sujeto a las pasiones del tirano. Además. el tirano necesita siempre muchos consejeros y es mejor que ya desde su fundación una ciudad esté gobernada por muchos hombres virtuosos , y que no que acaben a las órdenes de un tirano como sus consejeros. La ley es racionalidad sin pasiones. Los que ocupan cargos públicos actúan muchas veces por favoritismos o por venganzas , como lo hacen los médicos con sus enemigos o sobornados por los enemigos de su paciente. 1287 b Cuando un paciente no confía en sus médicos, busca su curación en los libros de medicina, como lo hacen los maestros de gimnasia y los mismos médicos cuando están enfermos, que buscan primero la ayuda de otros maestros de gimnasia o de otros médicos, ya que no pueden decidir sobre sí mismos al estar enfermos y no pueden juzgar bien. Aristóteles dice que entonces la gente busca el " termino medio", puede que quiera decir que el paciente y el ciudadano que no se fían de los médicos ni de sus gobernantes buscan su curación consultando a libros , lo cual representaría un " término medio" entre fiarse absolutamente de los médicos y de los gobernantes y no fiarse en nada. Aristóteles habla ahora de las leyes tradicionales, establecidas por la costumbre o consuetudinarias, a las que considera superiores a las leyes nuevas . Cree que estas leyes tradicionales tratan sobre asuntos más importantes y son más importantes . Podemos considerar leyes establecidas por la costumbre las que dicen que no puedes fiarte de nadie, que debes ocuparte de tus propios asuntos , y otros consejos relativos a la pura supervivencia en un mundo lleno de peligros consejos que cuentan los viejos a los jóvenes desde siempre. Las leyes no siempre pueden decidir sobre todo tipo de cuestiones, por la deficiencia en la escritura y la imposibilidad de prever para todos los casos posibles, entonces se le otorga al juez el poder de un tirano para que decida cómo debe aplicarse la ley en un caso dado. La gente sabe que una ley siempre juzga mejor que ningún juez, y por eso se diviniza a la ley, que es mucho mejor que cualquier hombre con sus pasiones. Además, no existen leyes en asuntos que están sujetos todavía a muchas discusiones y deliberaciones. por lo tanto, la existencia de un juez es imprescindible , pero Aristóteles prefiere que sean muchos jueces los que decidan sobre cada caso. 1288 a En este texto Aristóteles parece que justifique la existencia de los imperios invasores , dice que cuando aparece una raza de una manera natural que es superior a las demás entonces invade los países vecinos. Y que cuando aparece un hombre muy superior a los demás, deba ser rey porque este hombre no aceptaría nunca ser mandado por inferiores, y dice Aristóteles que cuando aparece un hombre así tan por encima de los demás, no hay más remedio que aguantar su tiranía, que es lo que hacemos todavía actualmente cuando aparece un artista o alguna figura en algún campo que es muy superior a los demás, pues fácilmente se convierte en un tirano en el campo donde trabaja, y a la vez : " no es natural que la parte se ponga encima del todo " , frase de Aristóteles que puede ser entendida como que un hombre que es parte de la masa no se ponga por encima de la masa, o que la masa que es parte de un todo se ponga por encima el todo ( que sería el rey) o que una parte como es Cataluña no se ponga por encima del todo que es España. 1288 b Aun cuando un ciudadano no quiera ser educado en el régimen donde vive, se le debe obligar, como el maestro de gimnasia obliga a la gente a practicar gimnasia para robustecer su cuerpo y para desarrollarlo de la mejor manera ( había multas para aquellos ciudadanos que no quisieran practicar gimnasia , 1297 a ) . Nos podemos encontrar con ciudades malas gobernadas por el peor régimen y que no provee a sus ciudadanos de lo más necesario como es la comida, y estas ciudades siempre supondrán un problema para las demás ciudades porque producirán gente mala y peligrosa para las otras ciudades. Es un camino equivocado fundar una ciudad imitando a la ciudad más rica o más poderosa y dotar a la nueva ciudad de gran cantidad de medios económicos y materiales, creyendo que de esta manera la ciudad ya será buena, y no ocurre así, lo hemos visto en estas ciudades españolas como Valencia que en estos años se han llenado de grandes edificios carísimos creyendo que solo con esto ya mejoraban la ciudad. Tampoco es mejor la nueva ciudad que imita a los espartanos por ser más austeros y simples, y por estar fuera de los vaivenes políticos, como es la tentación de la mayoría de los militares cuando se les pregunta por su régimen político ideal que siempre es Esparta. 1290 a Existen tantos regímenes políticos como tantas organizaciones sean posibles reunir en la ciudad respecto a los diversos ciudadanos que la forman , son las partes de la ciudad y cada ciudadano constituye a su vez parte de estas organizaciones. que poseen diferencias y ventajas entre sí como cada uno de los ciudadanos respecto a los demás. Así, para Aristóteles el arte de la política consiste en administrar o gestionar las diversas organizaciones de ciudadanos que aparecen en una ciudad , reunidas por sus semejanzas profesionales o por su dignidad o su riqueza o su virtud o por cualquier otra característica. Y la única manera de gestionar todas esas organizaciones en la ciudad es dando a cada una de ella oportunidades para estar en las magistraturas y en el gobierno de la ciudad, este pensamiento político lo hemos visto mucho desde la Transición en los ayuntamientos gobernados por los socialistas y otros partidos de izquierdas que siempre se han apoyado en las muchas asociaciones de ciudadanos existentes en sus ciudades para gobernar, después de negociar con ellas. La democracia y la oligarquía son los dos regímenes principales , como hay dos vientos principales, el del norte y el del sur y luego muchos otros vientos secundarios que se desvían de esos dos ( otra vez Aristótles relaciona un fenómeno político con un fenómeno natural) . Y también compara la democracia y la oligarquía con la armonía musical segun los modos usados ( frigio o dorio, o una más tensa como es la oligarquía y otra más suave y relajada como es la democracia) que son los principales modos musicales y luego hay más modos musicales que son desviaciones de esos dos. O bien que la oligarquía también es una ligera desviación respecto al régimen político perfecto, la oligarquía siendo más tensa y despótica que la suave y relajada democracia , o que la democracia es una desviación más suave respecto al régimen politico perfecto. Como ocurre que la armonía musical frigia y dórica es una ligera desviación, suave o tensa, respecto a una armonía musical perfecta. La masa no es la democracia, porque en una oligarquía también hay una masa de ricos que manda y en una democracia nos podemos encontrar con unos pocos que manipulan a las masas y que son los que realmente gobiernan ( son los demagogos, que pueden no ser ricos pero si poderosos en su habilidad para seducir a las masas, como ciudadanos superdotados que son.. . y que aspiran a ser reyes o dictadores , como hemos visto en tantos casos en el siglo XX por ejemplo con Fidel Castro, porque no soportan el ser iguales a los demás). La verdadera diferencia entre una democracia y una oligarquía es que es difícil en este mundo que todos los ciudadanos sean ricos, porque los recursos de este planeta son limitados ( excepto en países como Brunei o Qatar que, por unas casualidades históricas relacionadas con el petróleo, son países donde todos son ricos) . Por lo tanto, es más fácil fundar una ciudad democrática donde todos los ciudadanos sean libres que una ciudad oligárquica donde todos los ciudadanos sean ricos ( y en el universo ocurre lo mismo, no hay riqueza suficiente para que todos los seres del universo sean ricos pero sí hay la posibilidad de que sean libres) . En regímenes bárbaros, com el de Etiopía , se eligen los magistrados según el que sea más alto. En otros regímenes bárbaros, como en Germania, se eligen los gobernantes según su belleza ( ver Tácito "Germania") . En Apolonia y en Tera los colonos que llegaron primero son los que mandan. La ciudad es como un animal y todo animal tiene muchas partes, y cada parte tiene diversas funciones y variantes según cada animal . Aparecen diversos tipos de animal según las diversas combinaciones de sus partes esenciales que se puedan hacer ( Aristóteles supone, por lo tanto, que todos los seres vivos actuales explotan todas las combinaciones posibles de órganos esenciales y sus variantes que pueden darse en este universo ). En algún momento en su libro "Política", Aristóteles llega a decir que todos los regímenes políticos humanos son desviaciones en mayor o menor medida respecto a un régimen político perfecto al que todos los otros regímenes humanos aspiran a imitar que pero no alcanzan nunca , como si en todo el universo todos los sistemas de organización de seres y de materia aspiraran igualmente a una organización perfecta ( ideal según Platón) sin conseguir nunca alcanzarla ( 1293 b ) . 1291 a En una ciudad, una parte son los campesinos que producen el alimento, otra parte son los artesanos y obreros que producen los utensilios necesarios y de lujo para poder vivir en una ciudad, otra parte es la de los comerciantes que transportan los bienes, otra parte es la de los jornaleros o esclavos y la otra parte es la de los guerreros. En las nuevas ciudades, como hemos visto tantas veces en las peliculas del Oeste cuando se fundaban nuevas ciudades en el Oeste de USA, los colonos creen que lo primero que hay que hacer es proveer a esa nueva ciudad de sus distintas partes para satisfacer las necesidades de los ciudadanos, pero no atienden a cómo fundar su ciudad en el bien. La parte encargada de la guerra, sea un sheriff o sea un somatén de voluntarios armados, solo se organiza cuando esa ciudad se siente en peligro de ser esclavizada por otra o por una banda de malhechores. De la misma manera que la mente o espíritu es la parte más importante de un animal, en la ciudad su parte más importante es la que manda y determina lo justo y necesario. Es la mente de la ciudad. Hay partes del animal y de la ciudad que pueden tener dos funciones a la vez, por ejemplo el labrador puede ser tambien soldado. Pero es imposible que dos partes en el animal y en la ciudad sean ricas y pobres a la vez. Por lo tanto, las dos partes más diferenciadas en el animal y en la ciudad son la parte más pobre y la parte más rica ( como ocurre en todo el universo ) . Hay una lucha entre la parte pobre contra la parte rica, en todo el universo , como parejas de contrarios pitagóricas que son. Acepta que los ricos prestan un servicio a la ciudad con sus fortunas (porque son capitales necesarios para emprender obras) y que los jueces son necesarios para los que discuten sobre sus derechos como ciudadanos. 1291 b Hay ciudades donde los comerciantes son mayoría, en otras son mayoría los pescadores o los carpinteros. Hay ciudades de jornaleros , hay ciudades donde los matrimonios son desiguales entre ciudadanos y esclavos o extranjeros y hay ciudades tan pobres que sus ciudadanos no conocen el ocio ni el descanso. De estas diferencias surgen distintos tipos de " animales ciudades " . Un tipo de democracia es aquella donde todos los ciudadanos son iguales y libres. Otra democracia es aquella donde los más ricos acceden a las magistraturas aun siendo todos libres e iguales. Otra democracia es aquella donde todos son libres e iguales pero no responden ante nadie de sus actos excepto ante la ley, que es quien gobierna realmente. Otra forma de democracia es aquella donde todos los ciudadanos son iguales y libres y pueden acceder todos a las magistraturas pero solo si obedecen a la ley. Otra democracia es aquella donde es la masa la que gobierna y no la ley, pues se gobierna por decretos y no por leyes y la masa está manipulada por los demagogos , que adulan a la masa y la convierten en tirana que no obedece a las leyes , como si toda la masa fuera un rey . Los demagogos se presentan como servidores del pueblo peor en realidad lo utilizan y le hacen creer que la masa gobierna la ciudad. Y dan poder a la masa , echando a los jueces y poniendo a la masa como jueza. Pero Aristóteles considera que un régimen así ya no es ni una democracia porque no existen las leyes y el régimen ha degenerado tanto que no es más que el gobierno de la chusma, por decreto y sin leyes. Otro tipo de democracia es donde los agricultores tienen poco tiempo libre para asistir a las asambleas y se limitan a cumplir las leyes que otros han legislado . otro tipo de democracia es donde todos los ciudadanos cobran un subsidio mínimo, y no hay pobres y todos pueden asistir a las asambleas pero entonces son los ricos los que no tienen tiempo libre para asistir a las asambleas por estar ocupados en sus asuntos y los pobres son los que acaban mandando en la ciudad y no las leyes. Vemos que estos distintos tipos de democracia se presentan con frecuencia a la vez, en nuestra época, o que aparecen y reaparecen a lo largo de la historia reciente de una democracia como la norteamericana. Las oligarquías pueden ser : porque los ricos gobiernan y son los jueces, otra oligarquía es donde el hijo hereda el poder de su padre rico ( es entonces llamada dinastía ) , otra oligarquía es donde los ricos eligen a sus gobernantes entre otros ricos, otra es donde no hay leyes sino solo magistrados ricos. Las oligarquías poseen distintos grados según si en la ciudad los ricos son muchos o pocos. Así , cuando en la ciudad son muchos los que tienen alguna fortuna ( los nuevos ricos) y que quieren ocupar cargos públicos por ambición, pero no son tantos como para que la ley no siga gobernando la ciudad. Estos mismos grados en riqueza también se pueden observar en muchos fenómenos del universo . La peor forma de oligarquía u oligarquía degenerada es donde unos pocos ricos tienen enormes fortunas y gobiernan sin leyes. Es el equivalente a la democracia degenerada y entre estos dos extremos, la oligarquía degenerada y la democracia degenerada , se desenvuelve la vida en este universo . Ahora Aristóteles advierte que hay algunos regímenes extraños donde hay un oligarquía de hecho ( como en USA donde mandan realmente las grandes compañías) pero donde hay una costumbre y una orientación para que el país se gobierne democráticamente . O bien un país democrático donde en realidad gobierna una oligarquía. Dice Aristóteles que estos regímenes extraños aparecen en los primeros años después de un cambio de régimen, cuando los ciudadanos quieren mantener todavía leyes y costumbres del régimen anterior que no consideran malas, al mismo tiempo que quieren introducir las leyes y costumbres del nuevo régimen, como pasó en España en los primeros años de la Transición. Si consideramos a USA como un país que todavía está en ese paso de régimen monárquico absolutista propio del Imperio Británico, a su régimen republicano independiente democrático, se puede entender que USA sea un país donde convivan elementos del régimen anterior y del nuevo régimen, ! pero es que ya han pasado 250 años desde la independencia de los USA ! 1293 b _ Ahora Aristóteles habla de una nuevo tipo de gobierno aristocrático, formado por aristócratas de la virtud y no del dinero o de otras habilidades. Este tipo de gobierno sería además republicano y Aristóteles lo propone como mezcla o término medio de los regímenes básicos y algunos consideran que es la inspiración para la llegada de la democracia contemporánea norteamericana con sus mezclas de oligarquías y de democracias antiguas. En Cartago se valora la riqueza, la virtud y el poder del pueblo, en Esparta se valora la virtud y el pueblo. La tiranía no es un sistema de gobierno en absoluto , es la negación del gobierno. El tirano gobierna según su capricho para sus propios intereses y siempre es contrario a los intereses de sus súbditos ( 1295 a) . El tirano es el primer utilitarista de la historia, porque gobierna para su único interés y no se diferencia en nada del utilitarista de Betham que forma parte de una mayoría que se constituye como tirana, gobernando solo para su propio interés. Aristóteles introduce ahora su famosa doctrina del término medio: cree que se debe permitir la asistencia a las asambleas tanto a los ricos y a los pobres, porque la mayoría de la gente no es ni rica ni pobre. Quiere que se conserve de las democracias las elecciones por sorteo para los cargos y de las oligarquías que se nombren por elección de entre los más ricos o bien que se nombren los cargos por elección y que no dependan de la riqueza. Tomando elementos de los dos regímenes, Aristóteles propone uno de nuevo al que llama aristocrático republicano. Tal régimen es una mezcla y cuanto mejor mezclado mejor, y así lo parece el régimen de los USA, que es una mezcla de democracia y de oligarquía. Bien mezclada para que no parezcan que son ni democracia ni oligarquía, como es USA. En tal régimen, como sucede en Esparta, todos tiene la misma educación y todos tienen las mismas oportunidades sin distinción de dinero, tienen el mismo tipo de vestido para cada uno y pueden acceder igual a los cargos aunque unos son elegidos por el pueblo y otros solo estan abiertos a que la gente del pueblo pueda acceder pero sin ser elegida por el pueblo. Pero no se da el sorteo de cargos, lo cual según nosotros sería muy beneficioso para la igualdad de todos los ciudadanos, pero no según Aristóteles que lo elimina. 1295 b la clase media es la que puede ser más virtuosa porque no es ni pobre ni rica y puede someterse a la razón , y no ambiciona mucho los cargos ni los desprecia tampoco, mientras que lo que es super rico o super bello o super fuerte o super noble, es demasiado altivo para someterse a su razón y cae con frecuencia en los grandes robos y en grandes crímenes para mantener su superioridad en algún asunto, y por el otro lado lo que es super débil o super pobre o super miserable o super despreciable no puede preocuparse por atender a su razón sino a su supervivencia diaria y cae con frecuencia en la delincuencia de pequeños robos. Los delitos de los superdotados se cometen por su soberbia mientras que los delitos de los subdotados se cometen por su malicia. Los que son ricos en dinero, en fuerza, en belleza, en inteligencia, en vigor , en amigos o en cualquier otra cosa no se dejan gobernar por nadie excepto si gobiernan ellos como tiranos y ya son así desde niños , tiranos contra su propia familia porque han sido criados en sus riquezas y sus lujos, y la ambiciones de los ricos destruyen más a un régimen politico que ninguna otra cosa, mientras que los pobres son insignificantes y no saben gobernar sino que solamente se dejan gobernar como esclavos y Aristóteles ve también estos procesos en todo el universo. El resultado es una ciudad de señores y de esclavos donde quien gobierna realmente es la envidia y el desprecio , entre conspiraciones de los pobres para robar el dinero a los ricos y medidas de los ricos para aplastar a los pobres . La ciudad de la clase media evita esos males porque en ella la gente es lo más igual posible. la clase media nivela la situación en una ciudad de señores y de esclavos y evita así la aparición de contrarios de excesos ( otra vez podemos compararlo con situaciones en el universo de equilibrio entre dos contrarios excesivos ) . Además, los mejores gobernantes aparecen de entre la clase media. El régimen degenera o se radicaliza cuando uno de los extremos de la ciudad consigue el poder. Aristóteles considera que su régimen aristocrático republicano de la clase media, es ya un régimen de segunda generación comparado con los primeros regímenes aparecidos en Grecia, que eran democráticos u oligárquicos de una manera espontánea según los intereses de sus gentes. El régimen de Aristóteles es ya un sistema de diseño . Además, en una ciudad se dan cualidades como la nobleza, la libertad y la igualdad , la riqueza y la educación y luego hay cantidades que se refieren al número de sus distintas partes, al número de ricos y de pobres. Hay que lograr una buena mezcla de todas esas cualidades y esas cantidades. 1297b Los pobres suelen conformarse con su suerte si el estado no les quita sus pocas propiedades ni se les perjudica y pueden luchar en una guerra si se les da comida , pero los pobres siempre están sujetos a la amabilidad o no de los gobernantes. En las ciudades arcaicas, los militares ocupaban fácilmente los cargos, incluso después de acabar la guerra, como derecho que tenían por ser ex-combatientes. Luego, gracias al aumento de la población , otras partes de la ciudad crecieron en número y pudieron desafiar al poder de los militares. En este sentido, el aumento de población es en Aristóteles, a diferencia de Malthus, un bien ya que permite la llegada de un mayor equilibrio de fuerzas en la ciudad. El tema del sorteo diferencia a una república pura de una república aristocrática, pues en una de pura todos los ciudadanos entran en el sorteo, mientras que en una de aristocrática solo unos elegidos entran en el sorteo. Parece que Aristóteles está poniendo las bases de lo que actualmente de llama la división de poderes, especialmente con un tribunal superior y constitucional que sea un contrapeso del poder de las decisiones del pueblo . En la república aristocrática de clase media de Aristóteles, las minorías tienen la potestad de rechazar propuestas de leyes pero no tienen la potestad de presentar nuevas leyes, que siempre corresponde a la mayoría que representa al pueblo. La minoría puede ser una minoría de pobres o de ricos o de extranjeros o de una parte de la ciudad con otro idioma, otra religión y otras costumbres. las magistraturas pueden ser vitalicias o por un tiempo limitado, pueden mantenerse en la misma persona varias veces o puede estar prohibido que una misma persona acceda a ella dos veces. Aristóteles llama magistrados a todos los funcionarios que necesita la ciudad para funcionar, desde los jueces hasta los jefes del ejército. 1299 b En las ciudades pequeñas unas pocas personas se encargan de muchas magistraturas a la vez , siempre que no se estorben en sus funciones unas a otras y a veces no ejercen esas magistraturas excepto cuando hay alguna necesidad en la ciudad pequeña ( trasladado al cuerpo humano, los que tienen un cuerpo más pequeño o más pobre, poseen también unas pocas funciones directivas de su cuerpo y de su mente y además estas funciones solo se activan a veces cuando hace falta ). Las magistraturas pueden ser por elección o por sorteo , entre todo el pueblo o solo entre unos elegidos. Las magistraturas dirigen la ciudad como la mente de la ciudad y , como en la mente humana, hay muchas actuaciones a decidir en la ciudad y en la vida humana, en asuntos como los niños, las mujeres, el comercio, el trigo. En la democracia, todos se saben libres e infieren que por ello todos son iguales también, aunque sean diferentes en muchas otras condiciones. Creen que por ser iguales en libertad ya son tambien iguales en todo. En la oligarquía, si se saben desiguales en algo, por ejemplo en la cantidad de tierra propia, entonces asumen que tambien son desiguales los ciudadanos en todas las otras características y cada ciudadano busca destacar todavía más y ser todavía más desigual. En todos esos regímenes aparecen rebeliones porque ninguno de los dos es un régimen totalmente justo o recto. Por eso hay margen para las rebeliones porque una parte de la ciudadanía detecta los defectos de cada uno de esos regímenes y se apoya en esos defectos para iniciar la rebelión. Los más virtuosos de la ciudad deberían ser los más rebeldes pero resultan ser los más superdotados los que se rebelan más, porque no soportan un trato de igualdad con los otros ciudadanos y presumen de sus antepasados ricos. 1303 b la ciudad, como el ser vivo , puede crecer monstruosamente con un cuerpo asimétrico y desproporcionado y a veces puede cambiar incluso su foma en la de otro animal. Las ciudades caen en rebeliones cuando una parte de la ciudad está en un lugar más afortunado o cuando toda la ciudad está en un lugar malsano o pobre o está partida por un accidente geográfico. Pero la peor división en una ciudad es entre los virtuosos y los viciosos. La riqueza, la geografía y la virtud dividen a los hombres y los diferencian. Las rebeliones empiezan por pequeñeces como un asunto de tema sexual o una disputa entre hermanos ( es decir, empiezan en una familia ) y luego explotan para conseguir grandes objetivos, en una progresión geométrica donde el incendio se extiende rápidamente a partir de un principo, que dice Aristóteles es la causa de todo y que debe evitarse en todo lo posible. Otras veces las rebeliones empiezan porque un órgano de la ciudad, como por ejemplo el consejo, adquiere demasiado poder , por algún éxito conseguido . O la chusma consigue más poder por algún éxito suyo en la guerra. En términos médicos, el cuerpo enferma porque una parte del cuerpo crece más y es más rica que otras partes más pobres o el cuerpo sufre un ataque porque una parte del cuerpo se excede en su función. Un partido político no debe alcanzar excesivo poder, como ocurre con el PRI mexicano. Este partido no quiere ser igual que los otros partidos y se aferra a una posición de superiodad mientras que los otros partidos se rebelan contra él. Otras veces los dos partidos extremos, el de los ricos y el de los pobres, no dejan que exista un partido intermedio de la clase media moderada y uno de esos partidos extremos consigue tanto poder que mantiene en la clandestinidad al otro partido , por miedo a su poder. Otras veces los virtuosos de la ciudad , siempre pocos, se esconden por miedo a esos dos partidos extremos . Los líderes de las rebeliones siempre engañan al pueblo, primero usando la violencia para cambiar el régimen y luego engañando al pueblo para que apoye el cambio y luego obligándolo por la fuerza a aceptar ese cambio. Es la negación del arte de la política, que consiste en el juego entre muchos sectores distintos de la ciudad y sus relaciones. Los demagogos son presentados ahora por Aristóteles como unos líderes de rebeliones que juegan sucio, engañando al pueblo, prometiendo cosas y luego negándolas para sembrar la intoxicación ente el pueblo, denunciando a los más ricos para levantar el odio hacia ellos, o maniobrando en secreto para que el pueblo no obtenga lo que quiera y esté descontento o bien levantando acusaciones falsas contra los ricos para confiscar sus bienes o bien repartiendo el dinero de los ricos entre la masa a base de ponerles muchos impuestos . Como diría Lenin, todo vale para conseguir que una revolución triunfe... y los demagogos siempre hacen trampas. 1305 a Los primeros demagogos surgían de la milicia y el líder militar empezaba como un demagogo que se presentaba ante el pueblo como enemigo de los ricos y se convertía pronto en un tirano. Luego, con el progreso de las artes retóricas, los demagogos surgieron de los que sabían persuadir mejor a la masa. En la misma universidad tenemos un ejemplo de este proceso: los catedráticos surgen de entre los superdotados más capaces para aprender largos temarios pero tienen siempre la oposicion de la mayoría de los estudiantes y de otros profesionales de su materia que siempre se quejan del excesivo poder que tienen los catedráticos y que aspiran a que los mediocres puedan tener su oportunidad en la universidad, mientras que los demagogos de entre estos descontentos , calumnian a los catedráticos y prometen al pueblo que convertirán a la universidad en una de popular y democrática con acceso para todos. Pero muchas veces estos demagogos lo que quieren es colocarse de catedráticos en vez de los catedráticos actuales e imponer su tiranía. En las oligarquías se dan rebeliones cuando se perjudica a la masa, y siempre hay alguien que quiere ser el caudillo de esa rebelión ( en realidad, cualquier individuo de la masa sirve para ser ese caudillo ), otras veces la rebelión empieza entre los mismos ricos porque se quejan de que solo unos pocos tienen cargos. Otras veces el pueblo con su caudillo da un golpe de estado aprovechando la desunión y la debilidad entre los ricos. No importa si la ciudad está bien gobernada, el pueblo siempre intenta dar un golpe de estado. Otras veces los oligarcas se pelean entre ellos por el poder y para atraerse a la chusma o lo consiguen dando al pueblo el poder en los tribunales. Como vemos, todas las posiblidades de cambio en un organismo o ser del universo son aplicadas . Unos roban materia a otros y se acaban enfrentando entre ellos o contra los que se les oponen. Los oligarcas excesivos en sus lujos son además amantes del cambio y lo buscan o preparan el terreno para que llegue un cambio, por los mismos excesos de los oligarcas. Pero en una oligarquía donde unos pocos están en una buena unión, esta oligarquía se mantiene estable y tiene bajo control a la chusma. Otras veces, dentro de la oligarquía se crea otra oligarquía o se independiza de la ciudad para formar otra oligarquía, debido a que los cargos disponibles son pocos en la ciudad madre ( que es lo que ocurrió realmente con la independencia de USA respecto al Imperio Británico, no olvidemos que George Washington intentó hacer carrera militar en el ejército inglés y no pudo por ser indiano). Las oligarquías se convierten fácilmente en tiranías militares cuando los oligarcas, en una situación de guerra, dan demasiado poder a un militar que acaba proclamándose tirano o porque las oligarquías nombran a un mediador de los conflictos entre ricos y pobres y este mediador se acaba convirtiendo en su tirano. Los conflictos por orgullo , entre pretendientes a matrimonio, son frecuentes entre los oligarcas, ellos mismos llenos de orgullo por ser superdotados. A veces el azar interviene y hay el descubrimiento de una riqueza en la ciudad ( por ejemplo, unos años de buenas cosechas) y la gente se enriquece y hay un cambio hacia la democracia de ricos , poco a poco sin que nadie se de cuenta o de una manera más rápida. Las rebeliones en una aristocracia empiezan cuando aumenta mucho el número de la gente de la masa que se cree que es igual a cualquier otro ciudadano. Otras veces el conflicto empieza entre los mismos aristócratas porque unos se consideran superiores a otros. 13 07 a Otras veces uno de los aristócratas crece todavía más y quiere ser el único que gobierne, como Annón en Cartago. O porque unos aristócratas se aprovechan de una situación para enriquecerse más, por ejemplo una guerra, mientras que los otros aristócratas se empobrecen por la misma causa y ven que los primeros no quieren repartir mas tierras. La peor causa de la disolución de una república aristocrática es la falta de buena mezcla de virtud en ella. La aristocracia siempre tiende al engreimiento y la ambición, por sumismo vicio de querer la abundancia, mientras que el pueblo se conforma si ve que todos son iguales y que son más, porque son más fuertes los regímenes con una mayoría abundante. Además, los regímenes pueden cambiar hacia sus extremos si el pueblo ve que está siendo perjudicado o los aristocrátas ven que no hay la igualdad en la que creen , que es la igualdad de los que tengan los mismos méritos y donde a cada ciudadano se le da lo que se merece y le corresponde, una igualdad que Aristóteles llama la más duradera. Un pequeño cambio insignificante en la Constitución de un régimen puede arrastrar cambios mucho más graves, ya que cuando se empieza a modificar una Constitución, se abre un melón que nadie sabe cómo va a acabar, porque los que empiezan la reforma de una Constitución , pocas veces cumplen su palabra de que no van a tocar nada más de esa Constitución. Otras veces los regímenes se hunden porque hay cerca un país con otro régimen contrario. "Los principios contrarios producen otros contrarios", este lema de la medicina de su tiempo sirve a Aristóteles para mostrar que los regímenes se pueden salvar si actuan en ellos los principios correctos: no gastar más de lo debido en la ciudad y no cometer ilegalidades por pequeñas que sean. Los regímenes se salvan si dan al pueblo lo que quiere , es decir dinero y si dan a los ricos lo que éstos quieren, es decir cargos y honores. Los regímenes se salvan si se dan cargos por poco tiempo, por ejemplo por 6 meses , con lo que más gente puede ocupar esos cargos y además con solo seis meses en un cargo la gente no tiene tiempo de conseguir más poder. Los cargos más importantes deben estar en manos de gente leal al régimen. Es importante que las peleas en la ciudad se diluciden según las leyes antes de que gente que no tiene nada que ver con esas peleas se vea implicada pues entonces la guerra se extiende por la ciudad. 1308 b hay que ir adecuando cada año las rentas a la situación de la hacienda de la ciudad según si hay superavit o deficit. Nadie debe crecer desmesuradamente y hay que limitar los cargos en el tiempo o en su importancia para que nadie se corrompa y los cargos hay que darlos y quitarlos poco a poco y prohibir que ningun ciudadano tenga demasiado poder ni influencia ni amigos o riquezas. Y si surge algún ciudadano de este tipo, porque en su vida privada se ha ocupado de progresar o de crecer de alguna manera , hay que obligarle a vivir en el extranjero. Hay que evitar el progreso excesivo de una parte de la ciudad. Las magistraturas no deben dar dinero, porque lo que más irrita a las masas es que los magistrados ganen dinero robándolo de las arcas públicas, al mismo tiempo que a la misma masa no se le deja hacer lo mismo . 1309 a Las magistraturas no deberían suponer dinero y así solo los ricos estarían interesados en ocuparlas, porque ya son ricos y no necesitan más dinero, y así sabrían que la ciudad está gobernada por los mejroes que son ellos y no por la chusma, mientras que los pobres no tendrían interés en ocupar cargos porque no se gana dinero y se ocuparían solo se sus negocios privados. Contra la corrupción, las entregas de dinero se deberían hacer siempre ante muchos testigos y se debería premiar a los que no son corruptos. Las herencias deben estar lo más repatidas posible de manera que nunca uno solo se quede con toda la herencia sino que más pobres se beneficien de ella ( así debería ser también en la loteria nacional). Hay distintos tipos de justicia según cada regimen. 1309 b Si un gobernante es cumplidor y ama a su régimen ¿ qué necesidad hay de que además sea virtuoso ? Un régimen con este tipo de gobernantes todavía podría pasar . Luego Aristóteles compara las narices desviadas con los regímenes políticos desviados, dice que una nariz ligeramente desviada todavía puede ser atractiva y funcional para respirar, pero que una nariz totalmente desviada es ya una mostruosidad , fea y además no deja respirar, esta nariz es una exageración donde falta una parte contraria que mantenga recta a la nariz y donde ya no existe la más mínima proporción y ni tan solo algo parecido a una nariz. Lo mismo ocurre en todas las demás partes del cuerpo , costillas en los jorobados, piernas torcidas en los raquíticos, espaldas curvadas en los cifóticos, cuellos torcidos , brazos torcidos, dedos torcidos , pies deformados y de la misma manera en los órganos internos. Todas estas partes del cuerpo necesitan una parte contraria que las mantenga rectas para que no se desvíen. La teoría de que hay hombres que se tuercen como los árboles y que hay que enderezarlos atándolos a una vara , se encuentra en la mayoría de los pueblos primitivos. En la Grecia clásica,esta tesis influye al arte griego, en las esculturas de atletas como las de Miron, donde cada hueso y músculo y miembro está en su sitio , en su posición más recta o adecuada, con otro miembro, músculo o hueso que hace de contrario para mantenerlo recto. El hombre griego perfecto será un atleta donde todo esté " recto", desde los huesos a los músculos hasta todas las demás partes, por otras partes contrarias que mantengan en su sitio a las otras. Un régimen cuyas leyes favorecieran que todos los ciudadanos se enriquecieran, no sería un régimen virtuoso porque esas leyes causarían un exceso de placeres en los ciudadanos y en la ciudad. Por ello, la solución que proponen algunos partidos para resolver todos los problemas, una solución consistente en que todos los ciudadanos sean ricos, no lleva más que a un exceso de lujos y de opulencia, dañino tanto para los ciudadanos como para la misma ciudad y que no tiene nada que ver con el ejercicio del arte de la política donde se necesita que haya ricos y pobres, con los hijos de los ricos volviéndose flojos por la molicie mientras que los hijos de los pobres se vuelven resitentes y sufridos por sus condiciones de vida más duras y son más capaces de traer innovaciones a la ciudad ( aunque muchas veces estos hijos de pobres no aspiran a otra cosa que a hacerse ricos y volver a empezar el ciclo otra vez, con sus siguientes hijos degenerados por los placeres ). La educación enseña a vivir en cada régimen político . Aristóteles no es partidario de la libertad total de los pobres en una democracia donde los pobres viven a su aire sin preocuparse de nada, al revés, Aristóteles dice que los pobres deben vivir dentro del régimen democrático participando en él y sirviéndolo , porque esa es su salvación. 1310 b Hay matrimonios que unen lo peor de dos tipos y cuyos hijos contienen las imperfecciones y los errores de sus padres: así es también la monarquía, que surge de entre la nobleza de donde un miembro que se destaca por su virtud, por sus buenas obras, por conquistar territorios o liberarlos , se proclama rey, a diferencia del tirano que surge de la masa. La monarquía une lo peor de los dos regímenes políticos y solo existe para defender a los nobles contra la masa. El tirano busca los placeres propios mientras que el rey busca más la belleza dde su reinado y su prestigio ( así lo vemos en los actuales reyes españoles y su apoyo a olimpiadas y expos y trenes de alta velocidad , etc) . El tirano hace la vida imposible a la chusma, la obliga a cambiar de residencia, de trabajo, le quita las armas, la margina . Y con los superdotados hace lo mismo por el miedo que les tiene, intenta destruirlos en secreto o abiertamente pues son sus rivales , y los superdotados reaccionan con las rebeliones para sobrevivir o porque aspiran también a ser tiranos. Los tiranos eliminan fácilmente a sus enemigos con cualquier pretexto: que si le han insultado, que si no le corresponden amorosamente, que si pretenden a una hija suya, que si fue castrado de niño, etc. El tirano destruye a cualquier ciudadano que le resulte molesto por cualquier motivo... como por ejemplo , el que dice que el tirano tiene mal aliento . 1312 a Aristóteles hace un repaso a las causas por las que la gente tiránica se mata entre ella, y todas son causas relacionadas con el sexo, la familia , el orgullo y otras pasiones primarias como la búsqueda de la fama , el querer ganar dinero y el querer mandar . Cuando creen que pueden derrocar fácilmente al tirano anterior , lo intentan , pero no cuando lo ven difícil porque entonces pierden su osadía ya que cada tirano proviene de la clase militar y cree que es el más fuerte y que puede conseguir derrocar al tirano anterior fácilmente . La vida en una ciudad mala fácilmente degenera en un ambiente de guerra constante entre todos los ciudadanos cuando todos los ciudadanos son tiránicos, como ocurre en la Sicilia mafiosa y en los peores barrios de delincuentes. El odio es general así como el desprecio de unos a otros por sus vicios y en ese estado aparece la ira que no reflexiona y que ataca directamente porque no calcula sus actos . Las peleas son diarias. Para evitar esta situación primitiva, Aristóteles cree que solo hay un camino y es el desarrollo de la política tal y como la describe en su libro . Siendo la tiranía un régimen donde se vive entre el odio y el desprecio general, Aristóteles reconoce que las democracias y las oligarquías extremas son también tiranías pero repartidas entre mucha más gente, los oligarcas o ricos y la masa o los pobres son aquí los tiranos . Lo cual implica que en las democracias y las oligarquías extremas también se da en cierta medida el odio y el desprecio generalizado. Cuando llega un nuevo régimen mediante el engaño y la violencia , este régimen llega manchado de tiranía ( es el caso de los independentistas catalanes y su intento de instaurar un nuevo régimen en Cataluña mediante el engaño y un tipo de violencia ). Es fácil derrocar un monarca cuando éste degenera ( por ejemplo, Juan Carlos I ), pero es muy difícil o imposible echar a un tirano. La monarquía de tipo no absolutista donde el rey reparte sus poderes es la monarquía menos odiada por los súbditos, la que menos envidian y la que puede permanecer más tiempo. Los tiranos se mantienen mucho tiempo en el poder gracias a eliminar a los superdotados y a los virtuosos de la ciudad, a dejar al pueblo sin educación y sin que se desarrolle mental ni físicamente y así elpueblo no tiene fuerza ni ánimo para atacar al tirano ni para emprender nada , y por no permitir que el pueblo se reuna en gran número , al castigar la resolución y la confianza de cada individuo en sí mismo , mediante la represión , por facilitar el desconocimento de los ciudadanos unos repecto a otros , obligarlos a que estén siempre a la vista en sus portales o en las calles, que piensen poco y estén siempre sumisos por el terror al tirano, llenando de espías la ciudad y castigar a los que hablan demasiado, como se hace en los regímenes barbaros, por ejemplo en Persia, y lleva al enfrentamiento a todos los ciudadanos entre sí, los ricos contra los ricos y contra los pobres , los amigos contra los amigos y que todos hablen mal de todos, para que desconfíen todos de todos y el mismo tirano se encarga de acabar con los pocos ciudadanos honestos que despiertan confianza entre la gente , y que el pueblo esté ocupado en algun trabajo faraónico mal pagado , por lo que la masa no salga nunca de pobre mientras los guardias están bien pagados, y cobrar muchos impuestos al pueblo y enviarlo a una guerra . Como consecuencia de este ambiente infernal que promueve el tirano en su ciudad, todos los ciudadanos sueñan con matarlo y no tiene amigos y teme a la masa pues de ella saldrá su verdugo. Solo confía en sus aduladores , todos malvados . En este estudio psicológico sobre la personalidad del tirano, Aristóteles añade un detalle importante: el tirano necesita saber que es el único en la ciudad que es listo, inteligente, fuerte, guapo, audaz, y no soporta que haya en la ciudad otros individuos que tengan cualidades parecidas y no para hasta que los mata. Por lo tanto, el tirano es más bien un individuo que sería feliz si estuviera solo en el mundo pero la presencia de otros tipos que son parecidos a él en talentos le hace insufrible la vida porque necesita de una manera patológica ser el único hombre en el mundo y ese es el origen de su maldad , por eso le gusta exhibirse en público como feliz y satisfecho... de hecho es el único hombre que lo es en su tiranía. El resto de ciudadanos viven una mala vida aplastados por él, para que nadie le haga sombra. En nuestra época, este problema sigue dándose con miles de ciudadanos que no soportan que otros ciudadanos tengan el mismo talento o la misma formación o las mismas carreras y las mismas cualificaciones , serían felices si estuvieran solos en el mundo pero la vida en sociedad rodeados de gente que es igual de brillante que ellos, les resulta insoportable y este es el origen de gran parte del ambiente estresante y tóxico que se da en nuestra época donde debiod a la superpoblación , la mayoría de la gente de los países avanzados pasa por la universidad pero luego no soporta que los otros de la mayoría de la gente del país ahora tenga carreras. El tirano solo soporta a los extranjeros porque no los considera como una amenaza. El peor enemigo del tirano es el ciudadano que cree que el tirano le ha pejudicado a él o a su familia directamente, porque este tipo de ciudadano no parará hasta matar al tirano aunque pierda él también la vida ( ¿ ocurre esto también en los organismos, con los virus o las bacterias donde hay una que quiere acabar con el organismo aunque perezca también ella ? ). Con toda esta descripción genial que ha hecho Aristóteles del tirano, se puede comprender enseguida que en nuestra época seguimos padeciendo e lproblema de los tiranos, que son tipos primitivos que encontramos por todos sitios, como padres de familia, como jefes, como directivos, como políticos , como profesores, como empresarios, como delincuentes. La única manera de acabar con los tiranos, que es lo mismo que decir que acabar con la prehistoria que todavía permanece en nuestro tiempo, es educar a esos tiranos y no hay mejor libro para ello que la "Política" de Aristóteles donde se les explica que son tiranos , por qué lo son y por qué la política es el único camino que hay para salir de un estado de guerra de todos contra todos, propio de la prehistoria , cuando todos éramos tiranos. También menciona Aristóteles al tipo de tirano que se hace pasar por rey y que engaña al pueblo haciéndole creer que el tirano se ha suavizado, haciendo cosas buenas para la ciudad o haciendo ver que las hace, no regalando a extranjeros dinero que surge de los impuestos pagados por el pueblo, para no provocar al pueblo , y hace ver que lleva registros de lo que gana y de lo que gasta , y que cuando gasta dinero público es por una causa importante y no da miedo a la gente sino que ahora solo impone respeto y no impone castigos duros sino que da la impresión de dignidad y aparenta que modera sus placeres , que mejora su ciudad con obras públicas y premia a los buenos en persona, pero deja a los jueces el castigar a los malos , al tiempo que se hace pasar por religioso, no premia a un ciudadano solo sino a varios para que se vigilen unos a otros y si quita poder a alguno, lo hace poco a poco. Ya no usa la violencia contra los ciudadanos, ata y obliga a los más poderosos a que estén en el gobierno y utiliza los dos partidos, el de los pobres y el de los ricos , para sofocar una rebelión de uno de ellos con las fuerzas del otro partido y con las fuerzas del mismo tirano reconvertido ahora en falso rey . Este tipo de tirano encubierto es muy frecuente entre mafiosos y entre empresarios del tipo paternalista así como en dirigentes de la derecha y es la inspiración para el príncipe de Maquiavelo. Aristóteles reconoce que este tipo de tirano "civilizado" es al menos un poco bueno o al menos, es menos malo . Con toda la descripción que Aristóteles ha hecho del tirano de primera generación y del tirano de segunda generación, tenemos casi toda la historia de Roma contada, porque en gran parte la historia de Roma que va venir en los siglos siguientes, no va a ser otra cosa que repetir estos tipos humanos del tirano 1 y del tirano 2 y sus actuaciones , comportándose estos dos tipos de tirano igual como describe Aristóteles , una y otra vez y siglo tras siglo en la historia de Roma. Hay quienes creen , como Jack London en su novela "Before Adam", que lo que ocurre con los tiranos es , en realidad, el enfrentamiento entre dos tipos de HomoSapiens, uno representado por el tirano y el otro representado por el hombre democrático o civilizado. Cada uno de estos dos homo sapiens cree que es el auténtico y el que debe heredar la tierra y que el otro tipo de homo -sapiens es el equivocado ,el monstruoso y el malvado. Por eso el tirano no se ve a sí mismo como malo ni monstruoso sino como lo mejor de la especie humana, el ser más listo y de más fina inteligencia que existe. Por su parte , el hombre civilizado o democrático cree exactamente lo mismo de sí mismo y ve al tirano como un monstruo prehistórico que por alguna razón que no conocemos, sigue viviendo en nuestra época . Como cada uno de los dos homosapiens cree que debe sobrevivir él y no el otro , asistimos desde hace siglos al enfrentamiento entre estos dos tipos de homos -sapiens. El tirano tiene predilección para ejercer su dominio en el mundo de la delincuencia y de lo mafioso , así como en las dictaduras y en las empresas con un solo dueño y en los ambientes familiares machistas, mientras que el homo -sapiens democrático prospera en las universidades, en los ambientes con cultura, en los países avanzados , en los ambientes de alto nivel profesional , en el mundo femenino y en el mundo artístico ( aunque allí no faltan tampoco los tiranos desafortunadamente). Por supuesto, cuando estos dos tipos de homosapiens tienen la desgracia de coincidir en un sitio o en un negocio o en una situación , el enfrentamiento es inevitable . Para el tipo de homosapiens civilizado o democrático, la única posibilidad que tiene de sobrevivir es evitar todo lo que pueda a los ambientes controlados por los tiranos y combatirlos mediante las leyes , los tribunales y la policía . Por su parte, los tiranos siempre tienen la superioridad de que matar es habitual y fácil para ellos y tienen muchos sicarios a su servicio, así como el uso de sobornos y de todo tipo de artimañas ilegales, pues el tirano desprecia las leyes como propias de débiles homosapiens democráticos , unas leyes hechas a la medida de los homosapiens democráticos para aplastar al tirano . El problema de los tiranos está lejos de ser resuelto, 2500 años después de que Aristóteles los describiera mejor que nadie en su "Política" . Constantemente aparecen nuevos tiranos en las nuevas generaciones, llevados por su superioridad en fuerza, en inteligencia, en maldad o en ambición . Si son dinosaurios pertenecientes a otra era geológica que se han colado en nuestra época o si son otra variante de homosapiens que está convencida de que es la auténtica... eso lo dirá el tiempo. En cambio, el rey tiene amigos , los nobles, que son los que le mantienen en el poder. 13 16 b En algunas ciudades hay leyes que impiden que la gente se pueda enriquecer, al considerar que el aumento de oligarcas en la ciudad lleva a un cambio de régimen. Pero en Cartago, que Aristóteles entiende como una democracia, no existen esas leyes y la gente se enriquece libremente sin que llegue un cambio de régimen. En general, si aumenta el número de pobres llega una democracia y si aumenta el número de ricos llega una oligarquía. Aparecen revueltas cuando los ricos depilfarran su dinero y se empobrecen y cuando los magistrados pierden sus tierras y cuando hay gente que ha sido injustamente tratada. 1317 a Aristóteles se pregunta ahora si hay más combinaciones posibles de regímenes políticos. Puede haber una magistratura que sea democrática y unos tribunales que sean aristocráticos. Los elementos que forman una democracia pueden darse en diverso grado y proporción y crear así un tipo de democracia dado ( como ocurre en el ser vivo según las distintas porporciones de materia que posea). Estos elementos de la democracia son : primero la libertad, después el gobernar y ser gobernado alternativamente, o sea, que todos gobiernen sobre cada uno y que cada uno gonbierne sobre todos , tercero una justicia que viene dada por lo que quiere la mayoría y no por el mérito de cada ciudadano , cuarto un utilitarismo según el cual se hace lo que quiere la mayoría , quinto que cada ciudadano viva como quiera y sexto que nadie te gobierne a no ser por turnos, séptimo que todos puedan ser elegidos para gobernar , por elección o por sorteo ( y sin necesidad de experiencia ni de técnica o bien con necesidad de experiencia ) y que puedan juzgar todos los asuntos sin excepción , que los magistrados no tengan que ser ricos, que los cargos sean de poca duración sin posibilidad de repetir ni de que sean vitalicios , que la Asamblea de todos los ciudadanos tenga poder en todos los asuntos, que la democracia se distinga por la falta de nobleza , la rusticidad y la austeridad, que los esclavos sean indisciplinados , que las mujeres y los niños sean también indisciplinados y al mismo tiempo sean los esclavos de los pobres ya que éstos no tienen dinero para pagarse otros esclavos , con una vida libre del vulgo sin trabas puesto que el vulgo no entiende de moderaciones , y en general , que todo se realice por sorteo. La democracia busca la felicidad numérica , de la mayor cantidad de ciudadanos sin que ni los pobres ni los ricos sean aplastados. Una manera de conseguir la igualdad es repartir los anteriores cargos entre mucha más gente, por ejemplo si antes había 500 funcionarios ahora hay 1000. O en la Universidad, si hay cuatro catedráticos y 10 profesores titulares, ahora van a haber 100 profesores iguales y así se reparte la posibilidad de trabajar en la universidad en nombre de la igualdad de oportunidades para todos. Pero la tiranía de la mayoría en la democracia es una injusticia para con los ricos que son minoría ( o para otras minorías como los independentistas catalanes en España al ser una minoría en este país ) . 1318 b Cuando en una asamblea democrática se da un empate, hay que decidir el asunto echándolo a suertes. La repartición de todos los asuntos de la ciudad según un sorteo se podría interpretar como la manera más democrática de gobernar una ciudad, pero vemos que en la práctica pocas veces se realiza de esta manera en los países democráticos actuales, donde solo la lotería o los destinos militares se deciden por sorteo, cuando podrían decidirse muchos más asuntos por sorteo, por ejemplo en todas las oportunidades públicas para los ciudadanos, desde hacer teatro , cine, música, arte, deporte y cualquier otra actividad, que si se adjudicaran por sorteo vendrían acompañadas de una satisfacción general o de una resignación general ante la decisión de la ruleta o del dado, pero vemos que en nuestras democracias actuales nunca se hace así, lo que se hace es que cuando gobierna un partido se favorece a los partidarios de ese partido, pues ellos reciben todas las subvenciones y permisos, mientras que cuando gana el otro partido se favorece a los partidarios de ese otro partido y este sistema sigue funcionando sin que nadie lo cuestione. Siempre buscan la igualdad y la justicia los más débiles porque a los poderosos les da igual y así lo vemos desde la infancia donde los niños más débiles son los que protestan más por las injusticias de los niños más fuertes. Hay democracias de campesinos que no tienen tiempo para dedicarse a la politica y donde se conforman que unos pocos magistrados lleven esos asuntos, bajo su control , porque si los magistrados no son ni ricos ni pobres sino unos técnicos, entonces hacen lo que les place, no se saben contener en que salga su lado malo y se corrompen . Los campesinos aguantan tradicionalmente las oligarquías mientras se les deje trabajar en lo suyo y enriquecerse. En una democracia de campesinos, el control de la tierra es fundamental, y se puede prohibir que un ciudadano tenga demasiada tierra o la hipoteque o la subdivida para venderla. Los pastores también dan buenos demócratas porque están acostumbrados a la vida al aire libre y al ejercicio físico. Los artesanos, mercaderes y jornaleros dan peores demócratass porque son gente urbana sin virtud . 1319 b Las democracias acostumbran a regalar la ciudadanía a todos, a extranjeros, a bastardos, a hijos de matrimonios mixtos. Los demagogos son los que exhortan a que la ciudad se llene de todo tipo de gente, pero desde el punto de vista teórico, la ciudad no debería crecer más allá de un número en que estén empatados los ricos y los pobres. Por supuesto , los demagogos que utilizan a los extranjeros para llenar la ciudad de pobres , lo que quieren es imponer su mayoría de pobres a la mayoría de los ricos, como ocurre exactamente hoy en día con los actuales demagogos que constantemente hacen apología de la inmigración ilegal y de que España se llene de extranjeros. Aristóteles cree que en la ciudad hay que ir eliminando las facciones y procurar que toda la población tenga la misma religión y se mezcle y se rompan los vínculos que traían al llegar a la ciudad . También cree que las propiedades confiscadas a los ricos deben ser declaradas sagradas y por lo tanto intocables para que el vulgo no las pretenda y deje en paz a los ricos. También dice que hay que aumentar las penas para los chivatos de entre el vulgo que denuncien falsamente a ricos y a otra gente importante de la ciudad. También cree que los tribunales y las asambleas deberían durar pocos días para que no costaran dinero a nadie. Además observa que las ayudas a los pobres no sirven de nada porque en poco tiempo vuelven a estar sin dinero. Por ello Aristóteles prefiere un entendimiento con los ricos para que se de a los pobres tierras o se eleve la riqueza de la ciudad con más comercios y empresas. Así se hace en Cartago donde los nobles instruyen a los pobres en diversos oficios y les dan tierras en aldeas y nuevas colonias. Tambien en Tarantino donde los ricos comparten sus tierras con los pobres. En una oligarquía extrema, hay mucha vigilancia. Dice Aristóteles que los barcos mejor construidos y los cuerpos sanos pemiten más atrevimiento para acometer empresas peligrosas, porque el barco y el cuerpo van a resistir más, pero cuando ese barco o ese cuerpo está enfermo , cualquier dolencia o achaque hace empeorar su situación y puede llevarlos a un desastre. Pilotados por malos pilotos o con el cuerpo ya desgastado, cualquier equivocación les es fatal. Es propio de la democracia que la ciudad esté muy poblada pues entre tanta gente es más fácil pasar desapercibido, mientras que la oligarquía necesita que todos los ciudadanos estén muy vigilados por una buena organización oficial. En una oligarquía no hay ningún sorteo y todo se decide por el mérito de cada ciudadano. Un ejército caro y poderoso integrado por la caballería es propio de una oligarquía porque criar a los caballlos es caro, mientras que las democracias no pueden gastar más dinero que para dotarse de una infantería ligera y de una flota y practican ejercicios para hacerse ligeros y ágiles mientras que el ejército oligárquico es pesado ( así los vietnamitas derrotaron a los norteamericanos en la guerra de Vientam, encontrar un simil en el universo ). A veces se obliga a los magistrados a pagar impuestos para que el vulgo no quiera ocupar esos cargos. Las democracias celebran con gran pompa en la ciudad cada año que pasa con su régimen bien establecido, para que el vulgo vea lo fuerte que es. Los mercaderes compran y venden , es la primera de las relaciones entre los hombres y en el mismo universo , luego hay los constructores que reparan los edificios , los vigilantes de lindes, de puertos y de caminos, tesoreros y recaudadores, funcionarios de los tribunales, los inspectores , los alguaciles Aristóteles recomienda que los castigos y las ejecuciones estén repartidas entre muchos alguaciles para que la víctima y sus familiares no puedan identificar a un solo alguacil como el responsable del castigo a uno de ellos y no puedan vengarse en él, consejo que han seguido luego todos los jueces, abogados y verdugos que en el mundo han sido, repartiendo entre mucha gente de leyes la responsabilidad y el acto de ejecutar los castigos, lo cual debe tener algún significado cósmico, cuando el verdugo es uno solo, las familiares del ejecutado se vengan en él, pero cuando son muchos los verdugos no , es otro beneficio de vivir en una ciudad muy poblada y democrática. Los verdugos deben ser lo más repartidos posible y lo mismo los miembros del gobierno que deciden sobre actuaciones muy graves , para que el pueblo no le pueda adjudicar la responsabilidad a un solo miembro del gobierno . 1322 a Si un solo gobernante o juez aplica todos los castigos, se convierte en el enemigo de todos. Otras veces, como ocurre en los países mafiosos, el juez no se atreve a cumplir las leyes, por miedo a las venganzas de los condenados. 1323 a Una ciudad buena debe producir ciudadanos que sean valerosos, prudentes, justos, inteligentes, sensatos y sinceros, no como ocurre en las ciudades malas que producen gente que se asusta de todo, gente que traiciona a sus amigos por cualquier cosa y que para tener comida y bebida se vende o roba y que se comporta como un niño o un loco sin sensatez ni sinceridad. Pero en una ciudad buena no todos aman por igual a la virtud ya que consideran que con un poco de virtud ya es suficiente y no hay que exagerar pues usan la virtud para conseguir cantidades ilimitadas de placer, poder , dinero y lujos. Los ciudadanos inteligentes se contentan con una cantidad limitada de dinero mientras que los ciudadanos más desaforados quieren bienes materiales por encima de sus necesidades y sin límite y usan la virtud para que su ciudad llegue a ser rica y no les interesa ser virtuosos para nada más. Los bienes materiales tienen un límite en este mundo limitado , porque no hay bienes materiales ilimitados en este planeta y porque los bienes materiales no son más que instrumentos para alcanzar la felicidad y todos los instrumentos tienen un límite y este límite se refiere a si son útiles o no esos instrumentos pues su uso excesivo no sirve para nada. Los oportunistas de la virtud solamente usan la virtud como instrumento para conseguir más y más bienes materiales sin darse cuenta de que esos bienes materiales solo tienen una utilidad que es saciar las necesidades básicas del ciudadano y que cuando el ciudadano ya está satisfecho, el exceso de esos bienes materiales no sirve para nada, excepto para emborracharlo o para degenerarlo. En cambio, los bienes del alma, cuantos más mejor , porque traen la belleza y la utilidad. El alma es lo mejor del hombre, por encima del cuerpo y de la suerte. La felicidad es definida por Aristóteles como el estado donde el hombre obra de acuerdo con su virtud y su inteligencia , como Dios que no necesita ningún bien externo para ser feliz. La felicidad no depende de la suerte sino del esfuerzo del individuo por ser virtuoso. Sí que depende de la suerte la llegada de los bienes externos . No depende de la suerte que el individuo se haga justo. Una ciudad es feliz porque en ella todo funciona bien y todo va bien porque es una ciudad virtuosa, ya que es imposible conseguir el objetivo de un trabajo si éste no es guiado hacia el mejor fin posible y el mejor fin posible para una ciudad es que toda su población sea virtuosa. No se actúa bien con vistas a la mejor finalidad si no se actúa mediante la inteligencia y la virtud . La ciudad con ciudadanos virtuosos, justos e inteligentes será una ciudad virtuosa. Ahora Aristóteles se pregunta si es más feliz el extranjero que no participa de los asuntos de la ciudad pero se beneficia de ella y de sus servicios o si es más feliz el filósofo que lleva una vida contemplativa sin trato con los bienes materiales. En una ciudad tiránica, los ciudadanos creen que la finalidad de la ciudad es someter a todos los ciudadanos, pues a cada ciudadano le gustaría tener sometido a sus vecinos . En temas de guerra, las leyes sirven para obligar a la gente a combatir , como entre los espartanos, los cretenses, los cartagineses, los iberos ( ¿ de la Iberia asiática ?) , los tracios, los escitas, los persas o los celtas, pueblos todos que usan las leyes para obligar a la gente a matar enemigos. Sin embargo, Aristóteles observa que esas leyes tiránicas se aplican solo sobre los ciudadanos más débiles, los que pueden ser dominados, como la caza se aplica sobre los animales más fáciles de cazar y de comer. 13 25 a Aristóteles duda de que exista una ciudad aislada sin relación con el resto del mundo y que además sea virtuosa. Abunda más el pensamiento vulgar propio de la chusma de que el poder es lo mejor porque permite controlar más asuntos y personas, y así el padre puede traicionar a sus padres y a sus hijos para tener el mando y para que le vayan bien las cosas a él . Pero este tipo de ciudadano no se diferencia en nada de un ladrón. Además, este tipo de cuidadano no distingue entre nada ni nadie y , por ello, nunca conocerá qué es la virtud que depende de una inteligencia para distinguir entre objetos , sujetos y seres. El ciudadano virtuoso reflexiona y medita y esa es su actividad y lo hace con vistas al mejor fin para la ciudad, que es su prosperidad. El hombre malvado ni reflexiona ni medita ni sabe de nada. La ciudad está formada por muchas partes y comunidades que están interrelacionadas y el mismo Dios y el Universo también son así, pues se relacionan con los bienes materiales. Como el tejedor necesita buena lana y el carpintero buena madera, el legislador necesita buen material humano para trabajar. No es lo mismo una gran ciudad que una muy poblada, en una gran ciudad se siguen unos planes y hay un equilibro entre los diferentes tipos de hombres, en una ciudad muy poblada solo hay un montón de gente sin orden. ( los actuales urbanistas olvidan esta distinción pues prefieren crear megalópolis como Londres o París sin atender a que por muy grandes que sean no van a ser mejores si no son virtuosas ). Una ciudad demasiado poblada solo puede ser gobernada por Dios, porque a los hombres les es imposible gobernar un número muy grande de ciudadanos. Los hombres solo pueden gobernar dentro de un orden a un número limitado de ciudadanos, y pasado este límite todo se desborda y toma proporciones astronómicas y , por lo tanto, se sale fuera de las posibilidades humanas y cae dentro de la competencia de Dios. Los urbanitas actuales se creen dioses que pueden mantener en orden a una ciudad monstruosamente grande como México o Beijing, que no son realmente ciudades sino más bien " universos desordenados fuera del alcance humano". En todos los seres vivos la belleza depende de una proporción y una medida y si se rebasa esa medida, no hay belleza y el ser vivo es entonces inútil o defectuoso. Un barco pequeño o muy grande es difícil de navegar. Una ciudad con demasiada población que no puede escuchar los discursos de los políticos ni de sus heraldos ( hoy en día si se puede gracias a la televisión) es una ciudad fuera de las posibilidades humanas . Una ciudad no puede crecer infinitamente. El límite al crecimiento de una ciudad viene dado por el número de ciudadanos que se conocen, porque para votar en las elecciones a unos cargos hay que conocer a los otros ciudadanos. En una ciudad demasiada poblada donde la mayoría de la gente no se conoce, allí prosperan los oportunistas como los extranjeros porque nadie los conoce tampoco. La mejor ciudad tiene un tamaño que sea fácil de controlar y con una población suficiente para que unos proporcionen los bienes para los otros y se conozcan. Debe estar bien comunicada con otras ciudades para el comercio y el transporte y para la ayuda en caso de guerra. No es bueno estar al lado del mar porque a su puerto llegan barcos con inmigrantes con otras ideologías que perturban el orden en la ciudad. Los bárbaros de tierras frías tienen arrojo pero les falta la reflexión y la tecnica, viven libres pero sin organización política ni gran capacidad para invadir otras tierras. Los asiáticos son más reflexivos pero cobardes. Pero los griegos, que son un término medio entre los europeos y los asiáticos, son los libres, los capaces de organizarse y de dominar a otros pueblos ( solo cuando consiguen ponerse de acuerdo en un solo régimen político, como intentará Alejandro Magno como condición necesaria para su imperialismo helénico ) . Al mismo tiempo, las ciudades griegas relacionadas entre sí repiten ese mismo esquema de naciones , hay ciudades cobardes , hay ciudades estúpidas y hay ciudades bien organizadas. Los pueblos más avanzados son los que viven más según su alma porque sienten más el desprecio y el daño por la falta de reconocimiento . Y procuran tener un ejército para acabar con las rebeliones contra las leyes en la ciudad . Y dan poder a los viejos en los asuntos que necesitan reflexión, pero también dan el poder a los jóvenes en los asuntos que piden fuerza. Los ciudadanos de tierras fronterizas no deben participar en las asambleas porque no deliberarían convenientemente dada su situación entre dos aguas. 1332 a La gente más débil y pobre es la que necesita más recursos siendo que la gente con buen cuerpo y salud necesita menos recursos . 1334 a Sin ejército, la ciudad es esclava de sus enemigos, porque éstos no se atreven a atacarla si ven que está bien preparada para la guerra. La paz hace soberbios a los ciudadanos y descuidados en el entrenamiento militar mientras que la guerra nos obliga a ser justos y sensatos. En la pareja hay riqueza y pobreza, hay el hombre que es potente y la mujer que es yerma o al revés . Las relaciones entre marido y mujer siguen el mismo esquema que las relaciones entre la parte rica y la parte pobre de la ciudad. Los hombres y las mujeres muy jóvenes engendran niños débiles . Las mujeres muy jóvenes y ya con vida sexual son luego las más intemperantes. Hay un tiempo límite para la actividad sexual, mientras se está creciendo hay que evitarla así como al envejecer. Aristóteles cree que el cuerpo de los niños puede entrenarse para que responda a las necesidades de cada régimen político. El cuerpo debe corresponder a una clase media, ni demasiado atlético ni demasiado flojo , ni maltratado ni enfermo . Los atletas se entrenan siempre para una sola dirección o fin, que es ganar una competición atlética, y practican ejercicios muy especiales y violentos y , p0r lo tanto, cambian por la fuerza a su cuerpo y lo maltratan como lo hace un tirano sobre su ciudad , pero el ciudadano no debe entrenarse de esa manera ( que es propia de un régimen tiránico o espartano que cría atletas o soldados para que tengan una sola dimensión física y mental ) sino que el ciudadano de la clase media debe estar entrenado para muchas actividades distintas, propias de una ciudad democrática. 1335 b Los fetos se aprovechan de sus madres como las plantas se aprovechan de la tierra. Y las madres deben estar bien alimentadas pero no deben pensar demasiado ( ? ) . Los lisiados y los niños que pasan el límite de hijos pemitidos deben ser abandonados y dejados morir , antes de que tengan sentidos y vida. Los hijos de ancianos y de muy jóvenes son débiles y retrasados ( como lo es también una ciudad diseñada por muy viejos o muy jóvenes ). Los niños deben ser habituados al frío y a los juegos, que son como imitaciones de lo que en su vida adulta van a hacer en serio ( los juegos son imitaciones de la vida real , que a su vez es otra imitación de un modelo platónico ) y deben hacer ejercicios para que no se tuerzan los miembros ( y si ocurre esto hay aparatos para poner bien rectos los miembros, como en las ciudades desviadas hay medios para que éstas vuelvan al camino recto ). Aristóteles no quiere que los adolescentes asistan a conciertos ni beban alcohol. La educación sirve para prevenir todos estos males ( la educación es un sistema inmunológico que impide que la música y la bebida puedan hacer daño al cuerpo ). Hay que evitar que los jóvenes conozcan lo malo , a la gente mala, a los actores malos y a los músicos malos porque si no, se acostumbran a lo malo . Todo arte y educación pretenden complementar lo que le falta a la naturaleza. El arte añade a la naturaleza lo que le falta y en este sentido se puede decir que el arte forma parte del mismo cuerpo y mente humanos , ayudando a la naturaleza a completar su trabajo , siendo que este proceso forma parte también de la naturaleza, que se complementa a sí misma mediante el arte humano. Edición utilizada : Aristóteles "Política" , traducción de Carlos García Gual y de Aurelio Pérez Jiménez , Alianza Editorial , 1986. . LA DEMOCRACIA DE ARISTÓTELES El sistema político y económico diseñado por Aristóteles hace 2400 años , es, todavía en su esencia, el sistema actual que sufrimos todos. Se puede considerar que el concepto de democracia y de capitalismo provienen de Aristóteles y que luego fue desarrollado hasta el máximo de sus posibilidades durante el Imperio Romano, que en este sentido se puede decir que es un hijo de Aristóteles claramente. Por ello, en nuestra época en la que aparecen movimientos políticos que pretenden llevar a los países hacia un sistema político y económico mejor, cuando en realidad quieren aplicar viejas y gastadas fórmulas comunistas y anarquistas que ya han demostrado ampliamente que o no funcionan o que son defectuosas, en nuestra época es necesario repasar el sistema político y económico diseñado por Aristóteles hace ya 2400 años porque sigue siendo la base de nuestro sistema actual. Aristóteles ofrecía una visión bastante oscura de la condición humana, para él todos los hombres eran ambiciosos por naturaleza, la maquina humana estaba programada para ser ambiciosa y querer tener más de todo tanto a nivel del cuerpo físico como a nivel de la mente y de las propiedades materiales. Cada país estaba lleno de miles de ambiciosos que, inevitablemente, chocaban unos contra los otros por conseguir las limitadas oportunidades para enriquecerse o para crecer física y mentalmente. Para Aristóteles, la ciudad era el logro más importante de la civilización humana, porque entendía que una ciudad solamente existía para ofrecer a sus ciudadanos las condiciones mínimas de vida, especialmente la vivienda y la comida, es decir, el concepto actual de Estado del Bienestar donde el estado proporciona a todos los ciudadanos los medios mínimos de vida, vivienda, comida, educación, sanidad y trabajo, este concepto proviene de Aristóteles, quien creía que una ciudad solamente podía existir y ser llamada una buena ciudad si daba a todos sus ciudadanos los medios mínimos de vida. Por eso a Aristóteles no le importaba el bien puro de Platón sino que siempre hablaba de alcanzar el bien material en este mundo que, según él, estaba representado por la ciudad o estado, el mayor logro de la humanidad y que existía solamente para que todos los ciudadanos pudieran tener los mínimos medios de vida. Una ciudad era el bien si daba a todos los ciudadanos los medios mínimos de subsistencia, ese era el bien tal y como lo entendía Aristóteles y no le interesaba discutir sobre el concepto de bien puro de Platón. Pero en la ciudad o estado se daban unos movimientos o flujos constantes que , según Aristóteles, eran los mismos movimientos que se podían observar por todo el universo. Se trataba de fenómenos de igualación y de desigualación, que podíamos apreciar también en todos los fenómenos físicos y químicos que se daban en el universo. Pitágoras ya había hablado de estas parejas de contrarios , como la democracia contra la oligarquía o la igualación contra la desigualación, contrarios que presidían todos los fenómenos del universo. La unidad, asimilada a Dios, se despliega en lo múltiple , asimilado al mundo material, y esta multiplicidad empieza por la dualidad o número dos y sigue en muchas más multiplicidades, la primera de las cuales es la dualidad o parejas de contrarios propia de nuestro universo material. Por estos fenómenos constantes de igualación y de desigualación, los ciudadanos pobres de una ciudad aspiraban a lograr una igualación en esa ciudad, según la cual los ricos tuvieran menos dinero y los pobres tuvieran más dinero al repartirse mejor la riqueza de la ciudad y asimismo se buscaba una igualación en los derechos de los ciudadanos de manera que todos fueran iguales ante las leyes y ante las oportunidades de trabajo y de llegar a cargos públicos. Los pobres y la chusma de la ciudad siempre buscaban la igualación en la ciudad, mientras que los superdotados, que según Aristóteles no lo eran tanto pues solo podían presumir de alguna excelencia en su cuerpo o en su mente o en su fortuna o en su estirpe que les hacía creer que eran ciudadanos superiores a los demás, aunque en realidad no lo fueran sino solamente en alguna excelencia en concreto, este tipo de ciudadanos superdotados nunca se sentía a gusto en las épocas de igualación en la ciudad y siempre tramaba la manera de volver a una época de desigualación en la que estos superdotados tuvieran más oportunidades , derechos y privilegios que los otros ciudadanos. Aristóteles dice que estos superdotados siempre creían que por el hecho de poseer alguna excelencia en la que eran superiores a los demás ciudadanos, por ello se creían con más derechos que lo demás ciudadanos a enriquecerse, pues consideraban que es lo que les correspondia por ser excelentes en algo. De este movimiento de igualación hacia la desigualación aparecen los ricos de la ciudad, superdotados que necesitan ser ricos para vivir y que explotan, roban o manipulan a los otros ciudadanos para acumular las riquezas que consideran que les corresponden por ser superiores a los otros ciudadanos, Entonces se entra en una época de desigualación en la ciudad donde los ricos gobiernan y tienen muchos privilegios, es la oligarquía. Muchas veces, nos explica Aristóteles, la gente superdotada que vive en una ciudad igualitaria no soporta ese estilo de vida y busca de todas las maneras posibles el diferenciarse lo máximo posible de la chusma igualitaria, de los otros ciudadanos que son todos iguales o lo parecen , entonces el superdotado busca ser lo más diferente al resto de los ciudadanos y lo logra destacando en el arte, la guerra, el deporte, las ciencias, la técnica o la política . El superdotado que vive a disgusto en una ciudad igualitaria siempre busca desarrollar su cuerpo, su mente y sus aptitudes para ser lo más diferente posible a los otros ciudadanos de la ciudad igualitaria. Cuando lo consigue, se enriquece y convierte a la ciudad en una de desigual donde hay pocos ricos y muchos pobres. Con el tiempo se inicia otra vez el mismo proceso de igualación y de desigualación, al protagonizar los pobres unas revueltas o revoluciones para volver a instaurar la igualación en la ciudad, robando el patrimonio y el dinero de los ricos. Este proceso, según Aristóteles, no tiene fin y se repite una y otra vez en la vida de la ciudad, siglo tras siglo. Además, muchos de los superdotados que aparecen en la ciudad igualitaria, provienen de la antigua chusma o clase obrera o baja que había protagonizado las revoluciones en la ciudad para proclamar la igualación en la ciudad, es decir, que cuando todos los ciudadanos acceden a una igualación entre ellos, siempre hay algunos que entonces buscan ser superiores a los demás y ponerse por encima de esta igualación, para enriquecerse o para explotar alguna excelencia en la que destaquen. Por eso la visión que tiene Aristóteles de la condición humana es pesimista y oscura, ya que ve que todos los hombres son igual de ambiciosos y nadie puede confiar en nadie, pues entre los mismos que anteriormente habían buscado la igualación en la ciudad, ahora aparecen individuos que quieren ser lo más desiguales posibles del resto de ciudadanos para enriquecerse. No hay que fiarse de los partidos que dicen que luchan por la igualdad en el país, porque cuando esa igualdad se haya alcanzado, luego siempre aparecerán individuos listillos que intentarán salirse de esa igualación para destacar en algo que les pueda enriquecer. Este proceso de igualación y desigualación es perpetuo y es el mismo que se da en todo el universo a nivel físico o químico. La vida política en la ciudad transcurre alrededor de este proceso de igualación y de desigualación. Cuando la chusma o clase baja obrera triunfa en la ciudad, se da una época de igualación o democracia pero, con el tiempo, aparecen los individuos superdotados que buscan la desigualación y entonces llega la oligarquía o gobierno de los ricos, que también puede tomar la forma de tiranía o de dictadura militar . Aristóteles admite que en todas las democracias se da de hecho una mezcla de democracia y de oligarquía ( especialmente en la democracia de los Estados Unidos donde es evidente ). La vida política de la ciudad está determinada fatalmente por estos procesos de igualación y de desigualación y según Aristóteles no es posible escapar a este círculo vicioso en el que las épocas de igualación son seguidas por las épocas de desigualación. El sistema político y económico de Aristóteles surge de la aceptación de estos ciclos perpetuos de igualación y de desigualación, donde una época democrática y plebeya es seguida por otra época patricia y oligárquica y otra vez vuelta a empezar el ciclo. No es posible diseñar un sistema político mejor, cree Aristóteles, y de hecho ni tan solo cree que ningún sistema político sea mejor que los otros, pues observa que todos los sistemas políticos son igual de defectuosos, cada uno de ellos cría un tipo de hombre característico de ese régimen y cada sistema político usa la educación para formar al tipo de hombre conveniente para ese régimen. Para Aristóteles, no existe ninguna alternativa a su sistema político y económico, no se ha inventado todavía nada mejor y nadie sabría cómo hacerlo. Por eso debemos desconfiar de esos partidos políticos anticapitalistas que presumen de tener un nuevo sistema político que ofrecer, porque no existe, nadie lo ha inventado todavía y nadie sabe cómo podría hacerse. Seguimos viviendo en el sistema diseñado por Aristóteles hasta que aparezca un genio de la política y de la teoría económica que sea capaz de inventar un sistema mejor. Hasta entonces, no conocemos alternativa al sistema actual. Como consecuencia del sistema político basado en la alternancia en el poder de una época de igualación seguida de otra época de desigualación, aparece un sistema económico donde lo importante no son los ciudadanos, que son prescindibles, y que van pasando como el agua que fluye por los ríos, dice Aristóteles. sino que lo importante es la vida económica en la ciudad, que sigue los mismos flujos de empobrecimiento y de enriquecimiento que van ligados a los procesos de igualación y de desigualación en la ciudad. Cuando se da la igualación, la vida económica de la ciudad tiende a estancarse pero gracias a la aparición de nuevos ambiciosos superdotados que quieren enriquecerse, se vuelve a dinamizar la vida económica y vuelve a moverse el dinero , y cuando llega la revolución de la clase baja obrera que roba su dinero y propiedades a los ricos, entonces se vuelve a dar otra dinamización de la vida económica con una redistribución de la riqueza en la ciudad. Estos movimientos económicos son los flujos naturales en la ciudad, según Aristóteles, y no hay otros posibles. No importa si un ciudadano se arruina o si de pobre pasa a rico en poco tiempo o si a un rico le confiscan todo su dinero, eso es irrelevante para Aristóteles, lo importante es que se mueva el dinero por la ciudad. Por eso el sistema de Aristóteles es oscuro y feo. Los romanos lo desarrollaron hasta sus últimas consecuencias y por muchos siglos, así este sistema fue inamovible e indestructible, la clase baja , los esclavos y los pobres de Roma eran los que sufrían más este sistema inflexible y severo . Cuando llega el cristianismo, se propone acabar con el sistema de Aristóteles y sustituirlo por el nuevo sistema cristiano basado en el amor al prójimo y la compasión, pero tras encandilar a muchos romanos pobres y esclavos en sus primeros tiempos, el cristianismo pronto degenera y se convierte en otro sistema tan despiadado como el romano, donde no faltan los ricos muy ricos y donde los pobres solo tienen derecho a la beneficencia . El cristianismo fracasa pues, a pesar de haberse presentado como la nueva y esperanzadora alternativa a las crueldades del sistema romano. San Agustín propone convertir a las ciudades de Aristóteles, que llama ciudades mundanas, en ciudades de Dios donde todos lso hombres se ayudan unos a otros y donde no hay ni pobres ni ricos, pero fracasa, como todos sabemos tras 2000 años de cristianismo fallido. La realidad es que en todos los países del mundo, especialmente en los occidentales desde la revolución industrial, es el sistema de Aristóteles el que sigue funcionando, ahora llamado capitalismo y democracia parlamentaria. La naturaleza del hombre no ha cambiado en estos últimos 2000 años y todos los hombres son igual de ambiciosos y todos buscan la desigualación una vez han logrado la igualación, para ponerse por encima de los demás y enriquecerse. Contra esta ley inexorable de la política y de la economía, no se puede hacer otra cosa que seguir administrando los países según los conceptos de Aristóteles, aunque siempre surjan movimientos de protesta ante la evidente fealdad de su sistema. Hobbes mismo lo refrenda cuando dice que es un estilo de vida corto, brutal y desagradable. Los intentos para salir de esos ciclos imparables de igualación y desigualación no han faltado en estos últimos 2000 años, hemos mencionado ya el cristianismo, mencionemos ahora el falangismo español que quería salir de esos ciclos eternos y del capitalismo y el comunismo para formar un nuevo sistema político por encima de todos ellos. Y como todos sabemos fracasó porque el falangismo español pronto degeneró en un tipo de dictadura fascista. En general, todos los intentos por salir del determinismo ciego del sistema de Aristóteles han fracasado porque no tienen en cuenta la naturaleza humana ambiciosa que siempre busca diferenciarse de los demás ciudadanos para conseguir alguna situación de privilegio o de excelencia. Lo hemos presenciado claramente en estos 37 años de democracia en España, donde hemos visto como tantos tipos que procedían de la clase baja obrera en 1975, y que pedían entonces una sociedad más igualitaria, en estos 37 años de democracia se han colocado todos en puestos políticos o empresariales o en alguna situación profesional ventajosa y ahora son los nuevos ricos del actual régimen, confirmando una vez más el movimiento de igualación y de desigualación descrito por Aristóteles hace 2400 años. En cuatro palabras, esto es lo que explica Aristóteles en su libro "Política", aunque con muchas ampliaciones de detalle. Dedica el tercer libro de "Política" a criticar el comunismo de Platón, que considera un error porque los ciudadanos, al compartirlo todo, incluso los hijos y las herramientas y las casas, descuidan su mantenimiento porque no es cosa suya y nadie se ocupa de nada , ni de los hijos ni de las casas ni de nada. Todo es común y nadie se ocupa de nada. Un poco burlándose del concepto ontológico de Platón sobre la "participación " de las cosas sensibles en las formas inteligibles, Aristóteles dice que solo ve participación de todos los ciudadanos en todo lo que es de la ciudad, de todos en todo , al compartirlo todo, eso es lo que entiende Aristóteles por la "participación" platónica. Para Aristóteles el materialista, el único bien que existe es que todos los ciudadanos tengan comida y vivienda, es la felicidad material para Aristóteles y la mayor fuente de placer para el gobernante que ha sabido dotar a su ciudad de todo lo necesario para la vida, una vez más y burlándose de Platón, Aristóteles dice que la felicidad no es como los números que admiten más y menos números, la felicidad es o no es y solo es en una ciudad bien llevada. El mayor bien de un ciudadano es tener sus necesidades básica cubiertas y todo ciudadano necesita cada día la entrada de alimento, agua y aire en su cuerpo, Por lo tanto esas son las necesidades más imperiosas. Al mismo tiempo las substancias que entran y salen de su cuerpo cada día, como la comida, el agua y el aire, son también las que más influyen en ese ciudadano. El estado debe buscar el mismo bien para la ciudad, en sus entradas y salidas de mercancías cada día. Para Aristóteles, como para la mayoría de los economistas actuales, el compartirlo todo es anti-económico porque mata la vida económica de la ciudad. Ha de darse un mercadeo de bienes según su valor y según el valor del que lo haya fabricado y esa es la auténtica vida de la ciudad. Se ha de mover el dinero gracias a los cambios constantes por las igualdades y las desigualdades, lo cual ha sido interpretado por los economistas actuales más despiadados como una justificación del actual status quo donde los países pobres tienen que seguir siendo pobres "para que haya movimiento de bienes y de capitales por el mundo ". El mayor bien es , pues, una ciudad bien administrada, justa, bella, armoniosa cuando proporciona a todos sus habitantes la satisfacción de las necesidades básicas y cuando transcurre la vida política de esa ciudad de una manera armoniosa , es decir, con alternancia de épocas de igualación seguidas de otras épocas de desigualación y con un juego político entre todos los sectores de la ciudad. Las ciudades –estado de la época de Aristóteles poseían una población de unos 10.000 habitantes, una cifra adecuada para que en la ciudad viviera todo tipo de gente con todo tipo de profesiones y para que la ciudad pudiera mantener a un ejército que disuadiera a los enemigos acerca de invadir y saquear la ciudad. Una ciudad debía ser difícil de invadir. Aristóteles quería que se controlaran los nacimientos en la ciudad para que no hubiera demasiada gente y la ciudad se encontrara que no podía alimentarla ( esta política de sentido común está hoy en día totalmente en desuso como vemos en las ciudades españolas donde se dejan empadronar a miles de extranjeros sin saber si van a poderles dar trabajo ni las condiciones mínimas de vida). Por esto Aristóteles se nos presenta como un tecnócrata al que le encanta planificarlo todo, no solamente los nacimientos en la ciudad sino también el numero de extranjeros que son permitidos entrar en ella. Aristóteles dice que en su época " ya se había inventado todo " refiriéndose que en su época ya se habían probado muchos tipos distintos de constituciones políticas en muchas ciudades griegas con muchos tipos de leyes distintas. Aristóteles ha pasado a la historia como el defensor de la clase media. Creía que la clase media era necesaria para representar la estabilidad en la ciudad, porque la clase media no participaba en los ciclos de igualación y desigualación, La clase media solo se preocupaba de sus propios asuntos y no se mezclaba en política, solamente pedía al gobernante de turno que la dejara vivir en paz dedicada a sus asuntos, casi siempre referidos a enriquecerse pero de una manera más modesta y lenta que en el caso de los ricos de la ciudad, la clase media aspiraba siempre a no meterse en problemas y en seguir ahorrando con el fruto de su trabajo profesional. Por eso dice Aristóteles que la clase media era importante en la ciudad porque la estabilizaba , en medio delas luchas por el poder entre los ricos y los pobres. La clase media era la única que podía dar una larga vida a la ciudad, manteniendo sus propiedades y dineros en tiempo de revoluciones, ya que los ricos se arruinaban fácilmente o eran robados por los pobres y éstos a su vez siempre estaban tramando revueltas. A la clase media ni tan solo le preocupa el bien de la ciudad, solo le importa su dinero y que el gobernante de turno no se lo quite con expropiaciones o impuestos y lo único que pide al que gobierne es que la deje vivir en paz dedicada a sus asuntos. La chusma o la masa es la mayoría de la gente y Aristóteles advierte que, considerado en cada caso particular, cada ciudadano miembro de la chusma no es más que un hombre mediocre, pero la masa, considerada en su conjunto, es un adversario temible porque reúne a muchos hombres mediocres en ella y todos estos hombres mediocres van sumando sus mediocridades y las van complementando unas a otras, de manera que la chusma puede ser excelente gracias a la suma de muchas mediocridades. La masa puede tener un cuerpo excelente gracias a estar formado por miles de otros cuerpos mediocres. Sin embargo, Aristóteles no se engaña y sabe que la masa es tiránica por naturaleza, porque está compuesta por individuos que son tiranos unos sobre los otros. La masa impone su tiranía cuando tiene la ocasión de la misma manera como lo hace un solo tirano en la ciudad, la diferencia es que la masa está compuesta por miles de tiranos. La democracia es una tiranía de muchos que solo se distingue de la otra tiranía de uno solo, por la cantidad de participantes en ella. En la democracia cada ciudadano se comporta como un tirano con los demás. Como hemos comentado, a Aristóteles no le interesa la teoría del bien puro o ideal de Platón, y de la misma manera tampoco le interesa el tema de las copias defectuosas respecto a un ideal u original, que explicarían para Platón la aparición de regímenes extremos defectuosos, entendidos como malas copias de los regímenes políticos más clásicos. Según Aristóteles, los regímenes políticos más extremos no son malas copias de otros regímenes más puros, sino que son desviaciones de lo recto y que llevan a la democracia extrema o gobierno de los peores hombres de la ciudad, y a la tiranía extrema donde la ciudad es gobernada por un monarca o tirano que impone absolutamente sus dictados. Estos dos tipos de regímenes políticos extremos son , según Aristóteles, desviaciones monstruosas de los regímenes políticos más corrientes. Aristóteles cree que los regímenes monstruosos aparecen cuando las necesidades básicas de la población ya han sido cubeirtas por la ciudad, es entonces cuando aparece el lujo, la molicie, el afeminamiento, los excesos alimenticios, los excesos en la buena vida y las primeras manifestaciones de esos excesos son la aparición de leyes cada vez más complicadas, indescifrables o incumplibles que intentan regular las más mínimas situaciones en la ciudad, síntoma claro de que la ciudad está degenerando. Aristóteles dice que hay que parar esos excesos en la ciudad. Un rey es un tipo excepcional, es un superdotado, es un Heracles que aparece de tarde en tarde y ante el cual, debido a su superioridad tan manifiesta, los otros hombres lo aceptan como su superior. Se le dan todos los poderes de la ciudad por ser un superdotado. Aristóteles menciona una ciudad griega donde los gobernantes no solamente no cobran nada por ser políticos sino que encima deben pagar para poder acceder a un cargo público, ya que en esa ciudad se considera que la política debe ser vocacional, voluntaria y sin remuneración alguna, ya que es la actividad más bien considerada por todos los ciudadanos porque es la que trae la riqueza y el bien a la ciudad, por todo ello en esa ciudad griega los políticos no cobraban nada y además debían pagar de su bolsillo una cantidad importante de dinero para poder acceder a un cargo público. Aristóteles se pregunta ahora acerca del problema de los cargos públicos o magistraturas. Como todos los hombres son igual de ambiciosos, todos quieren acceder a un cargo público y ,de paso, enriquecerse con él y ayudar a sus amiguetes. Esto sucede siempre, dice Aristóteles, tanto en democracia como en oligarquía. Como solución al problema de a quién dar los cargos públicos, Aristóteles propone que el tiempo que se ocupe en esos cargos públicos sea muy corto, como de un año o menos, de seis meses, y que se renueven constantemente esos cargos para que la mayor cantidad posible de población tenga su oportunidad de ocupar uno de esos cargos, también dice que en los cargos públicos que conllevan una gran responsabilidad y que son fuente de creación de peligrosos enemigos, como son los cargos de verdugo en las sentencias de muerte y otros cargos punitivos odiados por la población , se han de distribuir esos cargos entre la mayor cantidad posible de gente, de manera que la responsabilidad de la ejecución de las sentencias recaiga en mucha gente y los perjudicados por esas sentencias no puedan vengarse en nadie en concreto y para que el odio del castigado no recaiga en un solo funcionario. Los cargos deberían ser por un año y pueden ser por elección o por sorteo o por los dos medios ( se sortea y luego el que haya salido agraciado se le elije también) y con la mayor alternancia posible en los cargos. Para Aristóteles, una ciudad es como un animal o un organismo vivo y posee las mismas partes que todo animal. En una ciudad entra y sale comida, son los comerciantes, una ciudad tiene un sistema inmunológico, son los soldados, tiene jueces que son la mente o espíritu de la ciudad, los que piensan , la ciudad tiene obreros que trabajan las materias, tiene esclavos que hacen los peores trabajos y tiene extranjeros ( podríamos considerar que los virus y bacterias tanto los buenos como los malos son los extranjeros de nuestro cuerpo ). La ciudad tiene partes que, como en la tragedia griega según Aristóteles, deben tener una relación unas con otras y deben ser las partes justas, ni una más ni una menos , para que la ciudad tenga vida propia y autosuficiente, como un todo formado por partes con un principio, un medio y un fin, como la tragedia griega. La ciudad tiene partes ricas y partes pobres que ser relacionan constantemente por los procesos de igualación y desigualación que llevan a que esas partes estén siempre cambiando. Hay partes del cuerpo y de la ciudad que buscan la igualdad y hay otras partes que buscan la desigualdad, la ciudad y el cuerpo sufren crecimientos monstruosos pero tienen también medios para controlarlos, la ciudad tiene tendencia a que una parte de ella tenga más poder que las otras y tiranice así a las otras partes, lo cual también puede ocurrir en un cuerpo enfermo. La ciudad es un organismo que necesita que todas sus partes estén presentes para que funcione como un todo, y que no le falte ninguna parte ni le sobre ninguna otra, lo importante es que en el interior del organismo se de ese juego político entre iguales y desiguales, entre partes ricas y partes pobres, entre intelectuales o los que representan a la mente y entre obreros o los que representan a los brazos y piernas del cuerpo, y todas esas partes deben moverse en una armonía que solo aparece cuando la ciudad está sana y viva, por todos los movimientos que se dan dentro de ella ( no olvidemos que para Aristóteles la vida es acción) . Entonces la ciudad es un cuerpo bello, armonioso, justo y bueno según Aristóteles, ya sea considerando a un atleta, a una estatua o a una ciudad. La única ciudad que puede darse en este mundo con las condiciones que se dan en este mundo es este tipo de ciudad buena . No es posible, para Aristóteles, la existencia de la ciudad de Dios de los cristianos, donde todos los ciudadanos fueran justos y puros, porque eso no es posible en este mundo. Aristóteles considera que este tipo de individuos virtuosos puros no pertenece a la ciudad mundana porque no participa en ella, vive al margen dedicada a la religión o vive fuera de la ciudad como eremita y no es parte de la humanidad. La mayoría de la gente no es ni justa ni pura ni virtuosa y esa es la realidad y la ciudad debe diseñarse para gobernar a la mayoría de la gente y no a una minoría de gente virtuosa y justa, que vive apartada y no se relaciona con el resto de la gente. Es el utilitarismo de Aristóteles: hay que gobernar para la mayoría del agente que es ambiciosa y que siempre busca ser superior a los demás para enriquecerse, hay que tomar decisiones políticas según lo que convenga o quiera esa mayoría. Entonces hay que definir qué es la virtud pura y la justicia pura para Aristóteles. Pero él prefiere definir qué es la justicia utilitarista y la virtud utilitarista, según las cuales cada grupo social y profesional de la ciudad posee su propia virtud particular procedente del ejercicio de su actividad profesional, y sigue su propia concepción de la justicia según lo que convenga a su profesión, pero la finalidad de la ciudad debe ser alcanzar un armonía entre las muchas virtudes particulares que se encuentran en ella, según cada grupo social o profesional. El fin de la ciudad no es ganar dinero porque eso convertiría a la ciudad en una ciudad de mercaderes ricos solamente, la finalidad de la ciudad tampoco pude ser la satisfacción del ansia de igualdad que tiene la masa, porque entonces la ciudad se convertiría en una tiranía de la masa que lo robaría todo a los ricos una y otra vez en nombre de esa igualación, y la finalidad de la ciudad tampoco puede ser la mera supervivencia de la gente porque la convertiría en un establo o en una hacienda de esclavos. La finalidad de la ciudad debe ser otra más elevada donde todas las secciones de la ciudad se complementen para la prosperidad de la ciudad, sin rehuir la lucha política entre ricos y pobres , entre igualación y desigualación.

Tunnel vision (Nietzsche, On the Uses and Abuses of History for Life) When Wittgenstein was young, he wrote a small book intended to solve all of philosophy problems with language, called Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922). A self-taught philosopher with an academic background in engineering, Wittgenstein had studied logic and philosophy under the supervision of Bertrand Russell, but the Tractatus was not written inside university walls. Wittgenstein wrote this small book on the front-line, during the First World War, in intellectual solitude, without any peers and without any feedback from his supervisor. After the war, Wittgenstein showed the book to Russell who immediately recognized its brilliance. The book was very well received by the Cambridge community of analytic philosophers and by the Vienna Circle. Later, Russell persuaded Wittgenstein to present it as a PhD thesis at Cambridge. The PhD defence, held in 1929, seven years later after the publication of the Tractatus, was a mere formality held among close friends G. E. Moore and Russell were in the commission. Although Wittgenstein was granted the doctoral degree by his friends, this book was never something one would call new that the degree was an exception, granted to an exceptionally gifted philosopher. But as an academic writer, Wittgenstein had failed. As an intellectual piece, the Tractatus is a strange beast, written by a student with the voice of a professor. Its process of creation resembles that of a fictional piece: the author is struck by inspiration, labours in solitude, and then translates the vision onto paper. Yet the Tractatus was not meant to be a work of fiction, rather to have the final say in a conceptual debate about the relation between language and world. This little book was meant to be the end of all philosophical conversation, the final nail in its coffin. Written outside the university, the Tractatus had the ambition of ending the academic conversation in philosophy, while it refused to engage with that conversation. This was not fair-play on any account. The Tractatus was never intended to be an academic text; it had no footnotes, no references to other authors. It was a vision of language that Wittgenstein had shared with the world. -back: everybody tried to draw Wittgenstein into the conversation he had fled from. But Wittgenstein could not endure involving the Tractatus in any battle of ideas. Initially, he claimed he had been misunderstood by everybody, even by Russell. Later, during the 1930s, after already embarking on other projects and writings, Wittgenstein admitted that he had been wrong in the Tractatus. But it was too late. The philosophers of the day kept asking him to comment on those ideas that he had come to see as mistakes. Sometimes Wittgenstein would just whistle a tune from Schubert, or turn his back and recite Indian poems, in response to their annoying demands. The book had gained a life of its own, against its creator. People wanted to talk about it then, and still today, conferences and books are written on Wittgenstein One can only wonder if Wittgenstein Tractatus would have resulted in such a strange piece had it been written inside the university, after debates with peers. As soon as an academic text is published or just shared with others, it gets placed in another context. Academic writers lose all authority over their own text and are forced to approach it as readers, with unfamiliar eyes. This is when the work starts to rise against its author: even if the author made no mistake, just by being cited, read and discussed, the work gets a whole new meaning decided by others. Academic writing is conversational in a way that other kinds of writing are not. Wittgenstein did not know this, he insisted on shushing the wave of words stirred by his text. A piece of academic writing does not stand on its own, it stands on other pieces of writing that came before it. This is what the footnotes and references signify. Nobody writes alone in academia: we start from others, we embed quotes and paraphrases in our own texts, then we discuss these texts with others, revising and rewriting. Academic writing is about weaving never-ending threads of texts-as-conversation, both in speech and in writing. The academic conversation can be overwhelming: it went on before we entered the discipline and will go on without us. The world created through this conversation cannot be grasped by one mind. It is not the world of one author, one vision, but a universe created by thousands of writers, each adding a minuscule layer to the existing textual corpus. In this vast universe of pre-existing writings, we are pulled and pushed in different directions by texts which seduce us. Sometimes we manage to find a moment of equilibrium, in which our ideas, facts and words align perfectly into a vision. Every writer knows these moments when words just flow out of the keyboard or pen, when everything seems to match perfectly, because we have found an a balance between what we say and the world of texts resisting us. These moments of equilibrium close us off to other possibilities of seeing and thinking. We get tunnel vision. There is something hypnotic when ideas are constructed in a harmonious way such that the parts fit the whole: because it is so well formulated, it seems true. In academia, we need to have conversations about our texts because the danger of getting tunnel vision is present a undergoes a phase when certain facts, concepts, and words fit so well into a model that any alternative perspective seems impossible. Once we manage to crystallize our theories into some kind of model, we want to settle down in that moment of peace and give up looking for other solutions. Once we finish the text and confront it with other construction fall apart. If we do not find others to discuss our own writings with, we become the people of one idea, one picture, one perspective. Finding a nice match between theories and facts is always accompanied by a feeling of accomplishment and finitude. We fell that we deserve a rest from all that writing. We found something, is that not enough? This is when a static vision becomes rigidity and intellectual death. Academic writing always entails a discussion with others, either before, during, or after the writing. In the university, our writing is exposed to others systematically. The writing of a dissertation or a thesis is exemplary in that way: it is a process of writing a first draft, then getting comments from the supervisors, then rewriting, discussing, repeat for N times. Each interaction makes us see our own writing anew, from the perspective of others who keep adding points of reference into our universe, expanding our vision. When others read our work, comment on it, or even cite it, we are forced to dissociate ourselves from our own creation, to look at it again as if for the first time. with us after reading our text, the baby becomes emancipated. We relate to our writing differently, as strangers, and thus, we relate to ourselves in another way. The concern for egoboosting and recognition through publication must give way to something else, the concern for the truth. The issue at stake is no longer ourselves and our talent as writers or truth-tellers, but the text itself: the truth it expresses must be given a voice. red while writing has no name. Perhaps we could call it educational detachment from oneself. It is not just a new world that is made possible in the process of writing-discussion, but a new self, which can stand beside itself and not be trapped in any vision, no matter how enticing. Writing as a solitary activity has been described as a technology of the self, most famously by context, however, the change of self through writing gets a different meaning. It is still a technology of the self, but it becomes collective. Academic writing works only if inscribed in a larger process of reading, writing, commenting, discussing, rewriting, revisiting, defending lly writing with others in view of expressing a common truth. The truth does not rest in the text itself, but rather in the interaction it creates with the others, the readers. It lies in the middle. is never finished; it is only the text that is abandoned, but also the writerly self, with all the ego and pride of the author. When academic writing functions as a technology of the self, it works because it opens up a possibility for the writer to become someone else, to think differently, to leave the comfortable spot of equilibrium for something unknown. Only in those moments, when the writer writes just for the sake of truth itself, the text speaks by itself, instead of the author. The self has disappeared and something else is left to emerge in the empty space. When writing, we find ourselves following a path in which everything makes sense. Then we are exposed to the gaze of others as they read our texts. In this exposure, we are disconnected a second time from our own ideas. The writing stands detached from us as an object, ready to be scrutinized. Once we understand how others see our writing, only then do we see it for the first time. In this estrangement from our own creation lies the main educational point of academic writing: we model ideas, we believe in our own constructions, we bring them to the light of another emerges: we get new ideas through conversation with others, and these ideas belong even less to us than the first batch. Ideas emerge in the middle ground of the conversation, and nobody can lay claim on their conception. To be able to see these new ideas, we must learn to detach less personal, more intersubjective. And then, after the first revision is done and one thinks harmony is achieved, the writer must be ready for yet another round of conversation, for yet another killing of the darlings. If time were not an issue, the rounds of academic writing would go on forever. Many years after the Tractatus was published, Wittgenstein wrote other things, less polished pieces that he did not find good enough to publish. At that time he was already a university lecturer. His writing style had changed. Looking at On Certainty, we already notice how Wittgenstein keeps referencing a lecture by Moore and several private conversations about that lecture. He is no longer the solipsistic genius trapped in a universe the size of a bottle. He later writings were composed after many discussions with his colleagues and his students, as an answer to these. He urged the students to abandon philosophy because he thought that it cannot be done, not in academia anyway. But he himself could not think if it weren seminars he conducted. Wittgenstein needed the university to confront his ideas and to never be trapped again in that bottle. References Foucault, M. (2000). Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth: the Essential Works of Michael Foucault, 1954-1984 (Vol. 1). P. Rabinow (Ed.). London: Penguin. Wittgenstein, L. (1922). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. (Trans. Ogden, C. K. and Ramsey, F.) London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner.

Trees for a 3-Valued Logic Author(s): Fred Johnson Source: Analysis, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Jan., 1984), pp. 43-46 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Committee Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3327454 . Accessed: 11/10/2014 16:22 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Oxford University Press and The Analysis Committee are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Analysis. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 129.82.28.124 on Sat, 11 Oct 2014 16:22:00 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING COMPLETELY WRONG 43 (B') If one has only incorrect beliefs about the reliability of one's method, then one does not know. The sophisticated sceptic's claim of leading a doxastic double life is troublesome because he would not be completely mistaken about the reliability of his method. He would be right by virtue of his natural belief and wrong by virtue of his philosophical belief. However , Jean and Julia are consistent and are therefore completely wrong about the reliability of their methods. And by virtue of the purity of their error, they are ignorant. Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan 48823, U.S.A. ? RoY A. SORENSEN 1984 TREES FOR A 3-VALUED LOGIC By FRED JOHNSON IN [3] Slater uses trees to restrict the classical propositional logic to avoid the paradoxes of material implication and other odd features of the classical logic such as these: (1) Something (a tautology) follow from nothing and (2) Something follows from a contradiction. The paradoxes of material implication are avoided by restricting the synthetic tree rule' that would permit one to write 'p v q' in a path that contains 'p'. (1) and (2) are avoided by requiring that every deduction tree have, respectively, a non-empty and a non-contradictory initial list. Though Slater's project is a good one there are some problems with his discussion. For example, as noted above, he says that (2) is false in his system, but he also says that his system could be presented as a natural deduction system in which there is the Rule of Simplification. With this rule 'p' follows from 'p & p', and thus (2) is not false. Another problem is that he provides no semantic account of validity. I will present a modified tree account of validity and a semantic account of validity with the same extension . We will see that with this account of validity we can avoid the paradoxes and oddities that Slater wished to avoid. 'Throughout the discussion I will follow the terminology of [11, and I will mime some of the arguments of [1], though only classical logics are developed in [1]. This content downloaded from 129.82.28.124 on Sat, 11 Oct 2014 16:22:00 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 44 ANALYSIS Consider a language in which statements are constructed in the standard way from the letters Al, Az, A3,..., parentheses, and the connectives '&' and '~'. To construct trees we will use the following (standard) analytic rules: p ~p ~ p p& q (p & q) x p p ~pl q q Moreover, we will use one (non-standard) synthetic rule: p qlq To use the synthetic rule the initial list has to contain the letters that occur in q. To construct a deduction tree we will require that the synthetic rule is not used before all uses of the analytic rules have been exhausted in the tree under construction. Let us call the initial part of the deduction tree that cannot be extended without the use of the synthetic rule the initial analytic part (IAP) of the deduction tree. Any part of a path P of a deduction tree D that occurs in the IAP of D will be in the IAP of P ofD. A path P of D will be open if 'x' (the 'x' of the analytic rule mentioned first) does not appear in the IAP of P of D; otherwise, it is closed. We will say that P,, ..., Pn syntactically entails C (P C) if and only if there is a deduction tree with initial list P1, ..., Pn such that (1) there is an open path in the deduction tree, and (2) C occurs in every open path. To define semantic entailment we will first define valuations as functions which map statements into the set {0, 1, 2}. (0, 1 and 2 can be thought of as false, odd (or meaningless) and true, respectively .) A valuation V meets these conditions: (V(, p) = 2 V(p); V(p & q) = 1 if either V(p) = 1 or V(q) = 1, and, otherwise, V(p & q) = the minimum of V(p) and V(q). (This definition of V is attributed by Rescher to Bochvar. See p. 29 of [2].) We will say that P1, ...-, Pn semantically entails C (P C) if there is a valuation V such that V(P & ... & Pn)= 2, and if for any valuation V V(C) = 2 if V(P, & ... & Pn) = 2. That the notions of syntactic and semantic entailment have the same extension is a corollary of the following four claims. 1. If PH C then there is a valuation V such that V(P) = 2. Proof: assume the antecedent. Then there is an open path OP in a deduction tree D with P as its initial list. Let V be a valuation that assigns 2 to those statement letters that are full lines of the IAP of OP and let V assign 0 to all of the other statement letters that occur in the IAP of OP. Any line in the IAP of OP is either part of the initial list or was placed by one of the analytic rules. Since for each This content downloaded from 129.82.28.124 on Sat, 11 Oct 2014 16:22:00 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions TREES FOR A 3-VALUED LOGIC 45 of the analytic rules a 2 below the line guarantees a 2 above the line, it follows that V(P) = 2. 2. If PF--C then V(C) = 2 if V(P) = 2. Proof: assume that V(P) = 2. If the upper part of an analytic rule is assigned the value 2 then at least one branch below the line is assigned the value 2. The same holds for the synthetic rule. For if V(P) = 2 then any statement composed of letters in P must have the value 0 or 2. (For suppose there were a letter in P that had the value 1. Then P would have the value 1. But if each letter in a statement has the value 0 or the value 2 then so does the entire statement.) But then either the 'q' or the '~ q' of the synthetic rule has to have the value 2. So if V(P) = 2 then in any deduction tree with P as initial list there is a path in which each full line is assigned the value 2. Such a path must be open. So if we assume that P C it follows that C is in this path, and thus V(C) = 2. 3. If P I= C then there is an open path in any deduction tree that has P as its initial list. Proof: assume the antecedent. Then there is a valuation V such that V(P) = 2. By an argument in the preceding paragraph it follows that there is a path in the tree in which every full line is assigned 2 by V. But this path has to be an open path. 4. If P ? C then there is a deduction tree with initial list P and with C in every open path. Proof: first note that if P C then any deduction tree with P and C as the initial list has no open paths in its IAP. For suppose there were such a path. Then by the argument for the first of the four claims under consideration there would be a valuation V such that V(P) = 2 and V(-C) = 2. But then it would be false that P C. Keeping this in mind, we use the following recipe to construct a tree: (a) Construct the IAP of a deduction tree with P as its initial list. (b) Apply the synthetic rule to every open path, putting 'C' to the left and 'C' to the right. (Any 'C' and anything that extends from it will be said to be in a 'right branch'.) Note that there is no difficulty in meeting the qualification on the synthetic rule since if C contained a letter S that did not occur in P then a valuation V that assigns 2 to P but 1 to S would assign 1 to C. Thus, it would be false that P = C. (c) Apply analytic rules to the 'right branches' until no more applications are possible. Since each of the 'right branches' is closed (by the argument we are keeping in mind) it follows that C occurs in every open path. That syntactic and semantic entailment have the same extension, for arguments with one premise, follows directly from statements 1-4. There is no difficulty in generalizing the argument to cover arguments with a greater number of premises. This content downloaded from 129.82.28.124 on Sat, 11 Oct 2014 16:22:00 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 46 ANALYSIS Let us complete our discussion by looking at some of the puzzles Slater mentioned in [3]. To separate the notion of entailment discussed above from classical entailment, let us call it superentailment . Since if V is any valuation V(Aj & -'A) = 0 or V(A1 & -~'A) = 1, 'A, & "-AI' does not superentail anything (though it entails everything ). Since there is a valuation V such that V(A1) = 2, V(A2)= 1 (and thus V(~ (Az & "-A1) = 1), it follows that it is false that A, h ~(A2 & ~A1). Thus, not everything superentails that everything 'materially implies' it (though everything entails that everything materially implies it). Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado 80523, U.S.A. ? FRED JOHNSON 1984 REFERENCES [11 Richard C. Jeffrey, Formal Logic: Its Scope and Limits, 2nd ed., New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981. [21 Nicholas Rescher, Many-Valued Logic, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969. [3] B. H. Slater, 'Direct Tableaux Proofs', Analysis, 41.4 (October 1981), 192-4. THE EFFECTS OF PRINCIPLES AND OF ACTIONS By M. C. GEACH When a man attempts to combat the principle of utility, it is with reasons drawn, without his being aware of it, from that very principle itself. His arguments, if they prove anything, prove not that the principle is wrong, but that, according to the applications he supposes to be made of it, it is misapplied. T HIS passage is taken from Bentham's Principles of Morals and Legislation, where he defines the principle of utility as 'that principle which approves, or disapproves, of every action whatsoever according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question'. We should notice that this principle is one which judges actions rather than principles. (I assume, however, that Bentham thought of it as a principle of conduct, to be employed as much in the judgement of proposed actions as in the judgement of actions already performed.) This content downloaded from 129.82.28.124 on Sat, 11 Oct 2014 16:22:00 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Hegel y América Latina. Entre el diagnóstico de la brecha de desarrollo y el eurocentrismo Por Héctor Ferreiro1 1. Las dos Américas en el pensamiento de Hegel En el capítulo sobre la "naturaleza geológica" en la Filosofía de la Naturaleza, Hegel caracteriza a la Tierra como un organismo que es en sí mismo (an sich seienden), el cual conforma un sistema cuyas partes, a diferencia de lo que sucede en el sistema de los organismos vivientes, son exteriores o extrínsecas las unas respecto de las otras2. En este contexto, Hegel afirma que la Tierra, en cuanto sistema de partes extrínsecas, se disocia en un "mundo antiguo" y un "mundo nuevo". El mundo nuevo, es decir, en concreto, el continente americano, es para Hegel –y esto desde un punto de vista propiamente geográfico– más joven y menos maduro que el mundo antiguo, es decir, que África, Asia y Europa3. Con esto Hegel no se refiere a que el continente americano surgió cronológica y geológicamente más tarde que el mundo antiguo, sino que es más joven y menos maduro en lo que respecta a las condiciones de posibilidad que ofrece para el desarrollo del espíritu humano, esto es, para el proceso de concienti1 Doctor en Filosofía por la Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Alemania. Investigador de tiempo completo (Categoría: Independiente) en el Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET) y Director del Programa de Investigación en Filosofía Clásica Alemana de la Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina, Buenos Aires, Argentina. Contacto: [email protected] ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3261-4723 2 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Werke in 20 Bänden. Auf der Grundlage der Werke von 1832-1845 neu edierte Ausgabe, ed. Eva Moldenhauer y Karl Markus Michel, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1971 [= W], Tomos 8-10: Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse [= Enz], § 339. 3 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Gesammelte Werke. Hamburg: Meiner, 1968ss. [= GW], Tomo 25.2, 956 (§ 393); véase también W 12: 107. HERMENÉUTICA INTERCULTURAL REVISTA DE FILOSOFÍA No 31, 2019 ISSN: 0718-4980 pp. 187-208 HEGEL Y AMÉRICA LATINA. ENTRE EL DIAGNÓSTICO DE LA BRECHA DE DESARROLLO Y EL EUROCENTRISMO / Ferreiro 188 zación por parte del espíritu de su propia esencia, que para Hegel no es otra que la libertad entendida como autodeterminación. Pero la Tierra no solo se diferencia en dos partes, una antigua y una nueva, sino también en tres tipos generales de geografía, a saber: en las zonas áridas altas de estepas, sierras y montañas, sin comunicación con otras zonas por medio de cursos de agua navegables (Hochland); en la región de los valles y praderas surcadas por grandes ríos (Talebenen), y en las regiones costeras en contacto en mayor o menor medida inmediato con el mar (Uferland). Hegel correlaciona las zonas elevadas de estepas y montañas con los pueblos nómades que se dedican a la cría de ganado; la zona de valles y praderas con los pueblos que se dedican primariamente a la agricultura y, finalmente, las zonas costeras con los pueblos que se dedican ante todo al comercio4. A diferencia de las tierras altas, los valles y praderas fértiles atravesadas por grandes ríos permiten el desarrollo de la agricultura y, con ello, una vida sedentaria vinculada al lugar físico, lo cual constituye para Hegel la condición de posibilidad para el desarrollo del principio de la propiedad privada y de la vida familiar; por su parte, el mar ofrece el elemento natural para el comercio. El mar es, así, el principio vinculante y con ello el mayor instrumento de desarrollo y educación de los pueblos. En esa medida, Hegel considera que las condiciones para la evolución de la historia universal se dieron tan solo en las regiones costeras y territorios próximos al mar5. Ahora bien, la región árida de estepas y montañas es, para Hegel, la característica principal o específica de África, más exactamente de la así llamada "África subsahariana" o "África negra"6. El norte de África, sobre la costa del Mediterráneo, constituye para Hegel, por el contrario, una región vinculada más a Europa y a Asia que a la África 4 W 12: 116-119. 5 Ibíd., esp. 118-119. 6 Ibíd., 119-120; GW 25.2, 956-957 (§ 393). También la mayor parte de Medio Oriente, los desiertos de la Península arábiga y del Sahara, así como la cuenca del Orinoco y el Paraguay están caracterizados, según Hegel, por este tipo de geografía (véase W 12: 116). 189 ISSN N° 0718-4980 HERMENÉUTICA INTERCULTURAL. REVISTA DE FILOSOFÍA No 31, 2019 ISSN N° 0719-6504 negra7. La zona de valles y praderas es la región geográfica que, a ojos de Hegel, caracteriza a Asia8. Por supuesto que tanto en Asia como en África existen costas, pero el mar, sostiene Hegel, no pone aquí en contacto a las distintas zonas con sus pueblos entre sí; en estos casos –por ejemplo, China e India– el mar representa más bien el límite último del propio territorio9. Europa, por su parte, reúne en su naturaleza a la región de estepas y montañas con la pradera y la región costera10. En lo que respecta al continente americano, su inmadurez deriva para Hegel de su división en dos grandes masas continentales, América del Norte y América del Sur, unidas entre sí por un istmo, es decir, Centroamérica11. Mientras en América del Norte existen grandes praderas atravesadas por anchos ríos, en América del Sur la cordillera de los Andes deja al oeste, sobre la costa del Océano Pacífico, una franja de tierra en última instancia angosta, solo parcialmente propicia para ser habitada, mientras que en el este las inmensas cuencas de los ríos Orinoco y Amazonas no resultan propicias, dice Hegel, para los "pueblos civilizados" (Kulturländer), dado que se trata más bien de anchas estepas12. Hegel considera a Asia, África y Europa como una única gran masa continental que conforma una totalidad en torno al Mediterráneo como su centro13. A diferencia y en contraposición a esta totalidad, el continente americano no posee un mar interno a través del cual los distintos pueblos que habitaban sus costas podían comunicarse y vincularse mediante el comercio. Una ulterior característica del mundo antiguo que ofrece, según Hegel, una condición favorable para el surgimiento de pueblos culturales es la presencia de las dos "grandes armas de la cultura", a saber, el caballo y el hierro, a los que Hegel describe como los órganos que permiten la imposición y consolidación del poder14. En este contexto, Hegel recuerda el rol 7 W 12: 120-121. 8 W 12: 117-118; GW 25.2, 957. 9 W 12: 119. 10 W 12: 120, 132-133; GW 25.2, 957; véase también Enz § 339 Zus. 11 W 12: 107. 12 W 12: 110. 13 W 12: 115-116. 14 Enz § 339 Zus. HEGEL Y AMÉRICA LATINA. ENTRE EL DIAGNÓSTICO DE LA BRECHA DE DESARROLLO Y EL EUROCENTRISMO / Ferreiro 190 decisivo que el caballo y el hierro jugaron en la conquista de América y en la consolidación de la preeminencia del mundo antiguo sobre el nuevo mundo15. Las regiones geográficas están, a su vez, estrechamente vinculadas para Hegel a las características naturales del espíritu humano. De este modo, las distintas regiones de la tierra conducen a una división del espíritu en los "espíritus naturales" particulares (Naturgeister), los cuales dan lugar a las diferentes razas16. En las zonas altas de estepas y montañas, es decir, en África, surge así, según Hegel, la raza negra; en la zona de los valles y las praderas, esto es, en Asia, la raza mongólica, y en Europa, que Hegel correlaciona, según se adelantó, con la región costera, la raza caucásica. En lo que concierne a los aborígenes americanos, Hegel no los considera como una raza específica, sino como una autodiferenciación de la raza mongólica17. Sobre las razas, Hegel afirma que la blanca o caucásica es la que lleva adelante a la historia universal18; los negros, por el contrario, son el hombre en estado completamente natural y salvaje, y conforman un grupo humano en estado primitivo19. Lo característico de la raza asiática o mongólica es, por su parte, su continua inquietud y movimiento que "no conduce a ningún resultado estable"; los individuos de esta raza configuran como "enjambres de langostas" que se abalanzan sobre otros pueblos, destruyen todo y luego desaparecen, dejando tras de sí la devastación20. En cuanto a los aborígenes americanos, Hegel afirma, entre otras cosas, que son una estirpe débil e indolente, claramente inferior a la raza blanca e incapaz de afirmarse frente a los europeos y los criollos de origen europeo21. Sobre la base de las diferentes regiones geográficas y de las razas que se han configurado a partir de las mismas –y, en esa medida, le son en 15 W 12: 109. 16 Enz § 393. 17 GW 25.2, 957. 18 Ibíd., 960. 19 W 12: 122. 20 GW 25.2, 958-959. 21 W 12: 107-109; GW 25.2, 961 (§ 393). 191 ISSN N° 0718-4980 HERMENÉUTICA INTERCULTURAL. REVISTA DE FILOSOFÍA No 31, 2019 ISSN N° 0719-6504 principio específicas–, Hegel analiza el rol de dichas regiones y razas en la historia universal: el África negra está, a ojos de Hegel, fuera de la historia; con esto se refiere, más precisamente, a que allí el espíritu humano se encuentra en un estado de completa unidad inmediata consigo mismo, por lo que en esa región la historia propiamente no ha comenzado todavía22. En este sentido, en cuanto región encapsulada en sí misma, es como un "país de niños" (Kinderland)23. Lo que ha acontecido, por su parte, en el norte de África no es un capítulo, según Hegel, de la historia africana misma, sino, según el caso, de la de Asia o de la de Europa24. En Asia, por el contrario, se abre ya "el teatro de la historia universal" (das Theater der Weltgeschichte), en la medida en que allí se han desarrollado las grandes culturas agrícolas, cuyo principio es la propiedad privada y la relación entre amo y siervo. Las grandes planicies y amplios valles cruzados por anchos ríos navegables ofrecieron en esa zona del mundo el sustento constante que resulta necesario para el desarrollo de la propiedad privada y la vida familiar; la propiedad y la familia constituyen, por su parte, el fundamento de las primeras formas de organización estatal25. A diferencia de la periodización habitual de la historia universal, Hegel no le atribuye a la escritura el rol de delimitar a la prehistoria de la historia; la historia universal comienza para Hegel con la aparición del Estado. En este sentido, el comienzo de la historia universal tiene lugar en China, India y Babilonia; también Egipto, cuya historia Hegel asigna a la historia de Asia, pertenece a este periodo de la historia universal. El acontecimiento que señala el tránsito de la historia universal de Asia a Europa es, para Hegel, la guerra entre Grecia y los persas y el triunfo de los griegos26. El principio de Europa es el principio del comercio y de la libertad de los ciudadanos, en el que son asumidos los momentos de la propiedad privada, la familia y la sociedad civil en un Estado que los unifica y supera al hacerlo su respectiva particularidad. Si Asia es el comienzo 22 W 12: 129. 23 Ibíd., 120. 24 Ibíd., 129. 25 Ibíd., 129-130. 26 W 12: 312-315. HEGEL Y AMÉRICA LATINA. ENTRE EL DIAGNÓSTICO DE LA BRECHA DE DESARROLLO Y EL EUROCENTRISMO / Ferreiro 192 de la historia universal, Europa es su "consumación" (Vollendung) y su "final" (Ende)27. La civilización occidental cristiana, sostiene ulteriormente Hegel, para quien el cristianismo constituye el último periodo de la historia de Europa, es "el mundo de la consumación; el principio ha sido completado y con esto se ha consumado el fin de los días"28. En lo que respecta a la América precolombina, a ojos de Hegel está, como el África negra, fuera de la historia universal, en el sentido más preciso que en ella la historia universal no ha comenzado aún a desenvolverse. En cuanto a la historia de América tras su descubrimiento por los europeos, Hegel sostiene que lo que sucede y ha sucedido desde entonces en el continente americano proviene en realidad de Europa29. La América indígena, ya sea en el norte o en el sur del continente, no tiene, según Hegel, historia propia; su historia comienza recién cuando entra en contacto con Europa30. Debe aclararse en este contexto que Hegel apenas conocía la historia y cultura de las civilizaciones azteca e inca, a las que menciona en su obra solo al pasar y de forma breve31. La América precolombina estuvo, así, menos fuera de la historia universal que de la esfera de conocimientos del propio Hegel. Ya dentro de la historia americana después de la llegada de los europeos, Hegel contrapone la historia de América del Sur a la de América del Norte32. Debe aclararse en este punto que con Sudamérica Hegel 27 W 12: 116: Das östliche Asien und das jenseitige Alpenland sind die Extreme jener bewegten Mitte um das Mittelmeer Anfang und Ende der Weltgeschichte, ihr Aufgang und Niedergang. Véase asimismo Ibíd., 115: Für die drei Weltteile ist also das Mittelmeer das Vereinigende und der Mittelpunkt der Weltgeschichte. 28 W 12: 414: Denn die christliche Welt ist die Welt der Vollendung; das Prinzip ist erfüllt, und damit ist das Ende der Tage voll geworden. 29 W 12: 114. 30 W 12: 109. 31 W 12: 107-108: Von Amerika und seiner Kultur, namentlich in Mexiko und Peru, haben wir zwar Nachrichten, aber bloss die, dass dieselbe eine ganz natürliche war, die untergehen musste, sowie der Geist sich ihr näherte. GW 25.2, 961 (§ 393): In manchen Theilen Amerikas fand sich zwar zur Zeit der Entdeckung desselben eine ziemliche Bildung; diese war jedoch mit der europäischen Kultur nicht zu vergleichen und ist mit den Ureinwohnern verschwunden. 32 W 12: s111-112. 193 ISSN N° 0718-4980 HERMENÉUTICA INTERCULTURAL. REVISTA DE FILOSOFÍA No 31, 2019 ISSN N° 0719-6504 no se refiere a una región geográfica, sino expresamente a América Latina, es decir, a Sudamérica, Centroamérica y México; en cuanto a América del Norte, se refiere primariamente a los actuales Estados Unidos, a los que denomina normalmente "los estados libres norteamericanos" (nordamerikanische Freistaaten)33. Hegel afirma que, con excepción de Brasil (recuérdese que entre 1822 y 1889 Brasil fue un Imperio), en América Latina hay por regla general repúblicas, las cuales, a diferencia de los Estados Unidos, descansan sobre el poder o la violencia militar, de modo que su entera historia es "una continua revuelta" (ein fortdauernder Umsturz), en la que, a través de revoluciones militares, desaparecen antiguas federaciones y surgen nuevas. En Estados Unidos, por el contrario, prosperan la industria y el orden social en una gran federación bajo un mismo Estado34. Hegel atribuye esta diferencia entre las dos regiones de América principalmente a dos razones, a saber: a que América Latina es católica, mientras que los Estados Unidos, a pesar de las muchas sectas –Hegel los llama la "tierra de las sectas" (das Land der Sekten)–, es en esencia protestante; y a que América Latina fue "conquistada" (erobert), mientras que los Estados Unidos fueron "colonizados" (kolonisiert)35. Al remitir el diferente desarrollo político y socioeconómico de las dos Américas a la cuestión de la religión, Hegel se ubica en una tradición de análisis de ésta en relación con la vida económica, que se convertirá a fines del siglo XIX en una tesis estándar36. Para poder comprender la explicación que propone Hegel sobre la brecha de desarrollo entre Norteamérica y América Latina por remisión, respectivamente, al protestantismo y al catolicismo, resulta indispensable comprender algunas tesis centrales de su filosofía de la religión. 33 W 12: 108, 110-111, 113-114. Hegel también se refiere a los actuales Estados Unidos con el término "Nueva Holanda" (Neuholland) véase Ibíd., 107. 34 W 12: 111. 35 Ibíd. 36 Véase así, por ejemplo, Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus (1904/1905) de Max Weber y Die Bedeutung des Protestantismus für die Entstehung der modernen Welt (1911) de Ernst Troeltsch. HEGEL Y AMÉRICA LATINA. ENTRE EL DIAGNÓSTICO DE LA BRECHA DE DESARROLLO Y EL EUROCENTRISMO / Ferreiro 194 Lo específico del catolicismo reside para Hegel en un conjunto de tesis que a sus ojos están íntimamente vinculadas entre sí. La primera de ellas, que constituye para Hegel la premisa mayor de la cual derivan todas las demás como sus corolarios, es la doctrina de la presencia real de Cristo en la Eucaristía, es decir, la doctrina de la transubstanciación. Hegel es especialmente severo con esta tesis del catolicismo, uno de cuyos corolarios sería para Hegel que "si un ratón come una hostia, el ratón y sus excrementos deben ser venerados"37. La doctrina de la transubstanciación, esa "idolatría y superstición papista"38, no solo es para Hegel una forma residual del estadio del pensamiento religioso que hipostasia lo divino en cosas externas, sino también –lo que es mucho más importante– constituye el principio de la disociación radical entre una casta sacerdotal, por un lado –a saber, el clero–, y el resto del pueblo, por el otro –es decir, los laicos39. Esta casta sacerdotal es la que opera y administra la transubstanciación y, según Hegel, la que en una línea de coherencia con ello es la única que está autorizada a ofrecer la interpretación correcta de las Escrituras y, en general, de los asuntos de la fe. En este contexto, el acceso a la Biblia está en el catolicismo mediado por el clero y, aunque no formalmente impedido, ese acceso está al menos obstaculizado para los laicos, toda vez que el idioma de la Biblia, así como el de la ceremonia de la misa, es el latín, idioma accesible solo a los grupos educados de la sociedad, y no la lengua vernácula respectiva accesible a todos los hombres. Pero la dicotomía ortodoxia-heterodoxia no solo abarca a los contenidos de la fe, sino que, por su propia dinámica, se extiende también al conocimiento de los asuntos más variados, circunstancia de la que resultan entonces, de forma natural, tensiones y conflictos con los dogmas de la fe y los contenidos de las distintas ciencias. A ojos de Hegel, la absolutización de la casta sacerdotal se vincula a su vez en forma directa con la institución del celibato y, sobre esa base, 37 W 19: 538: [W]enn eine Maus eine Hostie frisst, sie und ihre Exkremente zu verehren sind. 38 W 11: 69. 39 W 4: 68; W 12: 454-455. 195 ISSN N° 0718-4980 HERMENÉUTICA INTERCULTURAL. REVISTA DE FILOSOFÍA No 31, 2019 ISSN N° 0719-6504 con la sobrevaloración de la pobreza y la limosna, y la correlativa infravaloración de la industriosidad y el trabajo40. Frente a este conjunto de doctrinas católicas, el protestantismo contrapone a la doctrina de la transubstanciación el principio fundamental de que en la Eucaristía Dios está presente solo ante el acto de fe de quien ingiere la hostia, no en la hostia misma41. Si bien esta interpretación de la Eucaristía en el protestantismo, como han sugerido algunos teólogos, sería más bien la de Melanchton que la del propio Lutero, lo relevante es que en cualquiera de los casos el protestantismo se aparta de la tesis de la presencia real de Dios en la hostia, al modo como la sostiene la teología católica. Con esto pierde sentido la diferenciación radical entre sacerdotes y laicos, y con ella también lo pierden, según Hegel, todos sus corolarios. Así, ya no hay en este nuevo marco un grupo social que detente la autoridad única de interpretación de los textos sagrados; Hegel ve en la traducción de la Biblia al alemán por parte de Lutero un acto clave de la Reforma: todos los hombres deben en adelante ser capaces de relacionarse en forma directa con la palabra de Dios42. Con esto queda asimismo sentado el principio general para una mayor tolerancia en cuestiones teóricas, con lo que tendencialmente se suavizan los conflictos entre la fe y la ciencia. Suprimida la diferencia radical entre sacerdotes y laicos, pierde sentido también el celibato como característica específica de un grupo que busca con ello distinguirse del resto de la sociedad; el pastor protestante se integra en la sociedad civil a través del matrimonio y a través del trabajo que debe asegurarle el sustento de su familia. Según Hegel, esto aumenta considerablemente el valor social atribuido al trabajo, a la laboriosidad y, en general, al éxito económico. La Reforma protestante introduce así una variante de interpretación de la religión cristiana que funciona como el fundamento de un profundo cambio cultural43. Este cambio no sobreviene, según Hegel, 40 W 12: 503, 526; W 20: 49. 41 Enz § 552 Anm.; W 12: 454; W 18: 95; W 19: 538. 42 W 12: 498; W 20: 16, 53. 43 Véase W 12: 508-540. HEGEL Y AMÉRICA LATINA. ENTRE EL DIAGNÓSTICO DE LA BRECHA DE DESARROLLO Y EL EUROCENTRISMO / Ferreiro 196 de inmediato; se trata solo de un principio abstracto que va desplegándose a lo largo de los siglos. En efecto, Hegel reconoce que al comienzo el protestantismo se opuso también muchas veces, como la Iglesia católica, al poder terrenal del Estado, persiguió a quienes pensaban diferente y condenó a brujas a la hoguera44. No obstante, para Hegel el "principio protestante" o "principio del protestantismo" (das protestantische Prinzip, Prinzip des Protestantismus45) se identifica en sus contenidos básicos con el "principio del espíritu libre" (Prinzip des freien Geistes)46. Este último no es otro que la premisa general del ordenamiento jurídico socioeconómico y estatal que corresponde al ser humano que ha tomado conciencia de su propia dignidad y valor absolutos, valor y dignidad que residen, a ojos de Hegel, en la libertad concebida como autodeterminación. En cuanto a la segunda de las razones que Hegel propone para explicar la diferencia de desarrollo entre las dos regiones de América, a saber: que América Latina fue conquistada mientras que los Estados Unidos fueron colonizados, Hegel se refiere más precisamente a que, sobre la base del sentimiento de su superioridad sobre los indígenas, los españoles se adueñaron de sus tierras y riquezas mediante el poder y la arbitrariedad, mientras que en América del Norte no se trató en primera instancia de conquistadores sobre una amplia población aborigen preexistente, sino de colonos que se reconocían como iguales y que lo que en esencia hicieron fue trasladar su propia civilización europea a una zona diferente de la Tierra, con lo cual en las nuevas tierras se instauró desde el principio una cultura de libertad y justicia civil47. Hegel concluye su exposición sobre el continente americano en las Lecciones sobre la filosofía de la historia universal con un pasaje que se ha vuelto entretanto famoso: 44 W 12: 507, 514. 45 W 12: 517, 519; W 15: 470; W 20: 120, 123. 46 W 12: 417; véase asimismo W 12: 517, 520-521, 523-524, 527-528; W 20: 120, 123. 47 W 12: 111. 197 ISSN N° 0718-4980 HERMENÉUTICA INTERCULTURAL. REVISTA DE FILOSOFÍA No 31, 2019 ISSN N° 0719-6504 América es así la tierra del futuro en la que, en los tiempos que van a venir –acaso en la contienda entre la América del Norte y la del Sur–, debe revelarse la importancia históricouniversal. [...] Lo que ha sucedido hasta ahora allí es sólo un eco del Viejo Mundo y la expresión de una vitalidad ajena48. 2. Raza, razón universal y el persistente mito de Europa Que las apreciaciones de Hegel sobre los pueblos no europeos tienen un talante racista ha sido observado ya por pensadores de África, América Latina, Europa y Estados Unidos49. Hay ciertamente no pocos pasajes en la obra de Hegel que se dejan caracterizar fácilmente –y en buena medida con justicia– de ese modo50. Pero aunque resulta difícil no 48 Ibíd., 114: Amerika ist somit das Land der Zukunft, in welchem sich in vor uns liegenden Zeiten, etwa im Streite von Nordund Südamerika, die weltgeschichtliche Wichtigkeit offenbaren soll. [...] Was bis jetzt sich hier ereignet, ist nur der Widerhall der Alten Welt und der Ausdruck fremder Lebendigkeit. 49 Véase, entre otros, Serequeberhan, Tsenay. "The Idea of Colonialism in Hegel›s Philosophy of Right", International Philosophical Quarterly 29 [3] (1989): 301-318; Moellendorf, Darrel. "Racism and Rationality in Hegel's Philosophy", History of Political Thought 13 [2] (1992): 243-256; Bernasconi, Robert. "Hegel at the Court of the Ashanti". Hegel after Derrida, ed. Stuart Barnett. London: Routledge, 1998. 41-63; Sundstrom, Ronald. "Douglass and Du Bois's: Der schwarze Volksgeist". Race and racism in continental philosophy, ed. Robert Bernasconi (with Sybol Cook). Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003. 32-52; Wirth, Jason. "Beyond Black Orpheus: Preliminary thoughts on the good of African philosophy". Race and racism in continental philosophy, ed. Robert Bernasconi (with Sybol Cook). Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003. 271; Buck-Morss, Susan. Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009. 62, 74, 116-117. 50 Cf., por ejemplo, W 12: 122-124: Der Neger stellt, wie schon gesagt worden ist, den natürlichen Menschen in seiner ganzen Wildheit und Unbändigkeit dar; von aller Ehrfurcht und Sittlichkeit, von dem, was Gefühl heisst, muss man abstrahieren, wenn man ihn richtig auffassen will: es ist nichts an das Menschliche Anklingende in diesem Charakter zu finden. Ibíd., 127-128: Jede Vorstellung, die in die Neger geworfen wird, wird mit der ganzen Energie des Willens ergriffen und verwirklicht, alles aber zugleich in dieser Verwirklichung zertrümmert. [...] Aus allen diesen verschiedentlich angeführten Zügen geht hervor, dass es die Unbändigkeit ist, welche den Charakter der Neger bezeichnet. Dieser Zustand ist keiner Entwicklung und Bildung fähig, und wie wir sie heute sehen, so sind sie immer gewesen. Der einzige wesentliche Zusammenhang, den die Neger mit den Europäern gehabt haben und noch haben, ist der der Sklaverei. In dieser sehen die Neger nichts ihnen Unangemessenes. GW HEGEL Y AMÉRICA LATINA. ENTRE EL DIAGNÓSTICO DE LA BRECHA DE DESARROLLO Y EL EUROCENTRISMO / Ferreiro 198 constatar en la base de numerosas formulaciones una actitud racista, Hegel, en rigor, no sostiene que las razas sean disposiciones inamovibles ancladas en la esencia humana misma; en otros términos, Hegel no suscribe una posición esencialista acerca de las diferencias raciales en el sentido que éstas determinen la conducta de los individuos; no suscribe, pues, una teoría racial tal como la desarrolló en Francia a mediados del siglo XIX Arthur de Gobineau, o Madison Grant en Estados Unidos a principios del siglo XX, por no mencionar la radicalización de dicha teoría racial en la Alemania nazi. Para contrarrestar este tipo de interpretación de algunas formulaciones de Hegel sobre las razas es necesario recurrir a otras secciones de la exposición de su filosofía, ante todo ubicar al "alma" (Seele) y, ya dentro de ésta, al "alma natural" en el proceso general de desarrollo del "espíritu" (Geist). El alma natural es para Hegel tan solo el estadio del espíritu humano en el que éste no se ha concebido todavía como libre en sí mismo. Solo para el espíritu humano en este estadio de su autoconocimiento las diferenciaciones y determinaciones que surgen de la Naturaleza señalan un límite de lo que él momentáneamente es de hecho y cómo, según ese ser, se comporta; sin embargo, esos límites no son como tales insalvables, porque el espíritu está llamado a elevarse a la comprensión de la libertad que constituye su esencia; la libertad es para Hegel justamente la liberación de la razón humana respecto de la inmediatez y la naturaleza. Las razas no son para Hegel, pues, como para la teoría racial, los sujetos de la 25.2, 958: Das Höhere, welches sie [= die Neger, H.F.] empfinden, halten sie nicht fest; dasselbe geht ihnen nur flüchtig durch den Kopf. [...] In ruhigem Zustande ganz gutmütig und harmlos, begehen sie in der plötzlich entstehenden Aufregung die fürchterlichsten Grausamkeiten. Die Fähigkeit zur Bildung ist ihnen nicht abzusprechen. [...] Aber einen inneren Trieb zur Kultur zeigen sie nicht. W 12: 108-109: Die Inferiorität dieser Individuen [= der amerikanischen Eingeborenen, H.F.] in jeder Rücksicht, selbst in Hinsicht der Grösse, gibt sich in allem zu erkennen; nur die ganz südlichen Stämme in Patagonien sind kräftigere Naturen, aber noch ganz in dem natürlichen Zustande der Roheit und Wildheit. [...] Die Schwäche des amerikanischen Naturells war ein Hauptgrund dazu, die Neger nach Amerika zu bringen, um durch deren Kräfte die Arbeiten verrichten zu lassen; denn die Neger sind weit empfänglicher für europäische Kultur als die Indianer, und ein englischer Reisender hat Beispiele angeführt, dass Neger geschickte Geistliche, Ärzte usw. geworden sind [...], während ihm nur ein einziger Eingeborener bekannt ist, der es dahin brachte, zu studieren, aber bald am Übergenusse des Branntweins gestorben war. 199 ISSN N° 0718-4980 HERMENÉUTICA INTERCULTURAL. REVISTA DE FILOSOFÍA No 31, 2019 ISSN N° 0719-6504 historia, sino solamente una particularización provisoria del momento natural del espíritu humano. El sujeto de la historia es para Hegel el mismo "espíritu", es decir, la subjetividad humana que toma conciencia en el proceso mismo de la historia misma de que su esencia es la libertad frente a los condicionamientos de la Naturaleza. De este modo, en el contexto de su exposición sobre las diferencias raciales, exposición que despierta por momentos la impresión de que se trata de una teoría fuertemente racista, Hegel afirma con toda claridad: En lo que respecta a las diferencias raciales entre los hombres debe decirse antes que nada que la cuestión meramente histórica de si las razas humanas han surgido todas a partir de una sola pareja o a partir de varias no nos concierne en absoluto en la filosofía. Se le ha atribuido relevancia a esta cuestión, porque suponiendo un origen a partir de varias parejas se creyó poder explicar la superioridad espiritual de un linaje humano sobre otro, sí, se esperaba demostrar que en lo que respecta a sus facultades espirituales los hombres son tan diferentes por naturaleza que sería legítimo que algunos sean dominados como animales. Sin embargo, no se puede extraer a partir del origen un fundamento para legitimar o deslegitimar en los seres humanos la libertad y el dominio. El ser humano es en sí racional; en esto radica la posibilidad de la igualdad de derecho de todos los hombres y la nulidad de una diferenciación rígida entre linajes humanos con derechos y otros privados de ellos51. 51 GW 25.2, 956-957 (§ 393): Rücksichtlich der Racenverschiedenheit der Menschen muss zuvörderst bemerkt werden, dass die bloss historische Frage, ob alle menschlichen Racen von Einem Paare oder von mehreren ausgegangen seyen, uns in der Philosophie gar nichts angeht. Man hat dieser Frage eine Wichtigkeit beigelegt, weil man durch die Annahme einer Abstammung von mehreren Paaren die geistige Ueberlegenheit der einen Menschengattung über die andere erklären zu können glaubte, ja zu beweisen hoffte, die Menschen seyen ihren geistigen Fähigkeiten nach von Natur so verschieden, dass einige wie Tiere beherrscht werden dürften. Aus der Abstammung kann aber kein Grund für die Berechtigung oder Nichtberechtigung der Menschen zur Freiheit und zur Herrschaft geschöpft werden. Der Mensch ist an sich vernünftig; darin liegt die Möglichkeit der Gleichheit des Rechtes aller Menschen, die Nichtigkeit HEGEL Y AMÉRICA LATINA. ENTRE EL DIAGNÓSTICO DE LA BRECHA DE DESARROLLO Y EL EUROCENTRISMO / Ferreiro 200 Y, en esta misma línea, Hegel concluye su filosofía del espíritu subjetivo, es decir, lo que puede ser caracterizado en sentido amplio como su Antropología filosófica, afirmando que cada ser humano "tiene como tal un valor infinito"52. Ahora bien, una crítica al pensamiento de Hegel sobre América –y, especialmente, sobre América Latina– que, a nuestro entender, no puede ser descartada o anulada sin más como infundada mediante un análisis de la obra hegeliana en su conjunto, es la de la presencia en dicho pensamiento de una actitud fuertemente eurocentrista53. En efecto, a ojos de Hegel Europa representa la consumación de la historia en la exacta medida en que en ella el espíritu humano logra –supuestamente– superar las diferencias de la Naturaleza, es decir, entre otras, las diferencias que puedan surgir de la raza, del nacimiento en un hogar de poco o de más dinero o de las aptitudes físicas o intelectuales diferentes de cada cual. La Reforma protestante y la Revolución Francesa son, para Hegel, los hitos en la historia universal que señalan el momento en que el ser humano toma conciencia de su valor y dignidad infinitos, es decir, expresado en otros términos, señalan el momento en que los "Derechos del Hombre" (Rights of Man), como los llamó Thomas Paine, se convierten finalmente en el principio viviente del Derecho, del Estado y de la Historia. einer starren Unterscheidung in berechtigte und rechtlose Menschengattungen. 52 Enz § 482 Anm. 53 Véase en este respecto, entre otros, Mignolo, Walter. The Idea of Latin America. Malden/Oxford/Carlton: Blackwell Publishing, 2005. 35: Hegel's philosophy of history is a striking example in which the West is both a geo-historical location and the center of enunciation. History moves from East to West. In that move, the very idea of Western civilization became the point of reference for the rest of the world, and the goal as well. Véase asimismo Ibíd., 21, 26, 48-49, 51-53, 81-82. Véase también Mignolo, Walter. The Darker Side of Western Modernity, Durham/London: Duke University Press, 2011. 21-22, 119, 151-153, 173, 196-199, 281; Buck-Morss, Susan. Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009. 74; Santos Herceg, José. "La Imagen de América en Hegel. De la caricatura a la falta de respeto". La idea de América en los pensadores occidentales, ed. Jacinto Choza, Marta Betancourt y Gustavo Muñoz. Sevilla/Madrid: Thémata & Plaza y Valdés, 2009. 31-42 (esp. 32, 36-37). 201 ISSN N° 0718-4980 HERMENÉUTICA INTERCULTURAL. REVISTA DE FILOSOFÍA No 31, 2019 ISSN N° 0719-6504 Frente a esta lectura de la Reforma protestante y la Revolución Francesa, en Los orígenes del totalitarismo, publicado en 1951, pocos años después de la finalización de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, Hannah Arendt sostiene, por el contrario, que desde el primer momento de la Revolución Francesa y, en última instancia, como un resultado de la dinámica interna de la historia europea, hubo un conflicto entre el "Estado" y la "Nación"54. El conflicto latente entre Estado y Nación se puso de manifiesto, según Arendt, en el nacimiento mismo del Estado nacional, cuando la Revolución Francesa vinculó la Declaración de los Derechos del Hombre con la Declaración de la voluntad soberana del pueblo, es decir, con la soberanía específicamente nacional. Los mismos derechos fundamentales fueron con ello declarados como propiedad inalienable de todos los seres humanos, al mismo tiempo que como los derechos nacionales de pueblos particulares. El resultado práctico de esta contradicción fue que, a partir de entonces, los derechos humanos fueron reconocidos y aplicados sólo como derechos nacionales y que la auténtica institución de un Estado, cuya suprema tarea consistía en proteger y garantizar a cada hombre sus derechos como hombre, como ciudadano y como nacional, perdió su apariencia legal y racional y pudo ser interpretado como nebuloso representante de un "alma nacional". [...] El nacionalismo es esencialmente la expresión de esta perversión del Estado en un instrumento de la Nación y de la identificación del ciudadano con el miembro de la Nación55. 54 Arendt Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism. 1951. San Diego/New York/London: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1979. 230. 55 Ibíd., 230-231: The practical outcome of this contradiction was that from then on human rights were protected and enforced only as national rights and that the very institution of a state, whose supreme task was to protect and guarantee man his rights as man, as citizen and as national, lost its legal, rational appearance and could be interpreted by the romantics as the nebulous representative of a "national soul" which through the very fact of its existence was supposed to be beyond or above the law. [...] Nationalism is essentially the expression of this perversion of the state into an instrument of the nation and the identification of the citizen with the member of the nation. [El resaltado es nuestro, H. F.] HEGEL Y AMÉRICA LATINA. ENTRE EL DIAGNÓSTICO DE LA BRECHA DE DESARROLLO Y EL EUROCENTRISMO / Ferreiro 202 Arendt se opone con esta lectura al mito de la historiografía anglofrancesa sobre los orígenes teóricos, sociales y políticos del nazismo, mito que atribuye a Alemania un supuesto "camino especial" (Sonderweg) dentro de la historia europea. Esta idea de Arendt ha hecho, previsiblemente, poca escuela entre los historiadores e intelectuales de aquellas naciones de Europa que, supuestamente a diferencia de Alemania, jamás "abandonaron" Europa, sino, por el contrario, la defendieron y la "salvaron", es decir, entre los historiadores de origen francés, británico y, ulteriormente, estadounidense. El nazismo, sin embargo –esta es la enseñanza profunda de Arendt–, pertenece a la propia historia de Europa; su origen hay que rastrearlo desde siglos atrás en el antisemitismo, el colonialismo y el imperialismo europeos. En esta misma tradición se inscriben luego de Arendt algunos historiadores no europeos, como el historiador israelita Zeev Sternhell, que rastrea la mayor parte del ideario fascista en el mundo cultural francés56, o historiadores europeos, pero provenientes de naciones que, según la periodización estándar –que es también la de Hegel– no son centrales a la Europa ilustrada; así, por ejemplo, el historiador italiano Enzo Traverso, con su genealogía paneuropea del ideario y las prácticas del nazismo57. Como parcialmente lo advirtió el intelectual búlgaro Tzvetan Todorov en su análisis sociológico de la conquista de América, el problema de la historia de Europa fue en tiempos de la conquista el "Otro" (l Autre)58. Sin embargo, algo que Todorov –a diferencia de Arendt, Sternhell o Traverso– parece no haber advertido, es que el Otro continúa siendo, siglos después de la conquista de América, un "problema" en la historia europea. Frente a la tradición de autocomprensión europea suscrita ya por el propio Hegel, según la cual Europa –y, dentro de ésta, especialmente la Europa protestante– corporiza el principio 56 Sternhell, Zeev (with Mario Sznajder and Maia Asheri). The Birth of Fascist Ideology, Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989. 57 Traverso, Enzo. La violence nazie: Une généalogie européenne, Paris: La Fabrique, 2002. 58 Todorov, Tzvetan. La conquête de l'Amérique: La question de l'autre, Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1982. 203 ISSN N° 0718-4980 HERMENÉUTICA INTERCULTURAL. REVISTA DE FILOSOFÍA No 31, 2019 ISSN N° 0719-6504 universal del humanismo ilustrado, debe decirse, sin embargo, que Europa, en la práctica, no parece haber superado jamás el principio particularista del Estado-Nación; jamás se convirtió realmente, como se suponía lo habría hecho, en una federación cuyo principio identitario era la pertenencia misma al Estado respectivo; en otros términos, Europa no se convirtió realmente nunca en una federación de Estados constituidos sobre la base de los derechos universales del hombre, sino que continúa al día de hoy concibiendo a la ciudadanía primariamente sobre la base de la pertenencia natural y hereditaria a la nación. Ya Edmund Burke había criticado en sus Reflexiones sobre la Revolución Francesa, publicadas en 1790, que los "Derechos del Hombre" eran un principio excesivamente abstracto, pero no así los "Derechos del Hombre Inglés" (Rights of the Englishmen)59. Como sostiene Arendt, en Europa la declaración de los Derechos del Hombre "nunca fue garantizada por la política, sino solamente proclamada"60, y recuerda en este contexto que en la Europa posterior a la Revolución Francesa "los ciudadanos nativos del Estado-Nación con frecuencia miraron por debajo de sí a los ciudadanos que habían recibido sus derechos del Estado y no de la nación"61. Esta lectura de Arendt sobre la Revolución Francesa y sobre la recepción de ésta en la Europa del siglo XIX, no solo se presenta como un diagnóstico plausible sobre la historia europea de la primera mitad del siglo XX –que es la que Arendt aspira en primera instancia a hacer comprensible en Los orígenes del totalitarismo–, sino que aún a fines de la segunda década del siglo XXI conserva plena actualidad. En efecto, los Estados europeos consideran todavía hoy al ius sanguinis, al "derecho de la sangre", es decir, en concreto, a la pertenencia a la "comunidad nacional" 59 Burke, Edmund. Reflections on the Revolution in France. 1790. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003. 28: In the famous law of the 3rd of Charles I., called the Petition of Right, the parliament says to the king, ''Your subjects have inherited this freedom,'', claiming their franchises not on abstract principles ''as the rights of men,'' but as the rights of Englishmen, and as a patrimony derived from their forefathers. 60 Arendt Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism. 1951. San Diego/New York/London: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1979. 447. 61 Ibíd., 231. HEGEL Y AMÉRICA LATINA. ENTRE EL DIAGNÓSTICO DE LA BRECHA DE DESARROLLO Y EL EUROCENTRISMO / Ferreiro 204 (Gemeinschaft) y no a la "sociedad" (Gesellschaft), como la fuente principal o exclusiva de ciudadanía. En los casos en que existen entretanto leyes que abren el camino al ius soli, esto es, al "derecho del suelo" –por ejemplo, Alemania, desde las reformas sobre el derecho de ciudadanía a partir del año 2000–, son excepcionales y recientes, y se trata por lo demás de leyes que son menos el corolario natural del derecho consuetudinario que el resultado de una decisión política programática de la autoridad estatal. Por el contrario, en todo el continente americano rige casi sin excepción, desde Alaska hasta Tierra del Fuego, el ius soli como criterio principal de otorgamiento de la ciudadanía. La universalidad que hace posible al ius soli y que éste, además de encarnar, a su vez promueve, señala una diferencia específica, una genuina novedad respecto del "principio de Europa", como lo denominaba Hegel. Quien en América nace y se cría en un país goza de todos los derechos de los que gozan los demás ciudadanos de ese país, cuantos muchos o pocos sean esos derechos; más claramente: el hijo de un extranjero no es en América él mismo extranjero, no lo es formalmente para la ley ni fácticamente para los demás ciudadanos de la sociedad respectiva. El "derecho de la sangre" surge de la profundidad de la identidad europea, que no es así, pues, realmente universal, sino todavía la identidad particularista del Estado-Nación; el principio del Estado en el que la ciudadanía emana, en cambio, de la pertenencia de hecho a la sociedad civil y no de la pertenencia natural y hereditaria a la nación se da primariamente –y a nivel mundial casi exclusivamente– en el continente americano. 3. Reflexiones finales: América Latina y la historia universal A modo de conclusión, quisiera retomar la tesis de Hegel sobre la diferencia entre las dos Américas, pero llamando esta vez la atención sobre un aspecto en el que América Latina es ahora la que señala un avance del principio de la libertad respecto de los Estados Unidos. A pesar de fenómenos que pueden indudablemente ser identificados como expresiones de racismo, tras la proclamación de las Leyes 205 ISSN N° 0718-4980 HERMENÉUTICA INTERCULTURAL. REVISTA DE FILOSOFÍA No 31, 2019 ISSN N° 0719-6504 Nuevas de Indias en 1542 respecto de los indios y luego, a partir de mediados del siglo XIX, respecto de la población de origen africano tras los sucesivos decretos de abolición de la esclavitud, en América Latina no ha habido un racismo propiamente institucional, esto es, una segregación racial anclada formalmente en la legislación, como sí la ha habido en los Estados Unidos con las así llamadas "leyes Jim Crow", derogadas recién en los años 60 del siglo XX. El resultado natural de la ausencia de un racismo institucionalizado no ha sido otro que el mestizaje, el cual es un fenómeno específico de América Latina como de ningún otro continente. El mestizaje es, en efecto, un fenómeno mayoritariamente ajeno a las tierras conquistadas a lo largo y ancho del mundo por Francia e Inglaterra, supuestos representantes privilegiados del pensamiento ilustrado, donde la mezcla con las razas locales ha sido en todos los casos muy baja en comparación con la que ha tenido lugar en América Latina. La población de los conquistadores de esos países de Europa –y más en general, de la de los restantes países colonialistas del norte europeo, como Holanda, Bélgica y Alemania– evitó en general mezclarse con la población aborigen y, llegado el caso, se aisló en enclaves delimitados, en sus propias "colonias", barrios y clubs donde podía simplemente reproducir las formas de la comunidad nacional de la metrópoli. En este respecto resulta oportuno recordar lo que sostiene sobre América Latina el historiador británico Eric Hobsbawm en su Historia del siglo XX: Si bien la región había heredado de sus conquistadores ibéricos una intrincada jerarquía racial, también heredó de esos conquistadores, en su inmensa mayoría de sexo masculino, una tradición de mestizaje en gran escala. Había poca gente que fuese totalmente blanca, salvo en el cono sur (Argentina, Uruguay, sur de Brasil), poblado con inmigrantes europeos y con pocos indígenas. En ambos casos, el éxito y la posición social borraban las distinciones raciales. Ya en 1861, México había elegido como presidente a un indio zapoteca, Benito Juárez. En el momento de escribir estas líneas [= 1994, H.F.], el presidente de Argentina es un inmigrante sirio de origen musulmán, y el de Perú, un HEGEL Y AMÉRICA LATINA. ENTRE EL DIAGNÓSTICO DE LA BRECHA DE DESARROLLO Y EL EUROCENTRISMO / Ferreiro 206 inmigrante japonés, dos casos todavía hoy impensables en los Estados Unidos. Hasta el día de hoy, América Latina se ha mantenido al margen del círculo vicioso de política y nacionalismo étnicos que hace estragos en los demás continentes62. El principio del Estado de ciudadanos, cuando no permanece un principio meramente abstracto, lleva por su propia dinámica a la integración y sincretización de las formas culturales de los distintos grupos que conforman la población de hecho de un país –en el caso de la presencia de razas diferentes, también a su mestización– y, en esa medida, a una efectiva superación, es decir, a una superación práctica y no solo teórica, del particularismo del Estado-Nación. Lo que podría considerarse como una genuina "consumación" de la historia humana –y con ello quizás incluso como un "final" de la misma– será en todo caso posible recién cuando el Otro al interior del Estado no sea rechazado en su singularidad, sino que, mediante la promoción y formación de una nueva identidad de la respectiva nación, sea asumido –para expresarlo con terminología hegeliana– en una "identidad diferenciada en sí misma", en la cual sea entonces respetado en su diferencia específica, al mismo tiempo que reconocido en su dignidad y derecho como persona y como ciudadano. Precisamente en esta "Reforma" y "Revolución", todavía por venir, el ejemplo de América Latina, a pesar de todas sus falencias, pueda quizás ser de ayuda para los demás pueblos de la Tierra. 62 Hobsbawm, Eric. Age of Extremes: The short twentieth century, 1914-1991. 1994. London: Abacus, 1995. 360: While the region had inherited an elaborate racial hierarchy from the Iberian conquerors, it also inherited from an overwhelmingly male conquest a tradition of massive miscegenation. There were few genuine whites, except in the southern cone of South America (Argentina, Uruguay, southern Brazil) populated by European mass immigration, where there were very few natives. In both cases, achievement and social status cancelled out race. Mexico elected a recognizably Zapotec Indian, Benito Juarez, as president as early as 1861. At the time of writing Argentina has as president a Lebanese Muslim immigrant and Peru a Japanese immigrant. Both choices were still unthinkable in the USA. To this day Latin America still remains outside the vicious circle of ethnic politics and ethnic nationalism which ravages the other continents. [El resaltado es nuestro, H.F.] 207 ISSN N° 0718-4980 HERMENÉUTICA INTERCULTURAL. REVISTA DE FILOSOFÍA No 31, 2019 ISSN N° 0719-6504 Bibliografía Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism. 1951. San Diego/New York/ London: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1979. Bernasconi, Robert (with Sybol Cook), editor. Race and racism in continental philosophy, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003. Bernasconi, Robert. "Hegel at the Court of the Ashanti". Hegel after Derrida, ed. Stuart Barnett. London: Routledge, 1998. 41-63. Buck-Morss, Susan. Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009. Burke, Edmund. Reflections on the Revolution in France. 1790. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Gesammelte Werke. Hamburg: Meiner, 1968ss. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Werke in 20 Bänden. Auf der Grundlage der Werke von 1832-1845 neu edierte Ausgabe, ed. Eva Moldenhauer y Karl Markus Michel, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1971. Hobsbawm, Eric. Age of Extremes: The short twentieth century, 1914-1991. 1994. London: Abacus, 1995. Mignolo, Walter. The Darker Side of Western Modernity, Durham/London: Duke University Press, 2011. Mignolo, Walter. The Idea of Latin America. Malden/Oxford/Carlton: Blackwell Publishing, 2005. Moellendorf, Darrel. "Racism and Rationality in Hegel's Philosophy", History of Political Thought 13/2 (1992): 243-256. Santos Herceg, José. "La Imagen de América en Hegel. De la caricatura a la falta de respeto". La idea de América en los pensadores occidentales, ed. Jacinto Choza, Marta Betancourt y Gustavo Muñoz. Sevilla/Madrid: Thémata & Plaza y Valdés, 2009. 31-42. Serequeberhan, Tsenay. "The Idea of Colonialism in Hegel's Philosophy of Right", International Philosophical Quarterly 29/3 (1989): 301-318. Sternhell, Zeev (with Mario Sznajder and Maia Asheri). The Birth of Fascist Ideology. Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989. HEGEL Y AMÉRICA LATINA. ENTRE EL DIAGNÓSTICO DE LA BRECHA DE DESARROLLO Y EL EUROCENTRISMO / Ferreiro 208 Sundstrom, Ronald. "Douglass and Du Bois's: Der schwarze Volksgeist". Race and racism in continental philosophy, ed. Robert Bernasconi (with Sybol Cook). Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003. 32-52. Todorov, Tzvetan. La conquête de l'Amérique: La question de l'autre, Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1982. Traverso, Enzo. La violence nazie: Une généalogie européenne, Paris: La Fabrique, 2002. Troeltsch, Ernst. Die Bedeutung des Protestantismus für die Entstehung der modernen Welt. München/Berlin: Oldenbourg, 1911. Weber, Max. "Die protestantische Ethik und der 'Geist' des Kapitalismus". Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 20 (1904): 1-54. Weber, Max. "Die protestantische Ethik und der 'Geist' des Kapitalismus". Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 21 (1905): 1-110. Wirth, Jason. "Beyond Black Orpheus: Preliminary thoughts on the good of African philosophy". Race and racism in continental philosophy, ed. Robert Bernasconi (with Sybol Cook). Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003. 268-285.

IN DEFENSE OF THE WIDE-SCOPE INSTRUMENTAL PRINCIPLE BY SIMON RIPPON JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY VOL. 5, NO. 2 | FEBRUARY 2011 URL: WWW.JESP.ORG COPYRIGHT © SIMON RIPPON 2011 JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 5, NO. 2 IN DEFENSE OF THE WIDE-SCOPE INSTRUMENTAL PRINCIPLE Simon Rippon In Defense of the Wide-Scope Instrumental Principle Simon Rippon UPPOSE THAT WHAT I SHALL CALL the instrumental principle is true: people have reason to take the known, necessary means to the ends they intend.1 Then it appears to follow that your intentions to pursue ends, however you arrived at them, automatically give you reasons to take certain means. This idea might seem appealing: intuitively, people who fail to take the means to their ends are in violation of the reasons for action that they have, and that is why we describe them as practically irrational.2 But it is also deeply problematic, because it makes reasons for action too easy to come by. No reason to drink the petrol in that glass? Just adopt the bizarre intention of filling your stomach with any old liquid and suddenly you will have reason to do so! I will call this the Bootstrapping Problem.3 In his much-discussed paper "The Myth of Instrumental Rationality," Joseph Raz sees the Bootstrapping Problem and concludes that the instrumental principle must be false: your actual ends and intentions do not give you reasons to take the means to fulfilling them.4 Raz's suggested alternative is, roughly speaking, the principle that you have reason to take the means to just those ends that you have undefeated reason to have. But there is an immediate difficulty with this alternative sort of proposal: it leaves unexplained the phenomenon of cleverness and its opposite. Intuitively, people who take the means to ends they have no reason to pursue (or good reason not to) seem to be rational in a certain way (a way we may call clever), while people who fail to take the means to their ends, even when they lack any good reason to have those ends, seem to display a distinctive form of irrationality (let us call them obtuse). If the instrumental principle is false and only Raz's alternative principle is true, then we seem to have no grounds for saying that clever people do any better at following the reasons they have than obtuse people do. So how are we to explain the intuition that it is more rational to be clever than to be obtuse? We face an apparent dilemma: If we say that you have reason to take the means to the ends you actually have, the Bootstrapping Problem 1 I am especially grateful to two anonymous referees for JESP and to Selim Berker, Sharon Berry, Rachael Briggs, Iskra Fileva, Warren Goldfarb, David Gray, Christine Korsgaard, Japa Pallikkathayil, Derek Parfit, Joseph Raz, T M Scanlon, James Shaw, Jonathan Way, Ralph Wedgwood and Michael Young for their helpful comments. The initial context for discussion of these issues was made possible by Christine Korsgaard's seminar on practical reason at Harvard in 2007, funded by the Mellon Foundation. 2 I will use the phrase "the means" as shorthand for "the known, necessary means" to the end, since it is not practically irrational not to take a means one does not know about, nor to not take a sufficient means if one takes some equally good alternative sufficient means. These qualifications yield a weak but plausible version of the instrumental principle. A complete account of instrumental rationality would presumably include further principles as well. 3 Michael Bratman discusses the problem of "bootstrap rationality" in his "Intention and Means-End Reasoning," The Philosophical Review 90, no. 2 (April 1981): 252-265. 4 Joseph Raz, "The Myth of Instrumental Rationality," Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1, no. 1 (2005). S JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 5, NO. 2 IN DEFENSE OF THE WIDE-SCOPE INSTRUMENTAL PRINCIPLE Simon Rippon 2 threatens. If we say instead that you have reason to take the means just to ends you should have, there seems to be no room left for explaining what is rational about good means-end reasoning to bad ends: the rationality of cleverness.5 I advocate a scope distinction that promises to rescue the instrumental principle from the Bootstrapping Problem. According to the proponents of the wide-scope reasons approach with whom I agree, the instrumental principle is ambiguous because the deontic ("reason") operator in it can take either wide or narrow scope with respect to an implicit conditional (I will explain this more fully below, in section 1). The instrumental principle is held to be true only on the reading in which the deontic operator takes wide scope with respect to the conditional. But this reading is not the one that entails reasons of the kind that raise the Bootstrapping Problem.6 5 Raz develops his own rather sophisticated answer to this problem that unfortunately I cannot delve into here. Some other readers might think that what I have identified as the Bootstrapping Problem is not a problem at all – is it so crazy to think that we have very weak reasons to take the means to even our most bizarre and irrational ends? (cf. James Maffie, "Naturalism and the Normativity of Epistemology," Philosophical Studies 59, no. 3 (July 1990): 6-9.) A proponent of this view must face the difficult task of accounting for and accommodating these weak reasons, as well as the claimed difference in strength between the instrumental reasons that arise from our "bad" ends and those that arise from our "good" ends. And analogous problems to those mentioned here still arise: it is hard to explain why a merely "clever" person can easily seem just as rational, in a certain way, as a fully rational person, if it is assumed that the reasons the clever person is preoccupied by are so weak as to be obviously practically insignificant. 6 The wide-scope reasons approach was developed by John Broome and Jay Wallace. See John Broome, "Normative Requirements," Ratio 12, no. 4 (December 1999): 398419; R. J. Wallace, "Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason," Philosophers' Imprint 1, no. 3 (2001): 1-26. Broome does not use the term "wide-scope reasons" in his 1999 paper "Normative Requirements." He claims there that what counts in favor of intending to take what you believe to be the necessary means to an end you intend is a wide-scope ought or, as he calls it, a "normative requirement." Moreover, he argues that we must avoid the mistake of "confusing normative requirements with reasons" (p. 398). It might appear from this remark that he strongly opposed the instrumental principle as I represent it, in terms of wide-scope reasons. However, this interpretation is misleading. Broome defines another normative relation in that paper that he calls a "normative recommending," which is like a normative requirement except that it makes a "slack," rather than a "strict" demand on you – that is, you may not be failing to see to something you ought to see to even if you fail to do what it counts in favor of. Normative recommendings bear the same relation of slackness to normative requirements as ordinary, narrow-scope reasons bear to ordinary narrow-scope oughts. So Broome's concept of a "normative recommending" is just what I call a "wide-scope reason." Confusion may arise because Broome uses the term "reason" exclusively to refer to narrow-scope reasons, but this restriction is arbitrary. Moreover, if the plausible thesis that, if you ought to do something, then you have a reason to do it is true, then it will follow that all normative requirements – including what Broome (1999) presents as a genuine instrumental normative requirement – entail the existence of my wide-scope reasons. In more recent work, Broome preferred to describe what he had previously called "normative requirements" as "requirements of rationality," because he came to think it an open question whether rational requirements are normative, i.e., whether necessarily, if rationality requires of you to F, you have a (justifying) reason to F (see, for example, "Does Rationality Give Us Reasons?," Philosophical Issues 15, no. 1 (October 2005): 325.) JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 5, NO. 2 IN DEFENSE OF THE WIDE-SCOPE INSTRUMENTAL PRINCIPLE Simon Rippon 3 Most of this paper is taken up defending the wide-scope reasons approach against an objection Raz makes to it in "The Myth of Instrumental Rationality." Raz claims there that the Bootstrapping Problem arises even on the wide-scope reason approach: on both available readings of the instrumental principle, he argues, it entails that our intending an irrational end always gives us a reason to take the means to it (I will expound his argument in sections 2–4). I will argue (in sections 5–7) that Raz's argument only looks plausible due to a natural but rather serious misunderstanding of a certain class of wide-scope reason claims – namely, claims of the form "S has a reason to p or to q." My argument clarifies and resolves an important debate between Raz and John Broome. Broome has raised a separate objection to Raz's argument which is not obviously successful because it relies heavily on intuitions about which reasons we have in particular cases. Broome essentially argues that a central principle that Raz is committed to, which Raz calls the "Facilitative Principle," has counterintuitive implications about which reasons we have. For example, the Facilitative Principle implies that if you have an undefeated reason to avoid killing yourself, and you could avoid feeling hungry this afternoon either by eating a sandwich or by killing yourself, then you have not only a reason to eat a sandwich, but also a reason to kill yourself.7 Although Broome thinks this is obviously false, Raz claims that his intuitions differ from Broome's, and he is willing to bite the bullet in the disputed cases.8 While I am largely in agreement with Broome, I aim to build a more compelling defense of the widescope reasons approach here. By clarifying what we normally mean when we claim that "S has a reason to p or to q," my argument not only establishes that the wide-scope reasons approach is immune to the Bootstrapping Problem, but also resolves the clash of intuitions between Raz and Broome. I will show that Raz's intuitions about the particular cases, and his acceptance of the Facilitative Principle, rest on a logical mistake (section 8). I will then show that the same error also underlies a second objection to the wide-scope approach, according to which it provides too liberal an account of the instrumental reasons that we have (section 9). Showing that these two objections to the wide-scope approach to the instrumental principle fail is significant (as I explain in section 10). The wide-scope reasons approach, if it can be defended, allows us to (i) maintain the intuition that a practically irrational agent is irrational because he fails to respond properly to the reasons that he has, (ii) readily explain why instrumentally irrational agents are irrational in the same way in one Broome's more recent view thus leaves open the possibility that there are requirements of rationality even if there are no wide-scope reasons, such as those given by my instrumental principle. We need not adjudicate here whether Broome was correct in making that revision to his view, since even the later Broome shares my interest in defending the possibility of what I call instrumental wide-scope reasons (and thus the openness of the question of whether rational requirements are normative) against Raz's line of attack. 7 John Broome, "Have We Reason To Do As Rationality Requires? A comment on Raz," Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1, no. 1 (2005). 8 Joseph Raz, "Instrumental Rationality: A reprise," Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1, no. 1 (April 2005): 3-4. JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 5, NO. 2 IN DEFENSE OF THE WIDE-SCOPE INSTRUMENTAL PRINCIPLE Simon Rippon 4 important respect – whether or not they have reason to have the ends that they have – and (iii) cut off a well-known and seemingly forceful objection to the idea that rationality might be purely instrumental, according to which instrumental reasons arise only when normative force is "transmitted" from ends there is non-instrumental reason to have to the means to those ends.9 1. The Wide-Scope Reasons Approach Let me begin by very briefly showing how the wide-scope reasons approach to the instrumental principle is supposed to avoid the Bootstrapping Problem. Wide-scope reasons can be explained as reasons that constrain our attitudes and actions by governing combinations of them.10 We represent this logically by containing a connective within the scope of the reason operator. Thus, a wide-scope conditional reason says that we have reason to make it the case that (if the antecedent is true, then the consequent is true). We can characterize the instrumental principle as a widescope conditional reason this way: you have reason(if you intend the end, then take the means).11 As a matter of logic, wide-scope conditional reasons do not allow for factual detachment by modus ponens, which is to say that if one has a widescope conditional reason of the form: reason(to A if P), it does not follow generally from this and the fact that P, by modus ponens, that one has reason(to A). (The latter is a reason that we can call narrow-scope, because it has no connective embedded within its scope). The use of modus ponens is blocked here because the conditional is embedded inside the scope of an operator. Compare the following invalid argument: 9 Christine Korsgaard presses this objection in her "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," in Ethics and Practical Reason, Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut (eds.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 215–54. 10 See Jay Wallace, "Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason," 17. 11 Some philosophers have expressed semantic concerns about wide-scope normative claims like "reason(if A then B)." For example, it has been claimed that words like "ought" (and, by extension, terms like "reason") necessarily express relations between agents and actions (and not propositions or other entities that admit of a conditional form) (cf. Mark Schroeder, "The Scope of Instrumental Reason," Philosophical Perspectives 18, no. 1 (2004): 342-344.). I cannot fully address that objection here, but it may be worth clarifying that I understand the "reason" in constructions like reason(if A then B) in this paper as shorthand for "reason to make it the case that," and whatever is inside the parentheses as shorthand for a complete proposition. So "You have reason(if A then B)" means that you have reason to make it the case that a certain proposition is true – namely, the proposition that if A then B. An anonymous referee for JESP raised the different concern that when we say that there is a reason to , we can legitimately ask what fact constitutes or gives you that reason, but that this does not seem to be the case for what I am calling wide-scope reasons. On the narrow-scope view, if you have a reason to take a means M, we could say that your reason to take M is the fact that you intend E, or that you have undefeated reason to intend E, or something of the sort. According to the wide-scope view, you have a reason(to M if you intend E), but what fact, one might ask, is that reason provided by? My answer is straightforward: the fact that M is the means to E is the fact that gives you the reason(to M if you intend E). JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 5, NO. 2 IN DEFENSE OF THE WIDE-SCOPE INSTRUMENTAL PRINCIPLE Simon Rippon 5 Necessarily(something is on the mat if the cat is on the mat). The cat is on the mat. ⇒ Necessarily(something is on the mat). If the instrumental principle is itself expressed in terms of a wide-scope conditional reason, we cannot simply detach a narrow-scope reason to take the means based on the fact that we actually intend a certain end. So the wide-scope reading of the instrumental principle, it seems, avoids the Bootstrapping Problem. 2. An Objection: Raz's Detachment Argument Raz objects that the following argument is valid. If it is valid, then even the wide-scope instrumental principle entails narrow-scope bootstrapped reasons to take the means to the ends one actually intends. (I quote the premises directly including 1B, Raz's interpretation of the wide-scope instrumental principle.):12 The Detachment Argument (1B) One has reason(to do M if one intends to do E and M is the means to E). (2B) One intends to do E and M is the means to E. ⇒ One has reason to do M. At first glance, it might seem that the argument above works by straightforward factual detachment by modus ponens, with 2B providing the factual premise. But since, as we have seen, this move is not permissible here, we need an alternative explanation of how Raz thinks the conclusion is to be derived. One way the Detachment Argument might be thought to work is by an application of Raz's Facilitative Principle. He explains this principle as saying that, when you have an undefeated reason to perform a certain action (a "source action"), you have reason to perform each (though not more than one) of the possible alternative "plans" that would "facilitate" its performance.13 So our "source reasons" for performing actions, according to Raz, also give us "facilitative reasons" for taking any of the 12 Raz, "The Myth of Instrumental Rationality," 12. 13 Ibid., 5-6. I have disambiguated Raz's statement of the Facilitative Principle slightly by using the phrase "each (though not more than one)" where Raz uses the words "any one (but only one)." This disambiguation opposes Broome's interpretation of Raz's principle, according to which the Facilitative Principle entails the existence of a reason to take only one plan of action – presumably the best plan that will facilitate the end (Broome, "Have We Reason To Do As Rationality Requires?," 7.) That Raz intends the former interpretation, rather than the latter, is obvious from a footnote in which he remarks: "I may have a duty to be in Oxford by noon, and buying a train ticket will facilitate getting there. But it does not follow from these facts alone that I have a duty to buy a train ticket, only that I have a [facilitative] reason to do so. The fact that there may be alternative plans facilitating fulfilment of my duty, that others may be preferable, etc., may explain this diminution in stringency." (Joseph Raz, "The Myth of Instrumental Rationality," 13; fn. 18 [my italics].) Raz means the Facilitative Principle to entail a reason to take even a suboptimal plan so long as it would facilitate the performance of the source action. JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 5, NO. 2 IN DEFENSE OF THE WIDE-SCOPE INSTRUMENTAL PRINCIPLE Simon Rippon 6 possible plans that would lead to our taking those actions. For example, if I have undefeated reason to drink a cup of coffee, I thereby have facilitative reasons (insofar as these are possible ways for me to accomplish this) to head to the coffee shop with some cash in my pocket, to boil the kettle and put some instant in a cup, to grind some beans and start the percolator, and so on. (Facilitative Principle) When one has an undefeated reason to perform an action, one has reason to perform each (but only one) of the possible alternative plans that would facilitate its performance. The complex "action" that the wide-scope instrumental principle recommends is: "take M if you intend E," which is logically equivalent to: "take M ∨ not intend E." But Raz does not think of taking M, or of not intending E, as "plans" that "facilitate" your performance of this "action." What we are concerned with in this case, strictly speaking, is not the relationship between a source action and facilitative reasons, but the relationship between a source action (or a state of affairs) and reasons to perform some possible actions or bring about some states of affairs which would be sufficient to constitute bringing the source action about.14 What Raz needs specifically to fill in the argument here is another principle he accepts – namely that "if one has reason to bring about a disjunctive state of affairs, then one has reason to bring about either of the disjuncts."15 Let us call this the principle of Distribution of Reasons over Disjunction (DRD): (DRD) If one has reason to bring about a disjunctive state of affairs, then one has reason to bring about each (but only one) of the disjuncts. DRD is not an application of the Facilitative Principle, but rather a related claim that depends on essentially the same reasoning, as Raz himself confirms: "The inference pattern I relied on in the [Detachment Argument] is fundamental to practical reasoning: People have reason to do what will bring them into conformity with reasons which apply to them. I also relied on it in arguing for ... the validity of the facilitative principle."16 What, then, is the inference pattern Raz relies on to generate both the Detachment Argument and the Facilitative Principle? It is, I believe, the following: If you have reason to bring about some state of affairs A, and you can bring about A either by doing B or by doing C, then we may infer that you have reason to do B and you have reason to do C (but no reason to do both) in virtue of your reason to bring about A. I will call the principle underlying this inference "Liberal Transmission" for short, because it suggests that reasons are always "transmitted" from a source reason to every possible way of bringing about the state of affairs it is a reason for. It entails both DRD and the Facilitative Principle. 14 Ibid., 18. 15 Raz, "Instrumental Rationality: A reprise," 2. 16 Ibid., 3. JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 5, NO. 2 IN DEFENSE OF THE WIDE-SCOPE INSTRUMENTAL PRINCIPLE Simon Rippon 7 (Liberal Transmission) If you have reason to bring about A, and you can bring about A either by doing B or by doing C, then you have reason to do B and you have reason to do C (but no reason to do both) in virtue of your having reason to bring about A. We will come back later to discuss whether Liberal Transmission is in fact true. Let us for the moment put this question aside and assume for the sake of the argument that the weaker DRD is true. The wide-scope instrumental principle (1B) says that one has reason to avoid being in a situation of (intending to do E and not taking M). This reason can also be understood as a reason to bring about the truth disjunctive proposition (one does not intend E ∨ one takes M). By DRD, we can draw from it the implication that one has reason to take M. But this would be bootstrapping, so by modus tollens, according to Raz, we should conclude that the wide-scope instrumental principle is false. There are, I believe, a number of serious difficulties with this argument. Before explaining them, I want to make sure that the reader will grant that I have represented Raz's Detachment Argument properly. Here is the core of Raz's explanation, in his own words:17 (1B) does state that one has a reason ... it is a reason to avoid being in a situation in which one would be in breach of that reason. And one would be in breach of it if one both intends E and fails to do M. There are two ways to avoid being in that situation. One is to abandon the intention to do E. The other is to do M. So one has both a reason to do M and a reason to abandon one's intention to do E (though no reason to do both, because once one does one of them the reason to do the other lapses). That means that, so long as M is the means to E and one intends to do E, one has reason to do M. By doing M, when it is the means to E, one acts in a way that puts one on the right side of reason. By doing M, one conforms to the reason stated in (1B). It follows that one has reason to do M.18 According to this passage, the wide-scope instrumental principle (1B) gives us reason to pursue each (but not both) of the two ways of satisfying it – taking the means or abandoning the end. Raz's claim that one "has both a reason to do M and a reason to abandon one's intention to do E" represents an assertion of DRD, apparently motivated by his acceptance of Liberal Transmission (Raz does not offer a further argument for either of these principles). Now, since one obviously has no reason to abandon the end and then take the means, or vice versa, it is natural to add that "once one does one of them the reason to do the other lapses." 17 It should be noted, in fairness, that Raz's argument here may be partially founded upon a claim that Wallace makes (mistakenly, I think) in defense of a wide-scope instrumental principle. Wallace claims that "you can comply with [the instrumental principle] either by giving up the intention to [pursue the end], or by forming the intention to [take the means]" (Wallace, "Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason," 17.) While I defend the wide-scope instrumental principle against Raz's argument here, I seek to draw no conclusions about its success as a reductio of Wallace's position in that paper. 18 Raz, "The Myth of Instrumental Rationality," 12. JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 5, NO. 2 IN DEFENSE OF THE WIDE-SCOPE INSTRUMENTAL PRINCIPLE Simon Rippon 8 3. A Partial Reply, and the All Possible Ends Problem I want to begin to reply to Raz's argument by first noticing a problem with that last point. Even if we were to grant DRD, so that we can conclude from the instrumental principle that one has both a reason to take M and to abandon one's intention to do E, it would be a mistake to additionally conclude that once one has done one of these, one simultaneously loses one's reason to do the other. Nothing in the argument Raz offers establishes that, once we have abandoned our intention to do E, we lose our reason to take M, or that we only gain the reason to take M once we have adopted the intention to do E. (1B) states a wide-scope reason, and wide-scope reasons are not detachable by modus ponens. This means that our actual ends and intentions make no difference to the claim that (1B) makes on us. To see this point more clearly, suppose that I have an undefeated non-instrumental reason to intend to look after my teeth. Also suppose that when I realize that looking after my teeth requires a visit to the dentist, I become irrationally frightened. I decide that I am not going to take the means to that end, and I abandon my previous intention to look after my teeth. According to Raz's argument, by abandoning the intention I will have correctly observed the reasons that I have in the light of (1B), and I will no longer have a reason to visit the dentist. But this claim must be false. Here's why: Ex hypothesi, I still have a reason to intend to look after my teeth (though I do not intend to do so). And (1B) still presents me with the following instrumental reason, since visiting the dentist is a necessary means to looking after my teeth: I have reason(if I intend to look after my teeth, then I visit the dentist). The only way of acting in accordance with both of my reasons would be to intend to look after my teeth and visit the dentist, therefore it is obvious enough that their combination entails that I have a reason to do this, and hence a reason to visit the dentist.19,20 That is, (1B) combines with my non-instrumental reason to give me a reason to visit the dentist, even though I actually lack the inten- 19 It is important that the two reasons at play in this case do not conflict; if they did, they would not have combined in the way indicated here. Reasons might conflict by recommending incompatible actions or beliefs or, more generally, by being such that the justification for one undermines the justification for the other, or by being such that acting (believing) in accordance with one undermines the justification for also acting (believing) in accordance with the other. Perhaps I have some reason (e.g., testimony) to believe that P, and I have some other reason (e.g., I have constructed a reductio, but I might have made a mistake) to believe that If P, a contradiction follows. These two reasons do not jointly give me reason to believe that (P and a contradiction); the fact that two claims together entail a contradiction means that the reason for one belief counts against believing the other. Note that the fact that two reasons conflict need not necessarily be evident from their logical form. 20 This claim implicitly rests on the principle that a reason to perform a conjunction of actions entails reason to perform each of the conjuncts, which seems uncontroversial. Note that its truth is compatible with either response to the controversial question of whether one has any reason to bring about necessary side effects of actions one has reason to perform. JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 5, NO. 2 IN DEFENSE OF THE WIDE-SCOPE INSTRUMENTAL PRINCIPLE Simon Rippon 9 tion of looking after my teeth.21 This shows that my actual intentions and ends make no difference to the reasons (1B) provides me with, at least in this sort of case.22 If we take instrumental rationality to consist in coherence between my intended ends and the means I take, then I am not, of course, instrumentally irrational in failing to visit the dentist in the case where I no longer intend to look after my teeth. But my failure to visit the dentist nevertheless indicates my failure to follow the reasons that I have. It remains the case, even after I have abandoned my intention to look after my teeth, that, if I were to follow the reasons that I have, then I would intend to look after my teeth. Further, it remains the case that if I were to follow the reasons that I have, then I would visit the dentist as a means to looking after my teeth. In this sense, I still have a reason, in the light of (1B), to visit the dentist, no matter what my current intentions. It might be wondered what reasons (1B) would provide me with in the absence of further, non-instrumental reasons.23 On one type of Humean instrumentalist view, the only kind of reasons we have are instrumental reasons, and our ultimate ends are unanswerable to reason. Suppose an instrumentalist of this type accepts the wide-scope characterization of the instrumental principle (1B), and also accepts Raz's contention that (1B) provides reasons, for a given end and means, both to take M and to abandon E (though no reason to do both).24 Should this instrumentalist claim, like Raz, that once she has abandoned the end of looking after her teeth, (1B) no longer provides her with a reason to go to the dentist? I can see no reason for her to think so, with one proviso. The proviso is that the example is not a case in which abandoning E changes the relationship between M and E so that M is no longer the necessary means to E for the agent in question. For an example of this sort, consider a tightrope walker who intends to get to the other side by means of carefully placing one foot in front of the other. Suppose that, if this tightrope walker abandons his intention to get to the other side even momentarily, he will immediately lose his balance and fall. This tightrope walker loses his reason to carefully place one foot in front of the other if he abandons his intention to get to the other side, but only because his previous means of getting there will be ineffective as he plummets down from the wire. There may be some intuitive pull toward claiming that abandoning the end E causes one's reason to take the means M to lapse, even in cases that meet the above proviso. But this pull arises from a logical scope 21 This argument also shows that, if the wide-scope instrumental principle is true and there are (as Raz assumes there are) non-instrumental reasons to intend certain ends, we need not advert to a transmission principle like Raz's Facilitative Principle to explain the existence of reasons to take the means to ends that we have decisive reasons to have. 22 Of course, my having of ends and intentions may have effects that alter the terrain of my reasons in particular cases. For example, my abandoning my intention to look after my teeth may cause them to fall out, and I may thereby lose any further reason to look after them. I assume this is not the case in the present example. 23 I thank two reviewers for JESP for pressing this question. 24 This contention is accepted for the sake of argument; I will challenge it later. JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 5, NO. 2 IN DEFENSE OF THE WIDE-SCOPE INSTRUMENTAL PRINCIPLE Simon Rippon 10 confusion. What ought to be denied intuitively is that the instrumental principle (1B) provides me with a reason(to take the means and to not have the end). It is clearly true that I have no instrumental reason, in the present example, to both abandon the intention of looking after my teeth and visit the dentist. But to make this point is only to deny that I have a conjunctive reason. It is not to deny that I continue to have a pair of nonconjunctive reasons, even after I have abandoned my intention.25 To see the distinction here, consider that while driving I may have both a reason to put my foot on the brake pedal and a reason to apply the handbrake (in each case, to prevent the car rolling down the hill). But this does not entail that I have any conjunctive reason(to put my foot on the brake and to apply the handbrake). I might, of course, have some further reason for doing both (e.g., because one of the brakes might fail), but my two separate reasons do not on their own entail that I have a single, conjunctive reason to perform both actions. Similarly, then, in the dentist example, we may feel compelled to deny that I have any instrumental reason(to visit the dentist and abandon the intention to look after my teeth). But we can do this consistently with accepting that I have instrumental reason(to visit the dentist) and instrumental reason(to abandon the intention to look after my teeth). And assuming that the case meets the above proviso – that is, assuming that abandoning my intention to look after my teeth does not affect whether visiting the dentist remains the means to looking after my teeth – we have no grounds for thinking that abandoning the intention causes my reason to visit the dentist to lapse. Raz has no grounds for concluding in general that once one abandons one's intention to pursue an end, one's reason to take the means lapses. Raz's explicit argument against the wide-scope approach is unraveling already. He did not use the second, factual premise of the Detachment Argument to produce his conclusion, but instead simply took the wide-scope instrumental principle and invoked DRD.26 The more general point to be drawn is that the wide-scope instrumental principle does not let us derive narrow-scope reasons that depend on our actual ends, therefore our actual ends do not give us reasons on account of it, and the Bootstrapping Problem does not arise. But perhaps my argument so far has only made the prospects for the wide-scope approach worse. If the premise that the end is actually intended plays no role in Raz's argument, does the wide-scope instrumental principle entail narrow-scope reasons to take the means to all possible ends? The suggestion that we have such reasons is counterintuitive, at best, so I will call this the All Possible Ends Problem. 25 Though I will provide different grounds for denying the claim that the instrumental principle generally provides pairs of narrow-scope reasons (see §§ 5–6). 26 Broome also points out that the factual premise plays no role in Raz's argument (Broome, "Have We Reason To Do As Rationality Requires?," 5-6.) JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 5, NO. 2 IN DEFENSE OF THE WIDE-SCOPE INSTRUMENTAL PRINCIPLE Simon Rippon 11 4. Raz's Argument Reformulated To show that the All Possible Ends Problem is not a serious threat to the wide-scope instrumental principle, I will need to show that the argument for deriving narrow-scope reasons from it still goes wrong, even if it does not attempt to invoke one's actual ends. Here is a reformulation of Raz's argument that clarifies it and drops the unnecessary reference to actual ends. If it were valid, it would show that if the wide-scope instrumental principle is true, then for any possible end one could intend, one both has reason to take the means, and reason not to intend the end: (1C) If M is the means to E, then one has reason(to M if one intends E). (2C) M is the means to E. From (1C) and (2C): (2.1C) One has reason(to M if one intends E). From (2.1C): (2.2C) One has reason((not to intend E) or (to M)). From (2.2C): (3) One has reason to M. (4) One has reason not to intend E. The first step in the argument is straightforward modus ponens, so to block the conclusions, I will argue that it is one of the steps from (2.1C) to (2.2C) or from the (2.2C) to (3) and (4) that is invalid. Recall that Raz reasoned informally that a wide-scope conditional reason claim like (2.1C) states a constraint, that there are two ways of satisfying it, and that therefore we have reason to do each, but not both, of those things. Raz's argument here relies on two rules of inference, one that we may call the principle of Conditional Equivalence (CE), and another that looks much like the principle of Distribution of Reasons over Disjunction (DRD) that we met before: For the step from (2.1C) to (2.2C): (CE) If one has a reason of the form: reason(If A then B), then one has a reason of the form: reason(not A or B). For the step from (2.2C) to (3) and (4): (DRD*) If one has a reason of the form: reason(not A or B), then one has both a reason(not A) and a reason(B). Though DRD* looks very much like the earlier DRD, there is need for special care here, since Raz's argument is written in English rather than in formal logic. After the next section, I will defend DRD*, but also show how DRD* is importantly different from DRD due to a difference in meaning between English "or" in this context and the logical disjunction operator. Before I move on to that point, a brief reductio will show that at least one of the two principles CE and DRD* must be rejected. JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 5, NO. 2 IN DEFENSE OF THE WIDE-SCOPE INSTRUMENTAL PRINCIPLE Simon Rippon 12 5. Second Reply: A Reduct io of the Reformulated Argument Suppose, for the sake of argument, that we all have a reason to speak the language of whichever country we are in. Suppose, moreover, that this reason is wide-scope in form.27 This is captured by the following principle: (1L) If L is the language in C, then one has reason(to speak L if in C). By adding to (1L) an innocent minor premise and using Raz's principles, we can now complete an argument structurally identical to the one above: (1L) If L is the language in C, then one has reason(to speak L if in C). (2L) French is the language in France. (2.1L) One has reason(to speak French if in France). (2.2L) One has reason(to not be in France or to speak French). (3L) One has reason to speak French. (4L) One has reason to not be in France. But the conclusions (3L) and (4L) are a highly implausible result of such meager premises – as a matter of fact I am in England, and have no particular reason to go to France! My embracing the principle that one has a reason to speak the language (1L) surely does not, on its own, commit me to the view that, here and now, I have a narrow-scope reason to speak French (nor, indeed, to not be in France). We must therefore reject at least one of Raz's principles CE or DRD* that generate this form of argument. 6. The Conjunctive Interpretation of "or" and Why It Matters The most natural understanding of wide-scope reason claims connected by the English "or" actually vindicates DRD*.28 Suppose I assert, in English, "I have reason to A or to B." If this is to be understood as distinct from the narrow-scope reason claim: "I have reason(to A) or I have reason(to B))," then it is best understood as true if and only if my doing each of A or B (but not both) would count as satisfying that reason. 27 You might think that, if we do have a general reason to speak the language of the country we are in, it is a narrow-scope reason: Where L is the language in C, if one is in C, then one has reason to speak L. But understanding the reason in question as widescope has the significant advantage of leaving open the question of whether, when applied to any particular country, the principle counts in favor of my (learning and) speaking the language, or in favor of my not being in (or not staying in) the relevant country. So a general wide-scope reason could explain, for example, both my having grounds to speak French should I visit France, and also my having, because Japanese is hard to learn, grounds to avoid being in Japan. (Of course, these grounds may not be decisive.) 28 This point is a principal difference between my response to Raz and Broome's own. Broome's reply amounts to an attempt to refute Raz's argument by denying DRD or DRD* (without distinguishing the two). My explanation of why DRD* holds for English sentences will explain why Raz might be tempted to accept the similar DRD, even though DRD is false. JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 5, NO. 2 IN DEFENSE OF THE WIDE-SCOPE INSTRUMENTAL PRINCIPLE Simon Rippon 13 Think of the instructions on a ready meal: "Microwave for 4 minutes, or oven bake for 30 minutes." The instructions are best read as suggesting that I have a reason(to microwave or to bake) rather than (reason(to microwave) or reason(to bake)). I do not take a 50/50 gamble as to whether or not I act in accordance with the reasons the instructions present me with when I choose to microwave the meal! It is also not implausible to say that, when we say that I have this reason, I have reason(to microwave) and reason(to bake), and reason not to do both (or at least, no reason from this consideration to do both). Here is another example: Suppose I am lost in a forest. I have been walking this way and that for hours and have no idea which way is which. Absent further information, I have good reason to choose a particular direction at random and then to keep walking in a straight line: this navigational principle will give me the best chance of escaping the forest. Let us simplify and suppose that I can only choose to go either due north or due south (the other directions are presently blocked). My navigational reason can also be explained as a wide-scope reason connected by the English "or": a reason(to walk north or to walk south). It is a reason to walk in each of these directions, but not more than one of them. In choosing to start walking in one particular direction, I will be taking a gamble about whether it is the shortest way out of the forest, and therefore – arguably – about whether I am walking in the direction I have most "objective" reason to take. But I will not be gambling about whether I am obeying the reason that my navigational principle provides me with; whichever direction I choose to walk in, that principle gives me a good reason to do so, and not to walk in various different directions. These examples indicate that, on the usual interpretation, wide-scope reason claims connected by the English "or" do indeed imply narrowscope reasons to perform the actions on either side of the connective, so DRD* is vindicated. But the acceptance of DRD* now gives us clear grounds for rejecting CE. Combining (1L) with the minor proposition (2L), we straightforwardly derived: (2.1L) One has reason(to speak French if in France). Intuitively, everything we have assumed so far is consistent with the assumption that, here and now in England, I have no reason whatsoever to speak French. But we have seen that the natural interpretation of: (2.2L) One has reason(to not be in France or to speak French) entails that I have a reason to speak French, and therefore contradicts the last assumption. Therefore, (2.2L) cannot be entailed by (2.1L), and we must reject CE. To deny CE is to say that a wide-scope reason connected by the English "if ... then" does not entail its apparent equivalent connected by the English "or." That I have wide-scope reason to speak French if in France does not entail that I have a reason that can be properly represented in English as a "reason not to be in France or to speak French." We know this because, on the narrow-scope reading, this last claim entails that I have at least one of those reasons and, on the wide-scope reading, as we have seen, it entails that I have both! These results may appear to entail a denial of the intersubstitutivity of logical equivalents within the scope of the reason operator, and this JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 5, NO. 2 IN DEFENSE OF THE WIDE-SCOPE INSTRUMENTAL PRINCIPLE Simon Rippon 14 would be puzzling. A simpler explanation is that one of the English connectives involved is not translatable to its most obvious logical counterpart, so that the two English sentences in question are not in fact logically equivalent. In fact, a wide-scope "reason to A or to B" as stated in English is not naturally interpreted as equivalent to a disjunctive reason(to A ∨ to B) – where the connective is " ∨ "(read as vel), the logical disjunction operator. It is generally to be interpreted, rather, as equivalent to one of two conjunctions of reason claims: either to a reason(to A) & a reason(to B) & [from the contextually relevant consideration] no reason(to A & to B) (e.g., as when one has reason to staple a sheaf of pages or use a paper clip, and no reason to do both), or to a reason(to A) & a reason(to B) & a reason not (to A & to B) (e.g., when one has reason to walk north or to walk south, and not alternately in each direction, when lost in the forest). This interpretation makes it obvious why DRD* is a useful rule of inference for wide-scope reason claims over the English "or": since these claims have the logical form of a conjunction it is not surprising that, when they are true, their conjuncts are also true! There is, of course, no reason to think that a conditional reason such as reason(to B if not A) should entail a conjunction of reason claims like those just outlined, and this gives us clear grounds for rejecting CE: A wide-scope reason(to B if not A) is not equivalent to a wide-scope "reason to A or to B," where the latter is to be understood as suggested above. It is, rather, equivalent to a disjunctive reason(to A ∨ to B), a reason which is hard to state in a natural English sentence except as a conditional, or else as the negation of a conjunction: "reason not (to not A and to not B)." My thesis about "or" may at first seem radical, but the idea that the English "or" in certain contexts should be interpreted as a logical conjunction is nothing new: philosophers and linguists have long addressed it under the heading of "the problem of free choice permission." This name comes from certain sentences granting permission, such as, "You can have milk or lemon in your tea," which implies that you can have milk and you can have lemon but you cannot have both.29 The "problem" discussed is how to best explain the special interpretation of "or" needed in such contexts: as a feature of semantic meaning, as a pragmatic implicature, or as something else. That concern is orthogonal to the present discussion: what is important here is just that sentences of this sort are generally understood as having such an import (whether semantic or pragmatic) – thus making us licensed, and liable, to draw certain inferences from them that we should not draw from genuinely disjunctive claims. As far as I know, nobody has previously noticed the significance of conjunctive uses of "or" in the deontic contexts in which I detect them here. Making use of the conjunctive interpretation of the English "or" allows us to continue to understand the reason operator as functioning 29 Ralph Wedgwood helpfully raised this example in his commentary on an earlier version of this paper. JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 5, NO. 2 IN DEFENSE OF THE WIDE-SCOPE INSTRUMENTAL PRINCIPLE Simon Rippon 15 logically in ordinary ways. If we substitute the logical " ∨ " for the English "or" in CE and DRD* we can then accept the principle: (CE*) If one has a reason of the form reason(If A then B), then one has a reason of the form reason(not A ∨ B). CE* is either a simple instance of substitution of logical equivalents, or an entailment between an English conditional that is stronger than the material conditional and the disjunctive logical equivalent of the material conditional. It is, therefore, difficult to deny from a logical point of view. Let us return to our near-relative of DRD*, the principle of Distribution of Reasons over Disjunction: (DRD) If one has a reason of the form: reason(not A ∨ B), then one has both a reason(not A) and a reason(B). It is the principle we came across first when Raz took himself to make use of it in the Detachment Argument. I will now argue that we should deny it. There is an alethic modal analogy we can use to show that denying DRD is not prima facie implausible. From: necessarily(p ∨ not p), it does not follow that the disjunction of narrow-scope modals (necessarily (p) ∨ necessarily (not p)) is true; similarly from: reason(A ∨ B), it need not follow that the disjunction of narrow-scope reasons (reason(A) ∨ reason(B)) is true, let alone that the conjunction of these narrow-scope reasons is true.30 More importantly, the denial of DRD is supported by the threat of a reductio similar to the one I already provided: I could surely be committed to the claim (2.1L) that one has reason to speak the local language (in general) without being committed to thinking, here and now, that I have any narrow-scope reasons at all to speak French, or to not be in France. But we have accepted CE*, and if CE* and DRD were both true, such narrow-scope reasons would be entailed by the wide-scope claim. This gives us sufficient grounds for denying DRD.31 Wide-scope reasons like (2.1L) do not on their own provide us with narrow-scope reasons, so DRD must be false. 30 The analogy with the modal necessity operator should not be taken too far: in contrast with it, agglomeration is not permissible, i.e., (reason(to A) and reason(to B)) does not entail reason(to A and to B). The reason operator is analogous to the modal possibility operator in this respect. 31 Astute readers may notice that, according to my foregoing arguments, the claim (2.1L) may entail that I have a reason, here and now, to speak French: it will do so if I have a reason to be in France that does not conflict with the reason given by (2.1L). This may seem implausible at first, but it will not seem so implausible if we realize that my combined reason is just a reason, here and now, to be in France and speak French. It will not do anything for my acting in accordance with (2.1L) if I speak French here and now in England. Doing so will be superfluous to making true the disjunction (speak French not be in France), since that disjunction is already true, and it will additionally falsify another disjunction that (2.1L) equally gives me a reason to satisfy: (speak English not be in England). JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 5, NO. 2 IN DEFENSE OF THE WIDE-SCOPE INSTRUMENTAL PRINCIPLE Simon Rippon 16 7. Understanding Wide-Scope Conditional Reasons We are finally in a position to finish up our reply to Raz in the following way: to say that one has a wide-scope conditional reason is to say that one has a reason not to do both of the things that make the antecedent true and the consequent false. But this is not to say that one has reasons to do each (but not both) of making the consequent true and falsifying the antecedent, nor indeed to say that one has either of those narrow-scope reasons. It is only to say that one has a wide-scope disjunctive reason(to make the antecedent false ∨ to make the consequent true). This reason need not entail the existence of any narrow-scope reasons. The cause of mistakenly thinking otherwise is that the natural way to try to express the disjunctive reason claim in English is to say that "one has reason to make the antecedent false or the consequent true." But to make this claim, on the natural wide-scope interpretation of it, is to change the subject by making a claim about a conjunction of narrow-scope reasons. It is to mistakenly think of the wide-scope disjunctive reason as in every case giving us "options," when in fact it does no such thing. In showing that CE and DRD must be rejected, I have shown that the argument for deriving simple narrow-scope reasons to take the means to any end from the wide-scope instrumental principle fails (or at least, that it fails absent an additional normative premise, such as a premise that there is reason to intend the end). This point therefore successfully defends the wide-scope instrumental principle against both the All Possible Ends Problem and the Bootstrapping Problem. 8. Generalizing the Lesson: Against Liberal Transmission and the Facilitative Principle I suggested earlier that Raz might rest both DRD and the Facilitative Principle on a more general principle, the Liberal Transmission principle, that says: If you have reason to bring about A, and you can bring about A either by doing B or by doing C, then you have reason to do B and you have reason to do C (but no reason to do both). In denying DRD, I am committed to denying Liberal Transmission as well; I am claiming that you can have a reason to bring about the truth of a disjunction without having any particular reasons to bring about the truth of each of the disjuncts, even though either action would be sufficient to bring about the truth of the disjunction. If the Facilitative Principle is derived from Liberal Transmission, the argument that undermines DRD serves to undermine the grounds for the Facilitative Principle as well. But in any case, all three principles can be seen as motivated by the same informal argument that trades on a confusion about the logical form of wide-scope reason sentences connected by the English "or": (1) You have reason to do A. (2) You can do A by doing B or by doing C. (3) ⇒ You have reason(to do B or to do C). (4) ⇒ You have reason to do each of B and C, but not both. (5) ⇒ You have reason to do B & You have reason to do C. JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 5, NO. 2 IN DEFENSE OF THE WIDE-SCOPE INSTRUMENTAL PRINCIPLE Simon Rippon 17 It is the step from (3) to (4) that invokes the special conjunctive interpretation of the English "or."32 If we understand that "or" in step (3) as a true disjunction, there is no way to derive step (4) from it. If, alternatively, we understand it in the way I have described, as a conjunction, there is no way to derive it from premises (1) and (2). That there is no way to derive step (4) from the disjunctive interpretation of (3) follows from the more general truth that you can have reason to do something even if you do not have reason to do it in each and every one of the possible ways in which it can be done. I have already suggested that one's reason to take the means to one's ends should be understood in this spirit, but it is also supported by our intuitions about many other ordinary claims about the reasons that we have. For example, I may have reason to crack a joke at dinner, without having any reason to crack a racist, sexist and otherwise generally offensive one. I may have a reason to go to the party and have a drink, without having any reason to go to the party and have a drink of petrol.33 In other cases, some ways of doing what we have reason to do would quite explicitly defeat the purpose of doing it: I may have reason to get some money in order to buy a lottery ticket, but I have no reason do it by selling my existing lottery ticket. Reflection on such examples indicates that it is not the case that having reason to do something entails having reason to do it in each of the possible ways there is of doing it. Nor is it the case that having undefeated reason to do something (as Raz puts it in his statement of the Facilitative Principle) entails that you have reason to perform each possible plan that would facilitate its performance. My thesis about how the conjunctive "or" in a wide-scope reason claim may be confused with a logical disjunction provides a debunking explanation for why philosophers have been tempted to think otherwise. The present argument thus undermines Raz's argument for the Facilitative Principle as well as his objection to the wide-scope reasons approach. The argument I have laid out also makes a more radical claim about the relationship between wide-scope and narrow-scope reasons. It is not merely the case that you can have a reason to do something without having a reason to do it in each possible particular way in which it could be done; it is also the case that you can have a reason to do something without having a reason to do it in any possible particular way in which it could be done. That is to say, you could still have a reason(to A ∨ to B) 32 The conjunctive "or" may be present in premise (2) as well, but its presence or absence there makes no difference to the following argument. 33 It may be possible to bite the bullet about these examples and say that one does have some reason to do these things, though the reasons to do them are small and massively outweighed. Mark Schroeder offers an interesting pragmatic account of why it may sound odd to assert the existence of reasons that are small and massively outweighed in his Slaves of the Passions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). However, it would seem at least prima facie preferable to take our intuitions about the non-existence of the relevant reasons at face value. JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 5, NO. 2 IN DEFENSE OF THE WIDE-SCOPE INSTRUMENTAL PRINCIPLE Simon Rippon 18 even if you had no reason(to A) and no reason(to B). This is because your wide-scope reason to make it the case that a disjunction is true need not arise from, or be accompanied by, any particular reasons for making either of the disjuncts true; it would still be true even if the only reason you have is some reason not to both (not A & not B). My claim that you can have a wide-scope disjunctive reason while lacking any narrow-scope reasons is not, of course, to be equated with the paradoxical claim that a disjunction could be true without either of its disjuncts being true. The disjunction is embedded here within the scope of the reason operator, so there should be no air of paradox about it. It is analogous to the familiar claim about modal necessity: necessarily(p ∨ not p) may be true even though neither necessarily(p) nor necessarily(not p) is true. But I want to draw a yet closer analogy that wide-scope reasons bear to wide-scope requirements. In the case of requirements, it is quite clear that one can be subject to a wide-scope requirement without being subject to any narrow-scope requirements. For this reason, a version of Raz's detachment argument that was applied to a wide-scope requirement would have been implausible on its face. Suppose, for example, that I am subject to no reasons and requirements but a single wide-scope disjunctive requirement that I recognize: I am required(to A ∨ to B). Then my doing either A or B may be motivated by the thought that I am required to do it. Suppose I do A. Then it would be misleading to explain my motivation by saying that I was required to do precisely what I did; I was rather required(to A ∨ to B). This can be shown by the fact that, if I had recognized myself to be under two requirements – the one mentioned already and a second, narrow-scope requirement to A – and supposing that it were only possible for me to perform one of A or B, and I knew this, then I would not have been able to B and rationally be motivated by the thought that I was required to do it. The same goes for wide-scope reasons. Suppose, for example, that I am subject to no reasons and requirements but a single wide-scope disjunctive reason that I recognize: I have reason(to A ∨ to B). Then my doing either A or B may be motivated by the thought that I have reason to do it. Suppose I do A. Then it would be misleading to explain my motivation by saying that I had reason to do precisely what I did; I rather had reason(to A ∨ to B). It follows that wide-scope disjunctive reasons or requirements need not entail the existence of narrow-scope reasons or requirements, and may be acted upon rationally even so. The instrumental principle should, I believe, be understood in the way I have outlined here. We should not think that the existence of a reason to take the means to your ends depends on or entails either your having any reasons for taking particular means, or your having any reasons for not having particular ends. This is because it is plausible that your reason to take the means to your ends is ultimately just a reason of instrumental rationality: a wide-scope reason governing combinations of attitudes, or actions and attitudes, and not a reason of any other kind. JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 5, NO. 2 IN DEFENSE OF THE WIDE-SCOPE INSTRUMENTAL PRINCIPLE Simon Rippon 19 9. The Wide-Scope Instrumental Principle and "Process" Reasons The account of wide-scope reasons presented here enables us to respond to an additional objection to the wide-scope approach that has been developed in detail by Niko Koldony.34 Koldony speaks in terms of (rational) "requirements," but I will translate his objection into the language of "reasons" in order to address a potential argument that might be made against the principle defended here. Kolodny argues that the requirements of rationality are not "state" but "process" requirements, where state requirements require you to be a certain way, whereas process requirements require you to do something over a period of time. Process requirements, Kolodny says, can be normative in the sense that they "can function as advice or guide your deliberation," whereas state requirements "cannot be normative in this sense, since they do not tell you to do anything. At most, state requirements might be evaluative requirements – that is, necessary conditions for qualifying for a certain kind of appraisal."35 Translated into the language of reasons, we might say that state reasons are reasons to be a certain way, whereas process reasons are reasons to do things over time. If he wished to advocate the parallel distinction among reasons, Kolodny might say that, whereas process reasons can function as advice or guide your deliberation by counting in favor of a certain course of action, state reasons can only count in favor of making a certain kind of appraisal. Kolodny's analysis leaves us with two competing readings of my wide-scope instrumental principle, depending on which function it is intended to play. In terms of state reasons, it would then be expressed as: (WS) You have reason to not be in the following state: that you intend E but will not take M. In terms of process reasons, it would be expressed as: (WP) You have reason to avoid or exit, in whatever way you like, the following state: that you intend E but will not take M.36 The objection to my wide-scope instrumental principle then proceeds as follows: If we are interested in describing the instrumental reasons that we have to do things, then neither of these interpretation of the widescope instrumental can be satisfactory. That task should interest us in process reasons, rather than state reasons, and therefore in WP in particular. A man who, upon recognizing a necessary means to his ends, consistently abandons his ends, satisfies WP – but he is not a good example of 34 See Niko Kolodny, "Why Be Rational?," Mind 114, no. 455 (July 1, 2005): 509-563; Niko Kolodny, "State or Process Requirements?," Mind 116, no. 462 (April 2007): 371385. See also the reply by John Broome, "Wide or Narrow Scope?," Mind 116, no. 462 (April 1, 2007): 359-370. 35 Kolodny, "State or Process Requirements?," 371-72. 36 The alternative readings here closely parallel those of a rational requirement given by Kolodny in "State or Process Requirements?," 372. JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 5, NO. 2 IN DEFENSE OF THE WIDE-SCOPE INSTRUMENTAL PRINCIPLE Simon Rippon 20 an instrumentally rational agent. So WP is too liberal an interpretation of the instrumental process reasons that we have.37 This argument threatens to force us to abandon the wide-scope reading of the instrumental principle when it is intended as a guide to action. But the discussion of this paper shows why WP need not be accepted as the proper interpretation of the wide-scope instrumental principle even in terms of process reasons. As I argued above, you can have reason to make a disjunction true without having reason to make each of its disjuncts true. Therefore, if we wanted to represent wide-scope instrumental principle explicitly as a process reason, part of WP should be omitted, and it should rather be presented as: (WP2) You have reason to avoid or exit the following state: that you intend E but will not take M. The crucial point here is that WP2 does not imply that you have any reason to not intend E, nor any reason to take M. It says you have a reason simply to avoid or exit a certain state. While it is, of course, necessary that you either not intend E or take M in order that you avoid or exit the state, and you do have reason to avoid or exit the state, according to WP2, it does not follow that you have reason to do either of these things in particular. This is just what my denial of DRD, of Raz's Facilitative Principle, and of Liberal Transmission implies. You can have undefeated reason to do something even if you do not have reason to do it in every possible way in which it can be done. Using WP2 rather than WP as our interpretation of the wide-scope instrumental principle allows us to respond to the example of a man who consistently abandons his intentions upon recognizing the necessary means to them. Such a man does indeed, in every particular case, avoid or exit the state of intending E but not taking M. But we can glean no information from WP2 alone about whether, in every such case, he avoids or exits the state in a particular way in which he has a reason to avoid or exit it. Given certain widely shared background assumptions about what we have reason to do, people have undefeated reason to intend certain ends. As I argued earlier, such reasons would combine with our widescope instrumental reasons (here expressed as WP2) to provide us with reason to take the means to those ends. And this explains the intuition that there is something imperfectly rational about someone who consistently abandons his intentions on recognizing the necessary means to them. It might be objected that there is something defective about WP2 understood as a statement of process reasons, because when considered on its own it does not tell us which particular actions we have a reason to perform. But it is difficult to see why we should accept any such constraint on what counts as a legitimate statement of a process reason. In general, when we describe our reasons, we properly ignore various ways in which we have no reason to act that the specified reason may seem 37 I thank a reviewer for JESP for pressing this objection. JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 5, NO. 2 IN DEFENSE OF THE WIDE-SCOPE INSTRUMENTAL PRINCIPLE Simon Rippon 21 superficially to count in favor of. If you tell me I have a reason to go to London, it is no objection to point out that I have no reason to crawl there on my hands and knees. 10. The Promise of the Wide-Scope Approach The wide-scope reasons approach is, I believe, worth defending. It offers a simple and unitary explanation of why instrumental irrationality is something that can be criticized whether or not the agent has reason to have, or not have, the end he does. Someone who intends an end but does not take the means to it does not act in accordance with the widescope reasons that he has. He fails to make it the case that, if he intends the end, he takes the means. "Instrumental reasons" are best conceived of as wide-scope reasons, rather than narrow-scope reasons to take the means to our ends, or to the ends that we should have. That way, we can say that all instrumentally irrational agents act against their instrumental reasons. Since we did not need to derive any narrow-scope reasons either from the agent's actual ends or from the ends he ought to have in order to know that he has violated his reasons, this account of instrumental rationality does not require "transmission" of normative force from ends to means. It is conceivable, on this account, that agents in fact have widescope instrumental reasons and no other reasons whatsoever. It is conceivable, therefore, that rationality is purely instrumental. An important question remains: why think that we actually have the wide-scope reasons expressed by the instrumental principle? I have not attempted to answer this question here. But I have cleared away a problem that made answering it seem impossible from the get-go: I have shown why the instrumental principle, read as a schema for wide-scope instrumental reasons, is a credible account of at least some of the reasons that we take ourselves to have. Simon Rippon Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics and Somerville College, Oxford [email protected]

P a g e | 1 OBJECTIVE FUNDAMENTAL REALITY STRUCTURE BY THE UNREDUCED COMPLEXITY DEVELOPMENT ANDREI P. KIRILYUK Metallic State Theory Department Institute of Metal Physics, Kyiv, Ukraine E-mail: [email protected] Paper submitted to the 2017-2018 FQXi Essay Contest, 19 January 2018 Abstract We explain why exactly the simplified abstract scheme of reality within the standard science paradigm cannot provide the consistent picture of "truly fundamental" reality and how the unreduced, causally complete description of the latter is regained within the extended, provably complete solution to arbitrary interaction problem and the ensuing concept of universal dynamic complexity. We emphasize the practical importance of this extension for both particular problem solution and further, now basically unlimited fundamental science development (otherwise dangerously stagnating within its traditional paradigm). Objective fundamental reality cannot rely on postulated "principles", "mathematical reality", or "observation results" Despite the growing verbal popularity of "emergent" reality and concepts, the standard, positivistic science and knowledge structure is deeply and rigorously fixed, devoid of any intrinsic emergence dynamics and thus, basically, evolution, which is only formally simulated by artificial insertion of the notorious time-parameter (cf. e. g. [1]). That is exactly why "more is different" [2] in that, actually quite special (see below) and now desperately "ending" kind of science, where no structure or behaviour is directly, explicitly obtained from simpler components and should therefore be considered as given, by inevitable invention of ad hoc postulates, technical "principles", and equally abstract new entities. This is the true reason behind all the difficulties and ambiguities around the "what is fundamental?" question, again only within that kind of positivistic, or "unitary", science and its simplification of reality, which can be rigorously specified within the extended and intrinsically complete knowledge basis (see below). Characteristic examples include the relation between quantum and classical behaviour (both of persistently ambiguous origin), relativity, gravity, and cosmology issues. And although the observed structure and dynamics for each case and level of reality can be technically postulated as an empirically based "model", with various (but always limited) degree of success, the dynamic emergence links between the truly fundamental entities of unreduced reality (and therefore their genuine origin) remain poorly specified, thus compromising the objectivity of the resulting order of the world. P a g e | 2 The fact that these are not only "philosophical" problems of little practical or scientific importance is strongly supported by the accumulating new and persistent old "unsolvable problems" and "mysteries" of modern scholar science, which even falls in a strangely critical state, in the middle of its technical omnipotence, where the yet quite recent situation of science ending because of its quasi-total completeness is "suddenly" replaced by those growing numbers of "difficult problems" without solution in various fields, in striking similarity to the situation of imminent scientific revolution a hundred years ago. This quite practical importance of accumulated "general" problems of the official knowledge paradigm becomes even more evident and globally vital at higher levels of "truly complex" systems, in biology, medicine, ecology, and the entire civilisation development, critically depending on the growing unitary science impasse (in ever more striking contrast to the spectacular technological progress, strongly influencing also the fundamental science development). And while the empirically based intuition underlies the attempts of positivistic science to put the broken unity of nature together again by arbitrary guesses and respective artificial adjustment of separated world components in terms of abstract postulated "principles", redundant entities and their ambiguous "observation results", the obtained "Frankensteinian" construction of mechanically fixed "mathematical reality" [3] does not and cannot show the intrinsic, interaction-driven coherence and life-supporting efficiency of unreduced world dynamics and evolution, thus confirming ever more the importance of genuine, dynamically emerging fundamental levels of reality. The latter can be unambiguously derived only within the intrinsically unified and causally complete image of reality, obtained with the help of essential, qualitative extension of simplified unitary science projection to the unreduced hierarchy of dynamically multivalued interaction results, or universal dynamic complexity [4-16], providing consistent solutions to old and new problems, within the rigorously specified objective structure of fundamental reality emerging as the multilevel hierarchy of unreduced dynamic complexity. Dynamically emerging reality of unreduced interaction complexity In accord with the above programme of emergent and therefore objective fundamental reality, one should start its causally complete description with the unreduced solution of the underlying (arbitrary) interaction problem, beginning at its simplest possible configuration of the most fundamental level of reality that forms its material origin as such and then directly producing all its higher-level fundamental entities, in full agreement with their natural emergence, with all their intrinsic properties, dynamical laws and "fundamental principles", now unambiguously derived in their natural unity [4,8-10] (instead of being only mathematically and separately "postulated" in usual theory description). The mentioned simplest (and thus most fundamental) configuration of the global interaction process is obviously provided by two initially homogeneous continuous media, or "protofields", uniformly attracted to each other (and eventually giving rise to the electromagnetic and gravitational interaction forces respectively). If we analyse this interaction process rigorously and without any "model" or "perturbative" simplification (thus without any assumption of interaction weakness or special configuration), as permitted by the generalised effective potential method [4-10], then we obtain the explicit dynamic emergence of P a g e | 3 elementary world structures, recognised as (massive) elementary particles, in the form of quantum beat processes. The latter are obtained as localised, highly nonlinear and internally chaotic self-oscillation processes of the homogeneously attracting protofields, which perform nonstop cycles of their local interaction-driven squeeze (or "reduction") and extension due to the intrinsic dynamic instability of the unreduced interaction process. It is important that each dynamic reduction of the particle's quantum beat process is centred on a new physical "point" of thus emerging space, chosen in a dynamically random fashion among many other, equally probable and incompatible, or "redundant", reduction centres. We thus discover here, already at this lowest, most fundamental level of reality, the origin of the universal dynamic complexity within every real world structure, in the form of those dynamically multivalued, or redundant, results of any real, unreduced interaction process (which should, of course, be strong enough for noticeable structure formation, beyond insignificant fluctuations) [4-14]. Those explicitly emerging and mutually incompatible configurations of a system or interaction process, called realisations, are forced, by the driving interaction itself, to permanently replace one another in truly and causally random order thus dynamically obtained and rigorously defined. Dynamic complexity C (intrinsically coupled to chaoticity) is universally specified then as a growing function of the number of system realisations N (for integral complexity measures) or rate of their change (for differential complexity measures) equal to zero for the unrealistic case of only one system realisation, ( )C C N , 0dC dN  , (1) 0C  (e. g. 0 lnC C N or 0( 1)C C N  ). In fact, it is only the latter unrealistic case of effectively zero-dimensional (point-like) projection of dynamically multivalued reality that is exclusively considered in usual, dynamically single-valued, or unitary, theory and science paradigm (including its complexity imitations), thus underlying all its specific features, with relative successes, unsolvable mysteries, and ambiguities of abstract postulated "fundamental" entities and properties (which cannot be consistently defined within this severely limited approximation). While the detailed mathematical formalism of the universal complexity science can be found elsewhere [4-14], leading to the new mathematics of complexity, we can summarise it here by a symbolic relation, expressing the emerging complex-dynamical (multivalued) structure of any real interaction process 0 1( , ,..., )nV q q q :         0 1 0 1, ,..., , , , ,...,n r r r nV q q q q q q   D , (1) where 0 1, ,..., nq q q are the degrees of freedom of interacting system components forming the causally complete, multivalued, or complex, system dynamics D , which includes a well-defined set of system realisations { }r , with their respective, dynamically determined emergence probabilities { }r , measured system density distributions 0 1{ ( , ,..., )}r nq q q , and other relevant features. The dynamically entangled degrees of freedom of the resulting system structure on the right-hand side of eq. (1) (within every realisation) form the physically real space of the emerging complexity/structure level, 0 1{ ( , ,..., )}r nx x q q q . As realisations are permanently changing (appearing and disappearing) in dynamically random order, the observed system density ( )x is obtained as the dynamically probabilistic sum of individual realisation densities ( )r x : P a g e | 4     1 r N r x x      , (2) where the sign  marks the special, dynamically probabilistic meaning of the sum, implying the unstoppable probabilistic emergence and disappearance of individual realisation contributions ( )r x , with dynamic probabilities r causally determined as 1,..., ; , 1 r r r r r r r N N N N N N                     , (3) where N is the total number of elementary realisations (determined by the number of interacting system mode combinations) and rN the number of elementary realisations grouped within the r-th actually observed, compound realisation (which is the unified selforganisation mechanism, see below). The eventual multilevel, probabilistically fractal structure of the general interaction problem solution is implied in (1)-(3), so that any real system structure (including the world as a whole) emerges as permanently probabilistically evolving, multilevel branches of the dynamically probabilistic fractal [4-14], whose integral dynamic complexity C is always defined by a growing function of realisation number N , ( )C C N , 0dC dN  , (1) 0C  . Returning to the first level of world structure emergence in the form of quantum beat processes within every elementary particle (to be compared with abstract "state vectors" in usual theory), we note that already this lowest level of fundamental world structure is made by complex-dynamical, multivalued processes with complexity values ( ) 0C N  (and e. g. 100N for the electron). This leads, in particular, to the intrinsic and universally defined property of inertial mass, emerging without any additional entity (like the Higgs field and boson in the Standard Model), but simply due to the dynamic (spatial) randomness, or chaoticity, of the quantum beat process [4,8-10]. Other intrinsic particle properties (electric charge, spin, interactions) are also explicitly obtained as dynamically emerging features of the protofield interaction result. The related dynamical, e. g. quantum and relativistic, laws are equally consistently derived as results of interaction complexity development, without any abstract postulates or formally imposed "principles". All those properties and laws emerge in their natural unity, simply by their clearly specified dynamic origin, thus solving the "unsolvable" problems of usual theory. The fundamental entities of physically real space and time are obtained as emergent forms of unreduced dynamic complexity, reproducing the multilevel hierarchy of the latter [4-10]. The naturally discrete space emerges as the material tissue of dynamically entangled interaction components (the two protofields at the most fundamental level), in the form of physical space "points" given by the size of localised realisation structure (its eigenvalue separation in the unreduced interaction problem solution) and elementary length given by the separation of neighbouring realisations (i. e. their eigenvalues). The unstoppably and irreversibly flowing time emerges as the non-material realisation change process, specified by its intensity, i. e. frequency of realisation change events, where both the flow and irreversibility of this physically real time are due to the dynamic multivaluedness of unreduced interaction results. It becomes clear why these physically real entities of time and space cannot be consistently specified within the unitary science description and paradigm. P a g e | 5 Fundamental particle interactions that naturally emerge, with their observed properties, in this interaction-driven structure formation process [4,8-10] give rise to emergence of higher complexity levels, with their own, specific in detail, but universally described multivalued structures and processes, in the long general sequence of dynamic complexity development, or unfolding, determined eventually by the initial protofield interaction. The entire world structure hierarchy, including its highest known levels of life and consciousness, is thus explicitly obtained as emergent, interaction-driven, physically real and dynamically unified fractal of realisation sets (1)-(3), containing the clearly specified variety of dynamic regimes and obeying the single law of the universal symmetry, or conservation and transformation, of complexity, which includes the extended, causally complete versions of all (correct) particular laws and principles [4-16]. The mentioned diversity of complex dynamic regimes includes the entire range of observed internally chaotic structures, from the externally quasi-regular multivalued self-organisation case (with multiple and constantly changing, but very similar realisations, thus solving the entropy-growth problem) to the ultimately irregular regime of global, or uniform, chaos (with strongly differing and "entangled" realisations), with the rigorously specified criterion of transition between them. While the unified mathematical expression of this emergent world structure formation, dynamics and evolution can be found elsewhere [4-16], what we want to emphasize here is the related natural, physically and mathematically complete solution to all "fundamentality problems", simply because all world's explicitly emerging structures, features and laws, obtained in the unreduced completeness of their observed properties, are both fundamental by their clearly specified dynamic origin and equally causally ordered in this fundamentality, according to respective values of rigorously and universally defined unreduced dynamic complexity (as outlined above). As a particular example, we obtain the classical, permanently localised kind of system and behaviour as a higher level of unreduced dynamic complexity emerging from interaction of essentially quantum components (usually elementary particles) in the form of elementary bound systems, such as atoms [4,6,8,9], without any ambiguous "decoherence" of usual theory, just arbitrarily breaking the fundamental natural order of emergent world structures. It is confirmed by many other examples from "physical" and higher complexity levels, including genuine quantum chaos in nanosystems and the complex-dynamic origin of life, intelligence and consciousness, remaining "mysteries" in unitary science [4-13]. Beyond the horizon: The breakthrough research agenda There is much more than mere "philosophical" consistency to the described naturally emergent hierarchy of unfolding (unreduced) complexity of the world: in addition to causally complete solution of all "difficult", old and new, problems of unitary science (e. g. in cosmology [8-10]), it provides the fundamentally unlimited prospects for such intrinsically complete knowledge development, which are just badly missing in modern official science state that shows the growing and already dominating signs of its inevitable "end", either in the form of ontological saturation towards the independently progressing technologies or as a strangely increasing number of internal contradictions and "unsolvable" problems. P a g e | 6 Indeed, the described way of progressive development of the unreduced interaction complexity doesn't need to stop at any its known level and can have various probable links and issues towards larger and deeper reality of other complexity levels and structures. While they can be separated from the explicitly known world structures by natural complexity gaps (actually omnipresent in the observed complexity hierarchy and contributing to its reasonable efficiency), nothing prevents us from their progressive discovery and understanding, similar to previous, although often spontaneous and fundamentally blind search for deeper levels of now "well-known" material reality. Even the latter is very far from being perfectly understood within the dominating unitary science projection, as we show in detail in various applications of the qualitatively extended and provably complete framework of the universal science of complexity, from elementary particles to consciousness and modern development problems [4-16]. It becomes evident therefore that still much greater and fundamentally unlimited novelties can be waiting for us in the infinitely larger, dynamically multivalued space of unreduced complexity dimensions, and there are clear and rigorously specified indications in favour of their reality [8], far beyond the most advanced dreams of unitary science paradigm. It is important that now this fascinating search for genuine, qualitative novelties, both within and beyond the "ordinary" material reality, doesn't need to remain empirically intuitive and conceptually blind (which is the inevitable way of traditional unitary, or positivistic, science), since the unified hierarchy of naturally developing world complexity outlined above and constituting the objectively specified and causally complete fundamental reality provides both the consistent, well-defined "order of the world" and the guiding line for its further exploration. In summary, we show how and why the unreduced, now truly rigorous mathematical solution to the arbitrary interaction problem (illustrated by eqs. (1)-(3)), with its qualitatively extended (dynamically multivalued) structure as compared to the artificially restricted, dynamically single-valued projection of standard positivistic "models", not only provides intrinsically consistent solutions to various stagnating problems of the latter, but leads to the objectively determined and causally complete picture of multilevel fundamental reality, where all "impossible miracles" of unitary science become possible and natural, including the total, physically real unification of all, now causally complete knowledge and its basically unlimited development towards new levels and dimensions of unreduced, universally defined dynamic complexity [4-16]. P a g e | 7 References [1] I. Prigogine, From Being to Becoming: Time and Complexity in the Physical Sciences (Freeman, New York, 1980). [2] P. W. Anderson, "More Is Different: Broken symmetry and the nature of the hierarchical structure of science", Science 177 (1972) 393-396. [3] M. Tegmark, Our Mathematical Universe: My Quest for the Ultimate Nature of Reality (Vintage Books, New York, 2015). First edition: 2014. [4] A. P. Kirilyuk, Universal Concept of Complexity by the Dynamic Redundance Paradigm: Causal Randomness, Complete Wave Mechanics, and the Ultimate Unification of Knowledge (Naukova Dumka, Kyiv, 1997). ArXiv:physics/9806002. [5] A. P. Kirilyuk, "Universal Science of Complexity: Consistent Understanding of Ecological, Living and Intelligent System Dynamics", ArXiv:0706.3219 (2007), p. 1-13. Russian version: Nanosystems, Nanomaterials, Nanotechnologies 11 (2013) 679-700. [6] A. P. Kirilyuk, Complex Dynamics of Real Quantum, Classical and Hybrid Micro-Machines (LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, Saarbrücken, 2013). ArXiv:physics/0211071. [7] A. P. Kirilyuk, Complex-Dynamic Origin of Consciousness and Sustainability Transition (LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, Saarbrücken, 2014). ArXiv:physics/0409140. [8] A. P. Kirilyuk, Theory of Everything, Ultimate Reality and the End of Humanity: Extended Sustainability by the Universal Science of Complexity (LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, Beau Bassin, 2017). [9] A. P. Kirilyuk, "Consistent Cosmology, Dynamic Relativity and Causal Quantum Mechanics as Unified Manifestations of the Symmetry of Complexity", ArXiv:physics/0601140 (2006) 1-46. In Russian: Nanosystems, Nanomaterials, Nanotechnologies 11 (2013) 437-517. [10] A. P. Kirilyuk, "Complex-Dynamical Solution to Many-Body Interaction Problem and Its Applications in Fundamental Physics", Nanosystems, Nanomaterials, Nanotechnologies 10 (2012) 217-280. ArXiv:1204.3460. [11] A. P. Kirilyuk, "Unreduced Dynamic Complexity: Towards the Unified Science of Intelligent Communication Networks and Software", In: IFIP, Vol. 229, Network Control and Engineering for QoS, Security, and Mobility, IV, ed. by D. Gaïti (Springer, Boston, 2007), p. 120. ArXiv:physics/0603132. [12] A.P. Kirilyuk, "New Mathematics of Complexity and Its Biomedical Applications", Banach Center Publications 109 (2016) 57-81. Hal-01147395. [13] A.P. Kirilyuk, "Complex-Dynamical Nanobiotechnology Paradigm and Intrinsically Creative Evolution", Nanosystems, Nanomaterials, Nanotechnologies 14 (2016) 1-26. Hal01342331. [14] A. P. Kirilyuk, "Dynamic Origin of Evolution and Social Transformation", Nanosystems, Nanomaterials, Nanotechnologies 11 (2013) 1-21. ArXiv:1212.1939. [15] A. P. Kirilyuk, "Extended Mathematics of Unreduced Dynamic Complexity: The Exact Image of Unified Reality, from the Electron to Consciousness", 2015 FQXi essay contest, http://fqxi.org/community/forum/topic/2398 (2015) 1-10. Hal-01173946. [16] A.P. Kirilyuk, "The Unified Complex-Dynamic Origin of Time, Intention, Life, and Everything", 2016-17 FQXi essay contest, http://fqxi.org/community/forum/topic/2774 (2017) 1-10. Hal-01611317.

THE CATEGORY OF MEREOTOPOLOGY AND ITS ONTOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES SAIKEERTHI RACHAVELPULA Abstract. We introduce the category of mereotopology Mtop as an alternative category to that of topology Top, stating ontological consequences throughout. We consider entities such as boundaries utilizing Brentano's thesis and holes utilizing homotopy theory. Lastly, we mention further areas of study in this category. Contents 1. Introduction 1 2. Mereology 2 2.1. [G(E)M] 2 2.2. Differences to ZFC 5 3. Mereotopology 5 3.1. [G(E)M]TC 5 4. Brentano's thesis 7 4.1. Boundaries 7 4.2. Brentanian formulation 8 5. Topology 8 6. Holes 12 6.1. Homotopy 12 6.2. Products in Mereotopology 14 6.3. Homotopy in Mereotopology 14 7. Conclusion 15 Acknowledgments 16 References 16 1. Introduction The category of mereotopology, though not nearly as developed as topology, has often been of preference to those interested in formal ontology. Where ontology is traditionally defined as the science which deals with nature and the organization of reality, formal ontology deals with formal structures and relations in reality as they are governed in all material domains. This contrasts material ontologies (such Date: August 28, 2017. 1 2 SAIKEERTHI RACHAVELPULA as chemistry, biology, medicine, etc.) which study the nature and organization of certain sub-regions of reality [4]. The basis for mereotopology is mereology which is a formal theory of parthood. It was first introduced in Husserl's Logical Investigations; previously, it had received attention from those such as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Leibniz, and Kant. Specifically, it has proven helpful for disciplines such as natural-language analysis and artificial intelligence where more of an ontological motivation is desired. With the addition of topology, we derive mereotopology and become able to speak of partwhole relations. We, thus, become able to better understand the a priori nature of boundaries and holes, and we try to apply this to the questions philosophers and ontologists have been asking about these entities. Is a boundary an independent being? Do we view holes as immaterial particulars or spatiotemporal particulars? How do we address issues of genus? In this paper, we rigorously develop Brentano's thesis, and we introduce homotopy from algebraic topology to further develop the formal ontology of holes. One advantage of this is that we may bypass adopting a predicate 'H' (where 'H' represents the attribute of having a hole), and we may import knowledge of group theory which is already substantially developed to the category of Mtop. The organization of this paper is as follows: we begin by stating the [G(E)M] axiomatic schema in mereology Mer and how it is different from ZFC. From there, we introduce the remainder of [G(E)M]TC. We mention the rigorous formalization of Brentano's thesis as an important ontological work done in this category. Then, we define a continuous mereological morphism, and we show that Hausdorff topologies are indeed mereotopologies. Lastly, we approach the ontological problem of holes using homotopy theory and mention limitations and areas of further investigation in mereotopology. 2. Mereology 2.1. [G(E)M]. Definition 2.1. The theory of ground mereology (often shortened to [M]) concerns the binary predicate P (called "parthood": Pxy is read as "x is a part of y") with the following three axioms: (P1) Pxx, (reflexivity) (P2) Pxy ∧ Pyx → x = y, (antisymmetry) (P3) Pxy ∧ Pyz → Pxz. (transitivity) Remark 2.2. . Note the similarity to set theory. Set theory could be defined as the theory surrounding one binary predicate ∈, where x ∈ X is read as "x is an element of X," satisfying the axioms of one's choice, quite frequently ZFC. The major difference with mereology is reflexivity: in set theory, X ∈ X is quite infrequently true. Though there are some complaints concerning the axioms of ground mereology, these have been, for the most part, dismissed [3]. For example, a common complaint to (P3) is the notion that "the handle is a part of the door" and "the door is a part THE CATEGORY OF MEREOTOPOLOGY AND ITS ONTOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES 3 of the house," yet "the handle is not a part of the house." What we are dealing with here is not parthood in the primitive sense. Instead, we have imposed another condition on parthood. Specifically, we imposed being a"functional part." A part having "function" is, thus, closer to an open formula φ (Here, φ(x) is any open formula in one variable x, φ(x, y) is the open formula in two variables x, y, and so on. Generally, we say φ to mean that the sentence 'φ' is true for at least one object x), and no such claim is made that φ is transitive. Thus, the following may or may not hold: (M1) (Pxy ∧ φ(x, y)) ∧ (Pyz ∧ φ(y, z))→ (Pxz ∧ φ(x, z)) Now that the parthood predicate 'P' is defined, we may define other mereological relations which will be useful to us in the future as follows: (M2) PPxy := Pxy ∧ ¬Pyx, (x is a proper part of y) (M3) Oxy := ∃z(Pzx ∧ Pzy), (x overlaps y) (M4) Uxy := ∃z(Pxz ∧ Pyz), (x underlaps y) (M5) Dxy := ¬Oxy. (x is discrete from y) Definition 2.3. The theory of extensional mereology [(E)M] extends [M] with the supplementation axiom. (P4) ¬Pxy → ∃z(Pzx ∧ ¬Ozy) This is called "strong supplementation," and it allows us to derive another property "weak supplementation" as follows: (M6) PPxy → ∃z(PPzy ∧ ¬Ozx). Analogous to extensionality in set theory, strong supplementation allows us to identify when two objects are equal. Two objects would be equal in this strong sense if they (1) have the same parts, and (2) are parts of the same objects. Suppose x and y have the same parts. Now, suppose ¬Pxz ∧ Pyz. Then, by (P4), we have ∃w(Pwx∧¬Owz). Thus, by assumption of x and y having the same parts, we have Pwy. Then, by (P3), we have Pwz, but this is a contradiction of ¬Owz. Therefore, we cannot have both ¬Pxz∧Pyz, and thus x and y must be part of the same things. Therefore, (P4) tells us that x = y if and only if x and y have the same parts. Definition 2.4. The theory of closed (extensional) mereology [C(E)M] extends [(E)M] with the following axioms: (P5) Uxy → ∃z∀w(Owz ↔ (Owx ∨ Owy)), (P6) Oxy → ∃z∀w(Pwz ↔ (Pwx ∧ Pwy)), (P7) ∃z((Pzx ∧ ¬Ozy)→ ∀w(Pwz ↔ (Pwx ∧ ¬Owy))). These three axioms give us what we call sum, product, and difference in mereology. These objects are analogous to union, intersection, and set difference in set theory. However, note that a sum or product only exists when there is an already existing underlap or overlap respectively. Where 'ι' is a description operator for a given language, we have the following: (M7) x+ y := ιz∀w(Owz ↔ (Owx ∨ Owy)), (Sum) (M8) x× y := ιz∀w(Pwz ↔ (Pwx ∧ Pwy)), (Product) (M9) x− y := ιz∀w (Pwz ↔ (Pwx ∧ ¬Owy)) (Difference) 4 SAIKEERTHI RACHAVELPULA Thus, we can restate (P5), (P6), and (P7) as follows: (P5') Uxy → ∃z(z = x+ y) (P6') Oxy → ∃z(z = x× y) (P7') ∃z(Pzx ∧ ¬Ozy)→ ∃z(z = x− y) If we want to be able to, for example, sum arbitrarily many parts, we extend [C(E)M] to [G(E)M] or general (extensional) mereology. Definition 2.5. The theory of general (extensional) mereology [G(E)M] extends [(E)M] with the fusion axiom: (P8) ∃xφ→ ∃z∀y(Oyz ↔ ∃x(φ ∧Oyx)) Thus, we can define sums and products in [G(E)M] as follows: (M10) σxφ := ιz∀y(Oyz ↔ ∃x(φ∧ Oyx)), (M11) πxφ := σz∀x(φ→ Pzx). From here, we may reformulate (P9) as follows: (P8') ∃xφ→ ∃z(z = σxφ). This, then yields, (M12) ∃xφ ∧ ∃y∀x(φ→ Pyx)→ ∃z(z = πxφ). Thus, we have the following definitional equivalences in [G(E)M]: (M13) x+ y = σz(Pzx∨ Pzy), (M14) x× y = σz(Pzx∨ Pzy), (M15) x− y = σz(Pzx ∧ ¬ Ozy), (M16) xC = σz(¬Ozx), (M17) U = σz(Pzz). We may use these notions to prove the remainder principle: (M18) Pxy ∧ x 6= y → ∃z(z = y − x). Often the fusion axiom (which states that for any arbitrary number of parts, there exists a sum) is contested as not representing how we define objects colloquially. It brings into question whether there is a such a thing that consists of just my right foot and my left elbow. These types of questions have led some to restrict summations to those objects which are connected. However, an object such as a bikini consists of two disconnected parts, yet it is treated as an individual in our everyday language. The subtlety of the fusion axiom is that there are always summations of arbitrary objects such as my right foot and my left elbow, but these summations are only named as one if they are useful for us to speak about. For example, it is useful for us to speak about a bikini in terms of one object consisting of two disconnected parts. Thus, these hesitations remain at the level of language and raise no serious ontological concern. Furthermore, we note that there is a semantic difference between σxφ and simply the extension of φ. That is, the sum of some flowers is a bouquet while the bouquet itself is not a flower. Lastly, we note here that the fusion axiom is stated as a conditional and that the sum itself is unique (which is obvious from (E)). In mereology, empty sums do not exist. That is, if φ is not satisfied, then σxφ is undefined. The is precisely because empty sums are not a part of reality. This then gives rise to the notion of a universe and a complement as follows: THE CATEGORY OF MEREOTOPOLOGY AND ITS ONTOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES 5 (M19) U := ιz∀x(Pxz), (M20) xC := U − x. Lastly, we notice that we have not assumed atomicity in this formulation as follows: (M21) ∀x∃yPPyx. 2.2. Differences to ZFC. In comparison to set theory, mereology operates with the parthood predicate 'P.' whereas set theory operates with the set membership predicate '∈'. In set theory, a morphism (called a function) maps an element of the domain to an element of the codomain, retaining the set membership predicate. In short, we have f : X → Y is a set morphism if for each x ∈ X, we associate f(x) ∈ Y . Note, it is helpful to think of parthood as analogous to ⊆ in set theory. Note there is no analogy to '∈,' in mereology. Since we do not operate with this predicate in mereology [G(E)M], we thus have the following definition for a morphism in this category: Definition 2.6. A morphism in mereology is a map from the domain X to codomain Y such that for every part PzX, we associate a part Pf(z)Y , and if Pzw with PzX and PwX, then Pf(z)f(w). Definition 2.7. An isomorphism in mereology is a morphism f : X → Y such that there exists a morphism g : Y → X such that g ◦ f = h : X → X and f ◦ g = k : Y → Y are both respectively identity maps, i.e., such that h(x) = x and k(y) = y for all PxX and PyY . Secondly, Russell's paradox which posed problems for early set theory does not occur in mereology. Russell's paradox is as follows: Let R = {x : x /∈ x}. Then, R ∈ R↔ R /∈ R. Simply, because we have reflexivity in mereology, we avoid this problem all together. Lastly, in mereology we have a top but no bottom while in standard set-theory we have the exact opposite. 3. Mereotopology 3.1. [G(E)M]TC. Mereology by itself limits us to a theory of parts. For example, mereology does not give us the sufficient language to speak about the distinction between these two parts. 6 SAIKEERTHI RACHAVELPULA It is clear that though both of these objects are parts of some whole, they are different kinds of parts (specifically, one is a tangential part and the other in an interior part). Thus, in order to speak more about part-whole relations, we adopt topology. We begin to do so by adding the connection predicate 'C,' understood intuitively as topological connection. We assume that 'C' is reflexive, symmetric, and monotonic with respect to 'P,' giving us ground topology [T]. Definition 3.1. The theory of ground topology [T] defines the following axioms in relation to the connection predicate 'C.' Adding this theory to [G(E)M] give us [G(E)M]T: (C1) Cxx, (C2) Cxy → Cyx, (C3) Pxy → ∀z(Czx→ Czy). From here, we may define other relations as follows: (MT1) ECxy := Cxy ∧ ¬Oxy, (External Connection) (MT2) TPxy := Pxy ∧ ∃z(ECzx ∧ ECzy), (Tangential Part) (MT3) IPxy := Pxy ∧ ¬TPxy. (Internal Part) Now, we may define other quasi-topological operators as follows: (MT4) ix := σz IPzx, (interior) (MT5) ex := i(xC), (exterior) (MT6) cx := (ex)C , (closure) (MT7) bx := (ix+ex)C . (boundary) Now, we introduce the language of a self-connected whole as an object which cannot be split into two or more disconnected parts. Notice that this appears similar to the notion of connectedness in topology. (MT8) SCx := ∀y∀z(x = y + z → Cyz) We can also distinguish between open and closed individuals as follows: (MT9) Opx := x = ix (open), (MT10) Clx := x = cx (closed). To receive the full strength of [G(E)M]TC, we introduce closure conditions. Definition 3.2. The theory of [G(E)M]TC extends [G(E)M]T with closure conditions through the following axioms: (C4) Clx ∧ Cly → Cl(x+ y), (C5) ∀x(φ→ Clx)→ (z = πxφ→ Clz). Here, we notice that (C5) is given as a conditional because we do not assume a null object. From here, we may also derive axioms similar to the standard Kuratowski axioms for topological closure. The proofs of these are also identical. (MT11) Pxcx (MT12) c(cx) = cx (MT13) c(x+ y) = cx + cy (MT14) P(ix)x (MT15) i(ix) + ix (MT16) i(x× y) = ix× iy THE CATEGORY OF MEREOTOPOLOGY AND ITS ONTOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES 7 (MT17) bx = b(xC) (MT18) b(bx) = bx (MT19) b(x× y) + b(x+ y) = bx+ by 4. Brentano's thesis 4.1. Boundaries. One important advancement done in mereotopology is the rigorous formulation of Brentano's thesis which will be explained here. Brentano's Thesis is the ontological notion that a 'boundary' can exist as a matter of necessity only as part of a whole of higher 'dimension' of which it is the boundary. This notion is commonly accepted as the ontological nature of a boundary, and philosophers find benefit in formalizing it through a mereotopological approach rather than a pointset topological one [4]. To quote Smith, "the set-theoretic conception of boundaries [are], effectively, sets of points, each of which can exist though all around it be annihilated" [4]. Whether this motivation is accurate, mereotopology is still the category most ontologists (and those working in AI or cognitive linguistics) work in, and it is beneficial to communicate this notion in this category. Here, we follow Smith in choosing to rigorously formulate a simpler version of Brentano's thesis which does not assume the existence of higher dimensions: every boundary is such that we can find an entity which it bounds, which it is a part of, and which has interior parts. The motivation for such a thing is that we would like to speak of objects such as boundaries in a more ontologically sound manner, formalizing our psychological intuitions of these objects. In order to do this, we first define crosses 'X.' We define 'Xxy' to be read as 'x' crosses 'y'. (B1) Xxy := ¬Pxy ∧Oxy The idea here is that x overlaps with both y and the complement of y. Thus, there exists no entity that crosses itself, and the universe crosses every entity not identical with the universe itself. From here, we define straddles 'ST.' (B2) STxy := ∀z(IPxz → Xzy) Thus, an entity x straddles an entity y whenever every entity of which x is an internal part of crosses y. From here we have the following: (B3) STxy → ¬IPxy, (B4) Pxy → IPxy ∨ STxy. Note that every part of y is either an internal part of y or straddles y. Several philosophers have recognized that when we intuitively think about boundaries, there appear to be two different types of boundaries [4]. There are what we will call 'tangents' which include among their parts a 'boundary' of the straddled entity, and there are 'non-tangents' which are not connected and include no such 'boundary'. Then, x does not simply straddle y, but it is a 'boundary' of y. Earlier we defined boundary in (MT17), but here we define the predicates 'B' (where 'Bxy is read as 'x is the boundary of y') and tangent 'T' (where Txy is read as 'x is a tangent of y) as follows: (B5) Bxy := ∀z(Pzx→ STzy), (B6) Txy := ∃z(Pzy ∧ Bzy). 8 SAIKEERTHI RACHAVELPULA These definitions give rise to the notion that all parts of the boundary of an entity y are not merely straddlers but tangents of y: (B7) Bxy ↔ ∀z(Pzx→ Tzy). Similar to our closure axioms, we have the following properties for boundary: (B8) Bxy ∧ Byz → Bxz, (transitivity) (B9) Pxy ∧ Byz → Bxz, (B10) Tx(y + z)→ Txy ∨ Txz. (splitting) Moreover, we have the following collection principle: ∀x(φx→ Bxy)→ σxB(φx)y. Lastly, we expand on our earlier mention of the predicate 'b' as the predicate 'is a boundary' as follows: (B11) b(x) := ∃y(Bxy). 4.2. Brentanian formulation. Then, the first Brentanian Thesis is as follows: b(x)→ ∃z∃t(Bxz ∧ Pxz ∧ IPtz). However, we want our formulation to capture connectedness such that for connected boundaries, there exist connected wholes of which they bound. b(x)SC(x)→ ∃z∃t(Pxz ∧ Bxz ∧ C(z) ∧ IPtz) Though we have not done it here, we would like to strengthen this formulation by accounting for the intuitive notion that a boundary is somehow associated with a thing that is bounds. That is, our formulation of boundary behaves the same way when we consider it around the thing it bounds and that thing 's complement (since bx = bxC). What we would like is to have a formulation which allows for us to capture the difference between the boundary of a stone and the boundary of everything in the universe minus the stone. We also notice that such things are not restricted to spacial entities. Indeed, temporal entities such as events, seasons, or entire lives are also things of which we may want to define boundary and other mereotopological properties. 5. Topology Now, we may begin to show that Hausdorff spaces are indeed mereotopological spaces. Previously, it has been shown that [G(E)M] is a 'larger' category than Set [7] (Note that in order for this to have been done, it must be the case that P∅A is never true, for any A). This means that there exists a "functor" from Set to [G(E)M] that is injective but not surjective. Definition 5.1. Let C1 and C2 be categories (A category C is defined as that which consists of a class ob(C) of objects, a class hom(C) of morphisms between these objects, and for every three objects a, b and c, a binary operation hom(a, b) × hom(b, c) → hom(a, c) called a composition of morphisms. Moreover, associativity holds, and an identity exists.) A functor F from C1 and C2 is then, a mapping which associates to each object X in C1 an object F (X) in C2 and associates each morphism f : X → Y in C1 a morphism F (f) : F (X) → F (Y ) in C2 such that F (idX) = idF (x) for every object X in C1 and F (g ◦ f) = F (g) ◦ F (f) for all morphisms f : X → Y and g : Y → Z. THE CATEGORY OF MEREOTOPOLOGY AND ITS ONTOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES 9 Thus, functors allow us to compare categories. Here, we show that Hausdorff topological space indeed satisfies the necessary axioms of a mereotopological space. To do this, we show the existence of a functor from the category of Hausdorff topological spaces to mereotopological spaces by associating each object and morphism that satisfies the axioms of Hausdorff topologies with an object and morphism that satisfies the axioms of mereotopologies respectively. First, however, we begin by introducing the category topology Top. Definition 5.2. A topology on a set X is a collection τ of subsets of X, called open subsets of X satisfying the following properties: (T1) ∅ and X are contained in τ , (T2) The union of elements of any subcollection of τ is in τ , (T3) The intersection of elements of any finite subcollection of τ is in τ . Definition 5.3. A topological space (X, τ) is a set X together with a collection of open subsets τ that satisfies the above axioms. We also consider the definitions of connectedness in topology. Definition 5.4. A topological space X is said to connected if there does not exist a separation of X (where separation of X is a pair of U, V of disjoint non-empty open subsets of X whose union is X). Definition 5.5. For a topological space X, define an equivalence relation ∼ on X where x ∼ y if there exists a connected subspace of X containing both x and y. These equivalence classes are then called components of X. Next, we prove that this is an equivalence relation on X. Theorem 5.6. The relation ∼ is an equivalence relation. Proof. Reflexivity is obvious since for any point x, there does not exist a separation of x. Thus, x ∼ x. For symmetry, take two points x and y. If x ∼ y, then there does not exist a separation of the component they are contained in. Thus, it must be that y ∼ x. Lastly for transitivity, let A be a connected subspace containing x and y (x ∼ y). Now, let B be a connected subspace containing y and z (y ∼ z.) Thus, A∪B must be connected since they share a common point (To prove that since two sets share a common point that then they must be connected, suppose sets U, V share a common point a. Then U ∩ V 6= ∅. Thus, there does not exist a separation of U, V . Thus, there does not exist a set W = {U, V } that is disconnected. Thus, U, V are connected.) Thus, x ∼ z.  Definition 5.7. For a topological space X and subspaces A,B ⊆ X, we say A is disconnected from B if there exist open sets U, V such that A ⊆ U , B ⊆ V , and U ∩ V = ∅. If A and B are not disconnected, then we say A and B are connected, and write tc(A,B). As an exception, we say that the empty set is connected to every set. Quickly, comparing this to our definition of 'C.' Both are reflexive and symmetric, confirming our natural intuitions towards what it means for two objects to be connected. However, monotonicity is slightly different than transitivity. 10 SAIKEERTHI RACHAVELPULA Remark 5.8. We may 'specify' a mereotopological space by specifying all parts that exist, the P predicate, and the C predicate. Therefore, if the underlying universe is a set, this is specified via some subset of the power set, P, and C. If the parts are implicit in the definition of the P predicate, then a mereotopological space may be stated via the universe, U , the parthood predicate, and the connection predicate; therefore, a mereotopological space could be written as a triple M = (U ,P,C), where (U , P ) defines a mereological space. Just as in topology, it is also useful to us to define what it means for a given morphism to be continuous. In topology the definition of a continuous function is as follows: Definition 5.9. Let X and Y be topological spaces, and let f : X → Y be a function. If for each open subset V of Y , the set f−1(V ) is an open subset of X, then we call f a continuous function Definition 5.10. Let X and Y be topological spaces, and let f : X → Y be a bijection. If f and f−1 are both continuous functions, then f is a homeomorphism. In mereotopology, the objects we work with are parts and wholes rather than open sets as in a topology. Thus, it is helpful for us to have a definition of continuity that deals directly with these objects. We make use of the 'C' predicate to define continuity for the category of mereotopology. Definition 5.11. Let X and Y be mereotopological spaces, and let f : X → Y be a mereotopological morphism (preserving parthood). Then, for all PxaX and PxbX where Cxaxb, we have that Cf(xa)f(xb). Then, we call f a continuous morphism. Now, we show that a Hausdorff topological space satisfies the axioms of a mereotopological space. Theorem 5.12. If X is a Hausdorff topological space, then M = (X,⊆, tc) is a mereotopological space. Proof. First, we show that (X,⊆) is a mereological space (A space satisfying the axioms of [M]). Note reflexivity, antisymmetry, and transitivity are trivial. Next, we show supplementation: suppose A 6⊆ B. Then there exists z ∈ A such that z 6∈ B. Let D = {z} ⊆ A. Then, D ⊆ X, and D ∩B = ∅, as desired. Now, we translate the overlap and underlap predicates. We know that A and B overlap if and only if they intersect. Then, we define the sum to be the union. Similarly, A and B always underlap (noting two subsets always both contain the empty set, i.e., we have a bottom element). We define the product to be the intersection. The difference, then, is exactly the set difference. Thus, this set exists in Mtop, so we have now confirmed (P5), (P6), and (P7). We now show (P9), recalling that (P8) is an immediate consequence thereof. Formally speaking, (P9) fails to be true in the category of Set. However, ZFC has the axiom schema of restricted comprehension: in our current example, we simply restrict the comprehension to X, which is always a set. Thus, we don't run into THE CATEGORY OF MEREOTOPOLOGY AND ITS ONTOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES 11 the problems à la Russell's paradox. Thus, (P9) holds true, and thus (X,⊆) is a mereological space. Second, we check that topologies satisfy the additional axioms of [G(E)M]TC. We show that tc satisfies the axioms of C. Note that if A ⊆ B, then every open set containing B contains A, so A ⊆ U ∩ V . Thus, if A 6= ∅, we have A ⊆ B =⇒ tc(A,B). Therefore, tc(A,A). The definition of tc is symmetric. For (C3), suppose A ⊆ B. Let D be such that tc(D,A). Let U, V be a pair of open sets such that D ⊆ U and B ⊆ V . Then note A ⊆ V , so we have U ∩ V 6= ∅ by the assumption that tc(D,A). Therefore, tc(D,B). Now we need to translate these other predicates into set theoretical formulations. We have (IPxy ↔ Pxy ∧ ¬TPxy ↔ Pxy ∧ ∀z(¬ECzx ∨ ¬ECzy) ↔ Pxy ∧ ∀z((¬Czx ∨ Ozx) ∨ (¬Czy ∨ Ozy).) So A is an interior part of B if and only if A ⊆ B, and other set D either intersects B, is connected to B, or is connected to A. Being connected to A is harder, so we are left with this. Thus, suppose D ∩ Y = ∅. Then if IP (AB), tc(D,A) must be false. Thus, there must exist a pair of open sets U, V such that A ⊆ U , D ⊆ V , and U ∩ V = ∅ Note we assume that A = iA when A is open and A = cA when A is closed. In order to check (C4) and (C5), we must show a set A is open iff A = iA is open and a set A is closed iff A = cA is mereotopologically closed. Ideally, we would like to prove this for general topologies. However, consider the following space where an open set is not mereotopologically open: Let X be a space such that there is a point, x, contained in every non-empty closed set. Let A be any open set that is not the entire space. Note the only open set that contains x is the entire space, X. Therefore, every subset is connected to A. Suppose B ⊆ A is an interior part. Then B is non-empty, and every subset is also connected to B. But then {x} is connected to B, and {x} fails to intersect A. Therefore, B cannot be an interior part. Therefore, A has no interior parts. The proof for Hausdorff spaces follows since we can separate two points. We would be able to separate {x} from points of A and ultimately, avoid the contradiction above. A similar circumstance occurs when trying to show that a set A is closed iff A = cA is mereotopologically closed. Indeed, the same argument applies, but with complements of open sets instead of open sets. Now, we check (C4) and (C5). Note that (C4) and (C5) can only be proved when the space is Hausdorff. For two topological spaces A and B, we have the following Kuratowski axiom: cl(A ∪B) = cl(A) ∪ cl(B). Since we defined sum to be union, we have (C4). For (C5), we would like to show that the arbitrary intersection of closed sets is closed. Let X be an open set in the topology τ , and let Y = ( ⋃ X∈τ X)C . Notice that ( ⋃ X∈τ X) is open by the definition of a topology. Thus, Y is closed since it is the complement of something open. Also, by De Morgan's law we have that 12 SAIKEERTHI RACHAVELPULA Y = ⋂ X∈τ XC . Since X is an open set, XC is a closed set, and thus, the intersection of closed sets is a closed set. This translates to mereotopology with set defined as part, union defined as sum, and intersection defined as product. Closed and open sets are then translated to parts equal to their closures and parts equal to their interiors, respectively. Lastly, we show that if a function is topologically continuous, then it is mereotopogically continuous. Since above we showed that tc in topology is analogous to C in mereotopology, it suffices to prove that the continuous image of a connected space is connected. We argue by contradiction. Let f : X → Y be a continuous function, and let X be connected. Assume that f(X) is not connected. Therefore, there exist open sets U, V in Y such that f(X) ⊂ U ∪ V, (f(X) ∩ U) ∩ (f(X) ∩ V ) = ∅, and f(X) ∩ U 6= ∅ 6= f(X) ∩ V . Now, since f is continuous on X, there are open sets U ′ and V ′ in Y such that X ∩ U ′ = f−1(U) and X ∩ V ′ = f−1(V ). If xinX, then f(x) ∈ f(X) so that f(x) ∈ U or f(x) ∈ V . Thus, x ∈ U ′ or x ∈ V ′, i.e., X ⊂ U ′ ∪ V ′. Also, if x ∈ V ′ ∩ U ′ ∩ X, then f(x) ∈ U ∩ V ∈ f(X) = ∅. Thus, there is no such possible x. Note also that U ′ ∩ X = f−1(U) = f−1(U ∩ f(X)). However, since U ∩ f(X) 6= ∅ and f is onto f(X), it must be that U ′ ∩ X 6= ∅. Similarly, V ′ ∩ X 6= ∅. Thus, X is disconnected. However, this contradicts our initial assumption. Therefore, it must be that if f(X) is connected.  Remark 5.13. I had originally thought that a set was open if and only if it was mereotopologically open for any topological space (X, τ). However, I have not been able to finish the proof of this. So far, I have only been able to prove this to be true assuming Hausdorff which was found necessary for the above proof. Although I suspect a similar result may be true for general spaces, I have yet to determine a modified statement that holds for general spaces. Then a functor may be defined from the category Top to Mtop that can confirm my suspicion that Mtop is a broader category than Top. 6. Holes 6.1. Homotopy. In order to formalize a conception of circles and holes in Mtop, we introduce homotopies from algebraic topology. Definition 6.1. A path is a continuous function f : I → A. A loop, then, is a path where f(0) = f(1). Definition 6.2. The unit interval I is the closed interval [0,1]. Definition 6.3. If f and g are continuous maps of the space X into the space Y , we say that f is homotopic to g if there is a continuous map H : X × I → Y such that H(x, 0) = f(x) and H(x, 1) = g(x) for each x. Then, the map H is called a homotopy between f and g. THE CATEGORY OF MEREOTOPOLOGY AND ITS ONTOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES 13 Definition 6.4. Two maps f, g : X → Y are homotopic if there exists a homotopy between the two maps. We formally denote this by f ' g. Then, two paths f ′, g′ are path homotopic if f ′ ' g′ and f ′(0) = g′(0) and f ′(1) = g′(1). Definition 6.5. Two topological spaces X,Y are homotopy equivalent if there exist two maps f : X → Y and g : Y → X such that f ◦ g ' idX and g ◦ f ' idY . Then, we write X ' Y. Proposition 6.6. Homotopy is an equivalence relation. Proof. Here, we want to show that ' is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive. For reflexivity, we need to show that f ' f . Here, we use the constant homotopy defined by h(x, t) = f(x) for all t. For symmetry, we need to show that if h : f ' g, then g ' f . Define H(x, t) = h(x, 1− t). This defines a homotopy from g to f . To prove transitivity, let f ' g with h : X → Y as a homotopy. Now, assume g ' e where h′ : g → e is the homotopy between the two. Now, define a function H. H(x, t) = { h(x, 2t) t ≤ 12 h′(x, 2t− 1) t > 12 Since h(x, 1) = g(x) = h′(x, 0), H is well-defined. Thus, f ' e. Thus, ' is an equivalence relation.  Definition 6.7. A space X is contractible if it is homotopy equivalent to a single point. That is, X ' {∗}. Now, consider R2 \ {(0, 0)}. We will prove that this is homotopy equivalent to the circle S1. Example 6.8. Let X = S1, Y = R2 \ {(0, 0)}, and i : S1 → R2 \ {(0, 0)} be the standard inclusion. r : R2 \ {(0, 0)} → S1, x→ x |x| Then, r ◦ i = idS1 . Thus, we take the constant homotopy. Now, i◦r : R2 \{(0, 0)} is the map f given by f(x) = x|x| . H : (R2 \ {(0, 0)})× I → R2 \ {(0, 0)}, (x, t)→ x t+ (1− t)|x| Note, this is well defined, as it is impossible for xt+(1−t)|x| = 0. Now, H is a homotopy from i◦r to idR2\{(0,0)}. Thus, i is a homotopy equivalence with homotopy inverse r. Therefore, S1 ' R2 \ {(0, 0)}. The equivalence relation ' allows us to treat a class of homotopic paths similarly as one equivalence class. As these paths behave similarly, we may uncover universal traits of equivalent paths without identifying those traits in each path individually. Ontologically, this is a very important. What this means for the circle (our primitive object possessing a hole) is that we treat it similarly to a single point removed from 14 SAIKEERTHI RACHAVELPULA R2. The use of words such as missing and removed, in this language, suggest that the hole in a circle is an immaterial particular. Specifically, it is an immaterial particular which can be thought of as a point. Thus, this does not exactly formulate the notion that a hole may have parts. Remark 6.9. In its defense, the word 'hole' is often used in topology as a pictorial learning tool employed to understand the abstract concepts of algebraic topology. In this way, it is not exactly concerned with the ontology of objects such as holes, and it makes no such claim that it is. However, mereotopology possesses more philosophical and ontological motivations, and by slightly altering the crude notion of a hole in topology to this category, there is the opportunity to formally approach this object with more ontological intent. 6.2. Products in Mereotopology. Before, we may consider the mereotopological alternative formulation of a hole, we must define the product in mereotopology. We do this through a category theoretic approach with the product being defined. Definition 6.10. Given two objects X1 and X2, we say that (Z, π1, π2) is the product of X1 and X2 if, for all objects Y with maps f1 : Y → X1 and f2 : Y → X2, there exists a unique map f : Y → Z such that the following diagram commutes: Y X1 Z X2. f2f1 f π1 π2 The maps π1 and π2 are called the projection maps, i.e., π1 is called projection onto X1. Frequently, these maps are canonical or in some way assumed, and then, we say that Z is the product of X1 and X2, and write Z = X1×X2. Then, the map π1 is called projection onto the first factor, and map π2 is called projection onto the second factor. Note that the product is unique. What we want to show here is that there exists a unique object X × Y which allows the above diagram to commute and preserves the the below property. (Pzx ∧ Pwy)→ P(z, w)(x, y) where (z, w) = {z, z, w}. Though I have not worked out the formal details of existence and uniqueness, there is no obvious contradiction in assuming its existence and uniqueness. From here, we are able to essentially import the definition of homotopy in topology to mereotopology. 6.3. Homotopy in Mereotopology. From our earlier discussion of boundaries, what we may want to consider is the notion of the boundary of a hole. It seems intuitive that such a thing exists though we argue for it here. Consider S1 again, and recall that the boundary of an object is equal to the overlap of the closure of the object and the closure of its complement. Thus, part of the boundary of S1 is equal to the boundary of the hole. We expect, given that the missing substance of S1, the hole is a part of the circle's complement. Thus, the hole in S1 has a boundary that THE CATEGORY OF MEREOTOPOLOGY AND ITS ONTOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES 15 agrees with boundary laws which, from Brentano's thesis, implies the existence of an entity with interior proper parts. Thus, this hole is seen as having proper parts. An ontological advantage of working in mereotopology comes from not committing ourselves to atomization (despite that we don't assume atomization, something may still be equivalent to an 'atom'). Thus, this hole is not formalized in the language of 'a missing point' in this case. We are able to formalize the intuitive notion that this hole may have parts. To do so, we slightly alter the notion of homotopy for the category of mereotopology (though this is entirely reliant on the notion of a product existing). First, we must define I in mereotopology, as not all mereotopological objects have points. Definition 6.11. Define I as a closure of a self connected whole such that if an interior proper part is removed, it becomes disconnected. Now the same definition for homotopy applies where 0, 1 are analogous to the boundary parts of the mereotopological interval I. Definition 6.12. If f and g are continuous maps of the space X into the space Y , we say that f is homotopic to g is there is a continuous map H : X × I → Y such that H(x, 0) = f(x) and H(x, 1) = g(x) for each x. Then, the map H is called a homotopy between f and g. In this way, we may define a circle and its hole in mereotopology. With homotopy theory, we are able to bypass the formation of a new predicate 'H' (where Hx is read as 'x is holed') which some have chosen to do in mereotopology [9]. Now, we may distinguish the exact property for S1 to have a hole: the notion that it is homotopy equivalent to a self-connected whole with an interior proper part removed. Indeed, there remains the challenge of formalizing the notion that the hole in S1 may be a spatiotemporal particular. 7. Conclusion The main mathematical result contained in this paper was in showing that Hausdorff spaces indeed satisfy the necessary axioms of mereotopological spaces. From working in an alternate category that is primarily motivated by ontology, we are able to view controversial metaphysical questions such as the nature of boundaries and holes from a slightly different perspective. From here, we can perhaps ponder even broader metaphysical questions. For example, there is the Kantian inclination to believe that all boundaries are fiat (those boundaries such as geographic ones between countries whose existence is much more contingent on humans) as opposed to being bonafide (existing independent of humans such as bodies of water or mountains) [4]. However, by reasoning formally, some have been able to recognize that most boundaries are a combination of the two. Concerning our discussion on holes, we were only truly able to speak on the hole in a circle (we did not consider embeddings). However, not all holes are the same. 16 SAIKEERTHI RACHAVELPULA If extended using notions of the fundamental group which have not been developed here, it seems we will be able to distinguish between T and T#T (the double torus). This has already been done in topology, but once again, a different mereotopological perspective may be beneficial. Lastly, it is clear that there remain areas of mereotopological study. Perhaps, we ought to further consider the boundary of other metaphysically contested entities such as shadows or thoughts. We continue to employ mathematics to formalize our intuitions and rid logical contradictions. In this way, mathematics functions as a tool that synthesizes clarity. As Heidegger describes in The Question Concerning Technology, the purpose of technology (which includes mathematics) is to be the instrument which reveals truths and knowledge to ourselves [8]. Acknowledgments. It is a pleasure to thank my mentor, Michael Neaton for guiding me through this paper and for the numerous, vastly interesting discussions and tangents we had throughout our meetings. Additionally, I would like to thank Professor Peter May for organizing this lovely REU and providing me with the opportunity to participate. Lastly, I would like to thank Columbia Professor Achille Varzi for inspiring this paper and for his guidance throughout. References [1] Achille C. Varzi. Basic Problems of Mereotopology. In Nicola Guarino (ed.), Formal Ontology in Information Systems. Ios Press. pp. 29-38. [2] Achille C. Varzi. Parts, Wholes, and Part-Whole Relations: The Prospects of Mereotopology. Data and Knowledge Engineering 20: 259-286. [3] James R. Munkres. Topology. Prentice Hall. Edition 3. 2000. [4] Barry Smith Mereotopology: A Theory of Parts and Boundaries http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/articles/Mereotopology.pdf [5] E. Husserl. Logical Investigations. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1970). [6] Oscar Randal-Williams Algebraic Topology. https://www.dpmms.cam.ac.uk/ hjrw2/at.pdf [7] Eberle R.A., 1970 Nominalistic Systems, Dordrecht: Reidel [8] Martin Heidegger (1977). The Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays. Harper & Row. https://philpapers.org/rec/HEITQC. [9] Casati, Roberto and Varzi, Achille, "Holes", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = ¡https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/holes/¿.

Resolving Arguments by Different Conceptual Traditions of Realization (final version for Phil. Studies) There is currently a significant amount of interest in understanding and developing theories of realization. Naturally arguments have arisen about the adequacy of some theories over others. Many of these arguments have a point. But some can be resolved by seeing that the theories of realization in question are not genuine competitors because they fall under different conceptual traditions with different but compatible goals. I will first describe three different conceptual traditions of realization that are implicated by the arguments under discussion. I will then examine the arguments, from an older complaint by Norman Malcolm against a familiar functional theory to a recent argument by Thomas Polger against an assortment of theories that traffic in inherited causal powers, showing how they can be resolved by situating the theories under their respective conceptual traditions. 1. Conceptual Traditions of Realization I begin with three conceptual traditions that are relevant to the present discussion (see Endicott, 2005). There is a representational tradition according to which realization is a semantic or intentional relation. Generally speaking, some object realizes (or is the realization of) a term, concept, or other form of representation because the object meets the condition for satisfying that representation. Thus Alfred Tarski said that a set of objects is the "realization" of a language when the objects satisfy the predicates of that language (1956, pp.416-17; see also Lewis, 1980, pp.210-211). The representational tradition's idea of realization qua semantic or intentional satisfaction has been commonly used within areas of logic and philosophy, and it also captures the folk notion expressed in dictionary definitions whereby an idea is "made real" by an object. An idea represents an object, whose existence thus counts as the idea's realization. 1 1 A reviewer asked whether the folk notion is intentional as I claim rather than a metaphysical notion whereby a person (such as an artist) makes some object real by using other objects. My view, more cautiously stated, is that the common folk notion is at least in part an intentional notion. This can be shown by certain kinds of cases, e.g., when an artist unintentionally produces an object that does not correspond to his or her idea (the artist accidentally knocks over some paint which makes a mess). Since the result is neither intended by the artist nor represented by the artist's idea, it is not a 'realization' of 2 Then there is a mathematical tradition according to which realization is a mapping or isomorphic relation. Generally speaking, some object realizes (or is the realization of) another object because elements of the latter map onto elements of the former. For example, mathematicians speak of points in a geometric plane realizing sets of coordinate numbers by virtue of a one-to-one mapping from the sets of coordinate numbers onto the points in a geometric plane, and computer scientists speak of one machine realizing another by virtue of a one-to-one mapping from the states of the realized machine to the states of the realizing machine (Hakimi, 1962; Arbib, 1969, p.272). The mathematical tradition's idea of realization qua one-to-one mapping has enjoyed a wide application, being employed in various areas of mathematics, computer science, and the early philosophical literature on the computational model of the mind. Finally, there is a metaphysical tradition according to which realization is a relation of determination or generation. Generally speaking, one object realizes (or is the realization of) another object only if the former produces or determines the latter. Thus Jaegwon Kim says that the "very notion of a 'realization' presupposes nomological connections" between the properties of realizing and realized objects (1993, p.180), which philosophers typically understand to imply that the instantiation of a realizing property supplies a lawfully sufficient condition for the instantiation of a realized property (Lepore and Loewer, 1989, p.179; Tye, 1995, p.41). The metaphysical tradition's idea of realization qua determination has been popular in recent philosophy of mind, science, and metaphysics. Of course specific theories often contain supplemental notions. For example, philosophers who write in the metaphysical tradition typically add that the stated determination applies to synchronic, inter-level cases (Tye, loc. cit.; Kim, 1996, pp.221- the artist's idea in the common sense of that term. Nevertheless, the common notion might involve an additional element of metaphysical production, which is illustrated by a remark from Leibniz that I quote three paragraphs hence about realized things that correspond to ideas in the imagination and are made by God. Leibniz's remark is also relevant to another question the reviewer asks about whether mixed concepts of realization are more basic when compared to the unmixed versions that I describe under the semantic, mathematical, and metaphysical traditions. While mixed versions might be historically more basic – witness Leibniz's early usage – the unmixed views are conceptually more basic by standing as simpler parts to more complex concepts. 3 22). Some philosophers even mix ideas from different traditions. Thus, Leibniz describes God as a being "through whom those things which would otherwise be imaginary are realized [L, 'realiso']" (Leibniz, 1697/1989, p.45). 2 So things that are realized correspond to ideas in the imagination (intentionality) and owe their existence to God (metaphysical determination). But mixed concepts aside, theories that belong to different traditions were typically developed to meet quite different goals. Theories in the representational tradition are meant to provide meaning for a language, or content for a concept, or otherwise contribute to an understanding of intentionality. Theories in the mathematical tradition are meant to provide proof of a numerical equivalence, or supply a simulation of a particular domain, or otherwise create a formally equivalent model. And theories in the metaphysical tradition are meant to address certain philosophical problems, like the mind-body problem, or the objectconstitution problem, or the many-sciences problem that concerns the relation between the ontology of special and general sciences. But whether a specific theory meets the goals associated with the tradition to which it belongs, the facts typically addressed by one tradition are both different from and yet compatible with the facts addressed by another tradition. Consider a sample overlapping domain for two theories, one in the representational tradition and the other in the metaphysical tradition. A term or concept can be satisfied by an object while that same object (or one of its properties) is determined by its more basic engineering (or some its engineering properties). A model is depicted in Fig. 1 below, where 'D' is a type of representation or designator, 's' is the subject designated, 'F' is a nonbasic property, 'G' is a more basic property, the horizontal arrow '←' is realization qua intentional satisfaction, and the vertical arrow '⇑' is realization qua metaphysical determination. 2 Leibniz adds that the usage is "barbaric but graphic" (loc. cit.). Why "barbaric"? Translators Daniel Garber and Roger Ariew state in a footnote that 'realiso' is corrupt Latin. I asked Doug Jesseph several years ago about the text, and he explained that the classical Latin 'res' had no verbal form, and that even the adjectival form was medieval in origin. Hence 'realiso' was a contrived verb that was convenient to express a thing's being or becoming real. 4 (designator D) ← (subject s has F) ⇑ (subject s has basic property G) Fig. 1 Representational and Metaphysical Traditions of Realization. I point the arrow toward the designator to indicate that while D represents F, F thereby and conversely realizes D. In the representational tradition, realization is the converse of representation. The phenomenon of reference to a composite object provides a familiar interpretation of the model, as when someone successfully refers to a man or a machine. There is an intentional relation between language and object (pace the semantic tradition), and there is a distinct but compatible determinative relation between that object and its more basic engineering (pace the metaphysical tradition). Similar remarks apply if one were to use mathematical mappings in the place of the semantic relation. A thing can be mapped onto an object while certain properties of the object are determined by its more basic properties. I take these points to be so obvious that they would be hardly worth saying, were it not for the fact that the idiom of realization is ambiguous by covering the different kinds of cases just mentioned, making it possible to confuse the goals associated with one theoretical tradition for those of another. Granted, some theories might involve special considerations that create an incompatible situation, say, if pace Berkeley, the theory of representation deems material objects to be unthinkable or otherwise unrepresentable while the metaphysical theory involves determination between the properties of a material object. But I am only concerned with a select group of theories, specifically, those involved in arguments which purport to show that one theory should be chosen over another when in fact the theories are not genuine competitors. I start with an argument by Norman Malcolm that places a functional-role notion against a common-sense notion of realization. I then turn to an argument by Thomas Polger that places a family of metaphysical theories against an abstract notion of machine realization. 3 I aim to show that the theories in question are 3 A reviewer asked why I omit arguments by Kim, Shoemaker, or Gillett. But, as far as I know, they do not provide clear and explicit arguments that can be resolved by appealing to different but compatible theoretical traditions. Consider Gillett's (2002) worry over flat versus dimensioned theories of realization. Both types of theory fall under the metaphysical tradition, since they are both theories of determination meant to address the 5 compatible, and I will use the common facts illustrated in Fig. 1 as a model for understanding why that is true. 2. Malcolm Against the Functionalist View of Realization Norman Malcolm calls into question a familiar second-order functionalist concept of realization. More specifically, although Malcolm rejects David Armstrong's first-order functionalist view that expresses the mind-brain type-identity theory, he says: "one can get a grip on his view. The same cannot be said for those functionalists who subscribe to the causal theory but whish to avoid the identity thesis" (1984, p.97). He then articulates his complaint: For one thing, their use of the terms 'realize' and 'realization' is baffling. In ordinary language we speak of a plan, a hope, a desire, an intention, as having been realized. ('His long-standing desire to see the Taj Mahal was at last realized'; 'Her hope to become chief editor was realized'.) In this use 'realized' comes to the same as 'fulfilled,' 'achieved,' 'satisfied.' The realization of a desire is the occurrence of what was desired. The realization of a man's desire to see the Taj Mahal would be his seeing the Taj Mahal ... How different is the use of 'realized' by the functionalist! According to them, a man's desire to see the Taj Mahal would be realized even if he never got to see the Taj Mahal; it would be realized by one of his neural states (ibid., pp.97-98). 4 Here Malcolm says that the nonreductive functionalist view is "baffling" when measured against the ordinary language usage of 'realized' whereby realization is the satisfaction of a plan, hope, desire, or intention. By this he means to imply, among other things, that the functionalist view should be faulted because it does not fit the common same philosophical problems, such as the mind-body problem. The theories differ primarily on the details about the determiner – is it a coincident object with a more basic property (a flat view) or the parts of an object with their more basic properties (a dimensioned view)? The choice is not between a theory of intentionality versus a theory of determination by more basic engineering, like the cases examined in the present paper. Parenthetically, I believe that flat and dimensioned functional theories are compatible, but not for the reasons given here. See Endicott (forthcoming). 4 One might wonder why first-order functionalists get a pass, since their use of 'realized' also departs dramatically from the common language usage – one does not identify a man's desire to see the Taj Mahal with his seeing the Taj Mahal! 6 usage. Malcolm then underscores the difference by pointing out that, on the functionalist view, the desire to see the Taj Mahal could be realized by neural states even when the man never sees the Taj Mahal, which is to say, even when the desire is unfulfilled. By the functional theory the desire is realized, by the ordinary usage it is not. But to judge this as a problem, as Malcolm does, is a mistake. I will assume that Malcolm's ordinary language notion can be formulated in a definition according to which a desire or more generally a mental designator is realized when and only when it is satisfied. That is: (OR) a property F realizes a type of mental designator D if and only if D has satisfaction conditions, and the instantiation of F meets those conditions. 5 So by this ordinary notion, seeing the Taj Mahal (F) realizes the desire to see the Taj Mahal (D) because the desire to see the Taj Mahal (D) has satisfaction conditions, and the perceptual event of seeing the Taj Mahal (F) meets those conditions. The ordinary folk notion of realization thus stands in the representational tradition, since D represents F and hence F realizes D by meeting its conditions for satisfaction. Now the functionalist theory that Malcolm rejects is the popular second-order version of realization qua functional roles and occupants: (FR) a property G realizes property F if and only if some object instantiates F and G, F is the property of having some property that occupies a causal-role R, and G occupies role R. This is a theory in the metaphysical tradition. It expresses the determination of a functional property by its role-player property. Thus, given a second-order definition of F over a set of first-order properties that lawfully occupy role R, and given that G is a member of that set, it follows that if an object has G it must have F. So my point can be put very simply: the common folk view is an intentional notion that stands in the 5 Here and elsewhere I define realization in terms of properties. Others define realization in terms of property instances. Some think this leads to conceptual tangles. See Thomas Polger and Laurence Shapiro (2008). But I think definitions can be formulated either way, with the proper auxiliary assumption that allows the concept of realization to range over multiple categories. See Endicott (2010). 7 representational tradition, while the functionalist view is a notion of determination that stands in the metaphysical tradition, and the two are perfectly compatible. Certainly the latter should not be faulted for failing to capture the intentionality of the former. To appreciate the point, notice that the situation Malcolm describes is very much like what is depicted in the previous Fig. 1, save some inconsequential differences that will now be addressed. For one, he discusses the intentional relation in terms of mental states such as a plan, hope, desire, or intention, rather than a broader class that includes linguistic designators. Also, he does not describe these mental states in terms of functional concepts. Even so, the functional case can be depicted below, where 'D' is a type of mental designator, 'F' is the represented second-order functional property, 'G' is the first-order property that plays the causal role associated with F, while the representational and metaphysical relations remain the same, as shown in Fig. 2a. The representational theory of ordinary-language realization (OR) that describes the facts depicted at the top of Fig. 2a does not compete with the metaphysical theory of functional-role realization (FR) that describes the facts depicted on the right side of Fig. 2a. The theories simply explain different things about the object s – how it is represented versus how it is determined by its more basic properties. Moreover, the point remains the same if, as Malcolm considered, the mental designator is a desire D that is metaphysically realized by neural state G. The theories still pick out different but compatible facts, as depicted in Fig. 2b. Furthermore, since the functionalist theory aims to explain a different relation than the ordinary intentional notion, there is no reason to be baffled by Malcolm's variation on the case according to which the man's desire to see the Taj Mahal is functional-role realized by his neural states even when the desire is unfulfilled. This just means that the man's desire is metaphysically realized by his neural Fig. 2 a and b a (mental designator D) ← (s has second-order F) Ordinary-Language and ⇑ Functional-Role Realization (s has first-order G) b (s has second-order mental designator D) ← (s′ has F) ⇑ (s has first-order neural property G) 8 states (the fact depicted on the left-side of Fig. 2b) even when nothing counts as the ordinary intentional realization of that desire (when the fact that s′ has F depicted at the top-right of Fig. 2b does not exist). Of course the ordinary intentional facts and functional-role facts depicted in Fig. 2a and 2b are compatible barring special considerations. And perhaps Malcolm means to indicate a special problem when he goes on to say that the functional theory is unacceptable because it implies dualism under the interpretation according to which a neural state "produces" or is "correlated with" a mental state (1984, p.98). But Malcolm's interpretation is slightly uncharitable, since functionalists explicitly say more. They say that the neural state must play the causal role of the mental state, which is not implied by a dualist language of mere correlation. Indeed, it is a familiar virtue of functionalist theories that they supply an explanation for mind-body correlations (Levine, 1993, pp.129-132; and Horgan, 1993, p.579). More important for present purposes, Malcolm's complaint about dualism is different than the preceding argument that the functionalist theory is unacceptable because it conflicts with the ordinary language notion. At least he would need to show that functional role-occupant dualism is inconsistent with the ordinary intentional notion of realization, yet nothing he says would indicate a tension on that score (some argue that nonreductive functionalism is inconsistent with physicalism, but the latter is hardly the ordinary folk notion in question). My concern, in any case, is with the alleged conflict and how it can be resolved by minding the different traditions of realization and respecting their different but compatible goals. 3. Polger Against Causal Property Views of Realization Next I consider a recent argument by Thomas Polger that raises some interesting issues about machine functionalism and a diverse family of theories about realization. Polger says that his argument "applies equally to Gillett's dimensioned view and to the flat causal views of Kim and Shoemaker" (2007, p.239). The targeted views include any theory wherein the causal powers that individuate the realized property are inherited from the realizing property or properties. The causal theories are then "flat" or "dimensioned" depending upon how they parcel out that causal inheritance. 9 According to a flat view, (I) the realized and realizing properties are possessed by the same individual, and (II) the causal powers that individuate the realized property are matched by the causal powers of the realizing property. Sydney Shoemaker's (2001) subset view for a single individual counts as a flat theory, since the causal powers of the realized property are a proper subset of and thus are matched by the causal powers of the realizing property (see fn.15 for more detail). Likewise, Jaegwon Kim's (1988) combination of a causal inheritance principle with a functional theory of realization counts as a flat theory, since the causal powers that individuate the realized property are inherited from the realizing property, thus enabling the latter to play the causal role of the former. In contrast, according to a dimensioned view, (I*) the realized and realizing properties are possessed by an individual and its proper parts, respectively, and (II*) the causal powers that individuate the realized property are inherited from the distinct causal powers of the properties of the parts. Carl Gillett (2002), who introduced the flat and dimensioned distinction, promotes a dimensioned causal theory. What is Polger's argument against these views? Focusing on the paradigm case of a computing machine realizing the mathematical function of addition, he argues that: "the formal or mathematical relations are not themselves causal relations, so their realization cannot be in virtue of the physical system (or its parts) contributing the causal powers that are individuative of them" (2007, p.240). And again he puts the point in terms of "the archetypal case of the realization of a formal program or algorithm," meaning a formal program in the sense associated with an "abstract machine" rather than "physical machine," claiming that the realization of such abstracta are "neglected" by causal theories (loc. cit.). 6 Polger then summarizes his complaint as a conflict between causal theories and the abstract machine version of Realization Physicalism (RP) according to which special science properties are realized by but not identical to physical science properties: 6 Polger makes it clear that his argument concerns the relationship with machine abstracta: "There is a well-known ambiguity in familiar explications of Turing machines, between abstract and physical machines ... Here I am focusing on abstract computational functions, as will be clear from my examples" (ibid., p.240, fn.12). 10 The crux of my objection to the causal approach of Gillett, Kim, and Shoemaker requires that what is realized be causally individuated. On those views abstract algorithms like addition cannot be realized because they are not causally individuated. But mathematical and computational realization are standard examples for RP, so the causal approach must be mistaken (ibid., p.241). One way to understand Polger's "Noncausal Realization" argument is as follows: (i) If something is realized according to flat and dimensioned causal theories, it is individuated by causal powers inherited from the causal powers of the realizing items. (ii) But abstract machines as well as their formal and mathematical properties are not individuated by causal powers inherited from the physical realizing machines, their physical realizing components, or their physical properties. (iii) Hence abstract machines and their formal and mathematical properties are not realized according to flat and dimensioned causal theories. Now I think this part of the argument is sound, as long as one keeps a clear divide between the "abstract machine" and the "physical machine" (more on that later). But even if Polger is correct that causal theories do not account for abstract machine realization, it does not follow that they are mistaken unless one assumes in addition that: (iv) To be an acceptable theory of realization, abstract machines and their formal and mathematical properties should be realized according to that theory. (v) Hence flat and dimensioned causal theories are not acceptable theories of realization. Yet I will argue that one should reject premise (iv). Certainly Polger has put his finger on a puzzle. Abstract machine realization has been a central case in the philosophy of mind and science. So it would seem to be a desideratum for any adequate theory of realization to account for it. Nevertheless the key lies in the different conceptual traditions of realization. One can accept that abstract items in the traditional machinefunctionalist story are not 'realized' in the sense relevant to causal theories, since machine functionalists used the idiom of realization with a different meaning to account for a different but compatible phenomenon about machines. 11 Consider again Gillett's dimensioned theory. It is a mereological theory of realization qua parts and wholes, where the causal powers of the whole are determined by the causal powers of the proper parts. As a theory of determination it falls squarely within the metaphysical tradition of realization. I will define it more formally thus: (DR) Properties P1,...,Pn realize property F if and only if there is a system s that instantiates property F, there are objects x1, ..., xn that instantiate P1,...,Pn, objects x1, ..., xn are the proper parts of s, the causal powers that individuate property F are inherited from the causal powers of P1,...,Pn, and, necessarily, for any s and any x1, ..., xn, if x1, ..., xn are the proper parts of s, then if x1, ..., xn have P1,...,Pn then s has F. 7 In contrast, the traditional theory of machine realization that Polger describes is a relation between a physical machine and either a machine-table description or some abstract machine that is expressed by that description (Putnam, 1975, pp. 365, 371). In the parlance of the time, the abstract machine supplies the sense of the description, while the physical machine is its referent. For present purposes the difference does not matter, since machine descriptions as well as their abstracta stand in the same kind of relationship to the physical machine. Polger addresses that relation in terms of the abstract function of addition: "What must be the case for a physical system to realize addition? The physical system must have states whose causal relations to one another somehow 'correspond' or 'map' onto the mathematical relations characterized by addition" (2007, p.240). Polger then quotes Van Gulick, who puts the point in terms of machine descriptions: Instantiation [i.e., realization] of such a formal machine description requires roughly that there be some mapping relation from the formal states, inputs, and outputs of the abstract machine table onto the physical 7 This is only a basic idea of part-whole realization because, pace Gillett, it contains no reference to a complex aggregate of the parts that is coincident with x and no reference to complex structural property or organizational feature that could be identified as a roleplayer G for F. Gillett defines dimensioned realization in terms of property instances: "Property/ relation instance(s) P1-Pn realize an instance of a property F, in an individual s, if and only if s has powers that are individuative of an instance of F in virtue of the powers contributed by P1-Pn to s or s's constituent(s), but not vice versa (2002, p. 322, with a change in the variables). 12 states, inputs, and outputs of the instantiating system, such that under that mapping the relations of temporal sequence among those physical items are isomorphic to the relations of formal succession among the machine table items (Van Gulick, 1988, p.80; Polger, loc. cit.). Reference to the "instantiation [i.e., realization] of such a formal machine description" and "machine table items" that map onto temporal sequences of the physical machine is just another way of talking about the satisfaction of a machine description by a physical machine – which means that the traditional mapping view is an intentional story that falls under the representational tradition of realization. As Putnam said: "a 'machine table' describes a machine if the machine has internal states corresponding to the columns of the table, and if it 'obeys' the instructions in the table" (1975, p.365). Indeed, Polger likewise says that the noncausal aspects of abstract machines are "intentionally realized" and that the "relation between physical devices or systems and mathematical functions is usually thought of as an isomorphism, mapping, or representation" (2007, pp. 241, 246). One slight complication is that the machine-functional concept of realization has a foot in both representational and mathematical traditions by employing a mathematical mapping. But the mapping is an unsurprising component in a traditional intentional story, since it was a once popular way to express the semantic relation of "correspondence" (see Pitcher, 1964, pp.9-10). And the main point is just that machine functionalists used the idiom of realization in the stated intentional way. 8 So I will define this notion like Van Gulick's statement, only adding the alternative formulation about abstract machines: (MR) a machine-functional property F of a system s realizes a machinetable description D (or abstract machine M) if and only if D (M) has satisfaction conditions, the instantiation of F requires a set of inputprocedure-output processes, and the instantiation of F by s meets the 8 So Arthur Burks and Jesse Wright used the term 'represents' as the converse of 'realizes,' saying that a logical net N "represents" a circuit C can be expressed alternatively as "C physically realizes N" (1953, p.194). I add that, although machine functionalists used the idiom of realization in the stated intentional way, it does not follow that they were unconcerned with metaphysical goals and theories. Rather, they expressed them in a different way. In Fodor's case, for example, his theory of functional decomposition was a dimensioned theory in the metaphysical tradition, as I explain toward the end of section 4. 13 satisfaction conditions of D (M) because the elements of D (M) map oneto-one onto members of the set of input-procedure-output processes of s required by F. 9 Now when this theory of machine-functional realization is placed against the backdrop of the different conceptual traditions of realization, the resolution of Polger's noncausal realization argument seems clear. The machine-functional theory (MR) stands in the representational tradition, while the theory of dimensioned realization (DR) stands in the metaphysical tradition, and the two simply explain different facts about machines. A computational system s can satisfy a machine-functional description D (or an abstract machine M) and have its denoted functional property F determined by its collective engineering properties P1-Pn, as shown below: (description D or abstract M) ← (s has F) ⇑ (s's parts have basic properties P1-Pn) Fig. 3. Machine and Dimensioned Realization The fact that the machine description D or the abstract machine M lacks causal powers inherited from the properties of denoted system s or its parts is irrelevant to the account of the relationship between the property F instantiated by s and the properties P1Pn of its parts. 10 As a consequence, the metaphysical theory can be fully adequate to its intended domain (the facts depicted on the right side of Figure 3) without accounting for either the intentional relation or the abstract machines covered by the theory of realization qua one-to-one mapping (the facts depicted at the top of Figure 3). So premise (iv) in Polger's noncausal realization argument is false. Specifically, it is false that an adequate metaphysical theory of realization should account for the intentional realization 9 I do not believe this is an adequate account of the satisfaction conditions for a machinetable description, only that it approximates the once traditional view. For some added conditions, see Lycan (1987) and Chalmers (1994). 10 The point remains the same if one replaces the mereological dimensions of part-whole determination with the kind of facts described by a flat causal theory wherein the same object s has a realizing property G that contributes all the causal powers possessed by its realized property F (that is, if one replaces "s's parts have basic properties P1-Pn" with "s has G" in Figure 3). 14 of abstract machines and the formal and mathematical properties they possess. But notice that the premise is not altogether false – a metaphysical theory of realization should account for something about machine realization, namely, the metaphysical realization of the denoted machine. That is the goal of the causal theories in question, and nothing said thus far about the noncausal status of machine abstracta will frustrate that goal. Yet one might think that my compatibilist picture misses an important theme in Polger's argument. It is F's realization by the system s – not just the properties of a machine description D or abstract machine M – that is supposedly noncausal in a way that conflicts with the flat and dimensioned theories of inherited causal powers. But that claim is unsupported by mere talk about the satisfaction of machine tables, descriptions, and their associated abstracta. Even though descriptions that exist outside the system s and the abstracta that exist in Plato's heaven are not individuated by causal powers inherited from the denoted system s or its components, the instantiation of the functional property F by the system s would seem to be a different matter. At least one would need another argument about F's realization by s that does not trade on the status of items like descriptions and their associated abstracta. To that issue I now turn. 4. Responses and Further Reflections on Machine Realization There is more to Polger's noncauusal realization argument, a point about the individuation of F based upon the abstracta, which comes out clearly when he considers a criticism that his argument trades on an ambiguity. This issue is worth carefully sorting out, especially given the important place that machine functionalism has occupied in contemporary philosophical thinking. Thus Polger mentions the criticism: It could be suspected that I am trading on an ambiguity in notions like computation, program, or algorithm. These may pick out abstract relations, but they may also pick out physical operations. We can concede that the mathematical function of addition is not causally individuated, and thus cannot be realized according to the causal approaches. But adding is a procedure or operation (an algorithm' in the causal sense) and the property or state of being an adder (i.e., an adding machine) can be causally individuated. Even if addition cannot be realized, adding and 15 adders can be realized. And that is all that RP requires (2007, p.245). 11 Polger then responds that special considerations about noncausal individuation for symbolic properties create a conflict with the requirements for individuation laid down by causal theories of realization. That is, even though the property is possessed by a physical machine, the status of F as a symbolic property requires that it should be individuated by conditions based upon the mapping relations with the abstracta of the intentional story rather than the causal powers of a causal theory. 12 So Polger says: Of course realizing an adder involves having some causal powers. It does not, however, involve having the causal powers distinctive of addition, for this objector concedes that there addition is not causally individuated. But for the same reason there is no distinctive set of causal powers that individuate adders. What makes something an adder (an adding to machine) is that it has causal powers that stand in some relation to the mathematical addition function. The relation between physical devices or systems and mathematical functions is usually thought of as isomorphism, mapping, or representation. So, following Van Gulick, Cummins, and Marr, we may say that when the physical states and state transitions of a device map or represent the formal states and transitions of the addition function, then the device realizes the property or state of being an adding machine. The crucial point is that although an adding machine is realized by something's having particular causal powers, it is not realized-as Gillett, Kim, and Shoemaker would require-by anything's having the causal powers individuative of adding machines (2007, p.246). 11 Polger credits the objection to Chase Wrenn, Jose Luis Bermudez, and several anonymous referees. For the distinction between abstract and concrete programs, or external versus encoded programs, see Newell and Simon (1972, p. 33); Weizenbaum (1976, p. 111). Polger adds that even if the computational case fails to establish the conclusion about noncausal realization, there are other examples that do not trade on any ambiguity between abstract versus physical machines. I will return to that issue in the final section when I address the scope of my proposal. 12 Interpreting Polger's argument in this way requires that the original premise (ii) be modified to read: "(ii*) But the symbolic properties of a physical machine are not individuated by causal powers inherited from the physical properties of its physical components," with the remaining premises and conclusion revised accordingly. To anticipate, defenders of causal theories should reject (ii*), as long as the symbolic properties are construed in terms of the syntax of a physical machine. The semantics is once again a matter for a theory of intentionality in the representational tradition. 16 To put Polger's point in a different way, a machine is an adder because of the mathematical abstracta it is related to, not because of the powers it inherits from its more basic physical properties. And I agree with much of what he says. I think it is true that an adder, understood as a physical machine, does not have "causal powers distinctive of addition," since the latter is a relation in abstracta that is not causally individuated. I also think it is true that "there is no distinctive set of causal powers that individuate adders," not for the same reason that adding machines are abstracta that consequently are not causally individuated, but for the different reason that they are physical objects built in different ways with different parts that operate by different engineering principles. Finally, I think it is also true that adding machines stand in a mapping or representation relation to the abstracta. But none of this, I argue, creates a problem for causal theories of realization. I will state my position in terms of Robert Cummins' account of how a physical system computes the function of addition, since Polger says that Cummins' account supports his noncausal realization argument (2007, p.240), and since Cummins' account clearly distinguishes the numerals in a machine from the numbers they represent – a distinction between the syntax and the semantics that will loom large in my resolution of Polger's worry. Cummins says: To add is to be described by the plus function, +({m, n}) = s. Hence, to explain what makes a system an adder is to explain the fact that the system is described by +. But + is a function whose arguments and values are numbers; and whatever numbers are, they are not states or processes or events in any physical system. How, then, can a physical system be described by +? How can a physical system traffic in numbers and hence add? The answer, of course, is that numerals – i.e., representations of numbers – can be states of a physical system, even if numbers themselves cannot (1989, p.89). 13 13 Polger quotes the more detailed passage below, but the moral is the same: We may think of the button-pressing sequences as arguments to a function g that gives display states as values. An adding machine satisfies g; that is, the arguments and values of g are literally states of the physical system. Addition, as was remarked above, relates numbers, not physical states of some machine, so a physical system cannot literally satisfy the plus function. What an adding machine does is instantiate the plus function. It instantiates addition by satisfying the function g whose arguments and 17 So the plus function takes numbers in its argument place and yields numbers as values. But numbers are abstract objects that cannot be physical states of a machine. Consequently, a physical machine can only be said to add because it has physical symbols or numerals that represent numbers, or can be interpreted as numbers (hence Cummins calls this framework "interpretational semantics"). Cummins presents the relationship between the abstract numbers and the computation over symbols by a "Tower Bridge" structure, where the input to the adding machine is a sequence [C, M, +, N, =] for clear, first addend, plus, second addend, equals, and where the output is a display D which represents the sum of the two addends, as shown in Fig. 4a. Fig. 4a Cummins' Tower a Bridge (1989, p.90) +: I ([C, N, +, M, =]) = [n, m] → I (D) = n + m b The Tower Bridge with ↑ ↑ Metaphysical Foundations I I ↑ ↑ g: [C, N, +, M, =] = (computation) = D ⇒ b +: I ([C, N, +, M, =]) = [n, m] → I (D) = n + m ↑ ↑ I I ↑ ↑ g: [C, N, +, M, =] = (computation) = D ⇒ ⇑ ⇑ [s parts have P1-Pn] = (causes) = [s′ parts have P′1-P′n] ⇒ Cummins says that "the vertical arrows correspond to interpretation" (ibid., p.91), which is an intentional relation like ones depicted in Fig. 1 through 3 (only they were depicted horizontally rather than vertically). Hence, interpreting a function g computed values represent arguments and values of the addition function, or in other words, have those arguments and values as interpretations" (Cummins, loc. cit.). Call this "instantiation by interpretation": addition is instantiated in this intentional sense when the physical machine satisfies the function g in the Fregean sense that its physical symbols are arguments and values of g and when those arguments and values are interpreted as numbers. Note that this does not make the computed function g an abstract object, like the numbers and the plus function. Physical things can be treated as functions too. E.g., the biological process of generation can be treated as a function that takes parents as arguments and yields offspring as values. 18 within a physical machine system s as the function of addition is like interpreting a functional property F of a physical system s in accordance with a machine-table description. And this picture fits my proposal perfectly. Symbols within a physical machine represent abstract objects. This is 'realization' in the sense specified by the representational tradition. Flat and dimensioned theories may then account for how the symbols are determined within a physical machine by its underlying engineering. That is 'realization' in the sense specified by the metaphysical tradition. To complete the larger picture, consider how a dimensioned theory may enter at the foundations of the Tower Bridge as a vertical relation of determination between steps in the process of s computing g and stages in a causal process involving s's more basic parts and properties, as shown in Fig. 4b. The important point is that the metaphysical theory is only intended to explain the realization of the symbolic representations within the machine, not the abstract numbers they represent. Consequently, to answer Polger's worry about individuation, the machinefunctional property F that is causally individuated and subject to the inheritance of causal powers is being a symbol (e.g., being an N), which is a property of physical states in the machine, not being a number (e.g., being an n), which is a property of abstract objects, and not even being a symbol for or representation of a number, which is an intentional relation accounted for by the interpretational semantics (e.g., the interpretation I of N as n). That is, the machine is a physical symbol system whose inherited causal powers attach to the syntax, not the semantics. Indeed, familiar issues of wide content already yield the conclusion that meaning is not determined solely by facts about the system, including facts about the system's parts. So one should not expect the kind of metaphysical theory in question to explain the semantics of a machine system. Thus, to summarize, there is a division of labor such that the representational theory of realization explains the semantic properties of a physical machine, while the metaphysical theory of realization explains the syntactic (and other) properties determined by the basic facts of the machine. So what Polger worries about – conditions for individuation based on the relation to the mathematical abstracta – apply to the semantic properties of machine symbols, not their syntactic properties. Let me also emphasize that the larger picture of machine functionalism with the intentional 19 superstructure and the added metaphysical foundations was firmly grounded in traditional functionalist philosophy. In other words, I reject the idea that there was a single relation under consideration, "the realization relation," introduced by Putnam and central to the developing machine-functionalist views (Polger, 2007, p.247). To the contrary, the machine-functional notion of intentional realization qua one-to-one mapping was clearly in play, as already established. A flat theory of realization was also in play, in the form of the already discussed second-order functional theory. 14 And a type of dimensioned theory of realization was also in play, though not described under Gillett's rubric of a 'dimensioned' theory. Thus Cummins subsumes realization under a general theory that explains the instantiation of a property in a kind of system S by "the properties of S's components and their mode of organization" (1983, p.15). That is the mereology of a dimensioned perspective. In fact, this mereology is central to the more publicized species of a property instantiation theory introduced to the philosophical community by Fodor (1968) and developed by Cummins (1975), namely, a functional analysis wherein higher-level (realized) functional properties or associated capacities decompose into lower-level subcapacities that ultimately decompose into simple mechanistic-level processes (the basic realizing parts). Functional decomposition is just composition is reverse. Therefore as long as the properties in question are associated with causal capacities, the resulting functional analysis counts as a dimensioned theory of realization – the causal capacities, with their attendant causal powers, decompose into more basic physical parts, which, put the other way around, means that the causal capacities are determined by those compositional parts. So the traditional intentional theory of machine satisfaction and the traditional dimensioned theory of part-whole (de)composition were common parts of a larger machine-functional view. Finally, I should add that my point is not simply that the different theories of realization in question are formally compatible. They complement one another. On the 14 Anthony and Levine report: "Now back in the 60s, we thought we had all this straightened out. The trick was going to be to treat psychological properties as 'higherorder' properties 'realized' by physical properties. A higher-order property is a property you have to have in virtue of having some other property that meets certain specifications" (1997, p.85). 20 one hand, the deeper mereological theory serves to explain how a physical machine instantiates the functional property of computing certain symbols (and thus by interpretation certain numbers) by virtue of its more basic computational capacities and ultimately its most basic engineering parts. On the other hand, the intentional story plays an important role in the epistemics of machine realization. Satisfaction of a mapping relation is part of the justification for applying the machine description to the object in question. In other words, mapping elements of a machine table onto the component activities of a physical system is like going through a checklist to verify that the object is indeed what someone claims it to be. And ditto for other theories of interpretation that posit additional facts to justify the intentional ascription. This kind of epistemic practice can be crucial to understanding a machine, since one typically does not have epistemic access to the metaphysical details about how a machine is constituted by its basic physical mechanisms, save the exceptional engineer. So intentional and metaphysical notions of realization form a larger picture of machine-functional systems that includes not only their metaphysical status vis-à-vis underlying implementing mechanisms but also how they are described and how they are known. 5. Concluding Observations I want to finish by discussing the scope and limits of my proposal. Regarding the limits, as I stated at the outset, some arguments over different theories of realization have a point. For example, if the choice is between two theories in the same conceptual tradition with the same explanatory goals, then they are genuine competitors and my compatibilist proposal does not apply. Thus I count Yablo's (1992) theory of realization qua determinables and determinates and Shoemaker's (2001) theory of realization qua subsets of causal powers for single objects as genuine competitors. Both theories involve property determination over the same individual and thus both theories fall under the metaphysical tradition. 15 In contrast, my proposal requires two theories that belong to different conceptual traditions with different explanatory goals. 15 To substantiate this claim, consider: (DR) a property F is realized by a property G if and only if there is an object x that instantiates F and G, F is a determinable, and G is one of its determinates. Yablo explains the kind of determination in question: "G determines 21 Regarding the scope of my proposal, aside from the cases already examined, other types of cases can be understood in the same way by minding the different traditions of realization. Consider Fodor's (1981) economic example of multiply realized monetary units (cf. Polger, 2007, pp.241, 245-246). A dollar bill has a symbolic or representative function, meaning that the symbols printed on its front and back represent the economic backing of the United States government and its Federal Reserve. Hence the same division of labor applies. The intentional or semantic properties of the symbols are realized according to theories in the representational tradition, while the syntactic (and other) properties of a dollar bill are realized according to theories in the metaphysical tradition. Consequently, the symbolic property F that is causally individuated and subject to the inheritance of causal powers is once again the syntactic property of being a symbol (rather than representing the specific monetary value of a dollar), in this case an arrangement of ink that is determined by the material composition of the dollar bill – the ink, linen, cotton, and synthetic threads. Of course there might be other properties that cannot be easily assimilated into this division of labor between representational and metaphysical traditions. Thus, many philosophers argue that such things as minds and dollar bills also have historically individuated functions. On such views, a mental program is individuated in part by the historical-evolutionary fact that it arose in ancestors to fulfill a particular cognitive niche, F iff: for a thing to be G is for it to be F, not simpliciter, but in a specific way" (ibid., p.252, with a slight change in the variables). He thus offers the following principle as a partial analysis: "G determines F only if: (i) necessarily, for all x, if x has G then x has F; and (ii) possibly, for some x, x has F but lacks G" (loc. cit.). Clause (i) is a straightforward one-way conditional law of the kind found in the metaphysical literature on realization. Now compare subset realization, which can be defined as follows: (SR) a property F is realized by a property G if and only if there is an object x that instantiates F and G, and the causal powers of F are a proper subset of the causal powers of G. This also implies the same kind of property determination, at least with the appropriate background assumptions about the connection between causal powers and laws. Specifically, if properties are necessarily connected to their associated powers, the powers of G contain the powers of F across all metaphysically possible worlds and the one-way conditional law expressed by Yablo's clause (i) is true with metaphysical necessity. If properties are contingently connected to their powers, the powers of G contain the powers F across the pertinent nomologically possible worlds and the same one-way conditional law expressed by Yablo's clause (i) is true with nomological necessity. 22 and a dollar bill is individuated at least in part by the historical-causal fact that it was printed for the United States at the U.S. Bureau of Engraving and Printing. If so, such historical properties are not realized according to flat and dimensioned causal theories, since the properties are not wholly determined by the causal powers inherited from the system's material composition. But I see no reason why causal theorists could not accept a similar division of labor in their explanation of this larger history of the world. Specifically, they could account for the realization of syntactic and other properties within the chosen set of minded, economic, and other-natured systems, and leave the realization of the semantic, historical, and other-natured properties to the appropriate semantic, historical, and othernatured theories. Any call to make the idiom of realization univocal would already run afoul of the fact that there are established conceptual traditions of realization with importantly different theoretical and explanatory goals. Finally, I believe my proposal has an even larger scope that what has been previously indicated. Recall that Malcolm and Polger argue against certain metaphysical theories of realization on grounds that they do not capture certain intentional facts explained by a representational theory of realization. But I also believe philosophers have taken the converse attitude by avoiding the use of representational theories of realization on grounds that they do not capture certain facts of determination explained by a metaphysical theory of realization. Specifically, I think there is a widespread attitude that the once popular theory of machine realization qua one-to-one mapping was rightly replaced by a preferred metaphysical theory of determination such as realization qua functional roles and occupants, realization qua subsets of causal powers, or realization qua parts and wholes. The history certainly fits. The mapping view of realization dominated discussions in the philosophy of mind from the 1960s through the 1970s. Then Ned Block (1978) and William Lycan (1979) published papers at the end of that era vividly illustrating how an unadorned mapping relation could be satisfied by nonminded or otherwise noncomputational systems (the Chinese Nation or a group of Lilliputians, all taken collectively). Call this the problem of "wayward correspondence." Soon afterward philosophers almost universally dismissed the mapping view of realization. Indeed, aside 23 from historical references to the mapping view, or citations of the Block-Lycan-style problem of wayward correspondence, few philosophers even bothered to modify the mapping view with additional conditions for machine-table or machine-description satisfaction (but see Lycan, 1987, pp. 37-41; Chalmers, 1994). Otherwise metaphysical theories of determination dominated the discussion from the 1980s until the present day. Perhaps philosophers simply became more interested in metaphysical theories of realization. But it would seem that, unless philosophers viewed theories of mathematical mapping and the subsequent metaphysical theories as genuine competitors such that the latter should be chosen over the former, the natural reaction to the problem of wayward correspondence would have been to continue with the representational tradition and focus upon efforts to strengthen the mapping view into an adequate account of the conditions under which machine descriptions and their expressed functions are satisfied. But whether one argues against certain metaphysical theories of realization on grounds that they do not capture certain intentional facts explained by a representational theory of realization, or whether one avoids the use of representational theories of realization because they do not capture certain facts of determination explained by a metaphysical theory of realization, the reasoning fits a general pattern. A philosopher argues that one theory of realization is better than another because it provides a better explanation for a particular range of phenomena, say, accounting for common sense cases, or cases within the sciences, when in fact the theories in question are not genuine competitors because of their different but compatible goals. The moral is that the division between different conceptual traditions carries consequences that have been underappreciated. While philosophers have been aware of the many different concepts of realization, some have failed to situate the theories within their proper categories, leading to apparent tensions where in fact there is none. Ronald Endicott North Carolina State University 24 Acknowledgements: I have benefited from several discussions, some that trace back several years. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Carl Gillett, Jaegwon Kim, William Lycan, Brian McLaughlin, Thomas Polger, John Post, and an anonymous reviewer. 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Forthcoming in Kantian Review 25/3, September 2020 The Dialectical Illusion in Kant's Only Possible Argument for the Existence of God NOAM HOFFER Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Email: [email protected] Abstract The nature of Kant's criticism of his pre-Critical 'possibility proof' for the existence of God, implicit in the account of the Transcendental Ideal in the Critique of Pure Reason, is still under dispute. Two issues are at stake: the error in the proof and diagnosis of the reason for committing it. I offer a new way to connect these issues. In contrast with accounts that locate the motivation for the error in reason's interest in an unconditioned causal ground of all contingent existence, I argue that it lies in reason's interest in another kind of unconditioned ground, collective unity. Unlike the conception of the former, that of the latter directly explains the problematic ontological assumption of the possibility proof, the existence of intelligible objects as the ground of possibility. I argue that such Platonic entities are assumed because they are amenable to the kind of unity prescribed by reason. However, since the interest in collective unity has a legitimate regulative use when applied to the systematic unity of nature, the conception of God entailed by the possibility proof is retained as a regulative idea of reason. Keywords: Kant, Only Possible Argument, Ideal of Reason, Dialectical Illusion Introduction In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant famously argues for the impossibility of proving the existence of God by refuting three arguments, the ontological, the cosmological and the physico2 theological.1 He also criticizes these arguments in the pre-Critical period.2 Yet in texts from this period Kant also presented his unique theoretical argument for the existence of God, usually called the possibility proof. This argument is not explicitly discussed in the Critique, but it is mostly accepted that Kant's discussion in section two of the chapter 'The Ideal of Pure Reason', titled 'The Transcendental Ideal', involves an implicit criticism of the possibility proof.3 Following Grier's influential account of Kant's critique of metaphysics (Grier 2001: 9-10), the reconstruction of Kant's criticism can address two issues: the metaphysical error in the proof itself; and the illusion motivating the metaphysical error, which supposedly stems from a certain interest of reason. Regarding the metaphysical error, Abaci's recent elaborate and illuminating account identifies it as taking the principle that 'every real possibility must be grounded in actuality' (the actualist principle, AP) (Abaci 2017: 262) as an 'ontological principle unrestrictedly applying to the real possibility of things in general' (264).This ontological guise of the principle grounds the inference to a necessarily existing being. Regarding the motivation, Abaci locates the source of the error in a way which is mostly continuous with Grier's account of the illusion related to the transcendental ideal (272-4, 279, 281). According to this account, the motivation for taking the conclusion as objective is not presented in the reconstruction of the possibility proof implied in section two, but only in section three of the Ideal chapter, which details a separate illusory inference leading to the necessary ground of all contingently existing things (Grier 2001: 252-6, Grier 2010: 272-5). The account I develop in this article is mostly in agreement with Abaci's account of the metaphysical error. But I disagree with Abaci and Grier about the nature of the transcendental illusion that motivates it. Building on Abaci's account, I make the ontological assumption of the 3 possibility proof more specific. When applied as an ontological principle to things in general, AP entails that possibility is grounded in intelligible (abstract) entities from which the proof aims to infer an ultimate ground – God. I argue that this Platonist assumption makes the proof appealing because such an intelligible ground is amenable to the collective unity sought by reason, a conceptual and systematic kind of unity. For the critical Kant, the existence of a unified intelligible ground of the possibility of things transcends the conditions of possible experience and hence is unknowable. Yet the assumption of such a ground is retained as a regulative idea for science because it expresses the interest of reason in the systematic unity of the laws of nature. In section 1 I briefly present the pre-Critical possibility proof and its transformation into the transcendental ideal of the first Critique. In section 2 I begin to unpack Kant's implicit criticism of the error in the possibility proof, the assumption of an ontological ground for the possibility of things in general. In section 3 I show that the implicit criticism also encompasses the motivation of the error, reason's interest in collective unity as the unconditioned ground of all possibility. In section 4 I address the interpretation espoused by Grier, according to which the illusion motivating the error lies in a separate inference to an unconditioned ground for the existence of contingent things. I argue that this can motivate assent to the conclusion, but not the initial assumption of the proof, the ontological AP. I also show that this reading is problematic when considering Kant's pre-Critical refutation of the cosmological argument. To support my alternative explanation, in section 5 I expand on the erroneous ontological commitment of the possibility proof, the assumption of intelligible objects (intelligibilia) as the ground of possibilities. I support this explanation by recourse to the Amphiboly chapter, which clarifies why the transcendental ideal is the paradigmatic example of an intelligible object. In section 6 I provide further evidence for my reading by showing how the positive regulative role of the idea 4 of God stems from the same interest in collective unity which motivates the error of assuming the existence of intelligible objects. 1. The Transcendental Ideal and the Possibility Proof Kant's pre-Critical possibility proof for the existence of God is first presented in 1755 (NE 1: 395) and then elaborated in 1763 (OPA 2: 77-92). The gist of the argument is as follows: (1) The possibility of any individual thing presupposes not only a logical condition, i.e. the non-contradiction of its predicates, but also a material condition: the content of its predicates is given through some actual thing, either directly from predicates of an actual thing or indirectly derived from fundamental predicates of an actual thing (OPA 2: 77-8). (2) Using the notion of a material condition, Kant contends that the possibility of any individual thing is grounded in something actual (following Abaci, principle AP). (3) If there are no actual things, i.e. nothing exists, no predicates can be given, and therefore nothing is possible. (4) It is impossible that nothing is possible and therefore (5) It is necessary that something exists. (6) There exists one being grounding all possibilities. Since without this being nothing would be possible, this being exists necessarily.4 (7) This necessarily existing ground of all possibility is God. The argument is problematic in various ways as pointed out by many commentators.5 However, I will forgo here the examination of the various problems because my concern is Kant's own 5 rejection of the proof in the Critique of Pure Reason and the dialectical illusion he associates with it. I will only make one point about (2) which is relevant for the rest of my argument. There are various interpretations about the nature of the grounding relation between the actual thing and the possible predicates. The debate revolves mainly around the question whether possible predicates are grounded in virtue of being instantiated in something actual or by some other means.6 Abaci, for example, maintains that a predicate is made possible in virtue of its 'instantiation' in an existing thing (Abaci 2017: 265). It is true that a predicate's being instantiated logically entails that it is possible. Under some accounts, instantiation might also be a condition for the epistemic fact that a predicate is knowable. Indeed, Kant sometimes expresses the grounding relation in epistemic terms, as the requirement for a material element to be given for thought.7 But since the argument aims to derive an ontological claim from the grounding of possibility, the grounding relation is not only a logical or epistemological relation but rather a metaphysical one that entails some ontological assumptions about its relata.8 Thus, apart from the question of 'instantiation', we need to consider other features of the relata to reveal what is entailed ontologically from the grounding of possibility. The grounded things are predicates of possible things and so are abstract entities, and therefore it is plausible to think also of the ground as an abstract entity. One way to characterize such a metaphysical grounding relation is as a sort of Platonism about the grounds of possibility9. I will argue that Kant's realization that proving the existence of God from the grounds of possibility involves the reifications of concepts into abstract entities explains the ultimate rejection of the possibility proof, as well as the regulative significance of the corresponding conception of God. 6 Kant continued to value this proof in the Critical period.10 In his lectures on rational theology given after the publication of the Critique, he continues to mention it favourably: Here [in OPA] it was shown that of all possible proofs, the one which affords us the most satisfaction is the argument that if we remove an original being, we at the same time remove the substratum of the possibility of all things. But even this proof is not apodictically certain; for it cannot establish the objective necessity of an original being, but establishes only the subjective necessity of assuming such a being. (LPR 28: 1034) Although the proof 'affords the most satisfaction', Kant states that it cannot prove the objective existence of God, but only the subjective necessity of assuming it. But what prevents the proof from being apodictically certain? Kant's transcendental idealism entails that knowledge is limited to what can be given in sensible intuition and the a priori conditions of experience. Hence knowledge about a supersensible object such as God is impossible. The natural question that arises is whether, beyond the restrictions of transcendental idealism on knowledge of the conclusion, there is a fallacy within the proof itself. Without locating such a fallacy, the proof could perhaps provide a counter-argument overriding the justifications for transcendental idealism, proving that we can know the existence of at least one object of traditional metaphysics independently from the conditions of possible experience.11 In the Critique itself, Kant does not explicitly mention the possibility proof among the arguments for the existence of God. But a similar line of thought underlies his discussion of the theoretical conception of God as the ens realissimum (the most real being) in section two of 'The Ideal of Pure Reason', 'the transcendental ideal' (A571-84/B579-662). The construal of this conception 7 begins here not from the grounding of possibility, but from the principle of thoroughgoing determination: Every thing, however, as to its possibility, further stands under the principle of thoroughgoing determination; according to which, among all possible predicates of things, insofar as they are compared with their opposites, one must apply to it (A5712/B599-600) To put it simply, this principle prescribes what it is like to know everything there is to know about something, so that this knowledge would suffice 'to cognize a thing completely', i.e. as an individual object, solely through its concept (A573/B601). The principle of contradiction places logical constraints on concepts so that at most only one of a pair of contradicting predicates can apply to each concept of a thing. The principle of thoroughgoing determination, on the other hand, specifies the conditions for the individuation of a thing through its concept, i.e. in terms of a set of predicates: that one of each pair of all possible contradicting predicates applies to the object. According to the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, objects with the same set of predicates are identical, and hence the complete set of predicates uniquely identifies an individual object. Thus determining the complete set of predicates presupposes a totality of all possible predicates, 'the entire storehouse of material from which all possible predicates of things can be taken'(A575/B603). The sum total of all predicates is also the whole of reality (omnitudo realitatis) when considering positive predicates as signifying a reality and negative predicates as lack of reality. Each concept of an individual thing can then be determined by selecting a subset from this whole. Till now, the result is entirely conceptual, without making an ontological claim: 8 Yet all of this does not signify the objective relation of an actual object to other things, but only that of an idea to concepts, and as to the existence of a being of such preeminent excellence it leaves us in complete ignorance (A579/B607) What enables the ontological shift in the final step, is regarding the ground of the whole of reality as a single object. The ground of all reality should be thought of as prior to its parts and not as a mere aggregate of parts. Hence there is a shift from the notion of a sum total that can be limited to something that grounds all realities: the highest reality would ground the possibility of all things as a ground and not as a sum total; and the manifoldness of the former rests not on the limitation of the original being itself, but on its complete consequences, to which our whole sensibility, including all reality in appearance, would then belong, which cannot belong to the idea of a highest being as an ingredient. (ibid.) One reason for this shift is reason's demand for an unconditioned condition. An aggregate of independent parts would be conditioned by their parts and therefore not unconditioned. A second reason appears at the end of the last quote: the ground of all reality is also the ground of sensible realities, and those can only be grounded in the highest being but not included in it without sliding into Spinozism. What is important to note is that this shift brings us closer to the ontological commitment of OPA: the transcendental ideal is not only a concept of an aggregate of predicates but an ontological ground for predicates, which means that they are being regarded ontologically as abstract entities. When taken as a single object, the ground of all reality is the most real being, the ens realissimum (A576/B604), or in other words, God (A580/B608). Since the conceptual 9 individuation of things explains their possibility qua individuals, God as the condition for thoroughgoing determination is also 'the material ground of all possibility' (A573/B601; cf. A576/B604). The latter is the same term used in the possibility proof. The same 'all of reality' required for thoroughgoing determination of things is also the material ground, the real element of their possibility in the pre-Critical sense. Thus the affinity between this argument and the construal of the ideal of reason in the Critique is evident, textually and conceptually.12 2. The Error of Subreption in the Possibility Proof Since the construal of the ens realissimum is similar to the reasoning of the possibility proof, it is plausible to look for criticism of the proof in the analysis following this construal. Kant makes it clear that forming the concept of the ens realissimum does not include an assertion about the existence of its object: It is self-evident that with this aim – namely, solely that of representing the necessary thoroughgoing determination of things – reason does not presuppose the existence of a being conforming to the ideal. (A577-8/B605-6) The conclusion of the possibility proof, however, does assert the actual existence of God, and from similar considerations to the ones leading to the construal of the ens realissimum. Where does this erroneous conclusion come from? After presenting how reason construes the ens realissimum, Kant sets the task to identify the source of the error of inferring its existence, the dialectical illusion: It is not enough to describe the procedure of our reason and its dialectic; one must also seek to discover its sources, so as to be able to explain this illusion itself ... Therefore I ask: How does reason come to regard all the possibility of things as derived from a single 10 possibility, namely that of the highest reality, and even to presuppose this possibility as contained in a particular original being? (A581/B609)13 Kant's account of the nature of the error that leads reason to regard 'all the possibility of things' as grounded in one being is packed into the last two paragraphs of section two and is very succinct and opaque. I will, therefore, analyse it in detail. The account begins with the starting premise of the possibility proof, the grounding of possibility in actuality (AP). Kant states that this principle is valid for the possibility of cognizing objects of experience: The possibility of objects of sense is a relation of these objects to our thought, in which something (namely, the empirical form) can be thought a priori, but what constitutes the material, the reality in appearance (corresponding to sensation) has to be given; without that nothing at all could be thought and hence no possibility could be represented. (ibid.) Kant begins by alluding to the Postulates of Empirical Thinking (A218-26/B266-74).14 In their legitimate empirical use, the categories of modality do not determine anything in the object itself but only the relation of thought to the object. Two elements can be discerned in this relation. First, the object has to correspond with the formal conditions of experience, the a priori forms of sensible intuition and the categories. Secondly, the content (or matter) of the sensible realities which belong to the object 'has to be given' (A581/B609), i.e. regarded as actual.15 Thus the possibility of cognizing empirical objects presupposes the whole of experience as an actual sumtotal of all sensible realities: But because that which constitutes the thing itself (in appearance), namely the real, has to be given, without which it could not be thought at all, but that in which the real in all appearances is given is the one all-encompassing experience, the material for the 11 possibility of all objects of sense has to be presupposed as given in one sum total (A582/B610) This sum total is then conceived as the condition of the thoroughgoing determination of empirical objects: 'all possibility of empirical objects, their difference from one another and their thoroughgoing determination, can rest only on the limitation of this sum total' (ibid.) This line of thought is analogous to the starting point of the possibility proof. Also there, Kant distinguishes between the formal aspect of possibility (the principle of non-contradiction), and the material aspect, the actual ground of possibility (AP). But Kant contends that this analogy is deceptive: while AP is true for cognizing the possibility of empirical objects, it is not applicable to grounding the possibility of things in general: In accordance with a natural illusion, we regard as a principle that must hold of all things in general that which properly holds only of those which are given as objects of our senses. Consequently, through the omission of this limitation we will take the empirical principle of our concepts of the possibility of things as appearances to be a transcendental principle of the possibility of things in general (ibid) This is a case of 'transcendental subreption', by which a principle of possible experience is illegitimately used to gain knowledge of things independently of possible experience. i.e. thingsin-themselves.16 As Abaci shows, in its legitimate use for objects of experience, AP is an epistemological principle: for cognizing the possibility of empirical objects as fully determined regarding all realities, we presuppose the actuality of all the empirical realities in one sum total.17 The metaphysical error lies in substituting an epistemological AP applicable to the cognition of 12 objects of experience with an ontological AP applied to things in general (Abaci 2017: 285). But a complete critique of the possibility proof requires not only identifying the metaphysical error but also explaining the transcendental illusion that motivates reason to commit the error. Abaci focuses mainly on the error, and in continuity with Grier claims that the explanation of the illusion comes only in section three of the Ideal chapter. In the next section I lay out my alternative account of the illusion, and in section 4 I argue against Grier's account. 3. Collective Unity and the Formation of the Transcendental Ideal In what follows I will show that there is an implicit account of a motivating Illusion already in section two, in the notion of collective unity which comes up in the last paragraph of the section: That we subsequently hypostatize this idea of the sum total of all reality, however, comes about because we dialectically transform the distributive unity of the use of the understanding in experience, into the collective unity of a whole of experience; and from this whole of appearance we think up an individual thing containing in itself all empirical reality. (A582/B610; italics mine) The subreption that transforms the epistemological AP into an ontological AP is manifested by hypostatization, i.e. regarding the idea of a ground of possibility as a real object. I take the 'because' in the above sentence to indicate a purposive explanation: the subreption is motivated by an interest in transforming distributive unity into collective unity. What is the difference between these kinds of unity? In the Appendix to the Dialectic, Kant describes them as follows: just as the understanding unites the manifold into an object through concepts, so reason on its side unites the manifold of concepts through ideas by positing a certain collective 13 unity as the goal of the understanding's actions, which are otherwise concerned only with distributive unity. (A644/B672) The unity imposed by the understanding on the sensible manifold is distributive, while collective unity is a unity of reason, imposed on concepts (cf. Guyer 2003: 5). According to their seat correspondingly in the understanding or in reason, we can make the following distinction. The distributive unity of the understanding is generated by the relations among objects of experience, the way in which each object is constituted by its relations to all other objects and the cognizing subject.18 This unity is therefore distributed equally among its parts. The indeterminate whole composed thereby is only thought as an open series enabling the search for further relations without a definite endpoint. However, as a faculty of inferences, reason demands a different kind of unity, a collective unity of a system derivable from a single ultimate principle: [W]hat reason quite uniquely prescribes and seeks to bring about concerning it [the concepts of the understanding] is the systematic in cognition, i.e., its interconnection based on one principle. (A645/B673) Although the paragraph at the end of section two refers to the 'collective unity of a whole of experience' leading to an 'individual thing containing in itself all empirical reality', we should note that this collective unity is not a necessary condition for the possibility of experience but a mere idea of reason. Since collective unity originates in the faculty of reason, it requires something beyond what is available through the synthesising function of the understanding regarding sensible intuition.19 This 'collective unity of a whole of experience' is then 'by means of the transcendental subreption ... confused with the concept of a thing that stands at the summit of the possibility of 14 all things, providing the real conditions for their thoroughgoing determination' (A583/B611). What motivates this confusion? My claim is that the confusion, the error of subreption, is motivated by the interest of reason in collective unity. As noted above, the unity of experience is merely distributive, the unity resulting from the spatial, temporal and categorical relations between the objects of experience. But the interest of reason is to regard any manifold as a collective unity, i.e. a unity in virtue of being derived from a single principle. Since the unity between the actual objects of experience cannot be collective but only distributive, reason presupposes unity in what grounds the possibility of the objects of experience. The ontological ground of possibility is amenable to the unity of reason because it is an abstract entity that can be thought through the reification of concepts.20 Thus an important step in the course of reason concluding in the existence of the ens realissimum is the reification of a concept that unites all other concepts systematically as an actual object that grounds all possibility of things. This is suggested in a footnote: 'This ideal of the supremely real being, even though it is a mere representation, is first realized [realisiert], i.e., made into an object [Objekt], then hypostatized' (A582-3/B610-1, fn.). The hypostatization (assigning existence) of the ens realissimum is the erroneous conclusion, but there is a prior step mentioned in this sentence, that of 'realization', i.e. thinking it as an object,21 or what I called above reification. Once it is conceded that the Ideal designates an object that grounds all possibility, it is natural to infer its necessary existence, as without it nothing would be possible. Let us summarize Kant's account of the errors that follow from the construal of the ens realissimum: 15 1. A principle valid for the possibility of cognizing empirical objects is applied to the possibility of things in general for which it cannot be demonstrated to be valid (the dialectical subreption of AP). 2. The unity of experience which is only distributive is transformed into a collective unity of a system of concepts, in accord with an interest of reason. 3. Using this ontological AP, reason infers a single actual object which is the unconditioned ground of the possibility and collective unity of all things in general – God. What is the relation between (1) the dialectical subreption of AP and (2) the error of substituting collective unity for distributive unity? My claim is that there is a rational interest to regard the unifying distributive relations between empirical objects as grounded by the collective unity of relations between concepts. Thus reason is tempted to take its interest in (2) as objective, justifying the ontological commitment entailed by the subreption (1). Regarding the collective unity of reason as objective means making concepts into objects: making something which signifies only the relation 'of an idea to concepts' into an 'objective relation of an actual object to other things' (A579/B607). This leads to a metaphysical error when the objects thereby produced, purely intelligible objects, are regarded as existing. In section 5 I will expand on the nature of these objects and show how they function in the construal of the ens realissimum and the possibility proof. The following note provides additional evidence that it is this interest in collective unity which ultimately motivates the formation of the ens realissimum: The idea of the unconditioned unity of all objects of thought in an ens entium is necessary in order to seek for the affinity among everything possible and thereby also 16 thoroughgoing connection as unity of principle. (R5553, 18: 226; the three emphases mine. Cf. the footnote to A572/B600) The ens realissimum is construed for the sake of an unconditioned ground of the unity among all possibilities, i.e. unity among the essences which provide the 'matter' for all possible things. Hence the metaphysical error arises from thinking that the unity of concepts prescribed by reason has to be grounded in actual intelligible objects: 'where the universality of thinking through reason is taken for a thought of a totality of the possibilities of things' (R5553, 18: 224). In section 6, I show how this kind of unity receives a regulative status. 4. Transcendental Illusion and Section Three of the Ideal According to Grier, the construal of the ens realissimum in section two of the Ideal chapter does not include an explanation of the illusion motivating the error which comes only in section three. Thus she claims 'that section 2 and 3 constitute two stages in a single extended argument'.22 The following passage at the beginning of section three supports this reading: In spite of its urgent need to presuppose something that the understanding could take as the complete ground for the thoroughgoing determination of its concepts, reason notices the ideal and merely fictive character of such a presupposition much too easily to allow itself to be persuaded by this alone straightway to assume a mere creature of its own thinking to be an actual being were it not urged from another source to seek somewhere for a resting place in the regress from the conditioned, which is given, to the unconditioned (A583-4/B611-2) Kant claims that the need to assume the material ground for thoroughgoing determination presented in section two is not persuasive enough for forming the belief in the actual existence of 17 God without another motivation. This other motivation for belief in the existence of God is the argument that begins with contingent existence known through experience and concludes that there is something that exists necessarily, a cause for the whole series of contingent things: If something, no matter what, exists, then it must also be conceded that something exists necessarily. For the contingent exists only under the condition of something else as its cause, and from this the same inference holds further all the way to a cause not existing contingently and therefore necessarily without condition. That is the argument on which reason grounds its progress to the original being. (A584/B612) The existence of each contingent thing is caused by something else. The general interest of reason is to complete the regress of causal conditions, and therefore it postulates an unconditioned cause for the whole series. This type of inference corresponds to the generic form of a transcendental illusion that Grier identifies in all the arguments of the dialectic: a transition from the legitimate yet subjective principle of reason, 'Find for the conditioned knowledge given through the understanding the unconditioned' (P1), to the illusory principle, 'If the conditioned is given, the whole series of conditions, subordinated to one another – a series which is therefore itself unconditioned – is likewise given' (P2).23 P2 is here applied to the causal series of contingent things, resulting in a necessary first cause. Kant then continues to assert that only the unjustified combination of the two lines of thought, the first from the principle of thoroughgoing determination to the ens realissimum, and the second from the series of contingent things to their non-contingent cause, leads to the illusion of rational theology in its full force. Reason is compelled to assume the unconditioned cause for contingent things but has no insight into its nature. The concept of the most real being is then introduced as 'best suited to the concept of an unconditionally necessary being' (A587/B615). The ens realissimum is best suited for a concept 18 of an unconditioned cause because it is unconditioned also in another sense, as the most real being which grounds the possibility of everything else. According to Grier, it is only the need for an unconditioned causal ground of existence added in section three that accounts for the dialectical illusion motivating the hypostatization of the ens realissimum.24 Yet her account does not explain the relations between the series of errors detailed in section two, but only the appeal of using its final conclusion for a different purpose. 25 Therefore, when considering the account of these errors as an implicit criticism of the possibility proof, locating the motivating illusion only in section three cannot explain how the pre-Critical Kant thought the possibility proof was convincing in the first place. Moreover, the argument presented in section three for a necessarily existing cause of all contingent things is a version of a cosmological argument for the existence of God. Given that the construal of the ens realissimum in section two correlates with the pre-Critical possibility proof, locating the illusion only in section three would amount to the claim that the force of the possibility proof depends on an implicit appeal to the cosmological argument for supplying the concept of necessary existence. But could Kant be committed to this position? In OPA he explicitly maintained the opposite view: the possibility proof is the 'only possible argument' and superior to all other arguments, including the cosmological argument from contingency. The specific criticism of the cosmological argument in OPA (2: 158) is similar to the one levelled in the Critique (A604-7/B632-5), and shows that it implicitly depends on the Cartesian ontological argument. What is relevant for the present purpose is Kant's claim that the possibility proof is superior to the cosmological proof precisely with respect to the notion of necessary existence. The possibility proof renders the necessary existence of God intelligible because it 19 proceeds from an analysis of the concept of absolute necessity as that whose non-existence cancels all possibility, while the cosmological proof appeals to the merely negative notion of the non-contingent: It [the possibility proof] is, indeed, an argument derived from the internal characteristic mark of absolute necessity. Thus, our knowledge of the existence of this being is derived from what really constitutes the absolute necessity of that same being... None of the proofs which argue from the effects of this being to its existence as cause can ever – even granting that they are of the strictest character, which in fact they are not – render the nature of this necessity comprehensible ... from the fact that something is a first cause, that is to say, an independent cause, it only follows that, if the effects exist then the cause must also exist, not that the cause exists absolutely necessarily (OPA 2: 91, emphases mine) I believe that it is unlikely that Kant changed his mind about the independence of the possibility proof from the cosmological proof. If this is the case, then there should be another kind of motivating illusion than the one Grier locates in section three, which explains why the mere conception of the transcendental ideal is mistaken for a proof from the ground of possibility. As I have shown in the previous section, this illusion stems from the interest in the collective unity of all possibilities. We should note that the collective unity of the grounds of possibility is also a form of an unconditioned ground, and hence stemming from the general illusory principle P2, but it is not the unconditioned ground of existence described in section three. But how are we to understand Kant's statement about the lack of convincing power of the procedure in section two which correlates with the possibility proof? I suggest we take it as a 20 historical-anthropological observation rather than logical. The cosmological argument is more common in human history because it begins with ordinary experience and does not assume sophisticated metaphysical reflections: This is the natural course taken by every human reason, even the most common ... It begins not with concepts, but with common experience, and thus grounds itself on something existing. (A584/B612) [The argument is] so simple and natural that it is suited to the commonest human understanding as soon as the latter is once led to it. (A589/B617) Once human reason is led from the causal series of changes to the idea of a first cause, then further philosophical reflection can supply the idea of a most perfect being as a suitable candidate for that cause. But the logical course of reasoning as exemplified in OPA and still supported in the lectures as subjectively valid does not depend on the cosmological argument and is also not motivated by it, but by another demand of reason, that of collective unity. The next sections will elaborate on the ontological commitment to intelligibilia motivated by this interest and its relation to the regulative principle of systematic unity. 5. Intelligibilia and the Ontological Commitment of the Ideal The error of subreption is that of taking the 'empirical principle of our concepts of the possibility of things as appearances to be a transcendental principle of the possibility of things in general' (A582/B660). What is meant by things in general? In several other places, the term 'things in general' is followed by 'and in themselves' (B298/A238, B410). Things in general are thought not in relation to the conditions of experience but only as they are in themselves. Leaving out all sensible conditions, any thinkable determination of them would thus be purely intellectual, and 21 the objects would be intelligible objects. We may call these intelligible things in themselves intelligibilia.26 We can find the assumption of intelligibilia as related to the idea of God in the introduction to the Dialectic: in the third kind of sophistical inference, from the totality of conditions for thinking objects in general ... I infer the absolute synthetic unity of all conditions for the possibility of things in general; i.e., from things with which I am not acquainted as to their merely transcendental concept, I infer a being of all beings, with which I am even less acquainted through its transcendental concept, and of whose unconditioned necessity I can make for myself no concept at all. This dialectical syllogism I will call the ideal of pure reason. (A340/B398, emphases mine) The ens realissimum is not construed through direct reference to objects of experience, in contrast with the cosmological idea which is construed from the totality of appearances. Rather, it is inferred from the 'conditions for the possibility of things in general', hence things-inthemselves with which we are not acquainted. Although nothing can be known about such things, reason assumes their existence as purely intelligible when inferring the existence of God. To get a clearer view of the characteristics of these objects, we should note that the ens realissimum is not only the ground of thoroughgoing determination and the possibility of everything else, it is also described as the prototype, the perfect example, of things in general: 'the ideal is thus the original image (prototypon) of all things, which all together, as defective copies (ectypa), take from it the matter for their possibility (A578/B606) 22 The Platonic overtones in the above passage are not accidental. At the outset of the Dialectic Kant explicitly borrows the term 'idea' (Idee) from Plato to designate concepts of objects that cannot be given in experience but serve as standards of perfection (A320/B377). Most of Kant's examples for the significance of Platonic ideas come from the practical realm. But the Ideal chapter shows how theoretical considerations also lead reason to form an ontology of degrees of reality so that the ens realissimum grounds the possibility of all its less perfect copies. By conceiving the possibility of things in general as intelligibilia, reason reifies concepts as objects and makes them dependent on the most perfect object which corresponds with the most complete concept. This is, in other words, Platonism. This Platonic picture entails that by discerning the features of the prototype, i.e. the ens realissimum, we can learn what is assumed about the copies, i.e. the objects which depend on it. Because the ground of thoroughgoing determination is also the ground of possibility, this also clarifies the ontological commitments of the possibility proof. The ens realissimum is a paradigmatic example of a thing-in-itself because by having all perfections and no negations it is individuated solely by conceptual means: Through this possession of all reality, however, there is also represented the concept of a thing in itself which is thoroughly determined ... an individual being, because of all possible opposed predicates, one, namely that which belongs absolutely to being, is encountered in its determination (A576/B604, italics mine). The Amphiboly chapter provides further details about the characteristics of things-in-themselves as intelligibilia. The target of criticism in this chapter is the Leibnizian theory of monads, and the basic thought is that this theory could be justified according to the concepts of reflection if we 23 had cognition of intelligibilia. Yet we do not possess such cognition and the principles valid for intelligibilia are not valid for objects of sensible intuition. What is important for the present purpose is that we can also learn from this discussion what intelligibilia would be like had they existed, and why they are presupposed in the construal of the ens realissimum. The first pair of concepts of reflection states the identity of indiscernibles (A263-4/B319-20). As noted in section 1, the principle of thoroughgoing determination as a principle of individuation depends on this principle, and the ens realissimum itself as a concept of an individual exemplifies it. Thus the principle of thoroughgoing determination from which the construal of the ens realissimum begins is fully applicable only to intelligibilia. Also according to the second and the third pair of concepts of reflection, the ens realissimum is a paradigmatic example of an intelligible thing in itself: there is no opposition between its realities, and all its determination are intrinsic rather than relational (A264-6/B320-2). The Amphiboly chapter does not discuss concepts of modality, but the last pair of concepts of reflection, matter and form, is directly related to the grounding of possibility: In every judgment one can call the given concepts logical matter (for judgment), their relation (by means of the copula) the form of the judgment. In every being its components (essentialia) are the matter; the way in which they are connected in a thing, the essential form. Also, in respect to things in general, unbounded reality is regarded as the matter of all possibility, but its limitation (negation) as that form through which one thing is distinguished from another. ... The understanding, namely, demands first that something be given (at least in the concept) in order to be able to determine it in a certain 24 way. Hence in the concept of pure understanding matter precedes form. (A266-7/B322-3, emphases mine) Appearances are first individuated by the spatiotemporal form, and only then determined with regard to their content: 'the form of intuition (as a subjective constitution of sensibility) precedes all matter (the sensations), thus space and time precede all appearances and all data of appearances, and instead first make the latter possible' (A267/B323). But regarding intelligibilia, if there were such things, the existence of the matter of their reality could be inferred from their real possibility. The affinity of this discussion of matter and form in the Amphiboly to the construal of the ens realissimum and the possibility proof is clear. The reasoning to the matter of all possibility is conditionally valid for intelligibilia: if one could cognize the existence of such objects, then one could also cognize a sum total of all intelligible reality grounding their possibility. We should also notice in the above passage that components of intelligible objects are modelled after concepts (the predicates being related in judgement) and are called essentialia, the material to be combined in the essential form of a thing. When considering intelligibilia, the matter of all possibility is the totality of essences. Thus the conclusion of the possibility proof that the matter of all possibility is grounded in God is equivalent to the grounding of all essences in God. This notion of a unified ground of essences is exactly what Kant found valuable in the conception of God entailed by the possibility proof and allows its transformation into a regulative idea, as I will suggest in the next section. 25 To conclude: since the ens realissimum as the paradigmatic concept of an intelligible thing-initself is inferred from being the archetype ('the original image') grounding the possibility of all other things, those things, i.e. intelligibilia, are assumed to exist. 6. The Regulative Use of the Ideal In the series of the metaphysical errors following the formation of the ens realissimum, it is not only realized and hypostasized as an existing object but also made into a thinking substance: This ideal of the supremely real being, even though it is a mere representation, is first realized, i.e., made into an object, then hypostatized, and finally, as we will presently allege, through a natural progress of reason in the completion of unity, it is even personified; for the regulative unity of experience rests not on appearances themselves (of sensibility alone), but on the connection of its manifold by understanding (in one apperception); hence the unity of the highest reality and the thoroughgoing determinability (possibility) of all things seems to lie in a highest understanding, hence in an intelligence. (A583/B611, fn.; italics mine) As argued above, this whole series of errors is motivated by an interest in collective unity. Since this is a conceptual rather than sensible unity, it is plausible to regard its ground as intelligent. But what is important for the present purpose is that this unity is described as regulative, hinting at the positive regulative role of the ens realissimum. The regulative use of the ideas of reason is the subject of the Appendix to the Dialectic. The idea of God is specifically related to the systematic unity of nature: 'the idea of that being [God], means nothing more than that reason bids us consider every connection in the world according to principles of a systematic unity' (A686/B714). 26 In contrast with the legitimate regulative use, the possibility proof not only 'bids us consider', but concludes that there exists an object grounding the systematic unity of all possible things. But leaving aside the objective status of the conclusion, it is important to note that in the preCritical possibility proof the conception of God is also related to the systematic unity of nature. The second part of OPA (2: 93-155) discusses at length the systematic order of nature. Kant there criticizes explanations of natural facts that appeal to contingent divine intervention instead of necessary laws of nature. But investigating the latter is not in contrast with including God in the metaphysical explanation of nature. The ground of all possibility is the ground of essences, i.e. the necessary properties of things and the lawful relations between them (cf. Insole 2011). Hence investigating the unity of the laws of nature stemming from the essences of things coheres with the conception of God as the single ground of all possibility established in the first part of OPA: Our purpose from now on will be to see whether the internal possibility of things is itself necessarily related to order and harmony ... so that, on this basis, we could establish whether the essences of things themselves indicate an ultimate common ground. (2: 92) Kant espoused this view about God as the ground of essences and the laws of nature at least from the 1750s in his drafts on optimism (R3704, 17: 234) and the Universal Natural History (1: 2223, 332), and he continued to hold it in LPR (28: 1035). The usefulness of this conception of God is transformed in the Critique into a regulative idea expressing the need to assume the unity of the laws of nature.27 But taking this need as objective rather than subjective leads to the dogmatic assumption of the possibility proof, that essences 27 exist as intelligible things in themselves from which it is possible to infer their ultimate ground, God. In LPR Kant contends that the possibility proof establishes 'the subjective necessity of assuming such a being' for explaining 'what in general the possibility of something consists in' (LPR 28: 1034). A note from the 1770s provides further elaboration of this subjective necessity: Even if the existence of God does not follow from the conditions on which we ground the concept of possibility, it nevertheless follows sufficiently from the concession that we can judge a priori about this. The subjective conditions of thinking therefore serve very well for convincing cat anthropon, but not apodictically. (R5508, 18:203; emphasis added) The possibility proof is invalid without the assumption of a priori knowledge about the conditions of possibility in general. Since it proceeds from the ontological ground of possibility in general and not from the epistemic condition for cognizing the possibility of empirical objects, such a priori knowledge would amount to cognition of the matter of possibility as intelligible, hence knowledge about the existence of intelligibilia.28 Assuming this kind of knowledge is, in fact, assuming that the structure of thought is also the structure of reality,29 and therefore the argument is subjectively valid for human thought, cat anthropon (ad hominem). While this subjective validity is the illusion motivating the unjustified assumptions of the possibility proof, it also correlates with its positive regulative use. Thus although there can be no cognition of essences qua intelligibilia, the idea of God construed as their ground expresses the rational interest in discovering the unity of the laws of nature. Conclusion 28 I have shown that the conception of God as the ens realissimum and the ground of all possibilities is construed from the assumption of intelligible objects. For the pre-Critical Kant, the starting assumption that there are entities such as essences that ground the possibility of empirical objects was unproblematic. From these intelligible entities it was also unproblematic to construct a conception of God. For the Critical Kant, cognition of essences as things-inthemselves is impossible for human cognition. Therefore assuming that these intelligible building blocks of the possibility proof exist objectively is the erroneous result of a dialectical subreption, the application of a principle whose validity cannot be demonstrated for things in general. I have argued that this metaphysical error is not motivated by the interest of reason to seek the unconditioned ground of contingent existence, but by an interest in a different kind of unconditioned, that of conceptual collective unity. It is this interest that also explains the regulative role of the idea of God. Even though the intelligible grounds of possibility are not objects of knowledge, their amenability, as purely intelligible, to collective unity correlates with what guides scientific inquiry, the systematicity of empirical concepts. For this reason, even when losing its objective validity, the conception of God retains a subjective validity as the Ideal of reason, 'a concept which brings to a close and crowns the whole of human cognition' (LPR 28: 1037).30 Notes 1 I cite Kant from the Akademie edition by reference to volume and page number. Quotations from Critique of Pure Reason are cited by the standard (A/B) pagination. I mostly use the translations of the Cambridge edition of Kant's works (Kant 1998, Kant 2000, Kant 2001 [LPR], Kant 2003 [NE, OPA], Kant 2005 [Reflexionen]); if there has been no translation in that edition, translations are mine. References to Kant's unpublished Reflexionen will be given with the 29 numbers of the individual reflections (R #) provided in volumes 17, 18 and 19 of the Akademie edition. I use the following abbreviations: LPR=Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion; NE=A New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition; OPA= The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God; 2 Kant criticized the Cartesian ontological argument first in NE 1: 394-5 and then in greater detail together with the two other proofs in OPA 2: 72-5, 155-62. 3 However, the exact nature of this criticism varies among interpreters. See for example Wood 1978: 71-79, Fisher and Watkins 1998, Logan 2007: 357-61, Rukgaber 2014: 98-102, Stang 2016: 288-96, Abaci 2017. 4 This is the most controversial step in most reconstructions of the proof. See for example Fisher and Watkins 1998: 375, Adams 2000: 432-4, Stang 2010: 292-4, Boehm 2014: 27. 5 In addition to the previous footnote, see also Wood 1978: 70-1. 6 See also Adams 2000: 427, Stang 2010: 280-1, Chignell 2012: 645-8, Yong 2014: 38-44, Stang 2016: 107-19, Hoffer 2016: 193-198. 7 E.g 'The material element which is given here as standing in such a conflict is itself something and can be thought' (OPA 2: 77). 8 For a detailed discussion of the ontological commitments of the possibility proof see Kanterian 2017: 209-10. 9 Independently of Kant's argument, Platonism might be an attractive theory for grounding modal facts. See Berman 2013. 10 Paul Franks argues that there is a shift in Kant's thought from a dismissive attitude in the first Critique to more positive attitude in the 1786 Orientation essay (Franks 2005: 66). My 30 explanation of the regulative value of the proof implied in the former supports the view that there is no substantive shift. 11 See Fisher and Watkins 1998: 380-4. Logan argues that this is indeed the case, that Kant's rejection of his own proof is based on an unjustified empiricist shift in Kant's thought in the late 1760s (Logan 2007: 354-60). While this might explain the historical development that led to rejection of the proof, I will show in the next section that the Critical Kant refutes the proof by rejecting its main premise and not only its conclusion, and that he also explains the motivation for this premise by appeal to the interests of reason. 12 Rukgaber 2014 argues that although 'the metaphysical vision of the pre-Critical Kant is informing his theory of the transcendental ideal' the argument of section two 'shares nothing with the pre-Critical argument except the idea of the ens realissimum' (Rukgaber 2014: 100). I disagree, as the principle of thoroughgoing determination leads to the material substrate required for the possibility of things qua individuals. In this I agree with Stang 2016: 292. 13 I have emended the translation by Wood and Guyer which I believe is inaccurate: '...and even to presuppose these possibilities as contained in a particular original being'. The original reads: und diese sodann, als in einem besonderen Urwesen enthalten vorauszusetzen. It is more probable that diese refers to the possibility of the highest being and not to all the possibility of things, both for grammatical reasons, and because it was stated before that God is the ground and not the sum total of all possibilities, hence the latter are not contained in God. I thank an anonymous referee for noting this peculiarity in the translation. 14 This is noted in Wood 1978: 64-6, Grier 2001: 240-1, Longuenesse 2005: 219-22, Abaci 2017: 280-2. 31 15 It should be noted that this does not violate the claim that the modal categories do not determine anything in the object; here the presupposed actuality of the sum total of realities is not a judgment that an object is actual but only put forth as a presupposition for the possibility of thoroughgoing determination. 16 The term is first introduced in the Inaugural Dissertation of 1770 as the 'the confusion of what belongs to the understanding with what is sensitive'. In the Critique, the term is generalized for all cases in which a principle of empirical cognition is extended beyond its boundaries, e.g. inferring the existence of the soul from the unity of consciousness (A389, 402). See also Grier 2001: 246-7, Abaci 2017: 285-6. 17 Note that this sum total is also only an idea that cannot be given in experience, and hence empirical cognition can only strive for complete determination but never achieve it. See Abaci 2017: 283-4. 18 E.g. spatial, temporal and categorical relations: 'everything in our cognition that belongs to intuition ... contains nothing but mere relations, of places in one intuition (extension), alteration of places (motion), and laws in accordance with which this alteration is determined (moving forces)'. (B66; cf. A265/B321). 19 Longuenesse ignores the distinction between the two kinds of unity and the regulative role of the collective unity. She thus suggests that in these passages Kant offers a critical notion of thoroughgoing determination which can be formulated using the resources of the Analytic alone (Longuenesse 2005: 221-2). For criticisms of this reading see Grier 2001: 237-46, Verburgt 2011: 245-52. Fisher and Watkins (1998: 392-5) also argue that the rejection of the possibility proof is based on the distinction between understanding and reason and their different domains, but they do not explain in detail the illusion related to it. 32 20 In a different context, Glezer (2017: 164-8) suggests a similar connection between conceptual systematicity and noumenal reality. His ultimate position is incompatible with mine, but a full response is beyond the scope of this paper. 21 The German term is Objekt and it is clear that in this context it is not an object of sensible intuition but rather an object in general, thought as a thing in itself. 22 Grier 2001: 233. Abaci (2017: 287-9) agrees with Grier on this issue. 23 Grier 2001: 120, 122. As Boehm (2014: 51-2) has shown, P1 and P2 can be regarded respectively as subjective and objective formulations of the principle of sufficient reason. This fits well with my reading as it emphasizes that the principle of reason is not only applicable to grounding causal series of contingent things but to any kind of unconditioned ground. 24 Stang (2016: 293-5) has a different explanation of the illusion, motivating the Ideal in terms of principles which correspond with Grier's P1/P2 distinction: a Logical and a Pure Principle of Reason. The illusion stems from applying the latter to the grounds of noumenal real possibility, so that reason supposes that there is a determinate complete set of all possible predicates. Discussing this account is beyond the scope of this paper, but I find it compatible with mine: noumenal real possibility is itself a problematic concept of reason since we can only think about its ground as intelligibilia. 25 Willaschek (2018: 231, fn. 22) makes the stronger claim that section two does not at all discuss the metaphysical error of assuming the existence of the ens realissimum, and that this assertion comes only in section three. 26 'Leibniz took the appearances for things in themselves, thus for intelligibilia, i.e. objects of the pure understanding' (A264/B320). 'If, however, I suppose there to be things that are merely 33 objects of the understanding ... then such things would be called noumena (intelligibilia)' (A249). See also Allais 2015: 7. 27 More in Hoffer 2019. 28 Although OPA uses examples of empirical objects, the ground of the possibility of their fundamental predicates are essences, hence abstract objects. 29 Willaschek (2018: 9) argues that 'the claim that the structure of reality corresponds to that of rational thought' is the erroneous tacit assumption Kant identifies in speculative metaphysics in general). 30 I would like to thank Allen Wood and two anonymous referees for Kantian Review for invaluable comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I am also grateful to Nick Stang and other participants of the 2016 North American Kant Society Mid-West study group meeting in which an earlier version of this paper was presented. This research was supported by the ISRAEL SCIENCE FOUNDATION (grants of Ohad Nachtomy, Hagit Benbaji and Ido Geiger). References Abaci, Uygar (2017) 'Kant, The Actualist Principle, and The Fate of the Only Possible Proof'. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 55/2, 261-291. Adams, Robert Merrihew (2000) 'God, Possibility, and Kant'. Faith and Philosophy, 17/4, 425440. Allais, Lucy (2015) Manifest Reality Kant's Idealism and His Realism: Oxford University Press Uk. Berman, Scott (2013) 'A Platonic Theory of Truthmaking'. Metaphysica, 14/1, 109-125. Boehm, Omri (2014) Kant's Critique of Spinoza: Oup Usa. Chignell, Andrew (2012) 'Kant, Real Possibility, and the Threat of Spinoza'. Mind, 121/483, 635675. Fisher, Mark, and Watkins, Eric (1998) 'Kant on the Material Ground of Possibility: From "The Only Possible Argument" to the "Critique of Pure Reason"'. Review of Metaphysics, 52/2, 369 395. Franks, P.W. (2005) All Or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism: Harvard University Press. Grier, Michelle (2001) Kant's doctrine of transcendental illusion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 34 ---. 2010. 'The ideal of pure reason.' In The Cambridge Companion to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, edited by Paul Guyer. Cambridge University Press. Guyer, Paul. 2003. 'Kant's Principle of Reflecting Judgment.' In Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgment: Critical Essays (Critical Essays on the Classics), edited by Paul Guyer, 1-62. Lanham: Rowman \& Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Hoffer, Noam (2016) 'The Relation between God and the World in the Pre-Critical Kant: Was Kant a Spinozist?'. Kantian Review, 21/2, 185-210. --- (2019) 'Kant's Regulative Metaphysics of God and the Systematic Lawfulness of Nature'. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 57/2, 217-239. doi: 10.1111/sjp.12323. Insole, Christopher (2011) 'Intellectualism, relational properties and the divine mind in Kant's pre-critical philosophy'. Kantian Review, 16/3, 399-427. Kant, Immanuel (1998) Critique of Pure Reason. trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. --- (2001) Religion and Rational Theology. trans. A.W. Wood and G. di Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. --- (2003) Theoretical philosophy, 1755-1770. trans. David Walford and Ralf Meerbote. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. --- (2005) Notes and Fragments. trans. P. Guyer, C. Bowman and F. Rauscher. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kanterian, Edward (2017) Kant, God and Metaphysics: The Secret Thorn: Routledge. Logan, Ian (2007) 'Whatever happened to Kant's ontological argument?'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74/2, 346–363. Longuenesse, Beatrice (2005) Kant on the Human Standpoint. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rukgaber, Matthew (2014) 'Kant's Criticisms of Ontological and Onto-theological Arguments for the Existence of God'. Kant Yearbook, 6/1. Stang, Nicholas F. (2010) 'Kant's Possibility Proof'. History of Philosophy Quarterly, 27/3, 275299. --- (2016) Kant's Modal Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Verburgt, Jacco. 2011. 'How to Account for Reason's Interest in an Ultimate Prototype?' In Kant's Idealism: New Interpretations of a Controversial Doctrine, edited by Dennis Schulting and Jacco Verburgt, 237-254. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. Wood, Allen W. (1978) Kant's rational theology. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. Yong, Peter (2014) 'God, Totality and Possibility in Kant's Only Possible Argument'. Kantian Review, 19/1, 27-51.

International Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 51, No. 3, Issue 203 (September 2011) Craig on God and Morality Thomas W. Smythe and Michael Rectenwald ABSTRACT: In this paper we critically evaluate an argument put forward by William Lane Craig for the existence of God based on the assumption that if there were no God, there could be no objective morality. Contrary to Craig, we show that there are some necessary moral truths and objective moral reasoning that holds up whether there is a God or not. We go on to argue that religious faith, when taken alone and without reason or evidence, actually risks undermining morality and is an unreliable source of moral truths. We recommend a viewpoint on morality that is based on reason and public consensus, that is compatible with science, and that cuts across the range of religious and non-religious positions. THERE IS AN HISTORICAL DEBATE in philosophy that begins with Plato's Euthyphro on the relation between the omniscient authority of God and morality. We do not intend to rehash the vast literature on this topic.1 Instead we will concentrate on the arguments given by William Lane Craig, a well-known philosopher of religion whose influence on Christians is considerable. Craig has given a moral argument for the existence of God.2 If he is correct, then non-believers and non-theistic moral theories are inadequate. We regard Craig's view as invalid and in need of correction. We contend that the argument Craig gives is unsound. Let us first state the argument as Craig gives it: 1. If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist. 2. Objective moral values do exist. 3. Therefore, God exists. (p. 19) The argument is deductively valid because if (1) and (2) are true, then (3) must be true. However, the argument is unsound because, as we will show, (1) is clearly false. 1Some of the more salient work in this area includes Peter Byrne, The Moral Interpretation of Religion (Edinburgh UK: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1998), and his "Moral Arguments for the Existence of God," in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; Kai Nielsen, Ethics Without God (London UK: Pemberton Books, 1973), one of the first recent attempts to divorce morality from religion; P. H. Nowell-Smith, "Morality: Religious and Secular," in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. John Edwards (New York NY: Macmillan, 1967); Plato, The Euthyphro, in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (New York NY: Pantheon Books, 1961), pp. 169–85; and Philip Quinn, Divine Commands and Moral Requirements (Oxford UK: Clarendon Press, 1978) are among the vast literature. 2William Lane Craig and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, God? A Debate between A Christian and an Atheist (New York NY: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004), pp. 17–21, 67–69. In the introduction the debaters say that this is a popular debate and not professional philosophy, which would be more detailed and careful (pp. x–xi). However, Craig does not appear to have discussed this issue more professionally elsewhere, and since he influences the beliefs of a goodly number of people, we think it is worth pursuing the difficulties with his views. Hereafter, the page numbers in parentheses in the main text will be to this volume. 332 THOMAS W. SMYTHE AND MICHAEL RECTENWALD We will prove this by showing that (a) Craig has given no good reason for supposing that (1) is true, and that (b) there is excellent reason for supposing that (1) is false. We hold that there are objective moral values, in Craig's sense of that phrase, even if there is no God. We will then argue that it is desirable for pragmatic reasons to take the justification of morality out of the hands of religion entirely. First, we argue that (a) the author gives no good reason for believing that (1) is true. Let us look at the reasons that the author gives us for (1). The author must show that objective moral values are impossible without God. What is an objective moral value? Craig says that objective moral values are "values that are valid and binding whether anyone believes them or not" (p. 17). An example that the author gives is that the Holocaust was objectively wrong regardless of whether or not the Nazis, or anyone else, believed it was wrong. The author quotes non-theistic philosophers Bertrand Russell, Michael Ruse, and Friedrich Nietzsche, who all denied that there are any objective moral values. It should be mentioned here that there are plenty of non-theistic philosophers who have defended objective moral values.3 In addition, simply finding a few non-theists who disclaim objective moral values is not a good reason to think that they do not exist if there is no God. We raise some questions about Craig's conception of objective moral values. First, is a proposition binding independently of what anyone thinks sufficient for objectivity? We take Craig to be saying that it is sufficient. Secondly, if being valid and binding independently of what anyone thinks is necessary for objectivity in morality, then we believe this condition can be met by a non-theistic moral theory. But let us look at the arguments of the author. The author says that in the absence of God there is no reason to think that, if we evolved through a process of evolution only, that there could be objective values.4 The author says if one person were to rape another and if the rapist were an atheist, there would be nothing wrong with it. In short, if God does not exist, there is really nothing wrong with raping someone (18). We think that the author commits a form of the genetic fallacy here. His reasoning seems to be something like this: 1. Without God the morality of human beings simply evolved by natural processes. 2. Any moral code that evolves by natural processes cannot be objective. 3. Therefore, a non-theistic morality cannot be objective. Again, the argument is deductively valid but nevertheless unsound. It is unsound because premise (2) is false. Premise (2) is false because it assumes that if morality is something that is only conceived by human beings, then since human beings conceive it, it cannot be true independently of our beliefs. But a human origin for morality does not negate its truth as something independent of the beliefs of any 3Russ Shafer-Landau, Michael Smith, James Rachels, and others have argued for the objectivity of morality without theism. One example is James Rachels and Stuart Rachels, chap. 11, "Ethics and Objectivity," in Problems From Philosophy, 2nd ed. (New York NY: McGraw-Hill, 2005). 4We want to point out that these two alternatives are not exhaustive. Human beings could have been put here by a giant gorilla, a nonbenevolent deity, two or more Gods, or an endless list of other possibilities. CRAIG ON GOD AND MORALITY 333 person or group. We think that we can allude to universal moral truths that are true independently of what people think and that are true universally by virtue of the meaning of the terms involved: they are logically necessary moral truths. The explicit recognition of these truths evolved as mankind did, yet they are universally necessary moral truths that are being expressed in the ways in which our language is actually used. One example of a universal moral truth that is logically necessary and true independently of anyone's belief is the statement "murder is morally wrong." The term "murder" means "to kill unlawfully and with malice" or "the unlawful and malicious killing of a human being by another." It is universally and necessarily true that "murder is wrongful killing," whether anyone believes it or not and whether or not there is a God.5 The author has a further argument. Suppose "moral values do exist independently of God. . . . How does that result in a moral obligation for me? . . . Who or what lays such an obligation on me?" (p. 19). Our question here is why do moral values have to be given by someone, or laid on us, to have a foundation? Why cannot moral agents, or humans, give themselves moral obligations by virtue of the relations in which they stand to each other, and by virtue of the common moral language they use? Such moral obligations, once conceived, would be binding on all moral agents whether they believe so or not. The author argues that without God there would be no foundation or ground for morality (p. 20). Even if objective moral values existed, according to the author, there would be no grounds for our moral obligations. Our reply is that utilitarian ethics, Kantian ethics, ethics of virtue theories, and social contract theories of ethics have all provided grounds and foundations for morality that meet the conception of objective moral values that the author has specified. On any one of these moral theories reasons can be given to ground our moral theories. We do not need a deity to do the job.6 We now argue (b) that there are excellent reasons for supposing that (1) is false. Consider our moral language. Our moral language is enough to provide for an objective morality that is true independently of anyone's thinking so. Consider the following moral argument: 1. Lying tends to harm other people. 2. Harming other people is presumptively morally wrong. 3. Therefore, lying, when it results in harming other people, is presumptively morally wrong. This is a sound and valid deductive moral argument. The argument is sound independently of whether anyone believes it or not. If someone were to accept (1) and 5We do not think we have to show how these moral truths deriving from humans and encoded in human language became logically and objectively true. That would take a book. Craig does not have to show how humans developed a belief in God as the author of moral truths either. 6We believe we can make this point that possible nontheistic grounds can and have been given by ethical theorists without going into the details or trying to establish those theories. We assume the knowledgeable reader can fill in the details. 334 THOMAS W. SMYTHE AND MICHAEL RECTENWALD (2) but deny (3), one would simply be mistaken. Premises (1) and (2) logically imply (3) whether any moral agent makes an inference from premises (1) and (2) to the conclusion (3) or not. It is just as if one were to fail to make the inference from 3x = 3 to x = 1. Both would be logical errors. This consideration completely satisfies the author's conception that objective moral values are valid and binding whether anyone believes them or not. We need no appeal to abstractions or moral entities or divine commands. The objectivity of moral values lies in moral reasoning and moral logic. Does Craig think that God has moral authority because he knows moral truths? If so, why can't we know them as well? God may be better placed epistemically by being omniscient. That will still not show that moral truths do not exist independently of God. Craig may mean that God is the originator of moral requirements by divine fiat. This may be true, but it is not necessarily the case and the absence of divine fiat does not abrogate the possibility of an objective morality.7 Craig makes no good reply to the famous Euthyphro dilemma of Plato's. Is abusing children immoral because God forbids it, or does God prohibit us from abusing children because it is wrong? The author says nothing to show that abusing a child is not objectively wrong if God does not exist. His command-like His existence-is not necessary to make child abuse immoral. It is necessarily true that child abuse is immoral whether there is a God or not. The author does not show "how" God underwrites morality in any meaningful way. According to William Hasker (in correspondence), we have still not given a compelling reason for thinking that justice and other moral values could be objective if there were no God.8 Craig could very well say that "(2) Harming other people is presumptively morally wrong" is true only because there is a God, and would not be true otherwise. So, according to Hasker, we have not refuted Craig's position. We agree that we have not refuted Craig or shown that he is wrong to hold his position. Indeed, objective morality may exist due to divine fiat. However, we have shown that it is possible to hold an alternative position. Craig is claiming that objective morality is impossible without God, but by showing that it is possible to hold another position, we have shown that no one is compelled to hold Craig's position. We think we have a plausible alternative view to the author because he has not shown just exactly how God underwrites an objective morality, or why no alternative position can be true. The author may say that he is arguing that only an omniscient being who can take a view sub species aeternitatis can be morally objective, since there would be a correct answer to every moral question from such a point of view. However, the author never makes this clear. One problem with this view is that it does not help us to solve moral dilemmas. If that is the case, then there is no source of knowledge for human beings on certain moral quandaries such as the rights of workers, the effects of capitalism, stem-cell research, and cloning human beings. If the sole goal of moral agents is to find out what God wants us to do, there is no reliable 7We are indebted to Doug Long for the ideas in this paragraph. Long points out that even though God can punish us, that may or may not have anything to do with moral truths. 8William Hasker has kindly read our paper and made some comments on it. CRAIG ON GOD AND MORALITY 335 answer to that question. Consider the methods for finding out what God wills us to do. Religious faith is one such resource. But religious faith causes some people to behave abominably and to commit crimes against humanity in the name of God. Sacred texts, like the bible, provide another way. But nothing is true just because it is in the bible or in other sacred texts. When someone is telling other people how to live their lives, or what they ought to do, one needs reasons for acting on what any sacred text commands or forbids. If one can give no reasons, then there is not yet a good reason why anyone should or should not do it. This is especially true because there are diverse religions with diverse sacred texts that are not all compatible. We do not find the method of revelation to be a reliable indicator of what is right and wrong for human beings to do. We firmly believe that revelation never has been and never will be a reliable guide to understanding the reasons why something is morally right or wrong. Some people are not graced with such revelations, and thus revelation misses some of the very people who need instruction the most. Revelation may be a ground for a personal relationship with a deity, but it is not a reliable basis for telling other people how they ought to live their lives vis-à-vis other methods like evidence and reason. There is a more perspicuous way that we can bring out our argument. Consider child abuse. We think that it is a necessary truth that "it is wrong to abuse someone." It is objectively wrong in the same way that a truth of arithmetic is true, whether anyone believes it or not, independently of what anyone thinks. If someone thinks that "it is wrong to abuse someone" is not true by virtue of the meaning of the terms in the statement, then we would ask him to describe a logically possible situation in which it would be all right to abuse someone. We submit that it cannot be done. To abuse means "to use wrongly, to misuse; to mistreat." The statement "it is wrong to abuse someone" is necessarily true independently of anyone's belief whether there is a God or not. On the other hand, if somehow God willed that we should abuse a child, then God would be wrong. Even if there were no God, then it would still be objectively and necessarily true that it is wrong to abuse someone. Craig admits this point himself when he argues that objective moral values exist. He says: "We know objective moral values exist because we clearly apprehend some of them. The best way to show this is to describe situations in which we clearly see right and wrong: torturing an child, incest, rape . . ." (p. 21). We agree, and we see these truths to be the case independently of what anyone may think (thus they are objectively true) and whether or not there is a God. So, we may conclude that these truths exist independently of God's will and do nothing to show that God exists. Further, it is just not true that if there were no God, then ethical judgments would be a matter of "expressions of personal taste" (p. 20). There are objective ethical truths for both the believer and non-believer alike. The author's argument can be interpreted in another way. Premise (1) says that if God exists, there are objective moral values. That is true. If God exists, and he wills that stealing is wrong, then it is an objective truth that stealing is wrong because God says so, whether anyone believes it or not. The argument then goes on that since objective moral values exist, there is a God. However, that does not follow. Since there are other ways of accounting for the existence of objective moral values, their 336 THOMAS W. SMYTHE AND MICHAEL RECTENWALD existence does not entail the existence of a deity. The argument is invalid. It has the form if p, then q; q, therefore p. This pattern is clearly an example of affirming the consequent, which is a deductively invalid argument form. Nor is it a good inductive argument or an argument from the best explanation. We thus conclude that the values that the author cites are necessarily good or bad independently of anyone's thinking so, and good or bad whether or not there is a God. Craig has not shown premise (1), namely, that if there is no God, objective moral values do not exist, to be true. There are excellent reasons to think that it is not true. Hence, his moral argument for the existence of God is unsound or invalid. We now argue that for pragmatic reasons we should reject moral arguments from the existence of God as well as the position that morality is somehow dependent on religion, because to do so actually undermines morality. We begin by noting what William K. Frankena said in a paper on the logical relation between morality and religion: "one cannot help but wonder if there is any rational and objective method of establishing any religious belief against proponents of other religions or irreligion." He warned us against introducing "into the foundations of morality . . . all of the difficulties involved in the adjudication of religious controversies." Such a view "encourages ethical and political skepticism in those who cannot accept the required religious beliefs." He adds that "if one is honestly to hold that morality can be established if and only if it is grounded in religion, then one must also believe that religion has adequate grounds to stand on."9 We maintain that morality does not have to be grounded on religion, and, further that an effort at a religious grounding undermines morality. Frankena was much too kind and subtle. Religious faith is compatible with a lack of evidence and a lack of reason. So, if morality depends in the strong sense on religion, the foundation of morality will have to be religious faith. But blind faith of any sort (including religious) has not proven to be conducive to producing truth. If I have blind faith that someone who has gone off to fight in the war in Iraq will return unscathed, that is not a reliable indicator of the truth of such a belief. We think it is better to base morality on scientific knowledge and human reasoning as much as possible. To take an example from the contemporary scene, President George W. Bush, the leader of the free world in 2008, believes that frozen embryos are fully human beings and ought not to be used for stem cell research. His belief is based on the view that the embryo embodies a human genome at the time of fertilization, and this seems to be a scientifically established fact. But scientific knowledge shows that the human embryos that are destroyed for stem cell research do not have brains, or even neurons. There is no reason to believe that they suffer their destruction in any way at all. Even though they contain human genomes, it does not follow that they are fully-fledged human beings. Killing a fly may cause more suffering than killing a human blastocyst. As a result, we may be unnecessarily prolonging the misery of millions of human beings who could probably be helped by the development of stem cell research. We find this morally suspect. 9William K. Frankena, "Is Morality Logically Dependent on Religion?" in Divine Commandsand Morality, ed. Paul Helm (Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 30. CRAIG ON GOD AND MORALITY 337 Another example is that of a pope who apparently advocates that people in poor countries should not have abortions or use other methods of contraception. Instead he seems to recommend that they use one of the methods of natural family planning, but we believe that such methods may prove less effective than contraception, thereby allowing them to have numerous children, even though they are suffering from lack of food and housing, and contributing to population explosion. Again, we find this sort of position advocated by a world leader morally suspect. Another way that religious faith may undermine morality has to do with moral knowledge. How do we know what God requires of us? This is usually done by appealing to some sacred text such as the bible. Although we do not have the space here to go into the matter sufficiently, the bible was probably written by human beings, and nothing is true necessarily just because it is uttered in the bible. Instead, its propositions require independent moral reasoning if it is to be established as acceptable morality. It is quite controversial whether the entire bible is to be regarded as the inerrant word of God, and we will not enter into that thicket here. We point out that the bible documents such things as slavery, killing homosexuals and adulterers, killing prostitutes, killing children who curse their parents, burning witches, and dozens of other questionable precepts. Although the bible does not approve of everything it mentions, we think that there are morally suspect directives implied or explicitly mentioned therein, and we think it sufficient to point out that if morality can be established without such controversial foundations, it is worth doing so. We think it is relevant to point out here that classical utilitarians such as David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, and John S. Mill formulated the principle of utility without any mention of God's will. These theories are compatible with theism, but the non-believer can just as well adopt these theories too. Kantian deontological ethics is based on what is rational to do, and, although it is compatible with theism, it can be held without any dependence on a deity. The social contract theory of ethics does not depend on a deity for the social contract to be objective, once consent is given. The ethics of virtue, as formulated by Plato and Aristotle, does not depend on a deity. There is a certain kind of person that we ought to be for humans to thrive, independent of any deity. This remains true for more recent ethics of virtue theories.10 Religious ethics may also undermine morality by its tendency to be authoritarian. Religious authorities such as priests or preachers may be presumed to have been authorized to tell others what God wants them to do or to avoid. But we find the whole idea of such authorities problematic insofar as they obstruct our access to moral truths, and we find this to be a further way in which religion risks undermining morality. We do not think appeals to such moral authorities are preferable. As we have suggested, in some cases they may implicitly or explicitly maintain morally suspect positions. Instead, morality ought to be like science, in which a community of scholars searches for truth using reliable epistemic norms. We feel that morality should change as the facts, situations, and findings of science change. Such a view 10We take it that the typical reader of this paper knows these ethical theories well enough so that we do not have to go into the details to show that each of them is compatible with nontheism. 338 THOMAS W. SMYTHE AND MICHAEL RECTENWALD is incompatible with most religious means for gaining knowledge about reality and morality, such as revelation and scriptural authority. When reasonable persons morally disagree, we do not want to accept without further qualification that one of them speaks for God, or that the other is attacking God, being blasphemous, or committing a heresy. Moral disagreement should be reasonable and open to public debate, with participants arriving at consensus based on reasonable considerations, without reversion to religious authority that may stifle such debate and consensus. We conclude that an objective morality is possible without God. We find this liberating, uplifting, and beneficial to everyone concerned. We can direct our own lives by basing morality on evidence and reason rather than satisfying divine directives. If we see no compelling reason to do otherwise, we are happy non-diviners. In addition, we find it necessary for pragmatic reasons not to ground morality on religion since religious based morality may prove in some cases to be inimical to human welfare. Religious faith may inhibit the development of competent moral agents. We agree with those philosophers who advocate having a common morality for all of mankind based on evidence, reason, and justified belief independently of any particular religion.11 We need a philosophically justified common morality that cuts across religious differences and irreligion. 11Nothing we have said rules out adopting religious faith as a source of comfort, meaning, and purpose in life for believers. We are only against using such faith as a basis for telling everyone else how they ought to live their lives without appeal to evidence, reason, and justified belief. We do realize that many theists are reasonable moral agents. We just do not think it is because they are theists. We are concerned with the ones who are not morally reasonable because they are theists. We think the philosophy of William Lane Craig promotes intolerance towards other people because they are not theists.

Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 1095–1096Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Consciousness and Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate /concogReply The threshold of wakefulness, the experience of control, and theory development q Timothy Lane a, Chien-Ming Yang a,b,* a The Research Center for Mind, Brain, and Learning, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan b Department of Psychology, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan a r t i c l e i n f oKeywords: Sleep onset Control Subjective experience Perception of sleep1053-8100/$ see front matter  2010 Elsevier Inc doi:10.1016/j.concog.2010.05.015 q Reply to Commentary by Wackermann on Yang perception of falling asleep during sleep onset perio * Corresponding author. Address: Department of E-mail address: [email protected] (C.-M. Yana b s t r a c t  2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.We are very grateful to Professor Wackermann for his constructive and insightful comments. We take it that one among his main concerns is the possibility of variation that might go undetected due to our choice of methodology. For example, when inquiring as to the logicality or coherence of thoughts, we seem to be presupposing a shared internal norm that can be accurately reflected, despite multiple, mediating steps of memory and evaluation. Professor Wackermann's concern is by no means an idle one. But (1) we believe that queries of the sort employed here are necessary if we are to begin making progress in eliciting the structure of conscious experience. Were we to limit ourselves to questions that concern just raw, sensory experience, we would risk arbitrarily ignoring significant aspects of the subjects' phenomenology. Further, (2) our statistical analysis is indeed intended to balance out individual differences. Although this strategy does risk obscuring important variation, it can still be helpful in identifying significant, albeit not universal, indicators. Finally, (3) while it is possible that the transition from wakefulness to sleep follows different paths, the issue is an empirical one. Just as it would be unwise to arbitrarily ignore individual variation, so too would it be unwise to arbitrarily inflate individual variation. We realize that Professor Wackermann's concerns though are not mere methodological quibbles as regards how best to address a single psychological phenomenon. As Wackermann (2006) lucidly expresses elsewhere, he seeks to develop a strategy for discovering universal laws that is compatible with the study of entities that exhibit great variation, human beings. Indeed, we are in sympathy with his view that more attention should be given to what he terms the ''idiomatic" regularities. On this view, research should proceed in a two-step fashion: first, one should attend to intra-individual regularities and render these in logical or mathematical form. Only after this step has been completed should one seek inter-individual comparisons. As regards the research that actuated Professor Wackermann's critique, we are not able to present results in such a way that they would satisfy strict standards for ''distributed nomothesis." But, motivated by this strategy, we have re-evaluated the data, attending more carefully to individual variation. In so doing we found that, for most subjects, ratings on more than one item were associated with the perception of falling asleep. Moreover, for ten of the twenty subjects, ''control over think-. All rights reserved. , C.-M., Han, H.Y., Yang, M.H., Su, W.C., & Lane, T. (2010). What subjective experiences determine the d? Consciousness and Cognition 19, 1084–1092. Psychology, National Chengchi University, 64, Sec. 2, Chih-Nan Rd., Taipei 116, Taiwan. g). 1096 T. Lane, C.-M. Yang / Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 1095–1096ing process" was associated with the perception of falling asleep; for eight subjects, ''control over perception"; and, for seven, ''thinking experience," ''logic of thinking process," and ''orientation." This reanalysis suggests that the experience of control might be a key factor in the subjective experience of sleep onset. Not only is it cited explicitly with reference to thought process and perception, it seems to be implied by those who indicate that their thoughts were not logical. Speculating, perhaps further investigations of the relevant cognitive processes would reveal that one among the significant idiomatic regularities related to this transitional state involves diminution of the sense of control. Presumably the relevant meaning of control here does not concern the obsessive or intrusive thoughts that are commonly associated with insomnia-after all, the reported experiences are regarded by the subjects as indications of sleep onset. It would seem to be far more likely that the relevant sense of control bears greater similarity to the thought insertions experienced by schizophrenics, what Frith (1992) refers to as ''passivity experiences." Frith's account might also help to explain the association with ''control over perception," as his model emphasizes our capacity to distinguish between changes in our perception of the external world that result from our own actions and changes that result from alterations in the external environment itself. In schizophrenics this ability is impaired, an impairment that Frith attributes to a failure to monitor intentions. Inability to monitor intentions might well be experienced as an inability to control perception. Naturally we do not intend to suggest that sleep onset and schizophrenia are one and the same. Clearly the two differ in many respects. But exploration of the nature and degree of difference might well lead to significant insights. Such exploratory work would, we believe, be consistent with Wackermann's (2006) view that science should be dedicated to the search for a ''beautiful linking of facts." He believes that too much experimental work is nothing more than ''a game played by its own rules on an isolated playground." He advocates regarding experimental work as ''materialized reasoning": that is, experiments should be motivated by careful theory development that is relatively independent of particular databases. One goal of such development should be a ''beautiful linking of facts," where previously there had only been a disconnected jumble. As a very preliminary step in the direction of finding pattern amid jumble, recent research into control of action and goal maintenance suggests a separate, but arguably relevant domain. For example, Suhler and Churchland (2009) have proposed a neurobiological model of control that is applicable both to quotidian states wherein control is exercised (e.g. getting out of a warm bed on a cold morning) and to prototypical cases wherein persons feel ''out of control" (e.g. addiction). They propose a model of multiple parameters that includes neurochemicals, connectivity among brain structures, and so forth. The intent is to identify an ''in control" region within multi-dimensional space, a space that reflects the likelihood that there are many different ways of being in, or out, of control. Were we to further develop such a model, because the prefrontal cortex is implicated in self-monitoring and in goaldirected thought and because it is relatively inactive during NREM sleep (Muzur, Pace-Schott, & Hobson, 2002), we would likely include it as one among several parameters that needs to be highlighted. Nevertheless, we are keenly aware that our brief discussion here merely gestures in the direction of one possible line of inquiry. But an especially attractive feature of such theorizing is that it allows for the possibility of mathematical modeling in a way that can accommodate ''idiomatic" regularities: that is, it can account for different ways of being in and out of control. Of course whether or not thinking along the lines adumbrated here will yield fruitful results, we cannot say. But we are grateful for Professor Wackermann's gentle encouragement to search for the idiomatic and to take seriously the role of theorizing. References Frith, C. (1992). The cognitive neurobiology of schizophrenia. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Muzur, A., Pace-Schott, E. F., & Hobson, J. A. (2002). The prefrontal cortex in sleep. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6, 475–481. Suhler, C., & Churchland, P. S. (2009). Control: Conscious and otherwise. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13, 341–347. Wackermann, J. (2006). Rationality, universality, and individuality in a functional conception of theory. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 62, 411–426. Yang, C.-M., Han, H. Y., Yang, M. H., Su, W. C., & Lane, T. (2010). What subjective experiences determine the perception of falling asleep during sleep onset period? Consciousness and Cognition, 19, 1084–1092.

Miljana Milojević Vanja Subotić1 EKSPLORATIVNI STATUS (POST)KONEKCIONISTIČKIH MODELA2 apstrakt: Cilj ovog rada je da pruži novo viđenje uloge konekcionističkih modela u istraživanju ljudske kognicije kroz konceptualizaciju istorije konekcionizma – od najjednostavnijih perceptrona do savremenih dubokih konvolucionih neuronskih mreža, kao i kritika poteklih iz domena rivalske simboličke kognitivne nauke. Naime, konekcionistički pristup u kognitivnoj nauci bio je meta oštrih kritika simbolista koje su u više navrata uzrokovale njegovu marginalizaciju i skoro potpuno napuštanje njegovih pretpostavki u izučavanju kognicije. Kritike su uglavnom ukazivale na njegovu eksplanatornu neadekvatnost kao teorije kognicije ili na njegovu biološku neplauzibilnost kao teorije implemetacije, a od konkretnih nedostataka nekih konekcionističkih modela napredovalo se do zaključaka o nedostacima konekcionizma uopšte. U ovom radu želimo da pokažemo da obe vrste kritike počivaju na pretpostavci da su jedina prava objašnjenja u kognitivnoj nauci instance homunkularnog funkcionalizma i da uklanjajući ovu pretpostavku i usvajajući alternativnu metodologiju – eksplorativno mehanicističku strategiju, možemo da uklonimo i većinu prigovora konekcionizmu kao irelevantne, da objasnimo napredak konekcionističkih modela uprkos njihovim nedostacima i da skiciramo putanju njihovog budućeg razvoja. Usvajanjem mehanicizma i kritikom funkcionalizma odbacićemo prigovore eksplanatorne neadekvatnosti, karakterisanjem konekcionističkih modela kao skica generičkih mehanizama odbacićemo prigovore biološke neplauzibilnosti, dok ćemo pripisivanjem eksplorativnog karaktera takvim modelima pokazati manjkavost prakse generalizovanja od trenutnih ka opštim neuspesima konekcionizma. ključne reči: duboko učenje, eksploracija, konekcionizam, mehanicistička objašnjenja, tradicionalna simbolička kognitivna nauka. 1 Imena autora su navedena prema abecednom redu, a ne prema doprinosu. 2 Ovaj rad je nastao u okviru projekta „Dinamički sistemi u prirodi i društvu: filozofski i empirijski aspekti", evidencioni broj 179041, koji finansira Ministarstvo prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog razvoja Republike Srbije. THEORIA 2 (2020) : 63 : str. 135-164 https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2002135M Originalni naučni rad Original Scientific Paper 136 Eksplorativni status (post)konekcionističkih modela Uvod Veštačke neuronske mreže danas imaju izuzetno široku primenu, jer poseduju sposobnost učenja i modelovanja nelinearnih procesa – što ih čini izuzetno korisnim oruđem za rešavanje najrazličitijih zadataka poput prepoznavanja obrazaca, klasifikacije, klasterovanja, kompjuterske vizije i mnogih drugih. U tom smislu, njihova uloga kao veoma potentnih računskih sistema, bez kojih ne bismo mogli da zamislimo pametne telefone ili autonomne automobile, opšte je priznata i ne može se dovesti u pitanje. Ipak, iako su nastale prema ugledu na funkcionisanje neurona i njihovih sklopova u okviru mozga, status neuronskih mreža u oblasti kognitivne nauke, te pitanje njihove eksplanatorne moći povodom ljudske kognicije, ostaje predmet rasprave do danas. Naime, pojava konekcionizma u kognitivnoj nauci najčešće je konceptualizovana kao pojava alternative tradicionalnom kompjutaciono-reprezentacionom pristupu kogniciji. Prema takvom stanovištu, konekcionistički modeli treba da postuliranjem odgovarajućeg tipa mrežnih mehanizama i kognitivne arhitekture objasne sve one fenomene na čije su objašnjenje pretendovali i tradicionalni modeli – poput korišćenja i razumevanja jezika, kategorizacije, zaključivanja, itd. – ali na biološki plauzibilniji način i na finijem nivou opisa koji je ujedno i eksplanatorno bogatiji. Međutim, istorija razvoja konekcionističkih modela prikazuje upravo niz osporavanja obe ove ideje – ideje da konekcionizam potencijalno može pružiti objašnjenje svih kognitivno i psihološki relevantnih fenomena, kao i ideje da se njime pruža biološki plauzibilno shvatanje kognitivnih mehanizama. Zapravo, istorija razvoja konekcionizma može se uprošćeno prikazati sledećom skicom etapa: (1) predlaganje neke konkretne konekcionističke arhitekture i konkretnih modela; (2) ukazivanje na činjenicu da takva konkretna konekcionistička arhitektura ne može da pruži objašnjenje za kognitivni fenomen Φ, odnosno da struktura postuliranih mehanizama ne objašnjava ili čak onemogućava proizvođenje fenomena Φ; (3a) pokušaj konekcionista da argumentuju zašto konekcionizam ne mora da objasni fenomen Φ, pri čemu se obično pribegavalo odlasku na niži nivo opisa ili tvrđenjima da konekcionizam pruža objašnjenje implementacionih struktura, a ne samih kognitivnih fenomena, ili (3b) izmena strukturnih obeležja neuronskih mreža tako da Φ sada može da se objasni. Na ovakve odgovore konekcionista najčešće je potom odgovarano da: (4a) konekcionizam ne pruža dobra objašnjenja implementacije, jer mehanizmi koje postulira nisu biološki plauzibilni, ili (4b) postoji novi fenomen tipa Φ' koji ni novi modeli ne mogu da objasne. 137Miljana Milojević i Vanja Subotić Takvo apsolutističko shvatanje uloge konekcionizma u kognitivnoj nauci – da on mora pružiti ili dobru podlogu za objašnjenje svih kognitivnih, odnosno psiholoških, fenomena ili biološki plauzibilne mehanizme koji su odgovorni za pojavu takvih fenomena – dovelo je i do nekoliko čuvenih „zima" u razvoju neuronskih mreža, kao i do neodređenog statusa konekcionizma u okvirima kognitivne nauke. U ovom radu želimo da prikažemo jedan drugačiji pogled na ulogu konekcionističkih, odnosno postkonekcionističkih, modela koji pred njih ne stavlja ovako jake zahteve. Tvrdićemo da se takvim modelima može dodeliti eksplorativni status. Model ima eksplorativni status onda kad se koristi u svrhe istraživanja postavki određene teorije, tako što se model modifikuje, parametrizuje ili precizira preispitivanjem toga da li postavke mogu biti drugačije, ili kako će se teorija promeniti kada se neke od postavki skroz izostave (Fisher 2006). Ukoliko konekcionističke i postkonekcionističke modele posmatramo na ovaj način, većinu prigovora koji su im do sada upućeni možemo tretirati kao nekonkluzivne. Dodeljivanje eksplorativnog statusa ovim modelima ostavlja dovoljno prostora za njihov budući progres u pogledu kompjutacione moći, koji svaka nova generacija kritičara iznova proglašava u principu nemogućim dajući prigovore tipa (2), odnosno (4b). Eksplorativno shvaćeni modeli, kako će biti pokazano, nas približavaju kako-jenešto-moguće (eng. how-possibly) objašnjenjima u pogledu kognitivnih mehanizama i fenomena, a uz inkorporiranje neurobioloških detalja može se govoriti i o približavanju kako-je-nešto-plauzibilno (eng. how-plausibly) objašnjenjima, pa se na taj način mogu razoružati i prigovori tipa (4a). Drugim rečima, mi želimo da konekcionizam i postkonekcionizam tretiramo kao jedan moćan program koji ima potencijal da pruži kognitivno i neuralno plauzibilna objašnjenja, iako su se dosadašnje verzije suočavala sa eksplanatornim teškoćama u oba ova pogleda. Što bude intenzivnija saradnja između kognitivnih i neuronaučnika sa istraživačima na polju veštačke inteligencije, moći ćemo pre da se približimo kako-je-nešto-aktualno objašnjenima (eng. how-actually) (o napredovanju od kako-je-što-moguće do kako-je-nešto-aktualno objašnjenja v. Craver 2007: 114). Prvi deo rada biće posvećen kratkom istorijatu nastanka koncepta neuronskih mreža, u drugom ćemo se baviti prvim sukobom standardnih i konekcionističkih modela, u trećem ćemo posvetiti pažnju trenutnom sukobu tradicionalista i postkonekcionista, dok ćemo u četvrtom dati naš predlog koji nastale sukobe, kao i argumente i protivargumente sa obe strane, ne vidi kao „sve ili ništa" stvar, već kao uvid u istoriju živog i progresivnog programa čije plodove tek možemo da očekujemo. 138 Eksplorativni status (post)konekcionističkih modela 1. Sukob pre sukoba – neuronske mreže i problem izračunljivosti Napredak ka današnjim neuronskim mrežama počinje sa matematičkim modelom neuronske aktivnosti Mekaloha i Pitsa (McCullogh, Pitts) objavljenom u radu „A Logical Calculus of Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity" (1943). Inspirisani neurofiziološkim nalazima Santjaga Ramona i Kahala i Ser Čarlsa Skota Šeringtona (Santiago Ramon y Cahal, Sir Charles Scott Sherrington) prema kojima biološki neuroni primaju stimuluse na svojim dendritima, a nakon procesiranja signala i postignutog aktivacionog praga transmituju izlazni signal preko aksona, Mekaloh i Pits konstruišu model prema kojem neuroni sa binarnim pragom aktivacije mogu da implementiraju funkcije koje odgovaraju onima logike prvog reda. Dalje, oni konstruišu matematičku metodu za dizajniranje neuronskih mreža, koje bi reprezentovale odgovarajuće inferencijalne relacije između iskaza, odnosno pružaju model prema kojem su određene kompjutacije matematički ekvivalentne odgovarajućim logičkim operacijama (Piccinini 2004: 203). Posebno interesantna posledica njihove tehnike bio je kompjutacioni dizajn Bulovih funkcija, a koji je Fon Nojman (1945) inkorporirao u svoju arhitekturu digitalnog računara. Tako, neuron može da reprezentuje Bulovu „i" funkciju za stimulus koji ima dve promenljive, x i y, ili dve input jedinice, a čije vrednosti mogu da budu 1 i 0, tako što će se prag aktivacije baždariti na 2. Ukoliko prag nije postignut autput signal će biti 0, a ukoliko je postignut autput će biti 1. Za sve moguće vrednosti promenljivih x i y: (0,0), (0,1), (1,0) i (1,1), vrednosti autputa z će redom biti 0, 0, 0, 1, što reprezentuje funkciju „i". Funkcija „ili" mogla je da se izračunava postavljanjem praga na 1, a funkcija „ne" postavljanjem samo jedne input jedinice. Prvo unapređenje modela neuronske aktivnosti i prve neuronske mreže sposobne da uče pojavljuju se krajem pedesetih godina prošlog veka u radu psihologa Frenka Rozenblata (Frank Rosenblatt), koji spaja ideju Mekaloha i Pitsa sa uvidima Dejvida Heba (David Hebb 1949). Naime, Heb je primetio da ukoliko jedna neuralna ćelija često ekscitira drugu dolazi do pojačanja veze između njih i efikasnosti buduće ekscitacije čime se ujedno objašnjava i sposobnost učenja i pamćenja. Rozenblat je matematički formulisao Hebov neurofiziološki postulat, prema kom se proces učenja bazira na simultanoj aktivaciji između jedinica (odnosno, neurona), koja zauzvrat ojačava sinaptičke veze između tih jedinica (odnosno, neurona), i primenio ga kao algoritam za obučavanje dvoslojnih neuronskih mreža, tzv. perceptrona (Rosenblatt 1958: 386).3 3 Među savremenim autorima postoji neslaganje u pogledu toga koliko slojeva Rozenblatovi perceptroni imaju: Bengio et al. (2015) tvrde da je u pitanju jednoslojna neuronska mreža, Buckner & Garson (2018) tvrde da je dvoslojna. Međutim, interesantno je da Rozenblat opisuje i troslojne, četvoroslojne ili pak višeslojne perceptrone (Rosenblatt 1962: chs. 5, 15 & 16), ali su Minski i Papert, u svojoj knjizi iz 1969. godine, doprineli zabludi formalnim dokazom o ograničenosti učenja dvoslojne proaktivne mreže, u kojoj se signal direktno prenosi od jedinica inputa do jedinica autputa, pa se danas za osnovnu karakteristiku perceptrona uzima odsustvo dodatnih skrivenih slojeva između input i autput sloja. 139Miljana Milojević i Vanja Subotić Dok Hebov postulat konstituiše nenadgledano učenje, perceptron po imenu Mark I je mogao da se obučava i putem nadgledanog učenja, to jest preko metoda pokušaja i pogreške, tako što se sračuna razlika između željenog autputa i aktualnog autputa (u slučaju da mreža na početku ne daje očekivane rezultate), pa se potom „manuelno" podesi stepen aktivacije jedinica, odnosno snaga inputa, i to se ponavlja sve dok mreža za određeni input ne počne da pruža odgovarajući autput (Rosenblatt 1958: 395). Na ovaj način perceptronima je podarena fleksibilnost i mogućnost učenja, koju neuronske mreže Mekaloha i Pitsa nisu posedovale. Minski (Marvin Minsky) i Rozenblat su debatovali godinama o vrednosti perceptrona, svaki zauzimajući ekstremnu poziciju: dok je Minski tvrdio da perceptroni ne mogu da urade ništa i da je Rozenblatov rad bez naučne vrednosti (Minsky & Papert 1969: 4), Rozenblat je bio ubeđen da perceptroni mogu da se obuče da urade bilo šta, jer nisu morali da se programiraju pomoću eksplicitnih pravila koja bismo morali prethodno da otkrijemo, već su rešavali probleme zahvaljujući obrascima aktivacije do kojih se dolazilo treniranjem koje je operisalo samo nad zadatim inputima i željenim autputima. U koautorskoj knjizi sa Papertom, Minski je ponudio formalni dokaz da dvoslojni perceptron, koji ima samo sloj inputa i autputa, pa posledično i dvoslojne neuronske mreže Mekaloha i Pitsa, ne mogu da procesiraju funkciju ekskluzivne disjunkcije ili XOR. Dokaz je upućivao na činjenicu da dvoslojni perceptron može da računa samo linearne funkcije, to jest funkcije čije različite vrednosti mogu biti razdvojene pravom linijom, a XOR nije linearna funkcija, budući da nema prave koja bi prostor inputa podelila na odgovarajući način. Slika 1.1.4 4 Grafički prikaz je preuzet sa internet adrese https://mc.ai/solving-xor-with-a-single-perceptron/. 140 Eksplorativni status (post)konekcionističkih modela Čuvena „I/ili teorema" (eng. The And/Or Theorem), Minskog i Paperta, tumačena je potom tako da će i kompleksnije mreže nailaziti na slična ograničenja iako su Minski i Papert svoje rezultate ograničili na jednostavni dvoslojni perceptron. Njihova knjiga je bila do te mere uticajna da je došlo do marginalizacije istraživanja neuronskih mreža usled poteškoća sa dobijanjem finansija od naučnih fondova Sjedinjenih Američkih Država (Olazaran 1996). Međutim, perceptron-neizračunljivost XOR ne važi za višeslojne neuronske mreže, čega su Minski i Papert bili svesni iako to nisu potencirali. Već sa umetanjem jednog skrivenog sloja jedinica između inputa i autputa, čije bi jedinice ili neuroni bili konektovani sa oba spoljašnja sloja, moguće je postaviti težine jedinica na takav način da se prostor inputa transformiše u linearno deljiv. Ipak, treba takođe imati na umu da u to vreme nije postojao efikasan način za obučavanje mreža sa skrivenim slojevima – što je bio dodatni razlog za značajno slabljenje ovog programa. Teškoće u pogledu učenja višeslojnih neuronskih mreža rešene su tek sa primenom algoritma propagiranja greške unazad (eng. backpropagation of error) na neuronske mreže Rumelharta, Hintona i Vilijamsa (1986). Stoga, nakon Rozenblatove prerane smrti 1971. godine, nastupio je period neprimećenog tehničkog rada na neuronskim mrežama, a u kognitivnoj nauci, koja se aktivno razvija tek od sredine sedamdesetih godina prošlog veka, preovladali su modeli u kojima se kompjutaciono procesiranje vrši sekvencijalno nad simboličkim repezentacijama nalik onome digitalnih računara. Ovo je bio sasvim razumljiv tok razvoja, budući da je Tjuring (Turing 1936) dao model idealne mašine koja može računati sve funkcije koje danas nazivamo Tjuring-izračunljivim, a Fon Nojman (von Neumann 1945/1993) i arhitekturu digitalnog računara, koji takve funkcije može efektivno računati. Ideja da um funkcioniše tako što vrši logičke operacije, napokon je mogla da se objasni bez pozivanja na nekog unutrašnjeg mislioca, pa je um postao biološki realizovan digitalni računar. 2. Tradicionalna kognitivna nauka i konekcionizam 2.1. Poreklo sukoba Prvi pravi sukob između dva pristupa u kognitivnoj nauci nastaje tek sa jasno formulisanim programom konekcionizma i rešenjima problema sa kojima su se Rozenblatovi perceptroni suočavali. Naime, u narednoj deceniji, to jest osamdesetih godina prošlog veka, Makleland (McClelland) i Rumelhart (Rumelhart), u saradnji sa lingvistima, psiholozima i istraživačima veštačke inteligencije okupljenim u istraživačku grupu „PDP" (paralelno distribuirano procesiranje) objavljuju takozvanu „PDP Bibliju" – dva toma u kojima se detaljno opisuju svojstva modela višeslojnih neuronskih mreža i njihove primene u istraživanju različitih zadataka i kognitivnih procesa koji leže u osnovi obavljanja tih zadataka. Nedugo potom, Mekleland i Rumelhart 141Miljana Milojević i Vanja Subotić takođe objavljuju i udžbenik koji se prodavao uz dva flopi diska na kojima je bio softver sa primerima većine modela opisanih u „PDP Bibliji", čime je konekcionistički istraživački poduhvat postao dostupan svakom studentu, ekspertu ili laiku (Berkeley 2019: 194). Glavna prednost konekcionizma, smatralo se, bila je biološka plauzibilnost modela, bazirana na prirodi neuronske aktivnosti, uz empiristički pristup poreklu kognitivnih procesa, koji je počivao na učenju kroz treniranje mreža. Kako bismo jasno sagledali razlike između dva tada ponuđena programa – tradicionalnog i konekcionističkog, poslužićemo se sledećim uvidima Rodžersa (Rogers) i Meklelanda. Naime, oni u svom preglednom tekstu iz 2014. godine definišu kognitivnu nauku kao naučnu disciplinu kojom se traže odgovori na sledeća tri međusobno povezana pitanja: (i) koji procesi učestvuju u konstituisanju kompleksnog ponašanja inteligentnih sistema, kao što su ljudi, (ii) kakve reprezentacije su produkt pomenutih procesa, i (iii) kakva je osnova procesa i reprezentacija – urođena ili se formira zahvaljujući učenju? Odgovor na svako od tri pomenuta pitanja teorijski obavezuje kognitivnog naučnika na određene metodološke i ontološke pretpostavke – od toga za kakav tip modela će se odlučiti, kako će podesiti parametre, koji podaci će biti inkorporirani u model, pa do toga da li nam objašnjenja, koja dobijamo zahvaljujući modelima, govore nešto i o prirodi ljudskih kognitivnih procesa. Teorijski okvir za proučavanje ljudske kognicije, karakterističan za rane dane kognitivne nauke sedamdesetih godina prošlog veka, kao što je već pomenuto, podrazumevao je analogiju između digitalnog računara i mozga. Ova analogija nesumnjivo je bila utemeljena u uspesima Tjuringa i Fon Nojmana, a neuspesima ranih modela neuronskih mreža kao računskih sistema, a koji su se ticali izračunljivosti. Klasični kompjutacionizam ili tradicionalna simbolička kognitivna nauka se može, stoga, definisati kroz tri odgovora na Rodžersova i Meklelandova pitanja: (Ti) kognitivni procesi su nalik programima digitalnog računara, to jest liče na uređene liste eksplicitnih ili implicitnih pravila, koja su domenospecifična i sekvencijalna; (Tii) reprezentacije su simboličke, i odlikuje ih kombinatorijalna sintaksa i semantika; (Tiii) ovako shvaćeni procesi i reprezentacije moraju biti urođeni, jer je broj mogućih lista pravila virtualno beskonačan, te je potrebno pretpostaviti nekakvo prvobitno ograničenje kako bi se specifikovala pravila. U ovom periodu, vladao je entuzijazam kako u zajednici istraživača veštačke inteligencije u pogledu prospekata pravljenja inteligentnih mašina, tako i u zajednici kognitivnih naučnika u pogledu spremnosti simboličke kognitivne nauke da eksplanatorno obuhvati i niže i više kognitivne procese. Krajem sedamdesetih izgledalo je kao da naučnici više utvrđuju status quo nego što prave kartu do tada neistraženog 142 Eksplorativni status (post)konekcionističkih modela nepoznatog područja (Buckner & Garson 2018: 78). Vreme je, prema tome, bilo sazrelo za formulisanje rivalskog pristupa klasičnom kompjutacionizmu, a koje je bilo omogućeno uvođenjem algoritma propagiranja greške unazad i novih potentnih višeslojnih modela neuronskih mreža. Konekcionizam kao teorija o procesiranju informacija kognitivnih sistema koja se služi modelima neuronskih mreža može se definisati preko sledeća tri odgovora na pitanja Rodžersa i Meklelanda: (Ki) kognitivni procesi su nalik programu analognog računara, jer je neuronska mreža usmerena ka tome da pronađe najviše asocirani autput sa arbitrarnim inputom. Skrivene jedinice u trećem sloju, učestvuju u stvaranju šablona, koji predstavlja „ponašanje" neuronske mreže; (Kii) reprezentacije su distribuirane i sastoje se od niza jedinica nižeg ili subsimboličkog nivoa, čiji potpuni formalni opis može samo da aproksimira viši ili simbolički nivo; (Kiii) ovako shvaćeni procesi i reprezentacije se konstituišu „obučavanjem" neuronske mreže putem primera iz korpusa, to jest zahvaljujući njenom „učenju" iz iskustva. Tenzija između konekcionističkih i simboličkih modela je najizraženija u pogledu odgovora na pitanje (iii), budući da ih metodološke odluke upućuju na to da zastupaju ontološki suprotne teze u pogledu prirode kognitivnih procesa. S jedne strane, simbolisti tvrde da su kognitivni procesi urođeni i domenospecifični, što znači da su mnoge naše sposobnosti plod adaptiranosti, ili urođene spremnosti, za obavljanje specifičnih zadataka s kojima ćemo se susresti tokom odraslog života (Cowie 1999: 30). S druge strane, konekcionisti smatraju da su ključne karakteristike kognicije domenogeneralnost, to jest konstantno učenje putem iskustva, koje je, recimo, u obliku induktivnog rasuđivanja (Cowie 1999: 29), dok se urođenost specifičnih modula zaduženih za različite zadatke nastoji izbeći kao pretpostavka. Ova tenzija će igrati ključnu ulogu u dugogodišnjoj kritici konekcionističkih modela od strane zastupnika tradicionalne simboličke kognitivne nauke. Kako bismo bolje sagledali goreopisanu prirodu sukoba između tradicionalista i konekcionista poslužićemo se jednim primerom u kojem se daju dva različita modela iste sposobnosti – sposobnosti izgradnje prošlog vremena u engleskom jeziku. Simbolički tradicionalni pristup pruža objašnjenje mehanizama zaslužnih za proizvodnju ovog kognitivnog fenomena, kao što Abrahamsen i Behtel (Abrahamsen & Bechtel 2006) primećuju, veoma blizu samih fenomena. Postuliraju se dva mehanizma, prvi koji izvršava operaciju „dodaj nastavak -ed" ako je glagol pravilan i drugi koji zahteva pronalaženje odgovarajućeg oblika u mentalnom leksikonu ukoliko je glagol nepravilan. Konekcionističko rešenje istog zadatka (Rumelhart et al. 1986, PDP poglavlje 18) pretpostavljalo je samo jedan mehanizam koji je operisao nad binarnim subsimboličkim inputom: svaka morfema iz korena glagola bila je kodirana na šest jedinica 143Miljana Milojević i Vanja Subotić inputa (kodirani su, recimo, zvučnost, da li je u pitanju samoglasnik ili suglasnik, itd.), a u skrivenom sloju ulazni signali su bili transformisani u vektor realnih brojeva, dok je sloj autputa nalikovao sloju inputa, to jest za svaku morfemu bilo je izdvojeno po 6 jedinica. Osim što je konekcionistički model nakon treniranja bio uspešan u izgradnji prošlog vremena pravilnih i nepravilnih glagola sa samo jednim mehanizmom, on je, budući da je ujedno dinamički model koji učeći predstavlja i evoluciju procesa dodatno reprezentovao i krivu učenja koja je izuzetno podsećala na onu koja se javlja kada deca uče prošlo vreme. Naime, i model i deca su u jednom trenutku, čak i nakon naučenih ispravnih oblika prošlog vremena, počinjali da preterano generalizuju dodavanje nastavka „-ed" na obe vrste korena glagola, drugim rečima i mašinsko učenje je ispoljavalo dečiji „razvojni profil oblika U", prvi put opisan u Berko (1958). Na osnovu ovakvih slučajeva, gde su oba programa imala pretenziju da objasne isti fenomen i da pruže mehanicistička objašnjenja, koja su zauzvrat postulirala sasvim različite mehanizme dubinski nespojivih karakteristika, možemo reći da je sukob između simboličkog i konekcionističkog pristupta bio stvaran, a ne samo prividan kao što su neki autori poput Brodbenta (Broadbent 1985) tvrdili ističući da je konekcionizam samo teorija implementacije, a ne i kognicije. 2.2. Kritika Fodora i Pilišina: bauk sistematičnosti Fodor i Pilišin (1988) su smatrali, slično Brodbentu, da konekcionizam ima ozbiljnijih problema ukoliko zaista ima pretenzije na kognitivna objašnjenja. Ovi autori su inaugurisali čuveni argument o sistematičnosti (kasnije rafiniran u Fodor & McLaughlin 1990): budući da neuronske mreže nemaju kombinatorijalnu sintaksu i semantiku, one ne objašnjavaju svojstvo sistematičnosti na odgovarajući način, štaviše one prema njima ne mogu čak ni da ispolje svojstvo sistematičnosti. Značaj ovog argumenta ogleda se u činjenici da je sistematičnost, prema njima, suštinska karakteristika ljudske kognicije. Čuveni primer sistematičnosti jezika i misli tiče se toga da ukoliko neko razume rečenicu Džon voli Meri, on mora biti u mogućnosti da razume i reprezentuje rečenicu Meri voli Džona. Sistematičnost, i s njom povezana produktivnost – mogućnost razumevanja i produkovanja virtualno beskonačnog skupa rečenica, nisu odlike koje misao može imati, već ih ona mora imati, i svaka teorija o kogniciji mora imati spremno objašnjenje zašto i kako one nastaju. Uprkos tome što je bilo više konekcionistički nastrojenih autora koji su se uhvatili u koštac sa izazovom sistematičnosti (Smolensky 1988, Chalmers 1990), tvrdeći da nije potrebno da neuronska mreža bude strukturirana da bi mogla da bude senzitivna na sistematičnost, zastupnici tradicionalne simboličke nauke su insistirali na razlici između reprezentacija koje su aktualno sistematične i reprezentacija koje predstavljaju sintaksičku strukturu, čime sistematičnost emergira iz ponašanja, ali nije svojstvo same mreže (McLaughlin 1993: 178). Drugim rečima, ukoliko neuronske mreže mogu 144 Eksplorativni status (post)konekcionističkih modela i ne moraju da simuliraju sistematičnost pozivanje na njih ne može objasniti ovu suštinsku odliku ljudske misli, što dovodi do zaključka da je konekcionizam eksplanatorno manjkav kada su kognitivni fenomeni u pitanju. Za razliku od konekcionizma, kompjutaciono-reprezentacioni modeli upareni sa idejama lingviste Noama Čomskog (Noam Chomsky) mogli su spremno da objasne sistematičnost i produktivnost jezika. Kognitivni procesi se odvijaju nad sintaksičkim svojstvima simboličkih reprezentacija uz pomoć pravila nalik onima „univerzalne gramatike", to jest internalizovane strukture hijerarhijski postavljenih kategorija koje su uređene putem urođenih pravila, koja omogućavaju da deca u vrlo kratkom roku i na osnovu nekvalitetnih podataka ovladaju maternjim jezikom (1965: 57-58). Ovde treba primetiti da čitav argument počiva na pretpostavci da je sistematičnost suštinska odlika misli čiji su glavni konstituenti simboličke reprezentacije, a ne samo jedna od karakteristika nekih misli. Mnogi autori su osporavali ovu pretpostavku tako što su ili u potpunosti negirali reprezentacionu strukturu misli (poput Churchland 1986, Churchland & Sejnowski 1990), ili tako što su argumentovali da je kod Fodora i Pilišina uloga sistematičnosti prenaglašena (npr. Dennett 1991). Takođe, mnoga empirijska istraživanja ukazuju na to da misao ni na fenomenalnom nivou često ne ispoljava logičku strukturu koja se postulira simboličkim pristupima: tako, na primer, Vejsonov (Wason 1966) zadatak selekcije otkriva slabe performanse u deduktivnom rasuđivanju ljudi u određenim kontekstima, a drugi autori ukazuju na slabu sposobnost ljudi da aktivno barataju sintaksičkim drvetima (Gordon, Hendrick & Johnson 2001; v. takođe Marcus 2014). Ipak, ukoliko se složimo da je sistematičnost, makar i ne bila suštinska odlika misli, zasigurno važan kognitivni fenomen, onda se čini da bi konekcionizam trebalo da pruži neko objašnjenje zašto i kako do nje dolazi – ako uopšte ima pretenzije na davanje kognitivnih objašnjenja. Tim putem pošli su Prins i Smolenski (Prince & Smolensky 1993/2004) ponudivši „Teoriju optimalnosti" koja kombinuje prednosti oba pristupa. Oni su, zapravo, zaslužni za ekspliciranje suštinskog pitanja: „Zašto bi statistički mehanizmi poput neuronskih mreža uopšte morali da imaju tako rigidne i uređene autpute u vidu jezika?" Nažalost, ipak nisu uspeli da daju konkluzivan odgovor na to pitanje. Iako je sasvim jasno da moraju postojati određena ograničenja na inputu ili samom procesiranju, ni do dan danas nije otkriveno kakve su ona prirode, pa samim tim nije ni pružen konkretan model koji bi bio sistematičan u jakom smislu. Poslednje utočište konekcioniste koji prihvata sistematičnost kao bitan kognitivni fenomen je da odustane od pružanja kognitivnih ili psiholoških objašnjenja koja bi bila na algoritamskom nivou Marove trosolojne analize5 i da pristane na tvrdnju da je njegova teorija samo teorija implementacije. Prema takvom stanovištu, simbolički 5 Mar (Marr 1982) izdvaja tri nivoa analize sistema koji procesiraju informacije – kompjutacioni, algoritamski i implementacioni nivo, dok ih Pilišin (1984) naziva semantičkim, sintaksičkim i fizičkim. Prema Pilinišovom mišljenju, samo su prva dva nivoa kogitivno relevantna. 145Miljana Milojević i Vanja Subotić pristup bi nam pružao objašnjenja kognitivnih fenomena kao izvesnih zakonitosti pružajući deduktivno-nomološka objašnjenja, a konekcionizam bi nam pružao mehanicistička objašnjenja na implementacionom nivou bez pretenzija na objašnjenje kognitivnih zakonitosti (vidi Abrahamsen & Bechtel 2006). Međutim, ovde dolazimo do novog problema, a to je problem biološke plauzibilnosti. Ukoliko konekcionizam treba da objasni kako su kognitivni procesi implementirani, od njega se onda očekuje da objasni ne samo kako izvesni procesi mogu biti implementirani generalno, već i kako su oni implementirani u slučaju ljudske kognicije. Na kraju krajeva, kao što smo videli na primeru dva modela izgradnje prošlog vremena, ono što se može staviti u prilog konekcionističkom modelu je njegova biološka plauzibilnost (jedinstveni mrežni mehanizam koji uči i razvija se na sličan način kao i dete) u odnosu na simbolički (dva mehanizma, prelistavanje mentalnog inventara, posebno memorijsko skladište, itd.). Ipak, pretenzije na biološku plauzibilnost suočile su se sa više problema. Jedan od njih predstavlja algoritam nadgledanog učenja putem propagiranja greške unazad, koji ne izgleda kao da je implementiran u mozgu (Buckner & Garson 2018: 80), a koji je, setimo se, uveden kako bi se predstavile vrednosti skrivenih jedinica i kako bi se omogućilo učenje mreža sa više slojeva.6 Takođe, osim propagiranja greške unazad veštačke neuronske mreže iz osamdesetih godina propagirale su signale skoro uvek unapred, što nije slučaj sa signalima neuronskih moždanih sklopova gde postoje višestruki rekurentni putevi signala (v. npr. Kravitz et al. 2013). Takođe, konekcionistički modeli nisu se suočili samo sa problemima biološke plauzibilnosti, već i sa problemima efikasnosti. Iako su se pokazali odličnim za modelovanje percepcije, viši kognitivni procesi su iziskivali kodiranje unapred da bi neuronska mreža uopšte mogla da produkuje smislene rezultate. Ključni nedostatak tadašnjih neuronskih mreža ležao je u „katastrofičnom zaboravljanju" – tendenciji da se zaborave prethodno formirane veze između jedinica kada je potrebno da se obavi novi zadatak, ili kada nastupi obučavanje na prethodno neobrađenom delu korpusa (Buckner & Garson 2018: 81). Za simuliranje kompleksnijih kognitivnih domena potrebno je, dakle, da mreža „pamti" prethodne informacije da bi mogla ponovo da ih iskoristi. Ponovni progres došao je sa pojavom rekurentnih neuronskih mreža, unutar kojih postoji poseban sloj skrivenih jedinica između ulaznih i izlaznih jedinica, koje kodiraju ulazne i izlazne podatke, i predstavljaju „skladište" informacija. Informacije iz ovog „skladišta" bi bile poslate ulaznim jedinicama na ponovnu obradu. Uz primenu rekurentnih neuronskih mreža, tokom devedesetih godina neki metodološki problemi konekcionizma su počeli da se rešavaju putem inkorporiranja teorija dinamičkih sistema kako bi se omogućilo procesiranje u realnom vremenu, što se najviše koristilo 6 Propagiranje signala greške unazad menja snagu konekcije između nodova na takav način da snaga aktivacije nekog noda zavisi i od aktivnosti onih nodova koji nisu u neposrednoj komunikaciji sa njim što nije slučaj sa neuronskim sinapsama. 146 Eksplorativni status (post)konekcionističkih modela za modelovanje čitanja. Ipak, veliki deo problema koji se ticao eksplanatornosti, bilo kognitivne, bilo implementacione, i dalje je ostao na snazi – Kako jedan mehanički sistem učenjem može doći do apstraktnih simboličkih struktura? Kakvu eksplanatornu vrednost imaju modeli koji inkorporiraju biološki neplauzibilne elemente? Kako objasniti sticanje jezika?, itd., koji su doveli do još jedne „zime" u razvoju konekcionizma 3. Postkonekcionistički modeli: nove mreže i stare kritike 3.1. Duboko učenje i postkonekcionistički modeli Inspirisan nalazima Hubela i Visela (Hubel & Wiesel 1968) koji su sugerisali da postoje dve vrste ćelija u vizualnom korteksu mačke i koji su pružili opis njihove organizacije i strukture receptivnih polja, Fukušima (Fukushima) 1980. godine dizajnira neokognitron, preteču modernih konvolucionih mreža – mreža koje u barem jednom svojem sloju koriste linearni operator konvolucije i koje predstavljaju višeslojne perceptrone, odnosno mreže čiji su slojevi potpuno povezani7. Međutim, ozbiljniji razvoj dubokih konvolucionih neuronskih mreža (DKNM)8 nije bio moguć bez nove tehnologije koja se pojavila tek dvehiljaditih godina, pre svega grafičke jedinice za procesiranje (ili skraćeno GPU), dizajnirane za zahtevne video igre, i „big data"9, koji će zajedno omogućiti procesiranje velikog broja parametara i postizanje velike dubine mreža koje danas imaju i do sto slojeva, za razliku od klasičnih konekcionističkih mreža koje su tipično imale tri do četiri sloja. 7 Svaka jedinica u sloju je povezana sa svakom drugom jedinicom sledećeg sloja, a funkcije aktivacije su nelinearne. Većina neuronskih mreža jeste potpuno povezana, mada to ne mora biti (za modelovanje parcijalno povezanih neuronskih mreža prema tipovima inputa v. npr. Kang & Isik 2005) 8 DKNM se razlikuju od ranijih konekcionističkih modela po konvolucijskim filterima i sistemom sjedinjavanja (eng. pooling). Konvolucijski filteri služe za uprošćavanje velikog broja parametara i izdvajanje pojedinih odlika ili, konkretno, za izoštravanje i zamućenje slika, i za razaznavanje ivica slika, ili dokumenata i rečenica u zavisnosti da li se DKNM koriste u domenu kompjuterske vizije ili za procesiranje prirodnog jezika (Gu et al. 2017). Primenom ovih filtera, u tzv. konvolucijskom sloju neuronske mreže, moguće je, dakle, izvući ciljane karakteristike slika ili objekata (LeCun et al. 2015: 438-439). Sistem sjedinjavanja potom redukuje dimenzije podataka tako što se pomoću njega kombinuju autputi grupe jedinica jednog sloja u novu jedinicu unutar narednog sloja (LeCun et al. 2015: 439). Ove neuronske mreže se obučavaju tako što se u ulazni sloj uvodi neka slika predstavljena preko svoje širine, visine i vrednosti piksela, i mreža pamti njene karakteristike. 9 Od posebnog značaja izdvaja se projekat ImageNet kojim je sakupljeno više od 14 miliona anotiranih slika za treniranje mreža; za poređenje, dosta korišćen skup podataka CIFAR-100 sadrži „samo" 60 hiljada anotiranih slika. 147Miljana Milojević i Vanja Subotić Takođe, dvehiljaditih je ostvaren veliki napredak i na polju rekurentnih neuronskih mreža – mreža koje zahvaljujući svojoj arhitekturi mogu da procesiraju sekvencijalne ili serijske inpute (inpute čiji članovi serije mogu imati uticaj na druge članove) promenljive veličine. S obzirom na ovu odliku, kao i jako ispoljavanje dinamičkog ponašanja, rekurentne mreže pokazale su se posebno potentnim za procesiranje govora, muzičkih i drugih vrsta sekvencijalnih inputa. Iako su prisutne od osamdesetih godina prošlog veka, devedesetih i dvehiljaditih se dizajniraju nove arhitekture, poput arhitekture dugog kratkoročnog pamćenja (otuda se skraćeno nazivaju LSTM) inspirisane biološkim modelom pamćenja prefrontalnog korteksa (Hochreiter & Schmidhuber 1997; Graves et al. 2009), čija efikasnost se uvećava zahvaljujući moćnijim jedinicama za procesiranje.10 Takvi tehnološki i arhitekturalni pomaci u dizajnu neuronskih mreža će posledično omogućiti i efikasno duboko učenje (eng. deep learning), statističku metodu za klasifikovanje šablona, koji nastaju kao rezultat obučavanja neuronske mreže na ogromnom broju podataka da sama pronađe intrinsičnu strukturu koja ih objedinjuje (videti LeCun et al. 2015: 436). Posebno zanimljiva osobina dubokog učenja je mogućnost da se ono vrši nenadgledano i na nestrukturiranim podacima (ranije se obučavanje mreža vršilo isključivo sa inputima koji su bili obrađeni u skladu sa preferiranim karakteristikama), koja je omogućila rešavanje novih zadataka u najrazličitijim oblastima. S obzirom na ovakav značajan razvoj u oblasti neuronskih mreža i mašinskog učenja sasvim je opravdano postaviti sledeća pitanja: Da li novi modeli pružaju bolja kognitivna objašnjenja? Takođe, da li su ovi modeli i biološki plauzibilniji? Da li napredak u njihovoj arhitekturi i mogućnostima izračunavanja može da se uporedi sa napretkom od jednostavnog perceptrona do mreža sa skrivenim slojevima koje su se obučavale putem algoritma propagiranja greške unazad, i koje su rešile probleme izračunljivosti nelinearnih funkcija? 3.2. Nova stara kritika s obzirom na neadekvatnost objašnjenja sistematičnosti Argument protiv sistematičnosti Fodora i Pilišina nastavio je da se koristi kao oruđe za napad, ali sada na postkonekcionističke pristupe koji sa klasičnim konekcionizmom dele glavne osobine arhitekture kao što su neposedovanje kombinatorijalne semantike i sintakse. Ovaj argument ponavlja se u debatama koje se tiču procesiranja jezika i govora (Marcus, Vijayan, Bandi Rao, and Vishton 1999; Peña et al. 2002), a autori poput Aizave (Aizawa 2003) iznova insistiraju da nije dovoljno da model ispolji sistematičnost kao emergirajuće svojstvo podešavanja parametara mreže, već da ona 10 Više o različitim vrstama neuronskih mreža v. Hassabis et al. (2017: 246-247, 254). Važno je napomenuti da je najčešća praksa kombinovanje DKNM i rekurentnih mreža ukoliko zadatak zahteva više od perceptivnih „sposobnosti" mreže, recimo, kada je potrebno da se generiše i opis slike koju mreža prethodno prepoznaje. 148 Eksplorativni status (post)konekcionističkih modela mora biti nomološki nužna posledica same arhitekture. Markus (2018b) takođe preslikava kritiku Fodora i Pilišina, ali tako da se sada primenjuje na duboko učenje, a ne oslanja se na univerzalnu gramatiku Čomskog kao njegovi prethodnici, već pak na minimalistički program Čomskog, koji predstavlja rafiniranu verziju njegovog stanovišta o urođenosti jezičke sposobnosti.11 Međutim, kao što smo već sugerisale ranije, ova vrsta argumenta zavisi kako od pretpostavke da je sistematičnost suštinska odlika mišljenja, tako i od pretpostavke da je jedina validna vrsta objašnjenja u kognitivnoj nauci objašnjenje putem funkcionalne analize kakvu opisuju Fodor i Kamins (Fodor 1968; Cummins 1983). Funkcionalna analiza zahteva funkcionalnu dekompoziciju kognitivnih sposobnosti i postuliranje jednostavnijih „ne sasvim kognitivnih" sposobnosti (Figdor 2018), ili „glupljih" homunkula, od kojih je kompleksnija sposobnost koja se objašnjava sastavljena, a koje se moraju razlikovati od onih samog sistema kako objašnjenja koja se na njih pozivaju ne bi bila cirkularna. Proces se ponavlja sve dok se ne dođe do nekognitivnih procesa i sposobnosti. Klasični simbolički pristup se tako u objašnjenju sistematičnosti pozivao na svojstva i sposobnosti delova njegove arhitekture koja je uključivala kompozicionalno struktuirane reprezentacije i kodirana pravila koja operišu nad strukturalnim svojstvima takvih reprezentacija, a smatralo se da konekcionizam nema resurse da pruži takvu vrstu objašnjenja. Međutim, značaj i relevantnost funkcionalne analize kao pravog modela za kognitivna objašnjenja sve više opada, jer se u oblasti kognitivne nauke javljaju alternativni pogledi na eksplanatornost. Metjuz (Matthews 1997) podrobno kritikuje napad simbolista na konekcionizam ukazujući (a) da je sama sistematičnost neplauzibilno predstavljena u simboličkoj kognitivnoj nauci; (b) da simbolička kognitivna nauka zapravo ne pruža objašnjenje sistematičnosti; i (c) da ne mora svako kognitivno objašnjenje da se poziva na „gluplje" homunkule, već može biti i na nivou implementacije čak i u okvirima koje zadaje funkcionalne analiza. Povodom (a) Metjuz navodi da prema tradicionalnoj, simboličkoj kognitivnoj nauci sledi da, ukoliko neko može da zamisli aRb, on onda mora biti sposoban da zamisli, odnosno reprezentuje, bRa. Međutim, „ja mogu misliti misao da je x jedini član singlton skupa {x}, ali sam sasvim siguran da ne mogu da mislim misao da je singlton skup {x} jedini član x-a" – tvrdi Metjuz (1997: 162). Kada je (b) u pitanju, Metjuz ističe da je i sam Meklahlin (McLaughlin 1993) bio svestan toga da 11 Naime, u periodu od 1995. godine do početka dvehiljaditih, Čomski počinje da zastupa minimalistički program, prema kom razlikujemo jezičku sposobnost u širem smislu, koja podrazumeva senzorno-motorni sistem i pojmovno-intencionalni sistem kao i jezičku sposobnost u užem smislu, koju predstavlja apstraktni kompjutacioni sistem uređen prema urođenom mehanizmu rekurzije (Hauser et al. 2002). Specifičnost ljudske jezičke sposobnosti u odnosu na ostale ne-ljudske životinje (naročito primate) jeste mogućnost generisanja beskonačnog skupa iskaza na osnovu konačnog skupa elemenata putem mehanizma rekurzije. Budući da je ovaj mehanizam urođen, i dalje omogućava definisanje sintaksičkih kategorija, koje se tako postavljaju u hijerarhijski sistem. 149Miljana Milojević i Vanja Subotić simbolisti poput njega samo obećavaju da će pružiti odgovarajuće objašnjenje sistematičnosti, ali da nam ostaju dužni u pogledu formulisanja i ekspliciranja kompozicionalne sintakse jezika misli, odgovarajuće psihosemantike, kompjutacionih modela intencionalnih modusa, itd. (1997: 160). I na kraju, povodom (c), on primećuje da i sam Kamins (1983) dopušta da neke kognitivne sposobnosti mogu biti objašnjene putem instancijacije (npr. izračunavanje funkcije „i", kao što smo videli, može da se objasni mehaničkim nekognitivnim procesom). Ipak, Kamins je bio ubeđenja da interesantnije kognitivne sposobnosti ne mogu biti tako objašnjene, jer bi nam bez umetanja homunkula one ostale misteriozne. Odbacujući argument misterioznosti, Metjuz tvrdi da konekcionizam može da pruži jednu vrstu objašnjenja putem instancijacije, ali bez specifikovanja konkretnog mehanizma, već indirektno i induktivno pružajući objašnjenje relevantne funkcije uz pomoć jednostavnog mehanizma čiju strukturu bi delio i neki kompleksniji mehanizam (1997: 174-176). Keri Fidžor (2018) ide dalje od Metjuza i argumentuje da je sasvim izlišan zahtev da se kognitivne sposobnosti objašnjavaju putem jednostavnijih sposobnosti, koje su u nekim pogledima različite od onih sa višeg personalnog nivoa, ali u drugim pak slične (one su „ne sasvim kognitivne", ali ipak kognitivne u nekom smislu), pa posledično neeksplanatorne. Prema Fidžor (2018) funkcionalna analiza ili homunkularni funkcionalizam je samo zaostatak iz prošlih vremena kada nismo imali neantropocentričku perspektivu na um. Njome su se nepotrebno postulirali sve gluplji homunkuli, kako bi se perspektiva prvog lica postepeno gubila i kako bi se „misterija" psihološkog sve duže odgađala, sve dok ne dođemo do procesa i mehanizama koji nemaju kognitivna i psihološka svojstva. Konačno, kada su kognitivna objašnjenja u pitanju Pićinini i Krejver (Piccinini & Craver 2011) pokazuju da su objašnjenja funkcionalne analize i mehanicistička objašnjenja zapravo objašnjenja iste vrste, gde funkcionalna analiza pruža samo nezadovoljavajuće skice mehanizama koje treba upotpuniti. Ukoliko su ovi autori u pravu, (post)konekcionisti nisu u obavezi da pruže objašnjenja koja se pozivaju na jednostavnije sposobnosti od kojih je kompleksna sposobnost sastavljena, već mogu pružiti i neku vrstu mehanicističkog objašnjenja, koje je bliže nivou implementacije. Međutim, ovo ponovo otvara stare probleme zaodenute u novo ruho. 3.3. Nova stara kritika implementacije Ukoliko postkonekcionistički modeli treba da nas približe mehanizmima koji proizvode kognitivne fenomene, onda se tvrdi da bi modeli trebalo da budu efikasni, to jest da verno simuliraju proizvodnju relevatnih fenomena, da budu biološki plauzibilni i strukturalno transparentni. Iako su i DKNM i rekurentne mreže poput LSTM, kao i njihove preteče – neuroni Mekaloha i Pitsa i Rozenblatov perceptron, modelirane po 150 Eksplorativni status (post)konekcionističkih modela uzoru na određene biološke karakteristike neuroanatomije12, prelaz od ranih konekcionističkih na postkonekcionističke modele može da se okarakteriše kao sve veće zanemarivanje biološke plauzibilnosti. Naime, kognitivna nauka i neuronauka su tokom dobrog dela druge polovine dvadesetog veka bile tesno povezane sa istraživanjem veštačke inteligencije, što se očitovalo u vođenju računa o fiziološkim i neuralnim ograničenjima uključenim u rane konekcionističke modele, ali je saradnja u dvadeset prvom veku značajno manjeg intenziteta (Hassabis et al. 2017: 245). Razlog za to je pre svega specijalizacija težišta istraživanja – inženjeri veštačke inteligencije se bave veštačkim ekspertskim sistemima koji treba da obave određeni zadatak, i usled toga i kompjutacione detalje podređuju programiranju optimalnog obavljanja zadatka umesto biološki i kognitivno realističnom obavljanju zadatka. S druge strane kognitivni naučnici su se našli u živom blatu rasprave o prednostima i manama simbolizma odnosno konekcionizma, i primena postkonekcionističkih modela je stoga više fokusirana na izvlačenje kognitivnih posledica iz, recimo, modela koji je pobedio ljudskog eksperta u korejskoj igri go (Schubbach 2019), nego na brigu u pogledu toga koliko je sam model biološki plauzibilan. Umanjenje biološke plauzibilnosti i kognitivne efikasnosti navelo je autore poput Gerija Markusa (2018a; 2018b) da se fokusiraju na trenutne neuspehe neuronskih mreža u modeliranju kognitivnih procesa. Markus (2018a) kritikuje neuronske mreže koje se služe dubokim učenjem tvrdeći da takve mreže ne mogu imati mehanizme za učenje apstrahovanja osim ako se unapred ne kodiraju eksplicitne verbalne definicije. Dalje, budući da su potrebni milioni primera za obučavanje, češći je slučaj da duboke mreže preterano generalizuju, nego što su u stanju da pariraju ljudskom kognitivnom procesiranju. Markus se, takođe, slaže sa psihologom Brendenom Lejkom (Brenden Lake) koji u preglednom radu sa Baronijem (Lake & Baroni 2018), uz obavezno citiranje Fodora i Pilišina, tvrdi kako neuronske mreže „i dalje nisu sistematične nakon toliko godina". Dalje se navodi da su postkonekcionistički modeli još uvek značajno pogođeni razlikama između rečenica korpusa na kome se obučavaju i rečenica korpusa na kome se testiraju prilikom obavljanja zadatka procesiranja prirodnog jezika. Za ljude bi takav zadatak bio trivijalan, ali neuronskim mrežama su potrebni preveliki skupovi rečenica i previše vremena da bi se na ograničenom skupu rečenica približile ljudskom procesiranju. Iako se u svojoj kritici Lejk fokusira na rekurentne neuronske mreže, Markus smatra da se ovakva argumentacija može podjednako odnositi na bilo koju vrstu neuronskih mreža kojima se pokušava simulirati bilo koji viši kognitivni proces. 12 Istraživanja u komparativnoj neuroanatomiji sugerišu jednako distribuiran skup vizuelnih šablona u korteksu mačke pri stimulaciji, umesto decenijskog razlikovanja jednostavnih i kompleksnijih ćelija koje stvaraju različite vizuelne šablone (Priebe et al. 2004). A, podsetimo se, biološka inspiracija za DKNM se sastojala u pokušaju da se napravi analogija između toga kako su ćelije u vizuelnom korteksu mačke osetljive na izdiferencirano vizuelno polje i kako su artificijelni neuroni raspoređeni u konvolucijskom polju osetljivi na određene oblasti slike. 151Miljana Milojević i Vanja Subotić Pored nemogućnosti da se na prirodan način nose sa hijerarhijskim strukturama poput jezika, sklonosti ka preteranoj generalizaciji i potrebi za ogromnim brojem primera pri obučavanju, kritičari iznova ističu i problem „crne kutije" kao i biološku neplauzibilnost postkonekcionističkih modela. Prema prigovoru „crne kutije" (post) konekcionistički modeli su opisani pomoću mapiranja inputa na odgovarajući autput. Šta se dešava između, kako se input transformiše, ostaje sasvim netransparentno – poput sadržaja crne kutije. Mozer i Smolenski su prihvatili ovu osobinu neuronskih mreža kao njihovu vrlinu jer je „ono što konekcionističke mreže imaju zajedničko sa mozgom to što kada ih otvoriš i proviriš unutra, sve što vidiš jeste samo gomila kaše" (Mozer & Smolensky 1989: 3). Ipak, jedan broj autora se uhvatio u koštac sa ovim problemom i ponudio veliki broj metoda za analizu neuronskih mreža, kao što su klaster analiza, analiza glavne komponente, analiza uvezivanja, itd. (za pregled v. Browne 1997, a za najnovije pokušaje v. Zednik 2019). S druge strane, kada je biološka neplauzibilnost u pitanju ponovo se ističu algoritmi učenja koji se oslanjaju na propagiranje greške unazad, a posebno neplauzibilna osobina DKNM koju kritičari vole da izdvoje jeste deljenje težina u konekcijama neurona (eng. weight sharing) (v. Bartunov et al. 2018). 3.4. Da li je sve tako crno u crnim kutijama neuronskih mreža? Ipak, nije sve tako crno kada su neuronske mreže u pitanju. Pored nekih neplauzibilnih strukturnih detalja, DKNM inkorporiraju i biološki plauzibilne mehanizme kao što je sama operacija konvolucije, a za koje se može ispostaviti da imaju značajne posledice za kognitivno procesiranje, kao što se, na primer, ispostavilo da mreže sa više slojeva mogu da računaju XOR funkciju za razliku od jednostavnog perceptrona. Takođe, oblast koja se bavi algoritmima za učenje neuronskih mreža donela je niz novih plauzibilnijih algoritama. Pa su tako neplauzibilnim algoritmima propagiranja greške unazad ponuđene alternative poput metode recirkulacije opisane još kod Hintona i Meklelanda (Hinton & McClelland 1988), metode inspirisane biološkim pojačanim učenjem koje se fokusiraju na očekivanje nagrade umesto na minimiziranje greške (Williams 1992), pa čak i metode koje modeliraju uticaj konkretnih neurotransmitera i neuromodulatora na parametre mreže (v. za pregled Buckner & Garson 2019: 84). S druge strane, kada su u pitanju kritike koje se tiču neefikasnosti postkonekcionističkih modela, odnosno njihove nemogućnosti da verno simuliraju određene kognitivne zadatke, jedan broj autora im suprotstavlja mnogo pozitivnije viđenje trenutnog stanja u oblasti neuronskih mreža. Posebno interesantan pregled, pogotovo s obzirom na problem sistematičnosti i tvrdnje Markusa i Lejka da neuronske mreže „i dalje nisu sistematične nakon toliko godina", pruža zbornik Kalva i Sajmonsa (Calvo & Symons) iz 2014. pod nazivom The Architecture of Cognition: Rethinking Fodor and Pylyshyn's Systematicity Challenge. U njemu možemo naći rad Stefana Franka (Stefan L. Frank) u kojem se poredi efikasnost rekurentne neuronske mreže sa probabilističkim frazno 152 Eksplorativni status (post)konekcionističkih modela struktuiranim gramatičkim modelom rečeničkog procesiranja i koji zaključuje da su njihove performase zapanjujuće slične kada se testiraju pod uslovima koji uzimaju u obzir različita ograničenja stvarnog sveta. Eksplanatorni potencijal uspeha RNN se, s druge strane, otkriva u dinamičkim bazenima atrakcije, pa se pokazuje na koji način se mogu kombinovati postkonekcionistički modeli sa teorijom dinamičkih sistema kako bi se objasnili viši kognitivni fenomeni. Ališa Koram (Alicia Coram) u zborniku nudi jedan drugačiji pogled, koji je sasvim kompatibilan sa unutrašnjom postkonekcionističkom arhitekturom, a koji nas upućuje van bioloških granica subjekta. U skladu sa proširenim pristupom kogniciji, Koram predlaže da poreklo sistematičnosti ne treba tražiti u urođenim moždanim strukturama, već u okolini, odnosno jeziku i drugim javnim reprezentacionim shemama shvaćenim kao artefaktima koji povratno utiču na kognitivne sposobnosti (za pregled v. Symons & Calvo 2014). Pored ovih pokušaja rešenja starih problema, koji ukazuju suprotno kritičarima da novi modeli mogu da simuliraju i na određeni način objasne fenomene poput sistematičnosti, ali da ih je potrebno posmatrati kao uronjene u stvarni svet, u recentnoj literaturi možemo naći i jedan primer objašnjenja moći apstrakcije pomoću strukturnih osobina DKNM. U pitanju je argument Kamerona Baknera (2018) da odgovarajuće aktivacione funkcije implementiraju jednu vrstu kognitivne apstrakcije čime na empiristički način možemo da objasnimo apstraktnu kategorizaciju baziranu na pojedinačnim percepcijama. On u svom tekstu iz 2018. iznosi dve teze: (i) da se korišćenjem DKNM može modelovati ključna karakteristika ljudske inteligencije: kategorijalno apstrahovanje, što bi predstavljalo korak ka pokazivanju koje karakteristike treba modelovati da bi se došlo do verne simulacije opšte inteligencije; (ii) da upotreba DKNM pruža potvrdu za staru empirističku ideju da informacije apstrahovane iz iskustva omogućavaju više kognitivne sposobnosti, poput zaključivanja, donošenja odluka, i sl. Bakner, zapravo, u liniji sa ostalim konekcionistima, izražava ista uverenja – da (post)konekcionistički modeli generalno mogu da obuhvate i niže i više kognitivne procese, kao i da (post)konekcionistički modeli generalno pružaju odbranu empirizma i ključnih pretpostavki da su učenje i domenogeneralne sposobnosti osnova za razumevanje ljudske kognicije. Dosadašnje modelovanje prepoznavanja objekata na osnovu percepcije, a koja potpadaju pod svakodnevne kategorije poput: „koala", „krevetac" ili „pelena", nailazilo je na problem perspektive, jer se u odnosu na perspektivu menjaju i svojstva percipiranja. Prema tome, kako bi se omogućilo ispravno kategorisanje potrebno je ujediniti različite perspektive radi prepoznavanja jednog predmeta. U terminima modelovanja DKNM ovo znači da je u zadacima vizuelnog prepoznavanja potrebno kontrolisati skup „ometajućih" promenljivih (eng. nuisance variables) – koje se tiču veličine, pozicije i ugaone rotacije objekata. Napokon, kategorijalno apstrahovanje koju obavljaju DKNM bi prema Bakneru moglo da se definiše na sledeći način, imajući u vidu postojanje „ometajućih" promenljivih (2018: 5348): jedan reprezentacioni 153Miljana Milojević i Vanja Subotić format je apstraktniji od drugog u odnosu na način obavljanja zadatka klasifikacije; specifičnije, ukoliko je jedan format tolerantniji na ometajuće varijacije – koje moraju da se prevaziđu radi uspešnog obavljanja zadatka – on je ujedno apstraktniji. Ova hipoteza nam daje objašnjenje teze (i). Međutim, kako bi se zasnovala teza (ii) potrebno je pokazati da je ovakav način apstrahovanja DKNM biološki plauzibilan, odnosno da se i ljudsko apstrahovanje vrši na analogan način. Predlog za zasnivanje teze (ii) Bakner razvija primećujući najpre da je način na koji ljudi klasifikuju više predmeta kao pripadajućih istoj kategoriji u vezi sa procesiranjem perceptualnih sličnosti, koje se događa u mozgu sisara. Za potrebe modelovanja ovog procesa, prostor perceptualnih sličnosti se razumeva kao višedimenzionalni vektorski prostor u kojoj svaka dimenzija predstavlja jedno od perceptualno razlučivih svojstava. „Otisak" (eng. manifold) je deo ovog vektorskog prostora koji se uzima za označavanje granica reprezentacije kategorije, a „ometajuće" promenljive utiču na ovaj deo prostora tako što onemogućavaju razlučivanje granice različitih apstraktnih kategorija. Svaki sisar tokom vizuelnog procesiranja uči da sprovede niz transformacija unutar prostora perceptualne sličnosti kako bi se smanjio uticaj „ometajućih" promenljivih, kao što uče i DKNM. Važna pretpostavka je da je ovaj proces subpersonalan i nedostupan introspekciji. Stoga, Lok, čije shvatanje apstrakcije Bakner smatra bliskim načinu operisanja DKNM u zadacima apstrahovanja, ne bi morao da se interpretira kao da govori o apstraktnoj ideji trougla u vidu mentalne slike nekonzistentnih svojstava dostupne introspekciji, već takva ideja može biti nešto subpersonalno kao što je transformisan „otisak" kategorije. Tako, Lokov trougao bi u isti mah uključivao međusobno nekonzistentna svojstva (odnosno „ometajuće" promenljive koje utiču na „otisak"), ali bi se putem apstrakcije transformisale idiosinkrazije pojedinačnih trouglova tako da bi se primerci iste kategorije trougla grupisali u isti „otisak" (Buckner 2018: 5349). 4. Eksplorativni (post)konekcionistički modeli: od biološke plauzibilnosti do biološke aktualnosti? Do sada smo nastojale da opišemo dugogodišnju kritiku konekcionizma kao neadekvatnog programa u oblasti kognitivne nauke i razloge za njegovo napuštanje u različitim vremenskim periodima. Ono što se kristalizuje u ovom pregledu jeste forma njegove kritike. Kritika konekcionizma ima dva aspekta: (a) glavni opšti aspekat, gde se tvrdi da za konekcionističke mreže simuliranje nekog kognitivnog procesa nije uopšte moguće, (b) uži aspekat, gde se tvrdi da za konekcionističke mreže nije moguće trenutno da obave zadatak. Ono što je zajedničko svim kritičarima (Minsky & Papert 1969, Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988, Marcus 2018a, 2018b, Lake & Baroni 2018, i dr.) jeste da oni polaze od (b), odnosno pokazuju da neki model nešto ne može da učini, a odatle 154 Eksplorativni status (post)konekcionističkih modela generalizuju tvrdnju (a) da konekcionistički modeli uopšte to nešto ne mogu da učine. Sasvim je jasno da se generalizacija od (b) do (a) može opravdati samo ako se ukaže na neku suštinsku odliku konekcionističke arhitekture koja onemogućava proizvodnju odgovarajućeg efekta. Međutim, kao što smo videli u slučaju Minskog generalizacija je bila sasvim neopravdana. Fenomen koji nije mogao da bude simuliran bilo je rešavanje nelinearnih funkcija poput ekskluzivne disjunkcije. Međutim, svojstvo jednostavnog perceptrona da rešenja funkcije deli isključivo na linearan način, nije ujedno i svojstvo mreža koje su sastavljene od takvih perceptrona. Na osnovu jednostavne mereološke greške konekcionizam je morao da sačeka osamdesete godine da se ponovo vrati na scenu. U slučaju kritika Fodora, Pilišina, Meklahlina i Markusa postoji posredno opravdanje generalizacije koje ide preko metodoloških pretpostavki. Naime, usvajanjem funkcionalne analize zahteva se postuliranje svojstava i sposobnosti, poput reprezentacionih struktura koje su kompozicionalne, a koje neuronske mreže naprosto ne mogu imati. Onda kada se naiđe na neku mrežu koja ne može da simulira neki kognitivni fenomen – argumentuje se „pa očekivano, one to i ne mogu činiti, jer nemaju kombinatorijalnu semantiku i sintaksu". Međutim, ovde su jake ontološke pretpostavke kompozicionalnosti, urođenosti i domenospecifičnosti viših kognitivnih procesa na osnovu kojih se opravdava generalizacija, bazirane na relativno slabim metodološkim pretpostavkama. Dok trenutnu limitiranost neuronskih mreža ovi autori pejorativno opisuju preko klasičnog asocijativizma u psihologiji (Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988: 64), a svaku inovaciju dočekuju kao nešto što smanjuje biološku plauzibilnost koja bi donela prednost konekcionizmu makar kao teoriji implementacije (Marcus 2018b), oni kao da ne primećuju da njihova sopstvena pozicija zavisi od relativno zastarelih metodoloških principa funkcionalne analize koja nastoji da izbegne „misterioznost" psihološkog i kognitivnog postuliranjem homukula čije osobine mogu imati samo simboličke arhitekture. Ukoliko se takva metodološka pretpostavka ukloni, tradicionalna kognitivna nauka gubi na svojoj eksplanatornosti, a njegove ontološke pretpostavke ostaju jednako opravdane kao i konekcionističke, ako ne i manje s obzirom na biološku neplauzibilnost simboličke arhitekture. Inspirisane radovima Metjuza, Fidžor, Pićininija, Krejvera, Stinson, Fišera i dr., koji ukazuju na drugačiju metodologiju kognitivne nauke želimo da ukažemo na neuspešnost i irelevanciju dosadašnje kritike konekcionizma usvajajući eksplorativnu mehanicističku metodologiju koja modele vidi kao nepotpune skice mehanizama. Takođe, usvajajući takvu metodologiju moguće je objasniti napredak (post)konekcionističkih modela u simuliranju različitih kognitivnih fenomena koji bi ostao sasvim misteriozan ukoliko bismo zadržali metodološke pretpostavke funkcionalne analize. 155Miljana Milojević i Vanja Subotić 4.1. Kako izgleda proces eksploracije u postkonekcionističkim modelima? Važno je odmah napomenuti da konekcionistički modeli mogu da opisuju kognitivne procese na bilo kom nivou detalja, iako predstavljaju idealizovane modele fiziologije mozga. Naime, ovi modeli rekreiraju fiziološke detalje aktualnih kognitivnih procesa tako da se preispita da li kvalitativna razlika u određenim detaljima doprinosi ili odmaže funkcionisanju procesa (Stinson 2018: 127). Međutim, konekcionistički modeli nisu realistične simulacije mozga, niti je potrebno da budu takvi kako bi bili eksplanatorno vredni (Buckner 2018: 5367). Zaključke koje donosimo na osnovu takvih modela nisu ništa manje pouzdani nego što bi to bili zaključci koje usvajamo iz eksperimentalnih naučnih disciplina (v. Stinson forthcoming). Ukoliko (post)konekcionističke modele shvatimo na takav način, odnosno da se njima ne obavezujemo na jaku biološku plauzibilnost i detaljna mehanicistička objašnjenja, a uz odbacivanje pretpostavke funkcionalne analize i njenih ontoloških posledica na kognitivnu arhitekturu, te prihvatanja onoga što je Kamins (1983) nazvao „misterioznošću" psihološkog, (post)konekcionističkim modelima možemo dodeliti eksplorativni status. Stinson, slično Metjuzu (1997) predlaže da svrha implementacije neuronskih mreža nije dedukovanje preciznih aktivnosti moždanih struktura ili opisivanje konkretnih mehanizama, već u istraživanju i otkrivanju generičkih mehanizama koji vode funkcionisanje mozga (2008: 121). Generički mehanizam, prema Stinsonovoj (2018: 129), nastaje kada se otkrije regularnost između dva specifično ustrojena skupa činjenica, i operiše u okviru određenog raspona vrednosti parametara.13 Proces eksploracije bi tekao na sledeći način: matematičkim formulisanjem i empirijskim posmatranjem postavila bi se hipoteza da generički mehanizam M1 ima tendenciju da pod uslovima U1, U2, U3...Un produkuje određeni tip ponašanja P1. Sledeći korak je da otkrijemo, na osnovu prethodnog znanja o odnosu M1 i P1, odnos moždanih struktura prema određenom kognitivnom procesu (Stinson 2018: 130). Pogledajmo na primeru postkonekcionističkih modela koji implementiraju DKNM kako izgleda proces eksploracije. Zanimljivo je da su aktualne DKNM konstruisane tako da oponašaju vizuelni korteks mačke: putem matematičke formulacije i primene konvolucionih filtera i sistema sjedinjavanja, i empirijskog ispitivanja procesa opažanja sisara, preciznije mačaka, postavlja se hipoteza da generički mehanizam M1 (raspoređivanje neurona, odnosno jedinica, u konvolucijskom polju tako da se povežu sa neuronima, odnosno jedinicama, u drugim slojevima) ima tendenciju da pod uslovima U1, U2, U3...Un (kada se, recimo, ćelije učine senzitivnim na receptivna polja, odnosno kada jedinice prime signal iz sloja inputa tokom obučavanja) produkuje ponašanje P1 13 Stinsonova je inspirisana shvatanjem generičkih mehanizama Džona Stjuarta Mila (John Stuart Mill). Milu je ovaj termin bio potreban da ispita odnos uzroka i posledice: prvo je potrebno razložiti događaj na činjenice do one mere do koje nam je to potrebno, da bismo onda posmatrali koje činjenice slede iz kojih, to jest koje su uzroci a koje posledice u odnosu na okolnosti koje se eksperimentalno variraju (Mill 1843: ch. 7). 156 Eksplorativni status (post)konekcionističkih modela (diferenciranje vizuelnog polja tako da se prepozna specifičan objekat, odnosno detektovanje „otiska"). Na osnovu ovog eksplorativnog procesa u kome učestvuju DKNM možemo reći nešto o odnosu vizuelnog korteksa prema procesu opažanja, ili uz dodatne detalje, o procesu apstrahovanja, kako je Bakner pokazao svojom interpretacijom transformacione apstrakcije koju obavljaju DKNM. Odbacivanjem funkcionalne analize kao jedine eksplanatorno vredne strategije u kognitivnoj nauci i usvajanjem eksplorativne strategije odnos između simbolicizma i konekcionizma se značajno menja, a većina kritika upućenih konkecionizmu na osnovu jakih ontoloških pretpostavki koje su sledile iz funkcionalne metodologije pada u vodu. Ukoliko se postkonekcionistički modeli koji sadrže duboke neuronske mreže shvate kao eksploratorni umesto teorijski, moguće je da se „igramo" komponentama neuronske mreže i vrstama podataka kojim će se obučavati tako da istražimo kako se u svakoj od – milovski rečeno – varirajućih okolnosti ponaša. Na ovaj način bi se mogle testirati i nativistička i empiristička početna pretpostavka, tako što bi postale deo generičkog mehanizma, umesto da se unapred pretpostavljaju, a validacijom i interpretacijom P1 se može ispitati korisnost svake od pretpostavki za potrebe modelovanja procesa ili obavljanja određenog zadatka. Dalje, pripisujući eksplorativnu ulogu konekcionističkim modelima može se objasniti njihov dosadašnji napredak, a otvara se i prostor za njihov dalji razvoj. To što u svakom periodu, od Rozenblatovih perceptrona, preko pojave rekurentnih mreža devedesetih godina, pa do DKNM dvehiljaditih, dolazi do novih karakteristika i metodoloških prednosti ovih modela svedoči o tome da ne treba suditi o njihovim nedostacima u principu, već o njihovim trenutnim nedostacima, to jest da je inferencijalni skok sa trenutnih nedostataka na nedostatke u principu neopravdan. Kao što smo videli generalizacije u kritici konekcionizma poticale su ili iz nerazlikovanja kontingentih postavki koje se mogu menjati (recimo, broj slojeva, vrsta algoritma za učenje) od nužnih postavki bez kojih model ne bi mogao biti okarakterisan kao konekcionistički (recimo, relevantne strukturne sličnosti sa centralnim nervnim sistemom) ili su bile bazirane na ontološkim pretpostavkama o urođenosti i domenospecifičnosti, koje su zauzvrat branjene na osnovu metodoloških pretpostavki funkcionalne analize. 4.2. Pluralizam mehanicističkih objašnjenja Metodologija koju branimo, a kojom treba da se udahne novi život (post)konekcionističkim modelima je eksplorativno mehanicistička. Stoga, kratko ćemo razmotriti da li se mehanicistička objašnjenja uopšte uklapaju u interpretaciju konekcionističkog teorijskog okvira. Behtel (William Bechtel) i Ričardson (Robert Richardson) (2000) navode sledeća svojstva mehanicističkih objašnjenja: (i) ova objašnjenja se odnose na ponašanje sistema referiranjem na funkcije koje obavljaju delovi sistema, kao i na interakcije između tih delova; (ii) heuristika za razvijanje ovih objašnjenja se sastoji u dekompoziciji sistema na delove i aktivnosti delova, što zauzvrat zahteva uvide iz 157Miljana Milojević i Vanja Subotić više naučnih disciplina. Može se videti da je svojstvo (i) u vezi sa tim kako se generalno interpretira ponašanje neuronske mreže – preko funkcije i interakcija jedinica u mnogostrukim slojevima. Svojstvo (ii) podseća dosta na obrazlaganje Stinsonove kako konekcionističke modele treba shvatiti kao da imaju eksplorativni status kojim se otkriva generički mehanizam. Sledeći interpretaciju mehanizama uvedenih u (Machamer, Darden & Craver 2000: 3), a to je da postoji epistemički prelaz između nepotpune skice preko apstraktne sheme, pa do potpuno karakterizovanog mehanizma, možemo objasniti metodološki napredak konekcionističkih modela i predložiti dopunsko razmatranje njihovog eksplorativnog statusa. Naime, ako se konekcionistički modeli shvate kao skice, ili apstrakcije za koje se ne mogu u potpunosti eksplicirati entiteti i aktivnosti kojih se mehanizam tiče, i sadrže epistemičke „rupe" u pogledu hijerarhijskog odnosa između entiteta (Machamer, Darden & Craver 2000: 18), moguće je ostaviti prostora da se takve skice postepeno popunjavaju detaljima kognitivne i neuronauke (o odnosu između objašnjenja pomoću modela i mehanicističkih objašnjanja v. npr. Barberis 2013). Vremenom, konekcionistički modeli mogu napredovati do shema i potpuno karakterizovanih mehanizama, čime bi i objašnjenja koja pružaju bila bolje zasnovana. Ukoliko dalje napravimo razliku između kako-je-nešto-moguće, kako-je-nešto-plauzibilno, i kako-je-nešto-aktualno mehanicističkih objašnjenja (Craver 2007), možemo primetiti da konekcionistički modeli pružaju bar prve dve vrste objašnjenja. Ako se modelima dodeli eksplorativni status, konekcionista može ostati samo na nivou „igranja" komponentama modela, odnosno fokusiran na eksplorativnu ulogu per se, bez pretenzija na biološku plauzibilnost. U tom slučaju, konekcionistički modeli nam mogu pružiti kako-je-to-moguće objašnjenja, koja ne moraju biti u vezi sa detaljisanjem radi što vernije simulacije. Međutim, u nekim slučajevima, konekcionista može imati potrebu za inkorporiranjem bioloških ograničenja i stalo mu je do biološke plauzibilnosti, te samim tim eksplorativni modeli bi pružali kako-je-to-plauzibilno objašnjenje. Može se reći da je to slučaj sa modelima koji implementiraju DKNM – ovi modeli jesu biološki inspirisani vizuelnim korteksom mačke, efikasno simuliraju prepoznavanje slika do te mere da nekada prevazilaze i ljude u određenim zadacima. Međutim, budući da nam nije u potpunosti poznato zašto su DKNM uspešne, nije realno očekivati da mogu da pruže kako-je-nešto-aktualno objašnjenje. Može se argumentovati da kognitivnim i neuronaučnicima nije ni potrebno da konekcionistički modeli pružaju kako-je-nešto-aktualno objašnjenja, budući da reprodukovanje i simuliranje nije isto što i objašnjavanje fenomena. Modeli treba da odraze strukturne aspekte sistema koji su relevantni za produkovanje fenomena koji treba objasniti. To dalje znači da je potrebno naći dovoljno precizan nivo apstrakcije na kom će biti moguće odraziti upravo samo relevantne strukturne aspekte, a reprodukcija se može ostaviti istraživačima na polju veštačke inteligencije, ukoliko imaju pretenzije na potpuno reprodukovanje ljudske inteligencije. 158 Eksplorativni status (post)konekcionističkih modela Zaključak U ovom radu smo predstavile istorijat kritike konekcionizma, predložile jednu moguću konceptualizuju te kritike, kao i jedan način kako ona može da se odbaci i prevaziđe. Naime, iako se takva kritika najčešće predstavlja kao ontološka, ili kao sukob između nativističkih i empirističkih pristupa kogniciji, za nju se ispostavlja da počiva na određenim metodološkim pretpostavkama koje današnja filozofija dovodi u pitanje. Početna kritika Minskog i Paperta, može se reći, predkonekcionističkih modela, to jest perceptrona, zasnivala se na nedozvoljenom skoku od ukazivanja na nedostatke jednostavnih perceptrona na generalizovanje jednake neadekvatnosti kompleksnijih neuronskih mreža koje su od njih sastavljene. Kasnija kritika simbolista je sofisticiranija, ali primenjena u istom obliku i na konekcionističke i postkonekcionističke modele. Ona ukazuje na eksplanatorne nedostatke konekcionizma, to jest pokazuje da konekcionisti ne mogu da objasne suštinske kognitivne fenomene (poput sistematičnosti jezika) na zadovoljavajući način, i primorava konekcioniste koji prihvataju pretpostavku važnosti takvih fenomena da pribegnu stanovištu da konekcionizam pruža samo nekognitivnu teoriju implementacije simboličke arhitekture. Potom se ukazuje na nedostatke konekcionizma i kao teorije implementacije isticanjem biološki neplauzibilnih karakteristika različitih modela neuronskih mreža. Kako bi se teza simbolista ojačala navode se primeri neuspešnosti konkretnih modela u simuliranju relevantnih kognitivnih fenomena, koji se tumače kao da pokazuju da nijedan mehanizam, čija arhitektura ne inkorporira simboličke ontološke pretpostavke (postojanje kompozicionalno strukturiranih reprezentacija i urođenih sintaktičkih pravila) ne može uspešno da proizvede relevantne fenomene. U radu smo nastojale da pokažemo da takva neuspešnost konekcionizma sledi samo pod pretpostavkama tradicionalne metodologije kognitivne psihologije koja insistira na funkcionalnoj analizi. Zahtevajući najpre da kognitivne sposobnosti budu objašnjene jednostavnijim sposobnostima od kojih je eksplanandum sačinjen, konekcionista je na kraju bio primoran da prizna da on takvo objašnjenje ipak ne može da pruži, jer se u njegovim objašnjenjima ne pojavljuju „ne sasvim kognitivni" homunkuli, već samo mehaničke operacije koje se vode matematičkim pravilnostima. Simbolisti su, nasuprot tome, na osnovu ove metodološke pretpostavke došli do ontoloških tvrdnji putem kojih su nastojali da dokažu da svaki empiristički pokušaj kognitivnih objašnjenja mora propasti. Napokon, iskrivljavanje pozicije konekcionizma u kognitivnoj nauci kao implementacione teorije i njegova nemogućnost da pruži sasvim efikasne mehanizme koji proizvode kognitivne fenomene doveli su do potpune marginalizacije ovog programa. Odbacivanjem funkcionalne analize kao jedine ispravne metodologije u ispitivanju kognitivnog i psihološkog pokazale smo kako kritika konekcionizma postaje neopravdana i neuspešna. Usvajanjem eksplorativne strategije koja prihvata 159Miljana Milojević i Vanja Subotić mehanicistička kognitivna objašnjenja i viđenjem konekcionističkih modela kao nepotpunih skica mehanicističkih objašnjenja želele smo da razoružamo kritiku simbolista u sledećim pogledima: (1) simbolista više ne može tvrditi da konekcionista ne može pružiti kognitivna objašnjenja, jer se dopuštaju objašnjenja koja nisu plod funkcionalne analize; (2) simbolista više ne može insistirati na svojim nativističkim ontološkim pretpostavkama kao zasnovanim na neprikosnovenoj metodologiji, već ih mora opravdati na neki drugi način; (3) simbolista više ne može kritikovati konekcionizam na osnovu biološke neplauzibilnosti, jer novousvojena strategija insistira samo na generičkim, ali ne i na konkretnim mehanizmima; (4) simbolista više ne može samo ukazati na neadekvatnost nekog konkretnog (post)konekcionističkog modela kako bi kritikovao (post)konekcionizam uopšte, jer je status takvih modela eksplorativan i podložan izmeni relevantnih parametara. 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The Architecture of Cognition: Rethinking Fodor and Pylyshyn's Systematicity Challenge. The MIT Press, 3-31. Turing, A. M. (1936). On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem. Proceedings of London Mathematical Society 42 (2): 230-265. Corrections in (1937) Proceedings of London Mathematical Society 43 (2): 544-546. Von Neumann, J. (1945/1993). First Draft of a Report on the EDVAC. IEEE Annals of the History of Computing 15 (4): 27-75. Wason, P. C. (1966). Reasoning. In B. M. Foss (Ed.), New Horizons in Psychology, vol. 1. Harmondsworth, UK Penguin, 135-151. Williams, R. J. (1992). Simple Statistical Gradient-following Algorithms for Connectionist Reinforcement Learning. Machine Learning 8: 229-256. Zednik, C. (2019). Solving the Black Box Problem: A General-Purpose Recipe for Explainable Artificial Intelligence. Preprint arXiv:1903.04361v2 Miljana Milojević Vanja Subotić The Exploratory Status of Postconnectionist Models (Summary) This paper aims to offer a new view of the role of connectionist models in the study of human cognition through the conceptualization of the history of connectionism – from the simplest perceptrons to convolutional neural nets based on deep learning techniques, as well as through the interpretation of criticism coming from symbolic cognitive science. Namely, the connectionist approach in cognitive science was the target of sharp criticism from the symbolists, which on several occasions caused its marginalization and almost complete abandonment of its assumptions in the study of cognition. Criticisms have mostly pointed to its explanatory inadequacy as a theory of cognition or to its biological implausibility as a theory of implementation, and critics often focused on specific shortcomings of some connectionist models and argued that they apply on connectionism in general. In this paper we want to show that both types of critique are based on the assumption that the only valid explanations in cognitive science are instances of homuncular functionalism and that by removing this assumption and by adopting an alternative methodology – exploratory mechanistic 164 Eksplorativni status (post)konekcionističkih modela strategy, we can reject most objections to connectionism as irrelevant, explain the progress of connectionist models despite their shortcomings and sketch the trajectory of their future development. By adopting mechanistic explanations and by criticizing functionalism, we will reject the objections of explanatory inadequacy, by characterizing connectionist models as generic rather than concrete mechanisms, we will reject the objections of biological implausibility, and by attributing the exploratory character to connectionist models we will show that practice of generalizing current to general failures of connectionism is unjustified. keywords: connectionism, deep learning, exploration, mechanistic explanation, traditional symbolic cognitive science.

Benny Shanon The Antipodes of the Mind Charting the Phenomenology of the Ayahuasca Experience Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002, 475 pp., £50.00 ($150.00 Canadian, $74 US), ISBN 0-19-925292-0 (hbk). Introduction What happens when a worldly Israeli cognitive psychologist goes to the Amazon Basin where he ingests the famed psychotropic concoction Ayahuasca (the ʻvine of the deadʼ) again and again and again? Our intrepid philosophical psychologist is no longer a sprightly youth, maddened for adventure. He is instead an accomplished theoretician with widely published articles (several in this journal) and a noted book (Shanon, 1993) that speak the from the perspective of cognitive (or phenomenological, for Shanon) psychology against the reductive tendency to view the mindʼs activities as created by the the brainʼs activities. Even before his Amazonian quest, he placed himself in the Gibsonian camp seeing the mind as dynamic intermediary between organism and environment and active participant in both. What did happen is this extraordinary book, a scientific analysis of his own visions and the education of both Shanonʼs views and, perhaps, his soul. Benny Shanonʼs accomplishment in this unique and carefully written treatise is nonpareil. In his landmark attempt to chart and classify the experiences that follow ingesting the Amazonian brew, Ayahuasca (always capitalized by Shanon), he demonstrates a will to observe and explain as relentless as carbon steel, but his seeing and experiencing also require him to be as flexible as tungsten when he must shape his interpretations within experiences that have all but overthrown the pretense of objective observation. Indeed, as he becomes ʻeducatedʼ through his journeys with this brewed plant compound, apparently beginning his own shamanic initiation, his will, his very self must capitulate to experiences beyond words. Later, back at his desk, Shanon will use his notes and memory to go discover the order of things. This breakthrough study will achieve the respect and renown it deserves, but it is currently causing a stir in certain circles and amongst the openminded international intelligentsia. Shanon has written a slow-rising classic that should stay aloft for the duration of our era, not just as cognitive psychology or even as another narrative of the psychedelic experience, but as the revelation of the boundless potentials within the human journey itself. Since its release, it appears to have received universal praise from other critics and readers. However, word has not filtered out into the hungry minds of the general public or surely Antipodes1 would be on a bestseller list. Either its subject matter - pharmaceutically induced altered states of consciousness - is still considered too politically threatening or Benny Shanon needs to hit the talk show circuit. His book enters deep waters yet never loses its way. It may be a challenge for some to wade through his classifications but in doing so may find their thinking clarified. Shanonʼs writing is clear as a mountain brook. He wastes no words for grand effect but always goes straight and true for the point of the topic he had begun. This makes for a very satisfying read, which is helped immensely by the greater story lurking within it to do 2 with one manʼs awakening from the sleep from self consciousness. Antipodes is neither obscure nor excessive, so it might make a good selection for a book-of-the-month for educated readers. Oprah, are you listening? Nothing exactly like this has ever been written before,2 beautifully rendered and incisively analysed yet finally superseding its own analytic. The reader joins a dedicated scientist on a journey that most would consider well beyond the possibility of scientific data gathering, except in terms of chemistry or anthropology. This journey is a phenomenological analysis, Shanonʼs close observation his own experience. He wastes no pages speculating on what the neural correlates of his visionary experiences might be, not even taking much time to explain the active ingredients of the ʻbrewʼ or how it changes the brain. Within this work (but not always within his own experience), the phenomenological-analytical approach seldom wavers. Such an approach still requires a certain distance, so when the object of study is his own earthshaking visions or emotional tsunamis rising up to lay bare every suppressed anxiety, guilt, or self delusion (not even to mention the digestive trauma often encountered3), one finds oneself in mute admiration for this stalwart scholar who steadily perseveres, refusing to be swept away from his purpose. He admits to making wrong choices in his early Ayahuasca journeys, lingering at banquet or resisting the lure of jaguar metamorphosis when he should have continued his quest, but he learns and begins again. As new worlds open before him, sometimes terrifying, he never retreats in a desperate attempt to turn the experience off. But he also learns when to surrender. Song pours from him amongst strangers, but he knew he must allow the joy to have voice. Though only briefly alluded to, it seems his perseverance and purity of purpose allowed him to finally transcend the limits of knowledge altogether by surrendering his cognition and his very self in a metanoia beyond the realm of words, memory, or interpretation. Needless to say, this experience is not described. It is in this sense that Antipodes may find itself attacked (or ignored) from two opposed positions at once. Most hard science does not consider phenomenology a respectable undertaking since oneʼs subjective experiences can neither be observed by anyone else nor shown to produce repeatable effects. One attempting to draw up analytical structures for drug-induced visions is likely to be dismissed out of hand as delusional, taking hallucinations for reality.4 On the other hand, true believers - religious followers, mystic esotericists, New Agers - will be annoyed for though Shanon puts the stamp of ʻrealityʼ upon his altered-state journeys, he continues to be skeptical about the existence of supernatural deities behind the metaphysical curtain. In his captivating Prologue he states: ʻFor years I characterized myself as a "devout atheist". When I left South America I was no longer oneʼ (p. 9), but he later explains that his ʻtheismʼ is more related to a Spinozan pantheism grounded in creative dynamics than to anybodyʼs pantheon or hierarchy of static divinities. He also rejects as unlikely the many reports of enhanced psi powers during the Ayahuasca intoxication (noting that increased perceptual sensitivity and interpersonal attunement can explain the ʻmind readingʼ he has experienced and heard reported). He remains open, however, expressing the wish that reports like that involving the remote viewing of an actual 3 European city by an Amazonian native who had neither seen pictures nor heard stories of such a place should be objectively investigated. Others will argue, and have done so, that immersion in the vision quest involves the suspension of the judgmental, cognitive faculty. Shanon seems to have learned the right steps to his dance between reception and cognition. When the moment presents itself, he allows the imagery or ambiance to take over; but when he returns he makes note of all that can circumscribed. Such imagistic encouragement is similar to Spinozaʼs intuitive mode of knowing, as Shanon notes (p. 205), but he also stands by the need for subsequent careful analysis in the same way elucidated by Whitehead (1978): ʻThe true method of discovery is like the flight of an aeroplane. It starts from the ground of particular observation; it makes a flight in the thin air of imaginative generalization; and it again lands for renewed observation rendered acute by rational interpretationʼ (p. 5). Whether this ʻrational interpretationʼ infects that which is so interpreted, thus standing on the primary ontological ground beyond that of visionary experience remains an open question, to be asked again below. In what follows, I will attempt the briefest of summaries though such is an injustice to this groundbreaking psychological cartography of what is terra incognita to most of us. I will then share my perplexities and a personal response, before concluding. Summary As a reader, I was hooked immediately by the dramatic Prologue as well as the few selected illustrations, all details from the artwork Planos by Brazilian ʻshamanturned-artistʼ Céu. Each detail is a picture unto itself - a ʻframe of referenceʼ - yet ʻthe big pictureʼ reveals them all as aspects of a greater dynamic spiralling out from or in towards a core of light that no doubt ʻpasseth all understandingʼ. The plates seemed to be metaphor for The Antipodes of the Mind, frame of reference within frames of reference, each part structured by the whole, while the whole is changed by the activity of the parts. In the Prologue, Shanon tells the story of his first encounters with the Ayahuasca brew and the questions that brought him to begin his mammoth research project. In his first experience of any consequence he had visions that included jaguars and snakes. He learned later that this was commonplace for Ayahuasca drinkers and his professional curiosity as a cognitive psychologist was roused: ʻSnakes and jaguars seem to be just too specific to define cognitive universalsʼ (p. 7). But he also underwent horrible visions of human cruelty throughout history, including what must have been especially wrenching, the Jewish Holocaust. But rather than back away or fall into bitter cynicism, he countered it with contemplation of the beauty that humans had brought into the world: ʻHowever evil and petty human beings are, I thought, they are also the creators of some of the most beautiful things that exist in the universe. With culture and art, as well as with religion and spirituality, humankind can be redeemedʼ (p. 5). The anguish or fear evoked by unexpected and shocking presentations of evil must be the gate that has turned away many other first time drinkers from further pursuing this course. Through his faith in life and the human journey, Shanon himself emerged 4 beyond the gates in a centre of serenity within which it seemed the world and himself was born anew: ʻIt seemed this was the first day of creationʼ (p. 6). After these first world-changing experiences with the Santo Daime Church (daime=Ayahuasca), he was thrown into a period of critical self-analysis. He knew he had to further study this vine and its power, but how? It seems he first had to accept who he already was, an accomplished cognitive psychologist; he confirmed this identity by ending his self-analysis and beginning his journey to other realities found through Ayahuasca and then a long critical, objective, and categorical analysis of the Ayahuasca experience. This book is the fruit of his labours. It is clear, however, that he had also personal motivations to discover a way to confront the human dilemma of good and evil, as well as facing (or ʻbeing faced byʼ) the everpresent questions of a spiritual nature. Shanon set the time aside, returned to the Amazon, underwent prescribed purifications, and became a dedicated student of the School of Ayahuasca, a mystes into its mysteries. He knew from the first he would never ʻgraduateʼ as the result of a handful of Ayahuasca sessions, so he took his work seriously indeed. He travelled to gatherings among the three churches (two Christian inspired, one an offshoot of the Umbanda movement) in Brazil that use Ayahuasca as their sacrament and participated in their organized sessions. He sat with Amazonian tribespeople under the jungle canopy, often with the guidance of a ayahuasquero, the ʻspecialist of the sacredʼ, a shaman. Later, as he began to master his visions, he journeyed with few others among accomplished shaman-healers. He shared the brew with experienced users in urban settings, and, when he felt ready, flew solo. At the time of publication, he had gone on over 130 Ayahuasca journeys, though the ʻcore corpusʼ of his phenomenological research work is his first 67 sessions. Each session was summarized at its conclusion. Beyond that, he read everything he could find on the brew, from early reports of missionaries or explorers to current extended scientific analyses. None combined scholarly analysis with extended personal experience. Finally, he set out in good cognitive psychological fashion and interviewed others who had just concluded their own sessions or anyone in general who also had extensive experience with the brew: ʻMy estimate is that, all told, the data discussed here are based on about 2,500 Ayahuasca sessionsʼ (p. 410). Then Shanon got back to his desk to reveal the structure of the world (perhaps that should be ʻworldsʼ). The bulk of the book consists of prolonged exegeses, enumeration and elaboration of steps, systems and subsystems, categories of subcategories within supercategories, and lists of effects and affects. His point of departure is the phenomenology of his ʻcore corpusʼ. I will not summarize here his structural program, central to his topic as he deems it to be. Strange to say, I rarely found this approach tedious. For one thing, as noted above, the objects of his classifications are confrontations and participation with other realities, so there is a veritable tale of wonders interwoven within the data. Running through the exposition like an unruly stream upon well-manicured fields is the underlying narrative of the paradigmatic heroʼs journey into meaning. Furthermore, Shanonʼs mind, as expressed in his writing, is so refreshingly clear and organized that one feels perfectly secure in boarding his ʻaeroplaneʼ to survey mysteries of terror and delight well beyond most of 5 our experience or comprehension. It may be, however, that Shanon needed this comprehensive organization as a grounding for his more ultimate revelations. Perhaps it was necessary for him ʻsystematically to chart the various phenomena that Ayahuasca may induce and to establish order in themʼ (p. 48, my italics), so he could at least recall the pathway back toward the Source, the ʻstill point of the turning worldʼ. Shanon learns there are stages of advancement into these mysteries: The novitiate begins passively watching wonders unfold as on a screen, but with experience and courage, learns to enter the vision and explore its reality from within. Then there comes a stage where a certain degree of control over the unfolding reality is possible, though such ʻcontrolʼ is always partial and participatory - Shanon often uses the metaphor of playing an instrument or being played as such: ʻThus, I say that the Ayahuasca experience is like music played on an instrument which is the soul and that this music is a perfect mirroring of oneʼs entire beingʼ (p. 380). Indeed, the final stage seems to involve gaining the power to engage many worlds (or realities) simultaneously, but also the power to act in this world in ways never previously attained or attempted, such as the expressive arts or guidance and healing. The ʻgradesʼ of the School of Ayahuasca are summarized thus: First there was an exposition. ...the second course was discipline. ... The third course of my schooling was primarily concerned with healing and disease. ... The grades that followed focused on the sacred and involved powerful spiritual experiences. Then I had a long period-coupled with my partaking of Ayahuasca with traditional Amazonian healers-that focused on shamanism. ... The subsequent course ... focused on a variety of more specific issues (pp. 302-3). To get this far, the novitiate or mystes has endured many trials and temptations, yet s/he must be bold enough to know when to surrender to the reality that presents itself and wise enough to know when to actively alter it. One must have overcome the narcissistic limitations of oneʼs fears while not inflating vanity over oneʼs piloting control or expanding knowledge. Such hubris, as myths have taught us, may lead to the pride that goes before a fall. Shanon found the pure heart and ʻempty centreʼ to be accepted amongst the healers of the Amazon rain forest. He mentions that now he feels his role has become more performative than explorative as guide, hierophant, and something of an ayahuasquero himself. In terms of powers, Benny Shanon emerges as ʻBenny Shamanʼ (though I doubt he would admit this or appreciate the wordplay). In terms of wisdom, he states his conviction that the most expressive gesture of ontological truth is found simply in songs of praise for all creation, in the Hallelujah of his ancestors. As to the ontological question of what exactly is being so praised, Shanon avers it is not anything at all but the joy of the eternal dynamic process - neither God as an entity (or any other form of the supernatural), nor is it humanity or nature, as such. Creation is what the name implies, an ongoing unfolding of the infinitely potent creative core of all things, including ourselves. Obviously, such ʻknowledgeʼ cannot be attained either through phenomenological or analytic reduction. It is everpresent beyond the edge of the ʻknown worldʼ, that is, beyond the conscious mind ʻWherefrom words turn back, / Together with the mind not 6 having attained...ʼ (Tattirïya Upanishad 2.9). It is at this point that Shanon the scientist must give up on science and even knowledge in any usual sense and admit that such direct communion exceeds communication: ʻYet, there were occasions that it was clear to me that I had to make a choice-if I really wished to undergo the experience presenting itself to me, I would have to forgo my future recollection of it and give up any thought of ever talking about itʼ (p. 355). Furthermore, even the path to the edge of this unspeakable awakening is one not of ordered signposts and structured roads but of intuitive knowledge, well beyond categorical reasoning. After all his phenomenological analysis, Shanon at last confesses that very poignantly, I realized how limited the scientific approach is. It was evident to me that [in] pursuing this stance, there are realms of knowledge that can never be attained. I further comprehended that there are levels of knowledge that demand one to let go and relinquish all critical, distanced analysis. ... In this respect, despite all its limitations in terms of sociological power and cultural permanence, the indigenous stance has the upper hand (p. 356). Perplexities I continue to be perplexed about several things hinted at in this tome but not fully explained and I outline them here. These mainly result from my own application of traditional reasoning to that which eludes it or from Shanonʼs expressed reticence to reveal more personal detail or delve into metaphysics. My perplexities are mainly to do with the world of light and truth revealed to the author and apparently to other experienced Ayahuasca drinkers. Either the dark side is less real or it plays a smaller role than I had imagined. Unlike with LSD, there are said to be no ʻbad tripsʼ with Ayahuasca. Shanon admits he interviewed no one who drank the turbid brew but once, which would surely be the result if anyone ʻfreaked outʼ or was just turned off by the whole experience. The nausea, gastritis, and vomiting, emphasized in other first person accounts, may be enough to cause one to avoid the substance next time, but actual ʻmind-blowingʼ has not been reported, to my knowledge. Shanon makes it clear that when faced with a personal crisis under the intoxication one must soldier on, dealing with fear and related negative emotions in as grounded and unperturbed manner as possible. Still, crises occur: ʻQuite commonly,ʼ he states matter-of-factly, ʻpeople feel that they are about to dieʼ (p. 57). Elsewhere he notes that a mental breakdown is real possibility. Yet not in Antipodes or anything else I have read to do with Ayahuasca experiences is such a breakdown recorded. Is it bad-trip free? Along these same lines, my all-too-human binary thinking gets skewed in Shanonʼs brief discussion of the ontological status of good and evil. On the same page he reports that ʻAyahuasca leads people to the conclusion that the world contains both good and evil, that the two are intertwined, and that the ultimate reality is beyond good and evilʼ, but that, ʻFinally, there are visions in which one feels one is encountering the Supreme Goodʼ (p. 174). I realize Iʼm probably not getting the mystical paradox here, but elsewhere itʼs said that Ayahuasca has a cosmic sense of humor (not always benign), that it lies or hides as much as it reveals. Is the Supreme Light without shadow, or what? 7 I wonder also about the dark side of the initiatory process, especially shamanic initiation. In the pattern of the ritual death-rebirth cycle, there must be a dark night of the soul before the dawn of revelation. Shamanic lore especially emphasizes the almost universal experience of death and dismemberment5 (apparently the death of the everyday self) before the shaman returns, being one with death yet remaining alive. Shanon modestly and perhaps wisely downplays the significance, but he acted as shamanic healer and guide for others and was accepted at least among one ayahuasquero guild. The fact of this exceptional bookʼs existence is enough to convince me of Shanonʼs shamanic metamorphosis. No ordinary insight could have carried it through to the end. What I want to know is what sort of ritual or visionary death did our author have to endure? Or did he achieve his dawn without a dusk? Admittedly, he states such an autobiographical confessional was not his purpose here and may have to await a future literary venture. And one wonders about the whole question of the existence or creation of orderly categories from the data resulting from his phenomenological and statistical analysis. What sort of lists, tables, categories, and structures are being brought forth here, and why? On the one hand he notes commonalities in his visions and those of many others as well as intriguing parallel reactions to these visions, especially amongst the Ayahuasca cognoscenti. As noted, it was in fact these inexplicable similarities that set him on his quest in the first place, professionally speaking at least. Does he then think his structural analyses is revealing the universal latticework of creation, or at least of the Ayahuasca experience? Or is he himself creating such a latticework to place over the chaos of creation? Neither, it seems, or both. Shanon is well aware of the ambiguities of his project and how boundaries in the realms of visionary experience seem to shift or even, with a wink and smile, disappear altogether. In a universe in which the only constant is creative dynamism itself, it is impossible to distinguish between that which one discovers and that which one projects. He states that ʻthere is no clear-cut differentiation between interpretation and creation. ... In essence, all is interpretive, all is creativeʼ (p. 351). If it is so that all phenomena are simultaneously the product of interpretation and creation then - aside from the authorʼs need, personal or professional, ʻto establish order in themʼ (p. 48) - it feels like such cartographic detail is mapped onto shifting tides that will change with the phases of the moon. This is a slippery metaphysics with which we are left. Shanon lays his detailed phenomenological analysis upon the creative essence with some ambiguity, it seems to me, like placing the picnic blanket on the lake. If our acts participate in the unfolding of reality then categories, maps, structures, laws of science, and what have you achieve their substance over millennia of cultural or even transcultural ʻuseʼ, which results in the reality of habitual consensus. They are as real as anything else that seems to just be there, in one place, here and now. Does this leave his categories and structures and patterns with a ground on which to stand? Probably - at least temporarily. In fact, his studies prove beyond much question that certain visionary and experiential patterns reoccur across cultures and in times far apart. Several times Shanon asserts that his purpose is not to explore ontological questions, but he takes enough steps in that direction that the reader understands that 8 when Shanon finally states that ʻthe view put forth here is that the Ayahuasca experience is one of generation and creationʼ (p. 383), he is tantalizingly close to claiming this for our usual experience too. He even briefly discusses the source of these patterns of creation, which brings me to my last perplexity, the uncertainty over the terms ʻcreativityʼ and ʻimaginationʼ. Early on, Shanon assures us that ʻAyahuasca visions [exhibit] a beauty that is beyond imaginationʼ (p. 17)ʼ, referring to our usual notion of the imagination as a post-language faculty activated by the self from other images already stored in memory. In speculating on the source of such beauty, he denies that such creative imagining comes either from a ʻworld of formsʼ, already ʻout thereʼ in their own ultimate reality or from psychology, that is, the unconscious ʻin hereʼ. So, in his interpretation, neither Platonic ideas nor Jungian archetypes will do. To account for the reality of Ayahuasca experiences (and by implication, all experience), he posits a creational reality in which our own creativity participates but which ultimately exceeds our personhood or existence. So, ʻthe notions of "human creativity" or "power of imagination" turn out to be much more fantastic then they are usually thought to be" (p. 396). Yes, indeed, but the originality of this position is where perplexity arises. In the first place, isnʼt this the core of the Romanticsʼ apotheosis of the transpersonal imagination? Creativity as the core can also be found in some form in both Bergson and Whitehead. In the second place, I think Shanon is too dismissive of Jungʼs concept of the collective unconscious by reducing it to residing ʻin hereʼ, but this may be mistaken assumption based on Jungʼs misuse of Freudʼs original term, the unconscious. In his later years, Jung wrote a good deal about the objective psyche, meaning that the collective or transpersonal unconscious is the very world with which we engage and which is our source. Shanon refers approvingly several times to the somewhat similar notion of the anima mundi (ʻworld-soulʼ) as source of the real, both subjective and objective. Then again, as a result of his experiences of communion he would likely disagree that the world or world-soul should be understood as ʻunconsciousʼ (even if Jung meant ʻunconscious from the perspective of our self-contained consciousʼ). The Jung-inspired archetypal psychologist James Hillman (1975) brings us to the point where Jung meets Shanon when he proclaims that every perception, cognition, or memory is fantasy-laden and not possible without such imaginative elaboration. Fantasies, in this sense, are not individual: ʻThe revelation of fantasies exposes the divine, which implies that our fantasies are alien because they are not oursʼ (p. 184). This may add some flesh to the ontological skeletal frame of Shanonʼs ʻgeneration and creationʼ pantheism, though he adds the last note that in the ʻdanceʼ of creator and created it is impossible to tell who is leading. Allow me to reemphasize that my above ʻperplexitiesʼ are not in the way of criticism. These are questions I would love to sit and discuss with the author; no doubt the inadequacy of my understanding would soon be made plain. I should even apologize for critiquing the few hints of ultimate matters which he deigned to mention, for he himself admits they have not yet been fully thought through. However, feeling perplexed by Shanonʼs extraordinary encounters and the great work of his 9 phenomenological analysis, I couldnʼt help but wonder, ʻWhat does it all mean?ʼ Perhaps in his next book Shanon will explore an answer to that question. Personal Reaction After reading Antipodes with great pleasure and new discovery each time over several careful readings, I retain two reactions that are probably mine alone. One is that I am now sure I will never seek an opportunity to drink the brew of the ʻvine of the deadʼ. Put simply, I doubt that I have the strength of character it took for Shanon to advance from audience member to conductor of the orchestra. In part, my reticence arises from my tendency to wander off and become thoroughly lost in the aforementioned psychedelic era, sidetrack to sidetracks. It is my understanding - faith, if you will - that cognition, rationality, and analysis are themselves particular cultural fantasies. When one give intuition primacy, one tends to wander as way leads on to way. Shanon could absorb his incredible experiences and then later at his desk, ʻestablish order in themʼ. In fact, to the extent that it is possible, he has done just that. However, I fear I would become an Ayahuasca drifter, lost in other realities, but with no wish to return and nothing in order at all. The second reaction was not one I had expected. The Antipodes of the Mind gave me, first dimly then with increasing illumination, hope, suffusing me generously with that unfamiliar but uplifting emotion. By reminding me, ʻThere is more here than meets the eye and you know it!ʼ, a flood channel of forgotten memories opened and I was able to recall the moments I had found myself elsewhen or elsewhere (and not always as the result of substance ingestion). In the need to ʻget realʼ as I grew older, I had simply suppressed such experiences of wonder and awe because they were not ʻusefulʼ. I had pushed aside visions or encounters that threw into doubt the solid finality of day-to-day reality so I could join the grim march through the lifespan toward dusty death. Iʼm no fatalist, but I felt as though this book fell into my hands at just the right time. It is not just poetic license but a fact of consciousness-limited awareness that we walk about in worlds unrealized. So I wish to end this book review with appreciation rather than criticism: Thanks, Benny. Youʼve done wonders. Hallelujah to you and your important book. Notes 1. There is no singular form of ʻantipodesʼ. From my 1938 Funk ʼn Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary: ʻantipodes, n. sing. & pl. 1. A place or region on the opposite side of the earth; also, any two places or regions so opposed; as, australia is the antipodes (or at the antipodes) of England. 2. Those who live on the diametrically opposite sides of the earth; as, our antipodes sleep while we wake; the two nations are antipodes.ʼ 2. The only comparable work I know of may be John Horganʼs (2003) recent study. Former senior writer at Scientific American and noted science writer, Horgan takes a similarly skeptical show-me approach, even to his own ayahuasca experience. In Horganʼs Amazon.com review, he puts Antipodes on a par with classics on the further reaches of conscious experience by such as William James and Aldous Huxley. He errs, however, when he states that, after his journeys, Shanon remained an atheist, except in the most narrow definition of the term. 10 3. Shanon downplays the extreme digestive tract disturbances that have been widely reported, occasionally resulting in projectile vomiting. With experience, Shanon found he could avoid bringing forth such unpleasantness by bringing forth spontaneous song instead! 4. Benny cogently argues that such visions are more ʻother realitiesʼ than fictional hallucinations (also see Shanon, 2003). 5. ʻThe shaman learns to know death in the course of his initiation, when he goes for the first time into the underworld and is tortured by spirits and demons,ʼ declares Mircea Eliade (1990, undated entry 1952). Such universality (all universality for that matter) remains highly controversial in academic circles. 6. It would be most intriguing for Shanon write a phenomenological cartography after experimentation on LSD trips. Knowing the differences and similarities would tell us much about the status of visions. Do they arise from specific drug, personal idiosyncrasy, or have they a transpersonal status? References Horgan, J. (2003), Rational Mysticism: Dispatches from the Border Between Science and Mysticism. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin. Eliade, M. (1990), Journal I: 1945-1955, trans., Mac Linscott Ricketts (Chicago: U of Chicago Press). Original in French 1973. Shanon, B. (1993), The Representational and the Presentational: An Essay on Cognition and the Study of Mind (London: Harvester-Wheatsheaf). Shanon, B. (2003), ʻHallucinationsʼ, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10 (2), pp. 3-31. Hillman, J. (1975), The Myth of Analysis: Three Essays in Archetypal Psychology (New York: Harper & Row). Whitehead, A. N. (1978), Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, corrected edition, ed. David Ray Griffin & Donald W. Sherburne (New York: Free Press). Original 1929.

___ ___ ____ ____ __ ____ ____ ____ ______ ______ _____ _____ ____ ___ ____ _' __ ____ _____ __ _' ____ _____ ____ __ __ _____ ___ __ ______ __ ___ _____ Den hebräischen Text aus Sefer_Yetzirah_Kaplan.pdf, (Seite 8 von 25 (2:6)) kopieren, aber die letzte Zeile des hebr. Textes dort weglassen Hier auf hebräisch: Sefer ha-Yetzirah He formed substance out of chaos and made nonexistence into existence He carved great pillars from air that cannot be grasped. This is a sign [Alef with them all, and all of them with Alef] He foresees, transforms and makes all that is formed and all that is spoken: one Name. Sefer ha-Yetzirah∗ ∗ Cf. Sefer Yetzirah – The Book of Creation, (ed. Aryeh Kaplan), York Beach ME, Boston MA, 1997, p 131; the English translation is by Aryeh Kaplan. Names and Objects Outlines of an Essentialist Nominalism by Dan Kurth (version: draft, 24.08.2013) 'What's in a name?'1 2 Sing. Terms: Fire, Red etc. Gen. Terms : Atom, Table, Flower etc. --------------------------------------------To be the value of a bound variable, or not to be: that is not the question.3 1 William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act 2, Scene 2 2 Due to our nominalist and also Meinongian convictions we use the term 'name' here for singular terms, mass terms, general terms and of course proper names of individuals as well. 3 Cf. Willard Van Orman Quine, On What There Is, in: Willard Van Orman Quine, From a Logical Point of View, pp 1-19, 13/14 ff, New York, Hagerstown, San Francisco, London 1963; see also: http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_What_There_Is. Cf. also William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act 3, Scene 1. Quine's settling of ontology in logic became its popular expression in the – albeit not original, but later condensed formulated – famous line: 'To be is to be the value of a bound variable', which correctly paraphrases the main proposition of his essay "On What There Is". This proposition however is also quite a sophisticated and refined version of the Platonist (over)charge of logic, which dates back to the less subtle attempts of Frege. 1 Introduction: The myth of a link between logical extension and existence – baseless In this paper I will try to show, that the philosphy of the 20th century took a wrong turn, when – following the lead of Frege, Russell , the Wittgenstein of the 'Tractatus', Carnap, Quine and all their collaborators and followers – it became the predominant conviction that (– in particular – formal) language and modern (extensional) logic would prescribe the formal Aufbau or structure of any meaningful ontology or world. An essential prerequisite for that view was the supposed extensional setup of logic, which inevitably came at the expense of having to imply a – how watered down ever – sort of Realism or Platonism with respect to the extension of general terms. The foundation of this was laid in Frege's concept of Bedeutung (reference), which supposed that language and logic somehow mysteriously would relate to extra linguistic facts and objects. I hold this view by no means for being warranted. Language and logic rather are ways and instruments of communication and social interaction in general than being blueprints or structures of allegedly implied ontologies. The right turn philosophy should have taken instead, would have – in my view – been to follow Meinong's achievement in laying the foundation of any ontology in his 'Theory of Objects'. 4 Within this essentially intensional approach all the puzzles of what reference could be, if anything at all, become naturally bedeutungslos. Thus I will try to show, that the significance of Meinong's 'Theory of Objects' or 'Objectology', as I will refer to it in the following, has a much wider scope than the usually mentioned bizarr nonexistent objects like the Golden Mountain, unicorns or the square circle. It rather relates to all general terms, singular terms, mass terms, I disagree totally with that triple bind of language, logic and ontology and hold that Wittgenstein in his "Philosophical Investigations" successfully decoupled language from the others and that Meinong showed a way of successfully analyzing ontology as a special case of the 'Theory of Objects' starting by distinguishing nonexistent and existent objects. Btw. I am well aware, that Quine wasn't a Platonist at heart at all. Quite on the contrary he – for a long time – strived to come to a nominalist position, in particular in collaboration with Nelson Goodman. But in the end Quine was too much an elaborated logician to withstand the seductive ingredients of Set Theory and modern logical, i.e. Fregean, semantics. Naturalizing epistemology and a somewhat halfhearted constructivism however provide no remedy for the spectres induced by the sweet poison of 'Platonism in technical disguise'. 4 With some reservation also Husserl's somewhat comparable endeavour in his 'Logische Untersuchungen' and 'Einleitung in die Phänomenologie ...' has to be mentioned in that context. i.e. to probably all terms, which can function as a noun, with only some specialities with repect to certain proper names (of individuals). And in particular it relates to theoretical terms or scientific concepts. -------------------------------------------------------------The myth of extensionalism – baseless The set theoretically based formal logic as the still prevailing basis for formalized languages should better be replaced by mereology, i.e. a mereological calculus, perhaps in an appropriate combination with a Free Logic, at least if one still would hold up the claim that such languages should carry any ontological significance and therefore allow the introduction of an explicit strong predicate of existence. Yet it is indeed questionable, if one should make such a claim at all, since a short look into the history of science proves, that ontological commitment never had been anything else than the other side of the coin of ontological opportunism. The worlds of theories anyway become as impetuously repudiated and abandoned as they become created. Actually existing objects, i.e. individuals, cannot be members or elements of an abstract object, like for example a set. To claim the opposite is not just – albeit abundant and regular practice – obviously nonsense, but also technically a categorial fallacy. -------------------------------------------------------------2 Haecceic Essence To illustrate the use of the term 'essence' in this paper it might be helpful to go back in the history of philosophy to an era, when this notion had been in full flourish. In scholastic philosophy essence (or in Latin: essentia) had been just another word for quiddity (or in Latin: quidditas), i.e. the 'whatness' of a thing or a person or – in general – an object. Essence or quiddity then relates to the question: 'what is the special feature (differentia specifica) of that kind of things or objects, to which the respective thing or object belongs, compared with other kinds of things or objects, to which the respective thing or object does not belong'. In modern phrases this could be described as the specification or allocation of an object within a comprehensive classificatory ontological scheme. Therefore quiddity immediately entails some unwelcome ontological presuppositions. The classificatory scheme, in which the various quiddities are embedded, and which serves as a means for somehow 'triangulating' the respective single ones, is represented by (mostly a hierarchy of) general terms. And thus it also represents a hierachy of the living-dead abstractions of Platonist proveniance, which includes all the predecessors of the 'nonexistent yet nevertheless preexisting' abstract objects5 based on set theoretical metaphysics. The more humble general terms of ordinary language then – supported by that applied set theory called 'semantics' – obfuscate the world with linguistically bred zombies, and cannot tell the difference, if they exist or not. Once upon a time they called such overdeterminated semantic quibble 'quidditas'. But then another tale will always be there to be told. In sharpest contrast to the notion of quiddity stood the notion of haecceity (or in Latin: haecceitas) introduced by Duns Scotus, i.e. the 'thisness' of a thing or a person or – in general – an object. Haecceity then relates to the individuality or particularity of an individual thing or object. Haecceity is also sometimes referred to as 'essence', yet how meaningful that ever may had been in the context of scholastic philosophy it – at least – necessitates a distinctively different meaning of 'essence' compared with 'essence' as another term for quiddity. In particular can haecceity impossibly be seen as the most fine-grained resolution of the quiddities of things or objects. Moreover 'haecceity' was a central combat term of medieval nominalists (like William of Ockham), where the central argument of them eventually was, that there wasn't anything like (a substantial) quiddity or essence. "In contrast to more modern accounts of the problem of individuation, Scotus holds that the haecceity explains more than just the distinction of one substance from another. According to Scotus, the fact that individual substances cannot be instantiated also requires explaining. At issue is something like this: what explains the fact that (e.g) a clone of me is not an instance of me, but an instance of human nature? Haecceities, in addition to explaining distinction, also explain non-instantiability."6 5 Cf. for a concise introduction in this topic Edward N.Zalta, Abstract Objects, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster 1983 6 Medieval Theories of Haecceity (pdf version) from the Fall 2010 Edition of the Stanford Unfortunately the question, if and perhaps how haecceity might explain the noninstantiability of individual things, persons or – in general – objects rather obfuscates the relevance and meaning of haecceity as essence than to elucidate it. Quite on the contrary to the above cited argument an appropriate analysis will not only find, that haecceity is a perfect concept to explain instantiability and how it is to be understood, but also, why and how haecceity is the proper notion of essence. Let me now show the shortcomings in the above cited presentation of the argument of Duns Scotus concerning haecceity and non-instantiability. Firstly it seems to tacitly imply that the individuals in question are exlusively existent or spatio-temporal objects. That is, in my view, utterly unwarranted. Haecceity relates to all objects, existent ones as well as nonexistent ones. Secondly, and more important, is the fact, that the question, if a double of me (or any other person or object) is an instantiation of me (or the respective other persons or objects), is clearly put in the wrong way, since there simply are no individuals, which would or could be instantiations of another individual. Me and all possible proper doubles of me in all possible worlds (with all relative states of them) and also any existent or nonexistent object and all its proper doubles in all possible worlds (with all relative states of them) are solely instantiations of the respectively one and the same or identical haecceic essence evoked and designated by its name(s). I.e. haecceity can only meaningful be read as 'essence' in a strictly nominalistic context, and here it designates the individuality of an individual by its identity in all its instantiations. This identity is commonly known as transworld identity. This 'essence by (transworld) identity' becomes in particular graphic in the case of individuals, which are existent objects.7 Here haecceity marks – with respect to the individuality of a respective individual – the only possible difference to its designation by the particularization of its spatio-temporal existence. In other words: haecceity provides a designation of the 'thisness' of an (existent) individual, without having to resort to (the characteristics of) its existence. Ruth Barcan Marcus, Kripke possible worlds relative states,vulgo (and in my view misleadingly aka) 'Many Worlds' interpretation of quantum mechanics Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/medievalhaecceity/ , p 1 7 To avoid misunderstandings: all existent objects are individuals, but by no means all individuals are existent objects. That the scholastic philosophers couldn't bring forth such an idea of haecceic essence is certainly forgivable for historical reasons, since history, including the history of thoughts, tends to take – at least – some time. Thus the concept of (haecceic) essence is – sit venia verbo – essential in fending off the naturalistic limitations of mereological nihilism, and, by this, it is as well essential for the entire project of information monism. As a resume of this terminological excursion I propose, that haecceic essence entirely substitutes, what usually had been seen to be explained by quiddity and thus makes everything obsolete once associated with quiddity – including its modern descendants. 3 Names of mereological sums instead of abstractionloaded semantics or 'general terms' gegen Quine 'WaO' pp176 ff – 190; trying to argue for just the opposite, namely the substitution of general terms by names not with platonist presumptions but with nominalist rigour and a corresponding foundation in mathematics. There are two different kinds of mereological sums which play slightly different roles in the substitution of general terms. At first it should be clear that all mereolgical sums by their very nature to be sums or collections are strictly nonexistent objects for the reason that one cannot directly or indirectly interact with sums or collections, notwithstanding the fact that it may make a difference if one has to struggle with only one or many individuals of whatever kind. The interaction however will always be with the various single individuals, never with their sum. But then there still are two different kinds of mereological sums and even when both of them are nonexisting objects one has a spatio-temporal extension. These are the ones of which we justifiedly can assume that their proper parts, i.e. the individuals they are made of, are actually existing objects. Then these mereological sums obviously have a spatio-temporal extension, i.e. they come up and vanish, due and in accordance to that of their actually existing parts. Despite them having spatio-temporal extensions these mereological sums themselves are no actually existing objects, since one cannot interact with them. Then there are of course also arbitrarily many mereological sums which consists of individuals , which themselves are nonexistent objects (e.g. unicorns, centaurs, Rutherfordian atoms, particles of the Phlogiston, perhaps Higgs bosons, but the latter may turn out different, and so on). And therefore these mereological sums have no more of spatio-temporal extensions than their nonexistent parts, namely none. General terms have to be parsed and substituted for names, where 'names' are meant to be the names of mereological sums. And – as names in general – the names of mereological sums are very much alike singular terms. The respective individuals, which add up to these mereological sums then are their proper parts. The mereological sums, which themselves are Meinongian nonexistent objects, then are designated or called by their respective names. If someone may wonder how actually existing individuals can be proper parts of a nonexisting object as a mereological sum one should look at such examples as 'ensembles' in many sciences or 'population' as a special case of an ensemble in biology. Ensembles and populations are nonexisting objects in the same sense as mereological sums, of which they anyway are only special cases. Ensembles and populations or any other concrete collection then are as any mereological sum made up by a certain amount or number of actually existing individuals and when these indiduals eventually all should vanish then the respective concrete collections or mereological sums will happen to 'vanish' as well. Speaking of 'vanish' here means that concrete collections or mereolgical sums of actually existing objects have – in sharp contrast to abstract objects as sets – spatiotemporal extensions, yet still they are no actually existing objects themselves since one cannot actually interact with them – even if an opposite view of that fact is frequently hold. our approach argueing for the substitution of general terms by names culd be, yet not too correctly, paraphrased as something similar to a causal theory of reference albeit without causality and without refence. But what our view has in common with the latter is the supposed rigidity with which names designate or signify the respective objects, they are names of. But then again our concept of an object couldn't more differ than to that, what the proponents of a causal theory of reference once had in mind. The objects we have in mind would in no sense be of a whatever diluted empiric making, not being real things out there nor even exist at all. The objects we have in mind are Meinongian nonexistent objects and we hold that what normally is reffered to as 'general terms' are in fact names of such Meinongian nonexistent objects. But now, after that barrage of differnces to the original causal theory of reference, somehow inevitably the one point we have in common comes to light: the names of the nonexistent objects, which are usually seen to be concepts and general terms anyway are names of an invariant, intrinsic and signifying nature, which then signifies respective occurences as being instantiations of that nature or object. Traditionally such invariant, intrinsic and signifying nature goes as the essence of an object. We however hold that the nonexistent objects themselves are the essences, with respect to which related individuals become just this: instantions of those objects. In particular in science theoretical concepts are names of nonexistent, somehow abstract-iconic objects, objects which are paradigmatic of or embodying the quintessence of (a set of) respective instantitiations. The only existing objects are individuals, i.e. objects, with which one can possibly actually interact, and individuals cannot be and thus are no objects of proper (i.e axiomatic and preferably formalized) science at all. (Physical space and time do not exist independently of individuals, and that even in a twofold sense. On the one hand physical space and time are supervenient (in the sense of Leibniz relational concepts of space and time) on individuals, which are appropriate pregeometric entities and on the other hand they are immanent of another kind of individuals, which are called universes. These various individuals themselves are of course instantiations or actualizations of respective nonexistent objects of science) Es gibt keine Einzeldinge, instantiationen, die wissenschaftlich e objekte wären. Die theoretischen begriffe relate exclusively to the abstract-iconic essence of nonexistent objects. We are able to apprehend individuals as being (possible) instantiations or actualizations of a nonexistent object, the name of which then is the designation of an assumed essence of that apprehended individual, but not a name of that individual. in ordinary language general terms play – already grammatically – a role seemingly implying informal or rough ontologies, but in fact neither a proper ontology nor objectology can be founded in or based on ordinary language hier mit Wittgenstein II gegen Quine --------------------------------------------------------------------------In the case of some singular terms, as for example 'fire', and in particular in the case of mass terms like 'water', 'sugar' etc. we find the interesting fact, that here the name(s) of the particular occurences or instances of such existing objects and the name of that existing object as such, i.e. 'all (or the entirety) of fire in the world (or the whole universe)' or 'all (or the entirety) of water in the world (or the whole universe)' are essentially the same name, only distinct with respect to different spatio-temporal determinations (or in case of the respective entirety no particular determination at all). In the case of mass terms the particular occurences of existing objects like for example water are even – in a mereological (or any other) perspective – proper parts of the entire existing object of (all) water in the world (or the universe or even the multiverse – provided it exists). That is not in the same sense the case with respect to abstract singular terms like for example 'length'. 'color', 'redness' etc. Water occurences and water at all are – at least supposed to be – of the same stuff. Length instances and colour instances are not of the same stuff as length as such or colour as such and that not at least for the reason that none of them are stuff at all anyway. Now, if, as we've seen, the single water occurences are existing objects as well as the entirety of all water, where ever it may exist, is an existing object, and a nice example of a meaningful mereological composition as well, what's then about a nonexisting object, somehow related to all these existing ones? Is there any at all? Now, H2O as an object correlated to a theoretical physico-chemical concept is such a nonexistent object, for the simple reason, that we cannot and do not interact with such objects, which are just correlations of scientific concepts, neither with electrons, nor atoms nor with molecules as H2O and also not with planets, galaxies and so on. Of course we can and do interact with individuals, which we regard as being instantiations of such nonexisting objects of science, i.e which we regard as being existing objects. Yet then there is still a problem left, namely that the existing objects of the entirety of all water as well as all the single water occurences simply do not consist of some amount of individuals, which again we regard to be instantiations of H2Omolecules. We just suppose that in most cases existing objects which are such individuals (namely instantiations of H2O-molecules) make up the largest part of the existing water objects. But that's not a necessary condition, just a reasonable supposition. The existing water objects with which can and do interact are not determined by haveing to be composed of such individual instantiations of H2Omolecules, water could be composed of an entirely different stuff as long as we would regard it as being water, perhaps for being equivalent to water in appearance, usefulness and any other functions within our interactions with that stuff. Should we then find out about that difference we simply would have two kinds of water which still together would be parts of that existing object which is the entirety of water, with which we potentially interact. If in experiments it is said that someone observes a hydrogen atom H – or in a perhaps more spectacular case – an anti-hydrogen atom in an appropriate trap of electric and magnetic fields (Penningfalle !!) and then makes the intended tests and experiments and also documents this by various pictures it seems there is no doubt that the physicists which performed these experiments interacted most intensively with a proper object of science. And for all practical purposes perfectly justified these physicist themselves will be convinced that they actually did exactly this: interacted with an object of science. Yet this was not the case. The point which matters here with respect to objectologically correct semantics is the 'a' in 'a hydrogen atom'. That is to say, it is not (a nonexisting scientific object, namely) the hydrogen atom, with which the observer, experimentalists, technicians and physicists interact, but it is a particular (existing object, namely an) individual called 'hydrogen atom', with which they interact. This may sound a bit (or a lot) far-fetched at first, but it becomes much easier to comprehend, when one sees, that it is exactly the same as in the case, where we have a dog named 'Dog'. The only difference between the case where a hydrogen atom becomes called 'hydrogen atom' and the case where a dog becomes called 'Dog' lies in the fact that probably all hydrogen atoms are usually called 'hydrogen atom', when they become designated in a particular, e.g. experimental, situation and certainly most dogs are not called 'Dog' – some however are. -----------------------------------------------------------------Our stance with regard to the principle of free (or indefinite) mereological composability: There are ??? kinds of objects: Naturally generated objects (toposic, mereotopological etc.) Locally contiguent objects (like heaps, mountains or artefacts) and/or Locally functional integrated objects (like systems) Locally contiguent objects can be proper parts of locally functional integrated objects and vice versa. This possible as well as usual mutual inclusion of locally contiguent and locally functional integrated objects is characteristic for internally hierarchical-layered objects as for example organisms. ================================ 4 Mereology and Mistakes Mereological wholes are mereological sums where all parts of the respective mereological sum are either directly contiguent to each other or continuously, i.e. uninterruptedly connected by subsequences of directly contiguent parts. -----------------------------------------mereological nihilism, mereological essentialism and mereological 4dimensionality have a severe lack of understanding in common of what makes up an object, which is either a mereological sum in general or the particular form of a mereological sum, which is a mereological whole. The reason for that lack of understanding is that in these approaches objects are mistaken for things. But objects are no things. In the case of mereology mistaking objects, like mereological sums or mereological wholes, for things may be due to seeming concreteness of these individuals and the not less concrete robustness or solidity of its conceptually fundamental part-whole relation. But taking these individual parts or wholes for things is an unwarranted mistaking of a nominalistic feature for a naturalistic one. And any naturalistic account of an individual will necessarily fail. It will fail because an individual is signified or rigidly designated by relating to its essence and not by any asserted definite description. The reason for this is that a naturalistic desription of an individual inevitably leads to an overdetermination of the individual in question, since any aspect of any aspect, any variation of any partial description of any partial aspect of that individual matters not less than any other aspect or description and not less than any variation or change in any of these aspects. This overdetermination, which becomes apparent as the emptiness and ineffectiveness of any such attempt of a naturalistic description of an individual, only reveals the underdetermination of the theories of nature, which provide the means for such attempts. The result of any such attempt then only can be a complete dissolution of the individual in question in more and more general environments and more and more insignificant particularities. Instead of grasping the individuality of some things it turns them into becoming anything, i.e. instead of giving an image of the individual a naturalistic description of it never produces anything else than a blur. Objects on the contrary always necessarily relate to the essence of the individuals they stand for, i.e. the invariant aspect of the generic identity of the individuals in question, i.e. their characteristic individual signification. This characteristic individual signification relates to the invariant generic identity of the entire object, i.e. any existent object has a beginning and an end in time, and for the entire duration of their existence existent objects are, due to their invariant generic identity, continuously one and the same object regardless of the changing composition and the varying expression of the formation of the things these objects are associated with. But existent objects neither are things nor are they abstractions of things. They rather are the objectifications of the immanent essences of the things they are associated with. This becomes apparent and evident by the congruence of the generic identity of an existent object with its transworld identity in a possible world semantics or appropriate relative quantum information state ansatz. And all three positions, mereological nihilism, mereological essentialism and mereological 4-dimensionality, also try to dissolve the mereological objects into an allegedly more encompassing underlying 'environment', namely into a more (mereological nihilism) or less (mereological essentialism, mereological 4dimensionality) fundamental process. But no process ever can be a fundamental or primordial reality with respect to objects, since there simply cannot ever be a process, which is not a process of altering, changing, moving or varying objects or things. Mereological 4-dimensionality: a 4d-Socrates is the mereological sum of all 3dSocrates-instants along the space-time line of the 4d-Socrates, and it is the contiguity or the contiguous nexus of all of these 3d-Socrates-instants, which makes up not only the genidentity of Socrates, but also provides the base and matrix for (identifying the) essence of Socrates. Essentially – so to speak – the essence of any (formerly or actually) existing objects is that, what remains invariant in the course of their respective space-time lines. All the different 3d-Socratesinstants are not just realizations of crude facts, but they are actualizations of possible real Socrates-(instants), i.e. a selection of one single actualized instant from all possible worlds with 3d-Socrates-instants as proper parts. --------------------------------------------------294) Bis der Schöpfer die Welt erschuf, war Sein Name darin verborgen, und Er und Sein Name, der darin verborgen ist, waren eins. Sein Name ist Malchut, die-vor der Schöpfung-in Ejn Sof eingeschlossen und verborgen war, ohne irgendeine Enthüllung oder Erkenntnis. Zu dieser Zeit waren Er und Sein Name, der darin verborgen ist, eins. Nichts wurde enthüllt, bis Er wünschte die Welt zu erschaffen. Er schrieb und bildete Welten, aber sie waren nicht (aufrecht) zu erhalten und wurden zerstört. Das heisst, die Welten, die zu der Zeit von Zimzum Alef aus Malchut hervor kamen-genannt „Welten von Tohu," in denen der Zerbruch der Gefässe war, was die Zerstörung dieser Welten ist. Wir lernen über sie, dass am Anfang die Welt in Midat ha Din erschaffen wurde, Malchut de Zimzum Alef, welche Midat ha Din genannt wird. Er sah, dass die Welt nicht existierte-dass sie zerstört wurden-Er verband mit ihr Midat ha Rachamim. Das heisst, der Schöpfer, Bina, wurde in eine Umhüllung von Licht gehüllt und erschuf die Welt, das heisst erhöhte Malchut zu ihr. Deswegen verminderte sich ihr Licht zu WaK, „umhülltes Licht" genannt, denn dann wurde Midat ha Din, Malchut, mit Midat ha Rachamim, Bina, verbunden, wodurch die Welt existierte. Quelle: http://www.kabbalah.info/de/der-sohar/sohar-texte (ger_sohar_bereshit_232_bis_313.doc) 'Before the Creator created the world, His name had been concealed within it, and the names of all creatures and all the things in and above the worlds had been concealed. And He and His name, which had been concealed therein, were one (and the same). His name is Malkhut, which – before the creation – had been concealed and hidden within Ein Sof, devoid of any revelation or realization. Thus He and His name then had been one. Nothing was revealed before He wished to create the world. He wrote and made the worlds, yet the worlds could not be sustained and became destroyed. And he saw, that the worlds did not exist – that they became destroyed. Thence he dimmed their light to 'veiled light', whereby the worlds came into actual existence.' 8 8 Cf. Michael Laitman, The Zohar: Annotations to the Ashlag Commentary, Toronto (Canada) 2007, 91-100, 119-122; ("Malchut is the central part of creation and its purpose. She is the only creation and includes all the worlds with all that inhabits them, us included. Depending on its states, parts of Malchut or Malchut herself (which is one and the same) have different properties designated by the different letter combinations. For this reason, Malchut's parts receive various "codes" (combinations) of letters (properties) or names. All the words in the world originate here, in Malchut. There is not a single property in the world that is not included in Malchut. Each property of Malchut, each of the creatures (for all creatures are her parts) is designated by the property that distinguishes it from the others, by the unique set of letters-properties that forms its name." Ibid. 119/120). Cf. also Fischel Lachower, Isaiah Tishby, The Wisdom of the Zohar, vols. I –III, vol. II, Oxford, Portland (Oregon) 2002, 549-586 5 More ado about nonexisting objects 'Atom' name of a seemingly uninteresting nonexisting object, because a simple generalisation of particular atoms as H (hydrogen) or He (helium) etc.. But that in fact 'atom' isn't just a simple generalisation but a striking example of a highly interesting nonexisting object (or perhaps a bunch of various nonexisting objects) since atoms had been conceived just as that, namely nonexisting objects long before the first 'real' atom of modern times physics had been 'discovered' or rather some individuals had been identified as being hold as doubles of the elements (of the table of elements). It doesn't matter, if or if not the atoms of Democritus, Leucippus and Lucretius are the same or similar to those of Gassendi or Newton or Boltzmann or even to those, the existence of which Ernst Mach so fervently denied. In that context it may be worth mentioning that in particular these objects, the existence of which is denied, are at least paradigms if not chosen paragons for what makes up a nonexisting object. For denying something's existence one has clearly to designate that something, and that is to aknowledge that there is this, what is said not to exist. That is by no means a logical contradiction but an application of the Meinongian semantical distinction between 'being there' and 'exist'. Most of the above mentioned atoms had been conceived without any knowledge of the table of elements let alone Rutherford's or Bohr's models of atoms. So an atom is a nonexisting object (or some of them) by it's own right, and thus far more than a futile generalisation of the particular atoms of the table of elements. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------square circle : the runtime of a program is determined by a) the length of the program, and b) the capacity of computer. From this follows, that a sufficiently large (preferably parallel computing) quantum computer can bring any runtime close to infintely small. Therefore in the context of information monism, where literally everything is information and thus even a whole universe could be seen as a kind of computing space (FN Zuse), a programm is perfectly conceivable, which (perhaps iteratively) transforms a square in a polygon with Ω-infinitely vertices (with € Ω>>ω , and € x ∈ 1,...,{ i,...,ω} with x, i, and ω ∈ Ν) and vice versa in an infinitely small amount of time, let's say nearly as small as a single time quantum. Btw. the question about the nature of the circumference, i.e. if it is of a continous nature or not, doesn't matter for that task of squaring the circle.9 And since 'polygon with infinitely many vertices' is an admissible definition of 'circle', we eventually will get a square circle. That square circle, though still being a nonexistent object, would however be no more nonexistent than any ordinary square or any ordinary circle is a nonexistent object anyway. In contrast to D.Lewis', modal realism (which presupposes a Many World Interpretation of QM and / or at least a prolific Multiverse (cosmo-)ontology) and also against Kripke's seemingly ontological neutral (or perhaps just indifferent) essentialism argumentieren, dass wg. Gegenstandstheorie a) neither any epistemological realism nor – with respect to its immanent account of (the existence and – if any – the nature) of universals any ontological realism b) keine Auszeichnung von proper names, sondern vielmehr essence and identy subsists in the substance of the either existent or non-existent objects. 9 Obviously the same holds for the question if the boundary lines of the respective square are continous or not. 6 Transworld identity as information content identity10 7 Essentialist nominalism The essence of an object is the paragon of that object, it is not the idea of that object, in particular it is not alike any Platonic version of an idea, i.e. it is not a deceitfully masked reified abstraction (of e.g. a particular bunch of objects). In other words: the essence of an object is not (embodied in) an allegedly preexisting abstract object. Instead the essence of an object is the particular configuration or formation of the one and only substance (of all objects, non-existing as well as existing ones, and of anything anyway), where this particular configuration or formation is – except in general for their individuality and in the special case of actually existing objects for their actual individuality, also known as haecceitas – the distinguishing characteristics of the particular object(s) in question. 7.1 Names and logic: term logic mereologified Socrates is part of humanity instead is a human being (which is in the extensionalist interpretation the same is element of the class of human beings) 10 'Information content identity' or 'essence identity' here are seen as a sort of pattern identity of the information equivalents of the respective objects. It is however important to always keep in mind that the 'information content' is not in any sense encoded or inscribed in the respective object, and therefore in whatever sense different to the object. Yet on the contrary the object is just an equivalent instantiation of its information content and indeed the object itself is identical up to isomorphism with its 'information equivalent'. --------------------------------Now mereologification will not make the dead horse of term logic ever become a racing winner, but it showed us a – more or less tacit – precursor of the solution we will propose for overcoming the extensionalist dogma. 7.2 Parts of programs 7.2.1 λ-calculus with mereological aspect s. Polkowski et.al. 'Rough mereology', rough sets 7.2.2 From a Topos with mereological aspect ... 7.2.3 To a topos with mereotopological aspect s. also John C. Baez, Action as a Functor 'And as imagination bodies forth The forms of things unknown, ..and thereupon.. Turns them to shapes and gives to airy nothing A local habitation and a name.'11 8 Toposic Foundations: Meinongian Objects in Toposes as Bases for Nominalism in Mathematics 11 Slightly altered version of: William Shakepeare, A Midsummer Night's Dream, ActV, Scene1. Local Toposes as frameworks for (respectively local) foundations of Mathem atics Lit.: J.L.Bell, From absolute to local mathematics.pdf JOHN L. BELL, foundations of mathematics.pdf Geoffrey Hellman and John L. Bell, Pluralism and the Foundations of Mathematics.pdf G.Hellman-Foundational_Frameworks.pdf Geoffrey Hellman, FoundationalFrameworks.pdf Barry Smith, Kevin Mulligan, Framework for Formal Ontology.pdf Mathematical 'individuals' then are the various occurences in operations (e.g. calculations, computations, derivations, proofs etc.), definitions and theories, which are proper models of the respective objects in the particular toposes. Our purpose here is to try to give the notion of a mathematical object a proper sense yet strictly without having to retreat to any Platonic or Fregean hypostases of whatever sort of intelligible or abstract existence of those objects. . I.e. we will instead try to make the Meinongian notion of nonexistent objects efficacious in that seemingly unsuitable field. The Meinongian concept of object seems to be unsuitable for mathematical objects for the very reason that in the case of mathematical objects the instantiations (or 'referents') of the respective notions seem not to differ in their – abstractive – nature from these notions themselves. Mathematical objects (or nonexistent (abstract) objects) are only given internally i.e. within a framework or universe of mathematics in which at least a very large part of mathematics can be performed. The most convincing paradigm of such a mathematical universe is a topos. Like nonexistent objects in the sense of Meinong's theory f objects can in appropriate cases be possibly related to respective existentials, the nonexistent mathematical objects can be related to respective incidences if and when these incidences occur in operations and utilizations as applications of the respective objects (in the topos(es)) thereby the objects serving as the nonexistent (!) quasi-universals and the incidences as the very best approximation to an individual in non-mathematical ontologies. As such or for themselves i.e. not within a comparably comprehensive and powerful universe there are no mathematical objects but just mathematical concepts given. 'I have called you by your name. You are mine.'12 8.1 Foundations of – some – Mathematics in a nutshell: toposes Toposes as universes i.e. as universal background spaces for mathematics. That is the notion of 'mathematical object' becomes nominalistically treatable as 'object in a topos'. Such objects in a topos then can be rigidly designated by their respective. The concepts related to the respective structures or theories can then be treated as tropes of the respective objects. And even the respective particular topos itself can again be treated as a general object. 8.1.1 From Mereologies in toposes ... 8.1.2 ... to mereologies of toposes and more... 8.1.3 ... and the 'higher' topos(es) of these Lit.: J.Luria, Higher Topos theory The idea: a topos with mereologies as objects and toposes as morphisms 8.2 Towards nominalist neologicism R.Urbaniak, nominalist neologicism Bob Hale Crispin Wright G.Boolos, Logic, Logic and Logic, pp. 73-87, Nominalist Platonism 12 World English Bible, Isaiah 43:1 s. also Jean-Pierre Marquis, category-theory (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) pp.24-26; Steve Awodey, From Sets to Types to Categories to Sets 'And, which was strange, the one so like the other, as could not be distinguish'd but by names.'13 9 Names and Programs Cf. cat of automata, planet math 9.1 Names and programs s. Luca Paolini, Simonetta Ronchi DellaRocca,The Parametric Lambda Calculus: A Meta-Model for Computation Therefore the theory of objects provides already in its intrinsic ontological neutrality and/or the corresponding principle of independence the very basis of an immanent ansatz for a foundation of mathematics. This approach could then easily be called the objectivist foundation of mathematics and that would indeed not be an unjustified claim. But the so to say operational point of such an approach to a foudation of mathematics would probably better be grasped by the expression 'semi-constructive hyper recursivism'. 13 William Shakespeare, The Comedy of Errors, Act1, Scene1. (That also relates surprisingly well to the immediately following.) 9.2 Essence and Substance The (One) Great Program = one substance Subprograms = modes Variation of subprograms (up to individuals) = modes of modes Essentialist nominalism and information monism Due to its uncompromising nominalist setting essentialist nominalism isn't either any sort of Aristotelian essentialsm nor is it – due to its not less uncompromising essentialist setting – any kind of Quine-Goodmanian or similar radical nominalism, i.e. a nominalism which only knows individual entities with properties and attributes attached to them by purely semantic means. Yet such a proposed essentialist nominalism surely seems at first a fusion of incompatible ingredients if not a self-contradictory claim. And indeed for not being such a mere farce essentialist nominalism requires a very particular footing, namely a neutral substance monism into which's substance the various essentiae as well as existentiae thoroughly dissolve to reveal their very nature as being something of one and the same kind. (ausführen! begründen!) A new substance for a renewed essentialism: informationmonism 'essence identity' (as a kind of pattern identity of the underlying information) instead of originary transworld identity in the sense of Kripke Appendix Two dogmas of Linguizism A) the dogma of a linguistic discrimination of existent and nonexistent objects B) the dogma of (the possibility of) reference B) is the main reason for A) Thanks go to Vera for her patience , to Vitaly , who as strictly as sympathetically helped me to do a bit more than the required minimum to maintain my health. Thanks also goes to the voice of Maria Callas, which was a regular companion in the nights, when I meditated on the subject of this paper and eventually wrote down some of the outcomes. Then she sometimes sang: "Tacete! Tacete! Cessate! Cesatte! Manca solo a compire il delitto ......................................" That blended with a leitmotivic 'si tacuisses ...' to something 'wovon man nicht sprechen kann, ...'. But, beyond the linguistic turn, that spell eventually became broken – in the end.

Rev. Filosofía Univ. Costa Rica, XLVII (120-121), 91-97, Enero-Agosto 2009 / ISSN: 0034-8252 Abstract: It is presented an analysis of xenophobia in Costa Rica from a historical point of view. This approach makes possible to comprehend the phenomenon in question in relation to some factors that determine its apparition, among them we consider factors of economical, political and cultural type that define the sociohistorical context in which xenophobia appears. Key words: xenophobia. Migration. State. Human rights. Resumen: Se presenta un análisis de la xenofobia en Costa Rica desde una perspectiva histórica. Dicha perspectiva habilita comprender este fenómeno vinculado con diversos factores que condicionan su aparición, entre ellos factores de tipo económico, político y cultural que definen el contexto socio-histórico en que la xenofobia aparece. Palabras clave: xenofobia. Migración. Estado. Derechos humanos. Consideraciones generales El fenómeno de la xenofobia en Costa Rica tiene su origen en la propia historia. Esta historia, condiciona la manera en que la xenofobia aparece en un lugar y momento determinado como el producto de diversas influencias socio-culturales que configuran el imaginario y los modos de convivencia de aquellos sujetos que habitan ese lugar en ese momento determinado. La xenofobia es una situación donde los habitantes de un país muestran con actos, opiniones y actitudes "odio, repugnancia u hostilidad hacia los extranjeros" (Diccionario de la lengua española, 1992, 2112). Esta definición ofrece una idea general de la xenofobia. Sin embargo, para un análisis concreto de este fenómeno es necesario poner atención a lo que W. I. Thomas (citado por Berger, 1973, 122) denominó como situación social, cuyo sentido se forma por la manera en que los participantes definen dicha situación. De tal manera, que para estudiar la xenofobia se tiene que recurrir a las significaciones que los involucrados atribuyen a las prácticas sociales xenófobas. Por este medio, es posible determinar las diferentes formas y características con que se manifiesta la xenofobia. Como fenómeno histórico que es, la xenofobia no es estática sino que se desarrolla en diversos niveles y logra, en algunos casos, expandirse a toda la población de un país. Por expresar una relación de desigualdad social, la xenofobia implica necesariamente personas o grupos que la reproducen y personas o grupos que la sufren. Existen criterios para definir cuándo se da la xenofobia y cuándo no. Estos criterios, al tiempo que permiten diferenciar la xenofobia de otros fenómenos también permiten identificar fenómenos relacionados que pueden entenderse como sus condicionantes. Pedro J. Solís El fenómeno de la xenofobia en Costa Rica desde una perspectiva histórica PEDRO J. SOLÍS92 Rev. Filosofía Univ. Costa Rica, XLVII (120-121), 91-97, Enero-Agosto 2009 / ISSN: 0034-8252 Por ejemplo, de acuerdo con Simmel (citado por Del campo, 1976, 1190), la actitud de desconfianza inicial que muestran ciertos pobladores hacia los extranjeros no puede considerarse como un caso de xenofobia, pues es una reacción defensiva inicial que tiende a desaparecer con el tiempo. Sin embargo, si esta actitud se extiende más de lo debido en el tiempo conservando prejuicios y estereotipos hacia los extranjeros, entonces, aquí sí es posible hablar de xenofobia. En lo que respecta a sus condicionantes, la xenofobia no puede referirse a una causa única o esencial, por ejemplo, a la naturaleza humana, al instinto de autoconservación o al territorialismo innato al ser humano. Más bien, sus causas deben ser puestas en perspectiva histórica donde se hallará una multiplicidad de factores sociales cuya fuerza condicionante depende de la forma en que está organizada la sociedad, es decir, de la estructura social en un momento histórico determinado (Sobre el concepto de estructura social ver Light, D.; Keller, S. y Calhoun, C., 1995, 25). Entre esas causas o condicionantes, tenemos a los "de tipo psicológico, económico, de contacto y de tipo histórico, sobre todo cuando arraigan muy fuertes ciertos prejuicios antagónicos, creadores de hondas situaciones de xenofobia laboral, racial, religiosa, política, etc." (Del Campo, 1976, 1190) En el caso de Costa Rica, la xenofobia puede explicarse psicológicamente, por medio de lo que Freud denominó narcisismo por la mínima diferencia; económicamente, por la situación económica de la región y la percepción que tienen los costarricenses de que los extranjeros vienen a explotar sus recursos, saturar los servicios públicos y acaparar los empleos disponibles; por razones de contacto, debido a la superioridad que tienden a manifestar los costarricenses en el trato cotidiano con los extranjeros; e históricamente, por cuanto Costa Rica se ha caracterizado por un imaginario etnocéntrico que ha acompañado su formación como Estadonación independiente. Estos condicionantes, como factores explicativos, se desarrollan a lo largo del trabajo. Por el momento, es preciso indicar que la xenofobia se inscribe en el marco de un entramado de fuerzas sociales de carácter global y local. Lo global y lo local como criterios para entender el fenómeno de la xenofobia Desde el punto de vista global, la xenofobia se ve posibilitada por el surgimiento y consolidación de un capitalismo industrializado que fomenta la migración del campo a la ciudad de gran número de personas que buscan en la fábrica una nueva forma de ganarse el sustento, lo que implica a su vez una nueva forma de vida en condiciones de hacinamiento y hostilidad social. Este fenómeno de éxodo, se extiende más allá de los límites políticos de cada país en la medida que ese mismo sistema económico (capitalismo industrial) se internacionaliza generando una polarización global donde los países del denominado Tercer Mundo (predominantemente rurales y agrícolas) caen, por decirlo así, en una dependencia económica respecto de los países del Primer Mundo (predominantemente urbanos e industriales) debido a que estos últimos por su alto nivel tecnológico, generan un excedente de producción que se traduce en un incremento de riqueza al exportar a otros países (incluidos los del Tercer Mundo), ese mismo excedente en condiciones de claras ventajas comparativas. De manera, que los Países del Tercer Mundo por su atraso tecnológico y poca competitividad, experimentan un ensanchamiento de su deuda (pública y privada) con objeto de poder comprar y producir bienes (y servicios) y así estar a la altura de los mercados y patrones de consumo internacionales. Lo que conlleva, como un efecto no deseado, a un empobrecimiento paulatino que obliga a muchos de sus habitantes emigrar a otros países, principalmente del Primer Mundo, donde se van a encontrar con nuevas condiciones sociales doblemente excluyentes. Por un lado, se les excluye del mercado laboral porque en éste se privilegia a los locales, y por otro, se les excluye culturalmente porque aún no han recibido el proceso de enculturación correspondiente por lo que automáticamente pasan a ser los Otros desde el punto de mira de los locales. Esto implica considerar las fuerzas sociales locales, que se refieren al otro criterio a tomar en cuenta para entender el fenómeno de la xenofobia. EL FENÓMENO DE LA XENOFOBIA EN COSTA RICA DESDE UNA PERSPECTIVA HISTÓRICA 93 Rev. Filosofía Univ. Costa Rica, XLVII (120-121), 91-97, Enero-Agosto 2009 / ISSN: 0034-8252 Si bien Costa Rica es un país en vías de desarrollo, el aumento de las inmigraciones responde a la inestabilidad económica de los países de la región que sufren, al igual que nosotros, la polarización global generada por el sistema económico mundial. Dicha inestabilidad económica no hay que olvidar, también está asociada a la inestabilidad política en tanto los gobiernos de la región no han podido suturar las desigualdades estructurales de sus respectivas sociedades. Este es uno de los aspectos más importantes a considerar para entender la emigración a nuestro país, ya que Costa Rica goza de una alta estabilidad política en relación con los países vecinos, lo que la hace un sitio propicio para que los habitantes de esos países decidan emigrar hacia acá. Y como ya quedó manifiesto, aquellos que decidan buscar nuevas formas de ganarse el sustento en sitios alejados de su lugar de procedencia, se encontrarán con un mercado laboral excluyente y con una barrera cultural que, para el caso de los extranjeros puede tomar la forma de xenofobia. Este fenómeno tiene en Costa Rica sus particularidades, que no se explican únicamente a partir de las consideraciones generales que han sido expuestas. Como quedó establecido al inicio, la xenofobia de los costarricenses hay que verla en perspectiva histórica trayendo a colación sus especificidades que la hacen un caso concreto que debe ser estudiado por el investigador social. Migración y xenofobia en Costa Rica Al intentar comprender el fenómeno de la xenofobia en Costa Rica, se debe enfocar la mirada hacia la situación migratoria del país. En este sentido, Costa Rica presenta unas condiciones geográficas especiales que la hacen apta para la inmigración; entre ellas, ser un puente entre América del Sur y América del Norte, sus vastos recursos naturales, su situación económica y política que, a fin de cuentas, dan el aspecto de que el país goza de una cierta estabilidad interna si lo comparamos con los países vecinos. Por estas y otras razones, Costa Rica es un país con una alta tasa de inmigración si se toma también en consideración su territorio y población. Para tener una clara idea de esta tasa, la Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería en el año 2006, contabilizaba 296.101 extranjeros en el país, entre ellos residentes temporales y permanentes, de éstos 221.804 eran nicaragüenses. Es decir, más del 70 por 100 de los extranjeros en Costa Rica son nicaragüenses. Hay que dejar patente, que los extranjeros que deciden emigrar al país, en primera instancia, no vienen en condición de representantes de una cultura o de un país, vienen más bien en su calidad de individuos con una identidad particular y con sus propias historias de vida, las cuales sociopsicológicamente pueden ayudar a comprender por qué decidieron emigrar a este país y no a otro, o por qué simplemente decidieron abandonar su propio país. Pero la xenofobia no debe su origen solamente a que en este país viven muchos extranjeros, sino que la misma región es xenófoba desde el momento que la historia de América Latina está marcada por un sistema de dominio étnico-racial cuyos orígenes se sitúan ya en la época colonial. Desde la época colonial, la xenofobia se ha hecho ostensible en América Latina. Los europeos que vinieron a América traían ya consigo gérmenes xenófobos, en la medida que en Europa la discriminación se solía "dirigir contra los extranjeros que son distintos" (Van Dijk, 2003, 99-100). Y al asentarse en la región, y en su condición de inmigrantes/colonizadores, los europeos son quienes reproducen la xenofobia al discriminar a los no europeos, es decir, a los indígenas. Esto lleva a cristalizar una ideología racista en el continente que no solamente es reproducida por los europeos son también por los latinos blancos, y que consiste básicamente en discriminar y segregar a todo aquel que no sea de origen europeo. En el contexto latinoamericano, las migraciones que dan pie al surgimiento de la xenofobia generalmente son de los países más pobres a los menos pobres, observándose esto en el caso de bolivianos, peruanos y paraguayos que se desplazan a Argentina en busca de trabajo (Van Dijk, 2003, 106). Lo mismo podría decirse de lo que PEDRO J. SOLÍS94 Rev. Filosofía Univ. Costa Rica, XLVII (120-121), 91-97, Enero-Agosto 2009 / ISSN: 0034-8252 ocurre con los nicaragüenses que emigran hacia Costa Rica. La discriminación que sufren algunos extranjeros, principalmente los nicaragüenses, se justifica acusándolos de que vienen a desestabilizar social y económicamente al país. Estas justificaciones son formuladas principalmente por aquellos que detentan el poder. Para ilustrar lo anterior, véase una declaración del ex-diputado Ricardo Toledo Carranza sobre la inmigración en un debate parlamentario, Acta No 13, 20 de julio de 2005, para aprobar la actual Ley de Migración y Extranjería, expediente No 14.269: Pero qué diferente es lo que está pasando en nuestra Costa Rica... un país que ha colapsado el sistema educativo, con más de 7.000 millones de colones que cuesta atender a indocumentados... y cuando vemos que cuesta 11.000 millones a la Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social atender indocumentados, dinero que pudo invertirse en mejoras de la Caja, en mejoras del sistema educativo, para que las y los costarricenses tengan mejores servicios, que algunas se atrevan a decir que esta Ley va en contra de los derechos humanos, esta es la peor falacia que yo he oído ¡Y los derechos humanos de los costarricenses! (41) Este discurso de poder xenófobo se suma a otra realidad que también hace que la situación de los inmigrantes se agrave, y es que los inmigrantes que vienen al país a trabajar, como los nicaragüenses, en su mayoría perciben un salario inferior a lo legalmente permitido y además, son discriminados laboralmente aduciéndose que los nacionales deben ocupar prioritariamente sus trabajos. Esto genera una imagen poco hospitalaria del país y su respectiva respuesta de desconfianza de los extranjeros hacia los costarricenses, lo cual termina provocando en algunos casos, una tensión política entre los países de la región y Costa Rica. Tensión que se ha visto acentuada con la aprobación de la Ley de Migración y Extranjería en el 2005. Esta ley ha sido fuertemente criticada desde diversos sectores ya que, en algunos de sus artículos, parece rozar con los derechos humanos más fundamentales. Si se toma en consideración que los inmigrantes vienen a Costa Rica a asentarse o a trabajar (muchas veces ambas), ciertos artículos de la mencionada ley podrían obstaculizar esa posibilidad, entre los cuales se encuentran los artículos 75, 76, 77 y 79 del capítulo II intitulado "Residentes temporales". En lo que respecta al nuevo Proyecto de Ley de Migración y Extranjería, expediente No 16.594, no se presentan cambios significativos en los artículos correspondientes a ese mismo capítulo. En el artículo 75 de la ley vigente, se establece que el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto tiene la potestad de denegar la permanencia en el país a quienes profesan una religión no acreditada por el ministerio. Esto, desde nuestro punto de vista, puede generar discriminación hacia aquellas personas extranjeras que tienen una religión que en Costa Rica no se considera como tradicional. También se limita el ingreso de aquellas personas que en su condición de trabajadoras, no sean consideradas prioritarias de acuerdo con las políticas de migración. Esto incluso puede ser leído, como si el Estado no solamente puede arrogarse la potestad de decidir quién es útil a la patria y quién no sino además, y como consecuencia de lo anterior, arrogarse la posibilidad de excluirlo de su permanencia en el territorio. El artículo 76 señala, que los extranjeros únicamente pueden ejercer una ocupación previo estudio técnico del Ministerio de Trabajo, pero no se garantiza a los extranjeros si gozarán de las mismas posibilidades y libertades ocupacionales que los costarricenses. En los artículos 77 y 79, se exige que los extranjeros que quieran legalizar su condición en el país, deben tener unos ingresos estables. Ciertamente, estos ingresos están por encima del salario mínimo, pues van de los $600 hasta los $2000 mensuales. Esto evidentemente, excluye a aquellas personas de muy escasos ingresos, que vienen al país para mejorar en cierta medida su pobre condición originada en su país natal. Por lo tanto, nos parece que esta disposición es no humanitaria. Se infiere de tales artículos, que la discriminación por origen nacional se avala incluso legalmente, y que junto a esa discriminación EL FENÓMENO DE LA XENOFOBIA EN COSTA RICA DESDE UNA PERSPECTIVA HISTÓRICA 95 Rev. Filosofía Univ. Costa Rica, XLVII (120-121), 91-97, Enero-Agosto 2009 / ISSN: 0034-8252 hay implícitos elementos de clase y desigualdad social. La xenofobia en el país es, entonces, aquella que no solamente discrimina en razón del origen nacional sino también en razón del tipo y cantidad de oportunidades vitales que caracteriza a un determinado grupo de individuos y por la simple condición de ser diferente u ocupar diferentes papeles sociales (Sobre las nociones de clase, desigualdad y diferenciación social ver Kerbo, 1998, 3-18). Por su parte, la Declaración de las Naciones Unidas sobre la eliminación de todas las formas de discriminación racial de 1963, establece en su Artículo 2.1 lo siguiente: Ningún Estado fomentará, propugnará o apoyará, con medidas policíacas o de cualquier otra manera, ninguna discriminación fundada en la raza, el color o el origen étnico, practicada por cualquier grupo, institución o individuo. Esto nos deja claro las incongruencias entre los derechos humanos que incluso el país proclama y defiende de palabra y lo que constituye sus verdaderas prácticas justificadas legalmente basándose en la soberanía de su derecho interno. A continuación, se analiza la forma en que el imaginario construido por los costarricenses para pensar a Costa Rica contiene marcados elementos xenófobos. Lo imaginario en la nación El período de formación de Costa Rica como Estado-nación independiente es un proceso que empieza con la fundación de la República en 1848, y culmina con la consolidación de Costa Rica como una nación democrática y moderna en la década de los ochenta en el siglo XX. A lo largo de este período, pero sobre todo a partir de 1948 con la revolución, se gesta un imaginario que acompaña al proyecto político y social que denominamos Estado-nación costarricense. (Jiménez, 2002, 85, 88) Dicho imaginario tiende a explicar de una manera ciertamente mística la razón de ser de Costa Rica y la forma de ser de los costarricenses. Aquí se empieza a diferenciar al país de los demás países centroamericanos, lo cual atribuye a los costarricenses una identidad específica (nacional). Principalmente aquella que se define por su homogeneidad racial, a la cual se suma las ideas de que Costa Rica es un verdadero paraíso tropical, que es una democracia rural de pequeños propietarios caracterizada por la pureza de los sufragios y que es por tanto la Suiza centroamericana, ya que estas características "no" la poseen los demás países centroamericanos. (Jiménez, 2002, 88-89) La identidad nacional costarricense sin duda, forma parte de un imaginario que está desligado de la realidad política, social y económica del desarrollo nacional. La insistencia en las características de homogeneidad racial, de pureza etnocultural y racionalidad, ésta última característica alentada por filósofos e intelectuales de la segunda mitad del siglo XX, ha gestado una forma etnocéntrica de concebir al ser costarricense que, por el contrario, se caracteriza por su mestizaje y por una cultura predominantemente importada de Europa por los colonizadores, la cual a su vez fue propagada por aquellos intelectuales criollos que habiéndose formado en ese continente pretendieron medir a Costa Rica con la misma vara con la que los europeos se miden a sí mismos. Psicológicamente, el etnocentrismo del costarricense medio que reproduce este patrón puede ser caracterizado por lo que Freud denominó narcisismo por la mínima diferencia. Ello significa, que la tendencia insistente de los costarricenses por diferenciarse es el resultado de la intolerancia a saberse parecidos y compartir la misma historia de los demás países centroamericanos, una historia de colonización, explotación e injusticia que explica el atraso sistemático al que están sujetos los países de esta región. Los costarricenses obviamente, al no tener diferencias radicales frente a los demás habitantes centroamericanos tienden a exagerar mínimas diferencias que son prácticamente irrelevantes como su idiosincrasia, forma de hablar, estatura, color de piel, etc. El problema de todo ello es que a través de la supervaloración de estos aspectos irrelevantes, se establece un mecanismo que "parecería legitimar nuestra agresividad y crueldad con quienes esencialmente se nos asemejan, PEDRO J. SOLÍS96 Rev. Filosofía Univ. Costa Rica, XLVII (120-121), 91-97, Enero-Agosto 2009 / ISSN: 0034-8252 bajo el argumento de ser radicalmente diferentes" (Jiménez, 2002, 21). Esto último también explica el fenómeno de la xenofobia en Costa Rica por razones de contacto, debido a que los costarricenses al aducir que son radicalmente diferentes a los demás centroamericanos y que esa diferencia es un rasgo enteramente positivo, establecen prácticas sociales en las cuales se muestra la superioridad en su trato cotidiano con los inmigrantes de los otros países centroamericanos y con los nicaragüenses en particular. Ciertamente, estas prácticas no pudieran sostenerse si no se busca en los extranjeros las cualidades ficticias que los costarricenses se atribuyen a sí mismos. Moral y derechos humanos en relación con el trato de inmigrantes De acuerdo con Habermas, la idea de la integración de los grupos humanos incluidos los extranjeros, es una pretensión moralmente válida desde el momento que esa moral sea universal, es decir, válida para todos, y se podría añadir humanista, es decir, centrada en la persona humana. Este tipo de ética puede verse enunciada en los preámbulos de las declaraciones de derechos humanos que expresan los principios jurídicos denominados como dogmática iushumanista. Según Habermas, actualmente en las democracias occidentales existe un consenso mínimo sobre las pautas de convivencia humana tendientes a potenciar la inclusión del Otro. Ese consenso es eminentemente ético, por lo cual no es inmediatamente vinculante para los ordenamientos jurídicos de cada país. Por razones de soberanía, cada país tiene el derecho de establecer su propia política migratoria, lo cual en determinados casos entra en contradicción con los principios éticos y jurídicos esbozados en las declaraciones de derechos humanos. En este punto, moral y derecho no pueden identificarse sin más (Sobre este tema ver Habermas, 1999, 220-221). La integración de los grupos humanos (sin distingos de nacionalidad, grupo social, etnia, religión, etc.), como pretensión jurídica razonable es obstaculizada por las justificaciones ideológicas que amparan las políticas migratorias de cada país, y Costa Rica no es la excepción. Dichas justificaciones comúnmente, tienden a mostrar que una emigración descontrolada hacia el país rebasa la capacidad de las instituciones públicas para brindar un servicio efectivo a las mayorías, lo que ha de traducirse necesariamente en inestabilidad económica e inseguridad social, de modo que lo mejor sería aplicar mano dura con los extranjeros que ilegalmente ingresan al país y contra aquellos que les dan alojo y trabajo. Es así, como se palpa un hiato entre lo que se pretende a nivel de las organizaciones internacionales que fomentan y defienden los derechos humanos y lo que cada país justifica como jurídicamente relevante en el contexto de las políticas migratorias. Un hecho que comenta Habermas y que tiene validez para Costa Rica, es que por lo general esas justificaciones remiten a una idealización del Estado de Bienestar, que por diversas razones ha entrado en crisis en la gran mayoría de los países occidentales. Esta es una de las razones histórico-culturales más importantes que dan cuenta del actual fenómeno de xenofobia en Costa Rica. Esa idealización del Estado de Bienestar conlleva a ver en los inmigrantes la causa potencial de esa crisis que atraviesa el Estado-nación costarricense. A continuación, se ofrece un ejemplo de idealización del pueblo costarricense y sus logros como Estado-nación, del sociólogo Rodolfo Cerdas (citado por Jiménez, 2004, 32): Últimamente, se ha puesto de moda criticar a Costa Rica, como si aquí nada tuviera valor y solo tuviera defectos. Para repudiar el rechazo xenofóbico a la inmigración, especialmente la nicaragüense..., se tienden a perpetrar tres yerros inadmisibles: primero, denigrar, en general, a todo el pueblo costarricense, devaluando lo mucho y bueno que hemos conquistado; segundo, obviar los problemas reales que acarrean las migraciones. Y tercero, atribuir toda clase de virtudes y ventajas a los inmigrantes, sin reconocer sus desventajas educativas, de salud y adaptación sociales en que llegan. EL FENÓMENO DE LA XENOFOBIA EN COSTA RICA DESDE UNA PERSPECTIVA HISTÓRICA 97 Rev. Filosofía Univ. Costa Rica, XLVII (120-121), 91-97, Enero-Agosto 2009 / ISSN: 0034-8252 Con esta cita queda claro, que las justificaciones de la xenofobia por vía de la idealización del Estado costarricense provienen también de intelectuales, y por tanto, configuran un discurso "académico" cada vez más complejo de desarticular. Ello permite constatar la inconveniencia de todos aquellos discursos provenientes de intelectuales que escudándose en la autoridad de su profesión, justifican y propagan elementos xenófobos por motivos cuestionables como las supuestas repercusiones negativas de la estancia de ciertos extranjeros en el país. Sin duda, las viejas apelaciones a la estabilidad perdida del Estado benefactor es el fondo ideológico que subyace a este tipo de justificaciones. Conclusión Las prácticas xenófobas que fomenta el ordenamiento jurídico costarricense con su Ley de Migración y Extranjería pueden interpretarse a la luz de la desesperación frente al fin de un imaginario y de unas instituciones que han entrado en su etapa final y que, tomando en consideración las tendencias actuales, se están reorientando hacia una actitud de tolerancia multicultural y a un cambio institucional que puede definirse como el paso de los estados nacionales a los estados post-nacionales (Habermas). El prefijo "post", indica la inminente desaparición de los imaginarios y sensibilidades nacionalistas que en una época anterior sirvieron para justificar y oponer resistencia a la opresión colonial. Sin embargo, lo anterior no puede ser leído ingenuamente, como si con este cambio nos estuviéramos acercando a un estado ideal de verdadera igualdad y tolerancia entre grupos humanos: debido a que las fuerzas sociales globales y locales, orientadas por el actual sistema económico mundial, no reúnen las condiciones apropiadas para crear un ambiente social en el que la xenofobia se erradique totalmente. Pero no sólo eso, si bien la emigración en masa y la discriminación étnica o nacional, también en masa, a que conllevan las desigualdades sociales de los países del Tercer Mundo es primordialmente por causas económicas, lo cierto es que la cultura aquí también juega un papel crucial, ya que los procesos de enculturación propios de cada sociedad no han entrado en una dinámica de apertura y democratización necesarias para combatir efectivamente la xenofobia. Desde la familia, la escuela, pasando incluso por los medios de difusión de masas, no se ve un cambio sustancial y positivo en las opiniones y actitudes de los costarricenses hacia los inmigrantes. Estos agentes de socialización por su función meramente adaptativa, se centran en avalar las pautas sociales vigentes de manera poco crítica, favoreciendo que Costa Rica se perciba como una sociedad bastante idiosincrásica y cerrada. Bibliografía Berger, P. (1973) Introducción a la sociología. México: Limusa. Del Campo, S. (1976) Diccionario de ciencias sociales (2 Vols.). Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos. Real academia española. (1992) Diccionario de la lengua española (2 Vols.). Madrid: Espasa-Calpe. Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería. (2007) Planificación Institucional. San José, CR.: Editado por la Institución. Habermas, J. (1999) La inclusión del otro: Estudios de teoría política. Barcelona: Paidós. Jiménez, A. (2002) El imposible país de los filósofos: El discurso y la invención de Costa Rica. San José, CR.: Perro Azul. _________. (2004) Sociedades Hospitalarias. San José, CR.: Perro Azul. Kerbo, H. (1998) Estratificación social y desigualdad. El conflicto de clases en perspectiva histórica y comparada. España: McGraw-Hill. La Asamblea Legislativa de la República de Costa Rica. (2005) Ley de Migración y Extranjería. Extraído el 6 Noviembre, 2007 de http://www. asamblea.go.cr/proyecto/14200/14269.doc. Light, D.; Keller, S. y Calhoun, C. (1995) Sociología. México: McGraw-Hill. Organización de las Naciones Unidas. (1963) Declaración de las Naciones Unidas sobre la eliminación de todas las formas de discriminación racial. Proclamada por la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas el 20 de noviembre de 1963 [resolución 1904 (VXIII)]. Extraído el 14 Noviembre, 2007 de http://www. unhchr.ch/spanish/html/menu3/b/9_sp.htm Van Dijk, T. A. (2003) Dominación étnica y racismo discursivo en España y América Latina. Barcelona: Gedisa.

WERTE BEI CARNAP 1. Einleitung Es gilt als ausgemacht, dass die Logischen Empiristen des Wiener Kreises mit Ethik wenig im Sinn hatten. Aussagen über ethische Sachverhalte hielten sie für kognitiv bedeutungslos, und Werte waren Artefakte einer abstrusen Metaphysik. Eine wissenschaftlich akzeptable Beschäftigung mit ethischen Problemen kam für sie höchstens als Metaethik in Frage. Schaut man genauer hin, liegen die Dinge vielleicht nicht ganz so klar, aber zumindest für einen exemplarischen logischen Empiristen wie Rudolf Carnap scheint zu gelten, seine Beschäftigung mit Problemen der Ethik habe sich auf eher beiläufige Bemerkungen zur Metaethik beschränkt. Bei näherem Besehen erweist sich jedoch der Stellenwert des Themas "Werte" in Carnaps Philosophie als nicht so unbedeutend wie es zunächst den Anschein hat: (i) Der im Aufbau vorgetragene "Entwurf eines Konstitutionssystems" wird mit einer Skizze der Konstitution von Werten als der höchsten Schicht des Konstitutionssystems abgeschlossen (Aufbau § 152). (ii) Die Quasianalyse als Konstitutionsmethode des Aufbau steht mit der werttheoretischen Unterscheidung von Sein und Gelten in enger Verbindung (Aufbau § 42). (iii) Die Intellektuelle Autobiographie Carnaps schliesst mit einem eigenen Kapitel Werte und praktische Entscheidungen ab (Carnap 1963a). (iv) Die ausführlichste Replik Carnaps auf die im Schilpp-Band The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap versammelten Arbeiten gilt Abraham Kaplans Beitrag Logical Empiricism and Value Judgment. (Carnap 1963b) Insgesamt gesehen ist also das Thema "Werte" in Carnaps Werk wohl doch keine quantité négligeable. Diese Tatsache ist bisher nur unzureichend zur Kenntnis genommen worden. In dieser Arbeit geht es um die Rolle der Werte für Carnaps frühe Philosophie, d.h. für die Konstitutionstheorie des Aufbau und einige kleinere Arbeiten aus den frühen dreissiger 2 Jahren. Es werden also in dieser Arbeit nur die ersten beiden Punkte (i) und (ii) der obigen Liste erörtert werden.1 Fast alle Interpreten des Aufbau haben die Konstitution der Werte und allgemeiner der "geistigen Gegenstände", zu denen die Werte gehören, ignoriert.2 Als Begründung für diese Auslassung kann man vorbringen, die Konstitution dieser Gegenstände sei so skizzenhaft und unvollständig, dass es nicht lohne darauf einzugehen. Selbst wenn das richtig wäre, ist eine Vernachlässigung der Wertkonstitution damit noch nicht gerechtfertigt: Um den Aufbau zu verstehen, ist seine Gesamtarchitektur im Auge zu behalten, und dazu gehört eben auch die höchste Konstitutionsebene der "geistigen" Gegenstände, zu denen insbesondere die Werte zählen. Ob die Konstitution dieser Gegenstände gelungen ist oder nicht, ist eine andere Frage. Jedenfalls spielte die Konstitution der "geistigen" Gegenstände, mit denen sich die "Geisteswissenschaften" oder "Kulturwissenschaften" beschäftigen, im ursprünglichen Programm des Aufbau durchaus eine Rolle. Man kann sie nicht ignorieren, ohne die Architektonik des Werkes verzerrt darzustellen. Die Beschränkung auf Probleme der Konstitution mathematischer und physikalischer Gegenstände war im Aufbau keineswegs so ausgeprägt, wie es die empiristischen Interpretationen des Aufbau durch Quine und Goodman glauben machen. Die Vernachlässigung der geistigen Gegenstände ist weniger der ursprünglichen Intention des Aufbau selbst anzulasten als vielmehr der einseitig naturwissenschaftlichen Orientierung der analytischen Wissenschaftsphilosophie, die mit den geistesoder kulturwissenschaftlichen Aspekten des Werkes nichts anzufangen wusste. Werte im Sinne des südwestdeutschen Neukantianismus spielen im Aufbau jedoch nicht nur als Elemente der höchsten Schicht des Konstitutionssystems eine Rolle, werttheoretische Begriffsbildungen prägten auch die Konstitutionsmethode selbst, die sogenannte Quasianalyse. In § 42 skizziert Carnap eine Interpretation der Quasianalyse, die direkt auf die Sein-Gelten Unterscheidung rekurriert, die für den südwestdeutschen Neukantianismus charakteristisch war. Danach kann, wie später im einzelnen erläutert werden soll, die quasianalytische Konstitution eines Gegenstandes als strukturelle Bewertung bereits konstituierter Gegenstände begriffen werden. Schliesslich weist Carnap in §12 ausdrücklich darauf hin, dass die quasianalytische Begriffskonstitution auch und gerade die Konstitution kulturwissenschaftlicher Individualbegriffe umfasse, die der Wissenschaftsphilosophie der südwestdeutschen Schule besonders am Herzen lagen. Insgesamt möchte ich behaupten, 1 Die spätere Entwicklung, die vor allem die Rolle der Werte für die Beziehungen zwischen Logischem Empirismus und Pragmatismus betrifft, soll an anderer Stelle behandelt werden. 2 Ausnahmen sind Morris (1963) und Heidelberger (1985). Heidelberger hebt mit Recht hervor, dass erst mit Einbeziehung der geistigen Gegenstände die umfassenden einheitswissenschaftlichen Ambitionen des Aufbau deutlich werden (ibdidem, p. 144-145). 3 dass sich in den Skizzen zu den höheren Schichten des Konstitutionssystems das philosophische Rohmaterial, aus dem der Aufbau gestaltet wurde, deutlicher zeigt als in den formal durchgearbeiteten Konstitutionen der unteren Schichten. Deshalb ist eine Untersuchung gerade dieser Schichten für die Erhellung des philosophischen Kontextes, in dem der Aufbau entstand, von besonderer Bedeutung. Die Wertthematik erlaubt einen Blick auf Unterströmungen des carnapschen Denkens, die in den "offiziellen" logisch-empiristischen Darstellungen seines Denkens oft vernachlässigt werden. Dazu gehören Philosopheme des südwestdeutschen Neukantianismus, Fragestellungen der Lebensphilosophie, bis hin zu Anleihen bei pseudophilosophischen biologistischen Strömungen wie Ostwalds Energetismus. Alle diese Ingredienzen koexistierten keineswegs friedlich miteinander. Insbesondere zwischen Lebensphilosophie und neukantianischer Schulphilosophie gab es heftige Dispute, die Entsprechungen in Carnaps eigener philosophischer Entwicklung hatten. Das Ergebnis dieser Auseinandersetzungen war in den dreissiger Jahren eine thematische Engführung von Carnaps Philosophie, der die Verbindungen zu vielen nichtempiristischen Ansätzen wie den verschiedenen Strömungen des Neukantianismus und der Phänomenologie zum Opfer fielen. Diese Arbeit ist folgendermassen gegliedert: Im Abschnitt 2 geht es um die Beziehungen des Aufbau zum südwestdeutschen Neukantianismus Rickerts und zu einem Konglomerat aus Logik, Kantianismus, Lebensphilosophie, Neuromantik, das ich, Gabriel folgend, als Jenaer Konstellation3 bezeichnen möchte (cf. Gabriel 2004). Abschnitt 3 behandelt diejenigen Momente von Carnaps Konstitutionstheorie, die wesentlich durch die Wertphilosophie des südwestdeutschen Neukantianismus geprägt wurden. Dabei handelt es sich (i) um die Konstitution von Werten als Gegenständen der höchsten Konstitutionsebene, (ii) um die "werttheoretische" Interpretation der Quasianalyse als allgemeiner Konstitutionsmethode und (iii) um Carnaps These, die Konstitionstheorie des Aufbau verfüge über die begrifflichen Mittel, sowohl die individuellen Begriffe der Kulturwissenschaften wie auch die allgemeinen Begriffe der Naturwissenschaften zu rekonstruieren. Abschnitt 4 behandelt die Rolle der Lebensphilosophie für Carnaps lebenslange antimetaphysische Prägung, die sich seit den 30er Jahren insbesondere in einem strikten Nonkognitivismus manifestierte. Wir schliessen mit einigen Überlegungen zum Stil von Carnaps Philosophie, der durch die Jenaer Konstellation nicht unwesentlich geprägt wurde, und in dessen Eigenart sich manches von "Jena" erhielt, längst nachdem er Jena verlassen hatte. 3 Eine ausführliche autobiographische Darstellung der Jenaer Konstellation findet sich in Flitners Erinnerungen (Flitner 1986). Die philosopischen und politischen Aspekte des Jenaer Kontextes werden von Flitner jedoch nur am Rande behandelt. 4 2. Rickerts System und Carnaps Aufbau Obwohl Carnap in seiner Intellektuellen Autobiographie (Carnap 1963) Rickert nicht erwähnt, hat er sich lange mit dessen Philosophie befasst. Nachdem er 1910 sein Studium in Jena aufgenommen hatte, ging er 1911 1912 nach Freiburg und hörte dort Vorlesungen Rickerts; vor Ausbruch des Krieges kehrte er nach Jena zurück, um dort sein Philosophiestudium bei Rickerts ehemaligem Schüler Bauch fortzusetzen, dessen eigener Ansatz Rickerts werttheoretischem Neukantianismus nahestand. Seit Beginn des Krieges 1914 Soldat, kehrte Carnap Ende 1918 nach Jena zurück, um sein Studium abzuschliessen und bei Bauch zu promovieren. In seiner Dissertation Der Raum. Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschaftslehre (Carnap 1922) spielt der südwestdeutsche Neukantianismus aus thematischen Gründen naturgemäss kaum eine Rolle im Unterschied zum Aufbau, wie nun im Einzelnen gezeigt werden soll. In der Bibliographie des Aufbau, dessen erste Version wohl 1924/25 fertiggestellt wurde, werden das damals neueste Buch Rickerts System der Philosophie (1921) und die neuesten Auflagen seiner älteren Werke erwähnt. Auch wenn man die Unterbrechung durch den Krieg berücksichtigt, ergibt sich damit eine Zeitspanne von mehr als 10 Jahren, in denen sich Carnap mit Rickerts Philosophie befasst haben muss. Tatsächlich sind, wie im Folgenden gezeigt werden soll, die Bezüge zu Rickerts Philosophie im Aufbau weitaus enger als aus Carnaps direkten Verweisen oder aus der Bibliographie sichtbar wird. Um das zu zeigen, ist es zweckmässig, zunächst auf Carnaps Jenaer philosophische Wurzeln einzugehen. Über den Zusammenhang von Carnaps Frühphilosophie und Jenaer Konstellation hat Gabriel vor kurzem die folgende These aufgestellt: "Carnap's early philosophy, especially as it comes across in the Aufbau, Pseudoproblems in Philosophy, and Overcoming Metaphysics can be regarded as a configuration of influences a cross-fertilization of modern logic, neo-Kantian constitution theory, and the critique of metaphysics stemming from Lebensphilosophie highly specific to a particular time and place: Jena in the first two decades of the twentieth century, when Carnap grew up and went to university there." (Gabriel 2004, 6). Grundsätzlich ist Gabriels These, die Jenaer Konstellation habe Carnaps Frühphilosophie wesentlich geprägt, sicher zuzustimmen. Problematisch erscheint mir jedoch Gabriels Einschätzung der Rolle der Lebensphilosophie: Betrachtet man Carnaps Frühphilosophie insgesamt, beginnend mit seiner Dissertation Der Raum (Carnap 1922), gefolgt von Arbeiten wie Über die Aufgabe der Physik (Carnap 1923), Dreidimensionalität des Raumes 5 und Kausalität (Carnap 1924) usw., so ist festzustellen, dass diese Arbeiten schon aus thematischen Gründen keinerlei lebensphilosophische Bezüge aufweisen. Deutliche Spuren der Lebensphilosophie finden sich erst in den Arbeiten, die in Wien geschrieben wurden, nachdem Carnap Jena längst verlassen hatte, etwa in den Scheinproblemen.4 Die Metaphysikkritik in Überwindung (Carnap 1932), ist, wie Gabriel mit Recht betont, stark durch die Lebensphilosophie Nietzsches geprägt. Carnaps Wiener Metaphysikkritik ist aber auch deutlich beeinflusst durch aufklärerische und empiristische Ansätze, die nicht im Jenaer Milieu ihren Ursprung hatten. Gleichgültig wie weit man die Grenzen der Jenaer Konfiguration auch zieht, sie umfasst sicher nicht alle Einflüsse, die Carnaps Frühphilosophie prägten es fehlen z.B. Rickert, Husserls Phänomenologie5 und der Marburger Neukantianismus Cassirers und Natorps, von Autoren wie Driesch und anderen schwer klassifizierbaren Philosophen und Wissenschaftlern ganz zu schweigen. Um auch diesen anderen Einflüsse gerecht zu werden, schlage ich vor, Gabriels These folgendermassen zu erweitern: (i) Der Aufbau ist als Carnaps Versuch zu verstehen, aus einer Jenaer Perspektive alles, was er bis zu Beginn der 20er Jahre philosophisch zur Kenntnis genommen hatte, in einem Werk zu einer neuen wissenschaftlichen Philosophie zu synthetisieren. Dieses Vorhaben werde als allgemeines Synthetisierungsprogramm bezeichnet. (ii) Das antimetaphysische Potential der schon in Jena vorhandenen lebensphilosophischen Orientierung Carnaps wurde in Wien verstärkt durch eine spezifisch Wienerische Antimetaphysik, die in der Jenaer Konstellation nicht vorhanden war. (iii) Unter dem Einfluss der antimetaphysischen Einstellung des Wiener Kreises und seines Umfeldes (Wittgenstein, Mach) wurde um 1930 das allgemeine Synthetisierungsprogramm des Aufbau aufgegeben. Neukantianische, phänomenologische, und sonstige nichtempiristische Komponenten verschwanden aus Carnaps Philosophie. Wie umfassend der Synthetisierungsanspruch der Konstitutionstheorie war, erhellt bereits aus einem kurzen Blick auf die Bibliographie des Aufbau. Im Text selbst wird diese Perspektive an zahlreichen Stellen explizit formuliert. So findet man z.B. über das Verhältnis der Konstitutionstheorie zum Positivismus und Neukantianismus: 4 Die metaphysikkritischen Abschnitte im Aufbau (§§ 179 183) sind durch Wittgenstein beeinflusst: Der letzte Satz des Aufbau zitiert den letzten Satz des Tractatus. Das lässt vermuten, dass sie erst in Wien verfasst wurden. 5 Während Carnap in Buchenbach lebte, hat er an einigen Seminaren Husserls im nahen Freiburg teilgenommen. 6 "Das Verdienst der Aufdeckung der notwendigen Basis des Konstitutionssystems kommt zwei ganz verschiedenen und häufig einander feindlichen, philosophischen Richtungen zu. Der Positivismus hat hervorgehoben, dass das einzige Material der Erkenntnis im unverarbeiteten, erlebnismässig Gegebenen liegt; dort sind die Grundelemente des Konstitutionssystems zu suchen. Der transzendentale Idealismus insbesondere neukantianischer Richtung (Rickert, Bauch, Cassirer) hat aber mit Recht betont, dass diese Elemente nicht genügen; es müssen Ordnungssetzungen hinzukommen, unsere "Grundrelationen"." (Aufbau, § 75) Carnap stellte den Aufbau jedoch keineswegs nur in den Kontext der neukantianischen Tradition, ihm zufolge konnte die Konstitutionstheorie auch im Sinne von Husserls Phänomenologie als "mathesis der (reinen) Erlebnisse" interpretiert werden (Aufbau, § 3). Geht man von Carnaps allgemeinem Synthetisierungsprogramm aus, wird das Problem, ob der Aufbau neukantianisch, empiristisch, logizistisch, phänomenologisch oder wie auch immer zu lesen sei, zu einem gewissen Grade trivialisiert: Für alle diese Lesarten gibt es Belege, aber keine von ihnen kann ein Interpretationsmonopol beanspruchen. Das bedeutet, man sollte den Wettlauf um die eine "richtige" Interpretation des Aufbau aufgeben und anders fragen: Wenn der Aufbau auf eine umfassende Synthese der verschiedensten, hochgradig disparaten Einflüsse zielte, und dieses Programm in den dreissiger Jahren von Carnap aufgegeben wurde, legt das die Frage nahe, wie lange diese verschiedenen Ingredienzen sich in seiner Philosophie gehalten und wie sie sich entwickelt haben. Diesem Problem soll in dieser Arbeit für die Werttheorie nachgegangen werden. Genauer gesagt, möchte ich zeigen, dass die Konstitutionstheorie des Aufbau zunächst als eine modernisierte und formalisierte Version von Rickerts Konstitutionstheorie konzipiert wurde, wie dieser sie in seinem System der Philosophie (Rickert 1921) vorgelegt hatte. Diese durch Rickerts Ansatz inspirierte Interpretation des Aufbau wurde zu Anfang der dreissiger Jahre aufgegeben: Werte verschwanden von der Liste konstituierbarer wissenschaftlicher Gegenstände, und auch die geltungstheoretische Interpretation der Quasianalyse wurde als gegenstandslos fallen gelassen. Ein erster Hinweis auf eine engere Beziehung zwischen der Konstitutionstheorie des Aufbau und Rickerts System der Philosophie findet sich in Carnaps unveröffentlichtem Manuskript Vom Chaos zur Wirklichkeit (Carnap 1921/22), das er offenbar zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt mit der handschriftlichen Notiz versah "Dies ist der Keim zur Konstitutionstheorie des "Log. Aufbau"" (RC-081 05 01). In Chaos beschreibt er die Ausgangssitutation und Grundintention der Konstitutionstheorie folgendermassen: 7 "Die "Wirklichkeit" ist uns nicht als etwas Festes gegeben, sondern unterliegt dauernder Korrektion. Der Erkenntnistheoretiker sagt: sie ist aufgebaut worden um einer bestimmten Leistung willen aus einem ursprünglichen Chaos nach zunächst instinktiven Ordnungsprinzipien. ... [Der] Wille zur Neuordnung ... ist es, der die erkenntnistheoretische Überlegung und die in ihr auftretenden Fiktionen vom Chaos als Ausgangspunkt und von den Ordnungsprinzipien, nach denen der Bau geschehen ist, ... veranlasst." Dieser Wille, die Unstimmigkeiten der Wirklichkeit durch Umbau der Wirklichkeit zu überwinden, ist auch der irrationale Ausgangspunkt unserer Theorie." (Carnap 1922) Bei Rickert findet man die folgende Beschreibung für den Anfang seines "Systems": "Was wir unmittelbar "erleben", ... ist ... nach Abzug aller Auffassungsformen ein regelloses "Gewühl" von Eindrücken, die fortwährend wecheln ... Die völlig unsystematisch gedachte Welt ist für den wissenschaftlichen Menschen ein .... Chaos. Das kommt freilich den meisten nicht zum vollen Bewusstsein, aber das liegt daran, dass wir alle von Geburt an in eine festgefügte Gliederung der Welt hineinwachsen. (Rickert , 6/7) ... So ist mit dem Willen zur philosophischen Betrachtung der Welt der "Wille zum System"6 ... notwendig verknüpft. (ibidem, 10) ... Die Philosophie hat die Welt so zu denken, dass aus dem Chaos der Erlebnisse ein nach Prinzipien geordneter und gegliederter Kosmos entsteht." (ibidem, 50) Chaos war nicht zur Veröffentlichung bestimmt und enthält deshalb keine bibliographische Angaben. Die Ähnlichkeiten mit Rickerts gerade erschienem System (Rickert 1921) scheinen mir aber so frappierend zu sein, dass eine zufällige Übereinstimmung eher unwahrscheinlich ist. Für das Folgende spielt dies aber keine Rolle, es genügt die sachliche Übereinstimmung zwischen Aufbau und System. System und Aufbau beginnen beide mit einer grundlegenden Schicht minimal strukturierter Grundelemente, Rickert mit "Erlebnissen", und Carnap mit "Elementarerlebnissen". Diese sind keine wahrgenommenen oder erkannten Gegenstände oder Sachverhalte, sondern Fragmente, die erst durch gewisse "Formungen" zu Gegenständen und Sinnganzheiten zusammengefasst werden. Dadurch entstehen verschiedene Gegenstandsphären, die die Gegenstandsbereiche der verschiedenen Wissenschaften bilden. Diesen, bei Rickert nur informell geschilderten "Formungen" entsprechen bei Carnap die quasianalytischen Konsti- 6 Diesen "Willen zum System" verstand Rickert explizit im Sinne Nietzsches. 8 tutionen. Beiden geht es um eine logische Rekonstruktion des wissenschaftlichen Wissens, nicht um einen forschungslogische oder psychologische Beschreibung seiner Entstehung. Beide lehnten psychologische, soziologische oder historische Betrachtungsweisen als für die Wissenschaftsphilosophie im eigentlichen Sinne irrelevant ab. Eine andere weitreichende Parallelität zwischen Rickerts und Carnaps Ansatz besteht darin, dass beide den gesamten Bereich des wissenschaftlichen Wissens als Gegenstand einer wissenschaftlichen Philosophie ansehen. Sowohl im System wie im Aufbau geht es um eine "einheitswissenschaftliche" Theorie, die die Kulturwissenschaften und die Naturwissenschaften umfasst. Nach Rickert ist Wissenschaft als ein auf wahre Erkenntnis zielendes Unternehmen wie jedes sinnvolle Handeln im eigentlichen Sinne nur möglich durch die Anerkennung von Werten. Genauer gesagt, ist Wissenschaft als am Wert "Wahrheit" orientierte Tätigkeit zu charakterisieren, wie Rickert in zahlreichen Arbeiten zu betonen nicht müde wurde (z.B. Rickert (1911, 154ff), (1921, 344ff), (1932, 244ff). In jedem Urteil steckt daher ein wertendes Moment der Bejahung oder Verneinung. Theoretische Erkenntnis ist ebenso wie praktisches Handeln auf Werten begründet. Wissenschaftliche Erkenntnistätigkeit wie sinnvolles Handeln im allgemeinen setzen die Anerkennung von Werten voraus, an denen sie sich orientieren. Aus der Wertorientierung der Erkenntnis ergab sich für Rickert eine strikte Ablehnung jeder Abbildtheorie der Erkenntnis,worin er sich mit der Marburger Schule und den Logischen Empiristen einig war. Der Einfluss der Rickertschen Unterscheidung von Sein und Gelten auf die Konstitutionstheorie des Aufbau wird an mindestens vier Stellen deutlich: (i) Das quasianalytische Konstitutionsverfahren des Aufbau wird als iterative Verallgemeinerung und Präzisierung einer werttheoretischen Geltungsbeziehung begriffen. Quasianalytisch konstituierte Gegenstände stehen in einer Geltungsbeziehung zu den sie konstituierenden Elementen. (Aufbau § 42) (ii) Der Aufbau intendiert eine Theorie der wissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung, die Kulturwissenschaften und Naturwissenschaften im Sinne des Neukantianismus umfasst. Die allgemeine Konstitutionsmethode der Quasianalyse erlaubt sowohl die Konstitution der individuellen Begriffe der Kulturwissenschaften wie auch die der allgemeinen Begriffe der Naturwissenschaften. (Aufbau §§ 12, 158) (iii) Die Konstitutionstheorie leistet nicht nur die Konstitution psychischer und physischer Gegenstände, sondern bewährt sich auch in der Konstitution geistiger Gegenstände, zu denen insbesondere die Werte gehören. Erst durch die Konstitution 9 von Werten vollendet sich der Aufbau der Welt im eigentlichen Sinn. (Aufbau § 152) (iv) Die Konstitutionstheorie des Aufbau ist eine allgemeine Theorie von Konstitutionssystemen. Diese Allgemeinheit hat ihre Entsprechung in Rickerts Anspruch, mit seinem System der Philosophie eine objektive Theorie der Weltanschauungen vorgelegt zu haben. Im Unterschied zu Rickerts System konzentriert sich der Aufbau auf eine Theorie epistemischer Systeme. (Aufbau § 106) Die Thesen (i) - (iv) skizzieren einen Rahmen für eine südwestdeutsche Lesart des Aufbau. Es wird keineswegs behauptet, diese wäre die einzig richtige. So werden in dieser südwestdeutschen oder "Jenaer" Interpretation die Bedeutung der formalen Aspekte der Konstitutionstheorie ausgeblendet, auch die empiristische Orientierung des Werkes wird nur unzureichend gewürdigt, und die Beiträge der Marburger Schule und der Phänomenologie werden ignoriert. Gemäss der allgemeinen Synthetisierungsthese gibt es eine irreduzible Vielfalt von Lesarten des Aufbau, die je verschiedene Aspekte des Werkes in den Mittelpunkt stellen, andere herunterspielen oder ganz ausblenden. Die südwestdeutsche Interpretation des Aufbau ist dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass sie diejenigen Merkmale betont, die sich dem werttheoretischen Neukantianismus verdanken. Sie ist eine Momentaufnahme, die Merkmale von Carnaps Philosophieren versammelt, die bald verschwanden oder zumindest tiefgehenden Verwandlungen unterworfen wurden. Im folgenden Abschnitt soll nun die durch (i) - (iv) umrissene südwestdeutsche Lesart des Aufbau genauer expliziert werden. 3. Die Konstitution der Werte Konstitution meint im Aufbau Konstitution durch Quasianalyse (Aufbau §§ 69, 71)7. In jedem Konstitutionssystem nimmt die Konstitution ihren Ausgang von einer gegebenen Basis bestehend aus Grundelementen und Grundrelationen. Für das im Aufbau hauptsächlich betrachtete System bilden die Elementarerlebnisse die Grundelemente und die einzige Grundrelation ist die binäre Relation der Ähnlichkeitserinnerung. Die nächsthöhere, aus dieser Struktur zu konstituierende Schicht besteht aus sogenannten (Quasi)qualitäten. Eine durch Quasianalyse konstituierte Qualität Q ist extensional gegeben 7 Für das Folgende genügt eine informelle Beschreibung dieser Methode. Für eine Diskussion der formalen Details der Quasianalyse siehe (Mormann 1994). 10 durch eine Klasse von Elementarerlebnissen, die charakterisiert ist durch eine besondere Kohärenz ihrer Elemente. Grob gesagt, sind die Elemente, die Q konstituieren, zu einander ähnlicher als jedes Element, das nicht zu Q gehört. Carnap insistiert darauf, dass Q von den Elementen, die es konstituieren, wesentlich verschieden ist. Das bedeutet einmal, dass Q nicht mit seiner Extension gleichzusetzen ist, und zum anderen, dass es einen anderen Seinsstatus besitzt: während die Elemente von Q "sind", ist die Quasiqualität Q ein "struktureller Wert", der nicht "ist", sondern für die ihn konstituierenden Objekte "gilt". Mit anderen Worten, Quasiqualitäten und die sie konstituierenden Elemente sind "sphärenfremde Gegenstände": Die Elemente gehören zur Sphäre des Seins, die Quasiqualitäten zur Sphäre des Geltens. Damit gibt Carnap den typentheoretischen Unterschied zwischen Elementen und Mengen eine geltungstheoretische Deutung, sie ist als eine Art struktureller Bewertung zu verstehen: "In Anlehnung an einen zuweilen geübten Sprachgebrauch kann man auch von verschiedenen "Seinsarten" der Gegenstände verschiedener Sphären sprechen. Dieser Ausdruck bringt besonders klar zum Bewusstsein, wie völlig getrennt und unvergleichbar sphärenfremde Gegenstände sind. Im Grunde genommen geht auch der in der neueren Philosophie viel betonte Unterschied zwischen dem Seienden und dem Geltenden auf den Unterschied der Gegenstandssphären, genauer: auf den Unterschied zwischen eigentlichen Gegenständen und Quasigegenständen zurück. Wird nämlich ein Quasigegenstand auf Grund gewisser Elemente seines Ausgangsgebietes konstituiert, so "gilt" er für diese Elemente; damit unterscheidet er sich als Geltendes von den Elementen des Seienden." (Aufbau § 42) Mit der "neueren Philosophie", in der der "Unterschied zwischen dem Seiendem und dem Geltendem" eine zentrale Rolle spielt, ist der südwestdeutsche Neukantianismus gemeint. Das zentrale Dogma der Rickertschen Werttheorie behauptete, dass Werte nichts Wirkliches seien: "Werte sind nicht, Werte gelten", lautete der Slogan der neukantianischen Wertphilosophie. Über die werttheoretische Unterscheidung von Seiendem und Geltendem geht die Konstitutionstheorie des Aufbau dadurch hinaus, dass sie dieses Verhältnis als relativ auffasst: "[D]as für die Gegenstände einer ersten Stufe Geltende wird als Seiendes einer zweiten Stufe aufgefasst und kann dann Gegenstand für neues Geltendes (einer dritten Stufe) werden, usw. Darin besteht für die Konstitutionstheorie die Dialektik des begrifflichen Fortganges in logisch strenger Form. Die Begriffe Seiendes und Geltendes sind also relativ und drücken die Beziehung jeder Konstitutionsstufe zu der nächstfolgenden aus." (Aufbau, §42) 11 Da nun alle wissenschaftlichen Gegenstände (bis auf die Elementarerlebnisse) quasianalytisch konstituierte Gegenstände sind (Aufbau § 160), sind aus der Perspektive der Konstitutionstheorie die meisten wissenschaftlichen Gegenstände "irreal", oder besser, sie haben einen Doppelcharakter: für die sie konstituierenden Gegenstände "gelten" sie, und für die durch sie konstituierten Gegenstände "sind" sie. Ausserhalb eines Konstitutionssystems macht die Frage nach Existenz und Geltung keinen Sinn. Bereits hier findet man also einen relativierten Seinsbegriff, in dem man eine frühe Version von Carnaps lebenslanger Ablehnung einer "absoluten" Unterscheidung von Wirklichkeit und Nichtwirklichkeit erblicken mag. Carnaps Intention, die Konstitutionstheorie des Aufbau passgenau auf die Bedürfnisse der Wissenschaftsphilosophie des südwestdeutschen Neukantianismus zuzuschneiden, zeigt sich daran, dass er die Whitehead-Russellsche Relationslogik nicht nur als Logik von Allgemeinbegriffen, sondern auch als "Logik der Individualität" präsentierte: "Neuerdings ist mehrfach (im Anschluss an Gedanken von Dilthey, Windelband, Rickert) die Forderung nach einer "Logik der Individualität" erhoben worden, d.h. nach einer Methode begrifflicher Ordnung, die der Besonderheit individueller Gegebenheiten gerecht wird und nicht versucht, diese durch schrittweise Einengung in Gattungsbegriffe (Klassen) zu fassen. Eine solche Methode würde für die Individualpsychologie und für alle Kulturwissenschaften, besonders für die Geschichte, grosse Bedeutung besitzen (vgl. z.B. Freyer ... . Es sei hier darauf hingewiesen, dass der relationstheoretische Strukturbegriff eine geeignetet Basis für eine solche Methode bildet." (Aufbau § 12) In Übereinstimmung mit Cassirer (Cassirer 1910, Kapitel IV, 9) hält Carnap die neue relationale Logik sehr wohl für geeignet, individuelle und allgemeine Begriffe zu behandeln, da beide als funktionale Begriffsbildungen zu charakterisieren sind (vgl. auch Richardson 1998, p. 37f). Ähnlich wie Rickert behauptete Carnap, geistige Gegenstände oder Begriffe der Kulturwissenschaften liessen sich unter den für sie konstitutiven Werten nicht in der gleichen Weise subsumieren wie Elemente unter den Umfang einer Klasse (Rickert 1929, p. 739, 749ff, Aufbau § 37). Während aber für Rickert dadurch die prinzipiellen Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung aufgezeigt wurden, war dies für Carnap und Cassirer gerade ein Beleg für die Leistungsfähigkeit der neuen relationalen Logik. Für eine Diskussion der Konstitutionsskizze der Werte und anderer geistiger Gegenstände, die Carnap im Aufbau vorlegte, sei kurz die Architektonik des eigenpsychischen Konstitutionssystems rekapituliert, das im Aufbau hauptsächlich behandelt wird. Dieses Konstitu12 tionssystem hat vier Hauptschichten: (i) die eigenpsychischen Gegenstände, (ii) die physischen Gegenstände, (iii) die fremdpsychischen Gegenstände, und (iv) die geistigen Gegenstände. Werte gehören zur Schicht der geistigen Gegenstände. Daher werde zuerst allgemein auf die Konstitution geistiger Gegenstände eingegangen, und dann auf die spezifischen Eigenheiten der Konstitution von Werten. Für die Konstitution der Schicht der geistigen Gegenstände sei vorausgesetzt, dass die eigenpsychischen, physischen und fremdpsychischen Gegenstände bereits konstituiert sind. In realistischer Sprache formuliert heisst das, die Gegenstände dieser Sphären "sind". Das Problem der Konstitution der geistigen Gegenstände, insbesondere der Werte besteht dann darin, die Geltung dieser letzten Gegenstandsschicht für die vorangehenden zu konstituieren. Diese Konstitution wird wie alle Konstiutionen im System geleistet durch die allgemeine Konstitutionsmethode der Quasianalyse, die aber für den Fall der geistigen Gegenstände in einer besonderen Form auftritt, nämlich als Manifestation und Dokumentation (Aufbau §54ff). Was die Konstitution der geistigen Gegenstände betraf, nahm Carnap genau wie Rickert einen strikt antipsychologistischen Standpunkt ein: Auch wenn sie durch psychische oder physische Gegenstände konstituiert werden, gehörten sie einer anderen Seinssphäre an als diese. Sie bildeten einen eigenen Gegenstandsbereich, der von den Sphären der psychischen und physischen Gegenstände zu unterscheiden war. Durchaus in der Linie der später so genannten "kontinentalen" Tradition verweist Carnap darauf, dass die Eigenständigkeit der geistigen Gegenstände von der Philosophie des 19. Jahrhunderts lange Zeit nicht genügend beachtet worden sei; erst Dilthey habe die methodische und gegenstandstheoretische Eigenart der Geisteswissenschaften herausgearbeitet (cf. Aufbau, § 24). Geistige Gegenstände seien demnach zwar subjektgebunden, aber nicht aus psychischen oder physischen Gegenständen zusammengesetzt: so manifestiere sich etwa eine soziale Gruppe wie eine Nation oder eine gesellschaftliche Klasse durch die Individuen, die ihr angehören, sie könne aber nicht einfach als Menge dieser Individuen aufgefasst werden. Eine Nation etwa bleibe dieselbe, auch wenn ihre "Träger" wechseln. Geistige Gegenstände setzen sich also nicht aus Gegenständen der unteren Schichten zusammen, sie manifestieren und dokumentieren sich in ihnen. Eine Sitte oder ein Brauch als Gegenstand der Ethnologie oder Anthropologie manifestieren sich durch gewisse Handlungen, kulturelle Gegenstände wie Theorien oder Kunstwerke werden dokumentiert durch dauerhafte physische Gegenstände wie Bücher, Dokumente, oder Bilder. Alle geistigen Gegenstände werden damit entweder direkt oder indirekt auf ihre Manifestationen und Dokumentationen zurückgeführt und somit aus diesen konstituiert (cf. Aufbau § 42). Genauer gesagt haben die Manifestationen und Dokumentationen die Rolle von Kennzeichen, "aus deren Beschaffenheit allein die Wissenschaft die Beschaffenheit

|Appendix I| Publisher's note: We are very grateful to the Finnish Anthropological Society for giving us the permission to publish this reprint of Strathern, Marilyn. 1990. "Artifacts of history: Events and the interpretation of images." In Culture and history in the Pacific, edited by Jukka Siikala, 25–44. Helsinki: Transactions of the Finnish Anthropological Society. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © Marilyn Strathern Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported. Strathern, Marilyn. 2013. Learning to see in Melanesia. Masterclass Series 2. Manchester: HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory. Art i facts of history Events and the interpretat ion of images Marilyn STRATHERN University of Cambridge It has been something of a surprise for Europeans to realize that their advent in the Pacific was something less than a surprise. A number of accounts give the sense that their coming had been expected; that they were previously known beings "returned" or manifest in new form. Such ideas certainly fueled the millenarianism of cargo cults in Papua New Guinea. A further return was indicated in the future. So the one event encapsulated both past and future; indeed the two were conflated in so far as the second coming would bring not the generations unborn but generations already deceased, in the form of ancestors. Or if not the ancestors themselves, than their "cargo." What triggered this recovery of the past in the future was the actual advent itself: the appearance of Europeans, and the stories that circulated about them. In this chapter, I argue that at least as far as much of Melanesia is concerned, and especially Papua New Guinea, Europeans initially presented a particular kind of image. Images that contain within them both past and future time do not have to be placed into a historical context, for they embody history themselves. It follows that people do not therefore have to explain such images by reference to events outside them: the images contain events. And here Marilyn STRATHERN 158 we have a clue to the mixed reactions which early Europeans reported greeted their arrival in New Guinea. They were met with surprise, but the surprise was also tempered by nonchalance. As Rena Lederman (1986) reported of her own arrival at Mendi in the New Guinea Highlands, people were eager to assure her that they had not been caught off guard. Their own accounts of themselves already contained these otherwise unexpected newcomers. Images are presented through artifacts, and in cultures where artifacts are highly personalized (cf. Battaglia 1983) also through persons in their bodily form (O'Hanlon n.d.), and where it is equally the case that persons are objects of the regard of others, through performances of all kinds (Schieffelin 1985). People objectify or present themselves to themselves in innumerable ways, but must always do so through assuming a specific form. I suggest that Melanesians may have seen the advent of Europeans in the form of an artifact or a performance. The interesting question then becomes who the Melanesians thought was the maker of the artifact, the producer of the performance. However, I do not present an ethnographically argued case. Rather, my intention is to raise some queries against anthropological perceptions of historical process. In evoking Melanesian "images," I present a set of perceptions which poses problems for the still current division of labor between social / cultural anthropologists and those concerned with material culture of the kind that finds its way to museums. The result of the division has been that we have hidden from ourselves possible sources of insight into the processes by which people such as the Melanesians of Papua New Guinea deal with social change, and change themselves. Events: Two views of t ime There is a connection between the study of artifacts and the study of time, and between the idea of historical context and of cultural or social context. A certain perception of event is implied in the way that Western anthropologists have often understood the work of historians, which mirrors the way they have also understood museologists and those interested in material culture. APPENDIX I | ARTIFACTS OF HISORY 159 Contrary to the aspirations of many practicing historians, anthropologists often take them to be interested in events. The idea of a concrete, incidental event holds much the same place in the anthropological worldview as does the idea of a concrete, incidental artifact. Events may be understood as the inevitable and thus "natural" outcomes of social arrangements, or even more poignant, the chance encounter that has not been anticipated by those arrangements. These are the two forms of event with which Marshall Sahlins (1985) is concerned in the Pacific. They are taken as items which must be brought to account in our system of knowledge, like so much raw material, like so many facts to be systematized. No account can recover the past, argues David Lowenthal (1985: 215), "because the past was not an account; it was a set of events and situations." But the account may well create a relation internal to itself between events and the organizing process or systems which link / explain them. Indeed, Sahlins' (1985) study of Cook's sojourn in Hawaii exemplifies the interest of social / cultural anthropology in locating events as the raw materials of their systematizing endeavors. For Sahlins approaches the interaction between the people of Hawaii and the adventurer Cook in terms of the alteration of meanings that occurs in the cultural interpretation of historical events and the impingements of history on culture. He dwells on the antimony between "the contingency of events and the recurrence of structures" (ibid.: xiii), expanding event into a relation between happening and structure. Structure and event are then mediated by a third term, "the structure of the conjuncture." A structure must be seen to coordinate events: he dismisses the "pernicious distinction" between them in favor of the realization of structure in event and vice versa. There is no event without system, he proposes (ibid.: 154) and this, of course, has to be how anthropologists make knowledge for themselves. If Sahlins has displaced the pernicious distinction between event and structure with their irreducible relationship, this irreducible relationship can only be that between the knowing subject and the objects of knowledge. Sahlins suggests that an event as such should be seen as a relation between a certain happening and a symbolic system; it is the "happening" which takes the place of a natural fact in his scheme. A happening is domesticated through cultural interpretation. "The event is a happening interpreted" (ibid.: 153). This definition of event Marilyn STRATHERN 160 replicates for Europeans and anthropologists what is also imputed to the people of Hawaii. Sahlins' analysis of events turns on the manner in which the Hawaiian people interpreted and contextualized, placing concepts in correspondence with external objects: Hence his remark that Everything happens as if nothing happened: as if there could be no history, as if there could be no unexpected event, no happening not already culturally provided for. (ibid.: 30-31) Social action is an actualization or realization of the relationship between the concepts of the actors and the objects of their existence (ibid.: 154). Hence Sahlins' focus on the events as interpreted action, which utilizes (I suggest) the idea of event much as anthropologists habitually think of artifact. It is cultural construction which our systematizing interests force us to subsume under a further relation which also includes its social context, viz. structure. "Structure" is a frame metaphor, so to speak. Thus an event is seen as a culturally interpreted happening; in the same way an artifact is said to have meaning, this meaning requiring anthropological elucidation by reference to the system which produces meanings. Happenings stand in an intransigent rather than reflecting or expressive relation to structure, but are nonetheless not explicable to the observer (Hawaiian or European) without reference to a context. A cultural event is thus perpetually created out of a natural happening. In turn, the anthropologists' elucidation of structure takes these interpretations (culture) as the proper facts, the raw material, of systematic anthropological knowledge. Anthropology out-contextualizes indigenous (Hawaiian or European) contextualizing efforts. Whether or not we can use Melanesian material to comment on Polynesian, this excursus suggests one caveat in the opening up of historical investigation into culture and history in the Pacific. What do we intend to recover as ethnohistory? Thus we can, as I think Sahlins does, regard people's interpretations as "their" history, a kind of ethnohistory: their version of what we do lies in their referential codes and contextualizing practices. I do not know if this would work in Melanesia. To recover the knowledge which comes from perceiving structural relationships between events, we might have to seek the counterpart of our systematizing endeavors in people's artifacts and performances, in the images they strive to convey, and thereby in how APPENDIX I | ARTIFACTS OF HISORY 161 they present the effects of social action to themselves. And this would not look like our "history" at all. And it would not look like our history, because a quite different sense of time is at issue. These two views of time, European and Melanesian, can be apprehended as two ways of explaining or making manifest the nature of things. An event taken as incidental occurrence in nature, chancy and idiosyncratic, particular to the moment, is to be explained by being put into its historical (cultural) context. That is, its relations with other events is laid out, so that events are often seen in progression, one following another. An event taken as a performance is to be known by its effect: it is understood in terms of what it contains, the forms that conceal or reveal, registered in the actions of those who witness it. A succession of forms (cf. Wagner 1986b: 210) is a succession of displacements, each a substitution for what has gone previously and thus in a sense containing it, as it contains the effects it will have on the witness. Every image is in this sense a new image. Consequently, time is not a line between happenings; it lies in the capacity of an image to evoke past and future simultaneously. If this is the case, then in so far as they are concerned with their own uniqueness, the problem the makers of such images set themselves is how to overcome the recursiveness of time: how indeed to create an event that will be unique, particular, innovatory. What is true of time is also true of space. Analogously, we might say, space is not an area between points, it is the effectiveness of an image in making the observer think of both here and there, of oneself and others. The problem becomes how people can grasp the other's perspective to make it reflect on themselves: artifacts are displayed and circulated in order to return that knowledge (Munn 1986). The advent of Europeans Despite the uniqueness of the event in the European record, Nikolai Miklouho-Maclay's initial experiences on the Rai coast of New Guinea were to be repeated elsewhere. Whereas only certain Melanesians came to develop cargo cults, it seems that everywhere they expressed a pragmatic interest in transactions with the newcomers, and Lawrence notes the extent to which MiklouhoMaclay had to satisfy local demand for his goods. He established his Marilyn STRATHERN 162 position by gift-giving, among other things, and "his gifts were always returned" (1964: 60). At the same time, his biographer gives dramatic emphasis to Miklouho-Maclay's surprise at being taken for "some kind of supernatural being" (Webster 1984: 72). The man who gave gifts was also a local deity (Lawrence 1964: 65; Webster 1984: 104). On the part of many Europeans, both those involved at the time and anthropologists afterwards, common assumptions have been that (1) the coming of Europeans was a unique event; (2) it therefore stretched people's credulity, so that they had to find a place for the exotic strangers in their cognitive universe; so (3) it is no surprise that Melanesians regarded the first Europeans as spirits of deities; and (4) no surprise that in order to make sense of this untoward event, people reacted by trying to change their own lives and thus tap European power. Underlying these is the final assumption that (5) the Europeans really were the powerful ones, not least because it was they who were the occurrence, who arrived in the Melanesians' midst. In short, within anthropological analysis, the advent of Europeans has the status of a historical fact. The people of Papua New Guinea were brought face-to-face with a unique moment in history. I am sure people were taken by surprise. But should we interpret their reactions by assimilating that event to an event in history? Suppose it were not a unique moment; that it was not the case that only the Europeans had power, and that it did not require that people create new contexts for coping with the untoward. Let me produce a set of counter-suppositions, synthetic in that it is drawn from what we know of many times and places, but nonetheless potentially helpful in considering specific times and places-such as the exploration of the Highlands documented by Bob Connolly and Robin Anderson (1984). Suppose, then, we assimilate that event, the arrival of Europeans, to something that Melanesians were in fact already making. Uniqueness, power, and context can all be put into a rather different light. First, uniqueness. The Melanesian world is one where people constantly take themselves by surprise. And what takes them by surprise are the performances and artifacts they create. One thinks here of figures and carvings, and also of landmarks held to commemorate past events (Rubinstein 1981), tools taken as evidence of divine creation (Battaglia 1983), or shell valuables which carry a record of their exchange with them (Damon 1980). Accomplishment itself is celebrated. Melanesian politics are typified by the achieved APPENDIX I | ARTIFACTS OF HISORY 163 nature of prestige-but the idea of achievement goes beyond politics, and inheres in the very constitution of collective activity such as ceremonial exchange, spirit cults, or whatever. People amaze themselves by their capacity for collective action, as the men of Mt. Hagen are amazed when they decorate on exchange occasions. Their presentation evinces the power they hope to have encompassed, at once a divination of past success and an omen for the future (Strathern and Strathern 1971). We may borrow Bruce Kapferer's (1984: 193) observation from elsewhere, that rites are never mere repetition: acts and utterances constantly reassemble meanings. So however standard or traditional ways of doing things may be, the final configuration allows for the unexpected: a performance cannot be anticipated, for an image cannot be presented till the moment it is composed. Moreover, on many occasions, Melanesians present themselves as other than their appearance normally suggests. One may instance the disguise of self-decoration that hides the outer skin of the dancer by bringing his inner qualities to the surface (Strathern 1979); or the ambiguous displays of clans on the dancing ground that at once conceal their internal differences and reveal that no such conflicts exist (O'Hanlon 1983). Play may be made with man-spirit and other identities. Alfred Gell (1975: 243) observes of the Umeda that the identification of a masked dancer with the figure of a cassowary is only a disguise for the profounder identification of the cassowary with the man. The secret of the cassowary is that he is a man. Erik Schwimmer encapsulates this dualism in his comment on how often Melanesian dancers play in pairs, both parties representing spirits, masked or in mask-like attire: "Each knows himself to be a man, but when he looks at his partner he can see a spirit" (1984: 253). If they felt they were in the presence of an accomplishment of some kind, then Melanesians would not necessarily have to interpret the advent of Europeans as uniquely untoward. They were beings disguised: a surprise, but not a special surprise. And the identification of the men with spirits would be no more a special identification than the subsequent revelation that these were men. Second, power. Specific to Melanesians' reactions is the way they sought out transactions with the Europeans. They appeared practical, even mercenary, despite the wonder and marvel with which Europeans frequently reported they were received. Indeed, some of Marilyn STRATHERN 164 the Europeans (though this could hardly be said of the sober Miklouho-Maclay) seem to have been taken by their own image as a cause of wonder. The extent to which they subsequently dwelt on the apparently irrational elements in the indigenous response (as evidenced in "cargo thinking") was a prop to this. Yet what must be explained on the Melanesian side is people's simultaneous construction of Europeans as spirits and their nonchalant acceptance (also reported by Lawrence 1964: 233) of what Europeans regarded as technological marvels. Their capacity to interact with these beings and get things out of them became evident very early on. It was that interaction which revealed these beings were (also) human. In the example which Jeffrey Clark (n.d.) gives, the two perceptions existed side by side. People thus appear to have assumed that the Europeans' personal attributes, like other things they brought, were transferable, and the only problem was how to make the encounter work. Thus the Highlanders of Mt. Hagen sometimes think of themselves as turning "European" or else as remaining "Hagen," as though these were choices between domains of personal efficacy. One might suppose it was the Melanesians who had a sense of power. If the advent were treated as performance, akin to that of the masked dancer, then who was the producer of it? It cannot be the dancing assemblage of the mask itself. Performances are the artifacts of persons (whether human or not), contrivances, displays of artifice, even tricks. Indeed, it is arguable that many kinds of events we regard as historical contingencies in Melanesians' eyes have the character of improvisation (Wagner 1975). The makers of a performance are those who conceive it, fashion it in their diverse minds, and finally accomplish the display. A performance becomes an index of people's capacities; an enactment of a feast "is an accomplishment, a kind of coup" (Wagner 1986b: 193). The inhabitants of the Rai Coast may well have been in terror when the Europeans first appeared, as Miklouho-Maclay's (1975) diaries attest.1 But we cannot assume that it was simply terror of the powerful Europeans. My guess is that an 1. However, any reader who wishes to pursue the details of Miklouho-Maclay's reaction is advised to consult the translation published in Moscow in 1982 (Progress Publishers). I am grateful to Daniil Tumarkin for his comments on the accuracy of the Madang version. APPENDIX I | ARTIFACTS OF HISORY 165 initial component of people's terror may well have been at their own power-at what they had done to bring about an enactment of a quite extraordinary kind-or power they perhaps attributed to particular big men or neighboring peoples (J. Liep, personal communication). Someone must have produced them. There is a sense in which a witness is also an agent. A performance is completed by the audience (Schieffelin 1985), who may play an alternately passive and active role. In Melanesian cosmology, the agent or doer of an activity is often separated from the person (or happening) who compels the action. Thus under many patrilineal regimes, maternal kin are the "cause" of the prestations which flow to them as recipients by virtue of the health they bestow on their daughter's / sister's child; the active agents, those credited with the prestige which comes from taking action, are the paternal donors of the gifts. Donors show their power in accomplishing a prestation. In the same vein, to the extent that Europeans presented themselves as a cause for the people's response, the capacity to act lay on the side of those who responded. The Europeans would be an inert cause for all this activity. Third, context. It is this question above all which dominates anthropological analyses of cargo cults. The assumption is that cults show people trying to adjust the cognitive disorientation, or psychic disturbance in Jukka Siikala's (1982) critical phrase, created by the unexpected arrival of strangers in their midst. Yet their unexpectedness was, as it were, of an expected kind, merely a strange artifact. Initial difficulties in talking may have played a part in this. Europeans came hardly as enemies or allies would, with talk and ambiguous motivations, but confronted the beholders with, if not an unintelligible, an ineffable visual presence. Motivation had to be located in someone. I have suggested that the witnesses might know themselves as in some way the producers of the spectacle: if not themselves the makers of it, then themselves as the cause of their neighbors or enemies' actions directed at them. But the point about a spectacle is that it is disconnected from everyday events, is the result of motivations hidden until the moment of revelation. It is in this sense also to be taken for itself. It only works if it is untoward. There is more here than simply the fact that there can be no happening that is not culturally provided for, that cannot be "coded" as a recognizable event of some sort (Sahlins 1985: 31). And more Marilyn STRATHERN 166 thus than simply the assimilation of the newcomers to an existing pantheon of supernatural beings. The point about the sequence I have described is its self-contained nature. We do not have to imagine the event as an "interpreted happening." An artifact or performance grasped for itself is grasped as an image. An image definitively exists out of context; or, conversely, it contains its own prior context. The problems all lay in what was to be the future outcome of the performance, its consequences for the future, what would be revealed next, in short, its further effect. Consequently, the European advent did not have to be put into its social context. Melanesians did not have to make sense of it: they did not have to evoke the wider cultural and social milieu from which the Europeans came since they were under no compulsion to explain them. And ignorance of this context did not put the Europeans beyond reach, as the Europeans may well have thought it did. (No doubt they would have liked to have felt beyond reach, till education had taught people about Western society and the historical significance of the moment of contact.) On the contrary, the very act of presentation constituted the only context that was relevant-if Melanesians were also inclined to open the image up to explanation, then the question would be concerned with motivation, to be elicited or tested by the kinds of relationships into which the strangers could be enticed to engage with the Melanesians themselves. In short, we do not have to suppose a cognitive disorientation because we do not have to suppose that Melanesians thought they were dealing with beings whose decontextualization presented a problem. Image and context Melanesian responses are unlikely to have been stable. Indeed, what I have sketched here probably occupied only a point in a longer process which would turn these constructions inside-out, locate power on the Europeans' part and Melanesians as the inert causes of it, and eventually dismantle the constructions altogether. I imagine them merely in order to give pause to the kinds of constructions that Western anthropologists have in the past so easily imposed on historical events and the clash of cultures. It was suggested that such Western constructions often play on an analogy between putting APPENDIX I | ARTIFACTS OF HISORY 167 artifacts into their social / cultural context and laying out events as sequences which appear as points in time to be connected up to one another. Let me advance the argument with reference to the Melanesian construction of artifacts perceived as images. I draw on Roy Wagner's analysis of artifacts created by the Barok of New Ireland (1986b) as well as his theorizing on obviation (1986a and elsewhere). The artifacts include the spatial structure of their men's house, performances such as feasting, and in general the metaphors by which people construe ideas about power. In the minds of the Barok, such items evoke commonly held images. By "image" Wagner intends us to understand a particular type of trope. Perceptual image (or "point metaphor") exists in relationship to referential coding (or "frame metaphor") (Wagner 1986a: 31). Coding opens out a symbol with reference to its constituent parts and thus its relation to other symbols: it expands and obviates an image by interpreting it, by setting it within a context which thus becomes part of its meaning. An image on the other hand condenses or collapses context into itself in the sense that all points of reference are obviated or displaced by its single form. The constructions at issue may be illustrated through an example of an artifact that circulated all over Melanesia: the ceremonial stone axe. Battaglia (1983) presents an illuminating exegesis for axes used on Sabarl in the Massim. The triangular shape provided by the angle of the blade and haft may be perceived "as image of action and directed movement" (ibid.: 296). It at once evokes past actions and foreshadows future ones. Sabarl comment that it has the shape of mortuary feasts, that is, a lateral movement of wealth items from the father's side (the left arm of a person) to the mother's side (the right arm), which commemorates the support that kin gave a person in life. The elbow thus represents "the joint in the socially vital movement of reciprocal giving . . . [and] the ideal route of valuable objects away from person, clan or village and . . . back again" (ibid.: 297). But that explanation also covers (obviates) others. On the joint itself is the figure of a bird with a snake in its mouth, an image of a mythical challenge presented as sexual opposition. Battaglia argues that the ideal support relations between kin are transformed at death into individualistic conflict between them (over inheritance and such). Yet the simultaneity of ideas about support and conflict contained within the axe cannot be matched by the explanations which people give, for Marilyn STRATHERN 168 these must always place one perception in relation to another. An image is distinct from an element in a comprehensive coding or exegesis. It is less the privileging of one interpretation over another that is pertinent than the relationship between interpretation (frame metaphor) and the apprehension of something that is only itself (point metaphor). An object at one juncture taken for granted, as an image "standing for itself," at another may be coded through reference to further images (whose meanings must at that point be taken for granted). The bird-elbow intrinsic to the Sabarl axe has a shape that may also he explained as a map for kin relations; when these become points of reference for the axe, they take on assumed qualities of their own (are images of support, point metaphors). But the kin relations may then be opened to explanation, as happens in the give and take of the mortuary exchanges of which the axes are a part, in which case they cease to be taken for granted; and so on. The process of explanation by referencing or decoding deprives the image of its power to elicit taken-for-granted meanings. Conversely, by itself, the Sabarl axe is not a simple illustration of meanings describable in other terms: rather, it presents to perception a particular form that is its own. What the Sabarl Islander grasps in handling the axe that can be verbally explained as "the same as" kin relationships activated in exchange is not those kin relationships in fact. For when they become the focus of attention, kin are able to do things with their exchanges of valuables-including the axes themselves-which reinterpret the ideal route that valuables should take. In effect, in explaining or acting out their relationships to one another, kinsfolk subvert the taken-forgranted status of paternal support in the bird-elbow image. One relationship substitutes or displaces another. An artifact, or a performance such as an exchange, perceived as an image, is not reducible to the coding explanations that accompany it, or vice versa. Steven Albert (1986: 241) makes the point apropos malanggan for which other New Irelanders are famous: their expressivity "is to be found in the organisation of forms in the carvings, and not in some relation between particular forms and their referents." Referential coding is not only found in people's verbal explanations: Wagner's sequence between point metaphor and frame metaphor, between image and code, can be realized in the contractAPPENDIX I | ARTIFACTS OF HISORY 169 ion and expansion of any kind of artifact. Images may substitute for one another in a succession of analogies. At the same time, images both contain and elicit interpretations. Any one image, he argues, may synthesize several meanings, and in provoking response elicits this synthesis in the perceiver; the synthesis is taken apart when those meanings become expanded (coded) in reference to other images. Thus the meanings of the Sabarl axe are desynthesized when they are acted out with respect to the maternal and paternal kin who exchange axes as valuables. The coding is accomplished through further performance or assemblage of artifacts, as well as through verbal exegesis. It is significant, however, that exegesis is accorded a special place by Barok. The effect of description may be taken as contrary to the effect produced by an image (including a verbal image such as a metaphor), so image in turn is understood by Barok as a distinctive means of construing power or effectiveness: "An image can and must be witnessed or experienced, rather than merely described or summed up verbally" (Wagner 1986b: xiv), and if it must be experienced in order to be understood, "the experience of its effects is at once its meanings and its power" (ibid.: 216). Barok remain suspicious of talk. Talk is always part of an effort to manipulate events and relationships, making motivation ambiguous, whereas-like the revelation of gift (Biersack 1982)-in producing images, people produce the effects by which they know what they themselves really are. For "producing an image" means that an artifact has assumed a specific form (the image) in the mind of the viewer. Images are reflected self-knowledge. The way in which a person responds to a taboo or an injunction shows that person to be the kind of kinsman or kinswoman he / she is; similarly the visual figure of the men's house Barok build contains men's feasting activities and ancestral power in such a way as to make manifest their legitimated relationship with the dead. When the advent of Europeans created an affect similar to such "images," it would also provoke self-knowledge. It would present a particular form to the observer, known by the response it thereby elicited. As the carrier of (bearer of) its effects, the observer (in whose mind the image forms) was also in this sense, like all audiences, a producer of them. I deliberately refer to the process of coding and referentiality in verbal explanation in order to draw a comparison with certain Western practices of knowledge. When Melanesians construct knowMarilyn STRATHERN 170 ledge about themselves and their relations with others, they may well draw on perceptions that have the status of image where a European scholar would deploy verbal concepts in a referential, coding manner. A European is likely to explicate any one relationship through reference to others, through his or her description creating systems by bringing different concepts into connection with one another. Above all, he or she will make sense of individual incidents by putting them into their social or cultural context: an encounter with strangers requires understanding in terms of the society from which the strangers come, as a happening must be interpreted as an event in history. One might imagine, however, that the Melanesian would understand encounters in terms of their effects. It is the effect which is created, and effects (images) are produced through the presentation of artifacts. A concept of society is not an explanatory context for people's acts; rather sociality, as Wagner (1975) argues, consists in the implicit conventions against which people innovate and improvise. They construct further artifacts, such as cargo cults or wealth transactions, to see what the further effects will be. And the revelation will always come as a surprise. A division of labor The comparison throws light on certain assumptions held by social and cultural anthropologists over a recent period in anthropological history. Ever since the 1920s, much of Western anthropology has been concerned with approaching others through the elucidation of their worldviews. Part of our knowledge about material artifacts, for instance, must be our knowledge of their knowledge: it is taken for granted that we study the significance which such artifacts have for the people who make them, and thus their interpretations of them. Anthropologists, therefore, uncover meanings by putting people's own meanings into their social and cultural context. One might call this the phase of modernism in English-speaking anthropology (Ardener 1985; Strathern 1987). It gave rise to a division of labor in which the study of material culture became divorced from social or cultural anthropology. On the one hand were experts who looked at artifacts (museologists), while on the other hand were specialists in the study of society or culture APPENDIX I | ARTIFACTS OF HISORY 171 (social and cultural anthropologists). Over this period in anthropological history, the latter explicitly conceived themselves as experts in the elucidation of social / cultural contexts. Items of all kinds (not only artifacts but events and relationships) were to be understood by seeing how they related or referred to others. The compulsion applied equally to the artifacts of contemporary peoples and the remains or exemplars that found their way to museums. Indeed, I have suggested that there are strong parallels between anthropologists' attitudes towards history and towards the study of material culture. "Material culture" came to designate a kind of technological substrate by contrast with the abstraction "culture," which designated the values and modes of social life. There were always notable exceptions, and current interest in the culture of consumption (see, for instance, Miller 1987) suggests we can refer to this period as a past epoch. Nevertheless, for the time to which I refer, much anthropological analysis was almost exclusively concerned with the elucidation of systems-making sense of items by relating them in a coherent manner. The meanings of artifacts were elucidated by their context, whether the context was open to indigenous reflection, to be contextualized in turn, or was presented as a model on the ethnographer's part. Making social (or cultural) context the frame of reference had one important result. It led to the position that one should really be studying the framework itself (the social context = society). The artifacts were merely illustration. For if one sets up social context as the frame of reference in relation to which meanings are to be elucidated, then explicating that frame of reference obviates or renders the illustrations superfluous: they become exemplars or reflections of meanings which are produced elsewhere. It was in this sense that social anthropology could proceed independently of the study of material culture. Material culture became perceived as background information. Even when art forms were foregrounded for study, it was usually because they were made visible by some social process such as "ritual." In the many analyses of art or decoration undertaken in Melanesia, anthropologists often took as their task simply locating these objects within a frame already described in other terms (in terms of values and principles generated by the politico-religious system or embedded in kinship structure or gender relations or whatever). Marilyn STRATHERN 172 Frames of reference are intrinsic to the modernist anthropological exercise. These are the relationships within which we place our discoveries about people's cultural lives. The reason that material objects appear so intransigent is precisely because they are not the framework itself. Rather, they occupy a dual position, both its raw material and illustrative of its principles and values (at once "nature" and "culture" in relation to system). This creates a problem for the understanding of Melanesian perceptions. In supplying social context, the inquiring ethnographer does not merely translate other people's referencing into his or hers, but weights the perception of an object. An axe explained as the elbow of exchange partnerships is relocated within a framework which occludes both other frameworks and its significance as a synthetic image in itself. If decoding the meaning of an object makes certain presumptions about its referentiality, then putting them within their social context becomes a symbolic move analogous to the expansion of a frame metaphor from a point metaphor. Referentiality always introduces a further set of tropes. The whole perception is now the object plus its explanation, the interpreted happening indeed. Keesing (1987) has commented on Melanesians' frequent reluctance to give exegesis-to explain things by expanding frames verbally. Professed agnosticism is a kind of double resistance-first to altering meaning by making out one image to be another and secondly to privileging one frame that would exclude others. For talk always creates its own versions and transformations of what is being discussed (e.g., Goldman 1983; Rumsey 1986). Translation from one medium to another (as giving literal explanation for a metaphor or describing an object in words) alters the significance of what is being presented. We might reflect again on the self-proclaimed distance of Western social and cultural anthropologists from their material-cultural counterparts. If anthropologists are specialists in social contexts, in constantly apprehending items through frame metaphors ("society," "culture") which provide points of reference for the meaning of artifacts or art productions, then what are museologists but conservers of images? The exploration of internal design, the attention to artifact qua artifact, the relating of one style to others, the preservation of exemplars, suggests a self-contained, self-referential universe. The move from classification to aesthetics in museum displays could be APPENDIX I | ARTIFACTS OF HISORY 173 seen as one attempt to present a perception that consciously minimizes reference to wider social or cultural contexts. This is a controversial assertion; much museology is devoted to putting objects into their cultural context, producing functional and interpretative displays, objects as artifacts not art (Clifford 1985a; Williams 1985). At the same time, we may note George Stocking's observation on the space in which museum pieces exist. Encompassing both object and viewer, it has a "complex three-dimensionality that distinguishes the museum archive from essentially two-dimensional repositories of linear text" (Stocking 1985: 4). Because they are removed from their original contexts in time and space (which can never be recovered), and recontextualized in others, the meanings of material forms preserved in museums are problematic. But, as a result, there must always be a perceived discontinuity between the image and its new context (cf. Clifford 1985b). We thus imagine that the material artifact cannot be domesticated in quite the same way as texts, verbal descriptions of events, are subordinated in anthropological accounts to an overall analysis of society or culture; it is after all the objects themselves that appear to be on display, not the analysis of society. Consequently, they command attention in themselves. In so far as we perceive this to be the case, they remain figures against the grounding social context. Thus Westerners apprehend the responses they evoke as inevitably having an element of the aesthetic to it. Whatever battery of meanings and uses are ascribed to the museum object, display draws attention to form, explicitly confronting the observer with his or her own perceptions, and thus his or her act of appropriation in looking at them. Perhaps the museum that looks like an art gallery presents us with a certain analogy to the Melanesian construction of image. It is, of course, only a partial analogy. The objects both elicit a reaction on the part of the observer-in a manner analogous to the presentation of a Melanesian image-and as like as not will elicit an idiosyncratic reaction: that is, the self-knowledge so produced will necessarily be the self-knowledge of a Western kind, the aesthetics of personal appreciation. To recreate the elicitory power that Melanesian images had for the people who made them, one would have to be able to take for granted the cultural values and social relations of which they were composed. The paradox is that if it is taken for granted, such Melanesian knowledge of sociality is not referenced and coded. But Marilyn STRATHERN 174 we can only grasp that dimension through our referential and coding procedures. This paradox is intractable, because for us there can be no resolution in favor of one kind of presentation over the other-our aesthetic and referential strategies bypass one another and all we can do is move between the two points and know that each is inadequate. But that movement is essential. The "trick" would be to make that movement itself at once an image and a code in the anthropologist's mind. That might be approximated in the way we control our own metaphors in writing. I have argued that we should extend our concept of artifact to performance and to event. We might get a closer approximation to Melanesians' idea if we deliberately use that extension to switch metaphors. If we are prepared to see artifacts as the enactment of events, as memorials of and celebrations to past and future contributions (cf. O'Hanlon n.d.)-if the axe blade really is an icon of exchange relationship-then we must be prepared to switch the metaphors the other way too-to empty our notion of history as the natural or occurrence of events that present a problem for structure- to talk about people using an event the way they may use a knife, or creating an occasion the way they create a mask or demonstrate personal efficacy in laying out the phases of a feast according to strict social protocol. And that is why I chose the most event-full, chancefull occurrence in our own eyes as illustration, the arrival of Europeans. For we can extend the same metaphor-talking about events as artifacts-to visualize how people act as though they had power when confronted with the untoward. Perhaps the elucidation of possible Melanesian responses to such historical events will throw light on the changeability of these cultures. Melanesians' readiness to accommodate novelty and the unexpected has long been commented upon. A significant feature, and one that might have been important in processes of cultural differentiation, is that the enactment of social life was always a little unexpected. It was not the ground rules of sociality that people were concerned to represent to themselves, but (following Wagner 1975) the ability of persons to act in relation to these. This ability to act was captured in a performance or an artifact, improvisations which created events as achievements. In this sense, all events were staged to be innovatory. Melanesians' own strategies of contextualization necessarily included APPENDIX I | ARTIFACTS OF HISORY 175 themselves as witnesses of such spectacles. If they sought explanation, it would be to account for motivation (who produced the spectacle and with what intent). That would then let them know who they themselves were, for in entering into relations with Europeans, they would interpret the European presence through the only meaningful reference possible, in terms of its effects upon themselves. Let me rewrite an ethnographic vignette. Andrew Strathern (1971: xii) reports the words of an old man from Hagen who told how his neighbors had reacted to the appearance of the first administrative patrol in the area. The white man was thought to be a pale-skinned cannibal ogre, but "then he gave us shell valuables in return for pigs, and we decided he was a human." The unspoken side of this statement might read: "Then we gave him pigs in return for shell valuables, and we realized we were human still." Acknowledgements (from original) I am grateful to Jukka Siikala for providing a context for discussion and to the Academy of Finland for their hospitality and the opportunity to see the exhibition of Pacific artifacts organized by the USSR Academy of Sciences. This chapter has profited from the comments of Debbora Battaglia, David Lowenthal, Francesca Merlan, Michael O'Hanlon, and Alan Rumsey. Finally I am very grateful to Jeffrey Clark for discussion and for letting me cite his unpublished paper, as I am to Rena Lederman and Michael O'Hanlon. References Albert, Steven M. 1986. "Completely by accident I discovered its meaning: The iconography of New Ireland Malangan." The Journal of the Polynesian Society 95: 239–52 Ardener, Edwin. 1985. "Social anthropology and the decline of modernism." In Reason and morality, edited by Joanna Overing, 47–70. London: Tavistock. Marilyn STRATHERN 176 Battaglia, Debbora. 1983. "Projecting personhood in Melanesia: The dialectics of artefact symbolism on Sabarl Island." Man (N.S.) 18: 289– 304. Biersack, Aletta. 1982. "Ginger gardens for the ginger women: Rites and passages in a Melanesian society." Man (N.S.) 17: 239–58. Clark, Jeffrey. n.d.. "Sons of the female spirit, men of steel: Close encounters in Pangia, Southern Highlands Province." Adelaide. Unpublished Manuscript. Clifford, James. 1985a. "Objects and selves-an afterward." In Objects and others: Essays on museums and material culture, edited by George Stocking Jr., 236–46. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. ---. 1985b. "Histories of the tribal and modern." Art in America (April): 164–77. Connolly, Bob and Robin Anderson. 1984. First contact (film, 1983). Canberra. Damon, F. H. 1980. "The kula and generalised exchange: Considering some unconsidered aspects of The elementary structures of kinship." Man (N.S.) 15: 267–92. Gell, Alfred. 1975. Metamorphosis of the cassowaries: Umeda society, language and ritual. London: Athlone. Goldman, Laurence. 1983. Talk never dies: The language of Huli disputes. London: Tavistock. Kapferer, Bruce. 1984. "Postscript to The power of the ritual: Transition, transformation and transcendence in ritual practice." Social Analysis, Special Issue 1 (reprinted). Keesing, Roger M. 1987. "Anthropology as an interpretive quest." Current Anthropology 28: 161–76. Lawrence, Peter. 1964. Road belong cargo: A study of the cargo movement in the Southern Madang District, New Guinea. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Lederman, Rena. 1986. "The return of Red Woman: Fieldwork in Highland New Guinea." In Women in the field, edited by Peggy Golde, 359–88. Berkeley: University of California Press. Lowenthal, David. 1985. The past is a foreign country. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. APPENDIX I | ARTIFACTS OF HISORY 177 Miklouho-Maclay, Nikolai. 1975. New Guinea diaries 1871–1883, translated by C. L. Sentinella. Madang, Papua New Guinea: Kristen Press. Miller, David. 1987. Material culture and mass consumption. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Munn, Nancy D. 1986. The fame of Gawa: A symbolic study of value transformation in a Massim (Papua New Guinea) society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. O'Hanlon, Michael. 1983. "Handsome is as handsome does: Display and betrayal in the Wahgi." Oceania 53: 317–33. ---. n.d. History embodied: Authenticating the past in the New Guinea Highlands. Unpublished manuscript. Rubinstein, Robert L. 1981. "Knowledge and political process in Malo." In Vanuatu: Politics, economics and ritual in Island Melanesia, edited by M. R. Allen, 135–72. Sydney: Academic Press. Rumsey, Alan. 1986. "Oratory and the politics of metaphor in the New Guinea Highlands." In Semiotics, ideology, language, edited by Terry Threadgold et al., 283–96. Sydney: Sydney Association for Studies in Society and Culture. Sahlins, Marshall. 1985. Islands of history. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Schieffelin, E. L. 1985. "Performance and the cultural construction of reality." American Ethnologist 12: 707–24. Schwimmer, Erik. 1984. "Male couples in New Guinea." In Ritualised homosexuality in Melanesia, edited by G. H. Herdt, 259–68. Berkeley: University of California Press. Siikala, Jukka. 1982. Cult and conflict in tropical Polynesia: A study of traditional religion, Christianity and nativistic movements. Helsinki: Academia Scientiarum Fennica. Stocking, George. 1985. Objects and others: Essays on museums and material culture. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Strathern, Andrew and Marilyn Strathern. 1971. Self-decoration in Mt. Hagen. London: Duckworth. Strathern, Andrew. 1971. The rope of moka: Big-men and ceremonial exchange in Mount Hagen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Strathern, Marilyn, 1979. "The self in self-decoration." Oceania 49: 241–57. Marilyn STRATHERN 178 ---. 1987. "Out of context: The persuasive fictions of anthropology." Current Anthropology 28: 251–81. Wagner, Roy. 1975. The invention of culture. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. ---. 1986a. Symbols that stand for themselves. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ---. 1986b. Asiwinorong: Ethos, image, and social power among the Usen Barok of New Ireland. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Webster, E. M. 1984. The moon man: A biography of Nikolai MiklouhoMaclay. Berkeley: University of California Press. Williams, Elizabeth A. 1985. "Art and artifact at the Trocadero: Ars Americana and the primitivist revolution." In Objects and others: Essays on museums and material culture, edited by George Stocking Jr., 146– 66. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Metaphern als Indizien PREPRINT 1 Kaminski, Andreas (2014): Was heisst es, dass eine Metapher absolut ist? Metaphern als Indizien. In: Alexander Friedrich, Petra Gehring und Andreas Kaminski (Hg.): Journal Phänomenologie. Schwerpunkt: Metaphern als strenge Wissenschaft 41, S. 47–62. Was heisst es, dass eine Metapher absolut ist? Metaphern als Indizien Andreas Kaminski Blumenbergs Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie sind bekannt für die Entdeckung absoluter Metaphern. Zahlreiche systematische Fragen mögen dabei offen geblieben sein, etwa die nach verschiedenen Typen1 von Metaphern oder den Methoden ihrer Interpretation, so dass schon bezweifelt wurde, ob es sich überhaupt um eine Metapherntheorie handle.2 Immerhin: Dass es absolute Metaphern gibt, was diese sind und woran sie erkannt werden können, wird von Blumenberg in grosser Prägnanz und anhand zahlreicher Beispiele dargestellt. Wenn es eine unangetastete Gewissheit in der Blumenbergrezeption gibt, so scheint sie hierin zu finden zu sein. Dennoch möchte ich erneut die Frage an Blumenbergs Text stellen: In welchem Sinn ist eine Metapher absolut? Auf den ersten Blick mag diese Frage überraschen, da sie einen der offensichtlichsten Gedanken Blumenbergs berührt: Eine absolute Metapher ist nach Blumenberg eine solche, die sich nicht in Begriffe rückübersetzen lässt. In diesem Sinne wird sie von ihm als absolut charakterisiert. Warum halte ich dennoch diese Frage für berechtigt? Das wird am besten anhand einer Alternative verdeutlicht: Ist die absolute Metapher ein Ausdruck in einem fremden Kontext, wie Blumenbergs zahlreiche Exempel nahelegen (die Kraft der Wahrheit, die nackte Wahrheit), oder ist die absolute Metapher gleichsam die jeweilige ganze Theorie, bündelt sich in ihr der gesamte Text? Auf den ersten Blick mag diese Alternative paradox erscheinen. Vorgreifend sei der ihr zugrundeliegende Gedanke erläutert: Blumenbergs Darstellung der Fundstellen legt zunächst die erste Lesart nahe. Demnach wäre die absolute Metapher das Vorkommen eines Ausdrucks (wie »Kraft« oder »nackt«) in einem Kontext, in den sie zunächst nicht passt (Wahrheit). Die Metapher wäre dann zwar nicht ein Ausdruck allein, sondern ein Ausdruck in einem ihm fremden Kontext; sie wiese jedoch Grenzen auf. Wie unbestimmt diese auch verliefen, ob sie weiter oder enger anzusetzen wäre, sie wäre lokalisierund daher identifizierbar. Die zweite Lesart motiviert sich zunächst dadurch, dass Blumenberg vorführt, dass eine absolute Metapher gegeben sein kann, ohne dass sie als Ausdruck in einem Text vorkommt. Sie bildet dann dessen »implikatives Modell«; das heisst, sie stellt den Hintergrund der Begriffsbildung dar und entwirft das Verhältnis von Selbst und Welt. Was zunächst einen Sonderfall darstellt (Metapher ohne Ausdruck), verweist jedoch auf eine allgemeine Eigenschaft absoluter Metaphern bei Blumenberg: Diese sind Modelle für das Verhältnis von Ich und Welt und erfüllen dadurch theoretische und pragmatische Funktionen. Als solche ist die absolute Metapher nicht auf ein lokales Vorkommen begrenzt, sondern durchdringt den Text als solchen. Beide Möglichkeiten stehen in einem Gegensatz zueinander. Gleichwohl gibt es einen vermittelnden Gedanken: Die absolute Metapher (als Strukturzusammenhang des gesamten Textes verstanden) kann sich gleichsam in einem Ausdruck manifestieren, verdichten und selbst bezeichnen. Aber das Vorkommen von absoluten Metaphern wäre an das Vorkommen von Ausdrücken in einem fremden Kontext nicht gebunden. Die Diskussion dieser Frage steht im Zentrum des Beitrags (Abschnitte 1–2), sie hat Konsequenzen für zwei Gedanken (Abschnitte 3–4), die in ihrem Licht vielleicht klarer hervortreten. Diese betreffen nicht zuletzt die Rezeption Blumenbergs. Angesichts aktueller Beiträge zum Werk des Philosophen Hans Blumenberg entsteht der Eindruck, dass es dieses zweimal gibt. Metaphern als Indizien PREPRINT 2 Das eine ist umschlossen von einem anthropologischen Rahmen. Das andere ist geprägt vom taktilen Feingefühl, mit dem Blumenberg die feinen Zäsuren, groben Schnitte, Verzwirbelungen und langen Linien der Geschichte europäischen Denkens nachzeichnet. Ein erster Reflex darauf mag sein, dass zwischen beiden kein Gegensatz besteht. Schliesslich findet sich im anthropologischen Rahmen die Geschichte wieder. Für ihr Auftreten bietet er gleichsam eine Erklärung an. Und wenn man durch die Optik der späteren Werke die früheren liest, scheinen anthropologische Motive zumindest präfiguriert zu sein: Die in den Schriften der 1970er und 1980er Jahre entworfene These einer Entlastung des Menschen durch Sprache, Kultur und Technik scheint dann seine Entsprechung etwa in der Studie zur Legitimität der Neuzeit (welche ihrerseits eine Reihe früherer Aufsätze zum Abschluss bringt) zu haben, in der Blumenberg auch einer Entlastung, nämlich der von einem willkürlichen Schöpfergott, nachgeht. Gleichwohl glaube ich, dass es zumindest aus interpretatorischen Gründen von Vorteil ist, an der Fiktion festzuhalten, man könne das Oeuvre in dieser Weise verzweifachen. Dies hilft, die Kosten zu bemerken, die mit der anthropologischen Lesart entstehen, einer Lesart, zu der Blumenberg selbst am nachdrücklichsten beigetragen hat. Der in meiner Lesart zweifache Blumenberg, der historische und der anthropologische, entsteht, so scheint es mir jedenfalls, aus unterschiedlichen Antworten auf das, was die Paradigmen freilegen. Sie erschliessen einerseits auf neue Weise historische Bedeutungsdimensionen, andererseits entsteht gerade dadurch ein Problem, auf das Blumenberg mit einer anthropologischen Grundlegung reagiert. 1. In welchem Sinn sind Metaphern absolut? In den Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie, die 1960 erschienen, betrachtet Blumenberg die Bedeutung, welche Metaphern für die Philosophie haben. Diese Schrift bietet den konzentriertesten Beitrag Blumenbergs zur Theorie der Metapher. In dem fast zwanzig Jahre späteren Aufsatz »Ausblick auf eine Theorie der Unbegrifflichkeit« (1979)3 nimmt Blumenberg diese Überlegung wieder auf, lässt die Metapherntheorie jedoch nun in eine allgemeinere Theorie der Unbegrifflichkeit (1975)4 eingehen, deren Sonderfall sie nun darstellt. Worum geht es in den Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie? Blumenbergs Thema ist das Verhältnis von Begriff und Metapher. Die Philosophie, so Blumenberg, habe die Metapher überwiegend als blossen rhetorischen Schmuck betrachtet, sie also dem »ornatus« der Rede zugewiesen. Eine eigene Erkenntnisleistung sei ihr zumeist nicht zuerkannt worden. »Die Metapher«, so gibt Blumenberg diese antike Einordnung wieder, »vermag hier nicht die Kapazität der Ausdrucksmittel zu bereichern; sie ist nur Mittel der Wirkung der Aussage [...]. Der Redner, der Dichter können im Grunde nichts sagen, was nicht auch in theoretisch-begrifflicher Weise dargestellt werden könnte«.5 Kurz: Metaphorisch kann man nichts anderes sagen als begrifflich, man kann es nur wirkungsvoller sagen. In der Neuzeit sprach dann René Descartes der Metapher nicht nur eine eigene Erkenntnisleistung ab, sie wurde zum zu überwindenden Hindernis auf dem Weg zur eigentlichen philosophischen Sprache, die in der Begrifflichkeit bestünde. Würde die Philosophie ihr cartesianisches Ideal erreichen, wäre sie rein begrifflich. »Alle Formen und Elemente übertragener Redeweise im weitesten Sinne erwiesen sich von hier [dieser Idealsprache der Philosophie] als vorläufig und überholbar; sie hätten nur funktionale Übergangsbedeutung« (7). Blumenbergs Paradigmen liegt die Widerlegung dieser beiden eng zusammenhängenden und wirkungsreichen Thesen zugrunde. Weder ist die Metapher bloss vorläufig, noch ist sie blosser Redeschmuck. Vielmehr, so Blumenberg, gibt es Metaphern, die ein »Mehr an Aussageleistung« erbringen (9). Sie haben eine spezifische epistemische und praktische Funktion. Und weil sie eine solche ihnen eigene Funktion erfüllen, können sie auch nicht durch Begriffe ersetzt werden. Damit sind beide Behauptungen, welche über die Metapher im Verhältnis zum Metaphern als Indizien PREPRINT 3 Begriff aufgestellt wurden, in Frage gestellt. Metaphern, auf welche dies zutrifft, nennt Blumenberg absolute Metaphern. Diese sind »Grundbestände der philosophischen Sprache«, da sich das, was sie sagen, nicht ins »Eigentliche, in die Logizität zurückholen« lässt (10). Das erklärt auch, warum Blumenberg diese Metaphern absolut nennt. Sie sind nicht auf Begriffe zurückführbar oder durch Begriffe ersetzbar. Damit ist aber keineswegs der Bedeutungsgehalt der Rede von den absoluten Metaphern erschöpft, wie im Folgenden gezeigt werden soll. In den Paradigmen behandelt Blumenberg vor allem Metaphern für Wahrheit. Die Geschichte des Wahrheitsbegriffs, so Blumenberg, falle relativ kahl aus. Anders dagegen die Geschichte der Metaphern für Wahrheit. Als Paradigmen absoluter Metaphern nennt Blumenberg etwa die Lichtmetaphorik oder die der mächtigen Wahrheit, der Kraft der Wahrheit (der vis veritatis), der ergreifenden Wahrheit (Katalepsis), die bei den Haaren packt und zur Zustimmung zwingt. Später sind es dann die Gerichts-, Gewaltsund Arbeitsmetaphoriken, welche die Wahrheit bestimmen. In einem anderen Zusammenhang entsteht die Metaphorik der nackten Wahrheit, welche vor allem zeitdiagnostische Natur-/Kulturdebatten anleitet. Neben solchen Metaphern für Wahrheit sind es die vom Buch der Natur6, von der Welt als Maschine, als Uhr oder als Organismus, welche Blumenberg in ihrer Geschichte verfolgt. Es ist intuitiv durchaus plausibel, dass Metaphern wie die von der Macht der Wahrheit oder von der Wahrheit als Licht einen anderen Status haben als etwa jene vom ökonomischen Rettungsschirm oder vom »kleinen Despoten am Handgelenk«7. Nur, was ist der Unterschied? Inwiefern handelt es sich bei der Metapher vom Licht der Wahrheit um eine absolute Metapher? Blumenberg streut über den gesamten Text der Paradigmen verschiedene Hinweise aus, was absolute Metaphern kennzeichnet. Diese Hinweise können wohl als Kriterien verstanden werden dafür, ob eine absolute Metapher vorliegt. Als erstes Kriterium nennt Blumenberg die schon umschriebene Nichtrückübertragbarkeit: 1. Nichtrückübertragbarkeit: »Die Lichtmetaphorik ist nicht rückübertragbar.« (15) Angesprochen ist damit das schon eingangs erwähnte Verhältnis von Metapher und Begriff. Der metaphorische Ausdruck kann nicht äquivalent durch Begriffe substituiert werden. Vergleichen wir zwei Fälle, zunächst einen, in dem diese Rückübertragbarkeit sehr gut gelingt. So ist die Rede von einer »toten Metapher« selbst eine Metapher. Eine Metapher kann nicht tot sein. Gemeint ist aber, dass eine Metapher nicht mehr als Metapher erkannt wird. Statt von einer toten Metapher kann also von einer Metapher, an die man sich gewöhnt und die deshalb nicht mehr als Metapher bemerkt wird, gesprochen werden. Man kann es auch kürzer machen und einen Fachterminus dafür wählen: Tote Metaphern werden als lexikalisierte Metaphern bezeichnet. Deutlich wird, dass es also mehrere Möglichkeiten gibt, auf den metaphorischen Ausdruck zu verzichten und stattdessen die gemeinte Sache nichtmetaphorisch auszudrücken – auch wenn man dabei vielleicht einigen sprachökonomischen Aufwand in Kauf nehmen muss. Wie sieht es dagegen bei einer Metapher wie der vom Licht der Wahrheit aus? Hier steht man nicht nur vor ökonomischen Problemen (wie beschreibt man das kurz und prägnant), sondern vor der Frage: Wie kann man das damit Gemeinte überhaupt äquivalent ausdrücken, ohne die Metapher zu verwenden? Ein Wahrheitsbegriff, der dieser Wahrheitsmetapher äquivalent wäre, ist nicht verfügbar. 2. Nicht verifizierbar: Ein zweites Kennzeichen absoluter Metaphern ist für Blumenberg, dass sie nicht verifizierbar sind. Blumenberg schreibt: »Ohne weiteres ist klar, dass sich solche Metaphern wie von Macht oder Ohnmacht der Wahrheit nicht verifizieren lassen und dass die in ihnen entschiedene Alternative theoretisch gar nicht entscheidbar ist.« (23) Ist Wahrheit eine Macht, die sich aufdrängt und überwältigt? Oder ist Wahrheit nicht eher ohnmächtig? Muss sie nicht ergriffen und ans Licht gezogen werden? Oder aber: Ist die Welt eine Maschine, eine machina mundi? La Machine de l'universe? Oder ist die Natur ein Buch, das gelesen werden kann? Solche metaphorischen Totalhorizonte, Metaphern als Indizien PREPRINT 4 also Metaphern für Welt, Sein, Dasein, Geschichte, Leben sind als Totalhorizonte keiner Anschauung zugänglich. »Was die Welt eigentlich sei – diese am wenigsten entscheidbare Frage ist doch zugleich die nie unentscheidbare und daher immer entschiedene Frage.« (26 f.) Nun fällt auf, dass Blumenberg im Zitat weiter oben davon spricht, dass diese Frage »theoretisch gar nicht entscheidbar ist.« Warum betont Blumenberg hier »theoretisch«? 3. Pragmatisch: Die Frage führt zu einem weiteren Kennzeichen absoluter Metaphern. Metaphern geben eine pragmatische Orientierung, Metaphern induzieren »Stile von Weltverhalten« (25). »Ihre Wahrheit ist«, so Blumenberg weiter, »in einem sehr weitern Verstande, pragmatisch. Ihr Gehalt bestimmt als Anhalt von Orientierungen ein Verhalten, sie geben einer Welt Struktur, repräsentieren das nie erfahrbare, nie übersehbare Ganze der Realität.« (25) Was ist damit gemeint? Wird Wahrheit als Macht, als Kraft verstanden, so folgt daraus ein anderes Weltverhalten, als wenn Wahrheit als etwas Verborgenes gilt, das durch Arbeit und Gewalt zu fördern sei. Blumenberg schreibt in diesem Sinne: »Im umgekehrten Verhältnis zur Macht, die der Wahrheit zugemessen wird, wird das Mass der eigenen Anstrengung um der Wahrheit willen stehen.« (29) Je mehr Macht der Wahrheit, desto weniger Aktivität des die Wahrheit erkennenden. Kontemplation ist daher die Haltung, die der Auffassung von einer Macht der Wahrheit entspricht. Ganz anders verhält es sich, wo Natur als Geheimnis und Wahrheit als Arbeit erscheint, wie bei Francis Bacon. Hier gilt die Kontemplation nichts mehr. Stattdessen ist es das aktive Zugreifen mit den rechten Werkzeugen, das die Wahrheit hervorzwingt. Entsprechend schreibt der Aufklärer d'Alembert, dass es leichter sei zu lesen als zu sehen. Leichtigkeit (facilitas) gilt nun aber gerade nicht mehr als Kennzeichen von Wahrheit. Und Montesquieu beschreibt den Forscher als jemand, der sich ständig daran erschöpft, »der vor ihm flüchtigen Wahrheit nachzusetzen, die dem Proteus der Sage zu gleichen scheint, der sich unter tausend Gestalten und tausend trügerischen Erscheinungen verbarg.« (42) 4. Modell (von Ich und Welt): Diese Kennzeichen konvergieren in einem vierten: Absolute Metaphern drücken gleichsam ein Modell von Ich und Welt und ihrem Verhältnis aus. Blumenberg spricht von »elementaren Modellvorstellungen, die in der Gestalt von Metaphern bis in die Ausdrucksphäre durchschlagen.« (16) Absolute Metaphern sind nicht verifizierbar, weil sie sich auf Totalhorizonte wie Welt beziehen, sie bieten eine pragmatische Orientierung an und bestimmen auf diese das Verhältnis von Ich und Welt. Die Modellleistung der Metapher reicht für Blumenberg so weit, dass die Metapher selbst in ihrem Fehlen aufdringlich wird. So klingt es, so Blumenberg, zunächst wie eine rein terminologische Aussage, wenn Thomas von Aquin in De veritate Wahrheit als Wirkursache bestimmt: »Cognitio est quidam veritatis effectus«. Auch wenn hier scheinbar keine Metapher vorkommt, so ist diese Aussage für Blumenberg doch an der selbsttätigen Macht der Wahrheit, das heisst, »bei näherem Hinsehen deutlich an einem metaphorischen Hintergrund orientiert, den wir ›implikatives Modell‹ zu nennen vorschlagen. Das bedeutet, dass Metaphern in ihrer hier besprochenen Funktion gar nicht in der sprachlichen Ausdruckssphäre in Erscheinung zu treten brauchen; aber ein Zusammenhang von Aussagen schliesst sich plötzlich zu einer Sinneinheit zusammen, wenn man hypothetisch die metaphorische Leitvorstellung erschliessen kann, an der diese Aussagen ›abgelesen‹ sein können.« (20) Nichtrückübertragbarkeit, Nichtverifizierbarkeit, pragmatische Funktion, Modell (von Ich und Welt) – die von mir aufgesammelten Kriterien, die Blumenberg für absolute Metaphern gibt, sind problematisch. Sie sind eher intuitive Hinweise als belastbare Kriterien. Die Nichtrückübersetzbarkeit lässt es zum Beispiel offen, wie scharf die Bedingungen dafür sind, ob eine Metapher rückübersetzbar ist oder nicht. In der Regel verändert jede Substitution die BedeuMetaphern als Indizien PREPRINT 5 tung. So verändert die Ersetzung der Rede von der »toten Metapher« durch die von der »lexikalischen Metapher« die Bedeutung. Wird von der lexikalischen Metapher gesprochen, so wird zum Beispiel die Erwartung des Fortgangs eine vermutlich andere sein. Es werden eher aktuelle linguistische Konzepte und Debatten erwartet. Das mag aber durchaus nur einer der Unterschiede sein. Ob etwas äquivalent rückübersetzbar ist oder nicht, verweist wohl auf ein angelegtes pragmatisches Mass, das die Toleranz für Abweichungen angibt. Bei einer Zero-Tolerance-Politik lässt sich selbst ein Begriff nicht durch einen anderen ersetzen. Aber vermutlich muss man dieses Kriterium, nicht rückübertragbar, radikaler Lesen. Es wäre dann nicht so, dass es keine Rückübersetzung ohne Bedeutungsverlust gibt. Sondern vielmehr: Es gibt nicht einmal einen Begriff, in den man rückübersetzen könnte. Ich komme darauf später zurück, wenn es um die weitere Bedeutung, die die Rede von der absoluten Metapher hat, geht. Probleme gibt es auch mit dem Kriterium der Nichtverifizierbarkeit. Denn auch Begriffe sind nicht verifizierbar. Nur insofern sie Aussagen darstellen oder implizieren, sind sie das. Man müsste daher präzisieren: Metaphorische Aussagen seien nicht verifizierbar. Aber auch dann bleiben andere, und zwar zum Teil erhebliche Probleme bestehen. Es gibt auch terminologische Aussagen, welche sich nicht einfach verifizieren lassen. Eine Aussage darüber, was Wahrheit ist, ist nicht einfach wahr oder unwahr. Sie kann autologisch und in diesem Sinne konsistent auf sich selbst angewandt werden. Sie kann zudem angemessen erscheinen und begründet werden. Aber sie lässt sich nicht selbst in der gleichen Weise verifizieren. Nun könnte es sein, dass dieses Problem nur an den Metaphern für Wahrheit auftritt. Solche wie die vom Buch der Natur bleiben davon ausgenommen. Aber auch dann hören die Probleme mit diesem Kriterium nicht auf. Insofern sich absolute Metaphern auf Totalhorizonte wie Welt beziehen, könnten sie vielleicht sogar besonders leicht zu widerlegen sein. Ein Fall, in dem es sich anders verhält, genügte. Sie wären damit zwar nicht verifiziert, sondern falsifiziert, aber dann, wenn sie einmal falsifiziert sind, auch nicht mehr verifizierbar. Aber es dürfte für Blumenberg einen ganz anderen Grund geben, warum sich absolute nicht verifizieren lassen. Absolute Metaphern sind in der Darstellung Blumenbergs wie wissenschaftliche Paradigmen8. Eines mag zum anderen überleiten, aber sie lassen sich nicht deduktiv ableiten. Vielmehr wechselt mit ihnen auch die Terminologie. Das ist ja, was Blumenberg mit dem Kennzeichen des (implikativen) Modells im Sinn hat: Die Metapher relationiert die Begriffe. Metaphorischer Wandel kann daher eher abrupt, disjunkt verlaufen. Er gleicht eher einem Gestaltwandel als einer kontinuierlichen Entwicklung. Damit verbunden wäre auch eine Begründung, warum sich absolute Metaphern nicht verifizieren lassen: Sie liegen vor der Differenz von wahr/falsch, da sie diese erst eröffnen, und zwar auch dann, wenn es sich nicht um Metaphern für Wahrheit handelt. Denn auch eine Metapher wie jene vom Buch der Natur bestimmt, worin und auf welche Weise Wahres zu entdecken ist sowie was zu einem Aussen von wahr/unwahr wird. Eröffnen und organisieren absolute Metaphern Theorien, wofür es viele Hinweise im Text Blumenbergs gibt, dann stellt sich nachdrücklich und in der eingangs gestellten Form die Frage, was die absolute Metapher ist: Ist sie ein Ausdruck in einem fremden Kontext oder ist sie das Modell der gesamten Theorie? Die Alternative, welche sich nun ergibt, kann so erläutert werden: Eine Metapher ist sicherlich nicht bloss ein Wort, sondern immer die Beziehung eines Ausdrucks zu einem ihm fremden Kontext. Das Wort »Kraft« allein ist noch keine Metapher, sondern wird es erst gemeinsam mit einem ihm fremden Kontext, hier indem es auf die Wahrheit bezogen wird. Ebenso ist »Buch« keine Metapher, die Rede vom »Buch der Natur« dagegen schon. Zwei semantische Felder kollidieren hierbei, indem ein Wort aus einem Kontext in einen anderen »übertragen« wird, mit diesem interagiert.9 Ob die absolute Metapher allerdings die über einen Ausdruck vermittelte Kollision zweier semantischer Felder ist, ist fraglich, liest man Blumenberg genau. Einige Formulierungen legen nahe, dass die absolute Metapher vielmehr der metaphorische Ausdruck in eins mit der gesamten Theorie ist. Absolut wäre die Metapher dann deshalb, weil sie die Theorie betrifft, die keine andere Grundlage als sich selbst hat. Sie Metaphern als Indizien PREPRINT 6 begründet sich gleichsam im zwar nicht geschichtslosen, aber doch luftleeren Raum an sich selbst – als freischwebendes Unternehmen. Die »Aussagen« können aus diesem Grund auch nicht verifiziert werden, weil sie erst angeben, worin eine Verifikation bestünde. Damit hängt auch zusammen, dass die absoluten Metaphern ein Modell für das Verhältnis von Ich und Welt formulieren, welches dann pragmatische Orientierungsleistungen erfüllt. Dass diese Alternative besteht, wird deutlich an den Kennzeichen und Leistungen der absoluten Metapher. Diese bestimmen (i) Totalhorizonte, sie orientieren (ii) pragmatisch und (iii) sie implizieren den Zusammenhang der Theorie. An Blumenbergs Behauptung, dass absolute Metaphern ein »implikatives Modell« mit sich bringen, kommt dies besonders gut zum Ausdruck. Betrachten wir dazu noch einmal die bereits genannte Formulierung im Kontext von Thomas' Wahrheitsbestimmung: Die Wahrheit bewirke die Erkenntnis. Hier spricht Blumenberg, wie gesagt, von einem »metaphorischen Hintergrund«, an dem diese Aussage gewonnen sei – ein Hintergrund deshalb, weil explizit kein metaphorischer Ausdruck vorkommt. Diesen metaphorischen Hintergrund nennt Blumenberg ein »implikatives Modell« und er schreibt: »Das bedeutet, dass Metaphern in ihrer hier besprochenen Funktion gar nicht in der sprachlichen Ausdruckssphäre in Erscheinung zu treten brauchen; aber ein Zusammenhang von Aussagen schliesst sich plötzlich zu einer Sinneinheit zusammen, wenn man hypothetisch die metaphorische Leitvorstellung erschliessen kann, an der diese Aussagen ›abgelesen‹ sein können.« (20) Die Metapher strukturiert die Begriffe, mehr noch, sie gestaltet sie zu einem Ganzen. Die absolute Metapher wäre dann eben nicht nur der Ausdruck in einem fremden Kontext, der zwei semantische Felder miteinander kollidieren lässt, und die dabei freiwerdende Reibungsenergie nutzt. Sie kann sich in einem solchen metaphorischen Ausdruck verdichten und selbst anzeigen. Die Alternative wäre also, dass das implikative Modell insofern der Standardfall ist, als es immer gegeben ist, wo es eine absolute Metapher gibt. Metaphorologische Ausdrücke würden das Erkennen des metaphorischen Modells erleichtern. Ich glaube nun nicht, dass Blumenbergs Paradigmen ausdrücklich diese Alternative erwägen. Sie legen sie aber an einigen Stellen zumindest nahe. Auch wird der systematische Zusammenhang der Kriterien, welche sich verstreut in den Paradigmen finden, dann nachvollziehbar. Insofern die absolute Metapher das grundlegende Modell (von Ich und Welt) ist, ist dieses als Modell nicht verifizierbar, nicht rückübertragbar, sondern kann nur an seiner pragmatischen Funktion und Angemessenheit beurteilt werden. Die diskutierte Alternative bringt aber auch und zum Teil sogar erhebliche Schwierigkeiten mit sich. Diese sind etwa: Ist damit jeder Text absolut metaphorisch? Welche Bedeutung haben einander widerstrebende Metaphern in einem Text? Kann eine absolute Metapher nur lokal in einem Textabschnitt auftreten? Oder umgreift sie immer den gesamten Text? Wird die absolute Metapher dann nicht zu einem eigenartigen Latenzphänomen? 2. Metaphern als Indizien Sicherlich, an den meisten Stellen spricht Blumenberg von absoluten Metaphern im Sinne identifizierbarer metaphorischer Ausdrücke. Aber darauf beschränkt sich seine Redeweise nicht. Dies zeigt sich auch an Blumenbergs Darstellung der Funktion der Metaphorologie. Blumenbergs primäres Interesse gilt nicht dem metaphorischen Ausdruck – auch nicht in den Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie. Wie ist das zu verstehen, da sich Blumenberg doch offensichtlich mit nichts anderem beschäftigt? In der Tat sind es metaphorische Ausdrücke, die Blumenberg historisch verfolgt und die er auf den Begriff der absoluten Metapher zu bringen unternimmt. Aber für Blumenberg haben solche metaphorischen Ausdrücke (1) nur eine dienende Funktion. Sie sind (2) Indizien. Sie indizieren (3) historische Profile und historischen Wandel, und zwar (4) in einer kaum expliziten Bedeutungsschicht von Texten. Lesen wir dazu einige der vielen Reflexionen, die Blumenberg in seine Paradigmen wiederholt einstreut. Vom Gegenstand dieser Studie sagt Blumenberg: »[D]ie Analyse richtet sich auf Metaphern als Indizien PREPRINT 7 die Erschliessung der Fragen, auf die Antwort gesucht und versucht wird, Fragen, präsystematischen Charakters, deren Intentionsfülle die Metapher gleichsam ›provoziert‹ hat.« (15) Blumenbergs Analyse richtet sich also primär gar nicht auf den metaphorischen Ausdruck, sondern »auf die Erschliessung der Fragen [...] präsystematischen Charakters.« Diese Fragen zu erschliessen sei die Aufgabe der Metaphorologie. Damit stellen sich uns zunächst drei Folgefragen: Was sind das für Fragen präsystematischen Charakters? Warum müssen sie erschlossen werden? Wie werden sie erschlossen? Blumenberg schreibt: »Man darf die vermeintliche Naivität nicht scheuen, diese fundierenden Fragen – auch wenn sie nie ausdrücklich gestellt sein sollten – zu formulieren.« Diese Formulierung ist zunächst aufschlussreich, gibt sie doch an, warum besagte Fragen erschlossen werden müssen. Weil es sich um Fragen handelt, die zwar in den Texten behandelt werden, ohne dass sie aber als Untersuchungsfrage, als These, als Gegenstand ausdrücklich benannt werden. Blumenberg fährt fort, indem er ausführt, um welche Arten von Fragen es sich beispielsweise handelt: »Welchen Anteil hat der Mensch am Ganzen der Wahrheit? In welcher Situation befindet sich der Wahrheit Suchende: darf er vertrauen, dass das Seiende sich ihm öffnet, oder ist Erkenntnis wesentlich Gewalttat, Überlistung, Abpressung, hochnotpeinliches Verhör des Gegenstands?« (15) Unschwer lässt sich erkennen, wie Metaphern von der Macht der Wahrheit, von ihrer Kraft oder im Gegenteil von der zu erarbeitenden, zu erpressenden Wahrheit eine Antwort auf diese Fragen sind, ohne dass die Frage dazu eben ausdrücklich gestellt sein muss. Wenn die Fragen aber nicht ausdrücklich gestellt sind, so müssen sie erschlossen werden. Das gelingt, weil sich »überall in der Sprache der Philosophie Indizien dafür finden, dass in einer untergründigen Schicht des Denkens immer schon Antwort auf diese Fragen gegeben war«. Was sind das nun für Indizien? »Die kategorialen Mittel, solche Indizien zu erfassen und zu beschreiben, sind noch bei weitem nicht ausgebildet und methodisch parat; wenn wir etwa philosophische ›Einstellungen‹ als optimistisch oder pessimistisch klassifizieren, so bleiben wir im Grunde an der Verdrossenheit oder Heiterkeit einer Physiognomie hängen, ohne auf die Orientierung zurückzugehen, an denen sich solche scheinbar primär emotionalen Vorzeichensetzungen konstituieren, und zwar in der Weise, dass sie ›abgelesen‹ werden an ganz elementaren Modellvorstellungen, die in der Gestalt von Metaphern bis in die Ausdruckssphäre durchschlagen.« (16) Absolute Metaphern fungieren für historische Phänomenologen als Indizien. Der historische Phänomenologe versucht wie ein Detektiv die Indizien zusammenzutragen, um zu klären, was wirklich (gewesen) ist. Vor dem Hintergrund dieser detektivischen Funktion schreibt Blumenberg: »Dem historischen verstehenden Blick indizieren sie also die fundamentalen, tragenden Gewissheiten, Vermutungen, Wertungen, aus denen sich die Haltungen, Erwartungen, Tätigkeiten und Untätigkeiten, Sehnsüchte und Enttäuschungen, Interessen und Gleichgültigkeiten einer Epoche regulierten.« (25)10 Durch die Metapher legt der Phänomenologe jene Bedeutungsschicht von Texten frei, die immer schon im Spiel ist, die aber sachlich zu explizieren die kategorialen Mittel fehlen. Metaphern sind Indizien für das, was »durchstimmend, färbend, strukturierend gegenwärtig und wirksam gewesen ist.« (15) Die historischen Rekonstruktionen von Metaphern, die Blumenberg in den Paradigmen vornimmt, folgen tatsächlich dem detektivischen Verfahren. Ich möchte dies am Beispiel der Amerikaund terra incognita-Metapher kurz darlegen. »Im 17. Jahrhundert«, schreibt Blumenberg, »ist die Amerika-Metapher sehr beliebt.« So »spricht etwa Thomas Browne von dem America and untravelled parts of Truth«. In einem Gedicht über Thomas Hobbes wird dieser als grosser Kolumbus angesprochen, welcher der neuen Philosophie ein goldenes Land entdeckte. Was Blumenberg hier freilegt, ist die Offenheit des Erwartungshorizonts, die er als charakteristisch für »die Art der Intentionalität des Bewusstseins der frühen Neuzeit« betrachtet. »Das Gefühl, die Ahnung, dass die entscheidenden Landmassen der Wahrheit noch nicht entdeckt oder erst in Metaphern als Indizien PREPRINT 8 ihren Konturen andeutend wahrgenommen sind, wirken bewusstseinsbestimmend, wecken [...] ein in allem Neuen nur die Kaps und Vorinseln von Kontinenten sehendes Gespanntsein.« (78) Die Metaphern vom neuen Land, der neuen Welt, auf die auch Husserl noch zurückgreift, scheinen uns daher, so Blumenberg, »ein eigentümlich anachronistisches Selbstgefühl zu indizieren«. Husserls Metaphern gehören vielmehr zum eigentümlich intensivierten Erwartungshorizont der frühen Neuzeit als in dessen eigene Zeit, soll das heissen. Blumenberg schreibt: »Und dieses Indiz bestätigt sich denn auch in erstaunlicher Weise, wenn man die Selbstdeutung Husserls, in der er sich immer wieder an die Stelle von Descartes versetzt, näher untersucht.«11 (80) Blumenberg hat die Metaphorologie als eine Hilfsdisziplin der Begriffsgeschichte bezeichnet und die Begriffsgeschichte selbst wiederum als Hilfsdisziplin »für eine aus ihrer Geschichte sich selbst« verstehende Philosophie.12 Das ist verschiedentlich angezweifelt worden.13 Angesichts des methodischen Gebrauchs, den Blumenberg in der Untersuchung von Metaphern macht, ist es aber kein Understatement, die Metaphorologie als Hilfsdisziplin zu bezeichnen. Vermutlich liegen die Dinge auf der Seite der Textentstehung anders, wahrscheinlich haben hier Metaphern eine noch andere Funktion. Zumindest für den historischen Phänomenologen bieten Metaphern aber primär eine indizierende Zugangsweise an, um Geschichte in ihrer Fremde, Ferne und Unbekanntheit zu rekonstruieren. Dafür reicht die Metapher alleine nicht aus, wie Blumenberg schreibt, denn: »Um das spezifische Gefühl der ersten Jahrhunderte der Neuzeit für die Proportionen zwischen dem Bekannten und dem Unbekannten, dem Alten und dem noch anstehenden Neuen herauszuarbeiten, dazu genügt freilich eine isolierte metaphorische Untersuchung nicht. Sie macht nur das eigentümlich vortheoretische, stimmungsmässig Gespannte, Ahnungshafte einer Welthaltung deutlich, die sich am Anfang unermesslichen Zuwachses an Erkenntnis wähnt und dies in Willentlichkeit, Arbeit, Methode, Energie umsetzt. Die Metaphern geben das Feld an, in dem terminologische Untersuchungen das Detail zu liefern hätten.« (80) Ein zusätzliches Argument dafür, dass Blumenberg hier kein Understatement betreibt, ergibt sich aus dem Verhältnis von Begriffen und Metaphern, auf das er wiederholt eingeht. In Blumenbergs Aufsatz »Licht als Metapher der Wahrheit« von 1957 wird dieses Argument besonders deutlich auf den Punkt gebracht. Denn dort erläutert Blumenberg, dass die Lichtmetaphorik selbst ein allzu grosses und das heisst entsprechend diffuses Potenzial hat, um selbst sprechend zu sein. Blumenberg geht darin die Metapherngeschichte von Wahrheit als Licht von Platon bis Heidegger durch. Weil per se nicht feststeht, wie die Lichtmetaphorik zu verstehen ist, hat sie so viel Potenzial. Auch in diesem Aufsatz spricht Blumenberg im Übrigen davon, dass »die Umformungen der Grundmetapher die Wandlungen des Weltund Selbstverständnisses indizieren«.14 Ich versuche kurz zusammenzufassen: Metaphern interessieren Blumenberg in der Metaphorologie nicht primär, sondern sie haben für ihn eine Zeichenfunktion. Sie fungieren als Indizien. Was sie dabei indizieren können, sind jene grundlegenden Fragen und Gewissheiten, jene Erwartungen, Tätigkeiten, Interessen und Gleichgültigkeiten, die selbst nicht expliziert im Text formuliert sind, die ihn aber »durchstimmen, färben, strukturieren«.15 3. Querschnitte Das detektivische Interesse Blumenbergs an den grundlegenden Gewissheiten, Vermutungen, Wertungen, welche durch metaphorologische Ausdrücke indiziert werden, findet sich in dessen Oeuvre als ein durchgehender Zug wieder. Wie weit dabei das historische Spurenlesen gelingt, kann man erkennen, wenn man verschiedene Werke Blumenbergs im Querschnitt betrachtet. In seinem Aufsatz » ›Nachahmung der Natur‹. Zur Vorgeschichte der Idee des schöpferischen Menschen« verfolgt Blumenberg, wie sich am Ende des Spätmittelalters eine Schere zwischen Metaphern als Indizien PREPRINT 9 Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit öffnet.16 War das Mögliche zuvor durch das Wirkliche begrenzt und angezeigt, so wird, ausgelöst gerade durch die Allmacht eines Gottes, der auch andere Welten hätte schaffen können, diese Einheit zerbrochen. Erst damit entsteht die Möglichkeit des radikal Neuen und Anderen. Das Mögliche wird nun durch das Wirkliche nicht begrenzt. Die zunehmende Divergenz zwischen dem faktisch Gegebenen und dem Möglichen bildet sich auch in einer sich öffnenden Schere zwischen Lebenszeit und Weltzeit ab.17 So wird in einem längeren historischen Prozess erschüttert festgestellt, dass etwa nicht alle Wahrheiten in einem Forscherleben erkannt werden können. Der Gedanke eines Erkenntnisfortschritts war in Blumenbergs Lesart eine Irritation und zugleich eine Antwort auf diese Frustration. Astronomen zum Beispiel sammeln Daten, deren Ordnung und Erkenntniswert sie in ihrem Leben vermutlich nicht erfahren werden. Der individuellen Lebensspanne bleibt Wesentliches, den Kosmos Betreffendes, vorenthalten.18 Es gibt mehr, als aktuell gegeben ist. Dem entspricht wiederum Blumenbergs Nachzeichnung einer Veränderung, welche die Neugierde betrifft. Die neuzeitliche Wissbegierde gegenüber dem »innerweltlich Unsichtbaren«, so Blumenberg, stelle in doppelter Weise einen Bruch dar. In Astronomie, Mikroskopie, in Seefahrt und der Neugierde gegenüber dem, was unter der Erdoberfläche ist, dem »mundus subterraneus«, wird ein neues Interesse am Latenten, am innerweltlich Unsichtbaren vernehmbar.19 In der Entdeckung des Latenten taucht ein Übermass an bislang Vorenthaltenem, die Inkongruenz von sichtbar gegebener und vorhandener Welt auf. Im Gegenteil sei, wie beispielsweise ein Astronom im 16. Jahrhundert ausführt, der grösste Teil der Welt unsichtbar, das Nichtgegebene also im Übergewicht.20 Die Geschichte der absoluten Metaphern für Wahrheit spiegelt dies in anderer Weise wider. Jene Metaphern, welche Wahrheit als etwas sich Selbstdarbietendes, als eine sich aufdrängende oder ergreifende Macht (z. B. als Licht) auffassten, wurden im Verlaufe der Neuzeit durch Arbeits-, Gewaltund Nötigungsmetaphern ersetzt. Wahrheit muss nun vor Gericht gezwungen, pressiert, sie muss erarbeitet werden.21 Diese Geschichte ist keineswegs linear zu erzählen, die hellenistische Antike war beispielsweise für Blumenberg durch den Gedanken der Transzendenz des Lichts und dessen Flucht bestimmt. Darin findet sich dennoch keinerlei Gedanke an eine produktive, arbeitsame Aneignung von Wahrheit, die auf deren (innerweltliche) Latenz zielte.22 Trotz aller feinen und deutlichen Unterschiede im antiken Verständnis von Wahrheit bleibt es daher bei einem Paradigmenwechsel, wenn von Kraft der Wahrheit (im Sinne eines Genitivus subjectivus) zur Gewalt gegenüber der Wahrheit übergegangen wird. Blumenberg hat diese Parallelen zwischen den verschiedenen Geschichten nicht selbst gezogen. Sie fallen zeitlich auch nicht unmittelbar zusammen, sondern überlappen sich. Sie zeigen an, wie sich auf verschiedenen Ebenen eine zunehmende Inkongruenz von Aktualität und Möglichkeit auftut. Man sieht daran, welchen historischen Feinblick Blumenberg entwickelte. Angesichts dessen stellt sich nachdrücklich die eingangs aufgeworfene Frage: wie und warum Blumenberg zur Anthropologie kam. 4. Blumenbergs anthropologische Grundlegung In seinem Anfang der 1970er Jahre publizierten Aufsatz »Anthropologische Annäherung an die Aktualität der Rhetorik« geht Blumenberg von einer Parallele zwischen Rhetorik und Anthropologie aus. Die Rhetorik sei entweder als eine Disziplin aufgefasst worden, welche es zu tun hat »mit den Folgen aus dem Besitz von Wahrheit oder mit den Verlegenheiten, die sich aus der Unmöglichkeit ergeben, Wahrheit zu erreichen«.23 Dieser Alternative entspreche die scharf zwiegespaltene Betrachtungsweise in der Anthropologie: Der Mensch sei entweder als armes (etwa instinktreduziertes) oder reiches (etwa mit einem Überfluss an Talenten begabtes) Wesen aufgefasst worden. Blumenberg nun versteht dies nicht als eine zufällige Parallele. Vielmehr Metaphern als Indizien PREPRINT 10 hängen beide Alternativen zusammen: »Es lässt sich leicht sehen, dass man die beiden radikalen Alternativen der Anthropologie und der Rhetorik einander eindeutig zuordnen kann. Der Mensch als das reiche Wesen verfügt über seinen Besitz an Wahrheit mit den Wirkungsmitteln des rhetorischen ornatus. Der Mensch als das arme Wesen bedarf der Rhetorik als der Kunst des Scheins, die ihn mit seinem Mangel an Wahrheit fertig werden lässt.«24 Obgleich Blumenberg nun beide Alternativen eigens herausstellt, ja gerade deshalb, überrascht es umso mehr, dass er sich jeweils dem einen Pol anschliesst und ihn erkennbar zu seiner eigenen Position macht: Blumenberg geht im weiteren Textverlauf von der Auffassung des Menschen als armes, instinktreduziertes Wesen aus, das deshalb der Rhetorik bedarf, um diesen Mangel auszugleichen. Gerade angesichts der Dogmatik und Willkürlichkeit, mit der beide Thesen einander gegenüber stehen, ruft dies Fragen auf. Eine Begründung dafür ist im Text nicht erkennbar. Diese unmittelbar sich aufdrängende Frage droht jedoch eine andere zu verdecken: Warum entscheidet sich Blumenberg überhaupt, einer (gleich welcher) Anthropologie zu folgen? Auch auf diese Frage ist im Text keine Antwort zu finden; jedenfalls nicht ausdrücklich. Es lässt sich jedoch ein Motiv erkennen, wenn man sich mit Blumenbergs Metaphorologie befasst.25 Die Vermutung liegt nahe, dass Blumenbergs historische Phänomenologie zum Gegenteil dessen führte, was Husserl mit seiner transzendentalen Phänomenologie intendierte: diese suchte ein Fundament zu bieten, wogegen jene – zumindest dem Anschein nach – sich einem wilden historischen Relativismus ausgesetzt sieht. Die absoluten Metaphern, welche Blumenberg als nicht rückübertragbar in (kontrollierbare) Begriffe und also nicht verifizierbar bestimmte, stellen Paradigmen in einem ähnlichen Sinne wie beim Wissenschaftshistoriker Thomas S. Kuhn dar. Auch bei diesem erhob sich die Frage, inwiefern dies nicht in einen Relativismus wissenschaftlichen Wissens führe. Angesichts des drohenden Relativismus sind nun zwei Strategien naheliegend. Die erste wäre die des Historikers, der den Wandel nachzeichnet, der die Sinnverschiebungen und Zäsuren nachverfolgt. Blumenbergs Arbeiten lassen durchaus diese Strategie erkennen. Die zweite besteht darin, den historischen Relativismus gleichsam anthropologisch grundzulegen. Diese Stabilisierung erfüllt die funktionale Argumentationsweise, in welcher Blumenberg die Anthropologie einführt. Der geschichtliche Wandel wird auf ein identisches Problem bezogen: die Instinktarmut des Menschen und die gleichzeitige Überwältigungskraft der Wirklichkeit. Die historische Betrachtung kann nun die verschiedenen Lösungen des identischen Problems fokussieren. Angesichts des historischen Relativismus entscheidet sich Blumenberg für einen wissenschaftlich verbrämten Dogmatismus. In Frage steht allerdings, ob es nicht eine dritte Option gegeben hätte: die Philosophie als Reflexion jener Kriterien, die empirisch zur Anwendung kommen, selbst allerdings nicht unter diese Kriterien fallen.26 Metaphern als Indizien PREPRINT 11 1 Klar ist, es gibt absolute Metaphern. Aber dann gibt es auch andere, nur welche – relative? Ein Ausdruck für diese Metaphern fehlt in den Paradigmen, ganz zu schweigen von einer Systematik. Dass Blumenberg diese Fragen durchaus sieht, vgl. Margarita Kranz (2011), »Begriffsgeschichte institutionell. Die Senatskommission für Begriffsgeschichte der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft (1956–1966). Darstellung und Dokumente«, in: Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 53, S. 152–226. 2 Daher ist bezweifelt worden, ob die Paradigmen eine Metapherntheorie enthalten. Vgl. dazu Petra Gehring, »Metapher«, in: Robert Buch und Daniel Weidner (Hg.), Blumenberg-Glossar, Berlin: Suhrkamp 2014 [im Erscheinen]. 3 Hans Blumenberg, »Ausblick auf eine Theorie der Unbegrifflichkeit«, in: Ästhetische und metaphorologische Schriften, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp 2001 [1979], S. 193–209. 4 Hans Blumenberg, Theorie der Unbegrifflichkeit, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp 2007 [1975]. 5 Hans Blumenberg, Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp 1960, S. 8 f. Alle nachfolgenden Seitenangaben in Klammern beziehen sich auf diese Schrift. 6 Welche Metapher er dann später in einer eigenen Monografie untersucht. Vgl. Hans Blumenberg, Die Lesbarkeit der Welt, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp 1979. 7 Anne-Kathrin Hoklas, »Ausgenutzt und totgeschlagen. Metaphern der Zeit in populärwissenschaftlichen Zeitratgebern«, in: Matthias Junge (Hg.), Metaphern und Gesellschaft. Die Bedeutung der Orientierung durch Metaphern, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag 2011, S. 121–139, hier S. 135. 8 David Ingram, »The Copernican Revolution revisited: paradigm, metaphor and incommensurability in the history of science Blumenberg's response to Kuhn and Davidson«, in: History of the Human Sciences 6 (4) 1993, S. 11–35. 9 Die paradigmatische Theorie hierfür formuliert Black 1954 und 1977. Max Black, »Die Metapher«, in: Anselm Haverkamp (Hg.), Theorie der Metapher, Darmstadt: WBG 1996, S. 55–79 sowie Max Black, »Mehr über die Metapher«, in: Anselm Haverkamp (Hg.), Theorie der Metapher, Darmstadt: WBG 1996, S. 379–413. 10 Es ergibt sich hier eine systematische Parallele zu Wittgensteins Studie Über Gewissheit, in der es Wittgenstein um Gewissheiten geht, die als Gewissheit gerade nicht geäussert und thematisiert werden können (Ludwig Wittgenstein, »Über Gewissheit«, in: Ludwig Wittgenstein: Werkausgabe, Bd. 8, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp 1984, S. 113–257.). 11 Vgl. dazu den Beitrag von Alexander Friedrich in diesem Band. 12 »[...] dass eine Metaphorologie – als Teilaufgabe der Begriffshistorie und wie diese selbst als Ganzes – immer eine Hilfsdisziplin der aus ihrer Geschichte sich selbst verstehenden und ihre Gegenwärtigkeit erfüllenden Philosophie zu sein hat." (Blumenberg, Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie, a. a. O., S. 111) 13 Vgl. etwa Anselm Haverkamp, »Die Technik der Rhetorik. Blumenbergs Projekt«, in: Ästhetische und metaphorologische Schriften, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp 2001, S. 437–438., hier S. 437 f. 14 Blumenberg, Die Lesbarkeit der Welt, a. a. O., S. 140. 15 Es ist Merleau-Ponty, der in der Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung von einer existentiellen Bedeutung, einer »ersten Bedeutungsschicht« spricht, die Sprache habe. Diese Bedeutungsschicht sei jenseits der begrifflichen Metaphern als Indizien PREPRINT 12 Aussage »als Stil, als affektiver Wert, als existentielle Gebärde« gegeben. (Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung, Berlin: de Gruyter 1965 [1945], S. 216). So schön diese Beschreibungen sind, sie lassen daran denken, dass, wie Blumenberg schreibt, die begrifflichen Mittel zu ihrer Beschreibung und Bestimmung fehlen. 16 Hans Blumenberg, » ›Nachahmung der Natur‹. Zur Vorgeschichte der Idee des schöpferischen Menschen«, in: Ästhetische und metaphorologische Schriften, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp 2001 [1957], S. 9–46. 17 Hans Blumenberg, Lebenszeit und Weltzeit, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp 1986. 18 Vgl. ebd., vor allem im 2. Teil die Kapitel IV und V. 19 Hans Blumenberg, Die Legitimität der Neuzeit, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp 1996, S. 425 f. 20 Ebd., S. 436. 21 Blumenberg, Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie, a.a. O., Kap. 1–3. 22 Hans Blumenberg, »Licht als Metapher der Wahrheit. Im Vorfeld der philosophischen Begriffsbildung« in: Ästhetische und metaphorologische Schriften, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp 2001 [1957], S. 139–176, hier S. 144. 23 Hans Blumenberg, »Anthropologische Annäherung an die Aktualität der Rhetorik«, in: Ästhetische und metaphorologische Schriften, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp 2001 [1971], S. 406–431, hier S. 406. 24 Ebd., S. 407. 25 Möglich wäre es auch, entlang Blumenbergs Technikphilosophie dieser Frage nachzugehen, da sie unverkennbare Parallelen zur Metaphorologie aufweist. Diese liegen nicht darin, dass die Metapher als Technik betrachtet wird (so Campe 2009), sondern sie liegen auf der gleichen Ebene. Vgl. Hans Blumenberg, »Lebenswelt und Technisierung unter Aspekten der Phänomenologie«, in: Wirklichkeiten in denen wir leben, Stuttgart: Reclam 1981 [1963], S. 7–54 sowie Rüdiger Campe , »Von der Theorie der Technik zur Technik der Metapher. Blumenbergs systematische Eröffnung«, in: Anselm Haverkamp und Dirk Mende (Hg.), Metaphorologie. Zur Praxis von Theorie, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp 2009, S. 283–315. 26 Vgl. dazu Christoph Hubig, »Es fehlt der letzte Schritt. Lebenswelt, Natur, Technik im Ausgang von Blumenbergs Husserl-Rezeption, in: Journal Phänomenologie (35) 2011, S. 25–35.

1. La métaphysique de Raymond Ruyer dans son rapport à la théologie naturelle Philippe Gagnon Introduction Nous allons tenter de reconstituer dans ce texte certains des moments principaux qui structurent la pensée métaphysique de Raymond Ruyer, en essayant d'en dégager les quelques grandes idées qui nous semblent être présupposées partout s'agissant de réaliser le projet qui lui tenait le plus à coeur, celui d'écrire la théologie de l'âge de la science. Nous commencerons en introduisant la première de celles-ci, celle de subjectivité dédoublée ou délocalisée, après quoi viendront celle d'épiphénoménisme retourné, puis celle d'information signifiante. Nous nous pencherons ensuite sur la question de Dieu et son passage obligé, dans cette philosophie, par l'axiologie. Il convient de mettre en place quelques éléments de la Frühphilosophie de Ruyer. Ruyer fréquenta l'École normale supérieure de la rue d'Ulm et ce qu'on trouve dans sa thèse de doctorat, qu'il publia sous le titre Esquisse d'une philosophie de la structure1, c'est une tentative d'identification d'un fondement de toute réalité intelligible dans le concept de forme, lié au développement d'une philosophie réaliste. L'impulsion donnée à la pensée de Ruyer par cette recherche s'exprima par un antisubstantialisme élaboré dans une série d'articles de recherche publiés dans la décennie qui suivit, où se précise 1 Raymond RUYER, Esquisse d'une philosophie de la structure, Paris, F. Alcan, 1930. 12 une doctrine selon laquelle les formes, au sens rigoureusement géométrico-mécanique, sont tout ce dont il est besoin pour décrire l'ensemble de la réalité, y compris tous les états mentaux, les idées de quelque nature qu'elles soient, psychiques, mystiques ou même religieuses. Le Ruyer de cette époque, mettant en place la métaphysique qui à ses yeux serait seule appariée à une science unifiée autour des idées d'invariance et d'espacetemps, n'est pas très éloigné de la grande fresque du philosophe australien Samuel Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity (19201). Ruyer n'admet pas cependant l'émergentisme du premier grand philosophe du procès2. Cette thèse va se cristalliser autour de l'idée que tout s'explique par la structure, et si on doit reconnaître qu'une telle philosophie ne saurait être qualifiée de « matérialisme » au sens que recevait ce terme à l'époque, on doit certainement y voir l'énoncé d'un physicalisme, au sens où rien ne doit échapper aux méthodes éprouvées qui auront permis à la science de découvrir un point de vue véritablement universalisable sur la réalité. De pair avec cet exposé, Ruyer sait bien que la philosophie de la forme qu'il met alors sur pied – en une acception qui serait équivoque si on la rapprochait du sens de cette même notion en philosophie néo-scolastique alors qu'elle se rapprocherait cependant du sens de ce terme dans la première philosophie de Leibniz3 – devra faire l'effort de se situer par rapport à la tradition de la métaphysique. Il soutient que la seule métaphysique acceptable serait celle qui irait jusqu'au dernier degré d'enchevêtrement des structures et en dégagerait un invariant puis un pattern de sa répétition séquencée, mais qu'une métaphysique qui jugerait l'étant déployé sous nos yeux en termes de sa 1 Cf. le résumé qu'en donne Philippe DEVAUX, Le système d'Alexander. Exposé critique d'une théorie néo-réaliste du changement, Paris, Vrin, 1929, p. 177-178. 2 Cf. Raymond RUYER, Néo-finalisme, 2e éd, Paris, P.U.F., 2012, p. 230-238 ; id., Dieu des religions, Dieu de la science, Paris, Flammarion, 1970, p. 138-139. 3 Richard T. W. ARTHUR, Leibniz, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2014, p. 9. 13 correspondance idéale et parfaite à un monde archétypal, est à rejeter. C'est un des thèmes de l'Esquisse que d'argumenter à l'effet que la métaphysique représente l'effort de répondre à des questions qui n'intéressent que l'homme, alors qu'une fois exhumée la trame constitutive des entités réelles, le primat de la forme au sens géométrico-mécanique viendra mettre fin au mouvement qui porte à chercher à connaître. Il n'y a donc pas stricto sensu de connaissance métaphysique possible. La grande vérité du XXe siècle est le structuralisme mécaniste. Un des longs articles que nous mentionnions élabore sur ce point, et explique que si nous dialectisons la notion, il faudra rejeter une des options, en d'autres termes, si on peut admettre par la force des choses une métaphysique naturaliste de transposition, et lui assigner la tâche d'inverser la connaissance sensible en un savoir générique de l'étant, il faut rejeter toute métaphysique de construction, c'est-à-dire toute doctrine qui se proposerait d'expliquer l'univers par un autre numériquement différent1. Aux idées développées dans cette série d'articles écrits dans la décennie 1930-40, on ajoutera encore que le structuralisme alors mis en place, qui est aussi un « formisme » et qu'on ne confondra pas avec le structuralisme des années 60, rejoint tous les niveaux, puisque la conscience elle-même n'échappe pas à cette reconstruction. Si nous ne pouvons construire un automate conscient, c'est uniquement parce que certaines des liaisons nous échappent encore, alors que, si nous pouvions les reconstituer toutes, nous aurions reconstitué l'ensemble du phénomène. Nous dirions, en termes plus généraux, que cela implique également qu'il n'y ait pas d'inobservable en principe, que tout est exposé au regard scrutateur de l'intersubjectivité empiriométrique. On pourrait être tenté ici de rattacher ce projet à l'épistémologie du sensualisme britannique 1 Cf. Raymond RUYER, « Une métaphysique présente-t-elle de l'intérêt ? », Revue philosophique, vol. 119, nos 1-2, janv.-fév. 1935, p. 73-74. 14 ultimement mécaniciste, puis à celle du linguistic turn, pour laquelle la métaphysique est ce qu'on n'a pas encore analysé – que l'on pense par exemple à la « métaphysique descriptive » de Peter Strawson1 – mais certainement pas une doctrine qui nous fait progresser dans la connaissance des raisons dernières derrière l'existence, celles-ci étant plutôt données à l'analyse scientifique. Il n'en est rien cependant, et malgré les résonances presque néopositivistes du physicisme implicite dans la thèse de 1930, il y a une inspiration fort différente à l'oeuvre chez Ruyer, celle de la tradition du spiritualisme français. Cela devient évident lorsqu'on se penche sur l'axiologie développée par Ruyer2, mais on le verrait aussi dès le début si on prend la peine de se souvenir que ce qui semble rejeté dans l'Esquisse, soit toute forme d'interrogation trop humaine ou anthropomorphique sur l'avenir des sociétés, est pourtant développé en parallèle dans la thèse complémentaire de Ruyer sur L'humanité de l'avenir d'après Cournot3. Ruyer ne s'est pas confiné à l'analyse du langage humain, et puis il n'a pas partagé le présupposé du primat de l'analyse de ce qui est donné au sens commun et publiquement, mis en place des décennies plus tard chez Strawson. Il veut également éviter l'idéalisme du « résidu » purement intelligible, de la « substance » aux modes différenciés de l'épistémologie idéaliste à la manière de Brunschvicg. Il ne faut pas perdre de vue l'emprise exercée par cette dernière au moment où Ruyer s'asseyait sur les bancs de l'École normale supérieure. 1 Cf. Analyse et métaphysique, Paris, Vrin, 1985 ; Hans-Johann GLOCK, « Strawson's Descriptive Metaphysics », in Leila HAAPARANTA et Heikki KOSKINEN (dir.), Categories of Being : Essays on Metaphysics and Logic, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 391-419. 2 Par exemple, dans une recension au total négative de Philosophie de la valeur, le philosophe étatsunien hédoniste Albert L. HILLIARD voyait fort bien que la structure de l'axiologie de Ruyer est la même que celle de René Le Senne ou de Louis Lavelle, cf. The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 49, no 21, 9 oct. 1952, p. 678. 3 Paris, F. Alcan, 1930. 15 I. Domaine unitaire et domaines de survol Ruyer trouvera dans l'exercice de la conscience un paradoxe qui le forcera à avouer l'échec des modèles mécaniques dont l'efficacité avait été tentativement admise autour de 1930. C'est que l'unité du champ visuel conscient est absolue, quoique ce champ soit toujours localisé. On trouvera en particulier dans La conscience et le corps, dès 1937, l'énoncé d'une distinction entre la structure, seule identifiable par le travail du scientifique qui prendra autant de coupes instantanées sur la réalité, et celle de la forme, un terme qui acquerra à partir de ce moment un sens technique, le faisant désigner l'organisation réelle, qui seule est organisation, celle d'étants vrais auxquels on opposera les amas, les totalités sans unité interne. Nous le verrons plus loin, cette caractérisation deviendra le seul point de vue dont Ruyer aura besoin pour élaborer sa cosmologie. N'anticipons pas cependant. Le champ de conscience est là où est le cerveau. Ruyer prend position contre sa délocalisation par les néoréalistes (appuyée sur des convictions mi-slogan du genre « quand l'arbre tombe dans la forêt et que personne n'écoute, bien sûr que cela fait du bruit »). Répétons-le, quiconque aurait reconstruit toutes les liaisons d'un cerveau vivant, on dirait en un langage exploré par la suite par Ruyer, celui qui pourrait capturer toute l'information portant la structure de l'encéphale, ferait apparaître dans l'expérience un étant conscient. C'est que Ruyer va construire autour de la notion de « conscience » une métaphysique qui en réinterprète à la base l'idée même. La réalité du tissu vivant le rend conscient, parce qu'il est portion de l'espace organisée, ce qui pour Ruyer signifie portion auto-subsistante et autosurvolante. Ruyer localise donc les sensations dans notre tête1. La thèse fondatrice des néoréalistes voulait que, dans la 1 Cf. Raymond RUYER, « Les sensations sont-elles dans notre tête ? », Journal de psychologie, 1934, p. 577. « La subjectivité n'est pas un caractère que l'on puisse ou 16 perception d'une étoile éteinte mais qui nous informe encore sur sa position par un faisceau lumineux, la conscience se trouve là où est l'objet, situation évidemment invraisemblable, puisque la lumière se doit de parcourir un trajet qui est la seule manière pour le sujet connaissant d'être informé de cet événement. Il existe une portion de l'espace hautement organisée et c'est là seulement où la connaissance est possible. On voit ici, d'une manière plus robuste et articulée, la poursuite de la conviction fondamentale déjà relevée dès la thèse de 1930, soit qu'il faut se débarrasser de toute idée d'un résidu substantiel purement intelligible qui serait condition d'intelligibilité du phénomène. Nous sommes en présence d'un sujet qui, au moyen de ce champ de conscience, voit et éprouve l'étendue. Si nous détruisions ce champ, son organisation, les liaisons qui le rendent possible, nous supprimerions ce qu'il voit, qui ne subsiste aucunement dans quelque regard éthéré à un étage supérieur. Les convictions sur lesquelles repose la construction de Ruyer à ce stade étonnent, puisqu'elles conjoignent deux angles d'approche qui auront souvent semblé antithétiques. Si on appréhende le problème au plan anthropologique et épistémologique, on a d'une part l'expérience de la conscience telle que vécue et transférée ensuite sur d'autres modes de conscience, appréhendés moins quant à leurs états mentaux interne de représentation qu'à leur qualité d'organisation unifiée par maintien d'une forme, et puis la réalité de la corporéité, du fait que le corps est machine physique, chimique, puis biologique et qu'à ce titre il représente tout de même un pont avec le monde du fonctionnement inertiel. Renaud Barbaras a noté comment on a alors la conjonction d'une sphère d'immanence et puis d'un point de contact avec tout ce qui lui est extérieur, dans le premier cas la conscience intentionnelle et dans le second le corps. Si on considère la que l'on doive construire : elle n'est qu'un autre nom pour dire : être. Le matérialisme classique est exactement aussi absurde que l'argument ontologique : il prétend faire sortir le réel de l'abstrait. » (p. 573). 17 manière originale dont Ruyer articule leur connexion, il fait en réalité entrer un des termes dans l'autre. En effet, Ruyer force la convergence de deux perspectives « l'une, phénoménologique, qui présuppose la portée ontologique de l'expérience phénoménale, l'autre, objective qui met à profit les résultats de la science en en reconnaissant la valeur philosophique1. » Comme on ne saurait avoir les deux ensemble, il y a bel et bien ici, d'une manière souterraine, transposition d'une expérience vécue qui nous fait rencontrer une psychologisation du cosmos, et non une véritable matérialisation de la conscience. Certes, c'est le monde de la science qui est valorisé, mais il a subi un tête-à-queue, dont on peut apprécier la portée si on s'avise de la critique de l'« illusion d'incarnation2 ». Dans celle-ci, Ruyer considère que je ne suis corps que pour le champ visuel d'un autre, qui aurait oublié de me créditer de conscience telle que, pourtant, elle lui permet à lui de s'éprouver. Certes, je peux parler de mon corps, je peux voir mes jambes ou mes bras dans mon champ visuel, mais si l'on s'avisait de me retirer ces membres, puis de continuer en amputant les tissus spécialisés dont ces derniers représentaient encore quelque chose par mode d'excroissance, on n'aurait pas détruit mon existence tant que resterait encore une seule cellule3. La conscience est amplification d'une forme d'unité domaniale déjà donnée avec cette seule cellule, mais nous verrons également que la cellule la reçoit de la molécule, puis de l'atome. À un plan davantage formel, scrutant les conditions logiques sous-jacentes aux affirmations de Ruyer, on verrait que, dans la mesure où il construit la notion de champ domanial sur l'expérience d'être une conscience percevante « sans bords », c'est-à-dire ne percevant pas les bords de son 1 Renaud BARBARAS, Introduction à une phénoménologie de la vie, Paris, Vrin, 2008, p. 160. 2 Cf. Raymond RUYER, Néo-finalisme, chapitre VIII, p. 91-105. 3 Cf. Raymond RUYER, « La conscience et la vie » in Le problème de la vie, Neuchâtel, La Baconnière, 1951, p. 37-57. 18 champ visuel, ce qui devrait avoir pour effet de placer la conscience partout, avec comme corollaire la capacité de saisir ensemble tous les détails du champ visuel sans linéarisation ni balayage optique séquentiel, et que d'autre part il refuse l'idée d'une conscience diffuse partout mais insiste à la placer dans notre tête ou au point le plus complexe de l'organisation d'un système nerveux, Ruyer en vient en fin de compte à insister simultanément sur le local et le non-local. Yves Barel y voyait un paradoxe du passage entre métaniveau et niveau objet : « [...] la possibilité que « quelque chose » soit à la fois acteur et terrain de son action. La fusion, la superposition paradoxale de l'acteur et du champ, du « sujet » et de « l'objet », de ce qui dit et de ce qui est dit, revêtent mille formes différentes : auto-action, auto-reproduction, auto-réflexion, auto-vision, autoexpression, etc., etc. On retrouve la structure même du paradoxe logico-mathématique : il est impossible que le message et le méta-message soient confondus, que l'élément soit la classe et la classe élément d'ellemême, et pourtant cela est1. » Ruyer est, comme Karl Lashley, impressionné par la délocalisation des fonctions cérébrales, idée qui était venue à l'esprit de Lashley en s'avisant de ce qu'une partie du cortex lésée chez les rats qu'il étudia pouvait être remplacée par une autre à même de progressivement récupérer la capacité pour une performance concrète de direction de l'action2. Au niveau ontogénétique, celui du développement, Ruyer est von baerien, il étend vers l'hétérogène des débuts qui sont 1 Le paradoxe et le système. Essai sur le fantastique social, Grenoble, Presses universitaires de Grenoble, 2008, p. 20. 2 Cf. Karl LASHLEY, « Studies of Cerebral Function in Learning XII. Loss of the Maze Habit after Occipital Lesions in Blind Rats », Journal of Comparative Neurology, 79/3, déc. 1943, p. 431-462 ; Bernard ANDRIEU, « La réalité physique du cerveau selon Raymond Ruyer », Bulletin d'histoire et d'épistémologie des sciences de la vie, 12/1, 2005, p. 129-158. 19 toujours homogènes. Si en apparence, la spécialisation induit un non-retour, cela n'est vrai que des organes d'effection, et non du cerveau qui, lui, conserve les propriétés équipotentielles d'une « amibe géante1 ». Résumons deux points essentiels. D'abord, les sensations sont dans la tête. Le champ de conscience est étalé dans l'espace. Cela signifie que c'est l'espace qui connaît, d'où une inversion de la pierre d'angle de l'élaboration philosophique de Descartes. Ensuite, on peut trouver dans La conscience et le corps un progrès dans la démarche de Ruyer, au sens où parmi plusieurs choses qu'on rencontre dans cet ouvrage, on y trouve cette conviction que la forme n'est pas réintroduite dans la science. Le formisme de la thèse de 1930, qui était équivalemment un structuralisme, a donc conduit à une précision de vocabulaire. II. L'auto-surveillance et la notion de liaison Ruyer refuse les modèles qui feraient d'une force vitale, d'un esprit manipulant la matière, la condition de perception d'une liberté transcendante. Sa philosophie a voulu dès l'origine se distancier du vitalisme, qui suppose un système inerte, manipulé de l'extérieur par une forme ou âme immatérielle. Toute réalité matérielle autre que les amas de parties extrinsèques les unes aux autres contient en elle le 1 Un ouvrage tel que Who's in Charge ?, de Michael GAZZANIGA (New York, Ecco, 2011) représente l'énoncé du programme inverse, celui qui vise à dégager toutes les conséquences de la modularité dans le fonctionnement du cerveau, même si cela implique de soutenir que la conscience éprouvée de l'unité des images mentales est un sous-produit du fonctionnement de composantes ou modules indépendants. En un sens, il représente l'antithèse de la réflexion de Ruyer, mais avec l'avantage (à notre avis frauduleux) de se présenter comme la conclusion d'une science « dure ». Nous ne disposons pas d'un traité qui articulerait le point de vue inverse, sans sombrer dans le verbiage new age. Cf. Michel BITBOL, La conscience a-t-elle une origine ? Des neurosciences à la pleine conscience : une nouvelle approche de l'esprit, Paris, Flammarion, 2014, qui consacre une section à Ruyer, et dont les conclusions sont négatives. Ces dernières sont en dépendance d'une problématisation de ce coup de force à la fois phénoménologique et empiriste que nous évoquions, mais on ne pourra dans ce texte analyser à fond les nuances qui devraient être mises en place pour se positionner face à la critique de Bitbol. 20 principe de son unité, il n'y a rien à lui ajouter de l'extérieur. Les solutions telles que celle du « travail décrochant » à la manière de ce qu'on trouvait chez Adhémar Barré de SaintVenant ou chez Joseph Boussinesq1, une énergétique de l'action transcendante, sont mises en échec par Ruyer dès La conscience et le corps. Si on ne surprend jamais l'esprit en train de clicher, de faire l'équivalent de l'action de tirer une gâchette, réduisant asymptotiquement l'énergie nécessaire à activer un système en cascade jusqu'au point où elle pourrait être nulle, alors il n'y a pas pour Ruyer trente-six solutions, il faudra une inversion et reconfiguration de notre manière de comprendre le problème : là où la forme n'existe pas dans la science, elle est ce qui existe pour le philosophe, qui prend une coupe sur le travail de la science et puis l'interprète selon une dimension autre, ce qui sera très bien expliqué avec graphes à l'appui beaucoup plus tard dans Dieu des religions Dieu de la science, en 1970. L'auto-surveillance développée alors est une de ces inversions fondamentales chez Ruyer, qui, nous le disions, refuse la différence cartésienne entre une substance simple pensante, inétendue, et une matière qui n'est qu'étendue, supposant un réinvestissement de la conscience dans l'espace. Je suis l'espace organisé, si bien que la matière, les colloïdes, les protéines, les tissus, sont tous organisés à un degré tel qu'il est capable d'auto-survol puis d'autoconduction, et finalement de se savoir existant comme un tout. On voit bien que la conscience ici signifie autre chose qu'une pensée existant immatériellement à travers une image dans l'imagination, que la conscience c'est déjà le fait de maintenir sa forme par travail. Une position qui a des conséquences importantes, puisque Ruyer va refuser le besoin d'un acte de connaissance véritable, de liaison ou 1 Sur ces théories qui consistaient à scruter les conséquences de l'absence de solutions à certaines équations différentielles, cf. Jean LARGEAULT, Systèmes de la nature, préf. de René THOM, Paris, Vrin, 1985, p. 151-155. 21 déliaison à travers le jugement, et donc un acte de synthèse1. La « force » qui lie ensemble des éléments reliés, qu'on mette par exemple une boule de billard en contact avec une bande élastique qui ne permettrait plus de rejouer dans une direction ou l'autre le film du choc des boules sans constater un sens du temps2, ou qu'il s'agisse des propriétés spécifiques de la colle qui ne viennent pas de l'usage de colles sur les particules en descendant vers les constituants ultimes de la matière, tout cela implique une réflexion sur la notion de liaison rendue équivalente à la non-localité discutée de nos jours en physique des champs, mais dont Ruyer eut très tôt l'intuition en réfléchissant en particulier sur le phénomène de délocalisation dans l'imbrication moléculaire3. Une des implications de cette position c'est qu'il n'y a pas d'esprit, de moi, d'âme où ma vraie identité serait logée – depuis Socrate protestant que ce ne sont pas ses vieux os qui s'assoient ou qui se lèvent ou auxquels on ordonne de boire la ciguë, mais un être plus intérieur capable de décider, de contrôler les passions, de régner sur le corps (Phédon § 98ce). Il y a quelque chose de préoccupant à voir la pensée de Ruyer se monnayer comme une axiologie étant donné sa corollaire dénégation de toute substantialité personnelle. On pourrait du reste ajouter que Ruyer semble s'appuyer sur une épistémologie que, avec d'ailleurs beaucoup de respect, on pourrait qualifier de naïve, pour laquelle la connaissance 1 Cet aspect est bien résumé par Xavier VERLEY dans son ouvrage Sur le symbolisme. Cassirer, Whitehead et Ruyer, Louvain-la-Neuve, Chromatika, 2013, p. 113-125. 2 Cf. Raymond RUYER, « Le sens du temps. Réflexions sur les films renversés », Recherches philosophiques, vol. 5, 1935-36, p. 52-64. 3 Cf. Bernard RUYER, « La notion de liaison dans la philosophie de Ruyer » in Louis VAX et Jean-Jacques WUNENBURGER (dir.), Raymond Ruyer, de la science à la théologie, Paris, Kimé, 1995, p. 45-54, dont les deux premières pages font bien ressortir comment il y eut passage de l'idée de champ d'unification domaniale élaborée en observant la stabilité structurelle de formes matérielles « vraies » en direction d'une théorie de la conscience unificatrice qui assimile tout maintien d'une forme à la force ainsi qu'en l'expression « la force d'un raisonnement », donc un acte de conscience plus proche de la conscience intentionnelle. 22 n'est pas ici mais là, comme s'il s'agissait simplement de déplacement. III. Le verticalisme Ce n'est qu'en abandonnant l'espoir de trouver un modèle mécanique de la conscience que Ruyer entrevoit la possibilité de faire une philosophie de la vie. Comment en est-il arrivé là ? Lors de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, il fut envoyé en captivité dans un Offizier-Lager, un camp de détention que les Allemands avaient organisés pour les intellectuels qui ne faisaient pas partie de la liste des indésirables à exterminer, mais dont la présence aurait néanmoins été dérangeante dans une France occupée. Côtoyant plusieurs universitaires de premier rang, Ruyer eut l'avantage d'être initié plus en profondeur à la réalité de l'embryogenèse auprès d'Étienne Wolff, puis au mode de développement des végétaux cette fois auprès d'Alexis Moyse. Rappelons ce que nous présentions brièvement plus haut. Tout étant a un « soi », mais seuls sont des étants les « individus » authentiques (atomes, molécules, organismes), à comprendre comme « formes vraies » (pas comme substances) à opposer aux amas ou sommes (montagne, lac, planète). Si tout est amplification de subjectivités, il n'y a pas à se demander comment quelque âme spirituelle, base d'une subjectivité, peut s'unir au corps. Le problème de l'union de l'âme et du corps est pour Ruyer dépourvu de signification, puisqu'il y a amplification, puis association de lignées « fibreuses » qui sont notre seul moyen d'accéder à l'individualité. Si une des conséquences en est de réécrire le traditionnel problème de l'âme, une implication plus subtile devra aussi s'en dégager. C'est que, là où Ruyer a renversé l'idée que toute intellection « verrait » à travers une image mentale capable de prendre une perspective sur l'acte de voir donné immédiatement à l'espace organisé localement, investissant par le fait même l'espace de conscience, il a par ailleurs opéré cette inversion simultanément pour le temps. 23 C'est l'espace-temps qui en réalité devient conscience1. Tout étant entre donc, comme structure matérielle unifiée, en résonance avec sa forme vraie, mais celle-ci est tout autant schéma de développement. C'est cet aspect qui dès l'abord retiendra Ruyer lorsque, à l'époque des Éléments de psycho-biologie, soit au sortir de l'expérience d'internement lors de la guerre dont il vient d'être question, il se rend compte de la nécessité de la présence de ce qu'il nomme alors « verticalité », soit cette capacité de l'étant en développement de réinventer des jambes, des poumons, et même un cerveau par une prise sur le monde spatio-temporel d'un schéma d'organisation. Ce dernier ne saurait être statique, il doit représenter un cycle. Si les étants dérivent les uns des autres, si l'évolution est une réalité, il doit aussi changer. L'épiphénoménisme retourné Si nous venons de voir de quelle manière Ruyer a pu s'inscrire contre le vitalisme en faisant tout dépendre de la vie, réorchestrant certaines des conditions d'intelligibilité du panpsychisme, qu'il préfère nommer psycho-biologie, il reste à situer une autre de ses grandes conclusions, qui n'en est pas moins étonnante : celle qui permettra de se rendre jusqu'au rejet simultané du dualisme et du matérialisme. Ruyer créditera Aimé Patri, auteur d'une présentation sur la signification philosophique du behaviorisme, d'avoir été l'éveilleur l'ayant « sorti de son sommeil dogmatique2 ». Méditant sur le behaviorisme, Ruyer montrera à l'oeuvre la continuation de cette option « métaphysique » d'origine que nous présentions, contre les idées d'âme, de substance, ou d'arrière-monde, et il signifiera également, de manière qui 1 Cf. Jean-Claude DUMONCEL, « Une archéologie du structuralisme », Critique, vol. 804, no 5, 2014, p. 421 ; André CONRAD, « Repenser la finalité », Critique, vol. 804, no 5, 2014, p. 392 : « Les "domaines" de Ruyer, présentés comme "surfaces absolues" sont à la fois temporels et étendus ». 2 On peut lire le texte de cette présentation dans Aimé PATRI, « Signification philosophique du behaviorisme » in Jean WAHL et al., Ordre, désordre, lumière, Paris, Vrin, 1952, p. 32-46. 24 peut étonner, son accord fondamental avec la thèse du psychologue étatsunien John Broadus Watson, qui lie la structuration de la conscience à celle de l'action et du comportement. Pour Ruyer, il est exact, avec Watson, que mind is behavior and nothing else1, sauf qu'il y a inconséquence et confusion à traiter de la source du comportement d'un être organisé de la même manière que l'on traiterait de la source du comportement d'une machine agencée par quelque constructeur. Cette dernière en effet ne correspond à un plan prédéfini que dans la conscience de ce constructeur, alors que le comportement de n'importe quel vivant, fut-ce celui de l'amibe ou de la paramécie, manifeste improvisation et présence d'un plan immanent dans la forme qui est équivalemment l'espace organisé, travaillant, c'est là la clef, au maintien de sa forme par force psychique2. Tout étant qui agit fait quelque chose, il est absorbé dans cette tâche, il est identique à son action. Ruyer se sert alors en un sens inédit de l'adage médiéval operari sequitur esse, et en fait comme Barth il le renverse en esse sequitur operari et insiste sur le fait que, par exemple, la performance de qui traverse une rue dans une ville comme Paris ou Londres est incompatible avec le fonctionnement mécanique. Ainsi, si l'on peut dire que tout est dans le comportement (behavior), c'est que ce comportement est incompatible avec le déploiement de ce qui est préinscrit dans des forces en déplacement local et vectoriel et puis dans la structure matérielle des choses typique du fonctionnement. L'actualité des étants montre qu'ils sont identiques à leur activité, mais que celle-ci n'est pas fonctionnement. Par-là, on voit que la genèse des formes vraies est auto-formation, irréductible à l'action de structures préformées, préécrites (front-loaded dirait-on en anglais). Watson a donc eu raison de cibler le comportement, mais ce qu'il nomme comportement c'est encore un 1 Karl LASHLEY, « The Behavioristic Interpretation of Consciousness – Part I », Psychological Bulletin, vol. 30, 1923, p. 238 ; cf. Denis FISETTE et Pierre POIRIER, Philosophie de l'esprit. État des lieux, Paris, Vrin, 2000, p. 40. 2 Cf. Raymond RUYER, « Le paradoxe de l'amibe et la psychologie », Journal de psychologie, vol. 35, 1938, p. 472-492. 25 fonctionnement. Pour Ruyer, non seulement les behavioristes, mais même les gestaltistes, ne sont jamais sortis de cette équivoque. IV. L'information signifiante Parvenu à ce point, dans l'intérêt même d'une poursuite de l'idée d'épiphénoménisme retourné, selon laquelle l'agir serait inexplicable s'il ne faisait rien (et fonctionner sans but ni visée serait ne rien faire), il convient de se pencher un moment sur la présence de cette visée d'un idéal. Une des rencontres les plus significatives que fit Ruyer dans le développement de ses idées fut celle de la cybernétique, née à la suite de la publication de l'ouvrage du mathématicien Norbert Wiener Cybernetics, or Communication and Control in the Animal and the Machine en 1948. Ruyer fut un des seuls philosophes en France, avec Gilbert Simondon, à lire attentivement les ouvrages fondateurs de la cybernétique à leur parution, avec en outre Design for a Brain de William Ross Ashby ou encore The Living Brain de William Grey Walter. Le lien de la cybernétique avec le projet behavioriste a été souvent relevé. Ce que la cybernétique pensait pouvoir faire, c'est de rendre tout comportement « finalisé » dépendant moins d'un but, car ce dernier pourrait parfaitement être inscrit par des variations stochastiques dans les organisations moléculaires qui conservent le plan d'organisation du vivant, que d'une reconfiguration de la causalité, qui n'aura plus besoin de représenter l'action d'inscrire des moyens d'effection ou de communiquer une forme, mais qui sera réinterprétée comme exécution d'une trajectoire toute entière contenue dans ce que le mécanisme de rétroaction rend circulaire de la causalité, allié à son rapport à un environnement émettant des signaux imprédictibles. Si Ruyer aperçoit assez tôt l'idée de ce qui deviendra le pilotage de l'action par branchement sur la valeur, celle d'automates non poussés mais appelés, il reste à préciser et à 26 comprendre ce que peut bien signifier cette absorption de l'étant fonctionnant dans son acte. Aimé Patri montre dans son exposé que J.B. Watson réservait une priorité au langage humain, qu'il ne se défaisait pas complètement d'une vision cartésienne de l'homme. Si l'action de l'homme est conditionnée par son environnement, il possède un circuit lui permettant d'user d'un langage intérieur, verbal report dans les termes mêmes de Watson, thèse lui qui permet de se débarrasser de toute idée d'une émanation centrale1. C'est par le fait même toute idée d'un observateur central privilégié dont Watson se débarrasse, et si l'on voit le problème sous cet angle, la connexion avec le projet de Ruyer n'en devient que plus claire, pour peu qu'on ait à l'esprit la critique du regard dédoublé, ou regard surplombant. Ruyer a été un pionnier d'une philosophie qui se pencherait sur les présupposés et les limites d'une analyse à la fois de la cybernétique naissante et de sa science-soeur, la théorie de l'information. Il y a consacré beaucoup de temps et a écrit plusieurs articles, puis un ouvrage qui en reprend certains, resté célèbre dans les cercles de spécialistes et qui s'intitule La cybernétique et l'origine de l'information, publié en 1954 avec réédition augmentée en 1968. La cybernétique est actualiste, elle ne peut rendre compte de la croissance d'une forme qui se ressourcerait à même une vraie origination d'information2. En effet, elle s'est centrée sur l'homologie de fonctionnement entre mécanismes et organismes. L'homologie y a dépassé ce qui relève de la cinématique et de l'énergétique, pour s'étendre jusqu'à 1 Aimé PATRI, « Signification philosophique du behaviorisme », p. 44-45. 2 Usité en géologie, le terme d'actualisme désigne l'uniformitarisme, soit la doctrine selon laquelle les causes qui opèrent aujourd'hui sous nos yeux ont continué leur opération au cours des siècles immémoriaux. Dans le cas présent, l'actualisme se réfère au fait que la cybernétique mécaniste ne croit avoir besoin de rien d'autre pour décrire n'importe quel comportement que ce qui est disponible à un seul niveau de réalité, celui qui se donne à l'inspection visuelle immédiate. En ce sens, elle aura été la dernière grande tentative pour réduire la réalité ultime aux mécanismes auxiliaires et à leur fonctionnement. 27 l'auto-régulation. En d'autres termes, ce ne sont pas seulement les articulations biomécaniques qu'on imita, elles qu'on peut encore trouver grossières, ni la pensée calculante qu'on peut ramener à la manipulation d'opérateurs booléens ou de règles de la logique ensembliste, et donc estimer préaccordée à cette réduplication. Non, c'est cette zone plus difficile à circonscrire où des commandes qui semblent dépendre d'une volonté se glissent dans le fonctionnement physiologique et dynamique. C'est la pensée intéressée et non la pensée pure qu'on parvint à imiter. À bien y regarder, nous verrions dans l'usage du langage des moyens mécaniques de communication et donc d'information, au sens de déclencher un effet, en d'autres termes une transmission horizontale de configurations, mais tout autant deux centres qui s'expriment et se comprennent en participant à une dimension verticale et transphysique. Or, la cybernétique nie cette dimension verticale, elle nie donc l'enracinement de la mémoire et du code dans une véritable dimension psychologique, et fait ainsi de toute mémoire un stockage de configurations imitable par modèle mécanique. C'est dire encore qu'elle en fait des structures actuelles étalées dans l'espace. Si Ruyer fait lui aussi de la conscience quelque chose de distribué dans l'espace, il rejette avec véhémence cet actualisme. Il lui semble invraisemblable parce qu'il nous demande de croire que ce qui est soumis aux théorèmes de croissance de l'entropie, se mettrait soudainement à leur échapper. En effet, l'information, dont le concept se précise dans les mêmes années que le travail de Wiener sur la théorie du contrôle1, est définie comme un logarithme négatif exprimé en base 2 et en rapport avec une probabilité, ce qui fait que la réception d'une quantité d'information par un récepteur sera d'autant plus grande que la concaténation qui 1 Les deux biographes de Wiener, Flo CONWAY et Jim SIEGELMAN, suggèrent une dépendance très directe de Claude Shannon envers Norbert Wiener dont les visites finirent par agacer ce dernier, cf. Dark Hero of the Information Age : In Search of Norbert Wiener, New York, Basic Books, 2006, p. 126. 28 la contient est, elle, indistinguable d'une génération par un phénomène stochastique. Si les rapports entre les symboles se précisent, si la communication devient prédictible, c'est également qu'elle diminue d'autant en quantité d'information conviée. Ruyer fera cette remarque critique : inventer, dans tous les cas, que ce soit l'organisme dont la structure phénotypique est réinventée à chaque ontogenèse, ou que ce soit l'émission d'une idée nouvelle à laquelle personne n'a pensé auparavant, c'est toujours raccrocher l'effort et la tension en hauteur à un schème qui fait baisser la tension et qui semble bien fonctionner. Ainsi pourra-t-il également faire l'hypothèse que tout acte de structuration intellectuelle, de théorisation juste, représente le rétablissement d'une information1. Ultimement, c'est la seule véritable grammaire dont il soit besoin pour comprendre la nature qui est alors épelée sous nos yeux. Or, ce que l'actualisme cybernétique nous demande d'admettre, c'est que ce qui explique la structure du cerveau, l'information comme improbabilité, soumise comme toute réalité physique aux théorèmes de croissance de l'entropie, pourrait servir, sans reconfiguration de la notion, à expliquer l'invention, la théorisation ou la compréhension justes2. Donc, en résumé, Ruyer aura identifié deux problèmes : (1) la cybernétique mécaniste n'a que l'improbabilité pour rendre compte de la nouveauté, mais celle-ci devrait être considérée plus probable vue depuis l'esprit qui en possède la notion, ce qui s'oppose à la définition de l'information comme transfert d'une configuration exprimée mathématiquement par le biais de l'improbabilité ; (2) ensuite, un autre problème fondamental est celui du mode d'exercice de la mémoire, avec délinéarisation, rétention et attente, irreprésentable dans les termes de la théorie des automates finis (automata theory). En effet, si on fait de l'information 1 Cf. Raymond RUYER, « Le problème de l'information et la cybernétique », Journal de psychologie, vol. 45, 1952, p. 385-418. 2 Sur ce point, l'embarras de Norbert WIENER, dans son ouvrage posthume Invention : The Feeding and Care of Ideas (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1994) est véritablement à son comble. 29 une trace matérielle conservée, et qu'on en fasse le résultat d'une variation stochastique, on devra tenter de rendre compte de l'accès aux universaux, aux idées « bonnes », aux schémas eupraxiques, par mode d'inspection et de balayage des configurations présentes dans l'encéphale. Or c'est K. Lashley lui-même, occupé (pensait-il) à valider les présupposés théoriques du behaviorisme de J.B. Watson, qui se rendit compte qu'ils sont invraisemblables, lorsque par exemple une performance cognitive implique justement délinéarisation, rétention et attente1. Comment approcher cette idée d'information thématique ? Essentiellement de cette manière : connaître suppose le parcours, si on imagine par exemple deux hommes parlant au téléphone, d'une dimension verticale ou « se trouve » l'idée. Le physicien Karl F. von Weiszäcker l'exprimait à sa manière, celle d'entrer ensemble dans une autre dimension, « au sens [...] où deux personnes penseraient la même pensée2 ». Imaginons en effet nos deux hommes se parlant au téléphone : les ondes sinusoïdales modulées ne transmettent rien en dehors de la présence de ces deux consciences encadrantes. L'appareil téléphonique qui enverrait un signal électrique ou un signal ondulatoire modulé ne contient aucune information s'il n'est pas parti d'une conscience ou s'il ne retrouve pas une conscience à l'arrivée. Si donc agir ce n'est pas fonctionner, une description correcte de l'action implique que les dimensions d'espace et de temps ne suffisent pas à contenir toute la réalité. Le travail formateur, la mise en place de structures selon un optimum, avec schéma non pas trimais quadridimensionnel implique référence à ce que Ruyer nomme dès 1947 dans ses Éléments de psycho-biologie un potentiel3. Ce 1 Cf. Karl LASHLEY, « The Problem of the Serial Order in Behavior », in Cerebral Mechanisms in Behavior, Lloyd A. JEFFRES (dir.), New York, Wiley, 1951, p. 112146. 2 « In the sense [...] that two people think the same thought », The Unity of Nature, trad. F.J. Zucker, New York, Straus, Farrar & Giroux, 1980, p. 39. 3 Cf. Éléments de psycho-biologie, Paris, P.U.F., 1947, p. 94-100, 107-114. 30 potentiel est mnémonique, il se réfère à une norme, à un abouchement des étants au « domaine naturel du transspatial1 ». C'est clairement en ce point, depuis la découverte de la verticalité dans la reconstruction des structures vivantes, jusqu'aux travaux sur la genèse des formes vivantes irréductibles au fonctionnement mécanique, inertiel et entropique, que l'idée d'invention comme rétablissement d'une information montre d'elle-même en quelque sorte le lien fécond qu'elle est capable de tisser avec le problème central de la théorie de la connaissance, celui de la réminiscence, dont traite Ruyer à la suite de Platon dans le Ménon. Nous ne pourrons, dans ce texte introductif, analyser à fond cette idée, mais nous tenons à en souligner l'importance2. Ruyer appliquera à l'organisme en développement l'idée de passage par le domaine du transspatial où existeraient des stimuli-signaux et on pourrait exposer cette application, dans le cas de l'embryogenèse, sous le chapeau de l'idée précédemment introduite d'épiphénoménisme retourné. Clairement, ce que Ruyer veut faire ressortir c'est que les pionniers en embryologie, Hans Spemann par exemple, ont eut tort de chercher dans la chimie, dans la physique, bref dans ce que la science mesure horizontalement, un principe de compréhension de la genèse des formes. Ils doivent se référer à ou faire intervenir une transversale verticale, une 1 Cf. Raymond RUYER, « Le domaine naturel du trans-spatial », Bulletin de la Société française de philosophie, séance du 31 janv. 1948, p. 133-165. 2 Pour approfondir, consulter notre « Que reste-t-il de la théologie à l'âge électronique ? Valeur et cybernétique axiologique chez Raymond Ruyer », Chromatikon IX, Annales de la philosophie en procès, Michel WEBER et Vincent BERNE (dir.), Louvain-la-Neuve, Éd. Chromatika, 2013, p. 93-120 ; Cf. Raymond RUYER, La cybernétique et l'origine de l'information, 2e éd. augm., Paris, Flammarion, 1968, p. 179-181. 31 dimension hyperphysique. Un organisme ne vient pas à l'être tout fait, il se fait par obéissance à un thème1. Ruyer souligne de manière répétée l'insuffisance des explications chimiques par diffusion modulée de gradients, puis l'insuffisance de celles qui font appel au déploiement du contenu des gènes. Nous l'observions, l'organisme qui se développe est entièrement absorbé dans son acte. Donc, face au principe que « toute conscience est conscience de quelque chose, d'autre chose », qui a été tout un thème dans le développement de la phénoménologie transcendantale, Ruyer mettrait l'emphase sur quelque chose lorsqu'on dit conscience de soi et conscience de quelque chose, et ferait du soi, de l'ego, une complication du vrai mode d'unité qui est celui de la conscience primaire. La conscience que Ruyer nomme primaire, celle dont nous traitons depuis un moment et dont les résultats sont visibles en la capacité de maintenir une structure matérielle unifiée sous l'égide d'une forme, manifeste une connaissance par auto-possession dans la mesure où elle est capable de faire orchestrer le développement d'un membre, d'un bourgeon de membre dans l'embryon, puis de construire des jambes ou un cerveau la où il n'y en avait pas. Elle manifeste ainsi que nos opérations cognitives supérieures s'appuient sur une forme, à savoir la forme constituée du cerveau, qui est elle-même le résultat du déploiement d'une information. Il convient de s'arrêter un moment sur l'antisubstantialisme fortement accusé, repérable surtout depuis la thèse de 1930 jusqu'au tournant psycho-biologique. Ruyer le maintiendra au-delà même de ce point, mais d'une manière qui ne saurait convaincre. Il est remarquable que les notions spéculatives de « potentiel », d'« actualisateur », d'« essence », que Ruyer avait rejetées comme verbales, sembleront maintenant faire tout le travail. 1 Cf. sur ce point Raymond RUYER, La genèse des formes vivantes, Paris, Flammarion, 1958 (repris sous le titre L'origine des formes vivantes, même éditeur, collection « Science de la nature », en 1967). 32 V. Quel sort pour la métaphysique de construction ? Il convient en ce point de poser la question : Ruyer auraitil réhabilité la métaphysique de construction ? Laurent Meslet fait valoir que Ruyer, dans « Behaviorisme et dualisme » (une présentation faite à la Société française de philosophie), affirme ne pas avoir changé d'avis1. Il faut marquer cependant que cette présentation fut faite en 1957, et que Ruyer, répondant à la demande de Deledalle et Huismans de rédiger une notice autobiographique pour un ouvrage de présentation des philosophes français, y affirme avoir bel et bien changé d'idée2. Qu'est-ce donc qui motiva le projet de Ruyer, si on se souvient qu'il admet avoir été précédé en celui-ci par les romantiques allemands et leur Naturphilosophie, et avoue avoir voulu faire « une philosophie de la vie, échappant à la fois au vitalisme et au matérialisme mécaniste3. » Il va s'agir de conférer aux résultats de la science leur pleine intelligibilité. Cela commandera toute une entreprise visant à transformer les observations scientifiques en connaissance des liaisons, et puis à rapporter le tout à la dualité agent / idéal. Cela va consister pour Ruyer à fournir à la science le « mythe minimal » dont elle a besoin pour retrouver l'énergie qui la porte à lire le monde comme un théâtre expressif, contenant des significations branchées sur des sens. Avec Michel Serres, Ruyer aurait volontiers reconnu que « le plus beau mythe contemporain, c'est l'idée d'une science purgée de tout mythe4 ». 1 Cf. Laurent MESLET, « Raymond Ruyer – Philosophie de la nature et métaphysique », Cahiers philosophiques, no 87, juin 2001, p. 76 ; Id., « Raymond Ruyer et la métaphysique », in L. LANGLOIS et J.-M. NARBONNE (dir.), La métaphysique : son histoire, sa critique, ses enjeux, Paris/Québec, Vrin/ Presses de l'Université Laval, 1999, p. 923, 927. 2 Cf. « Raymond Ruyer par lui-même », Les études philosophiques, vol. 80, no 1, 2007, p. 4. Ce texte est paru à l'origine en 1963 dans un ouvrage intitulé Les philosophes français par eux-mêmes, aujourd'hui quelque peu difficile à trouver. 3 « Raymond Ruyer par lui-même », p. 6. 4 Michel SERRES et Bruno LATOUR, Éclaircissements, Paris, F. Bourin, 1992, p. 188. 33 Ruyer s'est tourné vers une philosophie de la vie. À la manière de celui qui a trouvé un trésor et dont l'évangile nous dit qu'il est prêt à tout vendre à condition de pouvoir le retenir (Mt 13,44), suite à sa prise de conscience de la puissance trans-spatio-temporelle de la vie, Ruyer prononça à la fin de son expérience d'internement une conférence où il partage sa conviction que le déchiffrage du monde au moyen des sciences présuppose un regard sur ce monde comme on s'aviserait de la forme inimitable d'un visage1. Les critiques faites à l'encontre du scientisme implicite lors de la naissance de la science moderne en Occident, par exemple par la théologienne Carolyn Merchant, appelant à une sortie de la vision physicaliste de la nature héritée du XVIIIe siècle, nous offrant une nature qui n'est que « morceaux de matière morte en mouvement2 », ne l'atteindraient pas. Pourtant, et c'est ce qui sera intrigant, Ruyer ne va pas enfouir quelque âme, ou quelque principe d'émanation mystique dans l'intime des choses ainsi que sont tentés de le faire les « écothéologiens » oeuvrant aux côtés de Merchant3. C'est que chez Ruyer l'organisme singulier est branché sur une valeur, sur ce potentiel dont nous avons introduit la notion, et que son ultime réalité ne sera jamais que là où elle se trouve. Nous le disions précédemment, Ruyer a combattu bec et ongles toute forme de subtilité, qu'elle soit celle de Maurice Merleau-Ponty ou des néoréalistes, qui plaçait la conscience et la perception au point où elle se porte et non dans quelque localisation redevable au système nerveux et à son organisation4. Or, en élaborant son axiologie, il va prendre un chemin qui semble diamétralement opposé en 1 Cf. Ruyer RUYER, « L'esprit philosophique », Revue philosophique, vol. 138, no 1, 2013, p. 16. Il s'agit, comme pour le texte autobiographique de Ruyer, d'une utile republication, encore une fois au vu de la difficulté de retrouver le recueil d'origine intitulé Orientation et publié en 1946. 2 Cf. Carolyn MERCHANT, The Death of Nature, New York, HarperOne, 1990, p. 20 s. 3 Cf. notre texte « Diversité et historique des mouvements écologiques en Amérique du Nord », Connaître. Cahiers de l'Association foi et culture scientifique, vol. 40, janv. 2014, p. 76-89. 4 Cf. en particulier Raymond RUYER, Paradoxes de la conscience et limites de l'automatisme, Paris, Albin Michel, 1966, surtout p. 64-74. 34 développant toute une théorie, en partie redevable aux observations faites en captivité par le géologue François Ellenberger sur le mode de fonctionnement du rêve et de la mémoire1, selon laquelle les prétentions les plus irréductibles du moi singulier, de l'ego personnel, n'en restent pas moins des actes que nul ne possède, qui correspondent à une fascination à même un domaine qui est pour le « je » un autre, et dont on ne prend conscience que par l'expérience d'un retournement (encore une fois) de l'intersubjectivité. L'autre, qui peut nous dénier la possession d'une subjectivité en nous traitant un moment furtif comme un corps, peut aussi faire l'inverse, et se faire notre « je », donc devenir pour nous un « autre-je2 ». C'est ce que Ruyer nomme le « principe de non-doublage », qui signifie qu'un Dieu qui verrait tout et revivrait nos expériences forcerait, métaphysiquement, à poser l'univers deux fois, ce que Ruyer considère inutile. Si ce non-doublage est vrai, alors c'est l'éternité et l'ubiquité qui sont vécues par tous les étants3. La science va donc procéder à une animation axiologique, elle va réintroduire dans le champ de manifestation phénoménal ce « je » qu'est aussi le potentiel, et qui rend toute subjectivité celle d'une conscience primaire. Dans les termes de l'ouvrage de Ruyer La Gnose de Princeton, paru en 1974, la philosophie a pour tâche de raconter le mythe autrement. Le sous-titre de cet ouvrage « Des savants à la recherche d'une religion » donne le ton et représente bien mieux l'intention originelle de l'auteur avant la censure de l'éditeur quant au titre. Ce retour du mythe correspond à une inversion du sens de lecture de la science, lue non plus à partir de la direction de croissance de l'entropie mais quant à son réservoir, ou potentiel, de branchement puis d'expansion 1 Cf. Le mystère de la mémoire. L'intemporel psychologique, Les Houches, Éd. Du Mont-Blanc, 1947. 2 Cf. le développement de cette idée dans Dieu des religions, Dieu de la science, p. 174-184. 3 Dieu des religions, Dieu de la science, p. 134-135, 164. 35 sur les domaines unitaires1. Nous ne nous attarderons pas ici aux circonstances de ce canular, dans lequel Ruyer avait caché ses propres idées en les faisant passer pour celles d'un groupe de savants néo-gnostiques présent sur les campus des grandes universités étatsuniennes2. Si nous prenons la question à un niveau plus profond, il sera utile de se souvenir de la manière dont Ruyer, dans son traité de métaphysique le plus achevé, Néo-finalisme, avait affirmé que le métaphysicien ne peut faire autrement que de se placer du côté de Dieu3. Il s'agit non seulement de trouver les catégories les plus universelles pour parler de toute réalité donnée dans l'expérience, comme en métaphysique dite analytique, mais de penser les conditions de la venue à l'être pour tout étant, qui sache rendre compte de toute disposition observable en référence au visible comme à l'invisible. La « transposition » adéquate de la science suppose de s'affairer à une construction, en dépassant les seules données objectives. Tentons de mieux le faire comprendre. Si Bergson a publié un Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience (1889), c'est Ruyer qui semble le compléter, car devant le réductionnisme scientifique, c'est au nom des données immédiates qu'il va réagir. En effet, nous observerons en compagnie de Laurent Meslet que, lorsque les affirmations de la science entrent en conflit avec les données immédiates de la conscience (c'est-à-dire lorsque, par exemple, le mécanisme en biologie écarte la finalité), le philosophe de la nature a pour devoir d'affirmer la priorité de l'immédiat sur la construction scientifique4. Cet immédiat sera le branchement sur la valeur, sur le stimulus-signal, dont la réponse n'est pas conditionnée par un déplacement de force. 1 Cf. Raymond RUYER, La Gnose de Princeton, 2e éd., Paris, Fayard, 1977, p. 63. 2 Cf. Jean-Claude DUMONCEL, « Les mutations de Raymond Ruyer » in Chromatikon V. Annuaire de la philosophie en procès, Michel WEBER et Ronny DESMET (dir.), Louvain-la-Neuve, Presses universitaires de Louvain, 2009, surtout p. 248-249. 3 p. 267-268. 4 Laurent MESLET, « Raymond Ruyer – Philosophie de la nature et métaphysique », p. 78. 36 Ou plutôt l'est-il, mais en redonnant à la force son sens spirituel, d'où en même temps l'extraordinaire situation d'un Ruyer pionnier d'une épistémologie goethéenne. Par exemple, la langue courante dira « le soleil se lève tous les matins ». Par la suite, Copernic intervient et explique cette impression, mais sans la nier ; elle s'obstine à demeurer ce qu'elle est. Mes sens voient le bâton brisé dans la chaudière remplie d'eau, et encore là l'esprit va corriger et situer, mais il ne va pas nier. Aucune science ne me convaincra que le bâton n'est pas vu comme brisé, de même qu'aucune connaissance sophistiquée de la théorie quantique ne parviendra à me convaincre que l'objet vert, la feuille d'arbre par exemple, puisqu'il absorbe toutes les longueurs d'onde et ne réémet que celle-ci, est en réalité en sa constitution interne, si on le considère comme filtre d'ondes, toutes les couleurs sauf la verte. Soit, mais le vert sera toujours vert, et même un des meilleurs exemples que nous possédions de l'intemporalité. Il serait fascinant de relier ces affirmations au propos du Husserl auteur de La terre ne se meut pas1, mais nous n'aurons pas ici loisir de le faire. Disons par exemple que le chat gratte à ma porte, et que l'on me dise qu'il n'y a là que fonctionnements par renforcement, que le chat n'a ni volonté ni dispositions supérieures d'ordre qualitatif ; on me demande alors de nier une donnée immédiate. À cet égard, le rôle de la philosophie sera de maintenir, contre une science sans sagesse, le primat de l'intuition, et de « rétablir le rapport normal d'enveloppement du mécanisme par la finalité2. » VI. Dieu et la valeur La dernière grande idée sur laquelle nous nous pencherons, c'est celle de la place de Dieu. Il est frappant de voir comment le Néo-finalisme s'ouvre par le rejet de l'argument ontologique, déclassé parce qu'il s'exerce sur des 1 Trad. Didier FRANCK, Dominique PRADELLE et Jean-François LAVIGNE, Paris, Éd. de Minuit, 1989. 2 « Raymond Ruyer – Philosophie de la nature et métaphysique », p. 79. 37 idées ou en définitive des mots (en 1970 il sera précisé qu'il est valide mais seulement s'il s'applique à l'univers entier), pour être remplacé par le cogito axiologique, que Ruyer rattache à Jules Lequier, par voie de Charles Renouvier. Ce dernier porte sur l'impossibilité d'une action qui aurait pour fin de prouver sa non-poursuite d'une fin1. Cela est nécessaire pour que la science soit intellection totale du monde. Ruyer se doit de réserver cette place pour rendre compte du fait qu'aucun étant en développement n'a atteint la pleine figure, la pleine réalisation de ce plan le développement. Il en conclut que si on fait le même raisonnement pour tous les étants du cosmos, on voit que Dieu a dû se partager entre eux. Avant de fixer de manière plus précise cette terminologie, et de parler d'un « partage » de Dieu ou d'une « explosion », il y a eu plusieurs années d'écriture et de réflexion de la part de Ruyer. Le mieux sera sans doute ici d'enjamber maints détails et d'aller directement au terme tout constitué. Ruyer fait l'hypothèse que, pour tout étant en développement, mais surtout pour tout organisme en phase embryonnaire, la démarche de fascination est équivalente à une « conscience-je », qui n'est telle que dans un « autre-je », ce qui signifie que pour lui la conscience n'est jamais là où se trouve le psychisme, qui serait participant de ce je. Cet étant que nous voyons, s'il est une totalité ou forme vraie, est tenu dans cette forme par un acte de liaison, et toute liaison est d'origine psychique. Elle ne l'est ultimement que par visée d'une valeur. Pour Ruyer, nous l'avons déjà dit, la science moderne, contre la thèse des néo-réalistes, montre le besoin inévitable d'un médium qui traverserait le temps et l'espace pour communiquer, rendant impossible à l'un d'entre nous de s'adresser à quiconque serait à l'extérieur du système solaire sans devoir attendre un délai qui peut être très long, puisque la communication instantanée relève de la magie. Cela 1 Cf. Néo-finalisme, chap. 1, p. 1-8. 38 devrait poser une présence dans un « ici-maintenant » des codages qui rendent un domaine d'espace qualitativement « dieu » par rapport au reste, et c'est de cette manière que Dieu finissait sa carrière dans l'exposé de Samuel Alexander, que Ruyer discute mais refuse1. Est-ce que la solution de Ruyer est panthéiste ? Le panthéisme ne semble pas le satisfaire, et ce qui, semble-t-il, distinguerait la pensée toute faite de Ruyer du panthéisme classique, c'est sa théorie axiarchiste2. Ruyer, nous l'avons déjà évoqué, a mis en place une impressionnante réflexion sur la valeur, dont un regard perspicace pourrait noter qu'elle est là depuis le début, bien qu'il faille savoir la trouver, alors qu'elle s'exprime catégoriquement dans deux ouvrages (et plusieurs articles) dédiés à l'axiologie, soit Le monde des valeurs (1948) et Philosophie de la valeur (1952, même année de publication que Néo-finalisme). Dans le premier de ces deux ouvrages, Ruyer développe une réflexion fascinante sur le problème de l'individuation, et traite la valeur comme un universel en se demandant quelle est sa portée, son impact sur le monde physique, le monde de l'expérience. Il se penche longuement sur le cas des couleurs. Il y fait l'hypothèse que la valeur ne sera pas toujours l'expression d'une conscience humaine intentionnelle valorisante, mais que des archétypes imposeront souvent au monde physique de réaliser ce que nous considérons comme des valeurs, par exemple la beauté. 1 Cf. La cybernétique et l'origine de l'information, p. 177-178. Samuel ALEXANDER, Space, Time, and Deity, I, Londres, Macmillan, 1920, p. 21. 2 Sur l'axiarchisme, on aimera consulter John LESLIE, Infinite Minds : A Philosophical Cosmology, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2002 ; Id., Immortality Defended, Malden/Oxford, Wiley/Blackwell, 2007. 39 Du niveau minéral (de l'essence à l'individu), organique (de l'espèce aux montages spécifiques), jusqu'au supraorganique, on voit à l'oeuvre une différenciation relative du sens à donner à cet intervalle, ou parabole, qui met en circuit la valeur, au sens le plus primitif qui se puisse concevoir, et son porteur, cristal ou espèce, mettant en oeuvre autant de relais par le moyen de boucles dans une organisation ou redondante ou hiérarchique et dissymétrique. Ce premier schéma est intéressant et nourricier pour la réflexion moins en raison de ce qu'il éclaire que de ce qui reste obscur lorsqu'on l'a médité un moment. Cournot, dans le Traité, avait remarqué que la région médiane, de part et d'autre de laquelle il y a distribution symétrique, reste le lieu d'inscription de quelque chose de mystérieux mais à la fois d'absolument central dans la nature. Si on divise en effet [1] les forces mécaniques, [2] les forces moléculaires et chimiques, [3] la vie végétative, [4] la vie animale, on constate symétrie entre les termes [2] et [3], puis correspondance entre [1] et [4]. L'idée d'une force mécanique ne serait jamais apparue, si nous n'avions pu observer les phénomènes de la vie animale1. L'animal ne fait pas que canaliser sa structuration immanente, mais il réalise hors de lui quantité de montages, d'essais, d'erreurs, bref une mise 1 Antoine A. COURNOT, Traité sur l'enchaînement des idées fondamentales dans les sciences et dans l'histoire, Paris, Hachette, 1861, § 210, p. 329. 40 sur pied d'appareillages, qui montrent la projection hors de lui d'un idéal de projets à finaliser, conditionnant déjà l'environnement à ses besoins et sa réalité au lieu de s'y soumettre passivement. La valeur ne doit donc pas être confinée dans la sphère de l'intentionnalité humaine ou de l'égologie, elle peut être objectivement appréhendée en ayant prise sur le monde physique. En considérant un cristal, nous la verrons diriger des réseaux de force et de liaisons atomiques (le diamant) ou moléculaires (le sucre) en leur soufflant de réaliser entièrement un modèle pour ainsi dire sans écran d'un monde purement mathématique. C'est le monde parménidien, celui de la sûreté, où le plus petit atome d'univers est divin, qui nous débarrasse également d'avoir à trouver une présence de Dieu sous le changement. S'il est une prérogative de Dieu, ce sera celle d'être un absolu. Dieu va-t-il déléguer cette individualité ? Le cristal nous montre une pure réduplication d'un monde où semblent se réaliser sans entraves les rapports mathématiques Lorsque nous portons notre regard sur l'espèce, nous nous rendons compte que le porteur de l'individualité acquiert des traits qui feront de lui un étant singularisé ultimement par l'histoire unique de son système nerveux, mais en s'appuyant sur des prédispositions typiques. Quantité de cycles de comportement, de boucles d'effection, assureront au membre de l'espèce quelque chose de cette sûreté, image réfractée de l'infaillibilité divine. Les espèces incarnent un effort vital visant des valeurs, qui ne sont pas toutes exprimables en termes biologiques, par exemple la symétrie. Il reste cependant que, envisagé à partir de la réalisation des caractères de l'espèce, ce porteur singulier n'acquiert aucune individualité au sens d'avoir été fait irremplaçable. Un second schéma présenté plus bas insère un niveau additionnel de différentiation et de partage, ajoutant aux visées et montages psychiques relatifs aux cycles de spécialisation de l'espèce, un partage entre l'intention consciente et l'idéal poursuivi. Parvenu au niveau de 41 l'individu réflexivement conscient, alors que ce codage de sa rencontre avec l'environnement par le biais des engrammes du système nerveux est la clef de compréhension, nous retrouvons une distance face aux valeurs. Ces dernières seront présentées avec un caractère d'immutabilité et d'éternité. C'est alors que l'homme, être symbolique par excellence, comprend la puissance des archétypes et peut en venir à réaliser que la liberté ne suppose en rien l'émancipation absolue ou la « création » des valeurs. Si le schéma étendu laisse indéterminé l'encadrement ultime, entre l'apophatisme de l'origine radicale et de la finalité ultime, on aura tôt fait de constater que sa version primitive laissait pareillement indéterminée la ligne de poursuite d'un idéal par l'homme. C'est que pour Ruyer, et ceci comme nous l'avons vu fort primitivement, l'option interprétative du sens le plus général de déploiement cosmologique de l'action s'est donnée comme non-anthropomorphe. L'homme ne comprendra l'idéal qu'il vise que par référence à la puissance qui porte tous ses projets et qui est celle de la vie comme puissance d'expansion des domaines de véritable unité. L'intrant-extrant (input – output) du schéma stimulusréponse du behaviorisme est une imitation dégénérée de la mise en éveil et du rétablissement de l'homéostasie typique de la vie de l'espèce. Cette réflexion sur ce qui individualise et sur le comment d'une telle individuation est présente dans Le monde des valeurs, puis ultérieurement développée en 1952 dans Néofinalisme. C'est là finalement que nous trouverons l'inspiration qui sera mise efficacement en schéma, repris ensuite de manière définitive dans Dieu des religions, Dieu de la science en 1970 (p. 114-120) : 42 Pour Thomas d'Aquin, c'est la ressemblance à l'étant transparent à soi, capable de retour vers soi (redditio ad seipsum), qui montre premièrement le besoin de Dieu dans ce schéma, et deuxièmement le fait que l'homme est à l'image de Dieu. Plus l'écart de soi à soi est grand, plus on doit en appeler à ce qui peut en conserver l'unité1. Pour Ruyer, ce n'est pas l'agent humain qui est remarquable, il définit celui-ci négativement comme qui ne fait pas que répliquer un cadre sans information parce qu'il serait entièrement généré par une répétition redondante comme dans le cas du cristal, mais c'est l'espèce, elle qui est intermédiaire d'une certaine manière entre le cristal et la conscience valorisante au sens que cette dernière revêt dans une phénoménologie mettant l'homme à la recherche des essences. C'est l'espèce qui correspond à l'amplification du type comme la molécule-type, c'est elle qui peut changer, mais surtout elle qui est à mi-chemin entre compression et expansion2. Ruyer, qui s'était depuis les grands articles des années postérieures à sa thèse fait adversaire d'une cosmologie des « règnes » hiérarchisés, donne alors finalement une solution que l'on pourrait qualifier de quantique au problème de l'harmonisation de ces traces de l'unité perdue dans le cosmos matériel. Elle n'est ni maximum de redondance ni maximum de turbulence, mais optimum de pilotage par mise en place de structures en amboception tentant de reproduire l'enjoyment absolu de la valeur. Ruyer reproche à A.N. Whitehead dans Néofinalisme ses spéculations sur la nature antécédente puis conséquente de Dieu3, car cette approche trahit une usurpation d'un point de vue surplombant auquel nul d'entre 1 Cf. p. ex. Somme contre les gentils, livre IV, La révélation, Ch. 11, trad. Denis Moreau, Paris, GF-Flammarion, 1999, p. 105-117. 2 Cf. Le monde des valeurs. Études systématiques, Paris, Aubier-Montaigne, 1948, p. 114. Consulter aussi Raymond RUYER, « Théologiens du salut, et théologiens du plaisir », Commentaire, vol. 1, no 4, hiver 1978-1979, p. 551-554. 3 Néo-finalisme, p. 285. 43 nous n'a accès. La seule réalité, c'est celle d'être pris dans le tissage d'une lignée fibreuse dans l'univers, d'être un « moi » qui est légion, parce que l'agrandissement de domaines unitaires l'ayant lui-même permis. C'est ici que Ruyer, encore une fois, rappelle Alexander, car nous sommes « dieu » par rapport à la rétroaction passive et morte du centre du schéma, et l'on peut hypothétiquement poser que, de la même manière que nous sommes dieu pour elle, quelque chose fait de notre propre situation une réalité ellemême encadrée, donc est « dieu » par rapport à nous. Seulement, nous y procédons à partir d'une réalité donnée et expérimentée, plutôt que de faire de toutes les mises en circuit cosmiques des sortes de manifestations fantomatiques d'une divinité expérimentée au premier degré d'identification. Ruyer élaborera une réflexion affirmant l'irréductibilité de l'homme aux programmations instinctives, en même temps que la dépendance des plus hautes idées que sont le moi, le monde et Dieu, face au monde comme horizon de ce qu'il nommera « sensifiance », dans la mesure où selon lui le sens est plus primitif que l'ordre syntaxique, c'est-à-dire l'ordre de correspondance de propositions énoncées dans le langage humain et jugées comme vraies ou fausses par correspondance. C'est qu'au fond Ruyer s'objecte à tout ce qui procèderait d'une conviction inavouée quant à la capacité de ne faire un monde non seulement symbolique mais effectif qu'à partir du langage de l'homme, qui n'est que celui d'une conscience secondaire, donc d'une conscience greffée : « Le passage de la valence à la valeur, du signal au sens et au symbole, est le moment capital, qui explique l'inversion du rôle de la conscience. D'instrument qu'elle était au service de l'organisme, elle devient appréhension d'un monde vraiment extérieur, et, à travers lui, d'un monde transcendant1. » 1 Dieu des religions, Dieu de la science, p. 52. 44 Confronté par exemple à la question de savoir ultimement pourquoi la vie est une valeur, pourquoi l'humanité à un avenir, Ruyer va se rabattre sur l'idée d'une sélection négative, c'est-à-dire d'une sélection qui pour lui sera la seule « naturelle », justement parce qu'éliminatrice de ceux qui se sont donnés la permission de nier la présence du génie de l'espèce, puisque c'est en définitive ce même génie de l'espèce qui se retournera contre eux pour les éliminer misérablement1. Lorsqu'il fait de la connaissance, comprise par le détour de la conscience primaire, quelque chose d'équivalent au rétablissement d'une information, cela ne peut se comprendre que dans le contexte de cette axiologie : il y a des systèmes de correspondance abstraits qui font qu'une action contre la finalité spécifique ne pourra jamais profiter2. Pour Ruyer, le « Tao au-dessus de tous les noms » reste l'énoncé le plus réussi au niveau de l'effort visant à circonscrire cette durée de la lignée ou de l'espèce, auquel il consacra un article3. Ruyer ira-t-il jamais plus loin que cette recherche d'un Dieu-Tao ? Il est significatif que dans son dernier grand manuscrit, malheureusement tenu à l'écart des chercheurs pendant une trentaine d'années et désormais publié, L'embryogenèse du monde et le Dieu silencieux4, il se réfère 1 Nous avons développé ceci dans une analyse de ce thème surtout en rapport à une note critique de Ruyer à propos de l'ouvrage du biologiste moléculaire Gunther STENT, The Coming of the Golden Age (1969), in « Le paradoxe du progrès : Cournot, Stent et Ruyer », Chromatikon X. Annales de la philosophie en procès, Michel WEBER et Vincent BERNE (dir.), Louvain-la-Neuve, Éd. Chromatika, 2014, p. 71-90. 2 Cf. les remarques de RUYER à propos de Max Scheler in Le monde des valeurs, p. 89-90 qui se voit cependant corrigé dans le sens de l'axiarchisme, ainsi que le faisait également Clives S. LEWIS The Abolition of Man, New York, HarperOne, 2015, surtout livre III, p. 53-82. 3 « Dieu-personne et Dieu-Tao », Revue de métaphysique et de morale, vol. 52, no 2, avril 1947, p. 141-157 ; cf. également Dieu des religions, Dieu de la science, p. 146155. 4 Paris, Klincksieck, 2013 ; voire notre note critique, « Le dernier état d'un finalisme contemporain. À propos d'un inédit majeur de Raymond Ruyer », Laval théologique et philosophique, vol. 70, no 2, juin 2014, p. 367-378. 45 au Dieu « silencieux », car cela oriente dans une autre direction. Pour le Tao, que Dieu soit silencieux ne poserait aucun problème, ne poserait pas même question. Le problème du mal, parfois nommé le « mystère d'iniquité », force Ruyer à faire un pas de plus. L'ouvrage avait comme titre original « Au Dieu inconnu, source de toute vie1 », et il faut bien voir que le titre faisait allusion au livre God the Known and God the Unknown de Samuel Butler (1917, reprenant des articles publiés dans The Examiner en 1879), Ruyer ayant décidé de changer le Dieu inconnu en Dieu silencieux. S'il soulève indirectement le problème du mal, en mettant en scène le thème d'un Dieu qui ne répond pas, donc celui de la responsabilité de Dieu, ouvrant ainsi l'immense affaire de la théodicée, il le soulève mais d'une certaine manière pour en démontrer l'irréalité. Au terme, le mal n'a pas d'être, ce qui est très classique, car peu importe les dérives, nous dira Ruyer, la vie, qui est la vie de l'espèce, triomphera des obstacles ou bien l'on n'en parlera plus. Ou bien la vie subsistera, ou bien il n'y aura plus de conscience : c'est un syllogisme disjonctif, qui réinsère toute conscience dans le psychisme universel, si l'on a cure de nos remarques précédentes sur la délocalisation de l'espacepsychisme. Ruyer pose un ciel d'archétypes, de formes-types, mais parce que l'expérience l'exige. Dans cette philosophie, l'argument ontologique vaut, mais il vaut de Dieu démultiplié et aventuré dans des lignées fibreuses de l'univers2, défaisant et inversant tout aspect physique de masse indifférencié que pourrait prendre l'univers, ce qui revient à l'avoir capturé avant qu'il n'ait lieu, bref contrecarrant l'aspect physique molaire de la physique classique depuis Newton. Que le monde soit autre que l'image que s'en est fait cette physique, que toutes les lignées individuelles, apparemment réfutées par les amas 1 Cf. Raymond RUYER, « Il n'y a pas d'inconscient. Embryogenèse et mémoire », Diogène, vol. 142, avril-juin 1988, p. 23. 2 Cf. L'embryogenèse du monde et le Dieu silencieux, p. 151-154, 197-199. 46 indifférenciés, soient en réalité seules porteuses de la vie du sens, voilà qui pour Ruyer pose Dieu. Ici, le panthéisme semble passer la barre, celle de l'univers entier, puisque de Dieu ubiquitairement présent dans tous les étants et éternitairement participé, on peut dire qu'il ne saurait faillir. Mais pourquoi Dieu ne saurait-il résister à toute défaillance qu'à l'unique condition d'être tous les étants ? Nous le disions, dans Néo-finalisme, Ruyer disait de l'argument d'Anselme qu'il fait trop souvent figure de sophisme minable, mais que si nous le comprenions comme cogito axiologique, alors il serait parfaitement irréfutable1. Mais pourquoi l'est-il ? Parce que si je ne puis nier que j'agisse dès que je cherche ou que je questionne, comment dès lors nier Dieu si le nisus de l'univers continue ? Cela supposera que Dieu soit en travail, qu'il ne « servirait » à rien s'il n'était pas requis pour pousser l'univers dans l'existence et puis l'aspirer vers le fonctionnement permettant au multiple de rester organisé, qu'il serait à rejeter exactement comme l'en-deça purement intelligible et substantiel de l'épistémologie des disciples de Brunschvicg était à rejeter. Il semble que tel soit bien le cas, si bien qu'au terme il faudra se demander si l'on n'a pas « scientificisé » Dieu. Quiconque voudrait s'arracher à lui ne le pourrait, puisque s'affranchir de lois c'est aller au-devant d'autres lois, axiologiques celles-là. C'est ainsi que Ruyer n'a jamais manqué une occasion de déclarer fou l'existentialisme de la liberté pure2. Socrate aurait dit : nul ne fait le mal complètement et sciemment ; Ruyer répond à deux millénaires de distance : nul ne le fait parce que nul ne fait en ne faisant rien. Il y a donc ici en jeu une conviction fondamentale anti- 1 p. 1-2. 2 Cf. « Raymond Ruyer par lui-même », p. 3 ; Id., « Les limites biologiques de l'humanisme » in Originalité biologique de l'homme, Paris, Fayard, « Recherches et débats » 18, 1957, p. 153-165. 47 contemplation sans action, anti-substantialiste et ces deux convictions fondamentales sont suspectes. Si nous devions les intégrer, c'est parce que nous tous les trouverions assorties de leurs raisons, sinon il n'y a pas à les accepter. Conclusion : le programme de l'ontologie de demain La métaphysique de Ruyer est d'une grande puissance si on l'envisage selon un éclairage moins axé sur la validité de chacune de ses composantes fondamentales, et qu'on accepte de l'éclairer à partir des problèmes laissés en suspens par la réflexion de la théologie philosophique traditionnelle. Si en effet Ruyer n'est pas celui qui a le plus à offrir lorsque vient le temps de s'interroger sur la personne incarnée comme lieu d'inscription des valeurs, puisqu'il nous laisse avec une théorie du déplacement de l'ego qui pose autant de problèmes qu'elle n'en résout et semble laisser un avatar d'individualité coupable de n'être pas l'universel qu'il vise, en revanche la métaphysique de Ruyer pose à nouveaux frais et de manière stimulante le problème de l'individualité distribuée sur des réseaux de colonisations successives. En effet, Ruyer a très bien vu que le concept de forme vraie n'en est pas un qui, d'abord et avant tout, permettrait de prendre en instantané quelque doigt divin dans l'engrenage, lorsqu'il intervient et suspens l'éparpillement matériel en injectant d'en-haut de l'organisation, mais qu'il procède plutôt en enveloppant et en étendant des structures capables d'aggrégativité et déjà opérantes. Ainsi l'homme, ou l'animal mettant en place les montages rendus nécessaires par la poursuite du sens de la part de la finalité instinctive, vont-ils unifier autour d'eux en référence à une fin comprise comme norme. Cette dernière ne serait norme de rien si elle ne rencontrait du déjà organisé en amont. Dire de l'homme qu'il n'est qu'un amas de cellules, c'est certes l'amputer de sa dimension transcendante, mais lorsqu'il va faire entrer un projet qui l'anime dans l'ordre d'exécution propre à la réalisation d'une fin, il devra traiter les éléments subordonnées comme si on l'avait traité, lui, comme un amas de cellules. Ce qui rend la cellule possible, ce sont les 48 propriétés des molécules biotiques, et ces dernières ont dû trouver des champs de valence leur permettant de réaliser une action de maintien d'un ensemble de liaisons. Si l'on devait remédier aux insuffisances de la théorie ruyérienne de l'individualité, et y réintroduire une réflexion trop brutalement écartée sur la substance1, on trouverait aussi, comme le notait Ronald Bogue2, des matériaux inattendus pour l'édification d'une théorie leibnizienne renouvelée, attentive aux niveaux de subordination de centres d'unités, de monades représentant, par la création d'une harmonie, une théorie spirituelle des rapports d'associativité qui sache respecter les formes de vie inférieures à celle de la conscience intentionnelle qui s'éprouve libre, et dont le ruyérisme nous aura également appris à penser l'enracinement. Références bibliographiques : ALEXANDER Samuel, Space, Time, and Deity, I, Londres, Macmillan, 1920. ANDRIEU Bernard, « La réalité physique du cerveau selon Raymond Ruyer », Bulletin d'histoire et d'épistémologie des sciences de la vie 12/1, 2005, p. 129-158. ARTHUR Richard T. W., Leibniz, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2014. BARBARAS Renaud, Introduction à une phénoménologie de la vie, Paris, Vrin, 2008. BAREL Yves, Le paradoxe et le système. Essai sur le fantastique social, Grenoble, Presses universitaires de Grenoble, 2008. 1 Michel SERRES remarque : « Mais justement comme [Christiane Frémont] le montre dans son beau livre, le lien substantifie, c'est-à-dire produit de la substance. », Éclaircissements, p. 166. 2 Cf. Ronald BOGUE, « Raymond Ruyer » in Deleuze's Philosophical Lineage, Graham JONES et Jon ROFFE (dir.), Édimbourg, Edinburgh University Press, 2009, p. 313. 49 BITBOL Michel, La conscience a-t-elle une origine ? Des neurosciences à la pleine conscience : une nouvelle approche de l'esprit, Paris, Flammarion, 2014. CONRAD André, « Repenser la finalité », Critique 804/5, 2014, p. 388-401. CONWAY Flo et Jim SIEGELMAN, Dark Hero of the Information Age : In Search of Norbert Wiener, New York, Basic Books, 2006. DEVAUX Philippe, Le système d'Alexander. Exposé critique d'une théorie néo-réaliste du changement, Paris, Vrin, 1929. DUMONCEL Jean-Claude, « Une archéologie du structuralisme », Critique 804/5, 2014, p. 417-430. -, « Les mutations de Raymond Ruyer » in Chromatikon V. Annuaire de la philosophie en procès, Michel WEBER et Ronny DESMET (dir.), Louvain-la-Neuve, Presses universitaires de Louvain, 2009, p. 243-250. ELLENBERGER François, Le mystère de la mémoire. L'intemporel psychologique, Les Houches, Éd. Du MontBlanc, 1947. FISETTE Denis et Pierre POIRIER, Philosophie de l'esprit. État des lieux, Paris, Vrin, 2000. GAGNON Philippe, « Diversité et historique des mouvements écologiques en Amérique du Nord », Connaître. Cahiers de l'Association foi et culture scientifique 40, 2014, p. 76-89. -, « Le dernier état d'un finalisme contemporain. À propos d'un inédit majeur de Raymond Ruyer », Laval théologique et philosophique 70/2, 2014, p. 367-378. -, « Le paradoxe du progrès : Cournot, Stent et Ruyer », Chromatikon X. Annales de la philosophie en procès, Michel WEBER et Vincent BERNE (dir.), Louvain-la-Neuve, Éd. Chromatika, 2014, p. 71-90. 50 -, « Que reste-t-il de la théologie à l'âge électronique ? Valeur et cybernétique axiologique chez Raymond Ruyer », Chromatikon IX, Annales de la philosophie en procès, Michel Weber et Vincent Berne (dir.), Louvain-la-Neuve, Éd. Chromatika, 2013, p. 93-120. GAZZANIGA Michael, Who's in Charge ?, New York, Ecco, 2011. GLOCK Hans-Johann, « Strawson's Descriptive Metaphysics » in Leila HAAPARANTA et Heikki KOSKINEN (dir.), Categories of Being : Essays on Metaphysics and Logic, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 391-419. HILLIARD Albert L., recension de R. Ruyer, Philosophie de la valeur in The Journal of Philosophy 49/21, 1952, p. 677682. HUSSERL Edmond, La terre ne se meut pas, trad. Didier FRANCK, Dominique PRADELLE et Jean-François LAVIGNE, Paris, Éd. de Minuit, 1989. LARGEAULT Jean, Systèmes de la nature, préf. de René THOM, Paris, Vrin, 1985. LASHLEY Karl, « The Problem of the Serial Order in Behavior » in Cerebral Mechanisms in Behavior, Lloyd A. JEFFRES (dir.), New York, Wiley, 1951, p. 112-146. -, « Studies of Cerebral Function in Learning XII. Loss of the Maze Habit after Occipital Lesions in Blind Rats », Journal of Comparative Neurology 79/3, 1943, p. 431-462. -, « The Behavioristic Interpretation of Consciousness – Part I », Psychological Bulletin 30, 1923 p. 237-353. LESLIE John, Immortality Defended, Malden/Oxford, Wiley/Blackwell, 2007. -, Infinite Minds : A Philosophical Cosmology, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2002. LEWIS Clives S., The Abolition of Man, New York, HarperOne, 2015. 51 MERCHANT Carolyn, The Death of Nature, New York, HarperOne, 1990. MESLET Laurent, « Raymond Ruyer – Philosophie de la nature et métaphysique », Cahiers philosophiques 87, 2001, p. 65-82. -, « Raymond Ruyer et la métaphysique », in L. LANGLOIS et J.-M. NARBONNE (dir.), La métaphysique : son histoire, sa critique, ses enjeux, Paris/Québec, Vrin/ Presses de l'Université Laval, 1999, p. 920-929. PATRI Aimé, « Signification philosophique du behaviorisme », in Jean WAHL et al., Ordre, désordre, lumière, Paris, Vrin, 1952, p. 32-46. RUYER Bernard, « La notion de liaison dans la philosophie de Ruyer » in Louis VAX et Jean-Jacques WUNENBURGER (dir.), Raymond Ruyer, de la science à la théologie, Paris, Kimé, 1995, p. 45-54. RUYER Raymond, L'embryogenèse du monde et le Dieu silencieux, Paris, Klincksieck, 2013. -, « L'esprit philosophique », Revue philosophique 138/1, 2013, p. 7-19. -, Néo-finalisme, 2e éd, Paris, P.U.F., 2012. -, « Raymond Ruyer par lui-même », Les études philosophiques 80/1, 2007, p. 3-14.. -, « Il n'y a pas d'inconscient. 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Denis Moreau, Paris, GFFlammarion, 1999. VERLEY Xavier, Sur le symbolisme. Cassirer, Whitehead et Ruyer, Louvain-la-Neuve, Chromatika, 2013. VON WEISZÄCKER Karl F., The Unity of Nature, trad. F.J. Zucker, New York, Straus, Farrar & Giroux, 1980. WIENER Norbert, Invention : The Feeding and Care of Ideas, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1994.

Moral Moral Decisiones Decisiones Moral Moral Decisiones Decisiones Moral Moral Decisiones Decisiones LEYENDAS DE TROLLEY: JUICIO MORAL Y TOMA DE DECISIONES Fabio Morandín Ahuerma 1 Candidato SNI. Doctor en Filosofía por el Instituto de Filosofía de la Universidad Veracruzana. Profesor investigador de tiempo completo de la Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla. ORCID: 0000-0001-6082-2207. Mail: [email protected]. UNIVERSITA CIENCIA Revista electrónica de investigación de la Universidad de Xalapa. AÑO 8, NÚMERO 22. MAYOAGOSTO 2019. ISSN 2007-3917 80 SUMARIO: 1. Resumen/Abstract; 2. Introducción; 3. Deontología; 4. Utilitarismo; 5. ¿Cuándo razonamos el juicio moral?; 6. Discusión; 7. Conclusión; 8. Referencias bibliográficas. 1. RESUMEN Sostengo en este artículo que no somos utilitaristas consecuentes en todo momento, ni deontologistas dogmáticos irracionales, más bien, una mezcla de utilitarismo y deontologismo que depende de una serie de factores no descubiertos o explicados convincentemente tanto epigenéticos, evolutivos, como educacionales, axiológicos, psicológicos aprendidos, conscientes e inconscientes en la toma de decisiones. También argumento que no es lo mismo toma de decisión, que construcción del juicio moral. El juicio moral no siempre conduce a la toma de decisión. Se puede tener un juicio, pero no necesariamente actuar en consecuencia. Palabras clave: Dilemas; deontologismo; utilitarismo; juicio moral; toma de decisiones. ABSTRACT I argue in this article that we are not consistent utilitarians at all times, nor irrational dogmatic deontologists, rather, a mixture of utilitarianism and deontologism that depends on a series of factors undiscovered or convincingly explained both epigenetic, evolutionary, as educational, axiological, psychological learned, conscious and unconscious in decision making. I also argue that decision making is not the same as constructing moral judgment. The second does not always lead to the first. I can have a trial, but not necessarily act accordingly. 81 Keywords: Dilemmas deontologism; utilitarianism; moral judgment; decision making. 2. INTRODUCCIÓN El cerebro humano, y el hombre en su conjunto, es un ente complejo que posee una capacidad de aprendizaje y adaptación superlativa insospechada, la individualización de esos procesos también es asombrosa porque, efectivamente, no existen dos personas idénticas, pero, los dilemas morales, pueden ser un pretexto para reflexionar, así sea un poco, en los mecanismos a través de los cuales ponemos a prueba nuestra libertad de decisión. Otro punto a considerar es saber si el proceso de generar juicios morales se lleva a cabo de manera racional o irracional, consciente o inconsciente, lenta o rápidamente. Si se juzga de manera ponderada, o si se hace por simples apariencias. Si bien la mayoría de las personas cree que toma sus propias decisiones, los dilemas pueden servir para explícitar ese proceso y revelar los mecanismos involucrados. Se piensa que los escenarios dilemáticos (Platts, 2001) sirven para construir una aproximación útil a las estructuras cerebrales involucradas en los procesos cognitivos a través de las cuales se generan las intuiciones morales (Petrinovich 2003). Me basaré en los dilemas clásicos conocidos como trolley1, fat2, transplant3 y Sophie4. 1 Un tranvía fuera de control se dirige hacia cinco personas que morirán si éste sigue su curso. La única forma de salvarlos es oprimir un interruptor que cambiará el tranvía hacia una vía alterna en donde matará a una persona en lugar de cinco. ¿Deberías girar el tranvía para salvar a cinco personas a expensas de la vida de una? (Greene et al., 2001: 2106) [Traducción libre]. 2 Estas parado en un puente peatonal sobre las vías. Puedes ver que un tranvía fuera de control se acerca a toda velocidad. Observas a cinco trabajadores justo a la salida del puente. ¿Qué hacer? Como eres un experto en tranvías sabes de una forma de detenerlo es dejar caer un gran peso en su camino. ¿Pero dónde encontrar uno? Da la casualidad que hay un hombre muy gordo, realmente gordo. Él se inclina sobre la barandilla y todo lo que tienes que hacer es darle un pequeño empujón y caerá a las vías. ¿Sería permisible para hacer esto? (Thomson, 1985: 1409) [Traducción libre]. 82 El punto a debate que continúa abierto es si las estructuras e intuiciones morales son individuales o compartidas por todas las personas. Si bien se tienen evidencias empíricas que sostienen que algunas partes más o menos situadas del cerebro están comprometidas en el proceso de toma de decisiones, aún no ha podido ser establecido hasta qué punto y cuáles son los factores que determinan que cada persona opte por un tipo de decisión u otra. 3. DEONTOLOGÍA En el dilema del tranvía (Thomson, 1985), la respuesta basada en principios sería la siguiente: Si debo escoger entre matar a uno o dejar que mueran cinco, debo dejarlos morir, porque yo no puedo intervenir en el curso de las acciones. Creer que matar es malo es una idea indexada a nuestro marco básico de creencias. Muchas de ellas son producto de la educación formal o informal y podría también provenir de una creencia religiosa o, incluso laica, sobre el valor y derecho intrínseco de la vida humana. Así, principios como no matar, no engañar, no lastimar, respetar a la autoridad, etcétera, son creencias que no necesitan de un largo proceso cognitivo de deliberación, simplemente se aplica la regla, como si fuese un reglamento de tránsito y ya. No paso la luz en rojo, no sólo porque está prohibido hacerlo, sino porque puedo morir en el intento. El hecho de que pueda ser castigado con una multa o que pueda causar un accidente en el que me lastime y/o salgan otros lastimados es, por principio, secundario. El punto es que está prohibido pasar la luz en rojo y por un principio mejor respeto la ley de tránsito, entonces, sabiendo 3 Eres un gran cirujano y tienes a cinco pacientes moribundos. Dos necesitan un pulmón, dos un riñón y el quinto necesita un corazón. Si no haces hoy los trasplantes, morirán. Te informan que ingresó un hombre joven y sano para realizarse su chequeo anual. ¿Sería para ti moralmente lícito extraerle los órganos para salvar a los cinco pacientes? (Thomson, 1985: 1396) [Traducción libre]. 4 Una madre polaca llega a un campo de concentración con sus dos pequeños hijos. Un oficial nazi la obliga a que elija a uno el cual podrá conservar; en caso de que se niegue a elegir, enviará a ambos a la cámara de gas. ¿Debe elegir a uno? (Styron, 1983). 83 de antemano que puedo morir, ya no necesito en ese momento pensar nada, simplemente me detengo ante la luz roja. Es un principio no sólo positivo, sino de sobrevivencia, que ya hemos incorporado. Por supuesto, no todos así lo han hacen, precisamente porque ante la ley, dudan y especulan, razonan que pueden lograr pasar en rojo sin que ocurra nada... y ocurre algo. Si bien puede decirse que existe un proceso cognitivo en saber aplicar la regla o principio adecuado a cada situación que se presente, no significa que haya reflexión o análisis sobre el valor del principio, por eso es un canon fundamental que no requiere de justificación ulterior, simplemente se acata y ya. Así que no debería haber mayor problema para entender cuál es el principio se debe aplicarse a cada caso. Hay un problema residual, que es considerar los elementos formales e informales del debate, no sólo teórico, entre altruismo recíproco versus competencia. La aspiración de toda ética como estudio formal, especialmente teórico, es poder acceder a la posibilidad o imposibilidad de construir universales morales que apliquen a toda persona y a toda situación, más allá del derecho positivo. Una moral universal podría involucrar elementos compartidos como el altruismo recíproco y, de hecho, en buena medida, nuestras sociedades actuales se basan en ello, sin embargo, la misma experiencia y muestras de reciprocidad, también nos han demostrado, utilizando los mismos argumentos epigenéticos, evolutivos y/o aprendidos social y culturalmente, que Hobbes (1651/2013) no estaba errado cuando sostenía que siempre que tengamos la oportunidad de sacar ventaja frente al otro, lo vamos hacer, sin reparar en supuestos valores universales. Por lo anterior, Gawronski & Beer (2017) consideran que, dentro de la formación de juicios deontológicos es necesario además hacer una distinción entre normas prescriptivas, esto es, entre aquellas normas que obligan a la persona a hacer algo y, las normas proscriptivas, las normas que impiden que la persona actúe. 84 4. UTILITARISMO La respuesta utilitarista no requiere mayor análisis: En los dilemas referidos, el utilitarismo considera que se debe buscar el bien mayor o el menor daño. Sin importar otras consideraciones, el consecuencialista radical debería responder a los dilemas afirmativamente, esto es, tomar siempre la decisión de intervenir. Los argumentos a favor de mover el interruptor para salvar a cinco personas a costa de la vida de uno son concurrentes ya que la mayoría de los participantes que resuelven los dilemas opinan, de una u otra manera, que "es mejor que muera una persona a que mueran cinco" o "uno es mejor que cinco". Del mismo modo, quienes argumentan que es lícito empujar a una persona para salvar a cinco utilizan más o menos las mismas justificaciones. Aunque se trata de dos dilemas diferentes, el razonamiento utilitarista, al centrar su atención en el resultado final o en el argumento de que se "debe buscar el menor daño o el mayor beneficio", no ofrece mayor resistencia analítica, esto es, no tiene dificultad argumentativa suponer que cinco personas vivas es mejor que sólo una, o 5 > 1. Incluso en transplant. Desde un punto de vista utilitario no sólo se tiene la posibilidad de salvar a cinco personas y a un hijo, sino que se tiene la obligación moral de hacerlo. Se debe tener presente el criterio de la utilidad o el mayor bien para el mayor número de personas. Y, en todo caso, no debería ponerse a discusión la conveniencia de salvar a cinco personas, aunque se deba sacrificar la vida de otro, si el resultado final es un número mayor de ganancia que de pérdida de vidas. Sin embargo, nos parece que habría que analizar otros factores además de los números fríos del consecuencialismo. 5. ¿CUÁNDO RAZONAMOS EL JUICIO MORAL? Según afirman haber descubierto Gawronski & Beer (2017), si se les obliga a los participantes en los dilemas a llevar a cabo un proceso cognitivo más intenso, 85 porque el dilema sea más difícil como Sophie y, se les presiona con el tiempo de respuesta, el resultado es que darán respuestas más utilitarias que deontológicas. Lo que significaría que las respuestas utilitarias se realizan con más frecuencia cuando el tiempo de respuesta es menor. Esto es congruente con lo que propone Styron (1979) en el momento en que Sofía debe tomar una decisión: Ella es presionada por el médico nazi y entonces da un grito: "¡Llévense a mi niña!". En cambio, otros autores como Greene (2008) y Suter & Hertwig (2011) sostienen que las respuestas utilitarias aparecen cuando los participantes realizan un proceso cognitivo que implique un mayor esfuerzo. En los dilemas morales experimentales no es complicado entender cuáles son los escenarios en los que disminuye el número de bien o de bienestar y, en los que aumenta el número de mal o de malestar; o, dicho en otras palabras, para un criterio de resultado final, presentado en cifras, cuál arroja un número positivo más grande y cuál un número positivo más pequeño, no requeriría tampoco mucho tiempo. Lo mismo sucede con los juicios morales deontológicos basados en principios, se creería que se lleva a cabo un proceso cognitivo intenso para determinar cuál es la máxima específica que debe aplicarse a ese caso dilemático concreto y que, por tanto, se requiere de reflexión para aplicar la regla. O se cree que es menester un proceso cognitivo prolongado para saber qué hacer "x" está bien o, que hacer "x" está mal, pero aquí, nuevamente, opino que, como Kant (1785/ 2018) ya lo había visualizado, cuando se actúa por deber, no hay margen para la especulación, simplemente se actúa o no se actúa. Se acata una orden, no se analiza o pondera, por eso es un ordenamiento imperativo y la respuesta es inmediata. No puedo actuar o no actuar, según mi propio criterio. ¿Cuándo entonces se llevaría a cabo un proceso cognitivo prolongado y complejo en la toma de decisiones o, por lo menos, en la construcción del juicio moral, que es algo totalmente distinto? Parece que nunca. Existe una ambigüedad en torno a 86 si cuando construimos juicios morales racionales, basados en principios ontológicos, estamos realizando un proceso de cognición deliberativa que implica la reflexión imparcial de distintos cánones morales. Esto es, entre los que debemos aplicar para tomar la decisión final, o si, por el contrario, simplemente aplicamos una regla irreflexiva que creemos que es verdadera y, por tanto, llegamos a la decisión, sin necesidad de pensarlo mucho (Gawronski, 2016). En los últimos años, ha tomado auge inusitado la cantidad de teorías que respaldan la idea principal de que la construcción de juicios morales está basada principalmente en las emociones que suscitan los elementos constitutivos del juicio. Esto es, únicamente a partir de lo que nos hace sentir los hechos o las oraciones que componen el material de juicio con que construimos dicha toma de decisiones (Greene et al., 2001) (Haidt, 2001) (Prinz, 2006). No ha quedado claro si una decisión por principios o deontológica es más emocional que una decisión consecuencialista, utilitarista o de la ética de la responsabilidad, como lo ha llamado Weber (2002). Algunos como Haidt (2001) sostienen que tanto la toma de decisiones basada en principios, como la toma de decisiones basada en la mayor utilidad carecen ambas de transparencia para explicar en qué momento es que se realiza un proceso de cognición que nos lleve a tomarla. Lo anterior, quiere decir que la idea que se ha defendido de que los juicios morales se construyen a través de un proceso racional, deliberativo, lento y templado para la toma de decisiones, carecería de fundamentos empíricos. 6. DISCUSIÓN ¿Se toma una decisión por la vía utilitarista y se hacen sumas y restas para saber qué es lo más conveniente hacer? ¿Acaso existe un criterio deontológico dicta que hay un principio absoluto sobre el derecho a la vida de las personas? Incluso los filósofos profesionales desvalorizan la clase de mecanismos de respuestas que intervienen en la toma de decisiones en situaciones extremas, como ilustra Sophie. 87 No está en duda que cada una de las situaciones planteadas en los dilemas sean dignas de análisis, pero, del modo en que se ha hecho hasta ahora, dejan un amplio espacio, incluso para la burla (Bauman et al., 2014), especialmente en dilemas como fat porque podría sonar como un cómic. Cuando se enfrenta el dilema de la pasarela y se plantea la posibilidad de empujar al gordo a las vías, para muchos, especialmente jóvenes, les parece chistoso, porque en el razonamiento lógico es absurdo que una persona, por obesa que sea, fuera capaz de parar un tranvía y, mucho menos un tren con su propio cuerpo (Bauman et al., 2014). El dilema de Sofía puede ser distinto, pues es de sobra conocida la crueldad con que actuaban los soldados nazis, especialmente los médicos militares quienes hacían experimentos de umbral del dolor antes de ver morir a las víctimas. Es precisamente cuando se tiene experiencia de vida cuando las personas, entonces sí, no saben qué responder. Sofía tomó una decisión absolutamente racional, si así se quiere llamar al momento de quedarse con su hijo y permitir que el soldado condujera a su hija a la muerte. Pero, al mismo tiempo, tomó una decisión irracional pues, tiempo después, cuando los sentimientos de angustia, culpa y auto-reproche la acosan, sintió que su existencia era miserable y que la vida no valía la pena seguir viviéndola. También se podría analizar el primer momento en que, de acuerdo a la película de la Decisión Sofía (Pakula, 1982) toma el camino de sacrificar a su hija para salvar a su hijo o, para no quedarse ella sin ninguno. Lo hace de manera irreflexiva, sólo ve que podría salvar a uno. Tampoco tenemos la oportunidad de preguntarle en qué momento exacto tomó la decisión de hacerlo, es una novela. Lo único que el autor nos ofrece es el desenlace trágico de la muerte de ella misma al cometer suicidio porque, se podría especular, se arrepiente de haber tomado una decisión así. Al tomar partido por uno en contra de la vida del otro, Sofía se siente copartícipe de la muerte de su propia prole cuando, en realidad, considero que ella no estaba 88 siquiera en un verdadero dilema. Jamás escogió estar en él. La respuesta podría ser obvia: ¿Prefieres que muera uno de tus hijos o ambos? Cualquiera podría responder que, por supuesto, no se querría que muriera ninguno. No es una muerte fortuita, es una muerte producto de una elección que ya había sido tomada por el médico nazi. 7. CONCLUSIÓN No estoy de acuerdo en la división deontología versus consecuencialismo para explicar el proceso de toma de decisiones ante dilemas morales. Si bien esta distinción estaría basada en diversos experimentos a través de respuestas a dilemas personales e impersonales, queda nuevamente abierta la interrogante sobre cuáles son los procesos cognitivos racionalizados y cuáles serían, digámoslo así, automáticos. Me parece que los enfoques hasta ahora planteados, a pesar de las supuestas pruebas empíricas que han ofrecido, especialmente por Greene (2001), son erróneos en su abordaje y, por lo tanto, podrían ser erróneos en sus conclusiones. Es una visión estrecha aquella que quiere catalogar de emocional las respuestas conductuales a través de las cuales se construyen los juicios morales. Se debe hacer una clara distinción entre la construcción de juicios morales, como simple opinión y la forma en que actuamos para responder a una situación dilemática, independientemente de nuestras convicciones éticas que no son únicas o unidimensionales. Sostengo que las respuestas basadas en principios no requieren de mucho tiempo de análisis, pues existe la regla general que se aplica a lo particular de forma automática y no debe demandar esfuerzo. No necesitamos un proceso cognitivo, ni análisis profundo para saber que no se debe pasar la luz en rojo. Incluso en trolley, pero con más claridad en fat y en transplant, simplemente la regla sería: abstenerse de actuar. No utilizo el interruptor, no empujo al hombre y mucho menos, le quito los órganos a un sano para salvar a cinco enfermos. 89 Especialmente en fat y transplant, la misma Thomson (1985) sabía que eran dos absurdos, porque lo que estaba defendiendo era, precisamente, que cuando las personas se enfrentan a trolley la mayoría opina que es lícito intervenir para salvar a cinco; por eso planteó los siguientes dos dilemas para demostrar que no es posible seguir defendiendo el consecuencialismo, a cualquier precio. Creo que la mayoría de los psicólogos experimentales, sociales (Greene, Haidt, Prinz) que han intentado responder a los profundos problemas de la ética y de la teoría de las decisiones, han banalizando los hechos y relativizado el verdadero problema detrás de una decisión de vida o muerte, especialmente cuando es literal. Los enfoques bipartitos entre deontología, fundamentalismo o ética de principios y, por otra parte, utilitarismo, consecuencialismo o ética de la responsabilidad, no logran ser descriptivos de los auténticos mecanismos a través de los cuáles los seres humanos tomamos decisiones en experiencias límite. A pesar de la supuesta evidencia empírica aportada, por Gawronski & Beer (2017) y por Greene et al. (2008), ambos enfoques podrían estar errados, puesto que, bajo un criterio utilitarista o consecuencialista de respuesta, no se requiere muchos análisis para saber que 5 > 1 y que 2 > 1. Son matemática básica que de acuerdo al criterio consecuencialista, incluso, en el mal llamado ética de responsabilidad (Weber 2002), la respuesta de utilizar el interruptor para desviar el tranvía, empujar al hombre para frenar la máquina y obtener los órganos de un paciente sano, no sólo sería moralmente correcto, sino imperativo. Es el mayor bien para el mayor número de personas. Pero si se piensa con detenimiento, dicha reflexión es absurda. El valor intrínseco de la persona, aunque indemostrable para la racionalidad teórica, no lo es para la racionalidad práctica. Creo que no podemos ser utilitaristas consecuentes en todo momento, ni deontologistas dogmáticos irracionales, más bien, una mezcla de utilitarismo y deontologismo que depende de una serie de factores no descubiertos o explicados 90 convincentemente tanto epigenéticos, evolutivos, como educacionales, axiológicos, psicológicos aprendidos, conscientes e inconscientes en la toma de decisiones. Finalmente, como hemos podido ver, no es lo mismo toma de decisión que construcción del juicio moral. El juicio moral no siempre conduce a la toma de decisión. Se puede tener un juicio, pero no necesariamente actuar en consecuencia. 8. REFERENCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS Bauman, Christopher, McGraw, Peter, Bartels, Daniel & Warren, Caleb. (2014). "Revisiting external validity: Concerns about trolley problems and other sacrificial dilemmas in moral psychology". En: Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 8(9), 536-554. DOI: 10.1111/spc3.12131. Recuperado de: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/spc3.12131 Gawronski, Bertram & Beer, Jennifer. (2017). "What makes moral dilemma judgments utilitarian or deontological?" En: Social Neuroscience 12(6), 626-632, DOI: 10.1080/17470919.2016.1248787. Recuperado de: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17470919.2016.1248787 Greene, Joshua. (2008). "The secret joke of Kant's soul". En Moral psychology (3), 35-79. Recuperado de: https://philpapers.org/rec/GRETSJ Greene, Joshua, Nystrom, Leigh, Engell, Andrew, Darley, John, Cohen, Jonathan. (2004). "The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment". En: Neuron (4)2, 389-400. DOI: 10.1016/j.neuron.2004.09.027. Recuperado de : https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15473975 Greene, Joshua, Sommerville, Brian, Nystrom, Leigh, Darley, John, & Cohen, Jonathan. (2001). "An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment". En: Science, 293(5537), 2105-2108. DOI: 10.1126/science.1062872. Recuperado de: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11557895 91 Haidt, Jonathan. (2001). "The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment". En: Psychological review, 108(4), 814-834. Recuperado de: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11699120 Hobbes, Thomas. (1651/2013). Del ciudadano y Leviatán. Madrid: Tecnos. Kant, Immanuel. (1785/2018). Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres. Ciudad de México: Ariel. Kohlberg, Lawrence. (1969). "Stage and sequence: The cognitive development approach to socialization". En D. A. Goslin (Ed.). Handbook of socialization theory, pp. 347-480. Chicago: McNally. Pakula, Alan. (1982). Sophie's choice [Film]. Los Angeles: Universal Pictures. Platts, Mark. (compilador). (2001). Dilemas éticos. México: UNAM. Prinz, Jesse. (2006). "The emotional basis of moral judgments". En: Philosophical explorations, 9(1), 29-43. Recuperado de: http://subcortex.com/PrinzEmotionalBasisMoralJudgments.pdf Styron, William. (1979). Sophie's Choice. New York: Random House. Styron, William. (2014). La decisión de Sophie. Barcelona: Kindle. Suter, Renata & Hertwig, Ralph. (2011). "Time and moral judgment". En: Cognition 119(3), 454-458. Recuperado de: https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2011-07580-013 Thomson, Judith. (1976). "Killing, letting die, and the trolley problem". En: The Monist, 59(2), 204-217. https://doi.org/10.5840/monist197659224 Thomson, Judith. (1985). "The Trolley Problem". The Yale Law Journal, 94(6), 1395-1415. Recuperado de: https://www.jstor.org/stable/796133 Weber, Max. (2002). Economía y sociedad. Esbozo de sociología comprensiva. Ciudad de México: FCE.

DATA What If Banks Were the Main Protectors of Customers' Private Data? by Carissa Véliz NOVEMBER 20, 2018 MARK WILSON/GETTY IMAGES The ability to collect and exploit consumers' personal data has long been a source of competitive advantage in the digital economy. It is their control and use of this data that has enabled the likes of Google, Amazon, Alibaba, and Facebook to dominate online markets. But consumers are increasingly concerned about the vulnerability that comes with surrendering data. A growing number of cyberattacks - the hackings of credit watch companies Experian (in 2015) and Equifax (in 2017) being cases in point, not to mention the likely interference by What If Banks Were the Main Protectors of Customers' Private Data? https://hbr.org/2018/11/what-if-banks-were-the-main-protectors-of... 1 of 4 23/11/2018, 11:06 Russian government sponsored hackers in the 2016 US Presidential elections - have triggered something of a "techlash". Even without these scandals, it is likely that sooner or later every netizen will have suffered at some point from a bad data experience: from their credit card number being stolen, to their account getting hacked, or their personal details getting exposed; from suffering embarrassment from an inappropriate ad while at work, to realizing that their favorite airline is charging them more than they charge others for the same flight. The most practical consequence of the concerns generated by data hacking has been the imposition of more stringent privacy regulation, of which the most obvious example is the European Union's new GDPR. We can certainly expect this trend to continue around the world. And digital natives are likely to become more rather than less sensitive to the value of their data. The obvious consequence from these trends is that the big tech firms will find it increasingly difficult to legally use the personal data they collect. At the same time, that data can be a toxic asset as it is hard to keep safe and coveted by many. A company that collects more data than it really needs is unnecessarily generating more risk because each personal datum is the object of a potential leak or lawsuit. And at least some of the personal data that companies gather generates little or no value for them - data that is inaccurate, out of date, unlawful, or simply irrelevant. In this environment online merchants will have to find ways to do more with less data - whether through smarter application of analytics or because they introduce a business model that enables them to offer their services without collecting sensitive data. But those changes do not really resolve the underlying challenge: how can consumers protect their digitized data? Prior to the digital age, that data was kept on paper which meant it could be protected by physical means and was relatively difficult to share. Today, the IT skills needed to protect digitized data are beyond most consumers and even most of the traditional custodians of data. This points to a business opportunity. But whose? One obvious possibility is that a few big tech companies - such as Apple, or maybe someone new - could become consumers' data guardians. Amazon, for instance, could offer an option on Prime in which it manages users' personal data for them, liaising with other companies and platforms but remaining in control of the data. There are problems with this approach. If the company is new, users might be unwilling to give up their most sensitive information to an organization that has still to prove its trustworthiness. What If Banks Were the Main Protectors of Customers' Private Data? https://hbr.org/2018/11/what-if-banks-were-the-main-protectors-of... 2 of 4 23/11/2018, 11:06 That would be less of a risk for a household name like Amazon, but in that instance, users might rightly hesitate to give an already hugely powerful digital corporation even more power over them. Another option that consumers might take would be to follow the approach being explored by Solid, a project led by Tim Berners-Lee, the inventor of the World Wide Web. Solid proposes that users store their personal data in virtual 'pods' that work like secure USBs through which users can share their data with whomever they want. It is uncertain whether the project will be able to garner enough support and resources to make it workable, widely available, and affordable. Users can store their pod with Solid - in which case we bump again into questions of trust and power - or keep it themselves. But if consumers keep the data themselves, that may not be as safe as it should be-a USB, physical or virtual, can easily get lost or stolen. It would be like keeping your money under your mattress. This analogy brings me to perhaps the most likely scenario. Maybe the best-suited institutions to manage digital data are banks. In a sense, banks are already data guardians. After all, most of the money in circulation is virtual, nothing but data. They also have a long history of being at the forefront of security methods, from the development of the vault to multi-factor authentication. Moreover, banks have experience in safeguarding privacy through their commitment to confidentiality. Finally, banks tend to have more local and personal relationships with their clients in ways that might make users feel safer than trusting their data to an international corporation. And if you're unhappy with one bank, you can always switch to another. Banks' business model and their experience give them a comparative advantage over other businesses to become our personal data guardians. Of course, banks are far from perfect. They are notoriously conservative, which may make them slower to roll out necessary updates to the technology involved. And regulatory hurdles might make it hard for them to expand their services. But given that governments have an interest in making sure their citizens can keep their personal data safe, and that banks may need to innovate and transform themselves in order to outlive fintech competition, these possible obstacles do not seem insurmountable. Maybe someday in the not so distant future we will keep our data where we keep our money. What If Banks Were the Main Protectors of Customers' Private Data? https://hbr.org/2018/11/what-if-banks-were-the-main-protectors-of... 3 of 4 23/11/2018, 11:06 Carissa Véliz is a postdoctoral research fellow at Oxford University in England Related Topics: SECURITY & PRIVACY | INTERNET This article is about DATA  FOLLOW THIS TOPIC Comments Leave a Comment P O S T REPLY 0  0  2 COMMENTS Ben Davies 2 days ago Good article and relevant topic. I think the underlying issues relate to both trust and interests. Banks may be bigger and better run data management businesses, but they are still businesses with a for profit interest. We expect businesses to operate in their own interests so there is a fundamental schism between that driver and the individual's need for privacy and control. We should expect businesses to use our data in their own business, we should not trust them as custodians of personal or public goods. I would far rather seen a not-for-profit organization or government agency set of for this purpose. Governments also hold much of our personal data (income tax submissions, passport data, health records, etc.), do not have a profit motive, and have been established to act (at least in theory) in the public interest. POSTING GUIDELINES We hope the conversations that take place on HBR.org will be energetic, constructive, and thought-provoking. To comment, readers must sign in or register. And to ensure the quality of the discussion, our moderating team will review all comments and may edit them for clarity, length, and relevance. Comments that are overly promotional, mean-spirited, or off-topic may be deleted per the moderators' judgment. All postings become the property of Harvard Business Publishing.  JOIN THE CONVERSATION What If Banks Were the Main Protectors of Customers' Private Data? https://hbr.org/2018/11/what-if-banks-were-the-main-protectors-of... 4 of 4 23/11/2018, 11:

Environmental Justice Pamela J. Lomelino VOLUME 6 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF DIVERSITY IN ORGANISATIONS, COMMUNITIES AND NATIONS http://www.Diversity-Journal.com First published in 2006 in Melbourne, Australia by Common Ground Publishing Pty Ltd www.CommonGroundPublishing.com. © 2006 (this paper), the author(s) © 2006 (selection and editorial matter) Common Ground Authors are responsible for the accuracy of citations, quotations, diagrams, tables and maps. All rights reserved. Apart from fair use for the purposes of study, research, criticism or review as permitted under the Copyright Act (Australia), no part of this work may be reproduced without written permission from the publisher. For permissions and other inquiries, please contact <[email protected]>. ISSN: 1447-9532 (print), 1447-9583 (online) Publisher Site: http://www.Diversity-Journal.com The INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF DIVERSITY IN ORGANISATIONS, COMMUNITIES AND NATIONS is a peer refereed journal. Full papers submitted for publication are refereed by Associate Editors through anonymous referee processes. Typeset in Common Ground Markup Language using CGCreator multichannel typesetting system http://www.CommonGroundSoftware.com. Environmental Justice A Proposal for Addressing Diversity in Bioprospecting Pamela J. Lomelino, University of Colorado, United States of America Abstract: Recently, there has been an insurgence of corporations that bioprospect in Third World countries (going into these areas in hopes of utilizing traditional knowledge about local natural resources so as to eventually develop a synthetic alternative that they can then market). Although this type of bioprospecting does not encounter the problem of depleting environmental resources, other problems arise. Two primary problems are: (1) determining who has legal ownership of these resources, and (2) who should share in the profits that were derived, in part, from these resources. Despite the attention that these problems have received, there has been little attention focused on the issue that I believe underlies these problems the differing views of nature between corporations (who consider nature to be an individually owned resource) and Third World communities (many of whom consider nature to be a communally owned resource). In this paper, I will present what I believe is an additional useful tool for policy makers in resolving the current problems regarding bioprospecting in Third World countries. The tool I have in mind is a set of method components that can be used as guidelines as well as a test for inclusiveness. To arrive at these components, I will look to James D. Proctor's methodological proposal for resolving conflicts between those with differing views of nature. Because he presents this methodology in a limited context (as a means of resolving the Ancient Forest debate), I will clarify and expand his methodology so as to arrive at a set of methods that I believe can be helpful in arriving at a fair global policy regarding bioprospecting in Third World countries. Keywords: Global Policy, Bioprospecting in Third World Countries WITH SIXTY TO seventy percent of theworld's biodiversity located in seventeenThird World countries1, bioprospecting (prospecting for useful applications, processes or products in nature)2 has been on the rise. Bioprospecting often takes one of two possible forms. Bioharvesting occurs when corporations directly harvest environmental resources, marketing them as products for commercial gain. Fortunately, the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) makes it illegal for anyone to deplete natural resources to the extent that it negatively impacts biodiversity.3 Consequently, the second form of bioprospecting has received the most attention -bioprospecting that occurs when scientists or corporations take a sample environmental resource, test it for beneficial applications, and attempt to reproduce this benefit in the laboratory so as to eventually arrive at a marketable product. Although this type of bioprospecting does not encounter the problem of depleting environmental resources, other problems arise. In searching for beneficial natural resources, scientists and corporations oftentimes narrow their search within this extremely biodiverse area of the globe by relying on communities' traditional knowledge of their natural resources. When corporations, in turn, are able to produce a marketable and profitable product, concerns over inequitable benefit sharing arise – namely, the concern that corporations are not adequately compensating (or giving no compensation at all to) ThirdWorld communities. Those within the environmental and philosophical communities have come to refer to this as "biopiracy".Moreover, this concern over biopiracy is justified given the current statistics on corporations that have allegedly pirated indigenous knowledge. For example, "the US-based Edmonds Institute recently published a report listing more than 30 examples of western medical, horticultural and cosmetic products it alleged had been 'pirated' from Africa (KenyaLondon News; August 28, 2006, ¶16)". Although there has been much attention directed towards solving these problems (i.e.: Shiva, 2000; Gepts, 2004; ThirdWorldNetwork Biosafety Information Service, 2005), the discussion has been focused on proposed policy changes with regard to: (1) intellectual property rights, and (2) benefit sharing. Despite the apparent importance of these discussions, it 1 Bolivia, Brazil, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, and Venezuela. (Megadiverse Countries, 2005, p.1) 2 Benefit Sharing in the National Parks, p.1. 3 The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD; signed in 1992 but not in effect until 1993) sets regulations for bioprospecting worldwide. Included in the CBD are several Articles that require the conservation of the environment and the protection of biodiversity, thus banning bioprospecting that results in harming the environment. (Common Policy Guidelines, 2000). INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF DIVERSITY IN ORGANISATIONS, COMMUNITIES AND NATIONS, VOLUME 6, 2006 http://www.Diversity-Journal.com, ISSN 1447-9532 (print), 1447-9583 (online) © Common Ground, Pamela J. Lomelino, All Rights Reserved, Permissions: [email protected] is important to note that there has been little attention focused on striving for an inclusive bioprospecting policy that addresses what I believe is the underlying issue – the differing views of nature between corporations and many Third World communities.4 Whereas corporations consider nature to be an independently owned resource, many Third World communities consider it to be communally owned. (It is important to note that, in stating this, I am by no means implying that there is a uniform interpretation of nature that is shared by all ThirdWorld communities. Instead, I am focusing on those communities who interpret nature as a communally owned resource.)With these differing views regarding nature, it is understandable that corporations andmany Third World communities would disagree as to what property rights are applicable to traditional knowledge and natural resources. In addition, it is this disagreement about ownership that lies at the heart of the disagreement regarding benefit sharing; if community ownership of traditional knowledge or natural resources is not acknowledged then the community is robbed of any possible claim in the eventual benefits derived from these resources. Given this underlying issue in the current bioprospecting debate (contending views of nature), I believe that it will help policy makers to have a tool specifically directed towards addressing this contention so as to arrive at more equitable benefit sharing policies. The tool I have in mind is a set of method components that can be used as guidelines as well as a test for inclusiveness. To arrive at these components, I will draw on James D. Proctor's methodological proposal for resolving conflicts between those with differing views of nature. Because he presents this methodology in a limited context (as a means of resolving the Ancient Forest debate), I will clarify and expand his discussion so as to arrive at a set of method components. After doing so, I will briefly outline some of the general ways in which these components can be applied to the current bioprospecting debate. Because I have not come across other methodologies directed at resolving the problem of contending views of nature, I am by nomeans asserting that my proposed methods are the only means by which one can do so. For the time being, however, and given the severity of the problem, I encourage policy makers to consider adopting these methods so as to arrive at fair bioprospecting benefit sharing policies. Expanding Proctor's Guidelines In his article, "Whose Nature? The Contested Terrain of Ancient Forests" (1996), James D. Proctor builds on his discussion of various definitions of nature and their subsequent varying environmental ethics to arrive at his proposed methodological approach for resolving conflicts that arise from these differing views. Despite the fact that he wrote this article several years ago and intended for it to be applicable to the limited context of the Ancient Forest debate, I believe that themethodology he provides is timeless and can be helpful inmuch broader contexts. Because I am here concerned with Proctor's proposed methodological components and how these can be applied to bioprospecting, I will not address his discussion of the differing views of nature in the Ancient Forest campaign and the resultant contrasting environmental ethics. Instead, I will present and further develop his proposed methodology for resolving conflicts in which there are opposing views of nature prior to applying them to a particular bioprospecting case. In attempting to bridge the gap between differing environmental ethics with regards to the Ancient Forests, Proctor proposes what he refers to as "some major landmarks to keep in sight (295)". According to Proctor, we should: (1) strive for a realist notion of moral pluralism; (2) take an anthropogenic and not anthropocentric approach; and (3) take into account important relationships with regard to location. In mentioning that these landmarks have to do with process (and not product; 295), it appears that Proctor is presenting us with methodological suggestions. However, it also appears that these are more than mere suggestions, for at the end of his article he refers to the "necessity of moral pluralism; the inevitability of an anthropogenic... approach; and the need to root, but not limit, ethics to place (Italics added; 295)." Thus, in response to the problem of the current contrasting environmental ethics that stem from differing views of nature, it appears that he presents us with three necessary methodological suggestions. Moral Pluralism In presenting his first guideline of striving for a realist moral pluralism, Proctor argues that we should be neither Absolutist nor Relativist; instead, we should strive to be somewhere in the middle. In order to accomplish this middle ground, he asserts that we must "embrace a necessary paradox (290)". On the one hand, we must address the strongly subjective 4 By focusing on the problem of contending views of nature, I am by no means implying that this is the only problem with regards to bioprospecting. Because the current legislation that relates to bioprospecting (the Convention on Biological Diversity [CBD] and the Trade Agreement dealing with Intellectual Property [TRIPs]) gives the negotiating power for benefit sharing to the governments and agencies within the relevant countries, there are important issues with regards to the influence of government, the responsibility of government to its citizens, and the responsibility of global citizens to members of Third World communities. Since I cannot address all of these issues in a paper of this length, it is my hope that others will do so. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF DIVERSITY IN ORGANISATIONS, COMMUNITIES AND NATIONS, VOLUME 6 aspect present in the Ancient Forest campaign that is comprised of diverse perspectives with regards to how we should treat the environment. At the same time, however, he argues that wemust also recognize the objective aspects of the Ancient Forest debate. For example, despite their differing perspectives of 'nature', Proctor points out that both sides of the ancient forest campaign value the forest and its inhabitants and are concerned with the effects of their actions on these. Although Proctor informs us that we must strive for a realist notion of moral pluralism, he does not expand on how this can be implemented in order to arrive at an inclusive environmental policy (and, with all due respect, this is not his intent). Yet, we can certainly take his suggestion a step further and attempt to formulate a more concrete method component. Keeping in mind his suggestion to embrace the subjective/ objective paradox, it makes sense that we should first locate the subjective and objective elements within a debate. Doing this places us in a position in which we can now take into account the differing subjective perspectives while grounding the discussion in an objective element. The advantage of doing this, I believe, is that it respects and recognizes the importance that differing views of the environment have without getting lost in this diversity (since we are able to utilize the objective element as a starting point for productive discussions of how we should treat the environment or traditional knowledge about the environment). An Anthropogenic Approach The second methodological guideline that Proctor presents is to strike a balance regarding our emphasis on human beings. On one end of the spectrum is the nonanthropocentric environmental ethic – an ethic that asserts that nature's value is intrinsic and does not rely on being instrumentally valuable to human beings. Yet, as Proctor points out, we should reject relying on this extreme ethic because it rules out those who hold an anthropocentric ethic (according to which nature's value rests solely on its instrumental benefit to humankind). At the same time, however, he also argues that we should reject moving to the other side of the spectrum regarding our emphasis on human beings by adopting an anthropocentric approach. Not only does this approach rule out those who hold a nonanthropocentric view, but it also fails to provide any justification for valuing the environment aside from human needs. Instead of adopting either a nonanthropocentric or an anthropocentric ethic, Proctor argues that we should take an anthropogenic approach – one that acknowledges (but is not driven primarily by) human concerns. Although he does not mention this, it is important to note the following additional benefit of an anthropogenic approach: doing so helps to reinforce our striving for a realist notion of moral pluralism. Recall that while some value the environment from an instrumental standpoint, others value it from a noninstrumental standpoint. By taking into account both the instrumental and noninstrumental values of the environment, an anthropogenic approach supports the first methodological approach of striving for moral pluralism by incorporating these various perspectives with regard to the environment. Location and Its Relevant Relationships Lastly, Proctor argues that we must take location into consideration when attempting to formulate an inclusive environmental policy. As Proctor points out, we must recognize that people's ethics arise from their experiences with nature. Thus, for example, in the Ancient Forest debate, all the experiences of those who have interacted with the Pacific Northwest Forests should be considered. In addition, the experience of the forest itself (its fire history, climate and vegetation changes) must also be taken into account. In taking location into account, however, it is important to note that Proctor warns that we should not be limited to location. In addition to the relationship between the land and the people, we must also consider other relationships that extend beyond the borders of the Ancient Forest. As with his previous guideline of taking an anthropogenic approach, Proctor again does not mention what appears to be an additional benefit of taking location into account.With the suggestion to consider location and its relation to broader relevant aspects of society, incorporating location helps to broaden the scope of an environmental policy, making it that much more thorough and inclusive. To summarize, then, I have arrived at the following three method components by expanding on Proctor's proposedmethodological guidelines. I have suggested that policy makers: (1) locate an objective component in which to ground differing subjective elements in the debate, (2) take an anthropogenic approach by considering both the instrumental and noninstrumental values of the environmental resource, and (3) take location and all of the relevant relationships into account. Applying these Components to Bioprospecting With the notion of nature as a resource to be communally shared juxtaposed to the notion of nature as a resource to be independently owned as the underlying issue in bioprospecting, I believe that the spePAMELA J. LOMELINO cific method components that I have derived from Proctor's methodology can be a helpful tool for those striving to achieve an inclusive global policy on bioprospecting in Third World countries. Unfortunately, due to paper constraints and the complexity of the issue, I will not lay out a detailed policy that might result from applying these methods. Nonetheless, I still believe it is helpful to present a brief example of how policy makers might incorporate these method components. Hence, I will present a generalized explanation of the methods that policy makers can apply, along with an example of how these methods can be applied to a particular bioprospecting case. The particular case I have in mind is the Australian SmokeBush.5 Based on the fact that indigenous Australian tribes had traditionally used this plant for its healing properties to cure numerous illnesses and diseases, the USNational Cancer Institute was drawn to investigate the SmokeBush for its possible healing properties with regards to cancer. In the 1960s, the Western Australian Government granted the NCI a license to harvest this plant for possible cancerfighting properties. Being unable to locate cancerhealing properties, the NCI shelved the plant until the late 1980s when its scientists were able to isolate the active ingredient, 'conocurvan', from the SmokeBush and found that it was effective in fighting the HIV virus. Upon making this discovery, the NCI patented the plant and awarded AMRAD (an Australian pharmaceutical company) a patent to develop the compound 'conocurvan' (Bailey, 1995).6 In doing so, indigenous Australian tribes were not recognized or compensated for the role that their traditional knowledge played.7 For this reason, I would like to use this case to apply my proposed method components as a means of illustrating how these can be utilized to comprise a more equitable benefit-sharing agreement. Achieving Moral Pluralism In order to incorporate the first guideline (a realist notion of moral pluralism), recall that I have argued that we must take into account both the subjective elements (the diverse perspectives) and the objective element of any given environmental issue. Based on the method component that I derived from Proctor's guideline, we should begin by trying to identify the shared objective aspect of the debate. Althoughmany Third World communities interpret nature as a communal resource, they share the similar objective with corporations in that they also desire to profit from their environmental resources (including their traditional knowledge).8 , 9 Keeping this in mind, then, it seems possible to achieve a realist notion of moral pluralism regarding bioprospecting. Such a notion would take into account the objective fact that both corporations and communities desire to profit from bioprospecting. At the same time, moral pluralism requires us to also consider the differing aspects with regard to ownership of environmental resources and traditional knowledge. Thus, corporations should recognize that communities currently have a claim to these resources, a recognition that would then allow these communities to have a stake in the profits resulting from bioprospecting. At the same time, these Third World communities should recognize the stake in the profits that corporations are entitled to based on the immense investment of time, money and technology necessary for arriving at a marketable product. Thus, for example, policy makers should consider such questions as: Did the community's use of a certain plant for medicinal purposes completely outside of those eventually gleaned through bioprospecting cause corporations to look at this plant as a possible medicinal source in the first place? If so, then the community's share of the benefits should be proportionately small. If, on the other hand, bioprospectors were able to produce a product that replicated the plant and its exact medicinal purposes for which the community uses it, then the community should receive a much larger share of the profits. In the case of the Australian SmokeBush, recall that it was initially the indigenous tribes' knowledge of the multiple healing properties of the plant which helped identify it as a likely candidate from among the vastly diverse environmental resources within 5 Among the well-publicized alleged biopiracy cases, one might recall such popular cases as the neem tree and Basmati rice. In response to the problem of Western corporations utilizing indigenous knowledge and resources without acknowledgement and compensation, India passed the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmer's Rights Act (2001), which granted individual ownership rights to farmers and breeders, providing a legal basis by which their knowledge and resources must be recognized. Hence, instead of turning to a case in which legislation has been passed to try to protect the rights of indigenous persons, I turn instead to a case (the Australian SmokeBush) in which I believe the legal conclusion regarding benefit sharing was unfair and to which applying the methods I propose would have helped arrive at a more equitable agreement. 6 AMRAD changed its name to Zenyth Therapeutics in December, 2005 (Zenyth Therapeutics, "About Us": "Company History"). 7Moreover, Australia's Conservation and LandManagement Act was amended to include provisions for conservation, which in turn "enabled the denial of the use of smokebush to the aboriginal people who first discovered its therapeutic application (Matur, 23)". 8Keep in mind that I am referring to the specific form of bioprospecting in which corporations draw on traditional knowledge and environmental samples in order to arrive at an eventual marketable product. Hence, I am by no means implying that the shared objective element is bioharvesting environmental resources for commercial gain to the extent that doing so negatively impacts the environment. 9 In fact, in some ThirdWorld countries, companies (such as INBio in Costa Rica) have been constructed so as to form business agreements with corporations regarding the profits that bioprospecting might bring (Hamilton, 2004). INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF DIVERSITY IN ORGANISATIONS, COMMUNITIES AND NATIONS, VOLUME 6 Australia. In this way, indigenous knowledge played an important role in the eventual discovery of the healing properties of 'conocurvan' (the active ingredient in the SmokeBush). However, given the immense amount of money and expertise that NCI spent in eventually isolating the active ingredient and identify its useful application, the overall role that indigenous knowledge played was proportionately small. Nonetheless, it is important to note that this knowledge did play an important role and, as a result, achieving moral pluralism calls for compensating Australian indigenous tribes with a small percentage of the benefits derived in AMRAD's marketing of conocurvan.10 Incorporating Location and Its Relationships In applying the secondmethod component (location) to bioprospecting in Third World countries, it is important to recall that this guideline is not limited to location alone – one must also consider the relationships that extend beyond the particular location. In doing so, there appear to be two important relevant relationships in bioprospecting. First, it is important to note that disagreements over ownership and benefit sharing occur within the larger realm of a market economy. In recognizing this relationship, policy makers should strive for a system of benefit sharing that recognizes both the corporation's input and the extent to which ThirdWorld resources and traditional knowledge have added to the development of a marketable product. Second, policy makers should recognize particulars about the relationship between corporations and communities. In addressing this relationship, one quickly notes the disparate power between them. With this in mind, a thorough application of Proctor's second guideline means that policymakers should strive to create an atmosphere in which all parties have equal negotiating power regarding sharing benefits. Of course, this is not to imply that benefits should be shared equally. Instead, equal consideration should be given to the role of each party's input in achieving an eventual marketable product. In applying this to the SmokeBush example, then, an inclusive bioprospecting policy would incorporate the following three principles. First, in taking location into account, policy makers would be certain to provide for the protection of the SmokeBush, allowing corporations to take samples for research purposes but never to the extent that doing so has a negative impact on this valuable resource. Second, in recognizing the important relationship between Australian indigenous tribes and the SmokeBush, policy makers must note that the traditional knowledge of the healing properties of the SmokeBush is situated within the larger context of centuries of tradition and, thus, reflects an important aspect of cultural identity. Consequently, policy makers must be careful to protect indigenous persons' access to the SmokeBush, being certain not to allow patent law to block their access. And lastly, a recognition of the disparate power between corporations and Third World indigenous communities calls for incorporating protective measures and assurances that the voices of these communities will be both heard and carry equal weight in negotiations. One way in which policy makers could accomplish this would be to appoint a third non-biased party to monitor the negotiations. Taking an Anthropogenic Approach In addition to considering location and incorporating moral pluralism, those working towards an inclusive environmental bioprospecting policy should also be careful to take an anthropogenic approach. Recall that an anthropogenic approach acknowledges human concerns but is not driven by these concerns. Hence, to take an anthropogenic approach to bioprospecting, policy makers should take into account the anticipated benefits to humanity that bioprospecting environmental resources and traditional knowledge in Third World countries may have. With a majority of the world's biodiversity located in these countries, these resources provide the opportunity for discovering cures to many fatal and severely debilitating diseases and illnesses.11However, in weighing these benefits to humanity, policy makers must beware to not take an anthropocentric approach and solely emphasize the benefits to humanity. Instead, as Proctor suggests, they must also take into account nonanthropocentric aspects (those that emphasize the noninstrumental value of the environment). In applying this to bioprospecting, then, policy makers should balance the anticipated benefits to humanity with requirements to preserve the valuable biodiverse region fromwhich corporations and scientists extract samples of environmental resources. Thus, for example, an inclusive policy addressing the Australian Smoke Bush would acknowledge the tremendous benefit to humanity of finding a possible cure for HIV by allowing corporations to have access to the 10 Given the potential millions of dollars of revenue from an HIV drug, a small percentage of the profits still results in substantial earnings for Australian indigenous tribes. 11 Many of our current medicines are extracted from tropical plants (most of which are located in developing countries). To name a few: vinblastine (extracted from rosy periwinkle; used to treat Hodgkin's disease); vincristine (rosy periwinkle; leukemia); and taxol (Pacific yew; ovarian cancer) (Gepts, 2004, p.1298). PAMELA J. LOMELINO SmokeBush, while at the same time being careful not to deplete this valuable resource by allowing corporations to harvest some (but not a damaging amount) of the Smoke Bush in its attempts to find a cure.12 Conclusion In this paper, I have presented a particular set of method components that I believe policy makers would benefit from using in formulating policies on bioprospecting in ThirdWorld countries. To illustrate why this is, I have argued that the underlying issue in the current bioprospecting debates (over ownership and benefits sharing) is differing views of nature. On the one hand, corporations consider nature to be an independently owned resource, while on the other hand, many (though not all) ThirdWorld communities consider it to be communally owned. With this in mind, I have argued that policy makers can benefit by applying a set of method components addressed at constructing an inclusive environmental policy (one that is specifically focused on resolving the debate among differing views of nature). Although this tool can be useful for addressing the underlying issue, it is important to note that it is not a sufficient solution. The issue of bioprospecting is complex, and as a result, requires many tools for arriving at a fair global policy. As such, these methods illustrate only one of these tools, yet one that has been overlooked in the current discourse. References Bailey, B. (1995). New Ideas, Old Laws: Copyright, Patents, Trade Marks and Designs, and How to Avoid Plagiarism. Retrieved September 20, 2006, from Parliament of Australia Parliamentary Library Web site: http://www.aph.gov.au/LIBRARY/pubs/bp/1995-96/96bp12.htm Benefit Sharing in the National Parks Environmental Impact Statement: What Is Bioprospecting? Retrieved April 12, 2006 from National Park Service United States Department of the Interior Web site: http://www.nature.nps.gov/benefitssharing/whatis.cfm . Common Policy Guidelines: Convention on Biodiversity (2000, November). Retrieved April 13, 2006 from the Botanic Gardens of Irkutsk State University Web site: http://www.isu.ru/inst s /botsad/cbd/cpg99_e.htm . Gepts, P. (2004). Who owns Biodiversity, and how should the owners be compensated? Plant Physiology, 1295-1307. Hamilton, R. (2004, April). Bioprospecting, With No Apologies. IDB America Magazine. Retrieved April 12, 2006 from http://www.iadb.org/idbamerica/index.cfm?thisid=2705&lanid=1 Hardison, P. & Mauro, F. (2000, October). Traditional Knowledge of Indigenous and Local Communities: International Debate and Policy Initiatives. Ecological Applications, 1263-1269. Harry, D. & Kanehe, M. (2005). The BS in Access and Benefit Sharing (ABS): Critical Questions for Indigenous Peoples. In B. Burrows (Ed.), The Catch: Perspectives on Benefit Sharing (pp.81-120). Washington: Edmonds Institute. Hasan, S. (2002). The Neem Tree, Environment, Culture, and Intellectual Property. Retrieved September 20, 2006 from TED Case Studies Web site: http://www.american.edu/ted/neemtree.htm . Intellectual Property Issues and Aboriginal Cultural Knowledge (n.d.). Retrieved April 16, 2006 from New South Wales Department of Education and Training Web site: http://www.anu.edu. a u/livingknowledge/html/educators/sic/ip.htm. Kimbrell, A. (1996, July). Replace Biopiracy with Biodemocracy. Third World Network. Retrieved September 20, 2006 from http://www.ratical.org/coglobalize/ReplaceBPwBD.html Koopman, J. (2005). Reconciliation of proprietary interests in genetic and knowledge resources: Hurry cautiously! Ecological Economics, 523-541. Matur, A. (2003, January).WhoOwns Traditional Knowledge? Retrieved from Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relationships Web site: http://www.icrier.org/publication/working_papers_archives.html Megadiverse Countries Join Efforts For Strong International Law onAccess and Benefit Sharing (2005, January 25). Retrieved April 12, 2006, from ThirdWorld Network Biosafety Information Service Web site: http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/service157.htm Merson, J. (2000). Bio-Prospecting or Bio-Piracy: Intellectual Property Rights and Biodiversity in a Colonial and Postcolonial Context. Osiris, 282-296. Michael, D. (2000). New Pharmaceutical, Nutraceutical, and Industrial Products: The Potential for Australian Agriculture. Retrieved September 20, 2006, fromAustralian Government/ Rural Industries Research and DevelopmentCorporation Web site: http://www.rirdc.gov.au/reports/Ras/00-173.pdf . Patten, J., Broun, G. (2004, June). One-Headed SmokeBush Interim Recovery Plan 2004-2009. Retrieved September 20, 2006, from Department of Conservationand Land Management Western Australian Threatened Species andCommunities Unit Web site: http://www.calm.wa.gov.au Proctor, J. D. (1996). Whose Nature? The Contested Terrain of Ancient Forests. In W. Cronon (Ed.), Uncommon Ground, Rethinking the Human Place in Nature (pp.269-297). New York: W.W. Norton & Company. Ramana, A. & Smale, M. (2004). Rights and Access to Plant Genetic Resources Under India's New Law. Development Policy Review, 423-442. 12 Of course, as previously noted, the protection of the SmokeBush is covered by Australia's Conservation and Land Management Act. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF DIVERSITY IN ORGANISATIONS, COMMUNITIES AND NATIONS, VOLUME 6 Shiva, V. (2000). North-South Conflicts in Intellectual Property Rights. Peace Review, 501-508. Siebenhuner, B., Dedeurwaerdere, T. & Brousseau, E. (2005). Introduction and overview to the special issue on biodiversity conservation, access and benefitsharing and traditional knowledge. Ecological Economics, 439-444. The New Piracy: How West 'Steals' Africa's Plants (2006, August 28). Kenya London News. Retrieved from http://www.kenyanewsnetwork.com/artman/publish/article_835.shtml . Weston, K. (2003, September). The Impact of TRIPs onAgricultural Economies in the DevelopingWorld.E LAW. Retrieved April 12, 2006, from http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v10n3/weston103_text.html . Whose Rules of the Game? Bioprospecting and Drug Research in Developing Countries (2006, April 19). Retrieved May 16, 2006, from United NationsUniversity Web site: http://www.ony.unu.edu/seminars/2005/bioprospecting19april05.htm Zenyth Therapeutics (n.d.). Retrieved September 23, 2006, from http://www.zenyth.com.au . Zerbe, N. (2005). Biodiversity, ownership, and indigenous knowledge: Exploring legal Frameworks for community, farmers, and intellectual property rights in Africa. Ecological Economics, 493-506. About the Author Ms. Pamela J. Lomelino My academic interests include Bioethics, Feminist Philosophy, Environmental Philosophy, Ethical Theory and Applied Ethics. I am currently working on my dissertation, "An Ethical Analysis of Creating Beings for Human Use", in which I focus on four controversial case studies involving creating beings for human benefit (creating human embryos for stem cell research; creating inter-species stem cell chimeras for research; creating geneticaly modified animals for human organ harvesting; and creating children for such things as bone marrow transplants for sibblings with immune system diseases). In addition, I am currently working on an ethical analysis of the philosophical and policy issues that arise from the corporate practice of Bioprospecting, as well as writing on a Feminist approach to reclaiming tools of oppression as a means of empowerment. All of the issues on which I focus have the common thread of dealing with systems of oppression as expressed (and reinforced) in the field of Medicine, Medical Technology, and global capitalist endeavors. PAMELA J. LOMELINO THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF DIVERSITY IN ORGANISATIONS, COMMUNITIES AND NATIONS EDITORS Mary Kalantzis, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, USA. Paul James, RMIT University, Australia EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD Ien Ang, University of Western Sydney, Australia. Samuel Aroni, University of California, Los Angeles, USA. Duane Champagne, University of California, Los Angeles, USA. Guosheng Y. Chen, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia. Jock Collins, University of Technology, Sydney, Australia. Bill Cope, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, USA. Heather Marion D'Cruz, Deakin University, Geelong, Australia. James Early, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, DC, USA. Denise Egéa-Kuehne, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, USA. Amareswar Galla, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. Barry Gills, University of Newcastle, UK. Margot Hovey, Curriculum Designer and Writer, Toronto and Montréal, Canada. Jackie Huggins, University of Queensland, Australia. Andrew Jakubowicz, University of Technology, Sydney, Australia. Ha Jingxiong, Central University of Nationalities, Beijing, China. Peter McLaren, University of California, Los Angeles, USA. Joe Melcher, Xavier University of Louisiana, New Orleans, USA. Greg Meyjes, Solidaris Intercultural Services L.L.C, Falls Church, VA, USA. Walter Mignolo, Duke University, USA. Brendan O'Leary, University of Pennsylvania, USA. Aihwa Ong, University of California, Berkeley, USA. Peter Phipps, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia. Ronald Prins, Managing Director, Bos en Lommer Neighbourhood Council, The Netherlands. Peter Sellars, Theatre, Opera and Film Director. Michael Shapiro, University of Hawai'i, USA. David S. Silverman, Valley City State University, North Dakota, USA. Martijn F.E. Stegge, Diversity Platform, City of Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Geoff Stokes, Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia. Terry Threadgold, Cardiff University, Wales, UK. Mililani Trask, Indigenous Expert to the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues for the Economic Council of the UN Assembly, Hawai'i, USA. Marij Urlings, Dean, School of Health Inholland University, Amsterdam-Diemen, The Netherlands. Joanna van Antwerpen, Director, Research and Statistics, City of Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Grethe van Geffen, Seba Cultuurmanagement, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Rob Walker, Keele University, UK. Ning Wang, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China. Owens Wiwa, African Environmental and Human Development Agency, Toronto, Canada. Please visit the Journal website at http://www.Diversity-Journal.com for further information: ABOUT the Journal including Scope and Concerns, Editors, Advisory Board, Associate Editors and Journal Profile FOR AUTHORS including Publishing Policy, Submission Guidelines, Peer Review Process and Publishing Agreement SUBSCRIPTIONS The Journal offers individual and institutional subscriptions. For further information please visit http://ijd.cgpublisher.com/subscriptions.html. Inquiries can be directed to [email protected] INQUIRIES Email: [email protected]

IMPORTANT: When citing this article, please refer to the print-version: Information Philosophie. (4)1997, 18-27. DER STREIT UM DIE PERSON Ein Bericht von Godehard Brüntrup und Berthold Gillitzer Das Problem der personalen Identität „Person" ist zumindest in den westlichen Kulturen ein Begriff von grundlegender Bedeutung. Er dient nicht nur dazu, eine Art von Gegenständen zu klassifizieren, sondern er ist auch ein Begriff der Anerkennung, ein nomen dignitatis. In diesem Zusammenhang ist dann von „Personwürde" die Rede. Zugleich aber scheint es unklar zu sein, was dieser Begriff überhaupt meint. Normalerweise identifizieren wir Personen, wie wir Menschen auch identifizieren, anhand ihrer äusseren Erscheinung. Dabei meinen wir aber mit dem Begriff „Person" nicht das gleiche wie mit dem Begriff „Mensch". Eine prägnante Fassung dieses Problems, welche die Debatte über den Begriff der Person bis heute bestimmt, geht auf John Locke zurück. Locke geht von dem Prinzip aus, dass die Bedingungen, die festlegen, wie lange ein Gegenstand derselbe ist, wann er entsteht und wann er vergeht, davon abhängig sind, zu welcher Art der Gegenstand gehört. Umgekehrt ist aber auch die Angabe der Identitätsbedingungen für die Art charakteristisch. Dieses Prinzip wendet er auf die Artbegriffe „Mensch" und „Person" an. Die Identität eines Menschen ist bestimmt durch die Kontinuität eines lebendigen Körpers. Davon kann die Identität von Personen abweichen. Wenn beispielsweise jemand im Dauerkoma liegt, dann ist es nicht unmittelbar klar, ob nur noch ein menschlicher Organismus oder auch eine Person existiert. Auf der anderen Seite scheint es nicht prinzipiell ausgeschlossen, dass auch Wesen einer anderen Spezies Personen sein könnten. Personen als Subjekte der Erfahrung wären dann von Menschen als biologischen Wesen verschieden. Damit stellt sich die Frage nach den Identitätsbedingungen für Personen. Das Problem der personalen Identität durch die Zeit besteht darin, die notwendigen und hinreichenden Bedingungen anzugeben, unter denen eine Person, die zu einem Zeitpunkt identifiziert wurde, identisch ist mit einer Person, die zu einem anderen Zeitpunkt identifiziert wurde. Im folgenden werden wir eine einführende Darstellung der Lösungen versuchen, die gegenwärtige Philosophen für dieses Problem vorschlagen. Unter Vernachlässigung feinerer Differenzierungen lassen sich drei grundlegende Kriterien zur Bestimmung der Identität von Personen angeben: das körperliche, das psychologische und das sogenannte einfache Kriterium. 1) Gemäss dem körperlichen Kriterium ist eine Person P2 zum Zeitpunkt t2 genau dann mit einer Person P1 zum Zeitpunkt t1 identisch, wenn beide Personen denselben Körper haben. Die Bestimmung personaler Identität unterscheidet sich nicht von der Bestimmung der Identität materieller Gegenstände im allgemeinen. Die einzelnen Teile des Körpers sind allerdings nicht gleichermassen relevant für die Identität der Person. Viele Autoren gehen davon aus, dass schon allein das Gehirn die Person hinreichend individuiert. Sollte in ferner Zukunft also einmal die Transplantation von menschlichen Gehirnen möglich sein, so „folgte" die Person dem Gehirn, auch wenn dieses in einen neuen Körper implantiert würde. 2) Gemäss dem psychologischen Kriterium ist es die Kontinuität und Verbundenheit mentaler Zustände, die personale Identität garantiert. Das klarste Beispiel ist die Erinnerung an frühere Erfahrungen. Eine Person P2 zum Zeitpunkt t2 ist genau dann mit einer Person P1 zum Zeitpunkt t1 1 von 8 IMPORTANT: When citing this article, please refer to the print-version: Information Philosophie. (4)1997, 18-27. identisch, wenn P2 zum Zeitpunkt t2 durch eine kontinuierliche Kette von Erinnerungen mit P1 zum Zeitpunkt t1 verbunden ist. Gefordert ist nicht eine aktuelle Erinnerung der gesamten Vergangenheit, sondern eine Kette von sich überlappenden Erinnerungen. (Beispiel: Man erinnert sich jetzt an Ereignisse im vergangenen Jahr, im vergangenen Jahr erinnerte man sich an Ereignisse im Jahr davor, usw.). 3) Wenn die Frage der personalen Identität gemäss dem einfachen Kriterium gelöst wird, werden empirische Kriterien wie physische und psychologische Kontinuität nur als Anzeichen personaler Identität betrachtet. Sie bestimmen nicht das Wesen personaler Identität. Es gibt keine empirisch überprüfbare Analyse personaler Identität. Personen dürfen nicht mit ihren Körpern (z.B. Gehirnen) oder ihren mentalen Eigenschaften (z.B. Erinnerungen) gleichgesetzt werden. Es liegt dann nahe, Personen als nicht weiter analysierbare Entitäten (Substanzen) eigener Art zu begreifen, die sich nicht weiter kriteriologisch bestimmen lassen. Im folgenden soll exemplarisch für jede der drei Grundpositionen ein Hauptvertreter vorgestellt werden. Anschliessend stellen wir zwei alternative Positionen dar: Die eine stellt die Relevanz personaler Identität überhaupt in Frage, die andere versucht eine Bestimmung personaler Identität, welche die klaren Grenzen des Dreierschemas sprengt. Identität als körperliche Kontinuität: Bernard Williams Bernard Williams wendet sich gegen ein psychologisches Kriterium der personalen Identität zu Gunsten eines körperlichen Kriteriums. Wenn ein psychologisches Kriterium richtig ist und körperliche Kontinuität nicht notwendig ist, dann kann es Fälle geben, in welchen eine Person nacheinander zwei verschiedene Körper besitzt, die nicht durch raum-zeitliche Kontinuität miteinander verbunden sind. Das ist aber nach Williams nicht möglich. Um dies zu zeigen, entwickelt er zwei Argumente: 1) Das psychologische Kriterium besagt, dass P2 zum Zeitpunkt t2 mit P1 zum Zeitpunkt t1 identisch ist, wenn P2 sich an die Erlebnisse und Handlungen von P1 zutreffend zu erinnern scheint und P2 charakterlich und in ihren mentalen Fähigkeiten P1 gleicht. Warum sagen wir dann aber nicht, P2 gleiche P1 ohne mit P1 identisch zu sein? Wenn es logisch möglich ist, dass P2 so beschaffen ist, dass sie P1 in allen ihren psychischen Eigenschaften gleicht, ohne denselben Körper wie P1 zu besitzen, warum sollte es dann nicht logisch möglich sein, dass zum selben Zeitpunkt t2 eine weitere Person P3 ebenso beschaffen ist, dass sie P1 in allen ihren psychischen Eigenschaften gleicht, ohne denselben Körper wie P1 zu besitzen? P1 kann jedoch nicht mit zwei verschiedenen Personen zugleich identisch sein. Es ist aber auch nicht plausibel, dass P1 nur mit P2 oder nur mit P3 identisch ist, weil beide nach dem psychologischen Kriterium gleichwertige (ununterscheidbare) Kandidaten sind. Damit kann das psychologische Kriterium für personale Identität nicht ausreichend sein. Auf seiner Basis ist eine Unterscheidung zwischen vollkommener Übereinstimmung in den Eigenschaften und numerischer Identität nicht möglich. Dies gewährleistet erst der Körper. 2) In der Sorge um unsere eigene Zukunft sind wir auf besondere Weise an der Zukunft unseres Körpers interessiert. Dazu ein fiktives Beispiel von Williams: Angenommen, mir wird mitgeteilt, dass ich zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt gefoltert werde. Man sagt mir aber zugleich, dass vor diesem Zeitpunkt alle meine Erinnerungen gelöscht werden und ich mit neuen Erinnerungen versorgt werde. Auch meine charakterlichen Eigenschaften werden durch andere ersetzt. All dies wäre kein 2 von 8 IMPORTANT: When citing this article, please refer to the print-version: Information Philosophie. (4)1997, 18-27. Grund dafür, keine Angst vor der Folter zu haben. Nach Williams gibt es aber auch keine Begründung für die Annahme, die Situation ändere sich, wenn mir zusätzlich mitgeteilt würde, meine Erinnerungen und meine charakterlichen Eigenschaften würden auf einen anderen Körper übertragen. Dies lässt sich nur dadurch erklären, dass ich mich in besonderer Weise mit meinem Körper identifiziere. Mentale Eigenschaften sind für Personen nicht irrelevant, aber Personen sind wesentlich Körper. Ohne die Kontinuität des lebenden Körpers gibt es keine Identität der Person. Dieser Ansatz wirft jedoch schwierige Fragen auf: Wie schon erwähnt, ist für die Identität der Person das Gehirn von besonderer Bedeutung. Ist aber das ganze Gehirn notwendig? Schon heute überleben Menschen mit nur einer Hälfte der Grosshirnrinde. Fordern wir aber nur die Kontinuität einer Hemisphäre des Gehirns, dann ist es denkbar, dass die zwei Gehirnhemisphären einer Person in zwei verschiedene Körper verpflanzt werden. Mit welcher der beiden entstehenden Personen ist die ursprüngliche Person dann identisch? Mit beiden kann sie nicht identisch sein. Das Verdopplungsproblem des psychologischen Kriteriums wiederholt sich. Identität als psychologische Kontinuität: David Lewis Die modernen Nachfolger des Lockeschen Ansatzes sehen die Verbundenheit und Kontinuität psychischer Zustände als Garanten der personalen Identität. Die kontinuierliche Sukzession psychischer Zustände in der Zeit wird durch eine geeignete kausale Verbundenheit dieser Zustände sichergestellt. Lewis gilt als einer der bedeutendsten zeitgenössischen Vertreter eines verfeinerten psychologischen Kriteriums. Die Konsequenzen des Ansatzes werden am deutlichsten, wenn man hypothetisch einige Extremfälle betrachtet. Wenn sich beispielsweise der Informationsgehalt eines Gehirns auf ein anderes Gehirn übertragen liesse, dann hätten beide dieselben mentalen Eigenschaften. Wäre die Kopie dann mit dem Original identisch? Wie bereits erwähnt, legen es empirische Befunde nahe, dass eine Hemisphäre ausreicht, um das mentale Leben einer Person hervorzubringen. Theoretisch könnte man also das Gehirn einer Person teilen und in zwei verschiedene Körper transplantieren. Die aus der Aufspaltung resultierenden Personen stünden nun in psychologischer Verbundenheit und Kontinuität mit dem Vorgänger. Auf der anderen Seite könnte man sich vorstellen, dass man die Teile der Gehirne von zwei Personen in ein neues Gehirn fusioniert. Wenn man P1 mit P2 so fusioniert, dass das Fusionsprodukt halb mit P1 und halb mit P2 psychologisch verbunden ist, dann folgt, dass es eine nur graduelle psychologische Kontinuität geben kann. Ebenso kann eine an der Alzheimerschen Krankheit leidende demente Person nur in denkbar geringem Masse psychologisch mit ihrer Vergangenheit verbunden sein. Wird dadurch die personale Identität gefährdet? Obwohl solche Gedankenspiele oft abwegig erscheinen, offenbaren sie doch ein grundsätzliches Problem des psychologischen Kriteriums. Es lässt Fälle zu, in denen die Beziehung zwischen Stadien in der Entwicklung der Person nicht mehr eins-zu-eins ist bzw. graduelle Abstufung zulässt. Die formale Beziehung der Identität ist aber eins-zu-eins und lässt keine Grade zu. Kommt es beim Überleben nun auf psychologische Verbundenheit oder formale Identität an? Lewis löst das Problem durch folgende Unterscheidung: Wenn man sagt, dass es beim Überleben auf mentale Kontinuität und Verbundenheit ankommt, dann spricht man über eine Beziehung zwischen momentanen Personenstadien. Wenn man sagt, es komme beim Überleben auf Identität an, dann spricht man über Personen als zeitlich ausgedehnte Kontinuanten, die zu verschiedenen Zeiten verschiedene Stadien haben. Eine Person als zeitliches Kontinuans ist nichts anderes als die auf richtige (kausale) Weise verbundene Kette von Erfahrungen. 3 von 8 IMPORTANT: When citing this article, please refer to the print-version: Information Philosophie. (4)1997, 18-27. Lewis' Konzeption ist in diesem Sinne relational. Die gesamte kontinuierliche Sukzession von psychologischen Zuständen ist die Person. Die Person ist keine Substanz, die durch die Zeit fortbesteht und Träger verschiedener mentaler Eigenschaften ist. Die Person ist ein Aggregat (eine mereologische Summe) von Personenstadien. Die Stadien sind Teile der Person. Zwischen den einzelnen Personenstadien besteht selbstverständlich keine Identität im formalen Sinn. Mein momentaner psychischer Zustand ist nicht identisch mit einem meiner zukünftigen psychischen Zustände. Trotzdem bleibe ich derselbe, weil beide Zustände Teile eines Aggregats miteinander verbundener Zustände sind. Nun können aber verschiedene Aggregate Teile gemeinsam haben. Daraus ergibt sich die bemerkenswerte Konsequenz, dass die beschriebenen extremen Möglichkeiten von Verschmelzung und Aufspaltung als Fälle von Stadienteilung sich partiell überlappender kontinuierlicher Personen betrachtet werden müssen. Würde ich also in Zukunft auf die beschriebene Weise aufgespalten, so wäre ich bereits jetzt eigentlich zwei Personen, die sich vorübergehend raum-zeitlich überlappt hätten. Diese kontraintuitiven Konsequenzen sind die Grundlage für die stärksten Argumente gegen die Position von Lewis. Personen als irreduzible einfache Entitäten: Richard Swinburne Swinburne unterscheidet zwischen dem, was wir meinen, wenn wir von Identität sprechen, dem Wesen der Identität, und den Merkmalen, woran wir Identität erkennen, den Kriterien der Identität. Psychische und körperliche Kontinuität sind für ihn nur empirische Kriterien, sie sagen uns nicht, worin die Identität von Personen besteht. Dafür nennt er zwei Gründe: 1) Beide Kriterien sind nicht in jedem Fall eindeutig. Immer sind auch Fälle denkbar, in denen mehr als ein Kandidat die Kriterien erfüllt. Eine Person zu einem früheren Zeitpunkt kann aber nicht mit zwei verschiedenen Personen zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt identisch sein. Diese Möglichkeit könnte zwar einfach per definitionem ausgeschlossen werden, doch dabei handelt es sich um eine willkürliche Lösung, die nicht in der Sache selbst begründet ist. 2) Sowohl körperliche als auch psychologische Kontinuität lässt Grade zu. Damit gibt es immer Fälle, in welchen die Frage nach der Identität vage wird. Dies lässt sich aus der Perspektive der ersten Person nicht nachvollziehen. Ich kann mir nicht sinnvoll vorstellen, dass ich zukünftig nur zu einem bestimmten Grad existiere. Die einzige Lösung für diese Probleme sieht Swinburne in einer Auffassung von Personen als irreduziblen einfachen Entitäten: Das, was die Identität der Person bestimmt, ist eine unteilbare immaterielle Substanz, die Träger der Person ist. Er belebt damit die Vorstellung von einer immateriellen Seele wieder. Dass dies die plausibelste Lösung ist, begründet er folgendermassen: Wir können uns logisch widerspruchsfrei vorstellen, dass wir als dieselbe Person einen anderen Körper besitzen oder ganz ohne Körper existieren könnten. Wären wir mit unserem Körper identisch, dann wäre eine solche Vorstellung nicht widerspruchsfrei möglich. Der Körper von Personen ist kein wesentlicher Teil von ihnen, weil es logisch möglich ist, dass sie ohne diesen Körper existieren könnten. Psychische und physikalische Kontinuität sind Kriterien für die Identität von Personen, denen wir im Alltag vertrauen dürfen. Es kann aber Fälle geben, in welchen die Identität durch diese Kriterien alleine nicht bestimmt ist, weil sie das Wesen der Identität nicht erfassen, das in einer immateriellen Substanz liegt. 4 von 8 IMPORTANT: When citing this article, please refer to the print-version: Information Philosophie. (4)1997, 18-27. Dieser Lösungsversuch wirft jedoch neue Probleme auf: a) Ist alles, was uns widerspruchsfrei vorstellbar erscheint, auch wirklich logisch möglich? Wenn Personen mit Körpern identisch sind, dann scheint es nur widerspruchsfrei vorstellbar, eine bestimmte Person könnte auch mit einem anderen Körper oder ohne Körper existieren. b) Wie sollen wir uns immaterielle Substanzen vorstellen? Wie interagieren sie mit Körpern? Was bestimmt, ob sie mit dem einen oder mit dem anderen Körper interagieren? c) In Problemfällen reichen die empirischen Kriterien nicht aus, um die Identität von Personen zu bestimmen. Wie plausibel ist der Ausweg, dass es über diese Kriterien hinaus etwas gibt, von dem wir prinzipiell nie mit Sicherheit wissen können, ob es der Fall ist oder nicht? Irrelevanz personaler Identität: Derek Parfit Parfit will zeigen, dass die Suche nach eindeutigen Identitätskriterien für Personen irrelevant ist. Identität ist für das Überleben nicht notwendig. Personen können nach Parfit keine Körper sein. Radikale psychische Veränderungen einer Person können dazu führen, dass wir nicht mehr von derselben Person sprechen, obwohl sie denselben Körper besitzt. Es ist aber auch vorstellbar, dass dieselbe Person durch unterschiedliche Körper realisiert wird. Für Personen ist nach Parfit vielmehr die psychologische Kontinuität wesentlich. Das Fortdauern (Überleben) einer Person ist dadurch bestimmt, dass gegenwärtige psychische Zustände in kausaler Verbindung mit vergangenen oder zukünftigen psychischen Zuständen stehen (z.B. Erinnerungen mit Erlebnissen oder Absichten mit Handlungen). Die Kontinuität dieser Verbindungen nennt er Relation R. Sie ist eine notwendige aber nicht hinreichende Bedingung für personale Identität. Normalerweise wird R durch die Kontinuität des lebenden Gehirns verursacht. Für das Bestehen von R spielt das aber nach Parfit keine Rolle. Eine Augenprothese ist genauso gut wie ein natürliches Auge, wenn sie normales Sehen ermöglicht. Eine Gehirnprothese ist genauso gut wie das natürliche Gehirn, wenn sie die gleichen mentalen Zustände und die Relation R ermöglicht. Normalerweise gehen Identität und Relation R zusammen. Wenn es sich herausstellte, dass eine Person P1 immer nur zu einer einzigen Person P2 in der Relation R stehen könnte, dann kämen Identität und Relation R immer nur zusammen vor. Nach Parfit ist das aber nicht der Fall. Ähnlich wie Swinburne argumentiert er, dass die Relation R nicht in jedem Fall eindeutig ist und mehr als eine Person in Relation R zu einer früheren Person stehen kann. Diese Möglichkeit lässt sich auch durch einschränkende Klauseln nicht einfach eliminieren. Diese machen nämlich die Identität entweder von externen Faktoren abhängig, indem sie per definitionem einen konkurrierenden Kandidaten ausschliessen. Oder sie machen sie von einem trivialen Faktum abhängig, das nur von einem Kandidaten erfüllt werden kann, z.B. einer Mindestmenge an Gehirnsubstanz, die kontinuierlich vorhanden sein muss. Zwischen einem Kandidaten, der das Kriterium gerade noch erfüllt, und einem Kandidaten, der es gerade nicht mehr erfüllt, gibt es aber keinen wesentlichen Unterschied. Einschränkende Klauseln hält Parfit deshalb für inadäquat. Die Swinburne'sche Lösung kann Parfit aber auch nicht akzeptieren. Die Annahme einer immateriellen Substanz ist für ihn unplausibel, solange wir keinen empirischen Beleg, wie überzeugende Beispiele von Seelenwanderung, dafür haben. Auch gibt es keine direkte Wahrnehmung einer solchen immateriellen Substanz: Das einzige, was uns zugänglich ist, sind unsere psychischen Zustände und ihre Verbindungen untereinander, die 5 von 8 IMPORTANT: When citing this article, please refer to the print-version: Information Philosophie. (4)1997, 18-27. normalerweise, aber nicht notwendigerweise durch die Kontinuität unseres Gehirns verursacht werden. Parfit zieht aus dieser Argumentation die Folgerung, dass die Identität einer Person für uns keine Rolle spielen sollte, sondern nur die psychische Kontinuität (R), egal wodurch sie verursacht ist. Dass wir von Personen sprechen, die psychische Zustände besitzen, beruht allein auf einer sprachlichen Konvention und bringt keine metaphysische Tatsache zum Ausdruck. Personen sind vollkommen auf die Relation R reduzierbar. Nicht meine Identität ist von Bedeutung, sondern das Bestehen von R. R kann zu verschiedenen anderen Personen bestehen und ist graduell. Damit kommt auch der Verantwortung für die eigene Vergangenheit und Zukunft weniger Bedeutung zu. Das zentrale Problem dieser Konzeption besteht darin, dass sich unser alltäglicher Personbegriff auflöst. Da wir keine hinreichenden Identitätsbedingungen für Personen angeben können, wird die Rede von Personen überhaupt fragwürdig. Was tritt dann an die Stelle der Person? Gemäss der Parfit'schen Konzeption sind es relativ kurzzeitige Ketten von psychischen Zuständen. Können diese die Nachfolge des Personbegriffs übernehmen? Können solche Ketten psychischer Zustände einen Charakter haben und Verantwortung tragen? Können wir uns aus unserer Perspektive mit solchen Wesen identifizieren? Oder müssen wir auch die Begriffe von Verantwortung, Charakter und Lebensplan mit dem Personbegriff revidieren? Wie weit kann aber die Revision unserer alltäglichen Annahmen gehen, ohne uns handlungsunfähig zu machen? Personen als lebendige Organismen: David Wiggins David Wiggins hat eine Theorie der personalen Identität vorgeschlagen, die Einsichten aus allen drei genannten Hauptalternativen in einen umfassenden Entwurf synthetisiert. Er verteidigt psychologische Kriterien als wichtige Elemente bei der Bestimmung des Personbegriffs. Sie müssen aber (im Sinne des körperlichen Kriteriums) auf ein biologisches Fundament gestellt werden. Mit den Vertretern des einfachen Kriteriums verbindet ihn der Rekurs auf den Substanzbegriff. „Person" ist ein Substanzbegriff, der sich auf Lebewesen einer bestimmten natürlichen Art (homo sapiens) anwenden lässt. Die Vertreter dieser Art verfügen im Normalfall über bestimmte mentale Eigenschaften (z.B. Selbstbewusstsein und Rationalität). Letztere sind von den physiologischen Eigenschaften abhängig (supervenient), ohne jedoch auf diese reduzierbar zu sein. Die Person ist also untrennbar von einem lebendigen Organismus, sie ist aber aufgrund ihrer mentalen Eigenschaften nicht mit diesem Organismus identisch. Die Person transzendiert ihren Körper, weil sie nicht-körperliche Eigenschaften besitzt. Die raumzeitliche Kontinuität des Lebewesens genügt aber, um die Person zu individuieren. Ein Beispiel: Ein völlig dementer Patient, der zu einem früheren Zeitpunkt bereits als Person identifiziert wurde, der sich aber nun in keiner psychologischen Verbundenheit mit seinen vergangenen psychischen Zuständen befindet, ist dennoch dieselbe Person, da es sich um denselben lebenden Organismus handelt Wiggins bestimmt den Personbegriff also nicht funktional (d.h. nicht im Hinblick auf bestimmte für Personen typische Fähigkeiten). Personen sind Substanzen. Im Sinne Putnams und Kripkes will Wiggins Substanzbegriffe nicht durch eine beschreibende Auflistung aller notwendigen Eigenschaften bestimmen. Substanzbegriffe sind Begriffe natürlicher Arten. Sie werden unter anderem dadurch festgelegt, dass man einige normale Exemplare der natürlichen Art als Referenz des Begriffs herausgreift. Was eine natürliche Art ist, muss dann durch die besten empirischen Theorien herausgefunden werden. Die besten empirischen Theorien beschreiben die Einbettung der natürlichen Art in das nomologische Netzwerk der Natur. „Person" ist ein Substanzbegriff in diesem 6 von 8 IMPORTANT: When citing this article, please refer to the print-version: Information Philosophie. (4)1997, 18-27. Sinn. Wenn Personen Angehörige natürlicher Arten sind, unterscheiden sie sich grundsätzlich von Entitäten, deren Identitätsbedingungen von konventionellen Faktoren abhängen. Personen sind also keine sozialen Konstrukte. Sie sind auch keine Artefakte wie Maschinen und Roboter. Nur ein Wesen, das auf die richtige Weise kausal mit den anderen Vertretern der Art verbunden ist, gehört zu dieser Art. Daher bestreitet Wiggins auch die Relevanz von Gedankenexperimenten der Aufspaltung und Verschmelzung von Personen. Im Kontext ihrer naturgesetzmässigen Einbettung haben menschliche Organismen klare Individuationskriterien. Wenn man die Organismen durch allerlei (zudem bloss hypothetische und völlig unterbestimmte) Science-Fiction-Experimente der Hirnspaltung und Informationsübertragung völlig denaturiert hat, so handelt es sich nicht mehr um Exemplare einer natürlichen Art, sondern um Artefakte. Für solche gibt es nur konventionelle Identitätskriterien. Ein zentrales Problem in Wiggins Ansatz besteht in der genauen Bestimmung des Verhältnisses von mentalen und physischen Eigenschaften der Person. Welche Rolle spielen die mentalen Eigenschaften, wenn menschliche Wesen im Koma immer noch Personen sind? Menschliche Personen können nicht ohne die Grundlage eines lebendigen menschlichen Organismus existieren. Kann es aber nicht sein, dass ein lebender menschlicher Organismus existiert, ohne eine Person zu sein? LITERATUR ZUM THEMA Baillie, J.: Problems in Personal Identity, 1993, Paragon House Publisher, New York. Sehr leicht verständliche Einführung; hinterfragt die Tauglichkeit der Gedankenexperimente und Puzzle-Cases. Bourgeois, W.: Persons: what philosophers say about you. Viii, 340 p., $29.95, 1995, Wilfrid Laurier, Waterloo, Ontario. Einführungstext mit breitem geschichtlichen Abriss bis in die Antike. Lewis, D.: Überleben und Identität, 1976, in: Siep 1983. Logisch konsequent durchdachte Darstellung des psychologischen Kriteriums. Locke, J.: Of Identity and Diversity, in: Perry 1975. Geschichtlich grundlegender Text für die heutige Debatte über den Personbegriff. Noonan, H. (Hg.): Personal Identity, 1993, Dartmouth. Ausführliche Sammlung gegenwärtiger Texte zur personalen Identität. Parfit, D.: Reasons and Persons, Teil III, 1987, 543p., ₤12.--, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Vollständigste Darstellung der Parfit'schen Position; verknüpft metaphysische Fragen mit ethischen Problemen. Perry, J. (Hg.): Personal Identity, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975. Sammlung mit Texten von Locke bis in die 70er Jahre des 20. Jahrhunderts. Perry, J.: A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality, in: Feinberg. J. (Hg.), Reason and 7 von 8 IMPORTANT: When citing this article, please refer to the print-version: Information Philosophie. (4)1997, 18-27. Responsibility, Wadsworth, Belmont u.a. 91996, 383-400. Didaktisch gute Darstellung der drei Hauptpositionen in Form eines „platonischen" Dialogs. Quante, M.: Die Identität der Person, Philosophische Rundschau 42 (1995). Einführender deutscher Text. Siep, L. (Hg.): Identität der Person Aufsätze aus der nordamerikanischen Gegenwartsphilosophie. 174 S., kt., DM 41.--,1983, Schwabe, Basel. Einzige deutsche Aufsatzsammlung mit Texten bis Anfang der 80er Jahre. Swinburne, R. und S. Shoemaker, Personal Identity, Blackwell, Oxford 1984. Darstellung der Swinburne'schen Position zusammen mit einem Gegenentwurf Shoemakers. Wiggins, D.: Locke, Butler and the Stream of Consciousness, in: Noonan 1993, Übersichtliche Darstellung der Position von Wiggins. Williams, B.: Probleme des Selbst. Philosophische Aufsätze 1956-1972. Kt., DM 15.--, Reclam UM 9891, 1978, Reclam, Stuttgart 1978. Aufsatzsammlung mit Texten von Williams zur personalen Identität und verwandten Themen. UNSERE AUTOREN: G. Brüntrup ist Dozent an der Hochschule für Philosophie in München, wo B. Gillitzer an seiner Promotion arbeitet. 8 von

THE REVIEW OF SYMBOLIC LOGIC Volume 10, Number 1, March 2017 'CHASING' THE DIAGRAM-THE USE OF VISUALIZATIONS IN ALGEBRAIC REASONING SILVIA DE TOFFOLI Department of Philosophy, Stanford University Abstract. The aim of this article is to investigate the roles of commutative diagrams (CDs) in a specific mathematical domain, and to unveil the reasons underlying their effectiveness as a mathematical notation; this will be done through a case study. It will be shown that CDs do not depict spatial relations, but represent mathematical structures. CDs will be interpreted as a hybrid notation that goes beyond the traditional bipartition of mathematical representations into diagrammatic and linguistic. It will be argued that one of the reasons why CDs form a good notation is that they are highly mathematically tractable: experts can obtain valid results by 'calculating' with CDs. These calculations, take the form of 'diagram chases'. In order to draw inferences, experts move algebraic elements around the diagrams. It will be argued that these diagrams are dynamic. It is thanks to their dynamicity that CDs can externalize the relevant reasoning and allow experts to draw conclusions directly by manipulating them. Lastly, it will be shown that CDs play essential roles in the context of proof as well as in other phases of the mathematical enterprise, such as discovery and conjecture formation. §1. Introduction. Visual representations of various natures are ubiquitous in mathematics, as well as in many other human activities. In the literature, these representations have been commonly labeled 'visualizations'. This term is actually vague: It has been employed in many different contexts in order to refer to various processes. As Carter (2010, p. 3) points out, the two main ways of using the term 'visualization' are to refer to "mental pictures" (or, more generally, "mental models") and to material representations. In the present study, the second meaning of the term will be endorsed and thus visualization will be considered as an 'externalization' of thought. Visualization can therefore be analyzed in order to shed light on specific aspects of human reasoning. The underlying assumption is that reasoning is heterogeneous, that is, not solely constituted by linguistic content. As Shin sums up (2004, p. 92), "all of us engage in and make use of valid reasoning, and in the process of reasoning human beings obtain information through many different kinds of media, including diagrams, maps, smells, sounds, as well as written or spoken statements." In this article, I propose a way of interpreting some specific cognitive and epistemic artefacts pertaining to visualization: commutative diagrams (CDs) in homological algebra. These diagrams are highly formalized diagrams used in algebra. They do not depict geometric objects, but they represent algebraic relations. Still, even if the pictorial element is absent, CDs exhibit essential spatial properties that make certain relations of the represented algebraic structure visible. CDs form an extremely perspicuous mathematical notation that allows mathematicians to perform specific epistemic operations, that is, calculations aimed at the production of mathematical results. I will describe CDs as a hybrid mathematical notation and unveil the reasons underlying their effectiveness. To do so, Received: December 21, 2015. c⃝ Association for Symbolic Logic, 2016 158 doi:10.1017/S1755020316000277 1 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 5 A 8 A 7 0 1 5 6 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 ./ 1 5AA 1 AC2:53 85 ,1 2 75 , 5 5 A 6 CA5 1D1 12 5 'CHASING' THE DIAGRAM 159 I will start by developing a general methodology to evaluate mathematical notations, and then I will apply it to the case of CDs. Therefore, the main contribution of this article is twofold: (i) a theoretical explanation of the effectiveness of CDs in mathematics1 and (ii) a methodological contribution to evaluate mathematical notations in general. More specifically, through a case study I will argue for the following five main claims: (1) CDs form an effective notational system.2 In order to sustain this claim, I will analyze their uses in specific mathematical contexts. I will apply to their analysis a general methodology to evaluate mathematical notations, which I will develop. (2) CDs function like geographic maps of abstract spaces: As I will describe in §4.2, they describe an algebraic 'landscape'. Moreover, their use consists in a constant feedback between diagrams and text. (3) CDs are 'dynamic', that is, their functionality depends on how experts can identify different movements through them. In particular, in order to use them correctly, experts have to perform calculations on them that take the form of a 'diagram chase'. (4) CDs are hybrid mathematical displays that present both diagrammatic as well as linguistic elements. The analysis of their nature will contribute to the rejection of sharp dichotomies in the classification of mathematical representations. (5) CDs can play essential roles in mathematical proofs, as well as in other phases of the mathematical enterprise.3 They contribute in a nonreplaceable way to both mathematical discoveries and justifications. In the present article, I will discuss epistemological issues concerning diagrammatic reasoning. More specifically, I will analyze a case study which can offer new insight on actual mathematical practices involving diagrams. This work is embedded in the tradition of the philosophy of mathematical practice, a recent trend in philosophy of mathematics that aims at broadening the scope of philosophy of mathematics to issues that have to do with mathematics as actually practiced by human agents, and not only focused on ontological and epistemological issues regarding abstract objects.4 I will present CDs, which are a specific type of diagrams that play essential roles in advanced areas of contemporary mathematics such as homological algebra and category theory. In the present article, I will focus on the use of CDs in homological algebra since, as I will explain, in this field they support a specific type of mathematical reasoning, the 'diagram chase'. Much work on diagrammatic reasoning in mathematics has been focused on logical diagrams,5 geometric diagrams, which 'depict' spatial relations,6 and diagrams in analysis.7 Nevertheless, mathematicians use other kinds of diagrams as well, which function diagrammatically but at the same time present some linguistic features. Feferman (2012, p. 372) acknowledges the presence of non-geometric diagrams in mathematical proofs: 1 This is a new contribution, not fully addressed in other works concerning CDs; see Giaquinto (2007), Feferman (2012), Halimi (2012) and Weber (2013). 2 'Effective' is here not meant in technical sense: An effective notation is a notation that allows the practitioners to perform the relevant tasks accurately and quickly. 3 This does not imply that given a proof involving CDs we could not find a different proof of the same statement without diagrams. Nevertheless, many actual proofs contain CDs and eliminating them would mean to alter the proof in a nontrivial way: We would create another proof, probably deprived of the virtues (such as understandability) of the original one. See Giaquinto (2008, pp. 24–26) for a discussion on criteria of identity for proofs. 4 Among the first and most important publications in this traditions are the collections edited by Mancosu, Jørgensen, & Pedersen (2005) and Mancosu (2008). 5 For example, Venn Diagrams or their generalization by Peirce or Shin; see Shin, Lemon, & Mumma (Fall 2013). 6 For example, Euclidean diagrams, as in Manders (2008). 7 For example, visualizations in calculus, as in Giaquinto (1994). 1 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 5 A 8 A 7 0 1 5 6 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 ./ 1 5AA 1 AC2:53 85 ,1 2 75 , 5 5 A 6 CA5 1D1 12 5 160 SILVIA DE TOFFOLI "the practice of reliance on diagrams in various ways is still integral to the presentation of mathematical proofs of all sorts, even outside of geometry and analysis." With the present case study, I aim at shedding light on the mathematical practices involving CDs in homological algebra.8 In §2, I will present some background material on notations in mathematics. I will argue that the introduction of new notations is a relevant part of mathematics: Effective notations matter for mathematics. In fact, as I will show, they allow experts to externalize the relevant reasoning and to perform specific operations. To do so, I will introduce specific terminology to characterize mathematical notations. I will consider three criteria through which it will be possible to evaluate different notations: expressiveness, calculability, and transparency. Briefly, the expressiveness of a notation reveals which kind of information can be conveyed through its use; calculability concerns the possibility of using the notation to perform specific operations with epistemic aims and transparency evaluates the possibility of exploiting our pre-existing cognitive abilities and acquired expertise in interpreting and using correctly the notation. The last label stems from the idea that a notation is 'transparent' if it can be understood and used directly (in a given context), without much explanation or instructions of use. In order to clarify how this methodology can be applied to specific cases, I will discuss two main examples of mathematical notations: numeric notations and notations in knot theory. In §3, I will present a case study in homological algebra, a mathematical subfield that developed from algebraic topology. I will specify the mathematical details, but only to the extent that they will help in understanding the case study and its philosophical significance. Two main results will be presented: the Five Lemma and the Fundamental Theorem of Homological Algebra. As we will see, the proofs of both these results rely heavily on the so-called 'diagram chase' technique. In §4, I will discuss the case study by listing and examining the five main properties of CDs and their uses mentioned above. In §5, I will sum up some conclusions and hint at new possible research directions. §2. Mathematical notations. I will introduce in this section some preliminary remarks on mathematical notations. The study of notations is philosophically significant from different perspectives: both from the traditional standpoint of philosophy of mathematics and from the more recent trend focusing on the practice of mathematics. From a more traditional standpoint, notations have been important in relation to foundational issues. It is enough to think about the centrality of the discussion on mathematical notations at the dawn of modern philosophy of mathematics, with Frege's Begriffsschrift.9 Nevertheless, traditionally notations have been studied focusing exclusively on their syntactic and semantic properties, with a constant eye toward formalization. From the practice based approach, the importance of notations, as pointed out by Grosholz (2007, p. 23), becomes significant not only with respect to its syntactic and semantic dimension, but also to its pragmatic dimension. The present contribution is situated in the tradition of the philosophy of mathematical practice and thus notations will be considered as actually used by practitioners. In one seminal contributions in this tradition, Grosholz (2007) considered different case studies concerning the use of heterogeneous representations in the history of mathematics and the sciences. She states her aim as 8 Another attempt in the direction of considering diagrams outside geometry is for example the analysis of the role of diagrams in free probability theory by Carter (2010). 9 See Macbeth (2012a) to a detailed analysis of diagrammatic reasoning in Frege's Begriffsschrift. 1 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 5 A 8 A 7 0 1 5 6 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 ./ 1 5AA 1 AC2:53 85 ,1 2 75 , 5 5 A 6 CA5 1D1 12 5 'CHASING' THE DIAGRAM 161 following, by contrasting it with the Carnapian idea of reducing mathematics to logic through syntax: My purpose in this book, by contrast, is to move towards an epistemology that works properly for mathematics by taking into account the pragmatic as well as the syntactic and semantic features of representation in mathematics. Focusing on the pragmatic dimension of mathematical language allows us to see the philosophical interest of useful ambiguity in mathematics, as well as the limits of formalization. (Grosholz, 2007, p. 23) In line with Grosholz, my present goal is to consider how specific notations in mathematics can be evaluated considering their pragmatic dimension, that is, the way in which they are actually employed in the various phases of the mathematical enterprise. More recently, other authors have considered issues concerning notations. For example, Colyvan (2012, chap. 8) points out that "there is a great deal more philosophical work to be done on understanding and appreciating the important role of notations in the various branches of mathematics."10 Accordingly, one of my present aims is to shed light on the case of the notation formed by CDs. I claim that effective notations allow users to perform calculations on them, i.e., they are highly "mathematically tractable."11 This implies that notations not only record information, but put mathematical reasoning in a material form. Specifically, I will argue that the effectiveness of mathematical notations is rooted on the fact that they externalize the relevant reasoning and enhance cognition. In order to analyze different mathematical notations, I will first report some concepts that have been used to characterize them. Afterwards, I will identify three main criteria to evaluate the effectiveness of a notation. I will start with two remarks on the adopted terminology. First, I will use the term 'notation' in a broad manner, in order to refer to representational systems of various kinds. Therefore, I will include as notations not only linguistic displays such as numerals12 and algebraic formulas, but also systems of diagrams, such as knot diagrams. In fact, even if the nature of such displays is diagrammatic and not linguistic, they are used in a formal practice in a codified manner. Indeed, it is the possibility of codification that accounts for the existence of formal diagrammatic systems such as the one proposed by Avigad, Dean, & Mumma (2009) for Euclidean geometry. Also in the case of CDs, diagrams are used in a formal practice. Even if, as we will see, mathematicians use them as single displays with which to reason, they will still be included as mathematical notations. Loosely, I will include as mathematical notations all that mathematicians write down as a cognitive aid in stable and shared practices. I aim to exclude squiggles that lone mathematicians draw with various aims, such as to promote concentration, in order to include only those signs that carry mathematical content and that can be shared. I will focus on specific notations that are the constitutive elements of formal practices of proving and, more generally, mathematical reasoning. 10 Other recent works on mathematical notations are Brown (2008, chap. 6) and Macbeth (2012c). 11 Macbeth (2012c) introduces this expression in order to evaluate mathematical notations, in particular Frege's Begriffsschrift and Euclid's diagrams. 12 Although cognitively we appear to have different systems of representations for numbers (in particular for small natural numbers) that are not purely linguistic but visual-symbolic as well, I am interested here in the written notation constituted by Arabic numerals. For the scope of this article, this can be considered as a linguistic notation. Thanks to Marcus Giaquinto for making me clarify this point. 1 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 5 A 8 A 7 0 1 5 6 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 ./ 1 5AA 1 AC2:53 85 ,1 2 75 , 5 5 A 6 CA5 1D1 12 5 162 SILVIA DE TOFFOLI Second, I will distinguish between linguistic and diagrammatic representations. As it will become clear in the following, this distinction is not sharp and it forms more of a spectrum than a dichotomy. As a first approximation, linguistic representations are formed by sequences of arbitrary symbols, whereas diagrammatic representations exploit their spatial configurations in an essential way, that is, their two-dimensional disposition contributes to defining their semantics.13 I will now introduce some terminology developed by Macbeth (2012c) while analyzing different notations such as the one formed by Euclidean diagrams and Frege's Begriffsschrift. She introduces the distinction between "trans-configurational" and "intraconfigurational" notations. On the one hand, a notational system is trans-configurational if it makes use of "rewriting." Examples of trans-configurational systems are algebraic notations, since when manipulating an algebraic expression, practitioners rewrite equivalent expressions in different ways. On the other hand, a notational system is intra-configurational if it does not require rewriting. As we will see, CDs are intra-configurational. Another case of intra-configurational displays are Euclidean diagrams. In Euclidean geometry, a diagram is a display which presents in an unique figure all the necessary diagrammatic elements for a particular argument: We do not draw different diagrams at each construction step, but analyse the same diagram in different ways.14 Another important distinction that Macbeth (2012b) introduces is between "describing" a particular mathematical reasoning and "displaying" it. Macbeth observes that often in mathematics the reasoning is described in natural language. This is done through expressions like 'let us consider the composition of...', 'from hypothesis, it follows...' or the description of a mathematical operation. Nevertheless, with the aid of specific mathematical notations, it is possible to display, rather than to describe, the reasoning:15 The paper and pencil calculation is radically different. It is manifestly not a description of a chain of reasoning one might undertake; rather it shows a calculation. (Macbeth, 2012b, p. 33) The crucial observation that a notation can enable us to reason directly within the system of signs is also supported by Krämer (2003), who takes a step further. Krämer analyzed different notations in mathematics and investigated a kind of writing labelled 'operative': The advantage of conceiving writing as nonphonetic reveals a whole new realm of written phenomena, which will be called operative writing in contradistinction to phonetic writing. Calculus is the incarnation of operative writing. (Krämer, 2003, p. 522) 13 Of course, linguistic representations are linear and thus in a sense also exploit their spatial disposition in an essential way, but in a much more rigid and limited fashion. 14 Alternatively, one can conceive the construction of an Euclidean diagram as a step-by-step process that consists in adding new elements to the same diagram. 15 A mixture of displaying and describing is often present in mathematical notations. In fact, we can adopt specific notations that display the reasoning, and then 'decorate' them with a description in order to make them more transparent. For example, we can use the symbol ' ⇐⇒ ' to indicate an 'if and only if' relation, as in the expression: a = b ⇐⇒ b = a. If this relation is grounded, as in this case, on the symmetric property of the identity relation, we can indicate this description as follows: a = b symm.⇐⇒ b = a. Thus, we mix notations that describes the reasoning, with notations that displays it. The symbol ⇐⇒ displays the reasoning since it is directly mathematically tractable. For example, we can, without any reference to the meaning of the symbols, invert what is on the left with what is on the right of it. 1 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 5 A 8 A 7 0 1 5 6 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 ./ 1 5AA 1 AC2:53 85 ,1 2 75 , 5 5 A 6 CA5 1D1 12 5 'CHASING' THE DIAGRAM 163 This notion regards the paper and pencil dimension of signs. Krämer opposes this type of writing to phonetic writing in so far as it is not subject to the linearity of time (not being a simple transcription of speech), but it exploits the two-dimensionality of the paper. Operative writing allows for a process of "de-semantification," that is, we stop paying attention to the meaning of the sign and perform 'blind' operations on them. Through desemantification we abstract from the semantic dimension and thus forget all meaning.16 Specifically, to draw inferences with operative writing means to stop following intuitions, because the unique task becomes to apply mechanically the rules defined within the formalism.17 Therefore, operative writing allows to lighten the cognitive load of the task and to reason directly in the system of symbols. This kind of writing can be observed in various areas of mathematics and can be used in order to better understand certain diagrammatic notations as well. Operative writing is possible only through a notation which, using Macbeth's distinction, displays the reasoning. Nevertheless, these two notions do not coincide. In fact, in the case of operative writing, we not only reason within the system of symbols, but also we do so in an 'automatic' way (though a process of de-semantification). These distinctions are helpful in clarifying certain characteristics of different mathematical notations. I aim now at identifying three different criteria to evaluate different notations: (i) expressiveness, (ii) calculability, and (iii) transparency. Expressiveness measures which kind of information can be expressed through the specific notation. Calculability determines which calculations can be carried by the notation. In Macbeth's terminology, it expresses which kind of mathematical reasoning can be displayed through the notation. Transparency quantifies how 'intuitive' a notation is. That is, to what extent it can be interpreted and used directly, by exploiting our cognitive abilities and our training. Therefore, the transparecny criterion cannot be fixed once and for all, but it is indexed to the practitioner's background. In fact, it depends on pre-existing cognitive abilities and on the degree of expertise and familiarity with other notations possessed by the practitioner. In the following discussion, I will refer to these criteria by using them as yardsticks against which to measure different mathematical notations. Nevertheless, I will not propose an algorithm to evaluate notations abstractly. In fact, these three features are present in all notations to different degrees and it is not possible to compare them out of context. Indeed, the effectiveness of a notation depends on its uses.18 For example, a notation designed with pedagogical aims will be evaluated differently than a notation used for research purposes. Thus, in evaluating a notation in mathematics it will be necessary to consider its pragmatic dimension as well, and not solely its syntactic and semantic nature. Larkin & Simon (1987) identified two criteria similar to the first two mentioned above. In order to explain the effectiveness of diagrammatic representations in comparison with sentential ones, they evaluated notations in terms of "informational efficiency" and "computational efficiency." The third criterion can be linked to the more general one of "naturalness," as defined in Giardino & Greenberg (2015). According to the authors, a system 16 Dutilth-Novaes (2012, p. 12) distinguishes three ways in which we generally characterize formal languages as abstracting from content, one of which is the formal as de-semantification (the other two being "formal as topic-neutrality" and "formal as abstraction from intentional content"). She writes: "In this sense, to be purely formal amounts to viewing the symbols as blueprints (inscriptions) with no meaning at all-as pure mathematical objects and thus no longer as 'signs' properly speaking." (Dutilh-Novaes, 2012, p. 13). 17 This notion is reminiscent of Leibniz's Ars Combinatoria, see Ishiguro (1990, chap. III). 18 The uses of a notation can be the ones intended at its creation but also unexpected uses which might develop afterwards. 1 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 5 A 8 A 7 0 1 5 6 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 ./ 1 5AA 1 AC2:53 85 ,1 2 75 , 5 5 A 6 CA5 1D1 12 5 164 SILVIA DE TOFFOLI of representation "is more or less natural to the degree to which human nature-including relatively universal aspects of cognition, physiology, social behaviour, and environmental interaction-rather than enculturation, makes that system easy to internalize and use" (Giardino & Greenberg, 2015, p. 8). I choose a different terminology in order to include both nature and nurture in the evaluation of how transparent is a notation, and not to enter in the discussion of this controversial distinction. From my perspective, the transparency of a notation does not depend only on innate cognitive and psychological characteristics of human nature, but also on cultural factors, such as the habit to see and manipulate a specific notation in a certain way. Often, expressiveness and transparency are present in complementary degrees. In fact, representations in mathematics present different degrees of abstraction and there is a tradeoff between expressiveness and transparency. In a previous work in collaboration with Giardino (De Toffoli & Giardino, 2015), we argued that this phenomenon is very clear in the case of logical diagrams: from Euler diagrams to their generalizations by Venn and consequently by Pierce and Shin. Euler diagrams are very intuitive and easily interpreted, but their expressive power is limited. Venn created new conventions to increase this expressive power, but at the cost of the intuitive interpretation.19 In the following, I will present two examples for comparing different mathematical notations: the fist concerns numerical notations (and thus linguistic displays) while the second concerns knot diagrams (and thus diagrammatic displays). Numerical notations are a clear example of how different systems of symbols support different calculations. Arabic numerals have replaced Roman numerals because we can calculate with them in a much more efficient way. This is possible because Arabic numerals externalize the mathematical properties of the natural numbers of being recursive, see Brown (2008, p. 85).20 In order to perform a numerical operation, like a multiplication, we can rely on a specific procedure which exploits the particular properties of Arabic numerals, like in Figure 1. Once the appropriate notation is established (and with it, its possible manipulations), it allows us to get results 'automatically'. We do not have to think about the specific procedures, as it is an instance of operative writing: The notation carries for us the cognitive load. In the case of Roman numerals (without an algorithm), we would have had to 'think' about the meaning of a multiplication in order to get the desired result. Moreover, in Figure 1, the mathematical reasoning behind the multiplication is externalized and has acquired material form, it is not merely a description of it. 4 2 4 2 4 1 6 9 6 8 4 8 1 0 1 7 6 × Fig. 1. Multiplication with Arabic numerals. 19 A description of these different diagrams in logic can be found in Shin et al., (Fall 2013) and it has been discussed in Giardino & Greenberg (2015). 20 Even if many scholars have accepted this claim, Schlimm & Neth (2008) have cast doubts on its foundations. According to their view, also Roman numerals allow for efficient calculations. Anyhow, this would not weaken my point. Arabic numerals are still superior to Roman numerals in various computational respects. Moreover, both Romans and Arabic numerals are 'better' than a linguistic description in natural language. 1 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 5 A 8 A 7 0 1 5 6 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 ./ 1 5AA 1 AC2:53 85 ,1 2 75 , 5 5 A 6 CA5 1D1 12 5 'CHASING' THE DIAGRAM 165 Let us compare these two notations adopting the criteria we discussed: (i) the two notations are informationally equivalent, that is, we can express the same information.21 (ii) We can calculate with both systems much better than with strokes alone or in natural language. Nevertheless, in the case of Arabic numerals, as we have seen, calculations become automatic and are externalized by the notation itself, whereas in the case of Roman numerals, performing arithmetic operations is more cognitively taxing.22 (iii) Both systems exhibit conventional elements which require a linguistically defined context of interpretation. Nevertheless, in the case of Roman numerals, we have more intuitive elements, such as the strokes for the numbers from one to four. Still, in our culture, we are so familiar with Arabic numerals that it is very easy for us to interpret and use them correctly. In the actual practice, the differences in the ways we calculate with various notations are not so sharp. In fact, we observe different uses of the same notation. For example, if we have to perform a multiplication, we can do it automatically within the symbols, or first simplify it, by thinking about it in a mathematically pertinent way, and then perform certain tasks automatically. For example, if we want to multiply 424 times 5, we can observe that this is equivalent to performing two more simple operations: first, multiplying 424 times 10 and second, diving it by 2; then we can perform the simpler operations 'automatically' in the notation (for example, the first one would correspond to add a zero). Therefore, there are cases of 'localized automaticity': It is possible to go back and forth between operative writing (through a process of de-semantification) and regular semantic reasoning (with the aid of adding meaning to the symbols).23 Macbeth (2012b, p. 60) compares these two numerical notations and claims that only in the case of the Arabic numerals, the collections of signs "do not merely record results; they actually embody the relevant bits of mathematical reasoning." In her view, a mathematical notation is effective only if it embodies the relevant reasoning, by displaying it. Whereas I agree with Macbeth in identifying an essential feature of an effective notation in the embodiment (or externalization) of the relevant reasoning, I disagree that in the case of numeric notations (and more in general as well) we observe such sharp differences. As can be observed from the comparison above, the question is not only whether or not a notation externalizes the mathematical reasoning, but also what exactly does it externalize and in which form (how highly mathematical tractable is the externalization). In fact, as noted above, also Roman numerals may externalize certain properties, just not as well as Arabic numerals. A similar phenomenon, in different degrees, is present with all kinds of notations. A notation will always enable us to lighten our cognitive load by allowing us to use particular representations to reason; therefore, a notation will always externalize the reasoning to a certain extent. The question becomes a matter of to what degree and in which form. With the example of numerical notations in mind, we can identify two extremes. At one extreme, to write an expression in natural language, already aids us (compared to having to memorize it). Indeed, notwithstanding the fact that performing numerical 21 Nevertheless, the standard Roman system allows to represent numbers only until 4,999, and a generalized version of it until 4,999,999 (Schlimm & Neth, 2008, p. 2097), but of course they can be indefinitely generalized. 22 This could be avoided by the adoption of specific artefacts, such as the abacus. Moreover, it has been pointed at computational possibilities allowed by Roman numerals that are generally ignored, see Schlimm & Neth (2008). 23 This back and forth between an automatic and a semantic type of reasoning is a similar to a phenomenon analyzed by Dutilh-Novaes (2012) and called "de-semantification," as in Krämer (2003), and "re-semantification." 1 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 5 A 8 A 7 0 1 5 6 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 ./ 1 5AA 1 AC2:53 85 ,1 2 75 , 5 5 A 6 CA5 1D1 12 5 166 SILVIA DE TOFFOLI operations without the aid of numerical notations is very hard, already the possibility to write down number words in natural language allows us to externally fix the data and thus let us unload the cognitive task of our memory. At the other extreme, to write a calculation in a system of symbols that are highly mathematically tractable allows us to perform operations that would be inconceivable in natural language. Let us now shift the discussion to diagrammatic displays. Knot diagrams constitute an effective mathematical notation which functions diagrammatically, but can also be integrated through linguistic displays.24 Knot diagrams are two-dimensional displays that are easily interpreted as three-dimensional knots. Notwithstanding their pictorial features, knot diagrams do not only display knots, but they are also mathematically tractable, that is, we can perform calculations with them. I will now compare two diagrammatic notations used to denote knots: standard knot diagrams and 'pointed knot diagrams'. This last one makes use of a nonstandard convention at crossings.25 In Figure 2, the trefoil knot is represented in the two notations. As I will discuss, these two notations present different degrees of transparency. In fact, Figure 2(a) is immediately interpreted as a three-dimensional curve, whereas in order to interpret correctly Figure 2(b) we need to know that at the crossing the line that goes between the two points is interpreted as going above the other. I will present now simple calculations involving the standard notation for knot diagrams (as I shall argue, this notation is more transparent and therefore the calculations that I will present are understood more easily adopting it). In Figure 3(a), a complicated diagram gets simplified into diagrams with less and less crossings, to end with a diagram with no crossings at all, Figure 3(g). This result is achieved through moves that are easily interpreted using "manipulative imagination," that is, a transposition of the imagination we would actually use for manipulating concrete objects, see De Toffoli & Giardino (2014).26 Part of the reason why knot diagrams are a transparent notation is exactly that they immediately trigger this type of imagination, which gets enhanced by expertise. Fig. 2. Diagrams of the trefoil knot. 24 For a detailed discussion of knot diagrams, see De Toffoli & Giardino (2014). 25 This convention was used by the first knot theorists, for example in Alexander (1928). 26 This is a concept that Giardino and I introduced in a previous work in order to describe how experts use knot diagrams: "the dynamic nature of knot diagrams involves a form of manipulative imagination that gets enhanced through training by transposing our manipulative capacities from concrete objects to this notation." (De Toffoli & Giardino, 2014, p. 839). 1 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 5 A 8 A 7 0 1 5 6 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 ./ 1 5AA 1 AC2:53 85 ,1 2 75 , 5 5 A 6 CA5 1D1 12 5 'CHASING' THE DIAGRAM 167 Fig. 3. Diagrams of the unknot. Looking at the diagram in Figure 3(a) and the one in Figure 3(b), it can be seen that they represent the same knot: It is enough to imagine 'pulling' the middle strand down in order to pass from one to the other. To conclude that all these diagrams also represent the same knot, we just need to apply further similar moves. Brown (2008, chap. 6) claims that knot diagrams form an effective mathematical notation since we can use them to calculate. Knot diagrams allow for calculations by manipulations (as the ones in the sequence of Figure 3) and, as we will see, through the definition of invariants such as knot polynomials. By this brief description already some properties of knot diagrams emerge. First, they are trans-configurational. In fact, we make use of rewriting when performing an operation with them. Second, they can be used to calculate, that is, they do not only function as descriptions but also display the relevant reasoning. This phenomenon becomes even more clear in the case of knot polynomials. Note that Macbeth does not appreciate the full range of possibilities for calculations offered by knot diagrams, by focusing exclusively on their pictorial features. She claims: Diagrams in knot theory [...] directly picture knots that can then be manipulated, in Reidemeister moves,27 essentially as one would manipulate an actual knot. In all these cases, as in the case of Roman numeration, one directly pictures something and then can manipulate the picture as one might manipulate that which it pictures. A Euclidean diagram, we will see, is different insofar as it (like a numeral of Arabic numeration) does not merely picture something but instead formulates the content of something-in this case, the contents of concepts of various plane figures-in a mathematically tractable way, in a way that enables reasoning in the system of signs. (Macbeth, 2012c, p. 63) When we consider the rules for the calculation of knot polynomials, as in Figure 428 it becomes clear that knot diagrams are much richer than what Macbeth claims. In the calculation of Figure 4, the brackets represent the bracket polynomial operation. In this example, are showed the three rules adopted to calculate the bracket polynomial: (1) The polynomial associated to the trivial knot is just one; (2) If we add a trivial component to a link (i.e., a union of knots), then we have to multiply a factor (−A2 − A−2) to our polynomial; and (3) for each crossing, it is shown how to decompose it. 27 The Reidemeister moves are local diagrammatic moves that allow one to connect all diagrams representing the same knot. 28 See Adams (1994, chap. 6) for a discussion and examples of actual computations of this polynomial. 1 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 5 A 8 A 7 0 1 5 6 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 ./ 1 5AA 1 AC2:53 85 ,1 2 75 , 5 5 A 6 CA5 1D1 12 5 168 SILVIA DE TOFFOLI 1. ! " = 1 2. ! L ∪ " = (−A2 − A−2)⟨L⟩ 3. ! " = A ! " + A−1 ! " Fig. 4. Rules for the calculation of the bracket polynomial. The use of knot diagrams as part of the calculations of knot polynomials proves that we do not only manipulate knot diagrams (or parts of them) as we would manipulate actual knots. Through them we can perform different operations which are defined by specific mathematical aims.29 I will now evaluate the two notations I presented for knot diagrams in terms of the three criteria identified above. (i) Through them we can represent any knot; they are completely equivalent regarding expressiveness. (ii) We can calculate with them, as in Figure 3, or with knot polynomials. We can perform the same calculations in an equivalent way with the two notations. So they are also equivalent with respect to calculability. (iii) The two notations are clearly not equivalent from the point of view of transparency. In fact, standard knot diagrams are easily interpreted as representing a three-dimensional knot. This is thanks to the conventions used at crossings: The interrupted lines are easily interpreted as 'going under'.30 This is not the case for pointed knot diagrams: These need a much more explicit set of instructions for interpretation and use. For example, the calculation in Figure 3 would have been much harder to follow in the pointed notation. In this brief excursus, I showed how mathematical notations are heterogeneous. For example, they can be linguistic, as in the case of numerical notations, or present diagrammatical features, like in the case of knot diagrams. Nevertheless, in order to be effective they must have something in common. In fact, they allow mathematicians to reason within the notations; these do not only record information, but also externalize the relevant reasoning, by displaying the mathematical content in a form that is at the same time understandable and tractable. It is therefore possible to calculate through an effective notation. Thus, there are not specific characteristics to follow for a particular notation to be effective, since the aim of externalizing mathematical content can be obtained in different ways. The three criteria identified above are useful to understand the functioning and the effectiveness of particular notations, but we have to remember that to evaluate a notation we must consider its intended context of use. A general observation is that, if in two notations two criteria are equal and one can vary, then the notation which is superior according to this third criterion would be preferable. For example, as we saw, in the case of notations for knot diagrams, the standard and the pointed notations differ only by their transparency. Thus, the notation that is more transparent, which is the standard one, is preferable. In the following sections, I will analyze how CDs form a good mathematical notation in homological algebra, which present features proper to diagrammatic as well as linguistic representations. I will maintain that the specific practices involving CDs, as well as CDs themselves, are epistemologically relevant, since they are integral parts both of the reasoning and of the justification provided. As we shall see, CDs, like other effective notations, do not simply record information, but externalize the relevant reasoning. 29 A similar argument can be deployed for the case of Roman numerals as well. Through devices such as the abacus we can manipulate the symbols in order to obtain valid mathematical results, as explained by Schlimm & Neth (2008, p. 2097). 30 In fact, standard knot diagrams exploit certain laws identified by Gestalt psychology, in this case the law of "good continuation" of visual perception, see Kanizsa (1980). 1 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 5 A 8 A 7 0 1 5 6 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 ./ 1 5AA 1 AC2:53 85 ,1 2 75 , 5 5 A 6 CA5 1D1 12 5 'CHASING' THE DIAGRAM 169 §3. Case study. The main goal of algebraic topology is to apply techniques and results of abstract algebra to topological inquiries. Algebraic invariants are among its most important tools. To topological spaces we associate algebraic structures that do not change if we replace the given space with one homeomorphic to it. The converse does not hold: In general the same algebraic structure can be associated to different topological spaces.31 Nevertheless, invariants are very useful because they allow one to discriminate, and in some cases to classify, topological spaces while working with more mathematically accessible objects such as groups or other algebraic structures. A very important algebraic invariant is homology, which will be defined below. Even if homology was first introduced in order to study topological spaces, it became interesting on its own. In fact, now there exists an entire branch of algebraic topology, homological algebra, which deals with the homology of algebraic structures, oblivious of the original topological motivations.32 3.1. Commutative diagrams. Let us start with some basic definitions. DEFINITION 3.1. A chain complex (C•, ∂•) is a sequence of abelian (i.e., commutative) groups connected by homomorphisms: * * * ∂n+1→ Cn ∂n→ Cn−1 ∂n−1→ * * * ∂2→ C1 ∂1→ C0 ∂0→ C−1 ∂−1→ * * * . The homomorphisms ∂• are called boundary maps.33 The composition of two consecutive homomorphisms is always the zero map: ∂n−1∂n = 034 for all n ∈ Z. In order to define homology groups, we need to analyse the images and the kernels of the boundary maps. In general, the image of a homomorphism f : X → Y is the subset of Y defined as Im( f ) := { f (x) ∈ Y |x ∈ X}. The kernel of f is the subset of X made of all the elements which get sent to the zero element: ker( f ) := {x ∈ X | f (x) = 0}. Note that if we consider the boundary operators, we have that both Im(∂n+1) and ker(∂n) are subsets of Cn . Moreover, since for all n, ∂n∂n+1 = 0, we have that Im(∂n+1) ⊆ ker(∂n). We can therefore define the homology groups as follows: DEFINITION 3.2. The n-th homology group of a chain complex (C•, ∂•) is the quotient: Hn := ker(∂n)/Im(∂n+1). We then characterize chain complexes according to their homology: DEFINITION 3.3. A chain complex is exact at Cn if Hn = 0. Therefore, a sequence is exact at Cn if ker(∂n) = Im(∂n+1). We say that a sequence is exact if it is exact at each node. Homology, in purely algebraic terms, basically measures how far a sequence is from being exact. 31 The converse only holds for the so called universal invariant. 32 For a rigorous definition of homology see Bredon (1993). As reference manual for algebraic material, including groups, homomorphisms, short exact sequences, and CDs, see Lang (2002). 33 The reason why the homomorphisms are called boundary maps is to be traced to the geometric origin of these algebraic objects. More specifically, a topological space can be encoded into a chain complex thorough a cellular decomposition. Then, the homomorphisms are actually the boundary maps which define how the cells are attached to each other through their boundaries. 34 It is common in the practice to indicate with '0' different mathematical objects: the trivial group, the trivial element, and the trivial homomorphism, sending all elements to the trivial element and the empty set. Thanks to Marcus Giaquinto for pointing out this ambiguity to me. 1 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 5 A 8 A 7 0 1 5 6 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 ./ 1 5AA 1 AC2:53 85 ,1 2 75 , 5 5 A 6 CA5 1D1 12 5 170 SILVIA DE TOFFOLI We introduce a particular type of sequence, as it will be relevant in the following: DEFINITION 3.4. A Short Exact Sequence (SES) is a sequence that is exact everywhere and has the following form: 0 → A f→ B g→ C → 0. Given a SES, the following properties follow from the definition: • f is injective. In fact, by exactness at A and observing that any homomorphism from the trivial group must be itself trivial, we have that ker( f ) = Im(0) = 0. (By definition, a map is injective when the kernel is zero.) • g is surjective. In fact, ker(0) = Im(g), but the kernel of the trivial map is the whole domain, so ker(0) = C . • ker(g) = Im( f ). Let us now consider two-dimensional 'arrow diagrams', and not only sequential ones: DEFINITION 3.5. A commutative diagram is composed by nodes and arrows connecting them. The nodes are a certain type of mathematical objects and the arrows are morphisms connecting them. A diagram is commutative if any two paths connecting a node to another one are equivalent. For example, the diagram in Figure 5 is commutative if and only if following the two paths from A1 to B2 we get the same result, that is, g ◦ α = β ◦ f . In terms of elements, if for every a ∈ A1, then g(α(a)) = β( f (a)). In particular, we can consider the case where the objects are abelian groups and the morphisms are homomorphisms. The study of commutative diagrams in general is part of category theory.35 CDs are extensively used in algebra. In fact, they serve to display in a single representation different algebraic information. They are frequently used to represent basic properties of modules or of groups, see for example Lang (2002, chap. 1). For instance, we can represent properties of quotient spaces in a single representation as in Figure 6.36 The mathematical details are not relevant here, I just aim to show different examples of CDs. I will now present a last example of a CD, the one in Figure 7, before getting to the diagram chase technique. This diagram appears in the proof of the Van Kampen Theorem, A1 A2 B1 B2 ✲α ❄ f ❄ g ✲β Fig. 5. A CD. 35 See Simmons (2011) for an introduction to category theory. 36 The diagram in Figure 6 refers to the following theorem: THEOREM 3.6. Let G be a group and N one of its normal subgroups. Let f : G → H be a group homomorphism such that N ⊂ ker( f ). Then, there exists a homomorphism f∗ : G/N → H such that the diagram in Figure 6 is commutative. That is, we have f = f∗ ◦ φ. 1 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 5 A 8 A 7 0 1 5 6 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 ./ 1 5AA 1 AC2:53 85 ,1 2 75 , 5 5 A 6 CA5 1D1 12 5 'CHASING' THE DIAGRAM 171 G H G/N ✲f ❄ φ # # #✒ f∗ Fig. 6. A triangular CD. π1(U1) π1(U1 ∩ U2) π1(U1) ∗π1(U1∩U2) π1(U2) π1(X) π1(U2) j1 i1 i2 ≃ j2 Fig. 7. An example of a CD. see Bredon (1993, pp. 159–160). Again, my aim here is just to show that CDs can assume different forms and help in proving various mathematical propositions, the technical framework and details are not relevant in this context. In these last two examples, CDs help to describe an algebraic situation and to infer results about it. Although also in these cases they are a great aid for mathematicians, the diagram chase technique is not involved. Therefore, let us now turn to CDs that support the diagram chase technique. 3.2. Diagram chase. I will present two proofs in homological algebra that make use of the so-called 'diagram chase' technique. I will argue that this technique involves representations which display both linguistic and diagrammatic features. As we will see, these proofs are based on the analysis of CDs. I will claim that these diagrams play different roles and are indispensable in understanding the relevant reasoning behind the proofs and even in phrasing in a meaningful way the statements of the theorems. One major difference between the two proofs is that the first involves a diagram which is a finite display of nodes and arrows, while the second involves a diagram which can be extended indefinitely: Suspension points are used at its extremities in order to indicate an arbitrary continuation. In this last case, I will interpret the diagram itself as the finite display, but the suspension points play a crucial role in its interpretation, as we shall explore in the discussion. There are deep philosophical issues that emerge in considering this type of 'infinite diagrams'. In particular, there are questions concerning the possibility of reasoning with diagrams by induction. Although this and other connected issues are relevant to the present study I am obliged to postpone their treatment to further work. To get an idea of issues that emerge considering infinite diagrams, from the point of the possibility of formalizing them, see Feferman (2012). I hope to convey an idea of how proofs by diagram chase go through, without discussing technical details which would be beside the point in this context. 3.2.1. The Five Lemma. LEMMA 3.7 (Strong version of the Five Lemma). Let the diagram in Figure 8 be commutative and such that its rows are exact. If f2 and f4 are surjective and f5 is injective, then f3 is surjective. Symmetrically, if f2 and f4 are injective, and f1 is surjective, then f3 is injective. 1 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 5 A 8 A 7 0 1 5 6 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 ./ 1 5AA 1 AC2:53 85 ,1 2 75 , 5 5 A 6 CA5 1D1 12 5 172 SILVIA DE TOFFOLI A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 ✲α1 ❄ f1 ✲α2 ❄ f2 ✲α3 ❄ f3 ✲α4 ❄ f4 ❄ f5 ✲β1 ✲β2 ✲β3 ✲β4 Fig. 8. CD for the 5-Lemma. Proof of the first part. I will prove the first part of the Lemma. The proof of the symmetric second part deploys the same technique and presents a similar structure, and will be omitted here. The proof consists in 'chasing' the diagram, that is, in moving an element through different paths of the diagram, as it is shown in Figure 9. We want to prove that f3 is surjective, given that f2 and f4 are surjective and f5 is injective. In other words we need to show that the image of f3 is all B3: Im f3 = B3. So, let us start with an element b3 ∈ B3, as in Figure 9(a). We want to show that there is an element a ∈ A3 such that f3(a) = b3. Now, we can carry b3 around the diagram until we find such an a. Let b4 := β3(b3), as in Figure 9(b). Since f4 is surjective, there is an element a4 ∈ A4 such that f4(a4) = b4, as in Figure 9(c). Now, β4 ◦ β3 = 0 since the rows form exact sequences.37 We have: β4(b4) = β4(β3(b3)) = 0, as in Figure 9(d). Since f5 is injective, the preimage38 under f5 of the zero element, is zero. Moreover, the diagram is commutative: f5(α4(a4)) = β4( f4(a4)). But β4( f4(a4)) = β4(b4) = 0, therefore f5(α4(a4)) = 0. Then, α4(a4) = 0, as in Figure 9(e). That is, a4 ∈ ker α4. Since the rows are exact, we have ker α4 = Imα3. Then, there exists a3 ∈ A3 such that α3(a3) = a4, as in Figure 9(f). Now, if f3(a3) = b3 we would be done, but we cannot assume it. Let us first suppose that f3(a3) = b′3; we have β3(b3 − b′3) = β3(b3) − β3(b′3) = b4 − b4 = 0. But then we can suppose that β3(b3) = 0; if this is not the case we just subtract from b3 the element b′3 which has a preimage in A3. 39 Then, b3 ∈ ker β3. But ker β3 = Imβ2 by exactness. So there exists b2 such that β2(b2) = b3. Then, since by hypothesis f2 is surjective, we can consider a preimage of b2 under f2 and find a2 such that f2(a2) = b2. We have, α2(a2) = a3. Therefore, by commutativity, f3(α2(a2)) = β2( f2(a2)). That is, f3(α2(a2)) = f3(a3) = b3, as wanted. ! 37 Actually, for this relation to hold we just need that the rows form chain complexs. 38 A preimage of an element b under a homomorphim f : A → B is an element a ∈ A such that f (a) = b. Of course, it does not always exist. A preimage of b exists only if b ∈ Im f . That is, we follow the arrow in the inverse direction. 39 These are standard moves in homological algebra, although they might be opaque to the unfamiliar reader. More explicitly, we wanted to prove the existence of an element a such that f3(a) = b3. If f3(a3) = b3, then we are done. Otherwise, suppose that f3(a3) = b′3, then β3(b′3) = β3( f3(a3)) = f4(α3(a3)) by commutativity of the diagram. But α3(a3) = a4 and f4(a4) = b4. Therefore, β3(b′3) = b4. But we also have that β3(b3) = b4. Thus, β3(b3 − b′3) = β3(b3)−β3(b′3) (since β3 is a group homomorphism) which is equal to b4 −b4 = 0. Now we can consider to substitute b3 with b := b3 − b′3. This will not alter the generality of the result since b′3 is an element in B3 that has a preimage. We wanted to prove that b3 had a preimage, now, if we add or subtract an element with a preimage to it, nothing changes: We modified the element b3 in a trivial way, with respect to what we wanted to prove. In the practice, thanks to the specific display, these steps are automatic (or semiautomatic). 1 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 5 A 8 A 7 0 1 5 6 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 ./ 1 5AA 1 AC2:53 85 ,1 2 75 , 5 5 A 6 CA5 1D1 12 5 'CHASING' THE DIAGRAM 173 Fig. 9. Display of a "diagram chase." 3.2.2. FTHA. In this section, I will briefly present the Fundamental Theorem of Homological Algebra (FTHA).40 As I will hint, the proof is based on a diagram chase in a diagram that is potentially infinite. 40 For a complete statement and proof see Bredon (1993, p. 178). 1 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 5 A 8 A 7 0 1 5 6 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 ./ 1 5AA 1 AC2:53 85 ,1 2 75 , 5 5 A 6 CA5 1D1 12 5 174 SILVIA DE TOFFOLI THEOREM 3.8 (FTHA). A short exact sequence 0 → A• i→ B• j→ C• → 0 of chain complexes induces a long exact sequence on homology * * * → Hp+1(C•) δ•→ Hp(A•) i•→ Hp(B•) j•→ Hp(C•) δ•→ Hp−1(A•) → * * * . As you can see in Figure 10, the rows are all SESs, while the columns are chain complexes; these are indefinitely long, with indices in the integers. The idea of the proof is to "carry elements around in the diagram" (Bredon, 1993, p. 178) in order to appreciate different properties of the various homomorphisms. A step of the proof. The proof is based on the analysis and use of the commutative diagram in Figure 10. In order to prove this theorem, once again, we have to chase the diagram. That is, we identify different paths exploiting the commutativity of the diagram, in order to verify some algebraic properties. In particular, we have to connect the two homology groups Hp(C•) and Hp−1(A•). This is represented in the diagram in Figure 11(a). I will give a brief idea of how this is mathematically done. First, we will check the existence of a homeomorphism Hp(C•) → Hp−1(A•), see Figure 11(a). In order to understand the following reasoning, it is necessary to follow the steps in the diagram represented in Figure 11(b). We have to check that an element c ∈ Hp(C•), i.e., such that ∂c = 0, is sent to an element in Hp−1(A•), that is an a ∈ A• such that ∂a = 0. Thus, we consider an element c ∈ C p such that ∂c = 0. Since j∗ is surjective, we can take b ∈ Bp such that j (b) = c. By commutativity, we have (omitting the indices) j (∂(b)) = ∂( j (b)) = ∂(c) = 0. Then, ∂b = b′ is in ker j . But ker j = Imi , since the rows are exact. Then there is an unique a ∈ Ap−1 such that i(a) = b′. Then, by commutativity we have i(∂(a)) = ∂(i(a)) = ∂b′ = ∂∂b = 0. Therefore, ∂(a) = 0, since i is injective. Then, for each c ∈ Hp(C•), there is an unique a ∈ Hp(A•) as wanted. ! ... ... ... 0 A p+1 Bp+1 C p+1 0 0 A p Bp C p 0 0 A p−1 Bp−1 C p−1 0 ... ... ... ❄ δp+2 ❄ δp+2 ❄ δp+2 ✲ ✲i p+1 ❄ δp+1 ✲jp+1 ❄ δp+1 ✲ ❄ δp+1 ✲ ✲i p ❄ δp ✲jp ❄ δp ✲ ❄ δpδ ✲ ✲i p−1 ❄ δp−1 ✲jp−1 ❄ δp−1 ✲ ❄ δp−1 Fig. 10. CD for the FTHA. 1 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 5 A 8 A 7 0 1 5 6 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 ./ 1 5AA 1 AC2:53 85 ,1 2 75 , 5 5 A 6 CA5 1D1 12 5 'CHASING' THE DIAGRAM 175 Fig. 11. Step in the proof of the FTHA. §4. Discussion of the case study. Through the display of the 5-lemma and of the FTHA, it is clear that CDs play an essential role not only in proofs, but also in defining the relevant content-matter in the statement of a theorem. In fact, without diagrams, even stating the results would be difficult. Not only it would be longer, but, as I will discuss, it would be also difficult to express the two results in a meaningful way. In the following, I will focus on the five aspects concerning the use of CDs identified above. 4.1. CDs form an effective notation. CDs are 'arrow-diagrams' that depict algebraic relations: Not only do they record all the relevant information, but they make it immediately accessible by representing the whole algebraic structure at once. This makes them effective as a mathematical notation, in the (nontechnical) sense that they function well in the practice in which they are deployed: They offer a convenient way to find a sequence of steps to prove a mathematical result. In the case of the 5-lemma, the display is complete in the sense that the entire situation relevant for the proof is depicted simultaneously. In the case of the FTHA, the diagram represents a relevant chunk of information-only three rows are displayed-but these are enough to obtain a general result. In fact, in order to prove the result, we choose an arbitrary index p and then analyze the situation in the rows corresponding to the indices from p − 1 to p + 1. It is the arbitrariness of p that makes the proof general enough. Even if these diagrams resemble a standard algebraic notation, spatial elements are exploited to externalize the relevant reasoning. In particular, planar configurations of the diagram correspond to algebraic relations. The arrows are to be interpreted as homomorphisms between groups and the different sequences of arrows, or paths, are compositions of homomorphisms. All spatial relations are to be interpreted topologically and not metrically. In fact, the exact shape and length of the arrows is irrelevant in any correct interpretation: Only their combinatorial structure matters. For example, in a CD a square is equivalent to a rectangle, but not to a triangle (as the one in Figure 6).41 In the case of CDs, metric properties do not play a mathematical role. 41 To further generalize, topologically, any polygon could be continuously deformed into a circle with nodes. Nevertheless, the disposition matters cognitively: Using squares and triangles instead 1 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 5 A 8 A 7 0 1 5 6 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 ./ 1 5AA 1 AC2:53 85 ,1 2 75 , 5 5 A 6 CA5 1D1 12 5 176 SILVIA DE TOFFOLI Another aspect of the spatial configuration of CDs is that in the case analyzed, these spatial elements are the disposition of the nodes and arrows in two dimensions to form squares or triangles. Generally, CDs in homological algebra are formed by these two shapes, but they could be in principle also made by other figures, such as pentagons or hexagons.42 Moreover, theoretically, CDs could have an arbitrary number of arrows touching any given node.43 Therefore, the fact that CDs in homological algebra present these simple shapes is not a fixed feature intrinsic to their nature, but depends on the specific algebraic structure represented. The fact that CDs present a simple and standard spatial disposition makes them particularly easy to interpret and use. For example, SESs, and their combinations into squares, are a standard representation of algebraic content. As soon as the groups and homomorphisms are represented in this way, certain properties become evident to the expert. For instance, given a display as the one in Definition 3.4, for an expert it is automatic that f is injective and g is surjective.44 Therefore, by exploiting the characteristic of standard shapes, mathematicians obtain results from the representations in an automatic way. This is a case of 'localized' operative writing. It is localized because just certain operations are performed automatically, while others require a specific mathematical interpretation and semantic reasoning. This case is similar to the one in which to perform a multiplication an agent simplifies (in a not automatic way) the task into simpler ones that then are to be performed automatically. Let us now consider how the three aspects we used to analyze mathematical notations (expressiveness, calculability, and transparency) are modulated in the case of CDs: (i) CDs are used to express algebraic relations. As we already observed, they generally come in standard forms (triangles and squares) but they could assume different shapes as well. The possibility to generalize the notation shows that they are highly expressive. Part of their expressiveness derives from the linguistic and abstract components they exhibit. I will develop this point in §4.2 where I will explore the similarities of CDs with geographic maps. In the context of homological algebra, they express any discrete collections of homomorphisms between groups. Nevertheless, the same notation can be used to represent other mathematical categories. (ii) Mathematicians apply the 'diagram chase' technique through CDs. The types of calculations CDs permit are not standard symbol-manipulations, but involve more conceptual processes. These operations are performed by moving elements around the diagrams. Therefore, the particular form of CDs makes them effective in conveying in a tractable form the relevant mathematics. The nature of these calculations reveals the dynamic nature of circles, we recognize more easily the corresponding algebraic relations. The notation is thus more transparent, at least for the community of experts. 42 Here I refer to 'combinatorial shapes', that is, the topological properties of CDs-the issue that instead of squares we could have circles is a distinct one, geometrical in kind. 43 Of course there is a practical limitation, a CD with nodes that engage a big number of arrows would be hard to interpret and use correctly: There is a cognitive limitation at play. 44 Note that a first example of CD is just a linear sequence of nodes and arrows, like a SES (for example a row in Figure 10). This is a limit case since in a sequence the commutativity condition is automatically satisfied: there is always a unique path joining two nodes. Nevertheless, the form of the representation in a SES is already relevant. Through it, we visualize the relevant maps all at once and we can infer some properties immediately. When deploying SESs, experts exploit their standard form in order to reason within the system of symbols. It is the specific arrangement in the plane of the paper that allows statement like "the rows are SESs" and "the columns are chain complexes." 1 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 5 A 8 A 7 0 1 5 6 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 ./ 1 5AA 1 AC2:53 85 ,1 2 75 , 5 5 A 6 CA5 1D1 12 5 'CHASING' THE DIAGRAM 177 of CDs, which I will explore in §4.3 CDs combine two different representational modes. On the one hand, they allow for an automatic 'movement' of elements in the diagram. On the other hand, as I will develop in the following section, they are 'algebraic maps' that present all the relevant algebraic relation in an unique two-dimensional display. (iii) CDs are highly conventional, so interpretation is needed in order for them to be used correctly. We need to add linguistically conveyed information to the diagrams, in order to interpret and use them correctly. For example, we know that two paths sharing the same starting and ending points are equivalent, that is, we need to be aware of the commutativity condition. Nevertheless, the simple geometric structures they present make them intuitive. The diagrammatic parts (arrow and planar disposition) are easily interpreted as algebraic relations, if the correct context of interpretation is given. 4.2. CDs function as maps. Let us now analyze another feature that contributes to the effectiveness of CDs: their similarities to geographic maps.45 As I explained, in order to correctly use a CD, not only does an agent need to understand how to interpret it correctly, but she also has to be able to 'move' between its various nodes. These diagrams can be interpreted as maps: CDs display the geography of an algebraic structure, where the mathematicians have to get oriented and be able to move abstract elements. In order to use CDs correctly, experts have to interpret the statements they want to prove in terms of the paths represented in the diagrams: A proof by diagram chase consists in moving an element around a map of an 'algebraic world'. A more accurate analogy would be with maps such as the London underground map, which are made of a finite number of interconnected nodes. In this type of maps (presenting a schematic nature), like in CDs, metric information does not really matter,46 but the relevant information is carried by the combinatorial structure. As maps, CDs display extra information 'for free', that is, they make available information that is not included in the set of linguistic data used to construct the diagram. Looking at the London underground map, we are immediately aware of how many lines intersect in a certain station or how many stops separate two stations. Analogously, looking at a CD we are immediately aware of all the possible paths from two nodes. Moreover, through extra information such as which maps are surjective, we can know in which cases we can follow an arrow backwards.47 As concrete maps allow us to grasp the landscape they represent at first sight, so CDs allow us to understand the whole algebraic situation immediately. Weber (2013, p. 7), considering a CD depicting the algebraic property of being a free module (i.e., a specific algebraic structure) writes: "Putting this notation into two dimensions makes a figure; and while the formal definition requires some time to absorb, the picture shows exactly and immediately what it means for F to be free." As we have seen in the case study, in order to carry out a proof which is based on a diagram chase, we must be guided by the written text step by step and follow in the diagram the various movements described. If we accept the analogy with maps, CDs represent algebraic landscapes, but they do not themselves gives us instruction on how 45 See Winther (Forthcoming) for a philosophical journey into the realm of geographic maps. 46 Of course, it matters cognitively to a certain extent. Nevertheless, it does not carry relevant information that can be read off. 47 This extra information can be integrated in the diagram by adopting specific conventions. For example, a two-headed arrow " indicates that the map is surjective and a hooked arrow ↪→ indicates that the map is injective. 1 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 5 A 8 A 7 0 1 5 6 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 ./ 1 5AA 1 AC2:53 85 ,1 2 75 , 5 5 A 6 CA5 1D1 12 5 178 SILVIA DE TOFFOLI to use them. We have to interpret them correctly and 'translate' what we want to prove in terms of paths in the diagrams. In fact, to perform a diagram chase, we need to pay attention at each step of the proof to a different node of the diagram and use the diagram to identify possible moves. This implies that the written text must guide us in the correct use of the diagrams. A similar phenomenon can be observed also in the case of Euclidean diagrams: As Manders (2008) pointed out, reasoning in Euclidean geometry consists in a constant feedback between figures and text. As in the case of geographic maps, not only are text and diagrams in continuous feedback in the case of CDs, but linguistic elements are also integrated in the diagrams. These are for instance indices and letters for CDs; in geographic maps we can find similar entries or even complete words. These linguistic elements are certainly advantageous, but they should not overshadow the importance of the two-dimensional disposition of CDs (and, more generally, of maps). Another feature that CDs have in common with Euclidean diagrams (and with certain maps) is that they are intra-configurational.48 Note that, in order to make the diagram chase visible, I rewrote the same diagram many times in Figure 9. Nevertheless this rewriting is normally omitted. The information carried by the extra-diagrammatical elements added to the diagram allowed me to include an encoding of the text into the diagram. Normally experts 'read' the diagram without rewriting. What I drew in Figure 9 is not a sequence of different diagrams, but sequences of the same diagram, where the relevant interpretation was made explicit by adding elements that did not strictly belong to the commutative diagram. It would be similar to drawing many diagrams for the same proposition in Euclidean geometry, in order to make explicit the construction of a single diagram, or again, to draw different maps of the London underground to highlight a specific path step-by-step.49 This aspect has been identified by Halimi (2012, p. 389) who, taking the 5-lemma as an example, states that adding an element does not lead to a new diagram: "We do not have two diagrams here, but just a single one, which is both a starting point and the embodiment of the successive updates involved in its completion." In §4.3, I will analyze in detail in which sense the "updates" can be regarded as an externalization of a mathematical reasoning, which is, as I claim, allowed by the dynamic character of CDs. In the case of CDs, we can quantify how much the particular disposition in two dimensions is optimal compared to a sequential one. First of all, we need to write sequentially all the maps forming the diagram. This means that if we have two arrows from a node, then in a purely sequential 'translation', we would have to write the node two times to describe both homomorphisms. Then, in order to impose the commutativity, we would have to add an equation for each square and triangle. In fact, a diagram is commutative if the path we follow to connect two nodes is irrelevant, that is, we would obtain the same result by following an alternative one. Thus, we have to check this for each rectangle or other closed cycle.50 48 This is not the case for CDs in category theory, where we might need to draw sequences of diagrams. But we do not need such a rewriting in order to prove a result by diagram chase. 49 The importance of using a CD step-by-step unveils the importance of the transmission of the construction steps of the diagrams. In the context of a mathematical classroom or seminar, it is much easier to convey in a vivid way this aspect rather than through published material. 50 Note that the commutativity of a rectangle formed by more than one square follows from the commutativity of the squares constituting it. For example, in the diagram of the 5-lemma, we only need to impose the commutativity of the four small squares and then the commutativity of the whole diagram follows directly. 1 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 5 A 8 A 7 0 1 5 6 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 ./ 1 5AA 1 AC2:53 85 ,1 2 75 , 5 5 A 6 CA5 1D1 12 5 'CHASING' THE DIAGRAM 179 4.3. CDs are dynamic. The fact that CDs present the relevant material in a unique display, is already a difference between CDs and a list of equations, but the point is not only that a diagram makes us save space. The important aspect is that with diagrams we can access to the whole situation simultaneously and calculate directly through the representations. Through a CD we get an unique display of the homomorphisms involved and their relations. The record of the same information via equations may obscure the overall situation. Weber (2013, p. 8) analyzes different examples of abstract spatial notations, such as CDs. He claims that "all this pure syntax is not just bookkeeping. It is a method for capturing structure, in compressed and manipulable forms." This assertion is in line with the claim that CDs form an effective notation partly because we can calculate with them. In the case of CDs, diagrams are not only shorter displays, but they are also essential for us to understand the mathematical situation. We could feed to a computer a sequentially encoded diagram, but we would have to reconstruct it in order to understand the reasoning behind a proof that involves it. The point is that CDs do not just record information, like (in a first approximation) a sequence of equations would, but they display information in a way that makes it accessible and mathematically tractable. By externalizing the reasoning, CDs allow mathematicians to reason within the symbols and to exploit their ability to reason spatially to draw inferences. In this sense it is possible to understand the claim that CDs externalize mathematical reasoning. Moreover, the fact that CDs support the diagram chase technique reveals their dynamic nature. Chasing the diagram is a specific type of calculation. In order to perform such a calculation, experts interpret CDs as dynamic reasoning tools, rather than static illustrations. In a previous work, in collaboration with Giardino (De Toffoli & Giardino, 2014), we considered the difference between static and dynamic mathematical representations. We claimed that it is possible for the same figure to be interpreted in different ways, either as a diagrams or as an illustration. For example, if a figure representing a knot is interpreted as a diagram, then it will become a mathematical notation supporting specific calculations. On the contrary, if it is interpreted as an illustration, it will only depict a geometric object. By illustration, we mean a static representation, which can be useful by conveying information in a single display, but where modifications are not well-defined. By diagram, we mean a dynamic representation, on which we can perform moves that can count as inferential procedures. Diagrams are dynamic inferential tools that are modified and reproduced by the experts for various epistemic purposes. (De Toffoli & Giardino, 2014, p. 830) Adopting this characterization, CDs are dynamic since chasing the diagram is an inferential procedure they support. This calculation requires the ability of focusing on different parts of the diagram and identifying different paths in it. Giaquinto (2007, chap. 12) has identified three types operations in spatial thinking, which he labeled as: "noticing reflection symmetry," "aspect shifting," and "visualizing motion." In the case of CDs, these operations are combined into a new one: paths identification, which is the same type of reasoning we perform with geographic maps (or better, with schematic maps such as the one of the London underground). Therefore, CDs present a dynamic nature in which different types of visual operations converge. The dynamic character of diagrams has been stressed also in the case of diagrams in category theory. In particular, Halimi (2012) has put forward the notion of "evolving diagrams" as diagrams that present a specific dynamic character. According to the author, 1 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 5 A 8 A 7 0 1 5 6 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 ./ 1 5AA 1 AC2:53 85 ,1 2 75 , 5 5 A 6 CA5 1D1 12 5 180 SILVIA DE TOFFOLI an evolving diagram would not only represent a mathematical object, but also support a specific mathematical reasoning or construction. CDs and other diagrams present similarities with Euclidean diagrams: One of the best examples of the latter feature is the Euclidean figure, which in a proof is often supplemented by the auxiliary lines and circles that the proof calls for. I would like to defend the idea that this is in fact a quite general fact: many mathematical diagrams do not represent mathematical objects once and for all; rather, they can be manipulated and enriched for the purpose of unfolding mathematical properties of the respective objects which they represent. (Halimi, 2012, p. 388) To return to Macbeth's essential distinction between describing and displaying mathematical content, CDs, via their dynamic character, display rather than describe the reasoning. This in particular implies that CDs are mathematical objects in themselves, and not only a descriptive tool.51 4.4. Beyond sharp dichotomies. As we saw, CDs are a hybrid notation in mathematics, containing at the same time diagrammatic as well as linguistic elements. These different elements support different kinds of reasoning, which can be labeled as geometric and algebraic. Nevertheless, as Giaquinto observed, it is misleading to conceive a sharp division between geometric and algebraic reasoning in mathematics:52 We commonly draw a distinction between algebraic thinking and geometric thinking. While that classification may suffice for casual discussion in restricted contexts, I claim that the algebraic–geometric contrast, so far from being a dichotomy, represents something more like a spectrum. To the extent that there is a fundamental dichotomy in mathematical thinking, it appears to be between spatial and nonspatial thinking. But I will present reasons for dissatisfaction with any binary classification: we should aim instead to develop a much more discriminating taxonomy of kinds of mathematical thinking based on detailed cognitive research. (Giaquinto, 2007, p. 240) In order to describe the division between geometric and algebraic thinking (or, better, between diagrammatic and linguistic representations), we can deploy the Wittgensteinian notion of family resemblance. Diagrammatic representations can differ widely, but we can identify features that we generally attribute to them. Then, given a particular instance of a diagram we can wonder what it has in common with other members of the same family.53 It is clear that CDs can be deployed to sustain Giaquinto's point. As Weber (2013, p. 64) notes, "images and inscriptions become rather indistinguishable in commutative diagrams." This means that according to him, diagrammatic and linguistic elements are integrated in the case of CDs. 51 The same point has been made for knot diagrams in De Toffoli & Giardino (2014) and for categorical diagrams in sketch theory in Halimi (2012). 52 On the other hand, Weyl (1932) famously distinguished sharply between these two different styles of reasoning in mathematics. I thank Tom Ryckman for pointing out to me this reference. 53 Specifically, we can wonder how "prototypical" a particular representation is, as belonging to a certain kind. This is done with the aid of Rosch's (1999) application of the notion of "family resemblance" to psychology. 1 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 5 A 8 A 7 0 1 5 6 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 ./ 1 5AA 1 AC2:53 85 ,1 2 75 , 5 5 A 6 CA5 1D1 12 5 'CHASING' THE DIAGRAM 181 As a complement to the analysis of Giaquinto (2008, chap. 9), I add some elements to the list he developed to highlight the features which CDs share with prototypical diagrammatic representations:54 1. The represented content is displayed in a synthetic whole. (That is, all the relevant information is accessible at once in a unique display. In fact, one CD substitutes for many separate equations.) 2. Spatial relations in the diagrams correspond to algebraic relations (for example, two nodes are graphically connected if there is a homomorphism between them). 3. CDs exploit the two-dimensionality of the paper, instead of being formed by symbols in sequence.55 4. Different parts of the diagram have to be grouped together in order to use it efficiently. In the case of a diagram chase, experts have to identify different paths in the same diagrams. This corresponds to grouping together different subparts of the diagram, made by nodes and arrows (this is an instance of aspect shifting and visualizing paths). This last point is well exemplified by Euclidean diagrams. In reasoning with Euclidean diagrams, a crucial operation is to interpret in different ways the same diagrammatic element. For example, in proving the possibility of constructing an equilateral triangle with side any given segment56 we have to interpret the same segment as side of a triangle and as radius of a circle.57 CDs present also features which are typical of linguistic displays: 1. They are highly conventional.58 2. They have a syntax. This is formed by letters, indices, arrows, and a 'wellformedness' condition on the two-dimensional concatenation of these symbols. Moreover, they are recursive in the same way language is. 3. Isolating a specific part of the diagram, we get information relative to a specific bit of the algebraic structure. 4. Part of the information can be read-off sequentially. In fact, we can read single rows (or single columns), but then the information is not entirely sequential because we have vertical arrows as well. Therefore, the diagrammatic/linguistic distinction, as well as the geometric/algebraic distinction, fails to capture the nature of CDs as well as the nature of other diagrams. This is not to deny the fact that these distinctions are meaningful in certain contexts, but to show that the dividing line is not sharp. Moreover, if we want to pursue a "more discriminating taxonomy of kinds of mathematical thinking," as Giaquinto envisages, then we have to abandon such oversimplified distinctions and introduce new ones, such as the one between intra-configurational and trans-configurational notations proposed by Macbeth. 54 Giaquinto (2008, chap. 9) identifies the first two features of the list. 55 This feature of diagrammatic displays is stressed by Krämer in (1988). 56 This is Proposition I.1 of the Elements. 57 See Macbeth (2012c, p. 69) for a detailed analysis of this example. 58 Although conventionality is clearly a typical feature of linguistic displays, it has been argued that also all visual representations are "highly conventional," see for example Panofsky (1991) and Goodman (1976). Thanks to one of the referees for this note. 1 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 5 A 8 A 7 0 1 5 6 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 ./ 1 5AA 1 AC2:53 85 ,1 2 75 , 5 5 A 6 CA5 1D1 12 5 182 SILVIA DE TOFFOLI The extreme usefulness of CDs derives exactly from the combination of elements belonging to both sides of the line, as we saw in the previous section, when we described them in terms of their expressiveness, calculability, and transparency. 4.5. CDs in different mathematical contexts. Concerning the role of diagrams in different mathematical activities, traditionally the debate has focused almost exclusively on the role of diagrams in proofs.59 In the following, according to this new trend in philosophy of mathematics, I will also take into consideration the roles diagrams can assume in phases of the mathematical enterprise other than proving, such as discovering and understanding. The latter is an important phase of the practice of mathematics, even if often its importance has been neglected. Supporting the importance of evaluating the role of diagrams in this broader way, Carter (2010) presents a case study involving diagrams that are not part of proofs, but play nonetheless important roles. The diagrams she considers do not depict geometrical objects, but belong to free probability theory. In particular, she identifies two roles: (1) diagrams suggest definitions and proof strategies and (2) diagrams function as "frameworks" in parts of proofs. In the case of homological algebra, CDs play the two roles identified by Carter: (1) a proof by diagram chase is inspired by the CDs and (2) if we consider CDs as maps depicting an algebraic situation, then they constitute the framework which allows us to understand and design the proof. Moreover, they are also the framework in which the statement of various results is expressible in a meaningful way. CDs also play two other important roles: (3) They display algebraic content in a meaningful and mathematically tractable way. Without them, even the statement of a result such as the 5-lemma would be much more difficult to understand.60 As we have seen, CDs organize content in such a way as to present the material in an accessible way, i.e., in a form experts can understand and use in order to draw correct inferences. (4) CDs allow for calculations by diagram chase; these calculations are an integral part of proofs involving CDs. One difference with Carter's case is that CDs are mathematical objects in themselves that are essential not only to describe or represent some other mathematical object, but they are themselves the subject-matter.61 This is similar to what Netz has argued for the case of diagrams in Greek mathematics: This shows that Greek mathematics relies upon diagrams in an essential, logical way. Without diagrams, objects lose their reference; so, obviously, assertions lose their truth-value. Ergo, part of the content is supplied by the diagram, and not solely by the text. The diagram is not just a pedagogic aid, it is a necessary, logical component. (Netz, 1998, p. 34) The case of CDs is analogous: They are the subject-matter. That is why even stating a result without them would be difficult, let alone proving it. A similar phenomenon is 59 See for instance Shin et al., (Fall 2013). 60 For the FTHA, the statement is about a CD, but the representation is linear, by using a convention on the indices. Nevertheless, the two-dimensional diagram is essential not only to understand the proof, but also to clearly conceive the situation under investigation. 61 It is important to keep in mind that a CD can be interpreted as a mathematical object or else as a concrete inscription, that is as a 'cognitive representation'. I am indebted to Marcus Giaquinto for helping me in clarifying this distinction. 1 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 5 A 8 A 7 0 1 5 6 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 ./ 1 5AA 1 AC2:53 85 ,1 2 75 , 5 5 A 6 CA5 1D1 12 5 'CHASING' THE DIAGRAM 183 observable in physics with Feynman diagrams, not only are they an inferential aid, but they make possible the exposition of content in a meaningful way.62 Feferman considers the proof of the FTHA and claims: While that proof [...] is written out fully in symbols, anyone who studies it can hardly deny that the diagram [...] is absolutely indispensable for understanding how it proceeds by "diagram chasing," i.e., the demonstration that the composition of maps along various paths from a given node to another in the diagram always gives the same result. This is completely typical of arguments in homological algebra, combinatorial topology and modern algebraic geometry. (Feferman, 2012, p. 379) Feferman discusses the possibility of formalization of such diagrams, in order to address the worries concerning the presence of diagrams in proofs. It is clear that if proofs are conceived as a sequence of symbols, as it is traditionally the case, then diagrams find no place in them. Nevertheless, observing this case study and other cases63 hints at the fact that the practice of mathematics does not follow such a strict definition of proof, and what counts as valid reasoning can contain diagrams as well. Moreover, the strict definition of proof as a sequence of symbols is essentially motivated by the desire of accepting as valid only "mechanically checkable proofs." In the case of CDs, this desideratum can be maintained, even admitting diagrams in proofs. The fact that we can translate CDs into a sequence of symbols does not mean that their specific planar nature is not essential for mathematicians to prove results with them. If we consider a proof as a syntactical object made by symbols and independent of human understanding, then CDs find no place in a proof. But if we consider a proof what actual mathematicians call 'proof', then CDs are an essential part of many proofs in homological algebra. Moreover, phrasing the problem of diagrams in proofs in terms of the possibility of eliminating them by translating the proof into a sequence of symbols misses the core of the issue. In fact, from the cognitive prospective, reformulating a proof analytically changes it completely. From my perspective, the fundamental problem is not whether a proof can contain diagrams or not, but whether it carries a stable mathematical knowledge. It is in this spirit that, in the case of Euclid, Manders (2008) analyzed the factors of the Euclidean practice that are responsible for the stability of the results of Euclidean geometry. Similarly, in the case of CDs we witness to a stable practice that is therefore also not at issue with respect to foundational worries. §5. Conclusions. By analyzing the uses of CDs, I hope to have conveyed how a mathematical notation can be effective by combining diagrammatic and linguistic elements. The simultaneous presence of these elements is what supports the specific form of calculation that expert perform on CDs: diagram chase. It is their hybrid essence that makes them such a perspicuous mathematical notation: Through their linguistic elements, they can represent general algebraic structures; through their configuration in two dimensions, they clearly represent the relations between these algebraic structures. The analysis in the present article has been made possible by the new approaches proposed by the philosophy of mathematical practice. In fact, it is only by a close scrutiny of 62 See Wüthrich (2010) for an introduction on Feynmann diagrams and an analysis of their origin. 63 See for example the case of low-dimensional topology in De Toffoli & Giardino (2015). 1 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 5 A 8 A 7 0 1 5 6 8 A 31 2 75 7 3 5 ./ 1 5AA 1 AC2:53 85 ,1 2 75 , 5 5 A 6 CA5 1D1 12 5 184 SILVIA DE TOFFOLI the practice of mathematicians that we can appreciate results such as the one presented in this article. This attention to the practice sets the ground in which scholars can contribute to more traditional debates as well, in particular by enriching philosophical notions such as 'notation', 'proof', and 'justification' in mathematics. Therefore, the attention to the practice leads us to shape the epistemological inquiries in philosophy of mathematics differently and more broadly. With the case of CDs, I hope to have contributed to this more general aim. A starting remark of this inquiry was that the role of notations is crucial in mathematics. A natural continuation of this research would be to enlarge the set of analyzed cases and include different types of notations, both in mathematics as well as in other areas of studies, such as natural or social sciences. In this direction, there are a number of studies on diagrams in natural science and in architecture and design,64 but a comparative study is still missing. Another further direction of inquiry is found from the observation that the point of view on mathematical notations presented here opens the door to experimental lines of inquiries. In fact, different mathematical notations can be approached also from the ground of cognitive science. In particular, it would be useful to identify what are the specific cognitive abilities triggered by different notations. For example, certain conventions in diagrammatic notations are better than others since they exploit our cognitive abilities such as vision and agency65 and the transparency of a notation (as defined in this article) depends on different cognitive abilities. The case of CDs would be particularly interesting also from this point of view because in it different cognitive abilities are triggered by their heterogeneous features. As I aimed to show, various representational advantages converge in a single CD. §6. Acknowledgements. I wish to thank Valeria Giardino for great suggestions and unending conversations on these topics. Moreover, I wish to thank: Jessica Carter, Tom Donaldson, Michael Friedman, Marcus Giaquinto, David Hills, Paolo Mancosu, Kenneth Manders, Thomas Ryckman, John Sullivan, David Waszek, and the referees for their helpful comments. 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Colección Razón y Sociedad Dirigida por Jacobo Muñoz LUIS FERNÁNDEZ MORENO (Ed.) PARA LE,E R A \NTTGENSTEII\ TLengua]e y pensamrento BIBLIOTECA NUE,VA Cubierta: José M.' Cerezo I,apresenteobrahasidoeditadaconlaalrrdadelaFacultaddeFilosofíadelaUniversidad' Complutense de Madrid. Luis Fern¿índez Moreno (Ed.)' 2008 Editorial Biblioteca Nueva, S. L', Madrid, 2008 Almagro, 38 2801Ó Madrid www.bibliotecanueva.es [email protected] ISBN: 978-84-97 42 815-6 Depósito I ngal: M-27 -092-2008 Imoreso en Lável Industria Gráfica, S' A' Impreso en España Printed in Spain euedaprohibidaf *.*:i::1:,'ni#l::ix'ÍJ?J:t:"til:.'ffi t#r:ffi '#i*'lJ;;ción, cOmuntcaclon Publlcr y transrorllra(rurr ':'''""'* :"' ; _- -l^;til#;;t;d.á t*.h¿.,j h infracción de los derechos mencionados puede ser consttruriva de delito conrra t. p.opi.d"d inrelectual (ans' 270 y sigs" Código Penal)' El Centro Es- ;;;ij] ó;h;; ilp."'tá"", f***..¿.o.oig) ,,.1" pó..i,op.,o á. Ios citados derechos. o @ indice Pnóroco 11 t5 T6 C¡r,frr.n-o l--knguaje, pensamiento e intencionalidad en el Ilactarzs, Alfonso García Su¿írez ......... Cpfrur-o 2.-El pensamiento y la triple dimensión de la figura en el Tiactattn, María Cerezo 1. Pensamiento y proyección ................. 2. ¿Tienen los pensamientos intencionalidad intrínseca? 3. Intencionalidad original, lingua mentis y sintaxis lógica ...... f. iQ"iUO pglg en coirelación áombres con objetos? .............. Referencias bibliogrrífi cas 1. El pensamiento en la Teoría de la figuración ....................... 2. Ios problemas exegéticos: la corresp-ondencia con Russell .... 1. ^Lor plob]gAas conceptuales: Ias taütologías Referentias bibliográfi cas 22 27 5U 35 C¡r,fruro 3.-op, dice p, \4cente Sanfelix Vidarte Introducción El enigmade.+ .. ... La forma d.9 ........... ¿Hermeneuta o hiper-naturalista? .......... El senddo de r............. La prioridad de la extensión ................ Contra los objetos intencionales l. 2. 3. 4. 6. 7. 39 42 49 )4 60 63 63 63 65 66 68 72 75 B. La crítica del sujeto Referencias biblio gráfi cas 1. L. I i*otcr, Car,írur-o 7.-Método y trascendentalidad en el Ilaaatus, Felipe Ledesma r89 190 19') 201 2t4 2l() 22.) n6 4.1. Naturaleza humana 226 4.2. Adíestramiento 228 Referencias bibliográficas 23l 1. El oroblema del método l5'r 2. Eniender la lógica " l(r0 .1. La lóeica y la áperiencia de que algo sea 16l 4. Circu'Íariáad del'lenguaje y método transcendental 167 5. Lóeica tr"ns..nderlá y fiiosofia especulativa " 17 3 6. La?eterminidad del séntido y sus éxigencias ..........."""""" 179 Referencias bibliográficas 187 i.otrt..u 83 83 86 92 79 82 C¡ritr¡ro 4.-Composicionalidad tracariana' Juan José Acero """ 1. lntroducción'...."""""""""""":"'-' 2. la compori.io'-'"1'i'áJ Jti;;"dd" de la proposición compleia' ' 3. La compo"oo"Já"J del sentido de la prooosición elementar ' 4. rJnai.',.rp,.t"t'üi'JtE;t1;;"t l3t-á'zis: (I) La forma v et .ontenido de una expresión """":':":":"' 5. Una i,l,.rpr.,"tiá'i ;:'T';'t":: 3'3 1 3' 3 1 B : (II) E'xpresiones' uroposicione'' u"'i'blt' y el Principio del Contexro (r.'Conclusiones """"""' Referencias biblio grrfi cas C,qrlr ut.r 5. -¿Hay sentido después del sinsentido? Reflexiones sobre los absurdos ¿¡el' i*''oit' Luis M' Valdés Villanueva """"' 96 101 \07 109 111 111 113 t4 r20 TzT r25 \27 130 Carírulo 8.-La teoría de \Tittgenstein acerca de los nombres propios, Luis Fernández Moreno 1. La teoría de Russell acerca de los nombres propios 2. Lateoríade los nombres propios del Tiactatus 3. La teoría de los nombres propios de Ias Inuestigaciones flosóficas ............ Re-ferencias bibliográfi cas C¡r,írur-o 9.-Una interpretación no escéptica del argumento sobre seguir una regla, Maigarita M. Valdés 217 Introducción 2lfl C¡r,Íru lo 6.-Sentido y co nocimien": Yl-#*ts epistemológico de diferentes tipo' ot p"pásición en Sobre k Certáz''ty e¡ el Trac' tatus, Stella Y illarmea " " " " Senrido yescepticismo " "'' "' "' nt'tditit áe la ñoción de duda El ámbito de la certeza l.i. r.op"ticiones especiales """""""' 3.2. Consentldo' t^tt"it dt sentido y sinsentido-:^':-;;^,-1. l. óo*prtación entre el papel de las propostcrones gramaricales y el de las ProPoslclones loglcas i""""':""""""' 3.4. i'i[ñí.î.iottt' ittáicionales o está1111 u/'t' lnterpretaciones novedosas o resolutas: un camino intermedio "" Sienificados indefinidos o difusos Cónceptos difusos, normatividad y escepticismo ..'.....'. " " "' Dos elia-rdianes de fronteras, la naturaleri humana y la comunidad .......... 1. Facticidad del sisnificado ................ 1 . 1. El Tiactatui o ulos muros del lenguaie, 1.2. L.a2lnvestigaciones filosóficas o-tuna fina red sobre el aDlSmO) Lenguaje, normatividad y normalidad 2.1.Tueeos de lenguaie en contexto 2.2. Ñoimatividaá, normalidad y formas de vida 3. Lenguaie y comunidad l-'t t' ,f Keterenctas blbllograrlcas l. 2. 3. 4. l. 2. r33 l.tt 134 137 137 138 140 \43 148 148 151 1,53 r)J C¡rÍruro 10.-Facticidad del significado y exigencia comunitaria en la filosofia del último \7ittsástein. Samuel Manuel Cabanchik ' 2'\'\ 2. 234 234 2.J7 241 241 245 250 25\ 3.5. Facticidad y comprensión """""" 4. Evaluación de la posición escePtrcar'"";^^""" """" ..a. LvilUdLru't u\ rq r-'-rt ' f , i. Lot límites del lenguaje y Ia tarea trlosorlca 6. Cerrando el círculo R.f..enci"s bibliográfi cas Isotcp 10 C¡rÍrur-o 11.-l-a pluralidad del significado' Manuel García-Carpin255 tero .... ..... . '.. l. Proferencias enunciativasyactuativas iZZ 2. La tesis de Austin """"""""""" L 3. El monismo semántico y el significado de los actuativos explícitos 266 4. 6;;;;.giu o; io'i d.l monista semántico " 275 5. La mejor ProPuesta monista 285 6. Cuestiones abrertas ?89 il.ru-..t i* Uibliogr,ifi"* )9I Nora sosR¡ Los AUToREs " 293 Calfrulo 7 Método y transcendentalidad en el Tiactatus Fei-rpn Lp,opsva I IIt, PROBLE,MA DEL MÉTODO l)c un tiempo a esta parre, los estudiosos de| Ti.actatus se han fi- ¡.r,1,' t'rr el problema del método: en cuál es el método de la filosofia '.,1 y ,. ,,rno-la entiende \X/ittgenstein y en cómo el Thactatus está consr , ,¡r,l, r siguiendo un cierto método que exige por parte del lector un r rrr rl ¡1 11¡ 11. lect,rr" acorde, que le p.t-i." ré.oir.r .l método o camilli | ( l(l(' :rl[í se le propone y pana el que allí encuentra una guía1. Bue- ' l)i,rrut¡nd (2000) habla expresamenre de othe method of the Tractatus, v de,,',' ¡'l'rlrt,r¡lticalprocedure, (pá¿. 155),queconduceallectoradescubrirhaiiael 1,,, rl , l, I lilrr. clue no ha entendido en realidad nada de lo que creía entender cuan- ' l' , 1, , rl ,,r l, ycnclo, pues las frases que lo componen tro son étr realidad más que ab- ,,, , 1, , .. , 1, r,, r rb'imiénto esre que cóntribuye norablemente a liberarlo de infundadas ' | ',,' r, ,r( s rrrctaÍlsicas. Conánt (2002) d'ice aI respecto: uThe actual method of the: , , rtr\ rr rlrr¡s ¿r literary surrogate for the strictlf correct method -one in which.1 ,' r rrrr ¡rr's rhc reader alrernarely to adopt rhe roles played by each ofrhe parties ' , ,1,, ,lr,ri,,l,,rrc in the strictly correct metÉod. As the'adáressées of this ,rrroq"t. r ,,,, ,,1 ,lr, itlrrrion, we are furnishedwith aseries of "propositions" whose attralti- ',' \r, .tl( ,rsl<ccl bothtofeelandtoroundonr (pág. 456,n. l3l).Ambosméto-| ,,',r,,, I nrtrr.do correcro de la filosoFía defendidó, segr.in é1, por Wittgensrein | !',,t,//tt\ lú)to el método efectivamentepuesto en práctica-a lo largó de sus 156 F¡llp¡ LEoEsv,r MÉrooo y TRANSCFTNDENTAT.TDAD pN pt. Trucrtrr¡s 157 na parte de las discusiones recienres enrre los intérpret es del Tractarus giraen.torno a la cuestión de cómo tenemos que léer esta obra, de un modo bastante parecido a como las discusiones entre los estudiosos de Platón se cenrran en la pregunta de cómo se lee un diálogo. pues probablemente hay dos módol de concebir la lectura de un"?. .rt", obras que normalmente llamamos filosóficas, dos modos que no solo son distintos,_sino que además suelen dar lugar a interpretaciones opuestas e. incluso intompatibles enrre sí, aun{ue ,or doi modos de leer complementarios. según una de .r"r .orr.ép.iones, la obra tiene interés en la medida en que transforma al lector, en que modifica su comprensión de ciertos asuntos y aun de sí mismo. Según la otra concepción de la lectura, lo esencial de la obra leída es h táis que defi.ende el autor y su posición respecro de las posiciones que manriene el lector mismo. Eñ principio, una obra cualquiera aámire ambas aproximaciones y muy bien puede suceder queli llamamos filosófico a un texto o a una obra esto se deba precisamente a que soporta por igual ambos modos de leer. Por eso parece raronabie deFender que la interpretación de un libro como el-Tiactatus no puede renunciar a ninguno de ellos, sino que, antes al conrrario, el intérprete debe evitar encastillarse en una sola de esas dos concepciones dé la lectura y desdeñar la otra, pues lo que busca es poner eÁ claro el sentido del texto y para ello. hace.tanta falta delimitar las posiciones que su lectura nos lleva a defender, en caso de qu9 noi con,renr" !l.rr"-.rrt., como contar la experiencia transformadora que es para nosotros dicha lectura, previa en cualquier caso a un pbsible convencimiento, salvo que esremos ya de antemano conyencidos. ca¡ece de sentido, entonces, separar los argumentos que en él se presenran para defender ciertas tesis del poténcial que el libro enciérra para modificar la comprensión del lector. Sin embargo, en el mundillo académico ha producido un cierro escándalo la propuesta que han hecho algunos esrudiosos de leer el 7hactatw, no como un libro de texto, r.gún ha dicho alguien con cierto desdén2, sino como una suerte de l"ibro-artefa.to, có-o,r.rto de tal manera que produce en el lecror suficientemenre aviüdo el efecto de liberarlo de sus personales ilusiones filosóficas, alqo así como un libro de propiedades rerapéuricas de corre pirrónico o1 quisecciones fos opone conanr a la "¡¡¿6[l¡isr¡ philosophical acrivirp, (pas.. 42D. Sobre esre asunro del método, cfr. rambien srein (200i) y Nordmánn'(zbol). saluo que se indique lo contrario, las traducciones son mías. Las referencias al rraítarus se darán en^tre paréntesis en el cuerpo del texto.2 Cfr. Diamond (2000), p$l r49 y r51. zá, algo así como un libro de autoayuda concebido para que incluso los más recalcitrantes puedan con su lectura deshabiiuarsé de l" -.taFísica3. La explicación de un tal escándalo hay que buscarla orobablemente en ei hecho de que en la "culrura filosóhca anglo-aÁericana contemporánean ha predominado una práctica inrerpretariva sustentada por una concepción de Ia lecturi que busca piincipalmente aislar tesis, así como (extraer y valorar la cadena ..nttal de razonamienrosu4. Quizápor ello la polémica subsecuenre sea una polémica tan típica de ula cultura filosófica anglo-americana conremporánear, pero a la vez una polémica que desdé otros ámbitos, puede ser que marginales, tendemos a ver como algo un tanto exagerádo y con más bien poca justificación. El problema del método es ciertamenre asunro central en cualquier ucultura filosófica, deudora, en el modo que sea, de la fenomenología, gue__tantl influencia ha tenido en el siglo to<. El problema del método ha llegado adem¿ís hasta nosotros marcado poi l" reflexión kantiana sobtefo tr"nscerrdental, reflexión de la que ,o-o, directos herederos y d9 cuyahorma no varnos a desprenderños f,icilmente. Pero el problema del método perrenece a la tradición de la metafisica clásica, que se remonta a Platón y a fuistóteles; tradición en la que se inscribe por derecho propio el Thactatus, o cuando menos el Tractatus vJ y como nos corresponde a nosotros leerlo, es decir, a quienes no sabemos leerlo de otra manera. El problema del método ro .r, como ya sabemos, algo accesorio para lá tarea filosófica, se enrienda ésra como se la entienda, sino cierramente crucial, pues el problema del mérodo no consiste e-n que no esré claro cul es el procedimienro adecuado para llevar a cabo ion cierto éxito esa rarea, y q.t. pot lo tanto haga falta poner a punto previamente para que podamos así acometeda; el problema del método consiste para la filosoÍ1a más bien en que ella misma es método,-camino, proceder. El problema del método ei el problema de la filosoffa mismajen t*to q,ré h filosofia misma es métódo, método transcendental, por decirlo cón el adjetivo kantiano, que \Timgensrein usa también varias veces en el Tiactatus. F-l problema del mérodo en este libro singular pu9d9 decirse, pues, que eslnseparable de la concepción transcendental de la filosofia que en él se despliega. ' Cfr. Conanr (2002). pág.4)l: "The premise under.lyins the procedure of rhe Tractatus (and rhis is connecñd to why rhe poinr oFthe i"ik is a'n erhical one) is that our most profound confusions of ioul show themselves in -and can be revealed to us through an attention toour confusions concerning what we mean (and, in particular, what we fail to mean) by our words.o a Conanr (1992), pág. 195. 158 Frl_u,p. L¡:oesw,q Como es sabido, de la filosofia deió dicho \Witteenstein oue (se compone de lógica y metafísica: la lógica es su base".."pe ro ,n ,\ Trortlttus enconrramos una sola alusión Jla merafísica, en la proposición 6.53, en la que además se habla de lo metafisico como'de'aleo sin más indecible. porque para hablar de ello sería menesrer empleár frases absurdas en que cierros signos carecerían de significado, por lo que Ia rarea propia de la filosoña consisre precisameñr. .n ponJr.o,o a cada nuevo intenro de decir algo meraiísico, a cada nu.uo intenro de hacer un uso transcendental d.e los conceptos, como decía Kant6, a cada nuevo inrenro de ir más allá de los límites que no se dejan traspasar y que, en tanto que límites, son, en orro sentido de la-palabra (que es el que más nos interesa), transcendentales. tanscendenrales son, por tanto, el yo, el mundo, la vida (cfr. 5.62y sigs.), Dios, la étic.a y la estérica ,kfr. _6.373-6.4321), pues no p.it.né..r, al mundo, sino a su posibilidadT. Po_r otra parre, en la proposición 6.13 se habla acerca del carácter, o del esraruro o naturilezá de la lógica y en ella se dicen, si es que esto es decir algo. esras tres cosas: que"nla l'ógica no es una doctrinar, que es más bien "una imagen especular del mundou v que además .cs transcendenral". Ahora bien, no esrá nada claro qué püeda sienificar ninguna de esas tres cosas, ni siquiera en el caso de'que se t"rate de sendas afirmaciones docrrinales, y mucho menos en el caso de oue sc trate de algo disrinro, de frases ."t.nr., de sentido y además absr.irdas, tal y como se nos sugiere al final del libro, en sus sécciones G.53,6.54 y 7, si e.s que_ les hacemos caso a éstas pero sin tomarlas como otros tantos absurdos. Lo que sí está claro, al menos, es que no tendría mucho sentido tomar en serio estas frases sin perseguil en el TTactatus una concepción transcendental y especulativa dé la filosoffa, abocada ella misma a su propia superación en el silencio. La filosofía, piensa \üTitrsens'tein,, tiene que. habérselas a la vez con la transcendentalidad del"ser y con la circularidad del lenguaje.r por lo ranro, con su propia circuraridad y con su propio caráéteí dé método rranscendenirl, p"r" lo que ] !:q¿t, pág 216 y (re7e b),Apéndice r, pág. 106.'' KrV, A 238-24BlB 297-305. 7 Hace tiempo que Erik Stenius subrayó la necesidad de entender el Tractatus comparándolo con la filosolía kanrianar cFi. tlgrro). cap. Xl. Karl-orro Apel ha insistido, por * gilr^.:Sn la rranscendentalidad de la concepción wittgenste'iniana de la lilosolíar clr. (1985). esp. r. I. págs.22\-l(. 229. 232.jJJ v r. IL"páes. J5 v 150_ 151. cfr. también Peter Bachnieiér (1978). [Jna versiór.r lr"ríar.rt. .ieío, -itirrdade esta similitud entre el Tract¿tus y la obra kantiarra es la que da David pears; cfr. (1987), esp. págs. 7,71,115 y 143-144. MLirr¡oo y rR{NSCIINDTTNTALIDAD t,x tr. Tnur:llrt.s \59 necesita articularse en torno a la oposición enrre lo oue se dice v lo que se muestra, oposición sin la que no serían reconocibles los límites del lenguaje y que por sí sola encierra uel problema cardinal de la filosofia,8."Qú¡î io eité tan claro de .ntr"dá todo esro, pero confio en que sí quede claro al final de estas páginas, pues es jusramente esto lo que me propongo defender aquí. ' Será preciso para ello abordar algunos otros asuntos, como el problema del orden interno del Tlactatus y el problema de la naturalezay el alcance de las frases que lo componen, así como el de su interna consistencia como conjunto de frases que es. Esta última cuestión de si la postura de V/ittgenstein es consisrenre, o por el conrrario incurre él mismo en una incoherencia al calificar de absurdas sus propias frases, ha dado lugar a ciertas discusiones recientes entre quiénes defienden, de acuerdo con la interpretación clásica, que parJleer el TTactatus de un modo coherenre hay que atribuir a tüTittgenstein ciertas incoherencias o paradojas" y q.ti.nes entienden qri"r secciones finales del libro reobran sobre todas las precedenres f en cierro modo las anulan, por lo.que n9 |ly." el diseño del conjunto.inconsistencia ninguna, sino más bien una peculiar complejidad rerórica, Iógica e incluso estratégica, que es tarea de los lectores desentrañarru. Por mi parte, trataré de mostrar que la coherencia del Tractltus, en mi opinión incontestable, no se reduce simplemente a una ausencia de cóntradicción entre unas y otras de sus^secciones, sino que es más bien la coherencia propia de un discurso que ha de habérselas con la circularidad del lenguaje y con la irrebásabilidad de sus límites, y que acomete la tarea propia de la filosofia entendida como método transcendental. Pero por ello precisamente no le encuentro ningún sentido a que se pongan aparre cierras secciones del libro que, junto con el prólogo, forman lo que se ha dado en llamar uel marcou de la obra, en el que se conrienen las instrucciones que necesitan los lectores para orientarse en su personal recorrido por ellarr. Creo más bien que el Tractatus es consistenre porque las últimas secciones no solo reobran sobre el conjunto del libro, sino que además se aplican a sí mismas, en el curso de un método circular e 8 Según le escribe a Russell el 19 de agosto de 1919, (1995), pág.124; (1979 a), pág. 68. .e Cfr. Hacker (2000), págs. 356, 367, 370 y 382, y \Xrilliams (2004), pág. 27.r0 Cfr. Diamond (1991), págs. 182, 194y197-198, Cor'"nt (2002),pigs.ZZ6, 37By 421. y Nordmann (2005), págs. 86, 92-94y l0l.rr Cfr. Diamond (2000), págs.149,151 y 160, Conant (2002),págs.457-458 n. 135, y Hacker (2000), págs. 360 y 383 n. 13. 160 Frlrp¡ L¡,o¡sr¿¡ :::-*?':::::l^11;r."da nuevo paso es, por ranro, provisional, ren-tatlvo y aproxrmado' Pero habrá que ir entrando en mareria. Lo miís conveniente será comenzar por lo que hallamos en la proposición 5.552 acerca dela transcendentalidad del ser y de su relación con el entendimiento de la lógica, que es (una imagen especular del mundo, y que además ues transcendental". Puede detirse. incluso que Io qr. "qui-. propongoes lormdmenre un comenrario de dicha proposición, en'el áu. ,. prerende aclarar las imbricaciones de lógicá y merafísica en ,l frartatus, entendidas como los dos .ompon.ñt.s b ingredientes de una filosoÍia especulativa y rranscendental, heredera de"la vieja tradición de la metafiiica 2. ENTENDER LA LÓCICA Lo que se dice de la lógica en la proposición 5.552 viene a cuento de "la pregunra por todas Ias formas'de frases simples,, pregunra 9u.e:_.9m_o, resulta obvio, uhemos de responder a priori, 6.5í, ,fr. 5.4731). Y enteramente a priori se r.tpond. qr.r. no podemos da., priori el número de nombrés con significado diferenre, ni, por lo tanto, la composición de la frase simple. El significado de lo! nombres !o-9t.n modg alguno deducible,-ni consriuible ni definible (véase 3.26 y sigs.), sino que ha de venir dado; mienrras que la posibilidad de que los nombres signifiquen perrenece a la misma "esencia de lanotación> (z.l+z¡ -de If chaiacteristica, como la llamaba Leib-nizt3-, pertenece a la nnaturaleza de la frase, (j.3lr. y este es precisamente el asunto de la lógica, "lo único que en la lógica se expT..:31 (6.124): que lo arbitrario presupone su piopia posibiiidad, posrDrtlctad que. no es en modo alguno arbitraria. Pues, como sigue diciendo, en ella no se trata de qué nosotros nos expresemos con ayuda d.l,or,signos, sino de que (erla lógica r..*pr.rá la propia na.i.al.za d,e los srgnos naruralmenre necesarios,, (¡bíd.). Esto significa que la ^, 12.Apel.-1cuyo iuicio la última proposición deI Traüatus no solo denuncia la falta de senrido de las anteriores, sino que además está claro que ha de aplicarse a sí misma, no reconoce sin embargo en la o-bra de \x4ttgenstein r-taá, pa..cidJ" un círculo hermenéutico: véase (1985), t. I, págs. 226y í61-362,,e.pJctiramen,.. p"r.." entender más bien que únicamenre Ln-a mediáción dialécrica'sería calaz d. hr.., comprensible y r,nanejable la."paradójica aurosupresión del rracnm¡, (16íá., pag. 22+¡, a la v,e' q'e se abriría con ello el camino hacia una pragmáLica tr"nr..nd.nti. 'r Cfi. sobre esro K¡eale (lc)66), págs. 204-21\. MÉrooo y TRANscENDENTAT-rDAD EN p.L Tnsc.r¿rus r61 lógica no necesita para nada de la nforma lógica especialo de la frase simple, pues no.d.R.nd. de nada que podarños haliar, invenrar o recrbrr (que para.el caso vlene a ser lo mismo), sino que más bien lo ha_ llado' inventado o recibido presupone ya "aquello'que me hace posible" (5.555) invenrar, hallaio reiibir una forma esbecial .u"lqri..". Con..respecro a la frase simple, a la lógica le basta .'on qu. t.ng"-o, 4:..11." (un^concepro,. Y esro (esrá .Taro que [lol renémosu."añade (ibíd.). La,frase simple..es simple en ranro que inconexa, es simple porque se la puede desligar de cualquier .rtru.tuta de la que puéd. formar parte. Su significado, por tanto, esarbirrario, porqú. uünicamente a los srgnos inconexos corresponde una conexión arbirraria cualquiera, de significad os (4.466). ' Resulta bastante claro que cgandg en el 7lactatus se habla de lógica no se está hablando de una ciencia formal cuyas realizaciones son cálculos que hacen posible la formalización del lázuaie, como el cflculo de enunciadol o los cálculos de predicados áe iistinto orden. Ocurre más,bien que, para.la concepción wittgensteiniana de la lógica como aquella parte de Ia filosofta que es su base, no parece t .r., ,irrgún sentido algo así como un cálcúlo de predicados,^en el que se esr¡pulen ciertas formas de frases simples. Así entendida, la lóLica no es una ciencia formal, no es ni siquiera una ciencia, ni una iocrrina o cuerpo de conocimienros, sino que la lógica es rranscendenral y especulativa,. en ranro que "imagen eipecuJar-del mundo,. por eso pr..ir"mente ,,la lógica há de ocufarse de sí misma, (5.473) y no delquello que no le compete. Ha de ócuparse, enrerarnenre a príori, de las conexion_es lógicas de signos, a las qüe corresponden dererminadas conexiones lógicas,de sus significadgs, y n9 def significado de los signos inconexos; ha.de ocuparse de la forma lógica dé la composición. ! no de las imprevisibles formas dela frase simpTe; ha de ocuparse del armazón lógico del mundo, y no de lo que pasa en el mund'o, pues en él no puede enconrrar solución a ninguno de sus problemas (véase 5.551). Mas por eso mismo la lógica, esta lógica de la que se habla en el Tiactatus, no es independienté del mundó. No por ier a Driori, transcendental y especuláriva deja de ser aplicable al -undo, a la experiencia; antes al conrrario, la lógica es aplicable precisamenr. por r.,. transcendental y especulariva, pór no r.i un hecÉo q,r. ".on,.ée en el mundo y del que.se pueda.tener experiencia. Recordemos lo que se lee al respecto en [a proposición 5.552: _ T a uexperiencio que necesitamos para entender la lógica no es la de que algo se comporre así o asab, sino la de que ,fgo ,ro, pero eso precisamente no es experiencia ninguna. 163r62 Fuur'¡: L¡oEsv,q La lógica es anterior acualquier experiencia -de que algo sea rzsí. Es anterior al cómo, no anterior al qué. MLl.rLrtt \ l[{AN\Lr\t'r N-lAr rDcl) f\ rl Tn¿, t ttt t la forma o posibilidad de un hecho cualquiera (es decir, de cualquier hecho posible) la denomina \fittgenstein forma kgica (véase 2.IB2.182). En virtud de ella, un hecho (Tittsache) pued.e ser una imagen (Bild) de otro cualquiera con el que comparta la misma estructura (véase 2.032,2.034,2.15, 4.014). Por lo que, a la inversa, necesariamente ula imagen es un hecho, (2.141). Pero lo que aquí se está llamando un hecho parece equivaler por completo a un complejo estructuralmente determinado (véase 2.14, 2.I5, 3.14, 3.24, etc.), que ntiene algo en común con otros), como se dice en la proposición 5.526\ a propósito del símbolo compuesto, pero de tal manera que lo así dicho se puede aplicar a lo compuesto en general, a los hechos. Es precisamente esa comunidad estructural lo que hace posible la expresión de un sentido (véase 3.141.-3.142) y afortiori la afirmación y la negación de lo expresado (véase 4.064). Más aún: ul-a posibilidad de todos los símiles -Gleichnisse-, del entero carácter imaginativo -Bitdhafiigkeitde nuestro modo de expresión estriba.tt l" lógica de la formación de imágenes -Logik derAbbildung-, (4.015). No olvidemos que todos los símiles son imágenes: precisamente por eso pueden actuar como símiles y en cualquiera de ellos puede reconocerse, por lo tanto, la lógica de la imaginación o formación de imágenes que hace posible el lenguaje porque hace posibles, en general, los hechosra. Ia Como rni inrención no es la de defender aouí una traducción alternativa a lâs que ya se har.r propuesto para las palabras Bild, Abbildungo bilden en eI TTactattu, stno explorar una línea de interpretación de esta obra que persiga en ella las huell¿Ls de la tradición metafísica, me voy a permitir entender sistemíticamente Bi/d como uimagen>, AbbiL/ung, como uimaginaciónu, en el sentido de uformación de una imagenD -aun-que resulte un tanto forzrdo, dado el uso habitual de esta palabra en nuestras leng"^y bildtn por uformar una imagenu. Ya desde el Sof sta plaronico sebemos que 1o propiodel hgosessupoderparaproducirimáge112-1r!9kyl!1ntásmatlt-qruer.o tienen otro apoyo u oüa materia que las palabras (vease234 c-e). No ciertamente las palabras sueltas, sino las palabr:u articuladas de acuerdo con Ltna sinta.xis (véase 262 c-d), que a su vez presupone crerta lógica (véase 259 e-260 b), de la que depende por entero la capaciclad de hablal y decir algo en general, pero también la posibilidad de jugar u opinar acerca de algo, de discu'rir y de que algo aparezca como algo (véase 263 d-264b). Lógica que se hace manifiesta especialmente en la articulación del decir más breve, en la frase simple (véase 261 d). Como es sabido, la uiógíca de la imaginaciónu o dsl .trrecer phaínesthaies, para Platón, dialéctica (véxe253 d), cosa que, para \f'ingenstein, es sin m¿is indecible. Y la dialéctica platónica, considerada desde el Tractahu, es un modo de Forzar el lenguaje con el que ie intenta decir lo que no puede decirse. sino que tan solo se tnuesffa. Sin embargo, Ia necesidad dialéctica de superar lo ya dicho, r-regándolo, y el carácter inagotable c{e lo que queda por decir pesan sobre el lengueje de ur-r modo muy semejante a como actúa sobre él la necesidad con que para \7rttgenstein está finaimente-abocado al silencio todo intento de decir algo aierca de aqueiio de lo que no se puede hablar. Pero ése es precisamente el asunto-de la me¡afisica. Aquí encontramos en efecto una precisión importante a propósito de la transcendentalidad de la lógica, pues se nos dice a qué es y a qué no es anterior, alavez que se hace una sugerencia sobre el vínculo esencial que une lógicay mundo. Pero si esas precisiones aclaran algo dependerá de que logremos entender las respuestas que parecen insinuarse para ciertas cuestiones complicadas con el asunto de la transcendentalidad de la lógica y bastante complicadas de por sí, que \Tittgenstein ha heredado de la vieja metafisica. ¿Qué puede ser eso de una nexperiencia) que no es experiencia ninguna? ¿Qué significa que algo sea, con independencia de que sea así o asao? ¿No es lo mismo decir de algo que es así o (asao) y decir qué es? ¿Qué se quiere decir con nentender la lógicar? ¿La entendemos de hecho? X por último, ¿hablar de la transcendentalidad de la lógica no exige algo así como un método transcendental, o más bien una concepción transcendental de la filosoÍia, entendida ella misma como método, un cierto camino circular que se encamine en cierta dirección y que parta de allí donde ya nos encontrarrros, para retornar a ello de tal modo que en ello mismo se hagan patentes las exigencias de su propia posibilidad? ¿Ese punto de partida podría ser, quizá, que entendemos la lógica, es decir, que la aplicamos, que nos entendemos hablando cuando entendemos frases con sentido (vaiea la redundancia)? ;Será eso lo arbitrario desde lo que podamos part]r para remontarno;a su posibilidad, que no puede ser ya arbitraria? Veamos. 3. LA LÓGICA Y IA E,XPERIE,NCIA DE QUE ALGO SEA Sirviéndonos de las socorridísimas comillas, que nos permiten escribir acerca de aquello de lo que no se puede hablar (¡ si le hacemos caso a la última proposición del 'lractatus, sobre lo que, además, ha de guardarse silencio), podríamos añadir que eso de entender la lógica es un uhechou, pero no en el sentido estricto de la palabra, sino en un sentido derivado o metaforico, que juega con la palabra porque la palabra nos da juego: el uhechou de que efectivamente entendemos la lógica. Pero esto precisamente no es hecho alguno, sino más bien algo presupuesto en los hechos, en tanto que exhibido por los hechos como su propia posibilidad, es decir, como su forma (véase 2.033,2.15,2.203,2.I7 y 2.I71; cfr. infia, M). Como es sabido, a r64 F¡,ur'¡ Lsot sl¡¡ Ahorl bien, .quizá podría, argüirse que. resulta poco. preciso, .y portanto erróneo, identificar hecho y complejo estruclural,-por más que los hechos tengan.una.esrrucrura i!{pleja; pues se rrartde dos conceptos que es preciso disringuir cuidadosamenre a menos que esremos dispuestos a tergiversarlos reduciendo uno de ellos al orro. Aquí, sin embargo, hay un problema. Y es que, por mucho que sea el cüidado que pongamos en distinguirlos y manrenerlos aparté el uno del otro, ellos mismos se nos r,uelven a iuntar de un modo bastante oscuro, casi podríamos decir que inextricable. Resulta obvio para cualquier lecror deI Tiacratus, o incluso para cualquier hablante (véase 5.5563), que llamarnos sin más hecho a un hecho posible, y que lo posible es en cada c:No un hecho. Pero que también, por orra parie, opónemos los hechos a las meras posibilidader, ,. pr.r.nten bajo la forma que se presenren, como conjeturas> meras apariencias, ilusiones, deseos, etc. (y ése parece ser el sentido de la palabrá hecho, Tatsachren las primeras sÉccioÁes del Tiactans). La misma indecisión la enconrramos en el uso de las palabras nestado de cosas -Sachuerhab-, y urealidad -Wirklichheít-,que unas veces aluden claramente ai sentido de las frases, al obieto de nuestro decir, a lo descrito o descriptible en y por el lenguaje, sentido este compadble con las distintas modalidad.r del ser 1véasé 2.06, 2.20I, 4.0I,.4.023,4.0621 y 4.1)t', y orras veces, en cambio, parecen reFerirse a algo aieno a.l lenguaie, algo con lo que resul¡a inevi¡able comDarar lo que"decimos, de m"odo que"nuesrro decir resulre necesariamenré verdadero o falso (véase 4.05-4.06). Es, en efecto, muy inestable el uso de todas esas palabras con que en nuestra lengua cotidiana hablamos de eso que normalmente llamamos la realidal o el mundo, de lo que en el lenzuaje técnico de la tradición metafísica se llama el ser y sus modalida?es; hasra el punto de que dicha inestabilidad da lugar a todo un capírulo especiai dé las confusiones lingüísticas, no ran iñocenres como aquell a de "Grün ist grün, O.323), donde la misma palabra es empleada'en dos ocasionesiomo dos símbolos distinros. El único modo de evitar es¡os errores en las frases que decimos pasa por consrruir un lenguaje sígnico que nos obligue a abstenernos ex prof¿so de "usar el mismo símboi-o en sisnos distinós, y de usar ne*terdamente de igual modo signos que desi[nen de modo diferente,, (3.325), piensa \Tittgenstein. Pero nb es ran fiícil eliminar estas confusio,t.r, ud. las que erá llena la filosofia toda,,, cuando se trata precisamente de ulas confusiones más fundamentales -die f""d.aMÉrooo r, TRANSCENDENTAT-TDAD t:N p.t. Tptct-,trus 165 mentalsten Wrwecltslungen-" (3.324). No está claro, sin embargo, qué quiere decir esto: si sorifurrd"mentales respecto de otras .orfuJiorá o si además entroncan con algo fundamental para el lenguaje. Las confusiones m¿ís fundamentales se producen, al parecer, cuando se intenta hablar de lo más fundamental y son por ello mismo fundamento de otras confusiones. Pero no por eso deja de ser fundamental lo que da lugar a las confusiones más fundamentales. Ocurre m¿ís bien que, si queremos que se muestre en el decir que eso fundamental para el decir no puede ello mismo decirse, no podemos renunciar al intento de decir justo aquello que no se puede decir. Las frases que intentan decirlo son ciertamente frases fallidas y no son, por tanto, frases, sino mrís bien absurdos. Pero esto se muestra cuando el propio lenguaje se resiste a decirlas; y no por enunciar una aparente tesis que aparenta afirmar que muchos de los problemas de la filosofta no son problema alguno (véase 4.003, donde ruo se enuncia esta tesis). Esta resistencia del lenguaje es lo que obliga a emplear en ciertas ocasiones las comillas, como cuando hablamos de esa nexperienciaD que no es experiencia ninguna, pero de la que depende que tengamos experiencias y que entendamos la lógca, como en efecto la estarnos ya entendiendo. Esta uexperiencia) está, así, supuesta en nuestro lenguaje corriente y moliente, por lo que para hablar de é1, sin salir de él (pues el lenguaje de la filosofia no es otro lenBuaje), tenemos que hablar sobre ella, usando las comillas; pues, ya sabemos que los problemas de la filosofia, es decir, (nuestros problemas no son abstractos, sino quizá los m¿is concretos que hay, (5.5563), los problemas de cada uno de nosotros. Nuestro problema ahora es que palabras como ¿J o srr oscilan inevitablemente entre estas dos cosas: de una parte, aluden a aquello de lo que hablamos en y con el lenguaje, aquello a lo que el lenguaje nos remite y que no podemos dejar de comparar con é1, en tanto que imagen suya-Bild- (véase2.2l); y, de otra, no salen del lenguaje mismo, sino que se limitan más bien a distinguir entre modos del oecir, como cuando se habla de probabilidad, esto es, de lo cierto, lo posible y lo imposible (véase 4.464). Nuestro problema afecta precisamente a la conexión entre la posibilidad de eso que decimos al hablar y la posibilidad de aquello de lo que hablamos. Este problema, quizá el más concreto, no se nos presenta por falta de entendimiento -hayque decir-, sino que, antes al contrario, es problema para nosotros porque -y en tanto queentendemoslo. Dicho de otro modo: 16 Para eliminarlo no basta en efecto con decir, como hace Hart (1971), pág. 277, que u\littgenstein has here at least illegitimately permuted a modal ope- 't T," palab." Sachlage se usa solamenre en estos contexros. Véase 2.11,2.2022.203,4.031. 166 FeLrpE LnoEsv¡ (entender una frase significa saber lo que es el caso si es verdaderau (4.024). Esto es obvio; como también k, es que, en consonancia con ello, la frase .se puede enrender sin saber si es verdadera, (ibíd.). pero lo que no es ran obvio -o quizá sea mejor decir que lo es hasta tal punto _que necesitamos de ciertas advertencias pari reparar en ello, al modo de esas glosas aclararorias que, cuandó .u-pl.n su papel, se muesrran ellas mismas absurdas, de las que me ocuparé^en el cap. IVes el sentido de la cláusula condici,cnal usi es verdade¡ar. Segúnparece, el uhecho, de que entendamos una frase, y con ello nos entendamos hablando (véase 4.026), es algo independiente del uhecho" de que esa lrase sea verdadera o falsa,'pero ná es independienre respecto del ,,hecho_o de que la frase tiene que ser verdadera o falsa, pues de ello_depende que se deje analizar.ómo u.r" función de verdad. Esros uheclhos, qúe no son rales y el .hecho,, de que entre ellos haya un vínculo preciio, que rampocó es realmente un hecho, están complicados con el uhechou -ésie también entre comillasde crue las frases describan hechos -ahora por fin sin comillas y ri.r r.érvas. Que una.frase describe un hecho parece, pues, signifi car, a la uez e inseparablemente, esras dos.or"r' q.t. la Fráse tiene"sentido v se entiende; { 9ue la frase remite a algo ajeno a ella misma .on lo qr.r. ha de poder ,compararse, concuelüe o no concuerde con ello, 'de modo que la frase iea una función de verdad (véase 5-5.01 v 5.23'41\. Que enrendemos las lrases que decimos significa, .n,on.ér. oue entendemos lo que las Frases dicen, los hechoíque describen, y que entendemos taryblan. pero de un modo disrinio, algo que no ie deja describir ni decir, y (ue no es hecho alguno: es. rémiti, de las frases llenas de sentido a aquello con lo que lIs frases que enrendemos han de poder ser comparadas. . La,posibilidad.de una tal comparación depende por entero de la IorTa lógrca. preclsamenre porque ésta es compartida por todos los hechos. La forma lógica es lo que hace posible'que cujquier hecho sea una imagen de oiro hecho éualquieri con el óu..o-b"rra su estructura; mejor aún: la forma lógica es la posibilidad misma de dicha comparación. De ahí que, en ranro que forma de un hecho cualcuiera, la forma lógica equiva)ga ala posibilidad sin más x por tanto. a ula forma de [a reilida d'-dil Form'der \yirklichke¡t-,i (i.l B, cfr. i.lg). Esta forma lógica o forma de la realidad es lo que desde anrisuo se viene llamando la inreligibilidad de lo que es, Ia naturaleza pe"nsable MÉrooo y TRANSCENDENTAITDAD p¡s p.t, Tnqcr¿rus 167 de los hechos. Y, de acuerdo con esta tradición, que se remonra a Parménides, \Tittgenstein llama pensamiento a ula imagen lógica de los hechos -¿ds logische BiH dr; f¿¡5a¡/.1sv-' (3), es lecir, a"lo pensable o inteligible en cuanto tal, a lo que de pensable o inreligiblé tiene lo que es, ól"rn.nte por ser, en viriud de su complejidadlde su estructura. 4. CIRCULARIDAD DEL LENGUATE Y M ÉTODO TRANSCENDENTAI Ciertamente, el uhecho, de que la realidad renga una forma y que ésta sea la forma lógica no .r ,Jgo de lo que t.ni"-o, experiencia alguna, como tarrpoco lo es la uexperiencia" de que algo sea, impresci-ndible p"r" .nteider la lógica. Pero, puestos a seguiihablando -y escribiendo entre comillasmás allá de los límites del pensamlento, nos encontrarrros con ese nhechon peculiar -tan peculiar que entrecomillamos la palabra con que aludimos a é1, no vaya a ser que se entienda en su recto significado y demos ocasión así a un enorme malentendido-que consiste, según parece, en el uhecho, de que haber lógica es inseparable de que"algá sea. O quizá sería mejor udeciru que consisre en el uhechou de que la Iógica es aplicable. O mejor aún: en el uhecho, de que hay sentido, pües hablámos aplicando la lógica (véase 5.5562-5.5563), al decir frases cuyo sentido éntendemos y, así, <con las frases nos entendemosu (4.026, cfr.3.3). Entenderse significa, pLles, que no hace falta que nos aclaren el sentido de las fraseípar" qr.t.logré-os entenderl"r (,ré"r. 4.02I). De lo contrario no estaríamos ya aplicando la lógica, pues aplicamos la lógica en ranto que entendemos el signo usin que nos sea aclarado, (4.02).Toda aclaración presupone que estamos ya entendiéndonos y usando la lógica: presupone, por tanto, que estamos ya moviéndonos en la circularidad del lenguaje, de la que no podemos sali¡ pues su principio y su término están más allá de sus propios límites, como reconoce \flittgenstein a propósito de la aclaración del significado de los nombres. En tanto que signos primitivos, los nombres son indefinibles (véase 3.26-3.261y 3.3411); su significado no puede propiamente ser dicho, sino tan solo mosrrado o expresado por el-usó (véase 3.262), precisamente porque ellos mismos se limitan a nombrar, sin decir eso que nombran, pues eso que nombran, los objetos, es indecible; cabe (tan solo hablar de elloso (3.221), como ya deiaron dicho Platón en el Sofsta y Aristóteles en el De Interpretitione'. Pero los nombres no rator and a quantifier, and perhaps also made a¡ all too easy siide from "possiblv" as l,t:,nt:1..,9p.rator ro "possible" as a predicare". I a cuesrión .r po|. q,ré t..rulrá ,-tacll el deslzamiento, si se trata de cateqorías tan claramente distintas. 169168 MÉ--r'c¡rro y rld NscTENDENTALToAD pN t:t. Tn¿ctt n.,.s presamente, pero sí parece responderla; y lo hace además diciendo algo que todo el mundo sabe, pero que no es propiamente decir ninguno: (a la esencia de la frase le pertenece que pueda participarnos un sentido nu€?)oD (4.027). Podríamos añadir, a modo de aclaración, que el sentido de la frase es siempre nuevo, de un modo inaeotable e imprevisible, pues el sentido nüeuo de la Frase no se deja déducir a partir de su posibilidad, no se puede fi1ar a priori; por eso la lógica no puede <anticipar lo tocante a su aplicaci ón (5 .557) . Pero si la frase se entiende es porque su sentido nuevo uha de participarlo con expresiones viejas, (4.03), expresiones que ya sabemos usar y que tienen por tanto algún significado para nosotros, en tanto que componentes de otras frases cuyo sentido ya entendemos y con las que ya nos entendíamos al decirlas, aun usin tener ni idea de cómo y de qué significa cada palabra, (4.002). Pues bien, esta circularidad del lenguaje en la que ya nos encontramos hablando y entendiéndonos es precisamente el punto de partida para la filosofia, comprendida como método transcendental. Es el único posible, además, pues es ahí donde ya nos enconrramos en cada caso: en medio de una frase. La filosofia, dice \littgenstein, uno es una doctrina, sino una actividad> (4.112). Actividad metódica, tenemos que añadir. Y tal cosa no significa que la filosofia tenga un método o ie sirva de un método, sino que ella misma es un método: el camino o actividad de encaminarse desde donde ya nos hallamos en cada caso hacia un lugar que no es otro lugar, pero en el que buscamos estar de otro modo, es decir, transformados o modificados por lo que respecta a nuestro modo de mirar el mundo y la vida, que (son una sola cosau (5.621). Pero cuando hablamos de estar, hallarse o caminar estamos aludiendo con distintas oalabras a uno de esos uhechos)) cue no son hecho ninguno, precisamente al "hecho,, de que hablamos y nos entendemos. Nos encontramos efectivamente hablando, diciendo frases y entendiéndonos. Nos encaminamos hablando v hablando esDeramos modificarnos a nosotros mismos al transfoimar nuestra -mirada, transformación que afectará también a nuestro modo de hablar; hasta el punto de que entonces aprenderemos a callarnos. Pero no yayamos tan de prisa, que aún nos quedan algunas cosas que udeciru. Esta modificación de nosotros mismos, por obra de una actividad que llamamos filosofia, tiene lugar en el lenguqe, cuyos límites no podemos sobrepasar hablando, precisamente porque ya estamos hablando (véase 5.6-5.61); se lleva a cabo además por obra del lenguqe, cuyanaturaleza se expresa a través de los signós que uso (véase 5.555 y 6.124); pero también obrando contra el lenguaje, que udisF¡lrlu LEoEsv¡ siempre son entendidos, _así que no pocas veces nhan de sernos aclarados para que los entendamos,, (4.0'26). ¿eué clase de frases son en_ tonces las que usamos para aclarar el signifiiado de los nombres sin, propiamente hablando, decir nada? Soñ Io que se llama glosas o co_ mentarios, Erhiuterungen (3.263). son frases q.t. ro añadán nada a lo que dicen las frases cuyos signos primitivos rrátan de aclarar y que no entendemos: no dicen nadimás, porque no dicen nada. Soá aigo así como frases parasitarias, que glosan o tom.nt"n lo dicho p"r" q"u. lo drcho se vuelva claro, pero que no pretenden susriruir ni cómplerar lo ya dicho y por.ellas glosado. del mismo modo que el comeniador de un poema o de un libro que no se enrrega con lacilidad al recror, como el rractatus, no aspirá a susrituirlo pór una suerte de prótesis a pie de página, ni a asfixiarlo bajo una balumba de resis y discusiones, sino más bien a verrer sobre.él algo de luz, a dejar que'simplemenre diga,lo que dice. Pero esas glosasó comenrarios_que'aclaral el signiflcaoo oe tos srgnos pflmrtrvos se componen ellas mismas de signos primirivos, por [o que ,,se pueden enrender solamente si los signi"ficados^de esos signos son ya conocidos" (ibíd.). Entender er seniido de las trases presupone, pues, entenderel significado de los nombres y, a la vez. enfender el significado de los noñrbres presupone enrender el sentido de las frases; no sólo el de las frases quáglor"r o comentan lo dicho, sino también v en prim5l lugar el de l"r?"r.s que dicen algo con sentido y.r.ry" ucónexión l-Zuro**r"h;"gr: i;i.;;"te tienen los nombres significado, (3.3). Lo uno y ló otro, significado de los nombres y seniido de las frases, ,. ,..rrrrí"., murua í.ir.l'r_ larmenre. Mas no por ello se produce esa sue*e de cortocirciiro del lenguaje que llamamos círculo vicioso, pues las glosas no son definiciones y de los nombres no hay definición posib"le. ocurre más bien que ya nos enrendemos hablando, es decir, diciendo frases con sentido; con un sentido más o menos claro para nosorros y que, por tan, to, requiere a menudo de alguna aclaración, e incluso de'aclaiaciones quizá interminables, pues los signos primitivos no rerminan nunca de entregársenos (véaie 4.2211)l Pero. no nos equivoquemos, Io así a.clarado no es propiamenre el senrido de las Frases, no.r ru compre- ¡rdad estructural, que remite a otras frases, sino el sienificado dêsus signôs simples, que remite a su uso. Por eso mismo É traducción de una frase se reduce a raducir usolamente las parres componentes de la frase, (4.025). La forma de su articulación es intraduclble precisamente por ser Io común. A la circularidad del lenguaje alude \Tittgensrein también cuando aborda la cuestión de cóñro es que nos eñtendemos, de cómo es que nos las arreglamos para hablar. No es que plantee la pregunta ex170 F¡r.u'¡' Lror-sv,q MÉrcroo y'I']LANScrlN DENTALT DA D ¿N rt T n ¡ c r,tn ¡s 171 fraza ,el pensamienro" (4.002, véase 3.323-3.325 y 4.002-4.0031), pues los límites del pensamienro son mucho más estrechos que los límites del lenguaje, de modo que podemos hablar sobre aquéllo de lo gu.e.ng_hay nada que decir y de lo grc por fanro no se puede en rigor lrablarl-: y avanza'desde y hacia el lenguaie, en Ia circularidad inagotable del lenguaje, capaz de resisrir con paciencia infinira la enrrio, siempre diferida d. ru! propios.o-pon.Á,.s (véase 4.2zlll. Cor.á"nl zamos por entendernos, esto es, por aplicar la lógica; pero hablamos para entendernos, esto es, para aplicar la lógica. Por éso dice \flittgenstein que la filosofia es una actividad que riene como mera (la aclaración ló€ica de los pensamientos -dii logische Küirung der Ge6lank(n-,,. Esto no significa, se apresura a aclaiar, que haya "frases filosóficasu, a las que nós conduzcá esa actividad m.lódi." oue llamamos filosofía, sino que adonde ésta conduce más bien es a un uvolverse claras las fráses -Klanuerdrn ltsl4 gd¡asn-¡ (4.LlD. En consonancia con ello, añade en el mismo lugar, us¡¿ tarea filosófica consiste esencialmente en glosas o .o-..rt".ios -Erláuterun7en-r,al igual que la tarea de aclarar el significado de los nombres."tr n.r.rtro uso corriente del lenguaje. Thnto en un caso como en otro, la palabra no es f,ícil de traducir, pues no basra con recurrir a aleún sinónimo de la traducción más óbvia de ErkLjrunr, como eluíidación o es c larecimiento. Co n Erhiuterungen no está habiándo \fittqenstein de la meta de la filosofía, sino de lás "frasesD que es preciso ir-udiciendo,, (así, entre comillas) para acometer esa tarea; taréa que, claro está, se lleva a cabo hablando, aunque no propiamenre diciendo frases con sentido. Son ufrasesu que no son frase alguna, que más bien traran de glosar -ertiuternlas auténticas frasei y hacer que se vuelvan claras. Y esto lo consiguen en la misma medida en qué a ellas mismas se las ureconoce comó absu rdas -unsinnig-,, (6.52). Las nfrases, de la filosofia_son, pues, ufrases, que no dicen"nada, que no describen nada que podamos enrender. que no son ni siquieia casos exrremos del simbolismo, como las frases de la lógica -de las que nos ocuparemos después-, pero que ayudan a enteñder [o que ya'enrendíambs en las f rases que decimos, sin enrenderlo. Las "Frases,,de la filosoFía no cxpresan el pensamiento, pero preparan su exhibición, aprovechándose (paraprepararlo) de que los límites del lenguaje sin más no son ran estrechos como los límites del pensamienro. es decir, como los límir7 Esta distinción fundamental entre hal¡lar de algo y hablar sobre algo o dcerct de algo queda a menudo desfigurada en las t¡aduccionés de la úlrima propásición del Tractatus, donde sin embalgo leemos claramenre que sobre aquello 7r Ib que no se puede hablar hay que callarse o guardar silencio. tes del lenguaje con senrido, aprovechándose de que podemos hablar sobre aqu{llo delo que no p,réd. hablarse. L", ufr"r.ro de la filosofia son glosas o comenrarios-que.intentan decir, sirviéndose para ello de alusiones, símiles ymetáforasr8,_lo que no puede decirse, porque p.rtenece al límite irrebasable del decir, p..o que t. -,t.rtr.-.n ei ini.nto de acercarse a decirlo; no porque lo muéstren ellas mismas con su lracaso como Frases decidorai, sino porque lo muesrran las frases llenas de sentido en las que ellas nos hácerreparar y que ellas contribuyen, con su fracasado inrento, a volver claras. Poi .ro puede decir \Tittgenstein de la filosofia que, uhaciendo presenre con claridad lo dgcible, hace que lo indecible se signifique ó se anuncie -sie wird das Unngbare bedeurcn, indem t\t dri Sagbare hlar darstelh-, (4.114, cfr. 4)13-4.1i4). No porque sus frases digan a la postre lo que no puede ser dicho, sino porque ayudan a que se vuelván claras nllestras frases y en ellas se sigÁifique, mostrándoie, lo que no se deja | . ]C)oeclr' Las nfrases, de la filosofia viven a cuenra de aquello que comentan: de ello parten y a ello retornan, para desaparecér en efio o, al menos, para ,ról r.tra inservibles t-rr" ,ra, usadas. Son, así, enterarnente provisionales, en tanto que meras tentativas o aproximaciones que han_ de ser superadas poiinservibles, cuando gr"ii"r a ellas se hú" luelto claras nuestras frases, si es que tal cosa és alcanzable; son uhases, que no aspiran a dejar algo dicho de algo. sino que más bien se d.icen'para que ng queden diéhas, para que-se disuelvan en el silencio, aunque ese silencio final y culminante haya de posponerse una y otra.vez, como ya sabía muy bien Platónz0. Las ufraseso de la filosofía no exponen ninguna docrrina o teoría que pueda ser tomada al oie de la ietra, pues ésrán hablando ace rca de aquello sobre lo qu. no ,. 1B Stenius habla de una umetáfora sir-rtáctica, ert el Tractatus, oero la considera propia de un "no-depicting language',, como si no fuese una imrgerr Bild-. Clr. (l 960). págs. 2i l-213. I'' Clr. Hadot (195c)), dondecompara a Wittgensrein con el neoplatónico Darnascio, distingue diFcrcnres usos del lenguaje ,n rI Tr¿,tutu, y r..o'ló.. un uso indicativo o moitrativo, que arribuye " h gé""irlid".l de las frasés del libro, nqui montrent néanmoins,_qui visent per-rt-étre, le langage dans ce qu'il a d'insurmbntableu (pág.4-8). Pero háy,'n equiuo.o.n "rr..Jdó de hablar que es preciso desha.cr,pues fas.,frrases" de la filosofia no indican en el senrido de qu..n eila, se muerrre lo ¿sí ind.icado, sino que lo hacen en ranro que di'igen la nrirad¡ he.ia lo que ellas mislnas ni muesrran ni dicen. Al menos crro e, lo q"u..rroy inrenrlndo deiender aqur. 20 Matthew B. Ostrow ha llamado la atenciór-r sobr" i" similitud ..rtre .l -éto.do. wittgensteiniano y la dialéctica platónica, pero me parece que no extrae de ello las mismas consecuencias que se extraen aquí. Cfr-. (2002), -págs. 12-15,43, 99 y 128-135. 172 F¡lrp¡ Lsoesu¡ pu.ede decir nada. Pero ni.siquiera esto último se deje romar al pie de Ia letra, lo que sería sencillamente absurdo: ranro éi en verdad'es lo mismo aquello sobre lo que hablan y eso de lo que no se puede decir nada, como si es otra cosa. Ni siquiera el prólogo del Tiactatus se lib¡a de ser tentadvo y provisional-, .orno [o es óualquier otra de sus grosas o comentarlos. Pero la tarea filosófica que consisre en dichas glosas o comenrarios no.puede susrraerse a li circularidad del lengüje, y habrá de ser necesariamente circular, algo así como un inacábable 'rodeo que va dando muchas vueltas. Primeramenre porque su punto d. pattida es rambién su mera, pero además porque esa mera no parece que terminemos de alcanzaila. En cualquiei caso, si alguien lo con'sigue, no tendrá de seguro que hablar tanto, sino qu.,.o"-o ya diiese pTarón21, nmirará el mundo derechamen te, (6.541, tras haber dejádo arrás, superadas en su camino, todas esas nfrasesr. Pero eso sol'amente quien lo entienda (a \üTittgensrein, se entiende): owelcher mich ueriteht, (ibíd.), dice él mismó. Nosorros. que no rerminamos de entenderlo, nos afanamos en la glosa de la glosá. Y con ello no creemos esrar Derdiendo el tiempo, sino rehacieñdo cada vez el camino de la filosáfia, circularmente. Partimos en cada ocasión del punto en que ya nos encontramos, de ulo singularr, que (se manifiesta siempre'de nuevo como algo sin importancia" (3.3421 ). Y otra vez nos éncaminamos hacia,ello para ver en ello derechamenre el mundo, porque no hay -ulqg alguno que ver en derechura, sino en Io singuiar mis-o. .La posibilidad de cada singular nos da una aberrur^ --Aufrrhlrílsobre-el mundo" (ibíd.). Isí entendida, como método t.ánsceáderrtal, la filosofia se encamina hacia un peculiar modo de ocuoarse del mundo, de vivir en el mundo, mirándolo derechamente a través de su abertura o desencubrimiento en lo singular y en cada caso sin importancia. Lo que cadavez intenta de nuJvo es que el mundo irrumpa o se abra, mostrándose en lo singular, de un modo parecido a como aflora el mineral escondido en lá entraña de la tierra, cuando la superficie de ésta se rompe y dejala veta al descubierro: éste es precisamente el sentido recto de la palabra alemanaAufich/u[|. Por eso hacía falta el rodeó, el intento de apró*imáción que paradójicamente necesita tomar una y otra vez el camino más largo, para ver lo singular derechamente .ómo lo en cada c"ro sobr.pasáá.o por srr posibilidad; para ver lo empírico, como Io en cada caso sobrepasado por lo supraempírico, poidecirlo kantianamenre. Pero el roMÉrc¡ocnr y rRANscrENDIi-NTALrt)AD pN ¡t. Taac'rtrus 173 deo no podía no retornar a lo que (se manifiesta siempre. de nuevo .o-o "lgo sin importanci¿,,, pués la posibilidad de eso s1n importancia es lo"úni.o q,r. revela el mundo' Y de eso sin importancia ha de alimentarse de iontinuo dicha revelación. Este camino que parte de lo singular y arbitrario, de lo en cada caso ya dado' para remontarse a su p"osibiúdad y retornar a lo singular mismo, que de ese modo se l,uelv'e manifestatión del mundo y?.lo no arbitrario, no tiene nada de nuevo: nasí es como, en efecto, suceden las cosas en filosofla' (ibíd.). Este camino no es otra cosa que lo que kantianamente suele li"m"rs. método transcendental, con el q.te y" se habían encontrado Plarón y Arisróteles, cada cual a ,u -"á.r")'. Y al igual que ellos, \flittgeÁstein enriende que la tarea de la filosoÍla consiste en el recorridJde dicho camino, q'.t. pasa necesariamente por la lógica, es deciq por poner de manifieito ,,el armazón del mundo, -un armazón lógico, ólaro estáen ulas frases lógicaso (6.124, cfr. 3.42 y 4.023). 5. LOGICA TRANSCE,NDE,NTAT Y FILOSOFIA ESPE,CUIATIVA Ahora bien, conviene insistir en que es siguiendo este camino üanscendental del que venimos hablando como únicamente nos sale al paso la transcenáentalidad de la lógica. No tendría ciertamenre -u.ho senrido afirmar que la lógica es iranscendental sin concebir la filosofia misma.orno -itodo tránrcertd.ntal. No basta, desde luego, con señalar hacia la raigambre kantiana de la expresión, como se ha hecho en ocasiones, p"." entender lo que leemos en la p-roposición 6.13 del Tiactatus. Ni basta rampoco con aplicarle ral cual alguna de las definiciones (o, quizá, aclaraciones) dél adjetivo nanscendental que proporciona.Kant enla Crítica de la razón pura, como si una lógica o un conocimiento transcendentales no tuviesen nada,que ver con una concepclon transcendental de la filosofta, en cuyo discurrir se remonta desde lo empírico hacia lo supraempírico. que no está aparte de lo empírico, sinb que esraba ya cada vez en lo empírico mismo, sobrepasándolo de continuo. Que Ii lógica es transcendental significa, en Primer.lugar, que no hav hécho niñguno al que podamos ll-amar lógica' Ni siquiera un hechb del tipo al"q.te p.iren.cen las diversas ciencias. La lógica no es 22 Véase el comienzo del libro YIl dela Rep., junto a los diversos lugares en que Platón se refiere al camino más larqo. Y de Aristóteles, entre otros lugares importantes para el concepto de epagogé, Ai. Post' II, 19 Erb. Nic', I, 4: y Fis' l' 1.2r Véase Rep.218 d. 174 F¡upe Lp.o¡srl¿n una de esas ciencias, como no lo es la metafisica: <no es una docúina, sino una imagen especular del mundon (6.1.}). La lógica perrenece más bien a esa actividad especulativa que llamamos fiTosoFía, en la medida en que la filosofia es acrividad áe aclaración lóeica. Lo así aclarado perrenece esencialmenre a Ia naruraleza del deciipero resulta indecible; lo así puesro de manifiesto en lo singular y ."r.nt. d. rmportancia pertenece esencialmente al mundo, eñ tanto que arma_ zón.lógico del mundo, p€ro no es un hecho singular del mundo. por eso.la lógica es transcendental. Pero sin dejar dáser una actividad, la Iógica es también una construcción, resultádo d. esa actividad filosófica.de glosa o comentario, un artificio técnico para el a¡¿ílisis del lenguaje, aunque no un lenguaje ella misma. Es más bien la lógtca del lenguaie: que se sirve de_esos (garabaros y manipulaciones rin especialesr, que no serían nada si nd se r,rar.tt p"t" .i. fin. ;Cómo o.réd. entonces la lógica abarcarlo rodo y espejeir el mundo al servirse de todos esos garabaros?, se pregunra \Wimgenstein. "únicamente porque todos ellos se anudan en una red infiniramenre fina, en el gran espejo> (5.51 1). Por eso además, por ser actividad de glosa o .orñ..rtario que teie el artificio del gran bspef o del mundo, p"ero sin conrarse entre lo que pasa en el mundo, ei la lógica tr"nrc.ñdental. Mas no acaba ahí la cosa. El recorrido de ese camino transcendental procura sin duda una uexperiencia, (así, entre comillas), de la que aIávez se alimenta, que no se reduce a Ia .experiencia" de que "l'go sea, sino que es alavez .experiencia" de los límires del mundo y del l.ngu"jé. Esra ,,experiencia" de limiración es inseparable de ésa acrivid"ad'de elosa o fomentario que llamamo_s filosoFía y que se propone la aclar:ación lógica del pensamienro. Partiendo-de la experiencia de que alqo se comporra así o asao -aunque el mero hecho de que aludamos-a ella con esta expresión tan general y anvagadelata que ya hemos pasado muchas veces por aquí en nuejrro ."-ino circulár-1, partiendo ou., del hecho de que algo se comporra así o asao, hecho que describó hablando' es decir, ariiculando'frases con senrido, me áncamino hacia algo que no es.ur1 hecho, que no es experiencia ninguna y que, sin embargo, se deja uexperimeñta' cuandó intenramos í.suit l" indi."- :ig",qy., desde.la experiencia del caso, nos conduce hicia su posibilidad. La uexperienciáu (entre comillas) resulta ser una experiencia fallida, en la que no se muesrra hecho alguno, sino algo qü.,. sustrae a f a experiencia y que está en cada caso"más allá de lo"s héchos. La frase.que apunl.a hacia.la posibilidad de los hechos se queda a medio camino, y no,llega a decir nada a la postre, sino que i. top" con los límites del decir y del mundo, se-da de bruces con los límires del pensar. Si consiguiese decirlo -eso a lo que apunta-, entonces está -laro que no lo diría, pues en ese caso estaría describiendo algún hecho y ño la posibilidaá de lor hechos, incluida la posibilidad-de éste, claro. está, que no habría razón ninguna para dejar al margen de su Proplo declr.- -Y de nada nos serviría establecer unas restricciones artificiosas a nuestras frases, que interfiriesen en su articulación sintáctica, para que las frases hablasen las unas de las otras según un cierto orden jerárquico, pero nunca cada una de sí misma: como si los signos perdiesen o ganasen su posibilidad de significar a nuestro antojo: nNo puedes prescribir a un símbolo aquello parastyaexpresión podría ser üsado. Todo lo que un símbolo puede expresar podría-expresarlou, le responde a Russell a propósito de la teoría de los tioos'r. Los proptos límites del decir impiden que podamos imponerle al lenguaje otras limitaciones distintai de las que se exhiben en cualquiera de las frases que decimos: no hay entre la lógica y la aplicación de la lógica algo así como una zona intermedia, en la que se pudiese pactar o estipular el modo en.que va a ser aplicada, de acuerdo con.otro tipo de restricciones o principios que no pertenezcan a la lógica, es decir, a la esencia de la notación. La lógica uno puede anticipar lo tocante a su aplicación, (5.557), y también por esto es transcencental. Cualquier intento de decir a qué es aplicable y a qué no lo es choca contra los límites del decir. Pero es un uhechou que ya la estamos aplicando, es deciq que estamos tomando decisiones (acerca de qué frases simples hay, (ibíd.), acerca de lo que es así o asao, cada vez que decimos frases con sentido y al decirlas nos entendemos. Es un nhecho, que ya la estamos entendiendo al aplicarla y que estamos teniendo la nexperiencia" de que algo es. Es un uhecho)r que la estamos exhibiendo en cada una de las ñ"ses que entende-oj y que resulta manifiesta en cada uno de los hechos de los que tenemos experiencia. La lógica es, pues) (anterior al cómo, no anterior al qué, (5.SSZ). Se muestra en iada frase, pero no hay frase que pueda enunciarla. Tenemos, pues, que es la filosofia, entendida como método transcendental -entendida como camino que parte de lo individual y en cada caso sin importancia, para retornar á ello y ganar en ello ína "b.rtura sobre el 'mundo, pásando por la posibiÍidád de lo singular y arbitrario-, la que con sus glosas va poniendo en claro dicha posibilidad, es decir, la que va haciendo manifiesta la forma lógica. Es MÉrooo y rrlrNscr"rNDENTArIDAn LrN t:. Tnqcr¿rus 175 23 Carta del 19 de agosto de 1919 (1995), pág. 125. En el original, la palabra podria aparece las tres veées destacada en mayúsculas. Cfr. Tractatus 3.332. 176 MÉl c¡ocr y tR-ANscLTNDEN'fAI.IDAD vN EtTn¿c:r¿'¡us t77FEln'E L¡;o¡srr¡-q la filosofia la que. a la vez, va llamando nuesrra atención sobre ras 'frases.lógicas,,o "frases de la lógica',, que de las dos maneras las llama wrrtgenstern^. ,l)ero esra segunda expresión no debe despisrar_ nos. Las frases de la lógica no soñ las frasei de una p"rti.ul", ái'r.iplina o cuerpo de saher. Son frases de nuestro lenguaje. pero no frases cualesqurera, sino frases a las que corrientemeri. Áo damos aDenas :iq"rj"."^.ii, pues no dicen nada sobre el mundo (uéarir 4.461,\.q2, 6. I | ' 6.121,), no 1qgT"n. información alguna sobre lo qu. p"r" o d.j, de pasar (.véase 4.461),.ni compromeren á nada a quien' las'pronuncia (véase.4-462' 6.1 I I ,6.1222),precisamente porque son raurtloeías sin sentido (véase 4.461, G.1, G.i26). Son m¿i blá eso que ." .?okof llamamos Frases de Pero Grullo. sin embargo, .rr", fr"J.r-*" áá -¿-ximo interés para.la filosoÍla, que hace de íu glosa o .o-.n,"rio ,rrr" ocupación ce.nrral. pues es mucho lo que -uirrr"n cuando a su rra_ ves se mlra derechamente el mundo. "La correc¡a aclaración de las lrases lógicas^!" Í]. asignarles una posición p.."lirt .n*. ,"a", r^ lrases', (6.1 12), dice vy'irrgensrein ion su ratónica solemni<lad. Lo que tienen.de parricular -en tanto que rautologías y aJ igu"l que I"scontradrccro es que son (casos extremosD o (casos límite de la conexión _de signos, a saber, su disolución" (4.6 y 4.466, respecriva_ T.,nr:),. ,Y precisamenre por ello, por ser la disolúción de la posibili_ Sii !:l lengua¡e, ocupan éstas una posición peculiar en el lénguaje.lau.tologras y conrradrccrones carecen de sentido, "sind siñn/os,(4.461 I, p9Io."9 por ello son sencillamente absurda s, osind aber nicht unsinni6" 6.4611), a diferencia de las glosas o comenrarios. perrenecen al stmbohsmo, y "ctertamente de un modo parecido a como el c€ro perrenece al simbolismo de la arirmérica,, (ibíd.). Son posibilidades exrremas -paradóiicas, por ranrodel sistema de ntración, que pertenecen necesariamenre a Ia esencia de éste, a la esencia de la frase, a la posibilidad de conectar signos. En ellas ur n"r.r-qu.'t", componen se anulan mutuarnente en su potencia decidora ' o ."pacidad de ser ima.gen de un hecho-, se equilibran I", ,n", , 1", otras, (y el e-stado de equilibrio muestra entonces cómo han de estar hechas esas frases" (6.lzl). Por eso, sin deiar de ser banales naderías, tienen ranta imporrancia para uer derechamente er mundo y ra vida. 5u glosa tilosofica busca dejar que se vuelvan claras estas fr"re, p..,rItares (véase 6.1 223), dejar que en ellas se muesrren ros Iímires denrro de los que se puede decir algo con sentido (véase 6. t73),yque se ma_ nifieste en ellas el armazón del mundo (véase 6.124), precisamente porque no dicen nada sobre el mundo y son tautologías sin sentido, b.ro no frases absurdas. Y el mismo rendimiento podemos obrener áe l"r.ontr"dicciones, pese a que éstas no expresan lo que llamamos formas del razonamienio correcto (véase 6.1202). La tarea de la lógica -o, mejor, la tarea lógica de la filosoÍía o' auizá, la tarea de "la ñlosofía de la lógica" (véase 6.1 l3)no consis- ,'. ..rort.., nada más que en glosat eias frases tan peculjares y en poner a punto un sistema de noáción-el gu9 s.. muestre el armazón del -,]ndo, en que se muestre la posibilidad de lo arbitrario allí donde se muestra lo aibitrario, es decii en la frase que lo describe. Por ello su asunto más propio es nla esencia de la notációno (3:.34?, ula propia natural.ezadél signo naturalmente necesario, (6.124). Y su concepto clave es el de for"ma general de la frase, concepto.que no se dcja pensar, pues no es hechó alguno, sino la posibilidad de un hecho cualquiera, su esencial complejidad; y que por lo mismo tamPoco se puede decir: no puede expresarse mediante una constante que fuese algo así como el signo de lá compleiidad esencial, sino que necesariamenre "la Forma eéneral de la lrase es una variable" (45r. Cualquier frase presupone"esa indecible y esencial compleiidad en que consiste la poiibilid"d misma de la frase. cuya forma es precisamente,lo que toi", lrs frases y todos los hechos ti.nen en común: Ia complejidad común a todo io posible, a todo ocurrir algo o conducirse las cosas así o asao: oDie aligemeine Form des Satzes lx: Es uerhrih sich so und so' (4.5; cfr. 5.47 , 6, etc.).' Con una notación adecuada, se nos añade, nnos las podemos arreglar sin frases lóqicasr, pues en ese caso nos bastará con nla sola mirída -das b1o.$e2ruseher-, ^ las frases para-reconocer en éstas sus propiedades Formales (6.122). En cualquier Frase llena de.sentido s'e eipejeará entonces el mundo. Pero nb se trata' sin embargo, de que ia notación por sí sola sea capaz de dirigir nuestra mirada' pu.i .l siqno adquiére sentido en su uso y la peispicuidad o transparencia áe la noración presupone un cierro uso de los símbolos esbecialmenre perspicaz, presupone un crcrLo modo de mirar' Rei,rérdese lo tu.'se inienra'decir sobre el asunto al final del Ilactatus: qn. tto depende solamente del signo el que al mirar el signo se -ú.r,r. .n él tn posibilidad, sino que. por él c.ontrario, la m"odificación de la miraáa -que aspira á ver derechamenre el mundo a través de lo que en cadá caso carece de importancianecesita de un trabajo de glosa o comentario, necesitide una filosofía especular o especulativa"que, entendida como camino transcendentai, volviendôde nuevo sobre sí misma supere sus propios intentos 24 Del primer modo, en 6.113, 6.122, 6.124, 6.125, 6.126;y del segundo, en6.1, 6.11, 6-.1 1 1, 6.12, 6.121, 6.126, 6.1264, 6.1ii. t7B de decir lo indecible y nos enseñe a mirar silenciosamente el mundo en el espeio de la ióeica. , 9r.o qL.1o hace fa]ta insistir más en que la concepción de la filosofía que se desprende del7lactatus es claiamente la áe una filosrfía especulativa. Pero sí conviene añadir que, de no ser así, no se entendería en modo alguno por qué las Frases que componen er ribro nabnan. cle ser superadas, ni por qué su superación habría de condu_ clr precrsamente al silencio. A un silencio que no es mera ausencia de voz, ni simple privación de lenguaje o renúncia a decir ro que oodría y quizá tendría que ser dicho, sino efectivo callarse y poririuJ ,..,rnocimiento de los límites del lenguaje; un silencio qu..i preciso guardar y cuidar decididament. p"r"Tl.í"t el lenguaje h",t" ,,1, propilo, ímires, para mantenerlo en sús Iímites y deiaique ésros se -u.rr'..n .n eJ lenguaie mismo. La superación de la que se'habla en la proposición 6.54 .es una. exigencia del'lenguaie a la qüe no podemos dejar ie aren- {e¡ sr¡ perder.la orienración o, dicho de orro modo, sin perder el sen_ tldo de los limrtes; sin renunciar,.por tanro, a lo que solembs llamar cordura o racionalidad. Podemos décir incluso q.ré lo propio de li razón consiste precisamente en supe'ar -überwinienlo q". dicen nuestras frases con pleno sentido y lo que no dicen sus glora, o .o-.r,"rior. Haf lamos aquí algo semejanre a Io que Hegel denóminó lo especuratiuo o ractonalmentepos¡tiud-, en que se resuelven las limiraciones v cont."posiciones en que se halla todb lo decible, todas las fr"r., .oÁ sentido pleno, d9 -cuya totalidad y de cuya esencia o naruraleza intenta¡ por su parre hablar rorpemente las *Frases" de la filosofía, pero sin conseeuir decir propiamenre nada acerca de ello. El silencio esp'ecularivo ar quÉha de conducir para \x,/irrgenstein esra tarea de la racionalidad que compete a la trlosotía consisre en un manrenerse cajlado reconociendo los límires que no se pueden sobrepasar, reconociendo el Fracaso del decir que pr^etende decirlo todo, o décir lo primero, o decir lo úrtimo, o decir el fundamento. El silencio especulativo es un silencio .lo..r.rt..., tanfo que reconoce que no se puede seguir hablando, que no se puede segurr preBunrando,por que y que hay,un punro en que es preciso de_ ¡ar de preguntar y abandonar ese "vagabundeo interminabreo en busca de fundamenro o razón, del que hablaba Hegel26. pero no es elocuenre porque en él se hag.a tácita manifestación de'cierras verdades inefablcs, sino porque tan solo callando acerca de ello deiamos que nuestras fraMÉrooo y rI{ANScTENDIINTALIDAD EN s. Tn¿<:t,t t u' 179 ses exhiban el problema de Ia verdad, Polqge tan solo callando acerca de los límites del decir el decir mismo exhibe sus límites. 6. IA DE,TERMINIDAD DE,L SE,NTIDO Y SUS EXIGENCIAS No está, sin embargo. nada claro qué es eso que Wirtgenstein llama una y otra vez "los límires". Esos límites que no se pueden trasp"sar, hát" el punto de que no pueden ser contemplados desde el ttro lado (véasá 5.61). Es ób,rio q.t. se trata de una metáfora mediante la que \Wittgenstein intenta, cbn notable éxito, pero también con inevitáble totpér", aproximarse a nuestra (experiencia' del lenguaie, que se resiste a decir'de sí mismo lo que por otro lado se hace manifi.r.o, p"r" quienes hablamos, como-lo ésencial del lenguaje' como aquello qu. [o.gobierna y se halla ya siempre presuPuesto :n.lo,qr1. en cada caso dectmos y que, Por eso preclsamente. no se cela oeclr sin incurrir en un absúrdb, pú.t neceiitaríamos para decirlo de algo así como un decir excepcional, capaz de no depender por una sola vez de aquello de lo qué depende rodo decir. Ese límite o limitación irrebasable de la capaiidad decidora del lenguaie es una vieia conocida en nuestra tradición metafisica, desde qñe Platón la señalase al final del f ibro M dela Repúblic¿, no precisamente empleando la meráfora wittsensteiniana áel límite, sino baio la forma de la falta o defecto q"n. "f..t", por la p-ropia índole de su construcción deductiva, a la geometría y a sus afinés' pues son éstas incapaces de remonr"rs. h"ía uerdadáos principios para partir de ellos en la prueba deductiva de sus teoremas. Lá limitación inherente al pensamiento deductivo consiste en que no hay modo de probar por deducción el principio de todas las deducciones. Puede decirse entonces que, con i.r -.iáfot" de los límites del mundo, del pensamiento y del lenguaie, \ülittqenstein está reinterpretando el vieJo diagnóstico plarónico y'alavezóresentándolo va de en¡rada con la máxima generalidad, pues no ,. ,r1," aquí de dgá peculiar del método deducr]vo propio de algunas ciencias, sino de aigo que alecra al lenguaie lil -ft." En esa misma tradicién meta{ísica, y en Ia medida en que ha ido tomando cuerpo el concepto de método transcendental, por llamarlo así, a la kantiana, comó aquel que nos permite hacernos cargo de en qué consista la actividad filosófica' se han ido ensayando otras metáfoias para entender eso que \ü/ittgenstein llama límites, todas ellas de raieambre iurídico-políiica: la añtigua metáfora del arkhé o principiuñ, de aquello qu.iig. feirreamené el lenguaje y elser' porque no hay nada anierior nl máJarribat Ia metáfora leibniziana delos requiF¡rupr L¡oEsw¡ " Véase Enzyklopridie. g 82. ,," 7Vi'1y'1!ff 13, pog;t, ed,Lasson, Hamburga Felix Meiner, reimpr., t975,t. ll, pág.88. Véase Ledesma (2007). 180 Fpt_rpr.: L¡:¡r_.s¡"r,n tjt! ? ligr"cias, que con tanta fuerzaha reaparecido en la filosofía l.:tF]" y, por ejemplo en el Tractatus, como veremos enseguida; Iameráfora kanriana de,las condiciones, que le permite ,.fl"-ni.r, .tproblema de lo incondicionado y "boid"" rrriJI". eiil"á"i" p.ri-bilidad de la experiencia, en ru frout.n-,aiica arriluraci¿" ."" .i ¿.tum de la razón: la metáfora d. lf, pr.*puesros o implíciros, ,^r'l1î :,X.11*:L:::,r?1, juego vien'e ¿r,i¿" ." l, ñrá!.?" á. I ",pi,r_cron nermeneutrca. Mediante rodas ellas se ha inrenrado entender una conexión de ida / vyerta esenciar para ra firorofr;;;ñou. "ru¿.el rórulo, rambién meraForico, de "méiodo ;r";;;A;;,1;;."""_xión.entre aquello que es necesario para otra cosa, que por lo tanro convrerre a esa orra .o:1 :n algo dependiente, hiporérico, derivado, li_mitado, sujeto a condicion.í o .t-o qu.r"-t, decirÍo, u .r" orr" cosa que, por ello mismo, conduce necesariamen,. h".ir'Jo".ilo a.ro que depende. Lo propio del método transcendental 'consisre, como es.sabido, en .emoniars. desde donde t;-;;;;;*r"-",lr"-cia aquello sin lo que no podríamos esrar aqlí donde u" no, .n.orr_tramos; desde el orden de ro posibilitado haiia er ordeí de lo pásibi_litante. En sus reflexiones pos.reriores \Timgenstein utiliza profusamente :::i:ff:itT'f1'" l,o mismo: ta det iüego, .uy", ,.gll "r-pr.a.":::::ii:r: srn de¡ar de jugar a ese juego, pero que qlira ,í ,. d.j.nenunclar sl se tuega a otro juego hacia el que los iügadbres pueden in_tentar deslizarse lasi rin áarr? .u.n,", y'p-u.d#?il;;;"í. iili*-mente pgrll:^no,se dan cuenra de que de un ¡uego se pasan a orrosrn especrar drtrcurrad. ,E-n er rracmtus, que es lo qúe ahóra nos inrel.l"lj*9.1a alguna de.las anrerior.r, '.o-o l" á. pr¡"iip;;i;;rr.rr't ¿/ y 6'a) y,recupera Ia metáfora leibniziana de roi ,rquiiia'o e*igenclas, para,rlusrrar una aproximación a los límires del feneuaie des_ ::j::l:,.1.]:"er"l. mismo y, por ranro, de un -odo t8nt",iuo y li:Il:r."", que emptea frases carenres de sentido y francamente ab_surdas cuando se las roma fl, Rie de la lerra, por lo que está abocadoal silencio que deja hablar d lÉnguaje -irrno para que así muesrre susllmltes. _^_ t, " Ia proposición 3.,23,hallamos al respecro lo siguiente: "La exi-gencra ;lor(ffung-. de.la posibilidad dé signos si-mples es la exi_ gencra de ra derermlnrdad -Bestimmtheit-Áel sen¡iáo." pero esrafrase que habla de sentido y."ig.r.iár.r-"-Uig"". pof,;;.;;;;.._ se que nos llega a nosotros Ltr" Ei..t" recramaciSn q,,. ."re. á.-rJro-tros que nos esForcemos por,determinar el s.nrido,'.s üi., ;;; ü", quem.os el modo de afinár, de p.recisar, de deriÁ-iñ ñ.rái*i".",..rsentido de nuestras frases. En trl."ro él,.rrtido -lril;;iíJ"ü;". MFrooo y'f RANscENDENTATTDAI sN rt. Tn,tcr'qrt¡s 1Bl se nos exige o que nos exigimos a nosotros mismos, y el análisis lógico sería un instrumento útil para la construcción de un lenguaje perfecto en que el sentido de las frases fuese absolutamente preciso o, cuando menos, un instrumento útil para el perfeccionamiento de nuestro lenguaje. En ese caso, el genitivo odie Ford.erung d.er Bestimmtheit, sería un genitivo objetivo. Pero puede entenderse también como un genitivo subjetivo, que no hablaría entonces de que el sentido debe ser obieto de una determinación, sino más bien de que el sentido de nuestras frases, que tienen ya sentido y por tanto un sentido ya suficientemente determinado desde el momento en que las .nt.trd.t ro, y nos entendemos en diciéndolas, nos presenta él mismo una exigenciá, relariva en este caso a la posibilidad de los signos simples; pJ-, en cualquier caso, una exigeñcia de orden transcindental. Dado que ya nos entendemos al entender algunas frases que decimos, y dado que entender una frase no es otra cosa que entender su sentido determinado, ha de poder analizarse entonces la frase con sentido en sus componentet últi-ot, han de ser posibles los signos simples (cfr. 4.22I). Se üata, dice \Tittgenstein en su Diario filosóf co, de una unecesidad lógica -a priori-r27, qLLe se nos impone como exigencia de la profia analizábilidad de lâfrase que entándemos, es décir, de su pópia complejidad, imprescindible a su vez, según par.ece, para que haya sentido. Pero es mejor decir que se trata de una exigencia transcendental, y por lo tanto lt priori, pues de ese modo resulta más claro que esta exigencia, y el carácter apriorístico con que se nos presenta, no nos llega impuesta desde un, principio a partir del que se deduzca necesariamente, ni desde un Fundamento én el que déscanse sólidamente instalada, sino desde el mero nhecho, de qué ya nos. entendemos hablando al decir frases con sentido. El que sea una exigencia transcendental y no de otra clase nos obliga por lo ta¡to a volver sobre nuestros pasos y a preguntarnos sl estarnos seguros de habernos entendido, " pot.i.tttue"stión que de verdad eniendamos el sentido de algunas ft"r.r, .t un movimiento de crítica o de reducción, por decirlo como lo decían Kant o Husserl. Pero antes de que podambs volver atrás, o de volver a tomar el camino que llevamos, o de volver a pasar por lo que ha sido y seguirá siendo nues2- ( 1982). anoración del día l4-\4-l 5. pág. l0J. El párralo completo dice lo siguiente: .Parece que Ia idea de lo SiMPLE vie-ne ya conienida en la de lo compleio y en la idea del análisis, de tal modo que independientemente de cualesquiera ejemplos posibles de objetos simples o de proposiciones en las que se hable de ésros, llegr-ór , esta idea y percibimos la exisieniia de los obieros simples como una necesidad lógica -a priori-,. 182 Fnupe L¡o¡sve tro punro de partida, tenemos que avanzar un poco más en el tramoque estarnos recorriendo. "^-'tl e]leeTcia rranscendental de la analizabilidad de la frase consenudo, que (en caso d.e 9p9 haya alguna) es frase.;;tl.ñi;;r r""_to necesariamente analizáble, nos ,i"rrd. po, su parre un cierto saber,que no es un saber acerca de hecho argúno, sino un r"u., "...." ¿.la posibilidad de los hechos. ñ; ;, ñ;.eso mismo, .rr, ,"L., q,r.provenga de ninguna experiencia, ,i,io "lgo G;;ffi'ji; \ri"_genstein, nsabenios a partir d. á;¿;.nros puramente lógicos,(5.5562). Estos nfundamenros puramente-lóá;;;;;; J,iro l"unecesidad lóeica, de que h"bh é" ior lageoücher: parecen aludir aalgo distinto ár .r,r" .ón.xión rógica e'.rtricto sentido, es decir, aalgo distinto de una función d.;:;á;; parecen aludi¡ más bien a laconexión que rraran de expr.esar -.,¡áir, ."_;il;.'."ig.iii" ",;'n:j.l:?'; Í"'t?'l : -: :: i i: i-1'* i g' " ii n d' n e'd e e x i ge n.7 7 op' i o uí¿"t."iq",*;;::#i:li,1l1,l;i,?iüH:[i.lái;f,ilfifrj^#_ rece esrar siendo usrdo aquí meraForicam.ñr., .n "ir,ua ¿.l"o""r..idoque los tundamentos v lá necesiá;J;;^q*;q;r ;;,*J;i""[i""¿,guardan con las .on."íorr.r lógi.";. p; ñ"y...r" diferencia obvia en-tre lo uno y lo otro:-mientras-que lo,propiámen,. fOji., .r";;;pr.una forma, la esrrucrura común a toda ,irr r..¡.'i"n,i¡,r"a..#pr._ 1_dades, esta exigencia a partir á. U qil-ii.gamos a saber algo pura_mente a priori no se deja reducir a f"im" arguna, pues consiste preci_samenre en Ia exieen:i" d: que haya rorÁX, ." h ._it.";i;;5'.1"" Lyl ::lqlei i dad"a nal iz"bt.,' q ;. ;í ;;;, ; .i;; #iil,.oL.",o ":::1ii:lj"rma posibte. La simitirud !nrr.l" pr;;;;;; "tó;;" yesfa exrqencra de oue haya lógica radica, segúñ párece, en Ia iurrr^.on qui"mb", ,. i,or,imponen a quienes hablamos y hablando nosentendemos, al entender ei sentido a. i;?*., q,r. d.í.r*r.;"fr.._ i: r:" que se "or iTlo-1.-::rr:1. que hablant.', t" .rid.i" ;.;".tas trases cuyo sentido enrendemos tengan u"";;;Éiii;-;;r"_ !l:: * decir, tengan u"" for-" ló;i;;;?;,a comparab le a la fuerzacon que se nos imoonen ras cone*iones rógicas q;ád.*;ffi il'.r"complejidad. Pero'eso que sabemos "a parrir de lundamenros pura_ T::tt_lósfoos' o, mejorl t¡anscenden á5r-i; sabemos únicamenie entanto que asumimos o, mejor, en ranro q,r. h._or;;";ñ;;i.h" e.xigencia rranscendenll3 :":.:d:;";,.;;"rorros mismos y con losdemás. Así, lo que sabe.mos a priori a parrrr de una pura exigenciatranscendental en realidrj f., fu *Ulr.ñrr, no es en absoluto nadanuevo para nosorros, desde el momento en que ,l h"bhr;;;;r';r"_mido ya de anremano dicha."ig.;;i;á. ""iir"btli¿¿ á;i;;.;; MÉl:roocr v'IRANSCI,T.NDEN'IR T.TDAD ¡.N t¡, Ta¿ ct z r ¿¡-s r83 pleios cuyo sentido entendemos. Todo esto queda bastante claro en i" propoti.ión de la que acabo de citar un Fragmenro y que, completa, dice así: uPongamos que sabemos a partir de fundamentos puramente lógicos quÉ h, de Éaber frases elementales, entonces esto ha de saberlo cialquiéra que entienda las frases en su forma no analizadao (5.5562). Resulta obvio lo que aquí se está tratando de decir: esos nfundamentos puramente lógicos, de los que habla \Wittgenstein no son otra cosa que exrgenciaJasumidas por cualquiera que entienda frases, exigencias que asume precisamente al entender esas trases y para podei entendérlas. Lo que no resulta obvio es qué es eso qu€-eni.ndé-or, y además a priori, todos los que nos entendemos hablando. Hay aquí efectiuaó.nr. un problema' ¿Acerca de qué puede de- .irr. qí. ,áb.-o, algo, y t"d" it.nos que'a priori, si no ló sabemos ^.rr.í de algo en particular, acerca de ningún hecho ni.experiencia alguna, ni siquierá acerca de hechos o experiencias inalcanzables o in"eFabtes pari quienes no podemos traspaJar ciertos límites? ¿Cómo se entiende qu. t.p"-os aigo acerca de nada?, pues saber algo acerca de Ia posibilid"d d. los hec-hos pero no sobre hecho alguno es tanto co-o s"b.r algo acerca de nadá. ¿Mas no será mejor decir entonces que en este caso no sabemos nadi acerca de nada, que viene a ser lo -ir-o que decir que ya lo sabemos ¡odo acerca del ser?'o Este es en .f..to .f proble-a de'la metafísica, por cierto antiguo y suficientemente conocido. El problema de la metaÍísica'ülittgenstein lo aborda en eI Thac' tatus timando el toro por los cuernos, éomo t. suele decir, siguiendo además Ia tradición de la filosofía rranscendental (tal vez sin tener de ello conciencia muy clara, lo que no le impide trabaiar dentro de esta tradición) y sirviénáose, Para iluminar el problema, de la metáfora de los límites. Ese saber que-sabemos a prioria partir de puras exigencias que nos impone el "Éecho' de que'hablando nos entendemós y de que no renunclamos a hablar (precisamente para entendernos), no es un saber que se extralimite de una u otra manera Porque hayamos encontradi una especie de escotillón por el que se nos permite.echar un vistazo más allá de los límites y vef algo al otto lado; antes al contrario, es un saber acerca de los límites Ñs-ot o, mejor, tn saber de los límites, que precisamente en cuanto saber de los límites intenta atender a la exigencia de tenerse en los límites y de no traspasarlos 28 Recuérdese lo que se dice en la proposición 5.552, que-venimos. comentando, sobre la -experieniia, de que "Jgo tér, neceraria para entérrder la lógica' es.dectr, necesaria prr" qu. ya la estembs eniendiendo al habiar y nos enrendamos hablando. 184 F¡ilrp¡ LEo¡s¡.¡¡ M!.r'oDo y TRANScENDI:N I'ALTDAD p,N pt Ttur,tzrt.¡s Frase implica otras frases, pero muestra lo que ninguna frase puede decir. Lo muestra Dorcue l" fot-" d. ,l., probio sie;o lo exhibê. Estop rq á rma e su r pi gn ibe oLle está oresuoueito oor la frase sin cue la frase lo diea v sin que seaqu p .t.,p.t. p q l ó g y 185 fl:djT,,: "-gún subterfugio, pero sin por ello ignorarlos. Es un sa_L'(r uc las exrgencras, que precisamente en c.,anio saber de las exi_gencias, si sa6e algo, li .iriiq".-ot. ., "r.r¿er a ellas. por esomismo, el modo á qug 1". fr"J., d.t -iouorurhabl n ¿;* ,1".sabemos a Driori a oarrir.d. p".", .*igán.i", rranscendenrales nopodía ser ei modo indicarivo,'qu. ., .l-n.,oJ;.;il;;;;iq"i., f'se describe un hecho y,dice ,lgo .on pleno sentrdo susceprible deentenderse' Las frases de que é"stá ilr;" ri-i,;it^i"ir"îii.¡ algo en.modo subjuntivoó. Ur,", ";;;, ;; .l ;J; lrüi"",iü ¿.lo que.las gramáticas llaman t"r rt"r., ".ordi.ionules, a menudocondicionales irreales' ran. apropiadas para ranrear ros rímires derlenguaje; orras veces, en el modá subjultivo, rnenos claro para lasgramáticas, de las perífra-sl_s-que ,. foím"n ._pl."rráo ;;;f;;" i,1:;!" proposición 5.55ó * ;; +ñ1"-.í;;."r" "i"_"r"_clon de ambos recursos, mediante los-que \Wittgenstein "o, t "ÉU,tentativa y provisionalmente, acerca d. lo qu. íu lq,uirr;lô il ,^_ber si es que algo enriende. Lo que hemos de saber quienes nos enrendemos habland teramente a priori en tanro que_asumimos una.rig.";;;;;_.rrr. transcendenial-.es que ha'drh"6;r;;; L.." o complejidad co_mún a cualquier imaqen _Bild_ y t" ,.Jiá"J, p;ü;".'il';;;" pueda ser imasen de"la realidad, p'.; q-rl' n,nguna rmagen puedeimaginar a b'b i I d e n-, p recrs am en re p o rque ;: l; a;-; IZ' ) rliis * u*'i¡:il6i#iiilF:s:ti$;1','J*:::;::::;tñir;:;*ny,f fr ?^rf: !i};f[;'¿li;jlÍl:n *P 4i P.;;;;;d-' i:i.l:,T.,fi ;HT:.o;"tr1#:i'Ji,uií:i$"#ilx'fl::.'r:#'"':"'i-,i¿"r.i-!..¿rtoa#ih:ft?xti.:#j*i"*"t.ri,.iíirffi ril:$,'.ilii:ir"+:!?jil'.'h:;il""'t':';'"ffi]'*"'Hnilrnt ;';#ii!,ii't:;::'li':r.;^i ji:rAt;,:;::::m,*¡i::Jr;:l1"llL:: u;¿"*¿,i..""árrc,,,,i'iii,iffi|?f i:,::;ffi r"T..tT..H#Í...f ::l1'XtiT; ff i:,_T::??:tlTüi,"'wf.í.*::*Ti'ü:Jt..t'.,;#füi:Í:',ffi Htr 6"i,?*'.i ilii Jfr ¿;'h i:..:üt :::ilH,:i:,i;x:::T"X.,1,il I,_:,í*: ffiT?i.i.:?f i:'*ui"ff ::.1*:;,W;{::!.;;}}ii"dt'i"2"^* t1':"1::'f*:t*lii:;*Ux:il:#;¡ff 1'jffi r1^"iJ,í#Kítr;:ff :,': de común a la imagen y lo imaginado; aunque, por lo mismo, cualquier imagen la exhibe -es weist sie auf- (cfr.2.l7-2.18). Lo que ür*ot delaber quienes nos entendemoi hablattdo, al menos miéntras no renunciemos a hablar para entendernos, es que ninguna de nuestras frases npuede representar -darstellenlo que ha d.e tener en común con la réalidad, para poder representarla, esto es, ula forma lógica". Habríamos de poder instalarnos con una frase fuera del mundo | fu.r" de f a lógica *para poder representar la forma lógica,, é.12). Lo qu, hr*o, de íaber y" désde qtré to, entendemos hábla"do es que (nosotros no podemos expresar)) hablando nlo que se expresa en el lenguaje" (4.121) cuando hablamos, esa complejidad común. Lo qué hemos de saber ya desde el momento en que entendemos -una frase cualquiera es q.r. esa complejidad común indecible por frase alguna la ..muestra -zeigt-, cualquier frase, la uexhibe o hace mánifiesta -usi5¡ sie auf-, (ibíd.), y por eso precisamente hemos de saberlo. . Ahora bien, ¿significa esto que lo que está llamando'Vittgenstetn mostrdr no es otra cosa que presuponet es oeclr, que no se anade nada al concepto de presuposición cuando se dice que lo presupuesto en el decii no se dice, sino que se muestra? ¿Significa esto que Ia conexión que recorre el método transcendental, tal y como lo entiende \fittgénstein, al remontarse desde donde ya nos encontralnos hacia aquello sin lo que no podríamos estar aquí donde ya.nos encontramos, no consrste en otra cosa que en una implicación? En modo alguno, hemos de decir. Lo que se mllestra en la frase está presupuesto por lo que la frase dice; esto es evidente. Pero está presupuesto en el modo del mostrarse, no porque sea algo que se deia delir por otras frases implicadas por la frase en que se muestra, sino más bien por lo contrario. Y en esto se echa de ver precisamente que presupoñer e implicar no son lo mismo, sino dos cosas muy d^istintas. T,a decible, lo exhibe el simbolismo en la frase. Es en efecto algo anterior a la frase, pero no .porque se haya tenido gue decir necesariamente anres, pues nr srqurera is un dicho posible;'es anterior a lo descrito por la frase, pero no porque haya tenido que ocurrir antes, pues ni siq.,iera es un posibl. h..h". NÍada habremos ganado con insistir en que no se trata aquí de una anterioridad temporal (que exigiría una réminiscencia de éstilo platónico), si seguimos entendiendo eso anterior como algo del mismo orden que aquello que va después, si nos saltamos a Ia torera los límites del lenguaje y confundimos el orden 186 30 conan¡ ha insistido en esta vaciedacl de las frases que no dicen nada y cue c. efecro nada mu€srran por sísolas. Clr. (2002), ¡regr. az'iaii. p;;";;; "'";;"r_rren nada porsi solas no equrvale e que no muestren nada. Clr. supra, n. l). MÉrooo y TRANSCL,NuF.NTAuDAD r.¡'t pt Ttucrltt¡s lB7 algo está siempre actuando en lo que decimos y por eso mismo no se deia decir. Áun así, no tenemos m¿is remedio que seguir preguntándonos por qué ese poder decidor del lenguale descansa sobre la complejidad, como ui.n. riéndo para nosotro, .uId.nr. desde Plarón y Aristóteles. RE,FERENCIAS BIBLIOGRAFICAS Alr:r-, K. O. (1985), La Tiansformación de k Filosofla, trad. española de A. Cortina, E. Chamorro y T. Conill' Madrid, Thurus. Bacular:nn, P (1978), Wixginstein und Kant: Wrsuch zum Begrif des 7lans' zendentalen, Francfort del Meno, Peter Lang. CoN,tNr', J.0992), nKierkegaard, \íittgenstein and Nonsense)' en T. Coh.n, É Gr.,y., y H. Purriam (edil.Vursuits of Reason. Texas Téch. Universiry Press Lubbock, págs. 195-224. - (2002), nThe Method of the7iactatuv,, en E. Reck (ed.), From Frege to Wttgenxein: Perspectiues on Early Analitical Philosoplry, Oxford, Oxford Universiw P ress, 37 4-462. DravoNo, C. (1991), uThrowing away the Ladder: How to Read the Tiac' tatue,, en C. Diamond, Thekealistic Spirir: Wittgenstein, Philosoplry and the Mind, Cambridge MA, MIT Press, págs. 5-27. - (2000), uEthics, Irñagination and the'M"ethod of the Wittgensteint Tractatus,, en A. Crary y R. Read (eds.), The Netu Wittgenstein' Londres, Routledge, págs. 149-173. Hnccn, P M. S.12000J, uVas he Trying to V4ristle it?,' en A. Crary y R. Read (eds.), The New Wixgenstein, Londres, Routledge, págs. 353-388. fl¡¡r rr, P (1959), "Reflexionisur les limires du langage á própos du Tracntus logico-philosophicus de \üTittgenstein". Rcuui de Métaphysiqu( ü d? Morale, 64, págs. 469-484. H¡rrr, \M D. (1'97i), uThe 'üíhole Sense of rhe Tlactatus,, The Journal of Philosophy, 68, págs. 27 3-288. KsuarE, W (1966), uleibniz and the Picture Theory of Language',, ReL'ue Internatio nale de P h i I o so p h i e 7 6-7 7, pags. 204 21 5. Lnnesr,¡a, F. (2007), uThe bntological-Aigument in the Tractatus,, Me' taDhvsica, B páss. 179-201. N,.,.,r'mí.^r, A.^ ()005), Wittgensteinls 7lactatus. An Innoduction, Nueva York, Cambridge Universiry Press. Osrnow, M. B. (20¡2), Wittgensteini Tiactatus. A Dialectical Interpretation, Cambridee, Cambridee Universiry Press. P¡¡n', D. oí87), The FaEe Prison, Oxford' Clarendon Press. SrrNrus, E. (1960), Wingenstein Tracmrus A Crirical ExPositi0n of its Mains Iina of Though¡, Oxford, Blackwell. SrnnN, D.-G. (2Ó03), nThe Methods of rhe Tiactarzs. Beyond Positivism and Metaphysics?u, en P Parrini, \(l Salmon y M. Salmon (eds.)' LogiF¡r.rp¡ Leo¿sr¿¡ de los hechos con el orden de_su posibilidad, el orden de lo posibilitado con el orden de lo posibilitanre. !9 qn. hemos de saber quienes nos movemos, vivimos y somos ll .l l*gu,"ie es precisa-ent. que el lenguaie riene límirerl ü .1u. vf ene a ser lo mrsmo que decir que podemos hablar. pero al hablar'así de ellos, llamándolos límites -.di"nt. esta fecunda -.tafor",1o q.,.esrarnos haciendo es roparnos^con ellos (es deci¡ con la p"riúitiaáa; al intentar saltárnoslos (metaforicamenr¿, claro está), o"'., JÁ"ur", de límires esramos inrenrando d:.ii q.uS si podemos h"6t", ., por.lu. no podemos. decir la posibilidad de hablar, que sin embargo ,[ prrd, mo.strar y de hecho se muesrra cuando hablamos (aunque se -L.rrr"de hecho mu.y.poco claramenre en las frases que decimás cuando ha- ?]_"T.r, de ahí que necesitemos de ciertas glósas o comenrarios que vuelvan claras nuesrras frases I 9ue,^ ellas riismas, no llegan a dáir nada,propiamenre, por lo que són francam.nt. atrurd"j. ad ,._ gún hemos de saber, el lenguaje riene límites no se reduce simp]em.nte a.que no se puede decir todo, o a q.ue hay Frases que no re pu.den decrr.y, por [anro, quien las dice rendrá que rerminar por deidecirse de ellas. pues no ha dicho nada al decirlas30; como si ia merálora de los limrtes apuntase hacia algo así como un uso incorrecto, una falta de metodo para asignar significado o una incapacidad de hablar v de p..ltt3. La metáfora de los límites alude por e[contrario " un" .ápr_ cidad, a una porencia, al poder del lenguaie, que, precisamenre Dor_ que puede, susrrae su propio poder al ioa.r del le'nguaie -ir-J g,preclsamenfe porque podemos hablar diciendo lrasis que enrende- .Tgs.p9r lo que en cada una de nuesrras frases se muesrra esa posibilidad. Y si las lrases con que intentamos hablar ¡;;iü;ílrr" por eso mismo frases ineptai (meramente rentativas, fallidas a fin de cuentas; a lo sumo sugestivas al modo de glosas á .á-.","rio, que quizá ayuden a que en nuesrras frases nórmales y corrienres, ÍT:r Su:,.ienen,un.sentido pleno, se muesrre esa pósibilidad denaDrar/' ello se cleb€ rustamente a que no pueden ir más allá de ese poder decrdor del lenguaje. "Lo que puede mosrrarse no Duede decirse> (4.1212), dice \X/irtgenstei" .ó., una de .r", f."r.r' absurdas con,las que intenta glo_sar I aclarar orras muchas frases. Eil" -ir-"no drce ni muestra nada, pero puede ser que nos ayude a reparar en algo que ya hemos de sal:ei, y.r q,t. (,,dicÉo, d. ,r*.,,,o .orrár." nlosa, que además en esre caso es flosa de la glosa) el poder de d?cir 1BB Fp,r.u,¡ L¡o¡sw¡ t!.1,E*pif*:ty.: Historical and Contemporary perspectizrr, pittsburgh, ____ Pittsburgh University Press, págs. 125-i56. \(/rrrravs, M. (2004), uNonsensé and cosmic Exile: The Austere Reading of rhe 7\actatus,i, en M. Kólbel y B. veiss (eds.), wittgensteinI Lastini Signif cance. Londres, Rourledge, páes. 6-Jl. \(ÁrrcsNsr¡rN, L. (1979a) , Canas1 ¡{rtitt, Kqtnes y Moore, rad. de N. Mí guez, Madrid, Taurus, 1929. - (1979b), Noteboohs, g{. de G. H. von Wright y G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford, Basil Blakwell,2." ed. - (1982), Diarioflosófco, trad. deJ. Muñoz, Barcelona, fuiel. - (1984), Tractarus Logico-Philosophicus, en Werhausgabe, Suhrkamp, FrancFort del Meno, vot. l. - (!.99.5), Carybridge Lettezr, ed. por B. McGuinness y G. H. von \ü/right, Blackwell, Oxforá.

Building enduring objects out of spacetime for Claudio Calosi and Pierluigi Graziani, eds., Mereology and the Sciences (volume under review at Springer, Synthese Library) Cody Gilmore Endurantism, the view that material objects are wholly present at each moment of their careers, is under threat from supersubstantivalism, the view that material objects are identical to spacetime regions. I discuss three compromise positions. They are alike in that they all take material objects to be composed of spacetime points or regions without being identical to any such point or region. They differ in whether they permit multilocation and in whether they generate cases of mereologically coincident entities. 1. Introduction Let me start with a rough characterization of two main views about persistence: Endurantism: At least some material objects persist through time; and every material object is temporally unextended and wholly present at each instant at which it exists at all. Moreover, it is not the case that every material object has a different instantaneous temporal part1 at each different instant at which it exists. Perdurantism: At least some material objects persist through time; any every material object has a different instantaneous temporal part at each different instant at which it exists. Material objects that do persist are temporally extended and are at most partially present (not wholly present) at any one instant. I will introduce more carefully formulated views later on (from Gilmore 2006), but these are adequate for present purposes. Endurantism fits comfortably with presentism and certain other A-theorist of time.2 It also fits together fairly well with a certain brand of B-theoretic eternalism. What I have in mind here is a view like Newton's, according to which substantival space and substantival time are two separate and fundamental entities, and spacetime, if there is such a thing at all, is merely a construct of some sort. (Perhaps spacetime points are identified with ordered <point of space, instant of time> pairs.) Call this view about space and time 'separatist substantivalism'; it should be understood as incorporating eternalism and the B-theory. 1 The standard definition of 'instantaneous temporal part' runs as follows: 'x is an instantaneous temporal part of y at t' means '(i) t is an instant, (ii) x is a part of y at t, (iii) x overlaps-at-t every part-at-t of y, (iii) x is present at t, and (iv) x is not present at any other instant'. (This is based on Sider (2001: 59).) For other definitions, see Gibson and Pooley (2006: 163), Parsons (2007), and Balashov (2010: 73). The key point is that, in order for a thing y to count as a temporal part of a thing x, y must be a part of x and y must be spatially co-located with x at any moment at which y is present. 2 A-theories of time all say that there is a time that is present in some absolute, not-merely-indexical sense. That is, they say that there is a 'metaphysically privileged' present time. The B-theory of time denies this. Presentism is an A-theory of time according to which there are no non-present entities (such as, presumably, pre-Socratic philosophers and Martian outposts). Eternalism is the view that the past, present, and future all exist equally. See Sider (2001) and Markosian (2010) for more on these views. 2 But eternalist, B-theoretic endurantism begins to run into trouble as soon as we shift to (i) relationism about time or to (ii) a spacetime framework, be it substantivalist or relationist. Start with (i). Given eternalism and the B-theory, endurantists face pressure to invoke times or spacetime regions to handle the problem of change. Suppose that Bob changes from being bent (an hour ago) to being straight (now). If perdurantism is true and Bob has temporal parts, then we can say that it was one temporal part of Bob that was bent and it is a different temporal part of Bob that is straight. If the A-theory is true and there is a metaphysically privileged time, then we can say that Bob himself is straight, not bent (though he was bent). Without temporal parts or a privileged present, however, the most natural account of change is to 'relativize to times': say that Bob is bent at one time (or spacetime region) and straight at another. The idea is that Bob's shapes are really relations: he bears the bent-at relation to one time (or region) and the straight-at relation to another.3 If, as the relationist claims, there are no such things as times or regions, then this account fails, and it is unclear what else endurantist can put in its place.4 I will assume, then, that if endurantism is going to find a home in an eternalist, B-theoretic world, such a world will need to include substantival times or spacetime regions. Now consider (ii). Is eternalistic, B-theoretic endurantism tenable in the spacetime framework? By 'the spacetime framework', I mean, roughly, the view that the spatiotemporal is more fundamental than the purely spatial or the purely temporal. Given the spacetime framework, we have a choice between spacetime relationism and spacetime substantivalism. Spacetime relationism, according to which there are objects and/or events standing in spatiotemporal relations but there are no spacetime points or regions, is inhospitable to endurantism for reasons that I have just sketched. So we can focus on the substantivalist version of the spacetime framework, which I state as follows: Spacetime Substantivalism. Spacetime is more fundamental than space or time. There are such things as concrete, substantival spacetime points and/or regions. If there are such things as points or regions of space, these are merely spacetime regions of certain sorts ('columns'). Likewise, if there are such things as instants or intervals of time, these are merely spacetime regions of certain other sorts ('rows'). The view is neutral as to whether spacetime is relativistic. The question we now face is this: how is endurantism affected by the transition from separatist substantivalism to spacetime substantivalism, be it pre-relativistic or relativistic? (As with separatist substantivalism, I will understand spacetime substantivalism as incorporating eternalism and the B-theory.) Ted Sider (2001) and Jonathan Schaffer (2009) both argue that endurantism is harmed by this transition. Their argument runs through two claims: (1) If spacetime substantivalism is true, then so is supersubstantivalism, the view that each material object just is a spacetime region. (They appeal to considerations of parsimony and, in Schaffer's case, fit with physics; more on this in section 2.) 3 See Haslanger (2003) for an overview of these issues. 4 See Hawthorne and Sider (2006) for a sophisticated discussion of this issue. 3 (2) If supersubstantivalism is true then perdurantism, not endurantism, is true. (Persisting spacetime regions perdure; they don't endure.) No analogous argument is available given separatist substantivalism. In particular, separatists have no analogue of premise (1). For they have no locations with which material objects can be plausibly identified.5 However, as soon as one makes the shift from separatist substantivalism to spacetime substantivalism, one gains the option of identifying material objects with locations (spacetime regions), and with that option available, parsimony (among other things) counts heavily in favor of taking it. Figure 1 5 They can't identify an object with its location in space, since objects often occupy different regions of space at different times, but no region of space occupies different regions at different times. And of course they can't identify an object with its location in time – say, the interval that is the object's total timespan. There are many reasons for this, but one of them is that, again, an object typically occupies different regions of space at different times, but no interval of time does this. Finally, they can't identify a material object with a spacetime region, since they either reject spacetime regions altogether or treat them as set-theoretic constructs; and presumably material objects are not set-theoretic constructs. The shift from space and time to spacetime solves these problems. No region of space is in different places at different times, but there are (curvy) regions of spacetime that are. And spacetime substantivalists are free to deny that spacetime regions are set-theoretic constructs. Is there a metaphysically privileged present? Yes (A-theory) Endurantism tenable No (Relationist B-theory) Endurantism untenable Yes (Substantivalist B-theory) Is spacetime more fundamental than space or time? No (Separatist Substantivalism) Endurantism tenable No (B-theory) Are there such things as times or spacetime regions? Yes (Spacetime Substantivalism) What is the relationship between material objects and spacetime regions? Material objects are identical to spacetime regions (Supersubstantivalism) Endurantism untenable Material objects share no parts or constituents with spacetime regions (Dualist Substantivalism) Endurantism tenable ? 4 The argument carries real weight. In light of it, there's no denying that the transition from separatist substantivalism to spacetime substantivalism does some harm to endurantism. Still, it's worth asking: if one insists on combining spacetime substantivalism with endurantism, how should one do it? Let me be more specific. Suppose that, on the basis of considerations given in support of (1), one rejects dualistic substantivalism, the view that material objects occupy spacetime regions but are never identical with any region and indeed never even share any parts or constituents with any region. In that case, how should one combine spacetime substantivalism and endurantism? In this chapter I explore several such combinations, some of them new, and I chart pros and cons of each. Though I take no stance on which, if any, of these packages is true, I suggest that some are promising and worthy of further attention. (See Figure 1 for a map of the terrain covered so far. A 'close up' on spacetime substantivalism – and its species – appears toward the end of the chapter.) 2. From Substantivalism to Supersubstantivalism to Perdurantism In this section I give a quick sketch of the considerations in support of (1) and (2). (1) Given spacetime substantivalism, there seem to be two main options concerning the status of material objects. First, one can be a dualist substantivalist, in the sense described above. This has been the standard default position for virtually all spacetime-friendly endurantists and even for some perdurantists (Hudson 2001 and 2005). Second, one can say that each material object is identical to some spacetime region – specifically, the object's path, the region that exactly contains the object's complete career or life-history. This is supersubstantivalism.6 (As I noted above, supersubtantivalism becomes a tenable option only given substantivalism about spacetime. Substantivalists who take space and time to be separate and fundamental entities have no locations with which material objects can be plausibly identified.) Of these two views – dualist substantivalism and supersubstantivalism – considerations of parsimony favor the latter. Dualist substantivalism is unparsimonious with respect to ontology, since it embraces (i) sui generis, substantival spacetime points and/or regions and (ii) sui generis material objects that occupy spacetime but that are not in any way constructed from the same basic ingredients as spacetime. And dualist substantivalism is unparsimonious with respect to ideology, since its proponents will presumably need some primitive, fundamental occupation predicate to state the facts about how material objects relate to spacetime regions. Supersubstantivalism economizes on ontology, since it avoids sui generis material objects, and it economizes on ideology, since it has no need for a primitive, fundamental occupation predicate. According to the supersubstantivalist, for a material object to occupy a region is just for the material object to be that region. Jonathan Schaffer offers a number of further considerations that he takes to favor supersubstantivalism over dualist substantivalism. Two of his arguments are worth quoting at length: The argument from General Relativity: General Relativistic models are Triples <M, g, T> where M is a four-dimensional continuously differentiable point manifold, g is a metric-field tensor, and T is a stress- 6 As I will understand it, supersubstantivalism is neutral as to which regions count as material objects. (Every region? Every 'matter-filled' region? Every maximal continuous matter-filled region?) And then there is the further question of what counts as being 'matter-filled'. Presumably this will need to be spelled out in field-theoretic terms, but even so the answer is hardly straightforward. Again, supersubstantivalists are free to disagree amongst themselves on these questions. They are united only in claiming that all material objects are regions. 5 energy tensor (with both g and T defined at every point of M, and with g and T coupled by Einstein's field equations). There are no material occupants in <M, g, T> triples. That is, the distribution of matter in General Relativity is not given via a list of material objects in occupation relations to regions. Rather the distribution is given by the stress-energy tensor, which is a field, and thus naturally interpreted as a property of the spacetime. . . . Thus Earman suggests identifying M with the spacetime manifold, and treating g and T as properties of M: 'Indeed, modern field theory is not implausibly read as saying the physical world is fully described by giving the values of various fields, whether scalar, vector, or tensor, which fields are attributes of the space-time manifold M' (1989, p. 115) [Schaffer 2009: 142, italics original] The argument from Quantum Field Theory: Quantum Field Theory, like General Relativity, is a theory of fields (which again are naturally interpreted as states of the spacetime) rather than material occupants. . . . Thus in quantum field theory, 'particles' turn out to be excitation properties of spacetime itself, as d'Espagnat explains: 'Within [quantum field theory] particles are admittedly given the status of mere properties,... But they are properties of something. This something is nothing other than space or spacetime, which, being locally structured (variable curvature), have indeed enough 'flexibility' to possess infinitely many 'properties' or particular local configurations' (1983, p. 84). [Schaffer 2009: 142-3, italics original] At the very least, Schaffer makes a convincing case to the effect that many leading authorities in physics and the philosophy of physics believe that sui generis material objects play no role in General Relativity or Quantum Field Theory and, further, that the existence of such material objects may be positively in tension with these theories. (See Schaffer's paper for many further quotations and references.) On the assumption that substantivalists must choose between dualistic substantivalism and supersubstantivalism, then, the case for (1) is strong. (2) Why think that supersubstantivalists ought to be perdurantists, not endurantists? The answer, roughly, is that spacetime perdures. More carefully: if spacetime region r is the path of persisting object, then – barring some highly exotic view about spacetime7 – r perdures; in 7 Here are four such views. (i) Extended Simple Regions. Spacetime might be composed of spatially and temporally extended but mereologically simple 'grains'. (See Braddon-Mitchell and Miller (2006) and Dainton (2010) for discussion of related views.) Such a grain might count as persisting (since it's temporally extended), but it wouldn't have any proper temporal parts, and so might not count as perduring. (ii) Spatially Gunky Spacetime. Spacetime might be 'spatially gunky' and altogether lacking in proper temporal parts: suppose that every spacetime region is complex, spatially extended, and of infinite temporal extent in both temporal directions, so that each region is eternal and composed of spatially smaller regions. These regions would count as persisting but not as perduring (and even opponents of extended simples can believe in them). (iii) Restricted Composition on Spacetime Points. Suppose that all spacetime regions are composed of spatially-and-temporally-unextended, mereologically simple spacetime points, and that some spacetime points compose something iff they are arranged 'complete path of a living organism'-wise. Then, since no living organism has a spacetime point or another living organism as a proper temporal part (let's assume), it's plausible that no temporally extended region has any proper temporal parts. (The pluralities of simples that would compose the temporal parts of such regions, if they composed anything, do not in fact compose anything.) In that case there could be regions that persist but do not perdure. (iv) Mereologically Coinciding Regions Without Strong Supplementation. Suppose that all spacetime regions are composed of spatially-and-temporally-unextended simple spacetime points and that every plurality of points composes a region. But suppose further that there is at least one plurality of points, the ps, that compose two different regions, r1 and r2, such that: (a) r1 and r2 are both spatially and temporally extended, (b) r1 has a full distribution of proper temporal parts, and (c) r2 does not have any proper temporal parts. Thus the relationship between r1 and r2 is like the relationship between a statue and a lump that are composed of the same simples but that differ in that the head of the statue is a part of the statue but not of the lump. (Strong Supplementation – the principle that if x is not a part of y, then x has some part that fails to overlap y – is violated in such cases.) In such a case r2 would persist but not perdure. (Eagle (2010) floats a view that sanctions mereologically coincident spacetime regions but does not suggest that they might different with respect to having temporal parts.) 6 particular, r is temporally extended and has (proper) temporal parts. So, if o is identical to r, then o perdures too. All persisting material objects perdure, according to supersubstantivalism. In sum: for those metaphysicians who are seeking to develop a viable form of endurantism that harmonizes with physics, there is reason to hope that endurantism can be freed from a commitment to dualistic substantivalism. Not only does dualistic substantivalism fail the parsimony test, but experts tell us that it's in tension with our best physical theories. 3. First Compromise: The Path Constitution View Fortunately, there is room to maneuver here. For even if we accept spacetime substantivalism and reject full-blown dualism about regions and their material occupants, we need not embrace supersubstantivalism. 3.1 Outlining the View Instead of taking material objects to be identical with the regions that are their paths, one might take them merely to coincide mereologically with those regions. The idea would be that the relationship between a material object and its spacetime path is the same as the relationship often taken to hold between a statue and the lump of clay that constitutes it: mereological coincidence without identity. (Say that x mereologically coincides with y if and only if x and y overlap – share parts with – exactly the same things.) As far as I am aware, this view was first entertained in print by John Hawthorne: One might take the further step of not treating occupation as fundamental. The statue and lump are mereologically coincident. Perhaps they are also mereologically coincident with a spatiotemporal region. Occupation can then be defined in terms of mereological relations to regions. And just as we typically picture the statue as inheriting certain properties – weight and so on – from the lump by mereological coincidence, we can here think of various objects as inheriting various magnitudes associated with fields by mereological coincidence with spacetime regions which in turn are the fundamental bearers of field values (2006: 118, n. 18). Following Schaffer, let's use the term 'monistic substantivalism' for the view that each material object is either identical to or mereologically coincident with some spacetime region. Monistic substantivalism comes in two main versions: the identity version, a.k.a. supersubstantivalism, which holds that each material object just is a region, and the constitution version, which holds that at least some material objects are not identical to any region, but that each of them coincides mereologically with a region. The constitution view achieves some measure of ontological parsimony, since it treats material objects not as sui generis entities but as things that, intuitively speaking, are composed of the same basic ingredients as spacetime regions themselves, and it is parsimonious with respect to ideology, since it allows us to define 'occupies' as 'coincides with', rather than treating it as a fundamental primitive. Further, as Schaffer notes, it harmonizes with General Relativity and Quantum Field Theory: The constitution . . . [version] of monism can claim parsimony, and can claim fit with General Relativity and Quantum Field Theory, insofar as these issues only concern the fundamental ontology. The constitution views preserve the fundamental ontology of a spacetime bearing fields (2009: 143-144). Suppose, then, that we opt for the constitution view. 7 How would this help endurantism?8 It's not at all clear that it would, since it's tempting to think that if x mereologically coincides with y, and y perdures, then x perdures too. But one possibility is this. In opting for the constitution view, we open up logical space for the doctrine that a given plurality of spacetime points, the ps, compose (at least) two things: (i) a region, r, which is temporally extended and has a full distribution of instantaneous and non-instantaneous temporal parts, the ts, and (ii) a material object, o, which is temporally extended and co-located with r, but which does not have any of the ts as parts and indeed does not have any proper temporal parts at all. (Presumably o and r differ with regard to their de re modal profile as well, so that o but not r could have had, say, a shorter temporal duration.) The core idea here is that the relationship between o and r is like the relationship between a statue and a lump of clay that are both composed of the same simples but that do not have exactly the same parts: e.g., the statue, but not the lump, has the head of the statue as a part (Lowe 2003). (As pointed out in note 7, this requires rejecting Strong Supplementation, the principle that says that if x is not a part of y, then x has a part that fails to overlap y.) At this point it will be convenient to fill in some details that have so far been implicit: 8 Hawthorne (2006) and Schaffer both seem to think that the constitution version is friendlier to certain forms of endurantism than is the identity version, although neither goes into much detail on this point. Hawthorne focuses mostly on forms of endurantism (framed in terms of grounding or metaphysical dependence) that will not concern us here. Schaffer's reason for taking the constitution-version to be endurance-friendly is not clear to me. He writes that 'the constitution view . . . does not entail four-dimensionalism . . . . Presumably the constituted object could have different persistence conditions than its constituting matter [a spacetime region]' (2009: 137). 8 The Path Constitution View Absolutism There is only one fundamental parthood relation, it is a two-place relation (expressed by 'x is a part of y'), and it does not hold relative to times, locations, sortals, or anything else. Plenitude for Regions Each set of spacetime (points and/or9) regions has at least one spacetime region as a fusion.10 Path Coincidentalism Each material object coincides with a spacetime region (its path), but no material object is identical to any spacetime region. No Fundamental Occupation The predicate 'occupies' is not fundamental; it is defined in mereological terms, as 'x coincides with y', or perhaps as 'y is a region, and x coincides with y'. Regions Have Temporal Parts Each persisting spacetime region has proper temporal parts. Objects lack Temporal Parts There are material objects, but none of them has proper temporal parts. Parts of Objects A material object x is a part of a material object y only if some region that x occupies is a part of some region that y occupies. The Path Constitution View (PCV) takes no stand on which spacetime regions constitute material objects. (Every region? Every region at which certain fields have an everywhere positive value?) Nor does it take a stand on how many material objects are constituted by a given region that constitutes at least one material object. (One? Two? Continuum-many?) We've already mentioned the main virtues of the PCV: parsimony, fit with GTR and QFT, and – for those with endurantist sympathies – avoidance of temporal parts of material objects. One potential drawback of PCV – for those who are attracted to a certain brand of endurantism – is that it treats persisting material objects as temporally extended and singly located in spacetime. Second, and relatedly, PCV denies that any fundamental parthood relation ever holds between, say, an oxygen atom with a 1 billion year-long career and a human being with a ninety-year-long career. For it often happens that the path of such an atom overlaps the path of a human being, but it never happens that the path of such an atom is a part of the path of a human being. I elaborate on these issues below. Toward the end of the paper I will mention some a pair of problems that afflict all three of the compromise positions to be discussed in this paper. 9 Henceforth points (if there are any) count as regions. 10 This view would fail if (i) some sets of regions had no fusion at all, in which case a form of restricted composition would be true or (ii) some set of regions had more than one spacetime region as a fusion, as discussed in note ?????. 9 3.2 Problems for the Path Constitution View In stating these problems it will be convenient to work with precise definitions of three notions: the notion of being weakly located at a region, the notion of an object's path, and the notion of persisting. Our definitions will invoke (i) a primitive predicate for parthood (which we take to be reflexive and transitive) and (ii) a predicate for occupation. Informally, to say that x occupies r is to say that x has (or has-at-r) exactly the same shape and size as r and stands (or stands-at-r) in all the same spatiotemporal relations to things as does r. But of course the friend of PCV does not take 'occupies' as primitive; rather she defines it in terms of mereological coincidence as specified earlier. Now for the definition of 'is weakly located at'. Intuitively, to say that x is weakly located at r is to say that r is 'not completely free of' x (Parsons 2007); thus Russia is weakly located in Europe, in Asia, in Siberia, and in the Milky Way, but not in the Andromeda Galaxy. (Pretend that Russia is a material object and the rest are all spacetime regions). Our official definition will be this: 'x is weakly located at r' means '∃r*[x occupies r* & r* overlaps r]'. In words: 'x occupies something that overlaps r', where 'overlaps' means 'shares a part with'. As for the notion of an object's path: intuitively, my path is the spacetime region that I exactly sweep out over the course of my career. Although it is natural to speak as though each object has at most one path, we will not build this into our definition. We will say: 'r is a path of x' means '∀r*[r overlaps r* ↔ x is weakly located at r*]', that is, 'r overlaps all and only those entities at which x is weakly located'. It follows from this definition (together with the reflexivity of parthood) that if both r and r* are paths of x, then r and r* coincide. So, although we won't assume that no object has more than one path, we are committed to the view that no object has two paths that fail to coincide with each other. Finally, we can say that 'x persists' means '∃r∃r1∃r2[r is a path of x & r1 is a part of r & r2 is a part of r & r1 absolutely earlier than r2]'. In other words, to persist is to have a path some parts of which are absolutely earlier than others. So much for definitions. Now, just as a matter of usage, when one says that a thing 'endures', one can mean at least two things. First, one can mean that the thing persists but does not have temporal parts. Call this mereological endurance. Second, one can mean that the thing persists and occupies many different spacetime regions, each of them instantaneous or spacelike. Call this locational endurance. (Some early discussions of locational endurantism include van Inwagen 1990a and Bittner, Donnelly and Smith 2004.) There is a corresponding ambiguity in the term 'perdure'. When one says that a thing perdures, one can mean that it persists and has (a sufficiently full distribution of) temporal parts, or that it persists and occupies only its path (or paths, if it has more than one). Call the former mereological perdurance and the latter locational perdurance. (See Gilmore 2006 for more on this.) Some philosophers seem to think that material objects endure both mereologically and locationally, while others seem to think that they perdure both mereologically and locationally. But there is logical space for mixed views. One might take material objects to mereologically endure but locationally perdure, or to mereologically perdure but locationally endure. See Figure 2 (from (Gilmore 2008: 1230)) for an illustration of these options. 10 As we have seen, PCV accommodates mereological endurance. Since there is logical space to say that two entities coincide with having exactly the same parts, there is logical space to say that Obama lacks temporal parts but coincides with a spacetime region that has temporal parts. Problem 1: PCV rules out locational endurantism. However, PCV does not accommodate locational endurance. Given the definition of 'occupies' in No Fundamental Occupation, we get the result that any two regions occupied by Obama coincide with each other. But, together with our other definitions, this entails that Obama occupies only his path(s), that is, that he locationally perdures. Loosely stated, the problem is this. The locational endurantist wants to say that (i) although Obama's path is temporally extended, each of the regions that Obama occupies (each of Figure 2 Locational Perdurance Locational Endurance M er eo lo gi ca l e nd ur an ce M er eo lo gi ca l P er du ra nc e A multilocated persisting thing with instantaneous temporal parts A multilocated persisting thing without temporal parts A singly located persisting thing without temporal parts A singly located persisting thing with instantaneous temporal parts 11 his 'locations') is temporally unextended, and that (ii) there are a great many pairs of these locations that do not even overlap, much less coincide. But given the definition of 'occupies' built into PCV, we cannot say that. Instead, we have to say that Obama occupies only those regions with which he coincides. And he can coincide with two different regions only if they coincide with each other. So he can occupy two different regions only if they coincide with each other. He cannot occupy two non-coinciding regions, not to mention two non-overlapping regions. So, for what it's worth, locational endurantists will need to reject PCV. This is the first potential drawback mentioned above. Problem 2: Gain and loss of parts (in a fundamental sense of 'part'). Now let me turn to the second potential drawback for PCV. Consider some material object m that satisfies the following conditions: (i) we would ordinarily describe m as being a part of Obama at some time, (ii) m's path overlaps Obama's path, and (iii) m's path is not part of Oama's path, perhaps because m pre-dates or post-dates Obama, or perhaps because m is for some period of time spatially outside of Obama. In particular, (iv) some parts of m's path fail overlap Obama's path, and some parts of Obama's path fail to overlap m's path. The object m might be an electron, an oxygen atom, or a tooth that was pulled when Obama was a boy. For concreteness, let's supposes it's a DNA molecule. Given these assumptions, PCV tells us that no fundamental parthood relation holds between m and Obama. Granted, if m had temporal parts, then some temporal part of m might be a part, in the fundamental sense, of Obama; and m itself might be a part of Obama in some non-fundamental sense; but m itself is not in any fundamental sense a part of Obama.11 Intuitively, however, m itself is a part of Obama, in some fundamental sense of 'part'. Put more carefully: there is some fundamental parthood relation R such that, if R is two-place, then R is instantiated by m and Obama in that order (or by the ordered pair <m, Obama>), and if R is a three-or-more-place relation, then it's instantiated by m, Obama, and some further relata (or by some ordered -tuple containing m and Obama). In short, people have DNA molecules as parts, in some fundamental sense of 'part'. We should accommodate this point if we can do so without paying too high a price. PCV doesn't accommodate it. So we should look elsewhere. 4. Second Compromise: The Many-Slice Constitution View Why does PCV rule out locational endurantism? In nutshell, it's because PCV says that (i) occupying a region requires coinciding with that region and that (ii) a thing can't coincide with each of many non-overlapping regions. The commitment to (ii) arises from the fact that PCV assumes that parthood is reflexive and transitive and that 'x coincides with y' is defined as '∀z[z overlaps x iff z overlaps y]'. These are highly plausible assumptions in the context of the claim, made explicit in Absolutism, that the relevant fundamental parthood relation is two-place. But Absolutism is negotiable. Indeed, almost everyone who accepts both endurantism and B-theoretic eternalism already rejects Absolutism for independent reasons.12 The idea goes 11 To see this, note first that, given PCV together with our set-up, no region occupied by m is a part of any region occupied by Obama. But then, by Parts of Objects, we get the result that m is not a part of Obama. So the fundamental parthood relation expressed by 'is a part of' doesn't hold between m and Obama. And according to Absolutism, this is the only fundamental parthood relation. 12 Many have argued that the fundamental parthood relation for material objects is a three-place relation expressed by 'x is a part of y at z', with two slots for material objects and one slot for a time (Thomson 1983, van Inwagen 1990, Koslicki 2008) or a region of space or spacetime (Rea 1998, Hudson 2001, McDaniel 2004, Donnelly 2010). 12 roughly as follows. Objects gain and lose parts over time. A certain DNA molecule, m, is a part of Obama at one time but not at another. If the present were metaphysically privileged, we might be able to capture this fact in terms of tense operators and a two-place parthood predicate: ~Part(m, obama) & WAS[Part(m, obama)]. If things had temporal parts, we could try to capture the fact in terms of a non-fundamental, time-relative parthood predicate, defined in terms of the notion of a temporal part and ultimately in terms of a fundamental two-place parthood predicate (Sider 2001). But without temporal parts or a privileged present, the most natural option is to hold that the fundamental parthood relation holding between material objects is a more-than-twoplace relation. It bears repeating that this is an independent motivation for dropping Absolutism. Making room for monistic substantivalism has typically been the farthest thing from endurantists' minds. And yet they – or at least the B-theoretic eternalists among them – have already rejected Absolutism almost universally. But it turns out that once we drop Absolutism, we can articulate a natural notion of coincidence (or 'coincidence-at') in terms of which we can say that a given object coincides (at different times or locations) with different regions that do not overlap (at any time or location) each other. This lets us say that Obama occupies – and coincides with – each in a series of temporally unextended spacetime regions, just as a wave coincides (at different times) with each in a series of wave-shaped portions of water. Thus by dropping Absolutism, we open up a way to combine locational endurantism with monistic substantivalism. As before, we will need to reject (the appropriately restated version of) Strong Supplementation if we are to avoid the result that persisting material objects have temporal parts. For we will assume that each material object mereologically coincides with each in a series of instantaneous slices of the object's path. If it turned out that the material object had these slices as parts, they would count as temporal parts of the object. So we will need to say that, in some cases, an object x mereologically coincides with an object y but does not have y as a part. This conflicts with Strong Supplementation. 4.1 Outlining the View I suspect that this basic strategy can be implemented in a variety of ways, depending upon what Absolutism is replaced with. One tempting suggestion is to replace it with 3P The fundamental parthood relation for material objects is a three-place relation expressed by 'x is a part of y at z', with one slot for the part, one slot for the whole, and a third slot for a time, region of space, or region of spacetime. On the basis of considerations that do not concern monistic substantivalism, I have argued (2009) that 3P is inferior to 4P The fundamental parthood relation for material objects is a four-place relation expressed by 'x at y is a part of z at w', with one slot for the part, one slot for a As far as I am aware, the only self-described B-theoretic endurantist who accepts Absolutism is Parsons (2000 and 2007). 13 location of the part (e.g., a spacetime region), one slot for the whole, and one slot for a location of the whole (e.g., a spacetime region).13 So I will make use of 4P in what follows. For all I know, 3P and 4P would both serve equally well for task at hand in this chapter. I am opting for 4P only because I take it to be preferable on grounds that will not concern us here. Now, to help firm up the reader's grasp of my proposed four-place parthood relation, let me set out some principles that plausibly govern it. I'll get all these principles (and some associated definitions) out on the table quickly, then I'll supply some examples, in diagram form, that should help to clarify the principles. So please bear with me. First, the Location Location Principle: LLP ∀x∀y∀z∀w[P(x, y, z, w) → [L(x, y) & L(z, w)]] If x at y is a part of z at w, then x occupies y and z occupies w. This just makes explicit the assumption that the second and fourth slots are reserved for locations of the part and whole, respectively. Second, an analogue of the reflexivity of parthood: R4P ∀x∀y[L(x, y) → P(x, y, x, y)] If x occupies y, then x at y is a part of x at y. We can't say 'for all x and all y, x at y is a part of x at y' since, together with LLP, this would entail that everything occupies everything, which is obviously false. R4P is the most natural alternative. Third, an analogue of the transitivity of parthood: T4P ∀x1∀y1∀x2∀y2∀x3∀y3[[P(x1, y1, x2, y2) & P(x2, y2, x3, y3)] → P(x1, y1, x3, y3)] If x1 at y1 is a part of x2 at y2, and x2 at y2 is a part of x3 at y3, then x1 at y1 is a part of x3 at y3. It will also be useful to define predicates for overlapping and coincidence: DO O(x1, y1, x2, y2) =df. ∃x3∃y3[P(x3, y3, x1, y1) & P(x3, y3, x2, y2)] 'x1 at y1 overlaps x2 at y2' means 'some x3 at some y3, is a part both of x1 at y1 and of x2 at y2' DC CO(x1, y1, x2, y2) =df. [L(x1, y1) v L(x2, y2)] & ∀x3∀y3[O(x3, y3, x1, y1) ↔ O(x3, y3, x2, y2)]] 'x1 at y1 coincides with x2 at y2' means 'either x1 occupies y1 or x2 occupies y2, and for any x3 and y3, x3 at y3 overlaps x1 at y1 if and only if x3 at y3 overlaps x2 at y2' The first clause in DC is needed to avoid the result that Obama, at a region r1 on the moon, coincides with Putin, at a region r2 on Jupiter. (Since Obama does not occupy r1, nothing (at any 13 Kleinschmidt (2011) independently proposes 4P and some of the same 4P-appropriate mereological principles to be given here. But she eventually rejects 4P. 14 location) is a part of him there, and so nothing (at any location) overlaps him there. Similarly for Putin and r2. It follows that exactly the same things, at exactly the same locations, overlap Obama at r1 as overlap Putin at r2.) With the first clause in place, however, we can show (given R4P, T4P, and DO) that if o1 at r1 coincides with o2 at r2, then o1 occupies r1 and o2 occupies r2. In slogan form: you can't coincide with things at regions at which you don't occupy. We will also want to define a predicate for fusion. To do this, we can think of fusion as a three-place relation that holds between a thing, a set, and a location of the thing, where the set in question is a set of ordered <thing, location of that thing> pairs: DF F(y, s, y*) =df. ∃z(z∈s) & ∀z[z∈s → ∃w∃w*[z=<w, w*> & P(w, w*, y, y*)]] & ∀z∀z*[P(z, z*, y, y*) → ∃u∃w∃w*[u∈s & u=<w, w*> & O(w, w*, z, z*)]] In words, y fuses s at y* just in case: (i) s is a non-empty set, (ii) each member of s is an ordered pair whose first member at its second member is a part of y at y*, and (iii) for any z and any z*, if z at z* is a part of y at y*, then there is some ordered pair in s whose first member at its second member overlaps z at z*. DF does not have the result that material objects have sets or ordered pairs as parts. When a thing fuses a set of ordered pairs, it has the first members of those ordered pairs as parts, not the pairs themselves, and not the set of them. Now for a pair of diagrams to illustrate these concepts. Figure 3 depicts a case in which two different composite objects (f and g) fuse the same simples (a, b, and c) and hence count as coinciding. These composite objects also occupy the same region. Figure 3 may also be useful in that it illustrates cases of overlapping and cases in which our reflexivity and transitivity principles (R4P and T4P) apply. 15 Figure 3 The raison d'être of three-place or four-place parthood is the need to accommodate cases in which an object is multilocated (occupies two or more non-coinciding spacetime regions) and exhibits mereological variation from one location to another (has parts at one of its locations that it does not have at another). Multilocation is missing from the diagram above. So it will be useful to consider another case. In the case depicted by Figure 4, m is a composite object that occupies two different regions: rm1 and rm2. Further, m has different parts at different locations: at rm1, m has d but not a as a part, and at rm2, m has a but not d as a part. ra rb a b d rd c rc e re f rf Some facts about the case 1. a – g are material objects 2. ra – rf are spacetime regions 3. g ≠ f 4. a occupies ra, . . . , f occupies rf, and g occupies rf 5. a at ra is a part of a at ra (by 4 and R4P) 6. b at rb is a part of d at rd 7. b at rb is a part of e at re 8. d at rd overlaps e at re (by 6, 7, and DO) 9. e at re is a part of f at rf 10. b at rb is a part of f at rf (by 7, 9, and T4P) 11. f fuses the set {<a, ra>, <b, rb>, <c, rc>} at rf, as does g 12. f fuses the set {<d, rd>, <e, re>} at rf , as does g 13. f at rf coincides with g at rf g 16 Figure 4 We can think of m as being analogous to an enduring human being who is composed of different parts at different times at which it exists or at different spacetime regions that it occupies. At the earlier region rm1, m is composed of a, b, an c (at certain locations of these objects) and at the later region rm2, m is composed of d, b, and c (at certain later locations of these objects). So far I have been suppressing a pair of important questions. First, is 'occupies' ('L') defined, and if so how? Second, how does the sub-region relation that holds between regions relate to the parthood relation that holds between material objects? I answer the first question affirmatively, and give the following definition: DL L(x, y) =df. ∃z∃w[P(x, y, z, w) v P(z, w, x, y)] 'x occupies y' means 'either x at y is part of some z at some w, or some z at some w has x at y as a part' As a slogan: to occupy a region is to be a part of something there or to have, there, something as a part. As for the second question, since we are emphasizing ideological parsimony in this chapter, we will operate under the assumption that there is just one fundamental parthood relation, and that it holds both between material objects and between regions (among other things, perhaps). Thus, if region r1 is, intuitively, a subregion or part-simpliciter of r2, then we should say that r1 at r1 is a part of r2 at r2. If we like, we can go further and define a two-place predicate for parthood simpliciter (which then comes out as a non-fundamental relation): DPS P 2(x1, x2) =df. ∃y1∃y2[P(x1, y1, x2, y2) & ∀y3∀y4[[L(x1, y3) & L(x2, y4)] → P(x1, y3, x2, y4)]] ra1 rc1 rb1 rm1 a b c m rd2 rc2 rb2 rm2 d b c m Some facts about the case 1. a – m are material objects 2. ra1 – rm2 are instantaneous spacetime regions 3. rm1 and each of its parts is absolutely earlier than rm2 and each of its parts; rm1 and rm2 do not overlap 4. m occupies exactly two regions, rm1 and rm2; m does not occupy any proper subor superregions of these 5. b and c each occupies exactly two regions: b occupies rb1 and rb2, c occupies rc1 and rc2 6. a at ra1 is a part of m at rm1 7. it is not the case that: a at ra1 is a part of m at rm2 8. ~∃r[a at r is a part of m at rm2], in words: a is not, anywhere, a part of m at rm2. 9. d at rd2 is a part of m at rm2. 10. ~∃r[d at r is a part of m at rm1], in words: d is not, anywhere, a part of m at rm1 11. m fuses {<a, ra1>, <b, rb1>, <c, rc1>} at rm1 12. m does not fuse {<d, rd2>, <b, rb2>, <c, rc2>} at rm1 13. m fuses {<d, rd2>, <b, rb2>, <c, rc2>} at rm2 14. m does not fuse {<a, ra1>, <b, rb1>, <c, rc1>} at rm2 17 In words, 'x1 is a part-simpliciter of x2' means 'x1, somewhere, is a part of x2, somewhere, and for any locations y3 and y4 of x1 and x2, respectively, x1 at y3 is a part of x2 at y4'. Presumably regions are singly located (occupying themselves only); at the very least it seems certain that no region occupies two non-coinciding regions. This makes it plausible that if region r1 is, at r1, a part of region r2 at r2, then r1 is a part-simpliciter of r2. With the understanding that regions, no less than material objects, can fill the 'part' slot and 'whole' slot in our four-place parthood relation, we are now in a position to set out a principle that links (i) facts about the mereological relationship between a pair of objects with (ii) facts about the mereological relationship between the locations of those objects. I will call it Withinness: W4P ∀x1∀y1∀x2∀y2[P(x1, y1, x2, y2) → P(y1, y1, y2, y2)] If x1 at y1 is a part of x2 at y2, then y1 at y1 is a part of y2 at y2. Intuitively, this says that if Obama's right arm, at region rra, is a part of Obama, at region ro, then the 'arm-region' is a part of the 'Obamba-region' – in four-place terms, rra at rra is a part of ro at ro. There are a number of further principles that we could set out that plausibly link 'mereological' facts to 'locational' facts, but W4P is enough for now. (Strictly speaking, these facts are all mereological, since we're working with just one non-logical primitive: our fourplace parthood predicate.) So far, everything that I have said concerning our four-place parthood relation should seem at least as plausible to the dualist substantivalist as to the monist substantivalist. Indeed, most of what I have said about that relation here just summarizes what I have said elsewhere (2009 and forthcoming a), working under dualist presuppositions. But now that we have this framework in place, we can simply drop the tacit dualism, and everything else should remain intact. In particular, we can say that each material object mereologically coincides with each spacetime region that it occupies: Monism4P For any material object o and spacetime region r, if o occupies r, then: o at r coincides with r at r. According to this view, if Obama occupies the three-dimensional, instantaneous spacetime region r1, then he, at r1, mereologically coincides with r1, at r1; and in that case the relationship between him and r1 is like the relationship between the material objects f and g in diagram 1: coincidence without identity. Moreover, he can bear this relation of coincidence to many different regions that do not bear it to each other. Perhaps he also occupies the distinct region r2. Then, given Monism4P, it follows that Obama, at r2, coincides with r2, at r2. But it does not follow that r1 and r2 even overlap, much less that they coincide: we remain free to say that ~∃r∃r*[r1 at r overlaps r2 at r*] and hence that ~∃r∃r*[r1 at r coincides with r2 at r*]. If we define a two-place coincidence predicate as follows, DC2 CO 2(x1, x2) =df. ∃y1∃y2CO(x1, y1, x2, y2) 'x2 coincides 2 with x2' means 'x1, at some y1, coincides with x2, at some y2' 18 then we can say, speaking quite strictly, that Obama coincides2 with regions that do not coincide2 with each other (since the two-place relation so defined is symmetric but not transitive). And of course, what goes for Obama also goes for any material objects that he ever has as parts, such as arms, legs, cells, or DNA molecules. The analogy with waves is worth repeating. Just as a wave mereologically coincides, at different times, with different portions of water (where many pairs of these portions do not even overlap with each other), an enduring material object coincides2 with many different instantaneous regions (many pairs of which do not overlap each other). It may help to consider Figure 5, which illustrates this combination of Monism4P and locational endurantism. Figure 5 We should think of this as a simplified, highly unrealistic situation in which an object, o, has a complete spacetime path that is composed of just two instantaneous regions, the earlier region r1 and the later region r2. The most important thing to note about the case is that it satisfies, in a precise way, both locational endurantism and monist substantivalism. The one material object in the case, o, occupies just the instantaneous, non-overlapping regions r1 and r2; o does not occupy its temporally extended path, which, for simplicity, we have left out of the diagram altogether. Hence o locationally endures. Further, monist substantivalism is respected since, informally put, everything in the diagram is ultimately composed of spacetime regions. The regions themselves are of course composed of regions. But so is the one material object in the situation, o. It is composed of different spacetime points at different locations. At its location r1, it is composed of the points p1 and p2. At its later location r2, it is composed of p2 and p3. Here is a general statement of the Many-Slice Constitution View (MSCV) that makes explicit some further details. p1 p2 r1 o p3 p4 r2 o Some facts about the case 1. o is a material object 2. p1 – p4 are mereologically simple spacetime regions ('points') 3. r1 and r2 are mereologically complex spacetime regions 4. Each spacetime region occupies exactly one spacetime region, itself 5. o occupies exactly two spacetime regions, r1 and r2 (hence o≠r1 and o≠r2) 6. o fuses {<p1, p1>, <p2, p2>} at r1, as does r1 7. o fuses {<p3, p3>, <p4, p4>} at r2, as does r2 8. ~∃r∃r*[r1 at r overlaps r2 at r*] 9. o at r1 coincides with r1 at r1 10. o at r2 coincides with r2 at r2 11. r1 does not coincide 2 with r2 19 The Many-Slice Constitution View One Parthood There is only one fundamental parthood relation, and it holds both among material objects and among spacetime regions. 4P The fundamental parthood relation for material objects is a four-place relation expressed by 'x at y is a part of z at w', with one slot for the part, one slot for a location of the part (e.g., a spacetime region), one slot for the whole, and one slot for a location of the whole (e.g., a spacetime region) Plenitude for Regions4P Each set of spacetime (points and/or) regions has at least one spacetime region as a fusion. In 4Pappropriate terms: for any non-empty set s, if each member of s is a spacetime (point or) region, then ∃r[F(r, {x: ∃y[y∈s & x=<y, y>]}, r) & r is a spacetime region. Locational Endurantism Some material objects persist (have temporally extended paths), but no material object occupies any noninstantaneous (or non-spacelike) region. Constitution+Monism4P For any material object o and spacetime region r: (i) o≠r and (ii) if o occupies r, then: o at r coincides with r at r. No Fundamental Occupation4P There is no fundamental occupation relation; the predicate 'occupies' is defined in terms of a four-place parthood predicate, as specified in DOCC. Regions Have Temporal Parts Each persisting spacetime region has proper temporal parts. Objects lack Temporal Parts There are material objects, but none of them has proper temporal parts. W4P If x at y is a part of z at w, then y at y is a part of w at w. Like PCV, MSCV leaves a number of questions open. It leaves open the question of which spacetime regions are 'material-object-paths', and which instantaneous slices of those paths are occupied by material objects. Further, it leaves open the question of whether a given instantaneous slice ever coincides with more than one material object. 4.2 How MSCV avoids the problems facing PCV How does the Many-Slice Constitution View help with the two problems that we raised for the Path Constitution View? Problem 1: Ruling out locational endurantism.The first problem (from an endurantist vantage point) was that PCV was committed to locational perdurantism and ruled out locational endurantism. Obviously MSCV solves that problem. It says that material objects occupy only instantaneous (or spacelike) regions. 20 Problem 2: Gain and loss of parts. The second problem was that PCV led to the result that a certain DNA molecule, m, is not a part of Obama, in any fundamental sense of 'part'. The underlying reason for this was that, in the case we considered, m's path extended outside of Obama's path, and according to PCV, the only regions that m and Obama occupy are their paths. Given the 'Withinness' principle, this forces us to say that m is not a part of Obama, in any fundamental sense of 'part'. MSCV avoids this problem by maintaining that m has many locations, each of them an instantaneous slice of its path. Similarly for Obama. Given this, it will be natural for the friend of MSCV to say that many of m's locations are parts of some location or other of Obama, and that m is a part of Obama, in some fundamental sense of 'part'. To be more precise, the friend of MSCV will find it natural to say that there are spacetime region rm and ro such that: (i) m occupies rm, (ii) Obama occupies ro, (iii) rm at rm is a part of ro at ro (presumably rm is a part-simpliciter of ro, in the sense defined earlier), and (iv) m at rm is a part of Obama at ro. Given 4P, clause (iv) amounts to the claim that there is a fundamental parthood relation that holds between m and Obama (and two regions). Crucially, all this is perfectly consistent with the fact that m's path extends outside of Obama's path. 4.3 A Problem for the Many-Slice Constitution View and the Path Constitution View There is one core feature of both PCV and MSCV that many endurantists will see as a drawback:14 the commitment to mereological-coincidence-without-identity. Some philosophers apparently reject coinciding entities on something like 'purely mereological' grounds. They see the ban on these entities as (a) intuitively compelling on its own, or as (b) being justified by an analogy between composition and identity, or as (c) following from intuitively compelling principles concerning the behavior of parthood (reflexivity, strong supplementation, and anti-symmetry). Others reject coinciding entities on the basis of the grounding problem (Bennett 2004). If coinciding objects x and y are not identical, presumably they differ with respect to certain properties – modal or historical ones, for example. But what could ground these differences, given that x and y coincide and hence are so similar physically? As applied to the thesis of object-region coincidence, the grounding problem runs as follows. If region r and object o mereologically coincide (at region r), then they will, presumably, be quite similar (at that region). They will be alike with respect to size and shape. As Hawthorne and Schaffer note, it's plausible that they will be alike with respect to the values of the various fields associated with r. Given these similarities, it may seem h and r should not differ in any way whatsoever. Some philosophers will be moved by none of these considerations. But those who are moved will want to find an alternative to PCV and MSCV. (I have a special interest in finding such an alternative. For I have given an argument in favor of locational endurantism that relies on the principle that it is impossible for two different objects to mereologically coincide (2007 and 2010).) 14 B-theoretic endurantists who are on record in opposition to mereological coincidence without identity include van Inwagen (1990), Burke (1994), Olson (1997), Rea (1998, 2001), Hershenov (2005), McGrath (2007), and Koslicki (2008). The argument for locational endurantism given in Gilmore (2007) depends upon the impossibility of mereological coincidence without identity. 21 5. Third Compromise: Regions-as-Pluralities Multilocationism Faced with a threat of mereological coincidence between two entities, a natural response is to keep one and eliminate the other. Our third compromise keeps the material objects and eliminates the regions with which they were said to coincide. Informally, the idea is as follows. There are spatially and temporally unextended, mereologically simple spacetime points, and there are sets of these points, but there are no mereological sums/fusions of these points: there are no mereologically complex spacetime regions. When we would ordinarily speak of a certain complex region r as being composed of some simple points, the ps, we should instead just speak of the ps plurally (Hudson 2005: 17). Thus, when we would ordinarily say, concerning some material object o, that o occupies r, we should instead say that o occupies the ps, where 'occupies' is treated as a predicate that is nondistributive with respect to its second argument place. And when the 4Per would ordinarily say that o at r is a part of some other material object, o*, at some other complex region, r* (composed of the p*s), we should instead say that o, at the ps, is a part of o*, at the p*s, where '__ at . . . is a part of - at ////' is treated as a predicate that is non-distributive with respect to its second and fourth argument places (at least). The monist substantivalist component of the new view is that a material object o occupies some points, the ps, only if o is (in a sense to be specified) composed of the ps. The locational endurantist component of the view is that a persisting material object occupies many different pluralities of points, each of them temporally unextended. Putting these pieces together, we can say that there are many different non-overlapping, temporally unextended pluralities of points, the p1s, the p2s, and so on, such that: Obama occupies p1s and is 'temporarily' composed of them, Obama occupies the p2s and is 'temporarily' composed of them, and so on. Thus we retain locational endurantism and monist substantivalism but, having eschewed talk of complex regions, we avoid the commitment to mereologically coinciding entities. To state this view more precisely, we will need to introduce a new set of definitions, properly restated in plural terms. First, a pair of principles governing the four-place parthood relation that we are taking to be fundamental: R4Pplural ∀x1∀yy1[∃x2∃yy2[Ppl(x1, yy1, x2, yy2) v Ppl(x2, yy2, x1, yy1)] → Ppl(x1, yy1, x1, yy1)] If x1 at yy1 is part of some x2 at some yy2 or has some x2 at some yy2 as a part, then x1 at yy1 is a part of x1 at yy1. T4Pplural ∀x1∀yy1∀x2∀yy2∀x3∀yy3[[Ppl(x1, yy1, x2, yy2) & Ppl(x2, yy2, x3, yy3)] → Ppl(x1, yy1, x3, yy3)] If x1 at yy1 is a part of x2 at yy2 and x2 at yy2 is part of x3 at yy3, then x1 at yy1 is a part of x3 at yy3. These are just plural analogues of R4P and T4P. I take them to be self-explanatory. Now for the definitions. I use the symbol '≺' for the predicate 'is one of'.15 PD1 Lpl(x1, yy1) =df. ∃x2∃yy2[Ppl(x1, yy1, x2, yy2) v Ppl(x2, yy2, x1, yy1)] 15 See Linnebo (2012) on 'is one of' and plural quantification. My notation follows his. 22 'x1 occupies yy1' means 'for some x2 and some yy2, either x1 at yy1 is a part of x2 at yy2 or x2 at yy2 is a part of x1 at yy1' PD2 PATHpl(x, zz) =df. ∀z[z≺zz ↔ ∃yy[Lpl(x, yy) & z≺yy]] x has zz as a path =df. for any z: z is one of zz if and only if there are yy such that: (i) x occupies yy and (ii) z is one of yy. PD3 ACHR(zz) =df. ∀x∀y[[x≺zz & y≺zz & x≠y] → SPCLK(x, y)] 'zz are achronal' means 'for any x and any y, if x is one of zz and y is one of zz and x≠y, then x is spacelike separated from y' PD4 PERS(x) =df. ∃yy[PATHpl(x, yy) & ~ACHR(yy)] 'x persists' means 'there are some zz such that: (i) x has zz as a path and (ii) zz are not achronal' PD5 L-ENDpl(x) =df. PERS(x) & ∀yy[Lpl(x, yy) → ACHR(yy)] 'x locationally endures' means '(i) x persists and (ii) for any yy, if x occupies yy, then yy are achronal'. Locational endurantism can then be stated as the view that at least one material object persists and all persisting material objects locationally endure. To state the remaining components of Regions-as-Pluralities Multilocationism, it will help to have definitions of plural versions of 'overlaps' and 'fuses'. PD6 Opl(x1, yy1, x2, yy2) =df. ∃x3∃yy3[Ppl(x3, yy3, x1, yy1) & Ppl(x3, yy3, x2, yy2)] PD7 Fpl(x, s, zz) =df. ∃y(y∈s) & ∀y1[y1∈s →∃u1∃ww1[[y1=<u1, {w: w≺ww1}>] & Ppl(u1, ww1, x, zz)]] & ∀u1∀ww1[Ppl(u1, ww1, x, zz) → ∃y2∃u2∃ww2[y2∈s & y2=<u2, {w: w≺ww2}> & Opl(u2, ww2, u1, ww1)]] The last definition requires some unpacking. As before, we are taking fusion to be a three-place relation, but now we take it to hold between a thing, a non-empty set of ordered <thing, set of things> pairs, and a plurality (of points). We say that a thing x fuses set s at plurality zz if and only if: (i) s is a non-empty set of ordered pairs, (ii) each of these pairs is such that its first member, at the members of its second member, is a part of x, at zz, and (iii) for any object u1 and plurality ww1, if u1 at ww1 is a part of x at zz, then some member <u2, {w: w≺ww2}> of s is such that u1 at ww1 overlaps u2 at ww2. With all these terms in hand, we can give an official statement of our new view as follows. 23 Regions-as-Pluralities Multilocationism (RPM) One Parthood There is only one fundamental parthood relation, and it holds both among material objects and among spacetime regions. 4Pplural The fundamental parthood relation for material objects is a four-place relation expressed by 'x at yy is a part of z at ww', with one slot for the part, one slot for some things (e.g., spacetime points) that are collectively occupied by the part, one slot for the whole, and one slot for some things (e.g., spacetime points) that are collectively occupied by the whole. Compositional Nihilism about Regions There are no mereologically complex spacetime regions: if r1 is a spacetime region and x at yy is a part of r1 at zz, then x=r and, for any w, if w is one of yy or w is one of zz, then w=r. In other words, the only cases of parthood holding among spacetime regions are cases in which a region r, at itself, is a part of r, at itself. Locational Endurantismplural Some material objects persist, and all persisting material objects locationally endure, in the sense defined by PD5. Objects Fuse Spacetime Points For any material object o and spacetime points, zz, if o occupies zz, then o fuses {x: ∃y[y≺zz & x=<y, {y}>} at zz. Unique Fusion4Pplural For any x, y, s, and zz: if x fuses s at zz and y fuses s at zz, then x=y. No Fundamental Occupation4P There is no fundamental occupation relation; the predicate 'occupies' is defined in terms of 'x at yy is a part of z at ww', as specified in PD1. Objects lack Temporal Parts There are material objects, but none of them has proper temporal parts. Withinness4Pplural If x at yy is a part of z at ww, then yy are among ww, i.e., ∀u[u≺yy → u≺ww] Figure 6 depicts a simplified situation in which both RPM and monistic substantivalism are satisfied. 24 Figure 6 We can think of RPM as a theory of restricted composition, à la van Inwagen (1990), but applied to spacetime points rather than to 'simple, enduring, fundamental particles' such as electrons and quarks. Simplified somewhat, the theory makes the following claims: (i) for any spacetime points, pp, if there are more than one of pp, then pp compose something if and only if: (a) they are achronal, and (b) they are arranged R-wise [where R is unspecified so far], and (ii) if there are more than one of pp and they do compose some entity o, then: (a) o is a material object, not a spacetime region, (b) o occupies pp, (c) o is the only entity that pp compose, and (iii) there are some persisting material objects, each such object occupies more than one plurality of spacetime points, and each such object is composed ('temporarily') of each of the pluralities of spacetime points that it occupies. The analogy with van Inwagen's position is more than incidental. In (i) above, one could replace 'R' with 'living organism' and the result would be a version of van Inwagen's position that is consistent with monistic substantivalism. (Of course, RPM is flexible enough to accommodate other views about composition as well.) According to the 'van Inwagen-ized' version of RPM, there are mereologically simple spacetime points, living organisms (which are composed of certain pluralities of these points and which are multilocated in spacetime), and no other concrete entities.16 16 Similarly, the dominant-kinds view developed in a dualist-substantivalist context by Burke (1994) and Rea (2000) can be developed in monist-substantivalist context with an appropriate replacement for 'R' in (i). Likewise for virtually any uniqueness-friendly endurantist theory of persistence-and-composition. See Markosian (2008) for more on restricted composition. no complex region no complex region p1 p2 o p3 p4 o Some facts about the case 1. o is a material object, not a spacetime region 2. p1 – p4 are mereologically simple spacetime regions ('points') 3. There are no other regions; in particular, there are no complex regions made up of p1 – p4. 4. Each spacetime region occupiespl exactly one spacetime region, itself 5. o occupiespl p1 and p2 (collectively) and o occupies pl p3 and p4 (collectively); o occupiespl nothing else 6. o fusespl {<p1, {p1}>, <p2, {p2}>} at p1 and p2 7. o fusespl {<p3, {p3}>, <p4, {p4}>} at p3 and p4 25 Admittedly, the van Inwagen-ized version of RPM faces worries about arbitrariness and anthropocentrism. Why privilege living organisms over artifacts or non-living natural formations such as molecules or planets? And it depends upon an assumption which some will doubt: viz., that spacetime ultimately bottoms out in simple spacetime points, rather than being gunky. But these criticisms apply equally to van Inwagen's actual view, a form of dualist substantivalism. (van Inwagen assumes that matter bottoms out in simple particles rather than being gunky.) Similarly, any version of RPM will need to make some maneuver that guarantees that no two material objects ever coincide even temporarily, and any such maneuver will have drawbacks. When I start with a lump-shaped piece of clay and mold it into a statue, it seems that I end up the following thing(s) in my hands: a piece of clay that has existed for several hours at least, and a statue that has existed only for a few minutes. This generates a Leibniz-law argument for the conclusion that the statue and the piece of clay are not identical, despite coinciding mereologically. One might deny the existence of statues and/or lumps (van Inwagen 1990, Merricks 2001), one might say that a lump ceases to exist when molded into a statue (Burke 1994, Rea 2001), or might find something else to say. Presumably these moves all have their costs. But the crucial point is that RPM is not to blame. Coincidence-deniers already had to make these moves in the context of dualist substantivalism, before RPM came on the scene. (Figure 7 summarizes the terrain covered in sections 2 – 5.) Figure 7 Spacetime Substantivalism Are material objects entirely composed of spacetime points/regions? Yes (Monist Substantivalism) Are material objects identical to spacetime regions? No. In fact, material objects share no parts or constituents with spacetime regions (Dualist Substantivalism) Endurantism tenable Yes (Supersubstantivalism) Endurantism untenable No ('Non-reductive' Monist Substantivalism) How is a material object built out of spacetime? It 'atemporally' mereologically coincides with its spacetime path (PCV) • Mereological endurantism tenable • Locational endurantism untenable • Commitment to coinciding entities It 'temporarily' mereologically coincides with each instantaneous slice of its path (MSCV) • Mereological endurantism tenable • Locational endurantism tenable • Commitment to coinciding entities It is 'temporarily' composed of many different achronal pluralities of points (RPM) • Mereological endurantism tenable • Locational endurantism tenable • No commitment to coinciding entities 26 6. Two problems for all three compromises So far I have suppressed a pair of problems that afflict all three compromise positions. To these I now turn. 6.1 New chalk Judith Jarvis Thomson has offered the following argument against perdurantism: [If perdurantism is true, then] as I hold the bit of chalk in my hand, new stuff, new chalk keeps constantly coming into existence ex nihilo. That strikes me as obviously false (1983: 213) This argument is often dismissed as question-begging or otherwise not worth taking seriously. Whether or not such a dismissive attitude is justified, one thing does seem clear: of those philosophers who take perdurantism to be a 'live option' prior to encountering Thomson's argument, few will be convinced by that argument when they are exposed to it. Still, I suspect that, for better or for worse, Thomson's central premise, (T) it is not the case that, as I hold a bit of chalk in my hand, new stuff, new chalk keeps constantly popping into existence, is a deeply held (perhaps basic) commitment for a significant number of endurantists. And if (T) is incompatible with perdurantism, it is also in tension with PCV, MSCV, and RPM. Let me take these in turn. PCV and new chalk. There is logical space to say that this bit of chalk mereologically coincides with its spacetime path, that its path has temporal parts, but that the bit of chalk itself does not. Still, on this view, there are entities (instantaneous temporal parts of the path) that are very much like temporal parts of the bit of chalk. Each of them is composed entirely of simples (spacetime points) none of which were present at previous moments. Presumably each of these temporal parts of the bit of chalk have many or all of the same intrinsic physical properties as the bit of chalk (at the relevant times) – so much so that it would be accurate to say that they are 'chalky'. And they keep constantly popping into existence as I hold the bit of chalk in my hand. This conflicts with (T) if perdurantism does. (Strictly speaking, it is not obvious that if perdurantism is true, then new stuff or new chalk keeps popping into existence. This depends on subtle questions about the semantics of mass expressions like 'stuff' and 'chalk'. We cannot address these questions here.) MSCV and the new chalk. The only major difference between MSCV and PCV is that MSCV takes the fundamental parthood relation, and the mereological coincidence relation defined in terms of it, to be relativized to regions. MSCV agrees with PCV that the bit of chalk has a spacetime path, that this path has instantaneous temporal parts, that these parts are 'chalky', and that they keep constantly popping into existence as I hold the bit of chalk in my hand. RPM and the new chalk. RPM denies the existence of mereologically complex spacetime regions. So it denies that the bit of chalk has a spacetime path that has instantaneous temporal parts. But it still conflicts with the spirit of (T). Roughly put, RPM tells us that as I hold the bit of chalk in my hand at time t1, the bit of chalk is composed of some simple spacetime points, the p1s, and a few seconds later, at t2, the bit of chalk is composed of some other simple spacetime points, the p2s, where none of the p1s is identical to any of the p2s. Indeed, according to RPM (and PCV and MSCV too), there is a clear sense in which, between any two instants (in 27 the same frame of reference), the bit of chalk undergoes complete mereological turnover at the fundamental level, the level of simples. There may not be any new complex entities popping into existence, but at each moment, there is an entirely new plurality of simples that pop into existence (and that compose the bit of chalk). Does this force us to say that new stuff or new chalk pops into existence? Again, this depends on questions about the semantics of mass expressions that I cannot address here. But either way, RPM surely conflicts with the spirit of (T), if perdurantism does. Of course, the endurantist who embraces dualist substantivalism does not face the problem about new chalk. Since he denies that material objects share any parts or constituents with spacetime, he is free to say that the bit of chalk undergoes no mereological variation at all. For example, he is free to say that it is composed of some simple, fundamental particles, the ps, at t1, and that it is composed of these very same simple particles at t2. 6.2 Spatially point-like enduring objects Interestingly, the existence of spatially point-like material objects would wreak havoc on all three compromise positions.17 We can take them in turn once again. PCV and spatially point-like material objects. Let e be a spatially point-like persisting material object, with a (one-dimensional) timelike curve as a spacetime path. Since's e's path is a timelike curve, the instantaneous temporal parts of that path are simple spacetime points. So, since e mereologically coincides with this path, these points are parts of e too. (Mereologically coincident objects may be able to differ with respect to their complex parts, but, given that parthood is reflexive, they cannot differ with respect to their simple parts.18) But if the given points are parts of e, they are instantaneous temporal parts of e. So e has instantaneous temporal parts: it mereologically perdures. Thus PCV loses its appeal for the endurantist. MSCV and spatially point-like material objects. The Many-Slice Constitution View does not say that e mereologically coincides with its path. Rather, it says that e mereologically coincides, in the '4P-appropriate way', with each instantaneous slice of that path. As I noted above, each of those slices is just a simple spacetime point. So, according to MSCV, e mereologically coincides with each in a series of simple points, without being identical to any of those points. But this is problematic. As I have noted elsewhere (forthcoming a, forthcoming b), the claim that (3) e mereologically coincides with a simple to which it is not identical is inconsistent with the reflexivity of parthood together with a plausible supplementation principle, 'quasi-supplementation': QS if x is a part of y and x is not identical to y, then y has parts z and z* that do not overlap each other. 17 And if spacetime is composed of spatially extended simple 'grains', the existence of 'spatially-grain-like' material objects would be equally problematic for all three compromise positions, for parallel reasons. 18 We will assume that (i) x and y mereologically coincide, (ii) z is simple, and (iii) z is a part of x; we will show that z is a part of y, too. By (i) and the definition of 'mereologically coincide', it follows that (v) x and y overlap exactly the same things. By the reflexivity of parthood, (vi) z is a part of itself. Together with (iii) and the definition of 'overlaps', this entails that (vii) x overlaps z. Together with (v), this entails that y overlaps z. So, by the definition of 'overlap', (viii) there is a thing, call it w, that is a part of z and a part of y. But by the definition of 'simple', the only part of z is z itself. So w=z, and hence z is a part of y. 28 (Similarly, the '4P-appropriate' version of (3) is inconsistent with the 4P-appropriate versions of reflexivity and QS, taken together.) The bottom line is that if QS and the reflexivity of parthood are both necessary truths, then, while it may be possible for two different complex objects to coincide with one another, it is not possible for a simple object to coincide with any other object. This gives the friend of MSCV a reason to hope that there are no spatially point-like material objects. RPM and spatially point-like material objects. The problem is essentially the same for RPM. Roughly put, RPM says that e is composed, at each moment of its career, of a different achronal plurality of simple spacetime points. In the case of a spatially extended material object, each of the given pluralities would include more than one point. But in the case of a spatially point-like object such as e, each of the given 'pluralities' includes just one thing, a simple point. So, at each moment of its career, e is composed of some simple (non-persisting) spacetime point – with which e is not identical. This is inconsistent with the conjunction of the relevant versions of the reflexivity of parthood and QS. 7. Conclusion Of those who work on the metaphysics of persistence, most seem to assume that only perdurantists can build material objects out of spacetime. But the situation is not so simple. If one is willing to embrace coinciding entities and reject Strong Supplementation, one can say that material objects lack temporal parts even though they coincide with temporally extended regions that have temporal parts. (This is the Path Constitution View, PCV.) Indeed, one can get this far while confining oneself to the perdurantist's attractively simple fundamental ideology – a primitive two-place predicate for parthood simpliciter. If one is willing to go a bit farther and help oneself to a slightly more exotic piece of fundamental ideology (a primitive, more-than-two-place predicate for a 'location-relative' parthood relation), and if one is still willing to embrace coinciding objects and reject Strong Supplementation, then one can say that material objects both (i) lack temporal parts, in the manner of 'mereological endurantism', and (ii) are multilocated in spacetime, in the manner of 'locational endurantism'. (This is the Many-Slice Constitution View, MSCV.) It is worth repeating, however, that virtually all eternalistic, B-theoretic endurantists already help themselves to a fundamental relativized parthood predicate, even in the context of dualist substantivalism. Finally, if one is willing to eliminate complex spacetime regions (in favor of sets or pluralities of points) and treat the fundamental parthood predicate as being not merely 'locationrelative' but also non-distributive, one can (i) reject temporal parts, (ii) retain locational endurantism, and (iii) avoid coinciding entities. (This is Regions-as-Pluralities Multilocationism, RPM.) However, all three views come with further costs. They are all subject to Thomson-esque worries about 'new chalk' constantly popping into existence. And none of them fits well with the view that there are spatially point-like material objects. But for the would-be endurantist who is impressed by the case against dualist substantivalism, all this may be a price worth paying. 29 References Balashov, Y. 2010. Persistence and Spacetime (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Bennett, K. 2004. 'Spatiotemporal coincidence and the grounding problem', Philosophical Studies 118.3: 339-371. Bittner, T., Donnelly, M., and Smith, B. 2004, "Endurants and Perdurants in Directly Depicting Ontologies", AI Communications, 13, 247-258. Braddon-Mitchell, D. and Miller, K. 2006. 'The Physics of Extended Simples', Analysis 66: 222226. Burke, M. 1994. "Preserving the Principle of One Object to a Place: A Novel Account of the Relations among Objects, Sorts, Sortals and Persistence Conditions," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54: 591–624. Dainton, B. 2010. Time and Space, 2nd ed. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's). Donnelly, M. 2010. 'Parthood and Multi-location', in D. Zimmerman, ed., Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 5: 203-243. Eagle, A. 2010a. 'Perdurance and Location', in D. Zimmerman, ed., Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 5, pp. 53-94. Gibson, I. and Pooley, O. 2006. 'Relativistic Persistence', Philosophical Perspectives, 20, Metaphysics: 157-198. Gilmore, C. 2006. 'Where in the Relativistic World Are We?', Philosophical Perspectives, 20, Metaphysics: 199-236 (December 2006) Gilmore, C. 2007. 'Time Travel, Coinciding Objects, and Persistence,' in D. Zimmerman, ed., Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 3., pp. 177-198. Gilmore, C. 2008. 'Persistence and Location in Relativistic Spacetime,'Philosophy Compass 3/6 (2008): 1224–1254 Gilmore, C. 2009. 'Why Parthood Might Be a Four Place Relation, and How it Behaves if it Is,' in L. Honnefelder, E. Runggaldier, and B. Schick, eds., Unity and Time in Metaphysics (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2009), pp. 83-133. Gilmore, C. forthcoming(a). "Parts of Propositions", in Kleinschmidt forthcoming. Gilmore, C. forthcoming(b). "Quasi-Supplementation, Plenitudinous Coincidentalism, and Gunk", in Robert Garcia, ed., Substance: New Essays (Philosophia Verlag). Haslanger, S. 2003. "Persistence through Time", in M. Loux and D. Zimmerman, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 315-354. Hawthorne, J. 2006. Metaphysical Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Hawthorne, J. and Sider, T. 2006. 'Locations', in John Hawthorne, Metaphysical Essays (Oxford: Oxford University press), pp. 85-109. Hershenov, David 2005. "Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem for Biological Approaches to Personal Identity?" Mind 114: 31-59. Hudson, H. 2001. A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person (Ithaca: Cornell). Hudson, H. 2005. The Metaphysics of Hyperspace (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Kleinschmidt, S. 2011. "Multilocation and Mereology", in J. Hawthorne, ed., Philosophical Perspectives 25: 253-276. Kleinschmidt, S., ed., forthcoming. Mereology and Location (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Koslicki, K. 2008. The Structure of Objects (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Linnebo, Ø. 2012. "Plural Quantification", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/plural-quant/>. 30 Lowe, E. J. 2003. 'Substantial Change and Spatiotemporal Coincidence', Ratio 16: 140-160. Markosian, N. 2008. 'Restricted Composition', in Sider, Hawthorne, and Zimmerman, eds., Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics (London: Blackwell), pp. 341-363. Markosian, N. 2010. 'Time', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/time/>. McDaniel, K. 2004. 'Modal Realism with Overlap', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82: 137152. McGrath, M. 2007. 'Four-Dimensionalism and the Puzzles of Coincidence', in D. Zimmerman, ed., Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 3: 143-176. Merricks, T. 2001. Objects and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Olson, E. 1997. The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press) Parsons, J. 2000. 'Must a Four-Dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts?', The Monist 83: 399418. Parsons, J. 2007. 'Theories of Location', Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 3., pp. 201-232. Rea, M. 1998. 'Temporal Parts Unmotivated', Philosophical Review 107, 225-260. Rea, M. 2000. 'Constitution and Kind Membership', Philosophical Studies 97: 169-193. Sattig, T. 2006. The Language and Reality of Time (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Schaffer, J. 2009. "Spacetime the one substance", Philosophical Studies 145: 131-148. Sider, T. 2001. Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Skow, B. 2005. Once Upon a Spacetime. PhD Dissertation, New York University. Thomson, J. J. 1983. 'Parthood and Identity over Time', Journal of Philosophy 80: 201-220. van Inwagen, P. 1990a. 'Four-Dimensional Objects', Noûs 24: 245-255. van Inwagen, P. 1990b. Material Beings, Ithaca: Cornell.

Draft America's connection to India: Freud, Jones & Bose. Subhasis Chattopadhyay This is a rudimentary paper written to claim my connection that the American and the erstwhile Indian modes of psychoanalysis are more authentic modes vis-à-vis the French mode. Some of the claims I make in this paper have been already published in Prabuddha Bharata and some are forthcoming. For instance, I have written on Ritalin which is pertinent to this discussion yet I have avoided mentioning this since my contention regarding Ritalin is pending publication in Prabuddha Bharata. Scholars have already documented America's connection to India through trade routes and the movement (production and consumption) of English novels. Ships left the ports of Kolkata (erstwhile Calcutta) bearing exotic Indian names, often derived from best-selling Bengali novels. Further, books published in England where pirated in Kolkata and the same went to US readers. This trajectory has been well documented by Sanjeev Chopra1. I want to add an area hitherto unnoticed by American Studies' and separately, Indian Studies' scholars: Ernest Jones (1879-1958) who popularized Freud (1856-1939) in America was in touch with Girindrasekhar Bose (1887-1953). Bose was in touch with both Freud and Jones2. Bose begun the Indian chapter of the (classically Freudian) Psychoanalytic Association3. This last came about through the office of Jones. 1 Chopra spoke on this at the Hyatt Regency, Kolkata on 4th July, 2017, evening. Chopra's detailed scholarship is beyond the scope of this draft. In private conversation with me has elaborated on his research. 2 "Girindra Sekhar Institute." Girindra Sekhar Institute of Psychological Education & Research, gsiper.org/page.php?page_alt_name. Accessed 23 July 2017. 3 Bose was the 1st President of the Indian Psychoanalytic Society. Therefore, my contention is this: there are more similarities between the Indian praxes of psychoanalysis and American praxes of psychoanalysis than between Indian and French psychoanalytic praxes; at least, initially. It is only later that through a very Indian obsession with Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) mediated through Gayatri Spivak4 (1942-) and the subaltern group that we find Indian Psychoanalysis become a mimicry5 of French psychoanalysis. Amardeep Singh's understanding of mimicry is worth noting for its ontological bias towards French philosophy. Singh in an act of mimicry sees mimicry as good in some circumstances! Indian academics seem to be too indebted to the Tel Quel (1960-82) school which is the psychoanalytic equivalent of the hippie movement within serious clinical practice. Therefore, now Jacques Lacan (19011981) has come to rule the roost in the discourse of social sciences in India6. If the dates are carefully considered, we in India are Johnny-come-latelies. The main mode of Indian psychoanalysis then was/is American and classically Freudian. But now it is Lacanian (and not even the sort practised by Julia Kristeva7). Unfortunately, both Lacan and Kristeva are too abstract to be of any use to clinical therapists like Thomas Bien8. The movement away from American psychoanalysis within Indian psychoanalytic studies has 4 Spivak has done a brilliant job of translating Derrida but both Derrida and Spivak are indecipherable and speak a language which is obscure and in the long run, Derrida is a marginal philosopher who was confused about the logos. 5 "Mimicry, however, is not all bad. In his essay "Of Mimicry and Man," Bhabha described mimicry as sometimes unintentionally subversive. In Bhabha's way of thinking, which is derived from Jacques Derrida's deconstructive reading of J.L. Austin's idea of the "performative," mimicry is a kind of performance that exposes the artificiality of all symbolic expressions of power. In other words, if an Indian, desiring to mimic the English, becomes obsessed with some particular codes associated with Englishness, such as the British colonial obsession with the sola topee, his performance of those codes might show how hollow the codes really are." See Singh, Amardeep. "Mimicry and Hybridity in Plain English." Amardeep Singh, May 8, 2009. Accessed July 23, 2017. http://www.lehigh.edu/~amsp/2009/05/mimicry-and-hybridity-in-plain-english.html. 6 I have mentioned about Lacan's obsession with the real etc. in many of my published reviews in Prabuddha Bharata. 7 I have one published review of Kristeva (1941-) and one is forthcoming in Prabuddha Bharata. This essay is being written on 23rd July, 2017. 8 I have reviewed Thomas Bien's excellent Mindful Therapy: A Guide for Therapists and Helping Professionals in Prabuddha Bharata. been to the detriment of clinical praxes in India. Empiricism (as in neuroscience) had been removed by Lacan who along with R. D. Laing (1927-89) have rung the death-knell of clinical psychoanalysis globally. I am working on the works of a German psychoanalyst, Felix de Mendelssohn whose work on organizational psychoanalysis9 may be the exact thing which can help redeem both global psychoanalytic norms and also, Indian psychoanalysis. Here is Jacques Lacan on anxiety, notice the meaninglessness of his verbosity: These remarks, as you can sense very well, are not digressional. [Notice how Lacan is hedging for attacks against precisely his "digressional" inanities.] Already, circumcision can no longer strike you as being some ritualistic whim, because it conforms to what I have been teaching you to consider in demand, namely the circumscription of the object and with it the function of the cut. What God demands [Lacan is now not only a teacher but also a theologian!] as an offering in this delimited zone isolates the object once it's been circumcised... (See p 81 in Lacan, Jacques. "That Which Deceives Not." Translated by A. R. Price. Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller. In Anxiety: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, 69-82. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2015.) Lacan invariably rambles in his work and has a superficial sense of gravitas when he tries to "teach" us. He has done irreparable damage to mental healthcare worldwide. Had Indian psychoanalysts heeded Bose, Jones and Freud, we'd be in good stead. Freud had written that he would be redundant when medical neuroscience caught up with psychoanalysis. But while Bose, Jones and Freud are not redundant, we can 9 Mendelssohn's work on group dreamwork(s) is fascinating. I am preparing a monograph on him and reading singers like Leonard Cohen through a matrix created from his analytic work. safely ignore French psychoanalysts within the matrix of psychoanalytic praxes. The American connection needs to be re-discovered and nurtured.

ANDRZEJ KLIMCZUK Gry komputerowe i branża gier a sztuka komiksowa elem niniejszego artykułu jest przybliżenie wspólnych obszarów gier i komiksu. Jednakże opracowanie w szczególności odnosi się do wzrostu znaczenia rynku gier cyfrowych na przełomie XX i XXI wieku. O procesie tym świadczą regularne badania ekonomiczne prowadzone przez takie instytucje, jak NPD Group czy PricewaterhouseCoopers. Do 2013 roku globalny wzrost sprzedaży gier tradycyjnymi i elektronicznymi kanałami dystrybucji ma być szybszy niż sprzedaż płatnych usług telewizji cyfrowej i kina, przy jednoczesnym spadku zainteresowania książkami, prasą i radiem. W zakresie rozrywki i komunikacji masowej od rynku gier szybciej rozwijać ma się jedynie rynek technologii teleinformatycznych związany ze wzrostem i jakością połączeń internetowych1. Procesy te wymagają pogłębionej refl eksji teoretycznej i metodologicznej.W pierwszej kolejności przybliżone zostaną podstawowe pojęcia. Następnie podjęta zostanie próba przedstawienia wspólnych przestrzeni gier cyfrowych i komiksu. Wskazane zostaną również możliwe kierunki dalszych badań. Za J. Juulem poprzez grę rozumie się „oparty na zasadach system formalny, ze zmiennym i policzalnym rezultatem, gdzie różnym wynikom przypisane są różne wartości. Gracz wywiera wpływ na wynik, jest do niego przywiązany, a konsekwencje aktywności gracza są opcjonalne i podlegają negocjacji"2. W tym miejscu przyjmuje się, iż gry komputero1 Zob. Global Entertainment and Media Outlook: 2009–2013, ed. by M. Fenez, PricewaterhouseCoopers, New York 2009. 2 M. Filiciak, Wirtualny plac zabaw. Gry sieciowe i przemiany kultury współczesnej, WAiP, Warszawa 2006, s. 44. Gry komputerowe i branża gier a sztuka komiksowa C Kontekstowy_miks_03.indd 373 2011-01-11 13:30:45 374 A N D R Z E J K LI M C Z U K we (wideo) stanowią jeden z możliwych rodzajów gier, przy czym są one czymś innym niż zabawy, które są nieformalne, cechują się swobodnym działaniem, nieskodyfi kowanymi regułami i brakiem obiektywnego rezultatu końcowego. Ponadto gry cyfrowe to media masowe, inaczej środki komunikowania masowego, które za D. McQuailem rozumie się jako „instytucjonalne środki publicznego komunikowania na odległość, do wielu odbiorców, w krótkim czasie"3. Media masowe są instytucjami tworzącymi niewiele przekazów, ale ich potencjalny zasięg i skala oddziaływania jest ogólnospołeczna. Ważne jest odnotowanie, iż badaniem gier i zabaw zajmuje się prężnie rozwijająca ludologia przynależąca do nauk humanistycznych. Mówiąc o branży gier komputerowych (wideo) czy też o przemyśle gier (computer and video game industry), odwołujemy się do terminologii nauk ekonomicznych. Mamy tu na myśli część gospodarki, w której znajdują się przedsiębiorstwa zajmujące się produkcją, marketingiem, dystrybucją i sprzedażą gier. Ich celem jest osiągnięcie dla swoich właścicieli zysków, które pozwolą na utrzymanie działalności i jej rozwój. Można przyjąć, iż zastosowanie poszczególnych wyprodukowanych i sprzedanych gier jest podobne. Niemniej przedsiębiorstwa konkurując ze sobą, przedstawiają swoją ofertę odmiennym segmentom rynku, czyli kategoriom odbiorców o zbliżonych cechach położenia geografi cznego, demografi cznych i społeczno-kulturowych. Mianem komiksu określa się dosłownie „komiczny pasek"4, historię składającą się z zestawionych ze sobą rysunków, wypowiedzi i komentarzy. Przy czym początkowo historie obrazkowe miały „charakter zabawy, polegającej na odtworzeniu w tworzywie jednej sztuki formy charakterystycznej dla sztuki zupełnie innej"5. Efektem ubocznym tych praktyk było położenie nacisku na odmienną od języka naturalnego „mowę obrazów" a przez to parodiowanie literatury i „literackiego" malarstwa. Komiks, podobnie jak gry cyfrowe, stanowi odmianę mediów masowych6, która tradycyjnie istnieje w postaci drukowanej, ale współcześnie także jako publikacje internetowe. Tu również mamy do czynienia z narodzinami nowej dyscypliny naukowej zwanej komiksologią lub komiksoznawstwem. Analogicznie można prowadzić analizy branży komiksowej czy też przemysłu komiksów (comics industry). Zdaje się jednak, iż przynajmniej w Polsce częściej dostrzega się istnienie komiksów w szerzej ujmowanych kategoriach, takich jak „branża wydawnicza" czy „branża mediów 3 D. McQuail, Teoria komunikowania masowego, przeł. M. Bucholc, A. Szulżycka, PWN, Warszawa 2007, s. 23. 4 J. Szyłak, Komiks, Znak, Kraków 2000, s. 11. 5 Tamże. 6 D. McQuail, Teoria komunikowania masowego, dz. cyt., s. 50. Kontekstowy_miks_03.indd 374 2011-01-11 13:30:46 G ry k o m p u te ro w e i b ra n ża g ie r a sztu k a k o m ik so w a 375 i rozrywki". Może to świadczyć o słabym rozpoznaniu zjawiska i niewielu podmiotach korzystających ze społeczno-ekonomicznego potencjału komiksów. Dotychczasowe rozważania prowadzą do wniosku, iż za cechę wspólną gier cyfrowych i komiksów można uznać realizację funkcji mediów masowych7. Do tego instytucje medialne prowadzą działalność gospodarczą i pełnionym przez nie funkcjom odpowiadają kreowane w nich dobra niematerialne i usługi (np. postacie, lokacje, działy, narracje, wątki, opcje). Poza tym, jako media, gry i komiksy pełnią rolę zwierciadła, „w którym ukazują się najbardziej istotne cechy danego społeczeństwa na aktualnym etapie jego rozwoju"8, ale przekaz ten wzięty nawet jako całość, nie odzwierciedla rzeczywistości społecznej, w której powstał, albowiem odtwarza i współtworzy wartości dominujące w danym społeczeństwie9. Innymi słowy: opierając się na uznawanych wartościach, autorzy gier i komiksów tworzą uproszczone, wyobrażone światy, które są zakorzenione w realiach, w których faktycznie żyją i na które oddziałują zwrotnie, ustalając sposób postrzegania i ich samych, i użytkowników ich wytworów. Kolejnym istotnym pojęciem artykułu jest sztuka, która za M. Golką ujmowana jest tu jako system artystyczny10. Wytwory uznawane przez ludzi za dzieła sztuki są zrozumiałe tylko w kontekście danego systemu artystycznego i jego nadsystemu społeczno-kulturowego. Kluczowe są tu instytucje artystyczne tworzące układy tworzenia, obiegu, obecności i odbioru dzieł sztuki11. Przykładem niech będzie fakt, iż dzieła takich dziedzin, jak fi lm, muzyka, taniec, sztuki plastyczne i teatr stanowią przedmiot badań wielu dyscyplin humanistycznych (m.in. estetyki, psychologii, historii sztuki, socjologii sztuki), ale też przedmiot kształcenia właściwych im dyscyplin artystycznych, jak chociażby dyrygentura, rytmika i taniec oraz konserwacja i restauracja dzieł sztuki. Poza tym za warunek niezbędny do odróżnienia sztuki od innych dziedzin życia społecznego uznaje się realizację funkcji estetycznej polegającej na dostarczaniu ludziom poprzez dzieła sztuki form widzenia świata i innych wartości12. 7 Takich funkcji mass mediów można wskazać pięć: informują; korelują (wyjaśniają, socjalizują, koordynują działania); zapewniają ciągłość (wyrażają dominującą kulturę); zapewniają rozrywkę i mobilizują (prowadzą kampanie popierające cele polityczne, wojenne, gospodarcze i religijne). Zob. tamże, s. 111-112. 8 E. Nasalska, Kierunki rozwoju analizy treści, „Studia socjologiczne" 3-4, 1982, s. 55. 9 Por. T. Goban-Klas, Media i komunikowanie masowe, PWN, Warszawa 1999, s. 129. 10 System artystyczny według M. Golki to „całość złożona ze wzajemnie współzależnych, powiązanych i względnie uporządkowanych składników, takich jak: ludzie występujący w różnych rolach, stosunkach, grupach, ich czynności oraz wytwory przeniknięte znaczeniami i wartościami przejawiającymi się w różnych dziedzinach". Zob. M. Golka, Socjologia kultury, Scholar, Warszawa 2008, s. 271. 11 Tamże, s. 274. 12 Tamże, s. 300. Kontekstowy_miks_03.indd 375 2011-01-11 13:30:46 376 A N D R Z E J K LI M C Z U K Gry i zabawy wraz ze sztuką, według A. Kłoskowskiej, stanowią dziedziny kultury symbolicznej, czyli rodzaje społecznych i psychospołecznych układów znaków i wartości, które są przedmiotami lub aktami ludzkiego zachowania, stanowiącymi korelaty postaw i znaczeń13. Przy czym zakres kultury symbolicznej określają: kryterium autoteliczności − czynności, wartości i przeżycia stanowiące cel istotny sam w sobie, nie z uwagi na uzyskiwane rezultaty czy korzyści oraz kryterium semiotyczności − tworzenia, przekazywania i odbioru znaków przez ludzi14. Zestawienie gier i zabaw ze sztuką w ramach kultury symbolicznej pozwala na dostrzeżenie pewnych ich podobieństw i różnic15. Poza tym zakłada się, że sztuka, w odróżnieniu od gier i zabaw, dostarcza przeżyć zastępczych i quasi-fatycznych. Zdaje się jednak, iż w przypadku gier cyfrowych i komiksów z rozbudowaną narracją trudno o takie odróżnienie od sztuki, gdyż odbiorca może identyfi kować się z postaciami, wątkami fabuły, motywami estetycznymi oraz wywoływać w sobie wyobrażenie kontaktu z postaciami i autorami gry16. Wydaje się zatem, iż część gier i komiksów można uznać za przykłady odrębnych dziedzin sztuki. Stąd też mianem sztuki komiksowej (comics art) da się określić dziedzinę związaną z tworzeniem narracji powiązanych z rysunkami, tekstami narratora i wypowiedziami postaci przedstawianych na planszach drukowanych w czasopismach, książkach i albumach lub jako cyfrowe dane wizualne. Jednocześnie należy zauważyć, iż analogiczne określenie sztuka gier komputerowych/wideo (computer and video game art) nie jest jeszcze upowszechnione17. Poprzez sztukę 13 A. Kłoskowska, Socjologia kultury, PWN, Warszawa 2007, s. 74. 14 Właściwości kultury symbolicznej sprawiają, iż niekiedy jest określana jako niematerialna lub duchowa. Przenika ona wszystkie sfery ludzkiej działalności materialnej (kultury bytu) związanej z produkcją i dystrybucją dóbr oraz usługami do zaspokojenia podstawowych potrzeb bytowych człowieka, jak też działalności społecznej (kultury społecznej) związanej z tworzeniem wspólnot norm i wzorów, uczenia się ich i dalszego przekazywania. Zob. tamże, s. 215. 15 Podobieństwa gier i zabaw ze sztuką stanowią: autonomizacja form, samoistność, oderwanie od praktyczności, nieproduktywność i swoboda mimo reguł. Odróżnienie gier i zabaw od sztuki umożliwiają natomiast następujące cechy: mogą, ale nie muszą im towarzyszyć elementy uznawane za estetyczne; ich dostrzeganie zależy od umiejętności wyrażania krytycznych interpretacji przez odbiorców przekazu; wytwory te kładą nacisk na realizację odmiennych funkcji, zaspokojenie innych potrzeb; gry i zabawy zdają się zajmować miejsce pośrednie pomiędzy kulturą artystyczną i społeczną; w odróżnieniu od sztuki mocniej angażują w kontakty interpersonalne; w słabszym stopniu poddają się dookreśleniu i odtworzeniu; swoboda gier i zabaw jest bardziej ograniczona niż dowolność fi kcji artystycznej. 16 Por. A. Kłoskowska, Socjologia kultury, dz. cyt., s. 241-243. 17 Określenie sztuka gier komputerowych/wideo znajduje uzasadnienie chociażby w serii wystaw Into the Pixel zapoczątkowanych w 2004 roku na targach Electronic Entertainment Expo przez Los Angeles County Museum of Art oraz w wystawach eksperymentalnych gier wideo organizowanych przez Australian Centre for the Moving Image w Melbourne od 2005 roku. Kontekstowy_miks_03.indd 376 2011-01-11 13:30:46 G ry k o m p u te ro w e i b ra n ża g ie r a sztu k a k o m ik so w a 377 gier komputerowych/wideo można rozumieć dziedzinę związaną z procesami projektowania powiązań koncepcji gry, jej szaty grafi cznej, oprawy dźwiękowej oraz mechanizmów sztucznej inteligencji i interaktywności z myślą o ich odbiorze za pośrednictwem sprzętu komputerowego, jak komputery osobiste, konsole, automaty i telefony komórkowe. Przypuszczalnie w obu tych dziedzinach sztuki da się już wyróżnić szczegółowe dyscypliny artystyczne, które mogą np. stanowić odmiany dyscyplin zaliczanych do innych dziedzin − jak rysunek ze sztuk plastycznych czy grafi ka trójwymiarowa z nauk technicznych. W tym miejscu wystarczy zaznaczyć jedynie, iż wskazane pojęcia sztuki komiksowej i sztuki gier zdają się pozostawać w sprzeczności z dominującymi opiniami − zarówno gry, jak i komiksy są bowiem postrzegane jako „produkty kultury masowej" lub „dzieła sztuki popularnej"18. Do bliższego określenia wspólnych obszarów gier cyfrowych i komiksu posłuży analiza form kapitału w nawiązaniu do klasycznych ujęć P. Bourdieu, J.S. Colemana i R.D. Putnama19. Określone zostaną wskaźniki pięciu jego rodzajów: ekonomicznego, ludzkiego, społecznego, kulturowego oraz symbolicznego. Dokonany przegląd ma pozwolić na dostrzeżenie zjawisk i procesów zachodzących między wskazanymi typami mediów i dziedzinami sztuki. Rezultaty analizy z wykorzystaniem tej wielowymiarowej kategorii o charakterze ilościowo-jakościowym mogą służyć celom teoretycznym i praktycznym, ujawniając zarówno wykorzystywane, jak i ukryte potencjały oraz bariery wspólnego rozwoju gier i komiksów. Przyjmuje się przy tym, że znajdujące się do dyspozycji ludzi zasoby są przekształcane w kapitał, tylko jeśli istnieje na nie popyt na „rynku" − w wybranych sferach życia społecznego. Uruchamianie kapitału służy osiąganiu zysku, celów i korzyści. Poprzez kapitał ekonomiczny rozumie się pieniądze i przedmioty do wytwarzania towarów i usług20. W odniesieniu do tworzenia gier i komiksów o nagromadzonym kapitale ekonomicznym danej jednostki, grupy czy instytucji może świadczyć własność produkcyjna, np. dostępne środki na inwestycje, pomieszczenia do pracy twórczej, sprzęt umożliwiający tworzenie komiksów i projektowanie gier. Zasoby takie gromadzą i projektanci gier, i twórcy komiksów jako przedsiębiorcy lub zrzeszające ich stowarzyszenia, fundacje, spółdzielnie, przedsiębiorstwa i korporacje. Za 18 Stereotyp użytkowników gier i komiksów może zaś stanowić „masa" a więc duża jednolita zbiorowość, która przejawia negatywne zachowania (niewykształcone, nieracjonalne, skłonne do przemocy) oraz jest pozbawiona zasad, porządku i organizacji. Zob. D. McQuail, Teoria komunikowania masowego, dz. cyt., s. 70-73. 19 Zob. A. Rymsza, Klasyczne koncepcje kapitału społecznego, w: Kapitał społeczny. Ekonomia społeczna, red. T. Kaźmierczak, M. Rymsza, ISP, Warszawa 2007. 20 J.H. Turner, Struktura teorii socjologicznej, przeł. G. Woroniecka, red. A. Manterys, G. Woroniecka, PWN, Warszawa 2004, s. 597. Kontekstowy_miks_03.indd 377 2011-01-11 13:30:46 378 A N D R Z E J K LI M C Z U K przykłady mogą posłużyć tu wspólne technologie wykorzystywane przy tworzeniu gier i komiksów. Przygotowanie oprawy wizualnej gier poprzedzać może opracowanie szkiców i historii obrazkowych przedstawiających wybrane postacie i sytuacje (np. sceny przerywnikowe w serii „Max Payne"). Komiksowa grafi ka może też stanowić podstawę oprawy wizualnej całości gry − tak było głównie w czasach dominacji gier dwuwymiarowych, choć wciąż jest szeroko wykorzystywane w grach przygodowych. Uznawane już za klasyczne gry opierały się na zasadach pixel art − edycji obrazów na poziomie pojedynczych pikseli widocznych na ekranie monitora21. Należy tu wspomnieć o technice renderingu grafi ki trójwymiarowej zwanej cell shading dzięki, której modele przestrzenne przypominają wyglądem ręcznie rysowane obiekty. Z pomocą tej techniki możliwe jest przedstawienie w grach scen zbliżonych do rysunków w komiksach lub scen z fi lmów animowanych22. W ten sposób twórcy mogą lepiej wykorzystać ograniczone możliwości sprzętowe platform do gier. Jednocześnie zastosowanie technologii komputerowych prowadzi do powstawania komiksów cyfrowych23. Najbardziej złożone i zbliżone do gier zdają się komiksy interaktywne z właściwymi sobie animacjami i ścieżką dźwiękową, w których odbiorca jest zachęcany do najeżdżania kursorem na widoczne na ekranie obiekty, wyszukiwania i używania ich oraz podejmowania decyzji za bohaterów (np. „NAWLZ.com", „MSPaint Adventures"). Poza tym współczesne konsole do gier wykorzystywane są również do promocji i dystrybucji komiksów, co sprzyja dotarciu do nowych odbiorców, jak też integracji fanów poszczególnych marek24. Pojęcie kapitału ludzkiego obejmuje wszystko to, co jednostka samodzielnie zainwestowała we własny rozwój i to, co zostało w nią zainwestowane z zewnątrz25. Istotne jest tu, że ludzie, uzupełniając własną wiedzę, stają się potencjalnymi innowatorami, którzy są w stanie skuteczniej przekształcać zasoby i odkrywać nowe sposoby ich wykorzystywania. Ten typ 21 Istotne przykłady pixel art mogą stanowić chociażby gry platformowe z serii Super Mario Bros, Rayman, Oddworld i pojedyncze tytuły jak Heart of Darkness (nad którą prace trwały sześć lat) oraz bijatyki Comix Zone, Fatal Fury i Street Fighter. 22 Technika cell shading została wykorzystana m.in. w takich grach, jak: Auto Modellista, Dragon Quest VIII, Jet Set Radio, Killer7, MadWorld, Okami oraz w licznych grach stanowiących adaptacje i kontynuacje komiksów, mang, seriali i anime (m.in. Avatar: The Last Airbender, Blood+, Dragon Ball Z, Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles, Fullmetal Alchemist, Afro Samurai). 23 Komiksy cyfrowe stanowią zeskanowane kopie komiksów wydanych na papierze, komiksy tworzone w całości w programach grafi cznych lub poddane w nich obróbce, „komiksy ruchome" stanowiące połączenie komiksów i animacji (np. Broken Saints, Watchmen: Motion Comic) i komiksy wykorzystujące hipertekst (np. Argon Zark!). 24 W 2009 roku usługę dystrybucji komiksów zaproponował koncern Sony, udostępniając posiadaczom przenośnej PlayStation Portable aplikację Digital Comics Reader, za pomocą której można czytać kopie prac zakupionych w kanale dystrybucji elektronicznej. 25 A. Sadowski, Białystok. Kapitał społeczny mieszkańców miasta, WSE, Białystok 2006, s. 23. Kontekstowy_miks_03.indd 378 2011-01-11 13:30:46 G ry k o m p u te ro w e i b ra n ża g ie r a sztu k a k o m ik so w a 379 kapitału, w odróżnieniu od innych, nie stanowi samodzielnego przedmiotu obrotu na rynku, nie może zmienić właściciela i nie ulega utracie podczas konwersji na inne formy kapitału. Wskaźnikami kapitału ludzkiego w analizowanym przypadku mogą być wszystkie cechy twórców gier i komiksów, które umożliwiają im kształtowanie wzajemnych powiązań między analizowanymi dziedzinami. Znaczące mogą być: wiedza, umiejętności zawodowe, znajomość obsługi narzędzi i oprogramowania grafi cznego, jak również aspiracje, ambicje i możliwości rozwojowe, miejsce zamieszkania, migracje, stopień zadowolenia z wykonywanej pracy oraz inwestycje w nich z zewnątrz (lub ich bariery) np. inwestycje rodziny i władz lokalnych w edukację oraz szkolenia w czasie pracy. Do określenia szczegółowych przykładów mogą służyć badania wywiadów z projektantami i artystami pracującymi nad grami i ich uzasadnień czerpania inspiracji z komiksów, tworzenia ich licencjonowanych adaptacji i odrębnych, „interaktywnych numerów". Możliwe jest tu też prześledzenie losów poszczególnych fi rm i instytucji powstałych z ich inicjatywy, np. studia Vigil Games, którego założycielem jest J. Madureira − autor komiksów Uncanny X-Men i Battle Chasers. W wąskim ujęciu kapitał społeczny to pozycje i relacje w grupach i sieciach umożliwiające mobilizowanie zasobów26. W szerszym jest to potencjał współdziałania osadzony w powiązaniach międzyludzkich i normach społecznych, który może przynosić korzyści osobom, grupom i społeczeństwom. W socjologii, ekonomii, antropologii i naukach politycznych ujęcie to akcentuje poszukiwanie powiązań, sposobów dostosowania się i rozwiązywania konfl iktów, a więc warunków sprzyjających integracji. Pozytywne efekty zewnętrzne dostrzegalne są głównie, gdy kapitał ten przybiera formę zwaną pomostową lub włączającą27, czyli kiedy dochodzi do kooperacji między ludźmi różnych kultur, religii, warstw i grup społecznych. Na poziom i jakość kapitału społecznego oddziałują mechanizmy kulturowe, jak religia, tradycja i historyczne nawyki28. Jego gromadzenie nie może odbywać się z inicjatywy jednostki, lecz wymaga wspólnych działań większych zbiorowości − głównie rozpowszechnienia i realizowania takich cnót, jak: odpowiedzialność, lojalność, umiejętność współpracy, poczucie obowiązku, uczciwość, oszczędność, racjonalne rozwiązywanie problemów i podejmowanie ryzyka29. Koncepcja kapitału społecznego pozwala dostrzec możliwość prowadzenia analiz poziomych i pionowych struktur kontaktów przedstawicieli grup tworzących gry i komiksy. Przypuszczalnie część z nich działa na pograniczu 26 J.H. Turner, Struktura teorii socjologicznej, dz. cyt., s. 597. 27 R.D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: the Collapse and Revival of American Community, Simon & Schuster, New York 2000, s. 22. 28 F. Fukuyama, Zaufanie. Kapitał społeczny a droga do dobrobytu, przeł. A. Śliwa, L. Śliwa, PWN, Warszawa–Wrocław 1997, s. 39. 29 Tamże, s. 57-61. Kontekstowy_miks_03.indd 379 2011-01-11 13:30:46 380 A N D R Z E J K LI M C Z U K obu dziedzin, utrzymując kontakty z artystami o odmiennych umiejętnościach i celach. Przykładowo w branży gier ważniejsza może być produkcja dla zysku ekonomicznego, a w zespołach scenarzystów i rysowników komiksów osiąganie nowych wartości estetycznych. Relacje między osobami o tak różnych celach mogą cechować się różnym stopniem zaufania, wzajemności i zaangażowania we wspólne działania. Powiązania takie mogą występować w grupach hobbystycznych, grupach organizujących konwenty, stowarzyszeniach obywatelskich, klastrach gospodarczych oraz za pośrednictwem internetowych grup dyskusyjnych. Poza tym istotne może być utrzymywanie przez twórców gier i komiksów więzi z fanami, użytkownikami i odbiorcami ich dzieł, którzy korzystają także z innych mediów i wytworów kultury. Korzystanie z komiksów i gier może służyć pracy zespołowej, integrowaniu członków zespołów projektowych oraz poszukiwaniu twórczych pomysłów rozwiązywania problemów i podejmowania decyzji. Wskaźnikiem kapitału społecznego może być również posiadanie przez poszczególne osoby tworzące gry i komiksy tożsamości korporacyjnej, której jedną z cech może być poszukiwanie sposobów łączenia obu tych dziedzin. O relacjach między grami cyfrowymi i komiksem może świadczyć także istnienie słabo zbadanych wspólnych komercyjnych i niekomercyjnych instytucji artystycznych tworzących układy tworzenia, obiegu, obecności i odbioru dzieł30. Poprzez kapitał kulturowy określa się umiejętności, zwyczaje, nawyki, style językowe, rodzaj ukończonych szkół, gust i style życia31. Ważne jest analityczne oddzielenie kapitału kulturowego od ludzkiego − różni się od niego tym, że reprezentuje kulturę grupy, a nie kultury poszczególnych jednostek32. Cechy kapitału ludzkiego mogą być elementami kapitału kulturowego, jeśli są uznawane za część informacji zbiorowych o charakterze kulturowym. Poza tym świadome nabywanie nowej tożsamości uznaje się tu za wskaźnik kapitału ludzkiego, podczas gdy posiadanie tożsamości przejętej z grup i wspólnot pierwotnych za wskaźnik kapitału kulturowego. W powiązaniach między grami i komiksami za wskaźniki kapitału kulturowego mogą posłużyć wszystkie znaczenia, symbole, wartości, idee, ideologie, mity, rytuały, wzory zachowań i kryteria prestiżu, jakimi dysponują osoby kształtujące dzieła obu dziedzin. Kapitał ten ulokowany jest 30 Za główne typy wspólnych instytucji gier cyfrowych i komiksów można uznać przedsiębiorstwa i wystawy. Pierwszy przypadek ilustrują japońskie korporacje. Przykładowo: Square Enix choć głównie kreuje i dystrybuuje gry, ma także oddział dedykowany komiksom zwany Gangan Comics, podobnie Namco Bandai dysponuje zespołem Bandai Visual, Nintendo jest właścicielem The Pokémon Company, a Enterbrain wydaje pisma o grach i komiksach. Drugim zaś są imprezy popularyzujące twórczość obu dziedzin, choć zazwyczaj kładą większy nacisk na którąś z nich (np. Comic-Con International San Diego, Electronic Entertainment Expo w Los Angeles, Tokyo Game Show, Gamescom w Kolonii oraz Międzynarodowy Festiwal Komiksu i Gier w Łodzi). 31 J.H. Turner, Struktura teorii socjologicznej, dz. cyt., s. 597. 32 A. Sadowski, Białystok. Kapitał społeczny mieszkańców miasta, dz. cyt., s. 23 i 36-37. Kontekstowy_miks_03.indd 380 2011-01-11 13:30:46 G ry k o m p u te ro w e i b ra n ża g ie r a sztu k a k o m ik so w a 381 też w wytworach materialnych, w treściach tworzonych przez nich gier i komiksów, jak również w strategiach rozwoju fi rm i grup, ich bazach danych, kampaniach promocyjnych, działaniach public relations oraz w kryteriach diagnozowania potencjału instytucji i otoczenia. Mieszczą się tu cenione przez twórców standardy kulturowe, np. akceptacja praw człowieka, wolności i równości wobec prawa, szacunku wobec mniejszości kulturowych, akceptacja orientacji na zysk, ocena konkurencji, skłonności do ryzyka, karier indywidualnych, wykształcenia, orientacji na współdziałanie, uznanie cech proinnowacyjnych struktur kulturowych (jak nieposłuszeństwo wobec rutyny, zachowań tradycyjnych i powtarzalnych, poszukiwanie zmian na lepsze i akceptacja lub przyzwolenie dla postaw ciągłego niepokoju) oraz ukształtowana tożsamość. Przykładem wykorzystywania kapitału kulturowego może być tworzenie gier stanowiących adaptację komiksów i komiksów bazujących na grach33. Zależności te świadczą o procesie konwergencji mediów, czyli przepływie treści między różnymi platformami medialnymi, co jest związane z poszukiwaniem nowych struktur fi nansowania mediów i migracjami publiczności za pożądaną rozrywką34. Możliwa jest tu analiza konwergencji korporacyjnej − kiedy przepływ treści między mediami jest uzasadniony dążeniem do zmniejszenia ryzyka inwestycji w grę i dążeniu do poszerzenia grona potencjalnych jej nabywców oraz oddolnej − kiedy dochodzi do prowadzonego przez fanów, odbiorców nieformalnego przepływu treści medialnych między różnymi platformami. Konwergencja oddolna może przejawiać się np. w tworzeniu modyfi kacji gier, animacji machinima lub komiksów internetowych. Zauważa się, że zjawisko komiksów internetowych o grach wideo zasługuje na odrębne, pogłębione badania. Nawet jeśli dzieła te stanowią krzywe zwierciadło kultury produkcji i użytkowania gier wideo, to mogą stanowić istotne źródło informacji o sztuce gier, ich twórcach i użytkownikach oraz motywach ich działań35. 33 Gry stanowiące adaptacje komiksów to w szczególności dzieła oparte na komiksach dużych wydawnictw, jak Marvel, Dark Horse i DC oraz na takich seriach, jak Kajko i Kokosz, Asterix i Garfi eld. Natomiast do serii komiksowych powiązanych z treściami gier należą m.in. City of Heroes, Dead Space, Gears of War, Silent Hill, Mortal Kombat, Tomb Raider, World of Warcraft i Street Fighter. 34 Zob. H. Jenkins, Kultura konwergencji. Zderzenie starych i nowych mediów, przeł. M. Bernatowicz, M. Filiciak, WAiP, Warszawa 2007. 35 Do najdłużej publikowanych komiksów internetowych o grach wideo należą takie serie, jak 8-Bit Theater (przykład sprite comic, gdzie umieszczane są grafi ki postaci skopiowane z gier), Ctrl+Alt+Del, Little Gamers, PvP i VG Cats. Z polskich można zaś wskazać na Gamer9 i Bears of War. Bezprecedensowy przypadek stanowi tu rozpoczęta w 1998 roku przez J. Holkinsa i M. Krahulika seria Penny Arcade. Popularność komiksu i związanych z nim gadżetów okazała się wystarczająca, by mogli nie tylko zarobić na swoje utrzymanie, ale też założyć w 2003 roku organizację charytatywną Child's Play, rok później zainicjować doroczny konwent i wystawę Penny Arcade Expo, a od 2008 roku rozpocząć wydawanie serii gier komputerowych Penny Arcade Adventures. Kontekstowy_miks_03.indd 381 2011-01-11 13:30:46 382 A N D R Z E J K LI M C Z U K Poza tym przy kryterium kapitału kulturowego należy odnieść się do komiksów i artykułów o nich w prasie dedykowanej grom komputerowym36. Istnieją także przykłady gier komentujących treści komiksów (np. parodia Dragon Ball w Crash: Mind over Mutant), nawiązujących do ich bohaterów i narracji (np. inFamous, Prototype) oraz zawierających je jako dodatki do odblokowania (głównie w grach na podstawie komiksów DC i Marvel). Ostatnią analizowaną formę kapitału stanowi kapitał symboliczny. Jest to pojęcie autorstwa P. Bourdieu, które opisuje wykorzystywanie symboli do uprawomocnienia pozostałych kapitałów37. Tym typem kapitału posługują się przeważnie przedstawiciele klas wyższych, dzięki czemu stają się uprzywilejowani w osiąganiu sukcesów i powiększaniu zasobności zróżnicowanych form kapitału. Uruchamianie tego kapitału oznacza dokonywanie aktów przemocy symbolicznej, czyli przedstawiania innym swoich wartości i dóbr jako społecznie pożądanych tak, iż odbiorcy przemocy przedrefl eksyjnie akceptują narzucane im zasady, uznając je za konieczne lub pozbawione alternatyw38. Ludzie, wchodząc w relacje z innymi, w różnych przestrzeniach życia społecznego mogą reprodukować zasady posługiwania się kapitałami lub je zmieniać, np. dyskredytując wartość podtypów kapitałów rywali39. Zakłada się, że część ludzi jest w stanie niejako wykroczyć poza swoje pochodzenie klasowe i przekształcać własne zasoby tak, by zamiast przedmiotu wstydu sprzyjały sukcesom i awansom. Przemoc symboliczna sprawia, iż cele działań jednostek nie są interesami ekonomicznymi, lecz uzasadnianymi kulturowo interesami społecznymi. Tak więc i w branży gier, i w środowisku twórców komiksów toczy się rywalizacja, która nie dotyczy tylko posiadania zasobów, lecz też określania jakie, pragnienia (wartości) są istotne oraz jak je osiągać (normy). Za przykłady rywalizacji i nierówności, z którymi wiąże się wykorzystanie przemocy symbolicznej, mogą uchodzić chociażby sposoby lokalnego i globalnego konkurowania między wydawcami gier bądź komiksów40. 36 Specjalny dział o komiksie japońskim miał np. nieistniejący już polski miesięcznik „Secret Service". Prasa ta, publikując komiksy nawiązujące do tematyki gier, stanowiła też miejsce debiutów znanych rysowników (np. M. Śledziński w „Secret Service" i „Świecie Gier Komputerowych"). Zdarzało się też, że redakcje publikowały komiksy luźno związane z tematyką gier (prace R. Adlera i T. Piątkowskiego w „Resecie"). 37 P. Bourdieu, L.J.D. Wacquant, Zaproszenie do socjologii refl eksyjnej, przeł. A. Sawisz, Ofi cyna Naukowa, Warszawa 2001, s. 104; J.H. Turner, Struktura teorii socjologicznej, dz. cyt., s. 597. 38 J. Szacki, Historia myśli socjologicznej, PWN, Warszawa 2004, s. 900. 39 P. Bourdieu, L.J.D. Wacquant, Zaproszenie do socjologii refl eksyjnej, dz. cyt., s. 81. 40 Konkurowanie między wydawcami może obejmować m.in. tworzenie partnerstw i aliansów strategicznych, przejmowanie kontroli nad spółkami, tworzenie oraz pozyskiwanie technologii i licencji, ustanawianie barier wejścia do branży. W tych działaniach mieszczą się też wydarzenia promocyjne i marketingowe, np. organizacja oryginalnych Kontekstowy_miks_03.indd 382 2011-01-11 13:30:46 G ry k o m p u te ro w e i b ra n ża g ie r a sztu k a k o m ik so w a 383 Łączenie gier cyfrowych i komiksów można tu interpretować jako jeden ze sposobów na osiąganie wyższej pozycji w hierarchiach bogactwa, władzy i prestiżu. Istotnym zjawiskiem może być również zachęcanie przedstawicieli konkurencyjnych fi rm do zmiany pracodawcy i poszukiwanie w szkołach najlepiej zapowiadających się osób kreatywnych − inżynierów i artystów41. Przy czym gromadzenie osób zdolnych do generowania innowacji wymaga od fi rm upowszechniania modeli organizacji wielokulturowych z procedurami sterowania różnorodnością42. Można zaryzykować twierdzenie, iż realizacją przemocy symbolicznej mogą być także próby tworzenia gier i komiksów dążących do zaspokojenia funkcji odmiennych od tych, które są im przypisywane jako podstawowe, czyli hedonistycznych i ekonomicznych, gdy postrzegamy je jako rodzaje gier i zabaw oraz estetycznych, jeśli chodzi o sztukę komiksową i sztukę gier. Mogą to być funkcje związane z modelowaniem wartości społecznych i modelowaniem więzi społecznych43. W pierwszym przypadku będą to następujące funkcje szczegółowe: terapeutyczna (wywoływanie dobrostanu psychicznego i regeneracja sił), ekspresyjna (wyrażenie siebie przez twórców), komunikacyjna (porozumienie z innymi na podstawie wspólnego języka), magiczna (nadawanie znaczenia świętości, ustanawianie ładu), ideologiczna (zdobywanie poparcia władzy określonych sił politycznych, społecznych lub religijnych), wychowawcza (przekazywanie dyrektyw życia zbiorowego) oraz poznawcza (dostarczanie wiedzy). O posługiwaniu się kapitałem symbolicznym świadczyć może zatem chociażby tworzenie odrębnych programów kształcenia twórców gier i komiksów oraz kształtowanie odmiennych języków porozumiewania się osób związanych z tymi dziedzinami. W odniesieniu do modelowania więzi istotne jest natomiast integrowanie i uspołecznianie ludzi w określonym systemie społecznokulturowym, ale też określanie różnic grupowych. Ustanawianie granic dostrzegalne jest chociażby w odmiennych cechach gier i komiksów oraz ich fanów wywodzących się z kultur zachodnich i wschodnich. Podsumowując, stwierdza się, że analityczne zestawienie gier i komiksów umożliwia wskazanie obszarów badawczych, których właściwości („medialnych") konferencji prasowych i stoisk na targach, rozdawanie związanych z grami komiksów, traktowanie ich jako dodatków do gier znajdujących się w tradycyjnym pudełku lub w ich treści, jak również tworzenie i rozpowszechnianie ideologii (marek, systemów identyfi kacji wizualnej) uzasadniających wyższość jednych wytworów nad innymi. 41 Zauważa się, że w globalnej rywalizacji o talenty istotne jest zapewnienie osobom kreatywnym możliwie największej swobody działań w miejscu pracy oraz atutów znajdujących się w bezpośrednim otoczeniu fi rmy – w miejscu zamieszkania przyjaznym odmiennościom i zróżnicowanym pod względem usług kulturowych. Regiony pozbawione tych cech nie sprzyjają tworzeniu innowacyjnych dzieł i rozwiązań. Zob. R. Florida, The Flight of the Creative Class. The New Global Competition for Talent, Harper Business, New York 2005. 42 R.W. Griffi n, Podstawy zarządzania organizacjami, przeł. M. Rusiński, PWN, Warszawa 2005, s. 190-193. 43 M. Golka, Socjologia kultury, dz. cyt., s. 295-300. Kontekstowy_miks_03.indd 383 2011-01-11 13:30:46 384 A N D R Z E J K LI M C Z U K wydają się jeszcze niedokładnie rozpoznane. Przedmiotami dalszych badań mogą być nie tylko grupy twórców i odbiorców oraz ich wytwory, ale też takie zjawiska, jak: branża komiksowa, sztuka gier, stereotypy związane z odbiorcami gier i komiksów, stereotypy zawarte w treściach dzieł, zakres podmiotowości zbiorowości związanych z tymi mediami, komiksy cyfrowe i internetowe oraz kreowanie i wykorzystanie różnych form kapitału w relacjach przedstawicieli obu dziedzin. Sporządzony przegląd pozwala sądzić, iż choć utworzono już wiele powiązań między rozpatrywanymi dziedzinami, to możliwości ich rozwijania nie zostały wyczerpane. Przedstawione zestawienie może posłużyć za punkt wyjścia do diagnoz empirycznych − w szczególności do prac nad monografi ami grup i instytucji oraz porównań realizowanych przez nie celów i sposobów ich osiągania. Takie badania dostarczą wiedzy m.in. o sposobach wykorzystania talentów ludzkich, strategiach konkurowania na rynkach gier i komiksów,; powstawaniu i wykorzystaniu nowych technologii, motywacjach do pracy nad nowatorskimi projektami i barierach w ich realizacji, sposobach gromadzenia i wykorzystywania wiedzy osób kreatywnych oraz o formach utrzymywania komunikacji i współpracy z fanami. Summary Growth in popularity of computer (video) games is a noticeable change in recent years. Electronic entertainment increasingly engages the wider society and reaches to new audiences by offering them satisfy of wide variety of needs and aspirations. As a mass media games not only provide entertainment, but they are also an important source of income, knowledge and social problems. Article aims to bring closer look on the common areas of games and comics. On the one hand designers and artists working on games are often inspired by comic books, as well as they create their licensed adaptations and separate „interactive issues". On the other hand more and more often we can see comics based on popular games. Study present the areas of agreement, cooperation or dependence like: technologies used to create games and comic books, use of comic books to comment events in the gaming industry and organization of exhibitions or events popularizing the works from both fi elds. Kontekstowy_miks_03.indd 384 2011-01-11 13:30:

Journal of Power and Energy Engineering, 2014, 2, 49-56 Published Online September 2014 in SciRes. http://www.scirp.org/journal/jpee http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/jpee.2014.29008 How to cite this paper: Chang, X.Y. and Nagano, H. (2014) Experimental Investigation on the Effection of Flow Regulator in a Multiple Evaporators/Condensers Loop Heat Pipe with Plastic Porous Structure. Journal of Power and Energy Engineering, 2, 49-56. http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/jpee.2014.29008 Experimental Investigation on the Effection of Flow Regulator in a Multiple Evaporators/Condensers Loop Heat Pipe with Plastic Porous Structure Xinyu Chang1, H. Nagano2 Department of Engineering, Nagoya University, Nagoya, Japan Email: [email protected] Received June 2014 Abstract Multiple loop heat pipes which have two evaporators and two condensers in one loop are a kind of active heat transfer device. Since they have two evaporators and two condensers, the operating mode also becomes multiple. This work discusses the cases that multiple loop heat pipes were operated with one condenser at high temperature and the other at low temperature. To avoid the high temperature returning liquid and keep the multiple loop heat pipes work properly, the flow regulator which was made of polyethylene was designed, fabricated and applied in this test. The effect of flow regulator was confirmed and analyzed. In the test that large temperature difference existed between two sinks, it can be found according to the result that the flow regulator worked effectively and prevented the high temperature vapor to enter the inlet of common liquid line, which can keep the evaporators and returning liquid to operate at low temperature. With the increment of heat loads and the temperature difference between two sinks, the pressure difference between two condensers became larger and larger. When the pressure difference was larger than the flow regulator's capillary force, the flow regulator could not work properly because the high temperature vapor began to flow through the flow regulator. According to the test data, the flow regulator can work properly within the sinks' temperature 0 C/60 C and the two evaporators' heat load 30/30 W. Keywords Flow Regulator, Loop Heat Pipe, Multiple Evaporators and Condensers, Two-Phase Heat Transfer 1. Introduction Loop heat pipes (LHPs) are two phase heat transfer devices which utilize the capillary force developed in the porous wick to circulate the working fluid. The heat can be transferred from heat source to radiator with the phase change occurred in working fluid [1]. The LHPs have been used in spacecraft and satellites to control X. Y. Chang, H. Nagano 50 temperature because the LHPs can transfer more heat than conventional heat pipes and be free from the electricity. To improve the efficiency of the LHP, multiple LHPs (MLHPs) which have two evaporators and two condensers in one loop have been studied. The experiment to prove the operation of MLHPs was conducted in 1997 with the device that has two evaporators and one condenser [2]. The test which was conducted with the device that has two evaporators and two condensers was done in 2002 [3]. Calculating work was done in 2004 by Triem T. Hoang and Ku [4]. The flow regulator is a device taken advantage of capillary force to regulate the mass flow rate that flows along two condensers. Since the flow regulator can prevent the vapor with high temperature condensing at the inlet of the common liquid line and keep the whole loop to operate at low temperature, it becomes a necessary part of MLHPs. The flow regulator was utilized in the experiment of miniature MLHPs which was conducted in 2008 [5]. However, in that paper specific discussion on the effect of flow regulator was not conducted. Even though the MLHPs have been researched for almost 17 years, the experiment data and the investigation on flow regulator is insufficient. This work is conducted to figure out the property of flow regulator, which was designed, fabricated and applied in the experiment. The characteristic of flow regulator will be discussed by comparing the cases that were operated with flow regulator and without flow regulator. 2. Features and Principles of MLHPs Figure 1 shows the schematic and two working ways of MLHP. This MLHP is made of two evaporators (Evaps), two condensers (Conds), two vapor lines (VLs), two liquid lines (LLs), two compensation chambers (CCs), and two flow regulators (FRs). There is one porous wick in each Evap. In the case of Figure 1(a), heat loads are applied to both Evaps, which causes that the vapor generates in each Evap. and converges in the common VL, after that the vapor separates and flows along each VL, then the vapor condenses into liquid in each Cond. The liquid converges in the common LL again and then separates in each LL which is connected with each CC. After the fluid reaches the CC, it will flow to the Evap to make up the volume that is evaporated in the Evap. The system is driven by the capillary force which develops in the porous wick in Evap. If the total pressure drop of the loop is larger than the capillary force, the system will deprime since the vapor penetrates the Evap. In the case of Figure 1(b) heat load is only applied to one Evap. That will lead to the inverse flow in the Evap (a) Heat load to both evaporators (b) Heat load to one evaporator Figure 1. Schematic of a MLHP. 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10121110 5 1 2 3 4 10 10 7 8 9 11 12 X. Y. Chang, H. Nagano 51 which is not heated. So the vapor is condensed on the surface of wick before enters CC. In that case, the Evap unpowered will work as one Cond and acquire heat from the other powered one. The operating temperature of MLHP depends on the temperature of each CC. The higher CC's temperature is the operating temperature of the loop. The feature and advantages of the MLHP is summarized as follows: 1) The MLHP can be used of cooling multiple heat source or a heat source with large thermal footprint because that it has two Evaps. 2) For the reason that MLHP has two Conds, the heat dissipation can become more flexible. For example, if one condenser can not work because of high temperature. The other Conds can still work to dissipate heat acquired from the heat source. 3) Because of the heat exchange occurs between two Evaps. If one Evap is not applied with heat load, the working Evap can offer the heat to that un-working Evap, in which way to save the electricity which is used to keep warm. 3. The Design of Flow Regulator In the cases the temperature difference exists between two sinks. The vapor which flows along high temperature side may not be totally condensed, that leads to the high temperature of returning liquid and makes the loop operate at high temperature, in order to avoid that and raise the utilization of two sinks. The FR which can regulate the flow mass rate on each condenser side is applied to assure that more working fluid flows along the lower condenser temperature side. Figure 2 shows the schematic of the FR. In the Figure 2, the porous wick can prevent the vapor flowing through. For example, when the temperature of Cond 2 is high and the temperature of Cond 1 is low. Uncondensed vapor from Cond 2 may exist and flow through the LL. When the vapor reaches the FR, it will be prevented by FR and other excess vapor flow will turn to flow through Cond 1, where it will be condensed to liquid and flow through the porous structure. In this way the mass flow rate can be controlled and the operating temperature descends. The pressure equation of FR is shown as follows: _cap vl ll FRP P P> ∆ + ∆ (1) In Equation (1), capP represents the capillary force of FR, FRP∆ the pressure loss through FR, _vl llP∆ the pressure loss from common VL to the LL confluence. According to Darcy's law, the pressure drop through the wick can be calculated as l l wi udP dt K μ− = (2) In Equation (2), dP represents pressure loss, dt the thickness of porous structure, lμ the viscosity, lu the velocity of liquid which flows through the porous structure, wiK the permeability of porous structure. The pressure loss through the FR which is applied in this experiment can be calculated as follows: 2(( ) ) 2 l FR FR FR l wi m t P dK μ ρ π − ∆ =  (3) In Equation (3), FRt represents to the thickness of FR, lρ the density of liquid, FRd the diameter of FR, m the mass flow rate. When capP is smaller than the pressure loss, the uncondensed vapor with high temperature will flow through FR and FR will not work properly. So the FR must be designed to satisfy Equation (1). According to the Figure 2. The schematic of flow regulator. X. Y. Chang, H. Nagano 52 mathematical model, the configuration of FR can be acquired. It is shown in Table 1. The pressure loss through FR is 1084 Pa when the temperature is 20 C and the heat load is 20/20 W (working fluid: acetone). 4. Experiment System and Test Conditions Figure 3 illustrates the schematic of the MLHP which were designed and fabricated in this work. The temperature measuring positions of MLHP were marked by black circles which shows the thermocouples numbers. In this experiment, 60 T-type thermocouples were used in order to measure each section of the MLHP. The Conds are enclosed in aluminum plates which are attached on copper plates. The copper plates' temperature is controlled by chillers. Pure acetone (99.5%) is selected as a working fluid and the fluid inventory is determined as 60cc to make sure that the vapor exists in one CC in the case of low heat load and the liquid exists in one CC in the case of high heat load. In order to reduce the heat leak from Evap to CC and decrease the operating temperature, PTFE porous media is used as primary wicks which has less thermal conductivity than traditional metal wicks. In this test, the FR was set next the confluence of liquid line, which can be seen from Figure 3. Table 2 lists the configuration of MLHP and Table 3 lists the experimental conditions, two kinds of experiments were conducted to figure out the operating characteristics of the MLHP under different conditions. 1) Test with sink temperature changed under the constant heat load to investigate the operation with the large temperature difference between the sinks and confirm the behavior of the FR. 2) Test to confirm the behavior of the FR. This test was conducted in the conditions that sink 2 temperature was 0 C/60 C. Test (1) and Test (2) were conducted in the cases that the MLHP was operated with FR and without FR (w/o). 5. Experiment Data and Calculation Results 5.1. Test Result of Case1 In the experiment of case 1, the two heat loads were kept at 30/30 W, the temperature of sink1 was kept at 0 C while the temperature of sink 2 rose 20 C for every 50 minutes from 0 C to 80 C. The temperature profile oper- Table 1. Configurations of porous wick. Material Ultra High Molecular Weight polyethylene porous Diameter 10 mm Thickness 1 mm Pore radius 5 μm Table 2. The configurations of MLHP. L (mm) O.D. (mm) I.D. (mm) Evaporator 70 12 9.3 CC 45 36 34 Vapor line 770 3.18 1.75 Condenser 500 3.18 1.75 Liquid line 800 3.18 1.75 Primary wick 50 9.55 5 Table 3. Test conditions. case FR Heat load to Evap.1/Evap.2 (W) Sink temperature sink1/sink2 ( C) 1-(a) with 30/30 0/0, 0/20, 0/40, 0/60, 0/80 1-(b) w/o 2-(a) with 0/0, 5/5, 10/10, 15/15, 20/20, 25/25, 30/30, 35/35, 40/40, 45/45, 50/50 0/60 X. Y. Chang, H. Nagano 53 Figure 3. Schematic of experiment system. ated without FR was shown in Figure 4 and the temperature profile operated with FR was shown in Figure 5. In the condition without FR, MLHP was operated with the stable temperature when the temperatures of sinks were 0 C/0 C and 0 C/20 C. When the temperature of sink2 reached 40 C, the operating temperature began to rise, which made the loop system operate in higher temperature. That is because when temperature was 40 C, the sink cannot condense all vapor. The uncondensed vapor flowed along the LL and finally met the subcooled liquid flowed from the other LL at the confluence of the LL, where condensation happened and large amount of heat emerged. That will make the returning liquid stay at high temperature and lead to the high operating temperature of the whole loop. To prevent that, the FR is required, which can make the fluid totally condensed when it reached the confluence of LL by changing the mass fluid rate of each condenser. In the condition with FR as shown in Figure 5, when sinks temperature rose to 0 C/60 C, the temperature of returning liquid began to rise and made the temperature of CC become higher, which indicates that on the temperature of 0 C/60 C, the uncondensed vapor began to penetrate the porous media located in FR. Even though the uncondensed vapor has penetrated the porous media, the MLHP can operate at lower temperature compared to the cases operated without FR because the mass flow rate on low temperature Cond side was much larger than the mass flow rate on high temperature Cond side. The temperature of each part of the MLHP in steady state are shown in Figure 6 with the conditions that heat loads were 30/30W and sinks temperature were 0 C/0 C, 0 C/40 C, 0 C/80 C. In the Figure 6, the left side were operated without FR while the right side were operated with FR. "Loop 1" means the loop which begins from Evap1, goes through Cond1 and ends at CC1. "Loop 2" means the counterpart of loop 1. In the case that the sinks temperatures were 0 C/0 C, all vapor was condensed in the condenser so no difference can be seen in both figures. In the case that the sinks temperature were 0/40 C, the temperature of LL and Evap operated without FR are higher than the case with FR, from which that uncondensed vapor reached the confluence of LL can be inferred. In the case that the sinks temperature were 0 C/80 C, the temperature of Evap and LL operated without the FR became much higher while the temperature of Evap. and LL operated with the FR were stable, which indicates that the FR worked effectively. Table 4 shows the average temperature of evaporator and common liquid line, ΔT represents the temperature difference between the cases that were operated without FR and the cases that were operated with FR. According to the test data, the temperature of Evap and LL with the FR were 21 C and 32 C lower than the case without FR. 5.2. Test Result of Case 2 In the case 2, both Evaps were applied with the same heat load. One of the test data of the case 2 is shown in the Figure 7. In that case, two sinks were set at 0 C/60 C and the ambient temperature was 25 C. In the test data, the heat load increased from 0 W to 45 W by 5 W for every step. In the Figure 7, the MLHP did not reach steady state until the heat loads rose to 15/15 W. After that the CC2's temperature kept stable while the CC1's temperature varied, which shows that the CC2 controlled MLHP's temperature and CC1 was filled with liquid. The temperature of returning liquid is not same, that is because the vapor existed in the departure of liquid line. Since the CC1 was filled with liquid, more liquid flowed to the LL1, the remained fluid with the large percent of X. Y. Chang, H. Nagano 54 Figure 4. Test data of case 3 (without FR). Figure 5. Test data of case 3 (without FR). Table 4. Temperature of Evap and common LL. Case Section w/o FR with FR ΔT 0 C/0 C Evap 48 49 −1 Common LL 13 14 −1 0 C/40 C Evap 65 58 7 Common LL 56 41 15 0 C/80 C Evap 80 59 21 Common LL 72 40 32 vapor flowed to CC2 and kept the LL2 in high temperature. In the Figure 7, the temperature of LL2 is the same with the temperature of VL from 20/20 W to 30/30 W, which indicated that the vapor existed in LL2, too. There is temperature overshoot on LL1, that is because the reverse flow happened when heat load changed. Also the temperature of LL1 became closer to LL2 with the increment of heat loads. The max heat loads in this case were 35/35 W. In the Figure 8, the operating temperature decreased first and then increased, which was one effect of FR. When the heat load was small, the porous media located in FR worked and stopped the uncondensed vapor. As the result, more and more liquid flowed to the side whose sink temperature was low. That reduced the temperature of returning liquid and made the operating temperature low. However, when the heat load rose to the value that high temperature vapor began to penetrate the FR, more heat from high sink temperature side leaked to the returning liquid. With the increment of heat load, more and more uncondensed vapor penetrated the FR, which made the temperature of returning liquid high and led to the temperature increasing of CC. The max heat load of this case was higher than the case that operated without FR. In this case, the operating temperature rose at the heat load of 30/30 W, which indicated that at that time the high temperature vapor penetrated the FR. In the Figure 8, when the heat loads were fixed to 30/30 W, the operating temperature rose at the temperature of 0 100 2000 20 40 60 80 Evap.1(1-4) Time (minute) Te m pe ra tu re (°C ), H ea t l oa d( W ) Evap.2(5-8) V.L.2(9-10)V.L.1(11-12) Cond.2(20-25) Cond.1(26-31) L.L.2(40) L.L.1(41) C.C.1(42-45) Heat load C.C.2(46-49) 0/0 0/20 0/40 0/60 0/80 0 100 2000 20 40 60 80 Time (minute) Te m pe ra tu re (°C ), H ea t l oa d (W ) Evap.1(1-4) Evap.2(5-8)V.L.2(9-10) V.L.1(11-12) Cond2.(20-25) Cond1.(26-31) L.L.2(41) L.L.1(40) C.C.1(42-45) C.C.2(46-49) Heat load 0/0 0/20 0/40 0/800/60 X. Y. Chang, H. Nagano 55 (a-1) sink 0 C/0 C without FR (b-1) sink 0 C/0 C with FR (a-2) sink 0 C/40 C without FR (b-2) sink 0 C/40 C with FR (a-3) sink 0 C/80 C without FR (b-3) sink 0 C/80 C with FR Figure 6. The temperature of all parts of MLHP in steady state. sinks 0 C/60 C, which indicated that at that time the uncondensed vapor reached the confluence of LL. So the experiment data in the case 2 is in accordance with case 1, which shows that the FR can work properly if the heat load is smaller than 30/30 W and the sink temperature is lower than 0 C/60 C. 6. Conclusion The FR was designed and produced in this work. Several experiments were conducted to figure out the effect of FR. In the case that the MLHP was operated with different sink temperature and stable heat loads. The case that MLHP was operated with FR makes MLHP operate at lower temperature. In the case that the temperature of two sinks were 0 C/80 C, the temperature of evaporator and the confluence of LL were reduced because of the FR's 0 10 200 20 40 60 80 100 Thermocouples Position Te m pe ra tu re (°C ) Evap. V.L. Cond. L.L. C.C. experiment data (loop 1) experiment data (loop 2) 0 10 200 20 40 60 80 100 Thermocoupous Position Te m pe ra tu re (°C ) experiment data(loop 1) experiment data(loop 2) Evap. V.L. Cond. L.L. C.C. 0 10 200 20 40 60 80 100 Te m pe ra tu re (°C ) Thermocouples Position Evap. V.L. L.L.Cond. C.C. experiment data(loop 1) experiment data(loop 2) 0 10 200 20 40 60 80 100 Te m pe ra tu re ( °C ) Thermocouples Position experiment data (loop 1) experiment data (loop 2) Evap. V.L. Cond. L.L. C.C. 0 10 200 20 40 60 80 100 Thermocouples Position Te m pe ra tu re (°C ) Evap. V.L. Cond. L.L. C.C. experiment data (loop 1) experiment data (loop 2) 0 10 200 20 40 60 80 100 Thermocouples Position Te m pe ra tu re (°C ) Evap. V.L. Cond. L.L. C.C. experiment data (loop 1) experiment data (loop 2) X. Y. Chang, H. Nagano 56 Figure 7. Test data of case 4 (without FR). Figure 8. Test data of case 4 (with FR). effect. In the case that the temperature of two sinks (with large temperature difference) was stable, the MLHP operated with FR can transport more heat. References [1] Ku, J. (1999) Operating Characteristics of Loop Heat Pipes. 29th International Conference on Environmental System, Denver, 12-15 July 1999, No. 1999-01-2007. [2] Bienert Wolf, W.B., Nikitkin, M.N., Maydanik, Y.F., Fershtater, Y., Vershinin, S. and Gottschlich, J.M. (1997) The Proof-of-Feasibility of Multiple Evaporator Loop Heat Pipes. Sixth European Symposium on Space Environmental Control Systems, Noordwijk, 20-22 May 1997, 393-400. [3] Delil, A.A.M., Maydanik, Y.F., Chernyshova, M.A. and Pastukhov, V.G. (2003) Development and Test Results of a Multi-Evaporator-Condenser Loop Heat Pipe. AIP Conference Proceedings, 654. [4] Hoang, T.T. and Ku, J.T. (2004) Mathematical Modeling of Loop Heat Pipes With Multiple Capillary Pumps and Multiple Condensers. http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20040171388.pdf [5] Ku, J.T., Ottenstein, L. and Douglas, D. (2008) Multi-Evaporator Miniature Loop Heat Pipe for Small Spacecraft Thermal Control. 49th AIAA/ASME/ASCE/AHS/ASC Structures, Structural Dynamics, and Materials Conference, 7-10 April 2008. 0 100 200 3000 20 40 60 80 Time (minute) Te m pe ra tu re (°C ), H ea t l oa d (W ) Evap.1(1-4)Evap.2(5-8) Heat load1 Heat load2 V.L.1(11-12) V.L.2(9-10) Cond.2(20-25) Cond.1(26-31) L.L.1(41) L.L.2(40) C.C.1(42-45) C.C.2(46-49) 0 100 200 3000 20 40 60 80 Time (minute) Te m pe ra tu re (°C ) P ow er (W ) Heat load1V.L.1(11-12) V.L.2(9-10) Evap.1(1-4) Evap.2(5-8)Cond.2(20-25) Cond.1(26-31) C.C.2(46-49) C.C.1(42-45) L.L.1(41) L.L.2(40) Heat load

A FORMALISATION OF KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC T. ACHOURIOTI AND M. VAN LAMBALGEN ABSTRACT. Although Kant envisaged a prominent role for logic in the argumentative structure of his Critique of pure reason [12], logicians and philosophers have generally judged Kant's logic negatively. What Kant called 'general' or 'formal' logic has been dismissed as a fairly arbitrary subsystem of first order logic, and what he called 'transcendental logic' is considered to be not a logic at all: no syntax, no semantics, no definition of validity. Against this, we argue that Kant's 'transcendental logic' is a logic in the strict formal sense, albeit with a semantics and a definition of validity that are vastly more complex than that of first order logic. The main technical application of the formalism developed here is a formal proof that Kant's Table of Judgements in §9 of the Critique of pure reason, is indeed, as Kant claimed, complete for the kind of semantics he had in mind. This result implies that Kant's 'general' logic is after all a distinguished subsystem of first order logic, namely what is known as geometric logic. 1. INTRODUCTION The purpose of this article is to examine from the point of view of mathematical logic, Kant's formal logic1 and its relation to what Kant called 'transcendental logic'. This may seem to be a hopeless enterprise. A typical modern dismissal of Kant's formal logic is: 'terrifyingly narrowminded and mathematically trivial' 2 and of course every student of logic is aware of the more politely expressed verdicts in Frege's Begriffsschrift and Strawson's The bounds of sense. Worse, Kant's transcendental logic does not seem to be a logic in the modern sense at all: no syntax, no semantics, no inferences. As against the received view, we will argue here that (i) Kant's formal logic is overly restrictive only if it is assumed that its underlying semantics is that of classical first order logic, whereas Kant's implied semantics is very different, (ii) the implied semantics, centered around Kant's three different notions of object, can be given a precise mathematical expression, thus leading to a formalised transcendental logic, and (iii) on the proposed semantics, a logical system very much like Kant's formal logic is a distinguished fragment of first order logic, namely, geometric logic. We thank Béatrice Longuenesse for enlightening correspondence, Pablo Cubiles Kovacs for discussions about the model-theoretic part of the paper, and the anonymous referee for pointing out flaws in the exposition. The first author is supported by the NWO project 360-20-150: 'The origins of truth'. Authors' address: ILLC/Department of Philosophy, University of Amsterdam, Oude Turfmarkt 141, 1012GC Amsterdam. Corresponding author: M. van Lambalgen, [email protected]. 1As expounded briefly in the Critique of Pure Reason [12] and in more detail in the various series of course notes produced by Kant's students, and the Jäsche Logik, commisioned by Kant and compiled from his notes by J.B. Jäsche; for all of which see [11]. We cite the Critique of Pure Reason in the standard manner, by referring to the page numbers of the first (A) and second (B) edition, so for example 'A57/B81'). 2Alan Hazen, 'Logic and Analyticity', in A.C. Varzi (ed.), The Nature of Logic, Stanford, CA: CSLI (1999), pp. 79-110. 1 2 T. ACHOURIOTI AND M. VAN LAMBALGEN What could be the purpose of such a, partly very technical, exercise? To say that the Critique of pure reason3 is notoriously difficult is an understatement. In his attempt to characterise our cognition of objects, Kant employs a vast array of technical terms that are insufficiently defined (at least for readers with an analytical mindset), such as 'judgement', 'transcendental unity of apperception', 'transcendental object', 'synthesis' and 'schema'. Perhaps a mathematical formalisation, however incomplete, can shed some light on these concepts and their relations. We are very far from claiming that the formalisation presented exhausts Kant's concepts; there is hardly a better inducement to modesty than trying to come to grips with the complexities of CPR, not to mention the secondary literature. But the formalisation may provide a starting point. One important aim is to attempt to restore logic to its rightful place in the argumentative structure of CPR. Kant himself was clear about the importance of logic; the so-called Metaphysical Deduction (§10 of CPR) uses the presumed completeness of the Table of Judgements to argue for the completeness of the Table of Categories, the a priori concepts that are supposed to underlie our cognition of objects and their relations. The communis opinio is that the Table of Judgements rests on a thoroughly discredited view of logic, and this has led to many reductive readings of CPR in which logic hardly figures, if at all. One notable exception to this trend is Béatrice Longuenesse's Kant and the Capacity to Judge [15], whose focal point is the connection between the logical forms of judgements and acts of the understanding. In fact, reading Longuenesse's commentary made us aware that there is much more to Kant's logic than meets the eye, and the present article can be seen as an attempt to translate some of her insights into logical terms.4 To our knowledge, ours is the first attempt to shed light on Kant's logic using the tools of modern mathematical logic. There exist overviews, such as Stuhlmann-Laeisz' Kants Logik [14], but these are set firmly in the context of traditional logic. There also studies of specific philosophical aspects, such as MacFarlane's dissertation [16] on Kant's use of the term 'formal'; or Posy on the question whether Kant is guilty of psychologism [18]. A recent article on Kant's transcendental logic, Rosenkoetter's 'Truth criteria and the very project of a transcendental logic' [20] interestingly suggests that transcendental logic is bound up with the search for a truth criterion that traditional logic cannot deliver (A57–9/B82–4), but there is no hint that transcendental logic can be conceived as a formal logic in its own right. This is precisely what we shall attempt. Before we delve into the intricacies of Kant scholarship and the sometimes considerable complexity of the formalisation of transcendental logic, we want to summarise why we think such an exercise can contribute to a better understanding of the first Critique. (i) Kant describes the role of transcendental logic as The part of transcendental logic that expounds the elements of the pure cognition of the understanding and the principles without which no object can be thought at all, is the transcendental analytic, and at the same time a logic of truth. For no cognition can contradict it without at the same time losing all content, i.e. all relation to any object, hence all truth. (A62-3/B87) 3Henceforth abbreviated to CPR. 4This is not to say that Longuenesse [15] is the only work taking the connection between the logical forms of judgements and acts of the understanding seriously. Two other authors that come to mind are Reich [19] and Wolff [28]. Here we shall not discuss the differences in interpretation between these three authors. A FORMALISATION OF KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC 3 The word 'logic' need not be understood metaphorically in this passage, neither did Kant intend it as such: his discussion of logic in A50-7/B74-82 amply shows this. From a modern perspective, what is stated here is a somewhat outlandish completeness theorem, as for instance that for Friedman's quantifier 'almost all' (cf. [21]): a sentence is inconsistent with the Friedman axioms if and only if it does not have a Borel model, i.e. a model where relations are interpreted as (uncountable) Borel subsets of the reals. The situation is completely analogous here: in both cases one needs consistency with a given set of axioms to force the language to have the interpretation one is interested in. Since transcendental logic plays such a huge role in the Transcendental Analytic, it is worth the effort to see whether a formalisation can clarify parts of the argument; much of the effort will go into the formalisation of Kant's three notions of object. (ii) A second potential benefit is conceptual clarification. As an example we may take the notion of judgement, which receives a different characterisation in each of CPR, Prolegomena and Jäsche Logik. The formalisation will illuminate each of these characterisations and show that in the end they are identical. (iii) There is however a potentially damning objection to this enterprise. As will be seen, the mathematical techniques used in proving the completeness theorem for transcendental logic are thoroughly modern, without any relation to what Kant could have known. Doesn't this invalidate the whole enterprise? What sense is there in attributing a logic to Kant whose formal properties are so far beyond what was available to him, thus turning him into some kind of bionic man? We believe a defense can be mounted along the following lines. As an analogy, consider Kant and his treatment of the continuum, which is striking because he does not consider it to be composed of points, as a set theoretic treatment would have it. Consistent with a constructive treatment, points in the Kantian continuum are only boundaries or limitations. Kant reasons quite consistently with this conception, even though its formal treatment, e.g. in terms of locales, was of course not available to him. Similarly, we believe that Kant's intuition about objects come very close to a mathematical structure (inverse systems), even though he could not articulate it in this way. These structures will provide a semantics for the language of transcendental logic, and as we will see this part is neither very sophisticated nor does it depart much from what Kant himself writes. Where we really go way beyond Kant is in using this semantics to prove limitative results, such as that the Table of Judgement is complete, as Kant conjectured (or rather, asserted). Still, one can view the formalisation as providing a model of Kant's thinking, thus showing its consistency and coherence. To us, that seems more profitable than chopping off a large part of Kant's thought because it is presumed to be hopelessly outdated. 2. KANT'S AIMS AND THE ROLE OF LOGIC Kant's overall aim in CPR was to delimit the scope for metaphysical reflection by arguing that (i) all knowledge starts with perceptual experience, (ii) our cognition contributes principles structuring perceptual experience, principles which are themselves not derived from sensory experience (space, time and the Categories), (iii) all our supra-sensory knowledge is confined to these principles, which Kant called 'synthetic a priori', meaning that they are informative but that their truth can be ascertained without recourse to experience, (iv) it is possible to give a complete enumeration of the Categories and the associated synthetic a priori principles, and this yields a precise delimitation of metaphysics. At this point it may be instructive to compare Kant to modern cognitive science, in which the idea that sensory experience needs structuring principles not themselves directly derived from 4 T. ACHOURIOTI AND M. VAN LAMBALGEN experience is fairly prominent. The classic statement of this view comes from F.C. Bartlett [2, p. 1]) Whenever anybody interprets evidence from any source, and his interpretation contains characteristics that cannot be referred wholly to direct sensory observation or perception, this person thinks. The bother is that nobody has ever been able to find any case of the human use of evidence which does not include characters that run beyond what is directly observed by the senses. So, according to this, people think whenever they do anything at all with evidence. If we adopt that view we very soon find ourselves looking out upon a boundless and turbulent ocean of problems. In his famous paper 'Beyond the information given' [4, p. 224], Jerome Bruner took this idea as a starting point, and argued for the importance of coding systems: We propose that when one goes beyond the information given, one does so by being able to place the present given in a more generic coding system and that one essentially reads off from the coding system additional information [. . . ] . Examples of such coding systems abound in vision, mostly of a geometrical kind, e.g. it is assumed that real-world surfaces can be described as smooth manifolds in the mathematical sense (the coding system). This brief excursion should suggest that the basic outlines of Kant's approach to cognition have contemporary relevance. For a much more extensive treatment, the reader should consult Kitcher [23]. We now come to the role that Kant envisaged for logic in this whole scheme. For Kant, all cognitive activity is directed toward judgement. This crucial term is easily misunderstood, especially when one first approaches it through the 'Table of Judgements', which seems to list possible syntactic forms of sentences (universal, particular, singular, hypothetical, disjunctive etc.). But for Kant, judgement is first and foremost a cognitive act, the result of which has one of the listed syntactic forms.5 This act-like character of judgement is clear if one looks at Kant's definitions of judgement A judgement is the representation of the unity of the consciousness of various representations ... (Jäsche Logik, §17) A judgement is nothing but the manner in which given cognitions are brought to the objective unity of apperception (B141). Common in these definitions is that a judgement is the act of binding together mental representations; this is what the term 'unity' refers to. But where the second definition differs from the first is that also the aim of judgement is indicated by means of the word 'objective', which is Kant's terminology for 'having relation to an object'.6 We will return below to the multiple meanings of the term 'object', but for now it suffices to think of objects of experience. For Kant, objects are not found in experience, but they are constructed ('synthesised') from sensory materials under the guidance of the Categories, which are defined as 'concepts of an object in general, by means of which the intuition of an object is regarded as determined in respect of one of the logical functions of judgement' (B128). It is here that judgement plays an all-important role, since Kant's idea is that objects are synthesised through the act of making judgements about them. An example will help here. Consider the universal judgement 'All A are B', which Kant glosses with the help of a quantifier as 'To everything x to which A belongs, also B belongs'. Kant inquires what the presuppositions of such judgements are, and finds that these include the 5Thus a Kantian judgement is very much unlike a proposition in the modern sense. 6 Kant also expresses this by saying that a judgement must be objectively valid. A FORMALISATION OF KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC 5 concepts of unity (to provide units that can act as substitution instances for the variable x), and totality (to ensure that x can run over the whole extension of A).7 Thus the conditions that have to be satisfied to make a universal judgement lead one to consider the Categories of Quantity: unity, plurality, totality. More generally, Longuenesse writes Kant asked himself which logical forms of judgement should be considered primitive if the original function of judgement is to "bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception", that is, to relate our representations to objects. Having discovered that the objectifying function of these forms provided him with the solution he was seeking to the problem of the categories,8 Kant retained as primitive only those forms which he thought indispensable for generating the relation of our representations to an object .... [15, p. 78] Thus Kant's argument is the following. Cognitive activity consists in binding together representations, and always issues in judgements. The mode of binding does not derive from the senses, but is contributed a priori by cognition (compare Bruner's 'coding systems'). Each primitive judgement form represents a particular a priori manner of binding together, and conversely, so that we have a one–to–one correspondence between judgement forms and Categories. Assuming that the list of judgement forms is complete, the corresponding list of Categories is complete as well. This is the content of the 'Metaphysical Deduction', which, if successful, would provide an exhaustive list of those concepts that legitimately go beyond sensory experience. Starting with §4 in Frege's Begriffsschrift, Kant's logic came under heavy criticism. Viewed from the perspective of the newly developed predicate logic, Kant's logic seemed a tiny fragment, devoid of special significance; and of course, Frege's anti-psychologism was inimical to associating cognitive operations to judgement forms. Another discussion of 'the trouble with Kant' can be found in Strawson's The Bounds of Sense, which focusses on Kant's aim to identify primitive logical forms, and to associate these with primitive functions of the understanding. At least in classical logic, it is impossible to talk about a distinguished set of primitive logical forms, since judgement forms are interdefinable (e.g. the hypothetical in terms of the disjunctive and negation).9 Strawson observes that if one abandons the idea of primitive logical forms, one could say that each of indefinitely many logical forms gives rise to a Category, which seems ridiculous; or one could say that it is logical ideas and not logical forms that are fundamental, in particular the formally atomic proposition (which for Strawson is in subject predicate form) truth-functional composition10 quantification. This then greatly reduces the number of Categories; what one is left with is that the notions of particular object and universal kind or character as categories must have application in a world in which judgements can be made. More importantly, these two categories can be directly deduced from transcendental considerations, without the detour via the Table of Judgements. 7While running over the extension of A, x describes a plurality, which may or may not be totalisable. 8The problem being how to provide a complete list of the Categories. 9At this point one can begin to see what could be wrong with this line of criticism: it is very much tied to classical logic, and would fail for e.g. intuitionistic logic. It is quite doubtful, to say the least, whether Kant adopts a material implication reading of the hypothetical. It is even unclear whether his disjunctive judgement, with its intended semantics in terms of parts and wholes, fully conforms to the classical model; see footnote 40 for more on this. 10But see footnote 9. 6 T. ACHOURIOTI AND M. VAN LAMBALGEN All in all it seems then as if Kant's attempt to involve logic in determining 'the bounds of sense' is an utter failure; so why try to resuscitate it? One reason for doing so is that the various criticisms have completely bypassed issues of semantics. It has been taken for granted that Kant's judgement forms can be translated in classical predicate logic, and thus inherit its semantics. But a moment's reflection shows that this may well be inappropriate. The semantics for classical predicate logic is given by models consisting of a domain of objects over which relations are interpreted; thus here the objects are assumed to be given. We have just seen however that for Kant, judgements somehow play a role in constituting objects from sensory material, so that it seems wrong to take objects as given from the outset. Could it be that by constructing a semantics that is closer to Kant's intentions, the judgement forms that he considers somehow do acquire a special status? 3. OUR AIMS Kant determined the judgement forms in the Table of Judgements not by looking at what the logic textbooks of the day had to offer, but Only insofar as [judgement forms] were selected and organized under the guidance of the transcendental question (what are the a priori conditions for the representations of objects in general?) could logical functions of judgement serve as a guiding thread to the table of categories [15, p.397]. Kant's procedure can be thought of along the lines of the 'method of analysis and synthesis' in geometry: in the analytic phase one assumes that one knows precisely how objects are constituted and one determines from this the logical forms of judgements that can have relation to an object, in so doing providing a transcendental justification of the Table of Judgements; in the synthetic phase (which takes up most of the Transcendental Deduction) one reverses the argument and shows how logical forms of judgement contribute to the constitution of objects. Our argument is focussed on the first, 'analytic', part. We consider a subset of 'the a priori conditions for the representations of objects in general' (as discussed by Kant) that is sufficient to generate an abstract mathematical representation of Kant's view of objects – as will be seen below for this purpose we use (abstract descriptions of) the three syntheses of the A Deduction (A99–104) and the 'unity of self-consciousness' (A109). The mathematical representation of Kant's view of objects then provides a semantics for judgements that allows one to ask the question: 'which logical forms of judgements are capable of having 'relation to an object'?'. Our main technical result is that this class of judgement forms consists of all and only those formulas that can be written as conjunctions of geometric implications, i.e. of formulas of the form ∀x(θ(x)→ ψ(x)), where θ is a conjunction of atomic formulas, and ψ is constructed from atomic formulas using only ∨,∧,∃,⊥.11 No judgement form outside this class can claim objective validity.12 In this sense there is a completeness result like the one Kant claimed for his Table of Judgements; and it is similarly based on transcendental considerations. At first sight it may seem that the class of judgement forms we have isolated extends the Table of Judgements: after all, it allows (some) quantifier combinations of the form ∀∃, whereas Kant's Table apparently doesn't. We shall argue, however, that this difference is spurious, because Kant's examples, especially in his treatment of causality, show that what he calls a 'hypothetical' judgement can be 11The relevant definitions will be given in section 9. 12For the meaning of this term, cf. footnote 6. A FORMALISATION OF KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC 7 as complex as geometric implications. And clearly the paradigm example of a synthetic a priori judgement Everything that happens (begins to be) presupposes something which it follows in accordance with a rule. (A189) is a geometric implication. Our main mathematical result does not answer the 'synthetic' question: 'how do judgement forms enable us to constitute empirical objects as substitution instances of the "x" in judgements?'.13 This involves looking at judgement forms, to assess their contribution to the constitution of objects. But before the how-question can be answered first those judgement forms need to be identified for which the how-question can be asked at all. 4. KANT'S LOGIC: GENERAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL The key to such an enterprise is that judgements in Kant's sense participate in two kinds of logics: general logic and transcendental logic. 4.1. General logic. [G]eneral logic abstracts from all the contents of the cognition of the understanding and of the difference of its objects, and has to do with nothing but the mere form of thinking. (A54/B78) Kant emphasises time and again the formality of general logic, which contains 'absolutely necessary rules of thinking regardless of difference of objects'. In particular, it abstracts from empirical content and makes no distinction between imaginary and real or actual objects. Kant's general logic is treated in the notes taken by his students and the Jäsche Logik and treats such topics as:14 forms of judgements (categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive, with various subdivisions) the inferences in which these judgements participate (immediate inferences such as conversion of subject and predicate; and inferences of reason such as syllogisms, modus ponens/modus tollens, disjunctive syllogism) the principle on which inferences of reason are based: the major premise must be a 'universal rule' and the minor premise must express subsumption under the condition of the rule. Categorical judgements are judgements in subject-predicate form, combined with quantifiers and optional negation: (affirmative) all A are B, some A are B, (negative) no A are B, some A are not B, (infinite) all A are non-B, some A are non-B, etc.15 Categorical judgements may occur as premises and as conclusion in syllogisms. Disjunctive judgements are not what one would think, judgements of the form p ∨ q. The Jäsche Logik provides the following definition: A judgement is disjunctive if the parts of the sphere of a given concept determine one another in the whole or toward a whole as complements. . . [A]ll disjunctive judgements represent various judgements as in the community of a sphere. . . ( Jäsche Logik, §27, 28) [11, pp. 602-3] As example Kant provides 13Cf. p. 4 for Kant's introduction of bound variables. 14We do not discuss Kant's treatment of concepts here. 15Kant thus makes a distinction between sentence negation (negative judgements) and predicate negation (infinite judgements. 8 T. ACHOURIOTI AND M. VAN LAMBALGEN Every triangle is either right-angled or not right-angled. Thus the logical form is something like ∀x(C(x) → A(x) ∨ B(x)), where C represents the whole, A,B its parts; here it is not immediately clear whether the parts can be taken to exist outside the context of the whole. In our formalisation, we will act as if the ∨ is classical disjunction; but see footnote 40. It would similarly be a mistake to identify Kant's hypothetical judgements with a conditional p → q, let alone material implication as defined by its truth table. A few examples from Kant will make this clear. In the context of a discussion of the possible temporal relations between cause and effect Kant writes in CPR: If I consider a ball that lies on a stuffed pillow and makes a dent in it as a cause, it is simultaneous with its effect. (A203/B246) The hypothetical that can be distilled from this passage is If a ball lies on a stuffed pillow, it makes a dent in that pillow. From this we see that Kant needs relations, not just unary predicates, to formulate his causal hypotheticals, and also that the logical form of this particular causal hypothetical is what we called above (p. 6) geometric implications. We now give an extended quote from the Prolegomena §29 which provides another example of a hypothetical judgement that really has geometric implication form, and which also shows that causality is related to the rule-like character of the hypothetical, which, as we shall see in section 9.1, means that the existential quantifier(s) in the geometric implication can be replaced by a concrete function. It is, however, possible that in perception a rule of relation will be found, which says this: that a certain appearance is constantly followed by another (though not the reverse); and this is a case for me to use a hypothetical judgement and, e.g., to say: If a body is illuminated by the sun for long enough, it becomes warm. Here there is of course not yet the necessity of connection, hence not yet the concept of cause. But I continue on, and say: if the above proposition, which is merely a subjective connection of perceptions, is to be a proposition of experience, then it must be regarded as necessarily and universally valid. But a proposition of this sort would be: The sun through its light is the cause of the warmth. The foregoing empirical rule is now regarded as a law, and indeed as valid not merely of appearances, but of them on behalf of a possible experience, which requires universally and therefore necessarily valid rules [. . . ] the concept of a cause indicates a condition that in no way attaches to things, but only to experience, namely that experience can be an objectively valid cognition of appearances and their sequence in time only insofar as the antecedent appearance can be connected with the subsequent one according to the rule of hypothetical judgements [13, p. 105]. The logical form of the first hypothetical is something like If x is illuminated by y between time t and time s and s − t > d and the temperature of x at t is v, then there exists a w such that the temperature of x at s is v + w and v + w > c, where d is the criterion value for 'long enough' and c a criterion value for 'warm'. Again we see the importance of relations in the logical form of hypotheticals, which is that of geometric implications.16 One last remark before we move on to inferences. Kant makes a distinction 16A full treatment of causality would involve structures containing events and times (as well as axioms governing these), whereas below we consider only the case where quantifiers range over objects. Nevertheless we hope A FORMALISATION OF KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC 9 between categorical judgements 'To all x to which A belongs, also B belongs' and hypothetical judgements 'if x is A then x is B'. The difference is that in the latter judgement type it is not asserted that x belongs to A, whereas that is asserted in the former type. This difference can be accounted for by working in a many-sorted logic where the subject term of a categorical judgement refers to a separate sort, always taken to be non-empty. This does not affect the technical results given below. Moving now to inferences, we see that general logic contains a specific set of inference rules, not a general semantic consequence relation. Simplifying a bit, one can say that the inference rules are like elimination rules in natural deduction. Corresponding introduction rules are lacking; e.g. there are no formal introduction rules for the hypothetical or the disjunctive.17 The conditions for asserting a judgement are not treated in general logic, but in transcendental logic, about which more will be said below. Before we do so however, we add a few remarks on Kant's formal theory of truth, which also belongs to general logic. Kant lists 3 'formal criteria of truth' (Jäsche Logik, [11, p. 560]: (1) the principle of [non-]contradiction (2) the principle of sufficient reason 'on which rests the (logical) actuality of a cognition, the fact that it is grounded, as material for assertoric judgements' (3) the principle of excluded middle The second principle seems out of place in logic, especially if one reads what Kant writes on the previous page If all the consequences of a cognition are true, then the cognition is true too. For if there were something false in the cognition, then there would have to be a false consequence too. From the consequence, then, we may infer to a ground, but without being able to determine this ground. Only from the complex of all consequences can one infer to a determinate ground, infer that it is the true ground. This seems a blatant fallacy, but the principle will make a surprising appearance in our formal treatment of Kant's transcendental logic. 4.2. Transcendental logic. We began this section by saying that judgements participate in two logics simultaneously: general and transcendental. About the latter, Kant says the following: a science of pure understanding and of the pure cognition of reason, by means of which we think objects completely a priori. Such a science, which would determine the origin, the domain, and the objective validity of such cognitions, would have to be called transcendental logic since it has to do merely with the laws of the understanding and reason, but solely insofar as they are related to objects a priori and not, as in the case of general logic, to empirical as well as pure cognitions of reason without distinction. (A57/B81-2) Roughly speaking, whereas general logic is concerned merely with inference rules, what transcendental logic adds to this is a semantics in terms of objects. At first sight this may seem the message is clear: there is considerable logical complexity (including quantifiers) hidden in Kant's notion of a hypothetical judgement. 17In fact the usual introduction rule for ∨ would be incorrect on Kant's interpretation of the disjunction, since it is tantaamount to the possibility to create wholes by arbitrarily putting together parts. 10 T. ACHOURIOTI AND M. VAN LAMBALGEN rather trivial: after all, first order predicate logic has a semantics in terms of domains of objects and relations defined on these domains, and thus there seems to be no ground for our earlier claim, when discussing Frege's and Strawson's criticism, that Kant's logic is different from first order predicate logic. But there is a vast difference between the notion of object as it occurs in modern semantics and in Kant's logic. In the former, objects are mathematical entities supplied by the metatheory, usually some version of set theory. These objects have no internal structure, at least not for the purposes of the model theory. Kant's notions of object, as they occur in the semantics furnished by transcendental logic, are very different. For instance, there are 'objects of experience', somehow constructed out of sensory material by 'the laws of the understanding and reason'. Transcendental logic deals with a priori and completely general principles which govern the construction of objects, and relate judgements to objects so that we may come to speak of true judgements. Since transcendental logic deals with construction of objects of experience, for the purposes of this logic objects must have internal structure; and a large part of this article will be taken up by a discussion of what that structure is. 5. 'THE RULES FOR THE PURE THINKING OF AN OBJECT' There appears to be an internal inconsistency in Kant's notion of an object, which follows from his treatment of causality. Kant was convinced by Hume's analysis of causality, showing that it cannot be inherent in the phenomena. Kant's proposal was to make causality a category, a 'pure concept of the understanding', which is instrumental in constituting phenomena but which cannot be derived from them. Now this seems to conflict with the natural tendency to say that representations within us are caused by objects outside us, that 'objects affect sensibility'. For in this case one extends the category of causality beyond its legitimate domain of application. We will adopt Longuenesse's analysis here. She proposes, following A92/B125, that Kant replaces the necessity inherent in causality by another form of necessity: instead of 'the object causes representations within us', one now has 'the object alone makes the representation possible', or 'without the representation the object is impossible'. Moreover, and most importantly, this form of necessity is internalised, what Longuenesse calls 'internalisation within representation', so that 'the object' as it occurs in the statement 'without the representation the object is impossible' is itself a kind of representation. Here is a quote from CPR making this point: It is necessary to make understood what is meant by the expression an object of representations. [A]ppearances themselves are nothing but sensible representations, which must not be regarded in themselves ... as objects (outside the power of representation). What does one mean, then, if one speaks of an object corresponding to and therefore also distinct from the cognition? It is easy to see that this object must be thought of only as something general = X, since outside of our cognition we have nothing that we could set over against this cognition as corresponding to it. (A104) We thus have the following slightly paradoxical situation: we have to relate appearances to objects represented internally as existing outside us. How Kant conceived of this remarkable feat will be our next topic. A FORMALISATION OF KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC 11 6. OBJECTS OF APPEARANCE, OBJECTS OF EXPERIENCE, TRANSCENDENTAL OBJECTS Longuenesse's interpretation hinges on an analysis of what Kant might mean when he glosses a categorical judgement such as 'all A are B' as 'To all x to which A belongs, B also belongs'. It is not open to Kant to let the variable x run over a particular set theoretically defined collection of objects; xmust run over objects as he conceives them, that is, as particular internal representations. But now the problem arises that Kant has several notions of object: object of appearance, object of experience, and transcendental object, and in some way the variable x is concerned with all three. In a footnote defending her interpretation against Allison's, Longuenesse puts this as follows: [R]eference to an object represented by the term 'x' in the logical form of judgement does have as one of its components reference to an independent object leading us to seek coherence among our representations of it and allowing us to think of the connection of representations as in some sense necessary, "even if the judgement is empirical and therefore contingent", which is precisely the role Kant assigned to reference to the "transcendental object = x" in the A Deduction [15, p. 111]. This seems to be saying that we should think of a variable x as referring to different types of objects simultaneously. This is a very unusual understanding of variables, and it will be one of our main tasks to make this idea precise. In order to do so, we will briefly introduce the three kinds of objects. In section 2 we remarked that Kant's theory of cognition can be captured by Bruner's phrase 'going beyond the information given'. Kant attempts to show in the A Deduction that the psychological data philosophers of empiricist persuasion typically assume are already the result of mental operations. Receptivity by itself is not enough, but what it yields must be processed in order to be used by the understanding, which is concerned with relating cognitions to objects. The general term for these processes is synthesis: By synthesis in the most general sense ... I understand the action of putting different representations together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition. (A77/B103) 6.1. Synthesis of apprehension in intuition. The A Deduction treats three such syntheses, which to a first approximation can be thought of as operating one after the other. The purpose of the first synthesis, the 'synthesis of apprehension in intuition', is to prepare the manifold received in intuition for further processing by representing it internally as a manifold of spatial parts and sensory qualities, together with the manner in which these are bound together: Every intuition contains a manifold in itself, which however would not be presented as such if the mind did not distinguish the time in the succession of impressions on one another; for as contained in one moment no representation can ever be other than absolute unity. Now in order for unity of intuition to come from this manifold ... it is necessary first to run through and then take together this manifoldness, which action I shall call the synthesis of apprehension ...(A99) A concrete example of this process of 'run through and take together' is given later, in B162, where Kant envisages 'mak[ing] the empirical intuition of a house into perception through apprehension of its manifold' by, as it were, drawing its shape, i.e. by a temporal process. Although this first synthesis has made much material available for further processing (spatial parts, sensory qualities), by itself it does not produce objects (always thought of as internal 12 T. ACHOURIOTI AND M. VAN LAMBALGEN representations); it does not distinguish between true cognition of objects and hallucinations. For this, additional mental processes are necessary, which are concerned with various forms of stability that objects must have. 6.2. Synthesis of reproduction in imagination. To begin with, experience presupposes the reproducibility of appearances, as can be seen from the following example, especially when considered in conjunction with the example of the house (B162) just given: Now it is obvious that if I draw a line in thought, or think of the time from one noon to the next, or even want to represent a certain number to myself, I must necessarily first grasp one of these manifold representations after another in my thoughts. But if I were always to lose the preceding representations (the first parts of the line ...) from my thoughts and not reproduce them when I proceed to the following ones, then no whole representation ..... could ever arise. (A102) Thus if one is engaged in mentally tracing the outline of the back of a house but in the meantime the representation resulting from tracing the front has dropped out of memory, no experience of the house will ever arise. In other words, to experience an object qua object, at any particular moment sensory experience has to go hand in hand with the reproduction of those aspects of the object that cannot be perceived at that very moment. Longuenesse puts this as follows: '[T]he aim to represent a whole guides every associative reproduction of the imagination [15, p. 42].' It is only through the synthesis effected by reproduction in imagination that we can strive toward complete knowledge, because at any particular moment sensory knowledge is limited. At the same time the aim to represent a whole is precisely that, an aim, because complete knowledge is beyond our reach. The preceding two syntheses (which are 'inseparably combined' (A102)) yield objects of appearance. In the formal model to be presented in section 7 objects of appearance will constitute the domains of models. Predicates are introduced through the following considerations. 6.3. Synthesis of recognition in a concept. Without consciousness that which we think is the very same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of representations would be in vain. For it would be a new representation in our current state (A103) It is the concept's job to generate the consciousness of the generic identity between the reproduced representation and all those preceding it [15, p. 46], i.e. to recognise a representation as being of a certain kind. Kant has an interesting dual view of concepts: they are on the one hand intensional rules (or algorithms) to be applied to objects of appearance, on the other hand the extensions generated by the applications of the rules. If objects of appearance can be stably classified as being of a certain kind, they are called 'determinate objects of experience', where 'determinate' here means 'determined by concepts'. 6.4. From transcendental unity of apperception to transcendental object. We are not yet done, however; there is another kind of stability we have to consider. Even though all our representations are internal, there is sometimes a stable coherence among them, and this leads us to think that there is an object 'behind' the representations that is responsible for the coherence. But we can know nothing about objects 'behind' representations, and the question arises how such an object can be internalised as a particular kind of representation. The answer is given in the following long sequence of quotes: A FORMALISATION OF KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC 13 We find however, that our thought of the relation of all cognition to its object carries something of necessity to it [...] since insofar as they are to relate to an object our cognitions must also necessarily agree with each other in relation to it, i.e., they must have that unity that constitutes the concept of an object. It is clear however, that since we have to do only with the manifold of our representations, and that X which corresponds with them (the object) [...] is nothing for us, the unity that the object makes necessary can be nothing other than the formal unity of the consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations. (A104–5) Now no cognitions can occur in us, no connection and unity among them, without that unity of consciousness that precedes all data of the intuitions, and in relation to which all representation of objects is alone possible. This pure, original, unchanging consciousness I will now name transcendental apprehension. (A107) [A]ppearances are not things in themselves, but themselves only representations, which in turn have their object, which therefore cannot be further intuited by us, and that may therefore be named the non-empirical, i.e., the transcendental object = X. The pure concept of this transcendental object (which in reality throughout all our cognition is always one and the same = X), is what can alone confer upon all our empirical concepts in general relation to an object, i.e., objective validity. [T]his concept cannot contain any determinate intuition at all, and therefore concerns nothing but that unity which must be encountered in a manifold of cognition insofar as it stands in relation to an object. This relation, however, is nothing other than the necessary unity of self-consciousness, thus also of the synthesis of the manifold, through a common function of the mind for combining it in one representation. (A109) Hence, on the one hand the transcendental object is responsible for grasping objects of experience as the same object, on the other hand the transcendental object is an internal representation of the 'necessary unity of self-consciousness'. To come back to the starting point of this section, the variable x must refer to objects of experience as well as to the transcendental object, and the latter must somehow be constructed from the 'unity of self-consciousness'. We seem to have strayed very far from logical considerations. It will turn out however, that it is possible to give a formalisation of transcendental logic that captures the formal relationships that are hinted at by Kant in the preceding quotes. The first step towards formalisation will be to propose semantic structures that can replace first order models with their inappropriate notion of object; these will be inverse systems of first order models and their limits. We will then show how to interpret formulas on such structures, in so doing making sense of the multiple interpretations of the same variable that Longuenesse believes is essential. Once we have done so, we can set up a proof system for transcendental logic and prove its soundness and completeness. A byproduct of the completeness proof is that there is a sense in which Kant's Table of Judgements is complete. 7. STRUCTURES FOR OBJECTS The purpose of the structure to be presented is to give an account of Kant's notion of object, in terms of formal counterparts of the three syntheses, the transcendental object and unity of self-consciousness. This leaves out important topics of Kant's transcendental logic, notably his theory of causality. The advantage of this restriction is that in our chosen domain, the structures necessary for formalisation already exist, namely inverse systems. 14 T. ACHOURIOTI AND M. VAN LAMBALGEN To make the complexity of the construction somewhat more manageable, we split it in two parts. We first deal with inverse systems of sets and the relation of these inverse systems to the first two syntheses. We then consider inverse systems of models, i.e. of sets with relations defined on them, and we relate these to the third synthesis. We emphasise that we introduce this division only for expository purposes; in reality the three syntheses are inseparably linked. 7.1. Inverse systems of sets, and synthesis. An inverse system is a collection of sets which are connected by mappings. We first give the pertinent definitions, then relate these to abstract properties of synthesis. Definition 1. A directed set is a set T together with an ordering relation ≤ such that (1) ≤ is a partial order, i.e. transitive, reflexive, anti-symmetric (2) ≤ is directed, i.e. for any s, t ∈ T there is r ∈ T with s, t ≤ r Definition 2. An inverse system indexed by T is a set D = {Ds|s ∈ T} together with a family of mappings F = {hst|s ≥ t, hst : Ds −→ Dt}. The mappings in F must satisfy the coherence requirement that if s ≥ t ≥ r, htr ◦ hst = hsr. 7.1.1. Interpretation of the index set. In our case, the index set represents some abstract properties of synthesis.18 Recall that the 'synthesis of apprehension in intuition' proceeds by a 'running through and holding together of the manifold' and is thus a process that takes place in time. We may now think of an index s ∈ T as an interval of time available for the process of 'running through and holding together'. More formally, s can be taken to be a set of instants or events, ordered by a 'precedes' relation; the relation t ≤ s then stands for: t is a substructure of s. It is immediate that on this interpretation≤ is a partial order. The directedness is related to what Kant called 'the formal unity of the consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations' (A105) or 'the necessary unity of self-consciousness, thus also of the synthesis of the manifold, through a common function of the mind for combining it in one representation' (A109) – the requirement that 'for any s, t ∈ T there is r ∈ T with s, t ≤ r' creates the formal conditions for combining the syntheses executed during s and t in one representation, coded by r.19 7.1.2. Interpretation of theDs and the mappings hst : Ds −→ Dt. An object inDs can thought of as a possible 'indeterminate object of empirical intuition' synthesised in the interval s. If s ≥ t, the mapping hst : Ds −→ Dt expresses a consistency requirement: if d ∈ Ds represents an indeterminate object of empirical intuition synthesised in interval s, so that a particular manifold of features can be 'run through and held together' during s, some indeterminate object of empirical intuition must already be synthesisable by 'running through and holding together' in interval t, e.g. by combining a subset of the features characaterising d. This interpretation justifies the coherence condition s ≥ t ≥ r, htr ◦ hst = hsr: the synthesis obtained from first restricting the interval available for 'running through and holding together' to interval t, and then to interval r should not differ from the synthesis obtained by restricting to r directly. We do not put any further requirements on the mappings hst : Ds −→ Dt, such as surjectivity or injectivity. Some indeterminate object of experience inDt may have disappeared inDs: more time for 'running through and holding together' may actually yield fewer features that can be 18At this stage the reader should think of syntheses executed by a single consciousness. This will be generalised later to several cognitive agents when we come to consider Kant's notion of 'objective validity'. 19Of necessity, this discussion is very brief, although it marks the point where the Transcendental Aesthetic comes into contact with the Transcendental Analytic. We will offer a much more detailed explanation elsewhere. A FORMALISATION OF KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC 15 combined.20 Thus we do not require the mappings to be surjective. It may also happen that an indeterminate object of experience in Dt corresponds to two or more of such objects in Ds, as when a building viewed from afar upon closer inspection turns out to be composed of two spatially separated buildings; thus the mappings need not be injective. The interaction of the directedness of the index set and the mappings hst is of some interest. If r ≥ s, t there are mappings hrs : Dr −→ Ds and hrt : Ds −→ Dt. Each 'indeterminate object of empirical intuition' in d ∈ Dr can be seen as a synthesis of such objects hrs(d) ∈ Ds and hrt(d) ∈ Dt. For example, the 'manifold of a house' (B162) can be viewed as synthesised from a 'manifold of the front' and a 'manifold of the back'. (Note that we do not require that every pair of objects in Dt and Ds is unifiable in this sense.) The operation just described has some of the characteristics of the synthesis of reproduction in imagination: the fact that the front of the house can be unified with the back to produce a coherent object presupposes that the front can be reproduced as it is while we are staring at the back. The mappings hrs : Dr −→ Ds and hrt : Ds −→ Dt capture the idea that d ∈ Dr arises from reproductions of hrs(d) and hrt(d) in r. 7.2. Inverse limit of an inverse system of sets. In the quote from A109, repeated below for convenience, Kant talks about the essential connection between the 'necessary unity of selfconsciousness' and the transcendental object: Appearances are not things in themselves, but themselves only representations, which in turn have their object, which therefore cannot be further intuited by us, and that may therefore be named the non-empirical, i.e., the transcendental object = X. The pure concept of this transcendental object (which in reality throughout all our cognition is always one and the same = X), is what can alone confer upon all our empirical concepts in general relation to an object, i.e., objective validity. This concept cannot contain any determinate intuition at all, and therefore concerns nothing but that unity which must be encountered in a manifold of cognition insofar as it stands in relation to an object. This relation, however, is nothing other than the necessary unity of self-consciousness, thus also of the synthesis of the manifold, through a common function of the mind for combining it in one representation. (A109) As we remarked above, this connection seems mysterious: 'unity of self-consciousness' and 'transcendental object' seem to belong to completely different conceptual domains. But if one agrees to represent unity of self-consciousness via a directed set of indices, there is a connection with the transcendental object, which is given through the following definition and theorem 1 below. Definition 3. Let (T, {Ds | s ∈ T},F) be an inverse system. Let D ⊆ Πs∈TDs the set of all ξ such that for s ≥ t, hst(ξ(s)) = ξ(t). Such ξ will be called threads. ThenD is called the inverse limit of the given inverse system. We propose to identify the transcendental object of A109 with the inverse limit as just defined. Before we state the properties of inverse limits that we shall use in the sequel, we give an excerpt from a letter from Béatrice Longuenesse (quoted with permission) that sheds considerable light on the notion of transcendental object: I would say "the transcendental object" should be taken as a mass noun referring to whatever it is that our intuition gives us access to without giving us any knowledge 20For an empirical illustration of this phenomenon, one can think of Treisman's 'illusory conjunctions' [25]. 16 T. ACHOURIOTI AND M. VAN LAMBALGEN of it except as an appearance. The singular term "the transcendental object" is not of the same nature as the singular term as we would use it to refer to an empirical object, e.g.: "the dictionary sitting on my desk right now." [One must not] think of "the transcendental object" as a count noun, or of transcendental object(s) as falling under categories of unity and plurality just like empirical objects do. The situation in fact is: thinking of our judgments as ranging over empirical objects is also thinking of our judgments as being about *some object =X*, whatever it is, however it is to be sliced up, that our empirical objects represent for us. To say that that object is "the same through out our cognition" to say that there is one and the same stuff out there that our cognitions try to capture and do capture by way of giving values to the variable 'x' in our judgments.21 This makes clear that the transcendental object must be represented as some thing, otherwise it couldn't be 'sliced up'; hence considered as a classical set it must be non-empty. Now, without additional conditions, it is possible that the inverse limit is non-empty, so that in this formal model there wouldn't be any 'stuff' for our cognition to capture. The comparison of the transcendental object with a mass noun suggests however that our formalisation of the transcendental object as a set is not completely adequate; it would be more appropriate to choose a whole/part template. Technically, this would require a category theoretic formalisation, but this would compound the expository problems. We therefore continue to work in a set theoretic framework, in which we have one transcendental object, the non-empty inverse limit, together with elements of the inverse limit, to be called transcendental elements, introducing a term not to be found in CPR. If the transcendental object viewed as inverse limit is non-empty, it provides 'coherence among our representations' in the following sense Lemma 1. Let (T, {Ds | s ∈ T},F) be an inverse system with non-empty inverse limitD. Then for each s, t ∈ T with s ≥ t there exists a mapping πs : D −→ Ds satisfying hst ◦ πs = πt. PROOF Given a thread ξ ∈ D, put πs(ξ) = ξs.  That is, there is a single transcendental object (the inverse limit) to which all intuitions (the Ds) relate. At the same time,'reference to an object represented by the term 'x' in the logical form of judgement does have as one of its components reference to an independent object', in the sense that for some d, assignment of d to x can be thought of as deriving from an assignment to x of an 'independent object' that projects to x. Although, as we remarked above, the elements of the transcendental object have no Kantian meaning per se, it is useful to think of them in the following manner. Recall that theDs represent the possible objects of empirical intuition. Intuitively speaking, one can have many different 21The continuation of the letter shows that there are constructive aspects to the notion of the transcendental object: "[Thus], it is true that if given the choice, the transcendental object should be thought about on the model of part/whole *rather than* set/elements and in that sense, is analogous to the Kantian totum continuum of space. In fact this comparison comes up when Kant discusses the Transcendental Ideal, which is thought of as a whole of reality where whole precedes parts just as in space, as an "infinite given magnitude", the whole precedes parts. But, it is probably even truer that strictly speaking, the transcendental object the object = X that "corresponds to" our intuitions transcends the distinction between the two ways of slicing up reality: whole/part *or* set/elements. For the fact that there is an *alternative* between these two ways of slicing up reality (roughly: whole/part being characteristic of intuition, set/element of understanding) is characteristic of our own, finite understanding, which does not intuit: for which intuition and concepts are two irretrievably separate modes of representation, which complement each other in our cognition. " A FORMALISATION OF KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC 17 intuitions of the same 'object'; think of all the different possible views of a house. There is no single intuition that contains within itself all the different intuitions one can have of the house; nevertheless these intuitions somehow form a unity. A transcendental element in the sense just defined is not an object of empirical intuition, since it is not an element of a Ds, but in virtue of the previous lemma it binds together objects of empirical intuition into a unity. Our next concern is the non-emptiness of the transcendental object. In the general case that we study here, in which the mappings hst need not be surjective, it is not guaranteed that the inverse limit is non-empty. If we require that the indexed setsDs are finite, non-emptiness can be proved, as we shall see in a moment. There is a Kantian justification for this assumption, which has to with the connection between the Categories of Quantity and finite numbers, provided by the so-called Schemata. In a nutshell, the idea is this. The universal judgement 'all A are B' corresponds to the Category of Totality: to make such a judgement one has to be certain that one has considered everything that falls under the extension ofA. Kant conceives of this 'considering everything that falls under the extension of A' as a serial process, taking place in time, i.e. one must enumerate the objects falling under the extension of A. For Kant, the enumeration yields a totality only if the extension enumerated is finite.22 The existence proof that we are about to give will make clear why there is an essential connection between the non-emptiness of the transcendental object and the directedness of the index set (the 'unity of self-consciousness'). Theorem 1. Let (T, {Ds | s ∈ T},F) be an inverse system where each Ds is finite. Then the inverse limit is non-empty. PROOF. For each s ∈ T provide Ds with the discrete topology. Form the Cartesian product Πs∈TDs; this product is non-empty by Tychonov's theorem. We have to show that the subset of Πs∈TDs consisting of the threads is non-empty as well. Define for each s ∈ T , As = {ξ ∈ Πs∈TDs | ∀t ≤ s hst(ξ(s)) = ξ(t)} =⋂ t≤s {ξ ∈ Πs∈TDs | hst(ξ(s)) = ξ(t)} . The last representation shows, using the definition of inverse system, that each As is a closed non-empty set. We show that the collection of sets As has the finite intersection property. Consider As and At. We have to show that As ∩ At is non-empty. By directedness of T , choose r ≥ s, t then Ar ⊆ As ∩At, which shows that As ∩At is non-empty. Analogously for all finite cardinalities. Hence by compactness, the collection of threads, ⋂ s∈T As, is non-empty.  7.3. Inverse systems of models, and the third synthesis. To formalise the 'synthesis of recognition in a concept', we represent concepts as relations on the indexed sets of an inverse system. This additional structure entails additional requirements on the mappings hst. Definition 4. Let T be a directed set. An inverse system of models indexed by T is a family of first order models {Ms|s ∈ T} together with a family of homomorphisms F = {hst|s ≥ t, hst : Ms −→ Mt}. The mappings in F must satisfy the coherence requirement that if s ≥ t ≥ r, 22For the full argument, we refer to Longuenesse [15, Chapter 9]. 18 T. ACHOURIOTI AND M. VAN LAMBALGEN htr ◦ hst = hsr. That hst :Ms −→Mt is a homomorphism means thatMs |= R(a1, a2, . . .) impliesMt |= R(hst(a1), hst(a2), . . .).23 Bearing in mind that s > t means that in index s there is more time for synthesis than in index t, the homomorphism condition means that if an object of appearance a inMs satisfies the concept C, its image hst(a) inMt will also do so; but if hst(a) satisfies C inMt, the extra time available in s may lead one to reject C(a) inMs. For expository reasons we introduced inverse systems of sets before defining inverse systems of models. This does not mean that first the mappings hst are fixed and that concepts have to conform to these via the homomorphism condition; on the contrary, there exists a mutual dependence between concepts and mappings, reflecting Kant's view that concepts play a constitutive role with regard to objects. 7.4. Inverse systems of models and their inverse limits. We are now ready to introduce the main definition, that will ultimately allow us to set up a sound and complete proof system for transcendental logic. Definition 5. Let (T, {Ms | s ∈ T},F) be an inverse system. Let Ds be the domain ofMs. Let D ⊆ Πs∈TDs the set of all ξ such that for s ≥ t, hst(ξ(s)) = ξ(t). Define a modelM with domain D by puttingM |= R(ξ1, ξ2, . . .) if for all s ∈ T ,Ms |= R(ξ1s , ξ2s , . . .). M is called the inverse limit of the given inverse system. Theorem 2. Let (T, {Ms | s ∈ T},F) be an inverse system of models where each domain Ds is finite. Then the inverse limit is non-empty. Lemma 2. Let (T, {Ms | s ∈ T},F) be an inverse system of models with non-empty inverse limitM. Then the projection πs defined by ξ ∈ M 7→ πs(ξ) := ξ(s) is a homomorphism that in addition satisfies for s ≥ t: hst(πs(ξ)) = πt(ξ). 8. A LANGUAGE FOR OBJECTS: OBJECTIVELY VALID JUDGEMENTS Kant provides several definitions of judgement, ranging from the enumeration of syntactic forms in the Table of Judgements24 to a definition of what the cognitive role of judgement is in §19 of CPR – where the latter pays scant attention to the possible syntactic form of judgements. Nevertheless, it is this definition that provides the clearest clue as to Kant's intended semantics for judgements, so we will give the relevant passages from §19 and then turn this into a formal definition. This will allow us to relate the cognitive role of judgements to the syntactic forms in the Table of Judgements, and also to provide a formal underpinning to Longuenesse's ideas about the various roles the variable x plays in Kant's representation of categorical judgements (see the beginning of section 6). If, however, I investigate more closely the relation of given cognitions in every judgement [...] then I find that a judgement is nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception. That is the function of the copula is in them: to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective. (B141-2) Only in this way does there arise from this relation [between given cognitions] a judgement, i.e. a relation that is objectively valid, and that is sufficiently distinguished from 23We do not require surjectivity of hst. 24This applies to the headings Quantity, Quality and Relation; Modality refers rather to ways of using judgements. A FORMALISATION OF KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC 19 the relation between these same representations in which there would only be subjective validity, e.g. in accordance with the law of association. In accordance with the latter I could only say "If I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight," but not "It, the body, is heavy," which would be to say that these two representations are combined in the object [...] (B142) We thus see again the connection between 'unity of apperception' and 'relation to the object' that we also encountered in A109, quoted in section 6.4.25 Following Longuenesse's interpretation, we combine A109 with B141-2, and then (quotation repeated for convenience) [W]e cannot but come to the conclusion that reference to an object represented by the term 'x' in the logical form of judgement does have as one of its components reference to an independent object leading us to seek coherence among our representations of it and allowing us to think of the connection of representations as in some sense necessary [...] which is precisely the role Kant assigned to reference to the "transcendental object = x" in the A Deduction [15, p. 111]. These considerations suggest that judgements must be interpreted both on objects of experience and on the transcendental object and that there should exist a relation between these interpretations. We illustrate this by means of the particular affirmative judgement 'Some A are B', which Kant glosses as 'To some x to which A belongs, also B belongs'. All we can ever do is find witnesses for x among objects of experience; but we hope that this is sufficient to have a witness for x that refers to an object internally represented as existing outside us. In terms of the formal structures introduced in section 7 this means: if we have an inverse system (T, {Ms | s ∈ T},F) whose limitM exists, and if for all indices s, Ms |= ∃x(Ax ∧ Bx), thenM |= ∃x(Ax ∧Bx). More generally, Definition 6. We may provisionally define a first order sentence φ to be objectively valid if for any inverse system (T, {Ms | s ∈ T},F) with inverse limit M, if for all s, Ms |= φ then M |= φ. So far we have talked about sentences only. If we also want to interpret formulas, we need to say something about assignments; this will give us one way of understanding how a variable x can refer both to objects of experience and to the transcendental object. Definition 7. An assignment F on an inverse system (T, {Ms | s ∈ T},F) is a function that assigns to each index s and each variable x an object in Ds (the domain ofMs) such that for s ≥ t, hst(F (s, x)) = F (t, x). We write Fs for the assignment onMs that results if we hold the argument s fixed in F . Definition 8. Let F be an assignment on the inverse system (T, {Ms | s ∈ T},F). We write (T, {Ms | s ∈ T},F) ‖−φ[F ] if for all s ∈ T ,Ms |= φ[Fs]. We think of ‖− as representing truth on the world of experience (T, {Ms | s ∈ T},F). If there is no danger of confusion, satisfaction on an inverse system will be abbreviated by {Ms} ‖−φ[F ]. Lemma 3. If the inverse limit of (T, {Ms | s ∈ T},F) exists, F (x), considered as a function of the index s is a thread in theinverse limit. 25§18 makes the point as well The transcendental unity of apperception is that unity through which all of the manifold given in intuition is united in a concept of the object. It is called objective on that account [...] (B139) 20 T. ACHOURIOTI AND M. VAN LAMBALGEN Definition 9. If F is an assignment on the inverse system (T, {Ms | s ∈ T},F), we write F for the function that assigns to each variable x the thread F (x). If we now look back at Kant's characterisation of transcendental logic as given in section 4.2, we see that transcendental logic is concerned with 'objective validity', and hence what truth of a judgement in the world of experience implies for truth about 'independent' objects. This can be captured formally in terms of a definition of validity as follows: Definition 10. Let Γ be a set of formulas and φ a formula. We write Γ ‖−ovφ if for any world of experience (T, {Ms | s ∈ T},F), any assignment F , and the associated transcendental object M, (T, {Ms | s ∈ T},F) ‖−Γ[F ] impliesM |= φ[F ]. If Γ ‖−ovφ, we say that Γ forces φ to be true of independent objects. Objective validity of a formula φ in the sense of definition 6 now corresponds to the condition φ ‖−ovφ. In section 9.3 we shall see that this characterisation captures a good part of Kant's intentions. Furthermore, if all formulas in Γ are objectively valid, Γ |= φ entails Γ ‖−ovφ. In general the entailment relations |= and ‖−ov are very different however, and their interplay will shed light on Kant's transcendental logic. 9. A CLASS OF OBJECTIVELY VALID JUDGEMENTS: GEOMETRIC IMPLICATIONS We will prove below that the class of objectively valid formulas coincides with a class of formulas that is of independent interest, the geometric implications. Definition 11. Let L be a first order language.26 A formula is geometric in L if it is constructed from atomic formulas in L using ∧, ∨, ⊥ and ∃. Definition 12. A formula in L is a geometric implication if it is of the form ∀x(φ(x)→ ψ(x)), where φ,ψ are positive primitive. We can view a geometric formula ψ(x) as a special case of a geometric implication by writing it as ∀x(φ(x) → ψ(x)) where φ is a conjunction of identity statements for the variables occurring in x. Lemma 4. A geometric implication is equivalent to a conjunction of formulas ∀x(θ(x) → ψ(x)), where θ is a conjunction of atomic formulas, and ψ geometric. If we now compare the judgement forms just defined with Kant's Table of Judgements (restricted to Quantity, Quality and Relation, since Modality is of a different character altogether), we see that the hypothetical and disjunctive judgements are included, as well as the affirmative categorical judgements; no distinction is made between affirmative and infinite judgements (this is because we consider for the moment first order formulas only; see footnote 32 for the required extension. Negative particular judgements are excluded, however, and this for good Kantian reasons, as we shall see in section 9.3. Of course the class of judgements defined in definition 11 goes somewhat beyond the letter of the Table of Judgements because of the ∀∃ combination, although as we have argued, not beyond its spirit: Kant's hypothetical judgement form needs the full complexity of geometric implications, and some of the synthetic a priori judgements have this structure as well. 26We assume L contains =. A FORMALISATION OF KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC 21 9.1. Constructive content. From a philosophical point of view it is interesting that the logic of geometric implications27 is intuitionistic: let Γ ∪ {φ} be a finite set of geometric implications such that Γ ` φ (classically) then there exists an intuitionistic proof of φ from Γ.28 This shows that logical relations between geometric implications are compatible with a constructive understanding of the existential quantifier, as providing a witness given by a construction that takes instantiations of the universal quantifiers as input. This brings us close to the definition of judgement that Kant gives in the Prolegomena §23: Judgements, when considered merely as the condition of the unification of representations in a consciousness, are rules. There is thus a logical relation between the definitions of judgement as given in CPR (B141-2) and as given in the Prolegomena §23. Coquand [6] has in fact devised a proof system for geometric implications (called 'dynamic proofs') which brings out their rule-like character particularly well. Geometric implications have strong connections to Euclidean geometry as well. For example, the axiom saying that given a centre and a radius, one can construct a circle with that centre and radius, can be represented by a geometric implication. Avigad et al. [1] have recently shown in this journal that Euclid's Elements can be axiomatised using geometric implications only, by formalising reasoning with diagrams. That is, proofs via diagrams correspond at the syntactic level to proofs involving geometric implications. Kant of course believed that geometric proofs proceed in intuition via construction, and do not correspond to symbolic proofs. At the same time, Transcendental Deduction B §24 introduces the intriguing notion of synthesis speciosa, the 'effect of the understanding on sensibility', which ensures the correspondence of the syntheses of the understanding according to the possible logical forms (synthesis intellectualis) to the syntheses of our sensibility.29 Seen in this light, it is surely of interest that the same judgement forms play a role in the domains of the understanding and of sensibility. 9.2. Geometric implications are objectively valid on inverse systems of finite models. Theorem 3. Suppose given an inverse system (T, {Ms | s ∈ T},F), where T is countable and the domain of eachMs finite. In this case the inverse limitM exists (theorem 1). Let φ(x) be a geometric formula and F an assignment such that {Ms} ‖−φ[F ]. ThenM |= φ[F ]. PROOF OF THEOREM 3 By induction on the complexity of φ. The statement of the theorem is true by definition if φ is atomic. If the statement holds for φ1, . . . , φn it holds as well for φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn. To proceed, we need a definition and two lemmata. Definition 13. Let T be the index set of the inverse system. A subset S ⊆ T is cofinal if for every t ∈ T there exists s ∈ S with s ≥ t. Lemma 5. If S ⊆ T is cofinal, the inverse limit of (T, {Ms | s ∈ T},F) is isomorphic to that of (S, {Ms | s ∈ S},F). Lemma 6. (Lyndon) Let h : A −→ B be a homomorphism from a model A to a model B. Let ψ(x) be geometric, and ā a tuple of elements from A, then A |= ψ[ā] entails B |= ψ[h(ā)]. 27The name derives from topos theory; see e.g. [8, §16.4]. 28See Palmgren [17] for a proof theoretic argument. 29Longuenesse [15, Chapter 8] provides an elaborate discussion of this topic. 22 T. ACHOURIOTI AND M. VAN LAMBALGEN Now let φ = φ1 ∨ φ2, where the φi are geometric, such that for all s,Ms |= φ[Fs]. We show that at least one disjunct φ1, φ2 holds on a cofinal set of indices (or rather on the models indexed by these indices). Suppose that for φ1 there exists t ∈ T such that for all s ≥ t,Ms 6|= φ[Fs]. It follows that for all s ≥ t,Ms |= φ2[Fs]. The set S = {s | s ≥ t} is cofinal in T , so the inverse limit determined by T is isomorphic to that determined by S. By the inductive hypothesis, M |= φ2[F ], whenceM |= φ[F ]. Lastly, suppose φ = ∃xθ(x), such that for all s, Ms |= ∃xθ(x)[Fs]. Since the index set is countable and directed, we can construct a linear cofinal subset of T , as follows. Enumerate T as t0, t1, t2, . . . and construct a linear cofinal subset S by putting s0 := t0; s1 is an index larger than both s0 and t1; s2 is an element larger than both s1 and t2, etc.; put S : {s0, s1, s2, . . .}. Since we assumed the indexed models are finite, the collection of domains {Ds | s ∈ S} can be given the structure of a finitely branching tree, using the homomorphisms hst to define the branches. Pick s ∈ S, then by hypothesis, for some assignment f on Ms such that for all variables z different from x, f(z) = Fs(z): Ms |= θ[f ]. If r ∈ S is such that r ≤ s, then hsr(f) defines an assignment onMr andMr |= θ[hsr(f)]. Since θ is geometric, it follows that the objects witnessing the existential quantifier in ∃xθ(x) determine a subtree of the finitely branching tree {Ds | s ∈ S}. Because Ms |= ∃xθ(x)[Fs] for all s, this subtree is infinite. By König's Lemma it must therefore have an infinite branch. This branch is a thread ξ in the limit of the inverse system (S, {Ms | s ∈ S},F) which can be extended to a thread in the inverse limit of (T, {Ms | s ∈ T},F) by cofinality of S. Define an assignment G by G(s, z) := F (s, z), G(s, x); = ξs. Then {Ms} ‖−θ[G], whence by the inductive hypothesis M |= θ[Ĝ], and henceM |= ∃xθ[F ].  Corollary 1. Suppose given an inverse system (T, {Ms | s ∈ T},F), where T is countable and the domain of eachMs finite. Let F be an assignment on the inverse system. Let ∀x(φ(x)→ ψ(x)) (where φ,ψ are geometric) be a geometric implication such that {Ms} ‖ −∀x(φ(x)→ ψ(x))[F ], thenM |= ∀x(φ(x)→ ψ(x))[F ]. PROOF OF COROLLARY 1 To show that ∀x(φ(x)→ ψ(x)) holds on the inverse limitM under F , assume thatM |= φ[G], where G is an assignment that differs at most on x from F , so that for all s ∈ T ,Ms |= φ[Gs] by lemma 6. The hypothesis of the theorem gives that for all s ∈ T , Ms |= ψ[Gs], whenceM |= ψ[Ĝ] by theorem 3.  9.3. A closer look at objective validity. With this theorem and especially its proof at our disposal, we can give a more detailed justification of the definition of objective validity. Consider a sentence ∃xA(x). If this sentence is true on some Ms, i.e. if the existential quantifier is witnessed by an object of experience inMs, then ∃xA(x) need not yet be objectively valid, i.e. witnessed by an object represented as being independent of our cognition; for the relevant object of experience inMs may disappear at stage t > s. Moreover, even if ∃xA(x) is witnessed in several Ms, and even though we intend ∃xA(x) to be true of the same object in these Ms, there is no guarantee this will be so. But if ∃xA(x) is witnessed by an object of experience in allMs, one would like this to be so because an object independent of our cognition unifies these witnesses and provides them with objective reality; and the above proof shows that there A FORMALISATION OF KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC 23 is a transcendental element (a thread in the inverse limit) which does this.30 But whether witnesses among objects of experience can be so related to the transcendental object depends on the type of judgement of which they are witnesses. For consider now ∃x¬A(x). It is easy to construct (see figure 9.3) an inverse system whose limit contains a single thread satisfying A, and where ∃x¬A(x) is true at each indexed model, but where the witnesses for ∃x¬A(x) are totally unrelated. In this context it is interesting what Kant has to say about the role of negation: To be sure, logically, one can express negatively any proposition that one wants, but in regard to the content of our cognition in general, that is, whether it is expanded or limited by a judgement, negative judgements have the special job solely of preventing error (A709/B737). This seems to suggest that negative judgements need not have objective validity.31 In this context, Wolff [28, p. 290–1] quotes C.S. Peirce, who wrote that in traditional logic, existential import of a judgement depends on its Quality not Quantity: negative judgements do not come with existential import. Peirce writes It is probable that Kant also understood the affirmative proposition to assert the existence of its subject, while the negative did not do so; so that 'Some phoenixes do not rise from their ashes' would be true, and 'All phoenixes do rise from their ashes' would be false. The same interpretation is given in Thompson [24], where it is also argued that the infinite judgement corresponding to the negative particular judgement – 'Some A is non-B' – does carry existential import.32 9.3.1. Objective validity and truth. It is important to distinguish objective validity from truth. Objective validity of a judgement does not mean that the judgement is true of transcendental objects, i.e. of objects represented as existing independently of us. Rather, it is a conditional notion: if the judgements holds on the world of experience (represented by an inverse system of models), then it holds for transcendental objects as well. Of course we can never be fully certain that the given judgement holds of the world of experience, so truth on transcendental objects cannot be established definitively, and functions rather as a regulative norm governing the activity of judgement. But if a judgement is objectively valid, we know at least that it is not pointless to verify it on the world of experience, since in doing so we may 'relate our representations to an object' (Longuenesse [15, p. 82]). 30As a consequence, if a geometric implication ∀x(φ(x) → ψ(x)) has existential import on all models Ms, i.e. if in eachMs there is an object of experience satisfying φ(x), then ∀x(φ(x) → ψ(x)) has existential import onM, and we can think of these objects of experience as unified by the transcendental object. 31Note though that it is a consequence of the formal definition of objective validity that negative universal judgements are objectively valid. 32The infinite judgement 'some A are non-B' can be formalised using the infinite disjunction W as_ C∩B=∅ (∃x(A(x) ∧B(x)). interestingly, this is still a geometric formula, and theorem 3 can be extended to show that this infinitary formula is objectively valid. 24 T. ACHOURIOTI AND M. VAN LAMBALGEN A ..... A A A FIGURE 1 9.3.2. Truly objective validity. Despite the relation established in A109 between 'unity of selfconsciousness' and 'objective validity', Kant does not intend that objective validity relates to each subject taken individually only: Persuasion is a mere semblance, since the ground of the judgement, which lies solely in the subject, is held to be objective. Hence such a judgement also has only private validity, and this taking something to be true cannot be communicated. Truth, however, rests upon agreement with the object, with regard to which, consequently, the judgements of every understanding must agree [...] The touchstone of whether taking something to be true is conviction or mere persuasion is therefore, externally, the possibility of communicating it and finding it to be valid for the reason of every human being to take it to be true; for in that case there is at least a presumption that the ground of the agreement of all judgements, regardless of the difference among the subjects, rests on the common ground, namely the object, with which they therefore all agree and through which the truth of the judgement is proved. (A820-1/B848-9) This distinction, between 'private validity' and 'validity for every human being' plays a prominent (and controversial) role in §§18–20 of the Prolegomena; see Longuenesse [15, Chapter 7] for discussion. Here we bring up this topic only to note that it calls for an extension of the interpretation of the index set T , which now contains the mental states in which syntheses are executed of all cognitive agents of interest, together with the requirement that the the mental states of each agent are cofinal in the set of mental states of every other agent (cf. Kant's remark on the 'possibility of communicating'). 10. THE TRANSCENDENTAL OBJECT REVISITED: GENERALISED INVERSE LIMITS So far we have worked with a concrete representation of the transcendental object as an inverse limit of a countable inverse system of finite models. However, if we look carefully at the justification for this identification, we see that what is really important are the properties of the maps that exist between inverse limit and indexed models, and between the indexed models themselves, i.e. the commutativity of the various diagrams of maps, since these express the A FORMALISATION OF KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC 25 unifying function of the transcendental object. Also, the proof that geometric formulas are objectively valid hinges on the compactness properties that obtain in this concrete setting. In order to get rid of this special feature we define a model-theoretic notion of inverse limit which has preservation of geometric formulas built in. Definition 14. Let an inverse system (T, {Ms | s ∈ T},F) be given. The structure M is a generalised inverse limit of (T, {Ms | s ∈ T},F) if it satisfies the properties (1) there exists an injective homomorphism fromM into the inverse limit of (T, {Ms | s ∈ T},F) (hence the inverse limit is nonempty). (2) for each s there must exist a homomorphism πs :M −→Ms satisfying the coherence condition: for b ∈M, s ≥ t: hst(πs(b)) = πt(b) (3) for geometric formulas φ, and parameters a fromM, if for all s ∈ T ,Ms |= φ[πs(a)], thenM |= φ[a] (4) M is maximal in the following sense: any modelN that satisfies the previous conditions (with projections π ′ n) and whose cardinality is less than that ofM can be embedded into M via a homomorphism g satisfying πn ◦ g = π ′ n). A few comments on this definition will be helpful. The elements ofM can be thought of as threads, via the mapping a ∈ M 7→ {πs(a) | s ∈ T}, where the r.h.s. is a thread because of coherence condition (2). This map will in fact yield the injective homomorphism required by (1); this follows from (3) applied to the geometric formula x = y. One way to think of condition (3) is to assume that the language ofM is expanded with a unique individual constant for each object ofM; we denote the resulting expansion of ofM by (M,−→a ). Let c be a name for the object a, then sinceM |= x = c[a] and x = c is positive primitive,Ms |= x = c[πs(a)]. Thus the constants of the language of (M,−→a ) have a unique interpretation in Ms. In this setting condition (3) can be formulated as for positive primitive sentences φ in the language of (M,−→a ), if for all s ∈ T , Ms |= φ, thenM |= φ. Lemma 7. Let (T, {Ms | s ∈ T},F) be an inverse system with generalised inverse limitM, and let φ be a geometric implication (in the language of (M,−→a )) true on allMs. Then φ is true on (M,−→a )). PROOF Immediate from definition 14.  We take a generalised inverse limit M to be a representation of the transcendental object associated to the given inverse system. While the mapping posited in (1) need not be surjective, in a sense the threads in the inverse limit are indistinguishable from the elements of M: if a thread ξ in the inverse limit witnesses a geometric formula φ(x), there will also be an element fromM that does so, by (3).33 10.1. Objective validity redefined. Since we will now work with generalised inverse limits, the definition of then entailment relation ‖−ov needs to be adapted. Definition 15. Let (T, {Ms | s ∈ T},F) be an inverse system with generalised inverse limit M. Then Γ(x) ‖−ovφ(x) means that for all a ∈ M, all s ∈ T , Ms |= Γ[πs(a)] implies M |= φ[a]. We call φ(x) objectively valid if φ(x) ‖−ovφ(x). 33Note that condition (4) implies that each set of ξ of cardinality less than |M|can be mapped homomorphically to M; but there doesn't have to be an isomorphism. 26 T. ACHOURIOTI AND M. VAN LAMBALGEN We see that the variables on the l.h.s. of ‖−ov receive their interpretation from the transcendental elements that are assigned to these variables on the r.h.s.; this seems to be as close as one can get to Longuenesse's view, cited on page 19, on the meaning of the variable x in Kant's logic lectures and in CPR. 11. A CHARACTERISATION OF OBJECTIVELY VALID FORMULAS Theorem 4. Let φ be objectively valid. Then there are finitely many geometric implications γ1, . . . , γn such that (1) φ |= γi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n (2) γ1 ∧ . . . ∧ γn |= φ PROOF Define Σ = {γ | γ is a geometric implication and φ |= γ}. By the compactness theorem it suffices to prove that Σ |= φ, for this will give us the finitely many geometric implications γ1, . . . , γn.34 The idea of the proof is that we pick a modelM of Σ and show that it can be written as generalised inverse limit of a countable inverse system {Mn | n ∈ N} such that for all n,Mn |= φ. Since φ is assumed to be objectively valid, it follows thatM |= φ. This proof sketch can be turned into a full proof most easily if we work with saturated models. We shall set aside worries about the additional hypotheses needed to guarantee existence of saturated models, and in particular will not present the proof in terms of special models, so as not to obscure the main ideas. (For definitions of 'saturated' and 'special' see Chang and Keisler [5, Chapter 5] or Hodges [9, Chapter 10].) An essential ingredient in the proof is the following reformulation of lemma 5.2.9 in Chang and Keisler [5]: Theorem 5. Let B be a saturated model of cardinal κ, and let A be a model of cardinality ≤ κ. Suppose every geometric sentence true onA is true on B. Let (A,−→a ) the expansion ofA with a 1–1 enumeration of its objects. Then there exists a homomorphism from A to B with respect to geometric formulas in the language of the expansion (A,−→a ) Choose a saturated modelM of cardinality κ withM |= Σ; we have to showM can be written as the generalised inverse limit of an inverse system {Mn | n ∈ N} such that φ is true on eachMn. We proceed by induction, and supposeMn and a projection πn :M −→Mn have been constructed. We assumeMn is saturated of cardinality λ > κ. We constructMn+1 as a saturated model of a certain set of sentences Ξn+1 that we now proceed to specify. (1) φ ∈ Ξn+1 (2) There must be a homomorphism hn+1 :Mn+1 −→Mn. By theorem 5 this means that every geometric formula true on Mn+1 is true on Mn. Since we do not have Mn+1 34At this point there is a curious analogy with one of Kant's 'formal criteria of truth', discussed in section 4.1: If all the consequences of a cognition are true, then the cognition is true too. For if there were something false in the cognition, then there would have to be a false consequence too. From the consequence, then, we may infer to a ground, but without being able to determine this ground. Only from the complex of all consequences can one infer to a determinate ground, infer that it is the true ground. Σ stands for the 'complex of all consequences' of φ that are possible grounds; we try to prove that Σ |= φ, i.e. 'if all the consequences of a cognition are true, then the cognition is true too', and in so doing infer the 'determinate ground', the γ1, . . . , γn. A FORMALISATION OF KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC 27 yet, this translates into: every geometric sentence false onMn must be false onMn+1. Define ∆n+1 = {¬ψ | ψgeometric ,Mn 6|= ψ} and put ∆n+1 in Ξn+1. (3) There must exist a homomorphism πn+1 : M −→ Mn+1. Again by theorem 5 this means that every geometric sentence true onM is true onMn+1. Define Γn+1 = {τ | τ geometric ,M |= τ} and put Γn+1 in Ξn+1. (4) To satisfy condition (3) of definition 14, consider the expansion (M,−→a ). Every geometric sentence false on (M,−→a ) must be false on someMn. We therefore need an enumeration θ1, θ2, . . . of geometric sentences θi and define Θn+1 = {¬θn+1(c) | (M,−→a ) 6|= θn+1(c)}, and put Θn+1 in Ξn+1. (5) This concludes the specification of Ξn+1. Lemma 8. Ξn+1 is consistent. PROOF OF LEMMA Suppose Ξn+1 is inconsistent, then there finite sets ¬ψ1, . . . ,¬ψk ∈ ∆n+1, τ1, . . . , τl ∈ Γn+1, and θn+1(c1), . . . , θn+1(ck) ∈ Θn+1 such that φ |= ¬(¬ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬ψk ∧ τ1 ∧ . . . ∧ τl ∧ ¬θn+1(c1) ∧ . . . ∧ θn+1(ck)), which is equivalent to φ |= (τ1 ∧ . . . ∧ τl → ψ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ψk ∨ θn+1(c1) ∨ . . . ∨ θn+1(ck)). Since the constants in the occurrences of θn+1 do not occur in φ, we have φ |= ∀x1 . . . xk(τ1 ∧ . . . ∧ τl → ψ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ψk ∨ θn+1(x1) ∨ . . . ∨ θn+1(xk)). The formula on the r.h.s. of |= is a geometric implication, hence in Σ. SinceM |= Σ and all τ are true onM, we have M |= ∀x1 . . . xk(ψ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ψk ∨ θn+1(x1) ∨ . . . ∨ θn+1(xk)). Now by the induction hypothesis a projectionM −→ Mn has been constructed so that the ψi are false onM, whence we get M |= ∀x1 . . . xk(θn+1(x1) ∨ . . . ∨ θn+1(xk)), which is a contradiction.  Due to the contribution of Θn+1, the set Ξn+1 can have cardinality κ. This was the reason we assumedMn to be saturated of cardinality λ > κ. We now chooseMn+1 as a saturated model of Ξn+1 of cardinality λ, then all required homomorphisms exist. We now have to verify thatM satisfies the conditions of definition 14 for being a generalised inverse limit. The essential observation here is that for a constant c in the language of the expansion (M,−→a ), (M,−→a ) |= x = c[a] implies (Mn+1, −−−−−→ πn+1(a)) |= x = c[πn+1(a)], which in turn implies (Mn, −−−−−−−−−−→ hn+1(πn+1(a))) |= x = c[hn+1(πn+1(a))]. But we also have directly (Mn, −−−→ πn(a)) |= x = c[πn(a))], whence hn+1(πn+1(a)) = πn(a). This gives conditions (1) and (2); and (3) holds by construction. To prove (4), observe that the diagram of homomorphisms is such as to force that every geometric sentence true on N is true onM.35 The commutativity of the diagram πn ◦ g = pi ′ n is established as before. Now suppose there are b, b ′ ∈ N such that g(b) = g(b′). Then for all n, Mn |= x = y[πn(g(b)), πn(g(b′))], whence Mn |= x = y[π ′ n(b), π ′ n(b ′)]. Since x = y is geometric, this means that b = b′.  35This is the only place where saturation of M is used. 28 T. ACHOURIOTI AND M. VAN LAMBALGEN Both for the purpose of the proof theory given below and for good Kantian reasons, we need a slight generalisation of the preceding theorem: Theorem 6. If Γ is a set of sentences and φ a sentence such that Γ ‖−ovφ, then there are finitely many geometric implications γ1, . . . , γn such that Γ |= γ1 ∧ . . . ∧ γn and γ1 ∧ . . . ∧ γn |= φ. PROOFSKETCH Analogous to the proof of theorem 4, the only change is that Σ is defined as {γ | γ is geometric implication ∀∃,Γ |= γ} and we again show that Σ |= φ.  The sentences in Γ specify a theory that every indexed model in the inverse system under consideration must satisfy. This is related to Kant's remarks in A573-4/B601-2, which point to the fact that concepts are not independent, but carry analytic structure: [W]e nevertheless find that this idea [of the sum total of all possible predicates in general], as an original concept, excludes a multiplicity of of predicates, which, as derived through others, are already given, or cannot coexist with one another [...] Theorem 6 then says that the only consequences of this analytic structure that have objective validity are of the geometric implication form. Longuenesse discusses this point on [15, p. 87] and again on [15, p. 107], both times with reference to §36 of the Jäsche Logik. The point is that Kant also introduces the variable x in the representation of analytic judgements: An example of an analytic proposition is, To everything x to which the concept of body (a + b) belongs, belongs also extension (b). An example of a synthetic proposition is, To everything x to which the concept of body belongs, belongs also attraction (c). Longuenesse comments Kant makes the presence of the x to which the two concepts are attributed explicit for analytic as well as for synthetic judgements. This is because in both cases concepts have meaning only if they are "universal or reflected representations" of singular objects [...] For all judgements, even when they are analytic, what ultimately makes the combination of concepts possible is relation to an "x of judgement". [15, p. 87] Since this 'x of judgement' is the same for both analytic and synthetic judgements, the same notion of objective validity must apply. 12. TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC AS A 'LOGIC OF TRUTH' Theorem 6 leads us back to the original purpose of 'the logic of truth': The part of transcendental logic that expounds the elements of the pure cognition of the understanding and the principles without which no object can be thought at all, is the transcendental analytic, and at the same time a logic of truth. For no cognition can contradict it without at the same time losing all content, i.e. all relation to any object, hence all truth. (A62-3/B87) In this section we present a sound and complete proof system for the 'logic of truth', which more or less does what Kant wants it to do. We will see that the main step in the completeness proof is theorem 6. We claim here that the 'logic of truth' is determined by the notion of validity ‖−ov.36 The logical form underlying ‖−ov involves the Kantian notion of object as formalised through inverse systems and their (generalised) inverse limits. In terms of this notion of validity, that φ is objectively valid can be stated as 'φ ‖−ovφ', or if we restrict ourselves to inverse systems that satisfy 36In the sense of definition 15. A FORMALISATION OF KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC 29 a given theory Γ, as 'Γ, φ ‖−ovφ'. That a 'cognition' φ contradicts the 'logic of truth' can then be formalised as either φ 6‖−ovφ or Γ, φ 6‖−ovφ. In the first case this means concretely that there is an inverse system {Ms} with generalised inverse limitM such that all s ∈ T ,Ms |= φ but M 6|= φ. We would like this to be the case if and only if the sequent φ ⇒ φ is not derivable in a certain sequent calculus. 12.1. A sequent calculus for the 'logic of truth'. Let ⇒ov be the syntactic counterpart of ‖−ov, to be used in the geometric implicationtion of the sequent calculus. The peculiarity of this calculus is that, whereas usually φ ⇒ φ (or more generally Γ, φ ⇒ φ) is taken as an axiom(schema), here it is one purpose of the calculus to determine for which φ, the sequent φ⇒ov φ is derivable. One special case of the schema can be taken as axiomatic, since for atomic formulas A we do have A⇒ov A. In the usual systems one would derive φ⇒ov φ (for arbitrary φ) from this by induction, but with respect to⇒ov the rules should be such that the induction is blocked beyond the geometric implication stage. We achieve this introducing an auxiliary sequent arrow ⇒pov which has the same semantic interpretation as⇒ov, but for which the rules are such that φ⇒pov θ is derivable only if φ, θ are geometric. The proposed proof system thus has three sequent arrows: ⇒, whose interpretation is as in classical logic, and both⇒ov and⇒pov whose interpretation is given by ‖−ov. The purpose of the calculus is to derive sequents of the form Γ ⇒ov φ;⇒ and⇒pov are auxiliary notions. We will have the following types of rules: rules for classical logic, formulated using⇒, rules for the objectively valid formulas involving only⇒pov, rules for the objectively valid formulas holding for both ⇒pov and ⇒ov (to avoid duplication we will write these rules with an arrow ⇒(p)ov which means 'either⇒pov or⇒ov'), and rules that mix the various arrows. The system will be called LT in a reference to Kant's term 'logic of truth', and comprises the following rules: (1) The standard sequent rules for⇒. (2) Rules valid for⇒pov only A⇒pov A Axiom (A an atomic formula) φ⇒pov φ ψ ⇒pov ψ φ⇒pov θ ψ ⇒pov θ Left ∨ φ ∨ ψ ⇒pov θ φ⇒pov θ Right ∃ φ⇒pov ∃xθ φ⇒pov θ Left ∃ (x not free in θ)∃xφ⇒pov θ (3) Rules valid for both⇒pov and⇒ov φ⇒(p)ov θ Left ∧ φ ∧ ψ ⇒(p)ov θ φ⇒(p)ov θ φ⇒(p)ov τ Right ∧ φ⇒(p)ov θ ∧ τ φ⇒(p)ov θ Right ∨ φ⇒(p)ov θ ∨ τ 30 T. ACHOURIOTI AND M. VAN LAMBALGEN (4) Rules valid for⇒ov φ⇒ov θ Left ∀∀xφ⇒ov θ φ⇒ov θ Right ∀ (x not free in φ) φ⇒pov ∀xθ (5) Rules involving⇒pov,⇒ov and/or⇒ φ⇒pov φ φ⇒ov φ φ⇒pov φ Γ⇒ov φ Γ, ψ ⇒ov θ Left→Γ, φ→ ψ ⇒ov θ φ⇒pov φ Γ, φ⇒ov ψ Right→ Γ⇒ov φ→ ψ Γ⇒ φ φ⇒ov ψ ψ ⇒ θ ov–CutΓ⇒ov θ The ov-Cut rule plays a special role inLT : one could say it connects 'general logic' (represented by the classical sequent arrow⇒) with transcendental logic proper (represented by⇒ov). It says that cut-formulas must be of a specific form (geometric implications ). It cannot be eliminated, because it expresses that inferences from inverse system to inverse limit have to proceed via objectively valid formulas, and cannot proceed more directly. Our next aim is to prove soundness and completeness of LT with respect to ‖−ov. Lemma 9. φ1 ⇒ov φ1 . . . φn ⇒ov φn φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn ⇒ov φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn PROOF. By repeated application of the left and right ∧ rules.  Lemma 10. φ⇒pov φ ψ ⇒ov ψ φ→ ψ ⇒ov φ→ ψ PROOF. φ⇒pov φ ψ ⇒ov ψ Left→ φ→ ψ,φ⇒ov ψ φ⇒pov φ Right→ φ→ ψ ⇒ov φ→ ψ As a consequence we have Lemma 11. φ⇒pov φ ψ ⇒ov ψ ∀x(φ→ ψ)⇒ov ∀x(φ→ ψ) Lemma 12. LT is sound for the intended interpretation: Γ⇒ov ψ implies Γ ‖−ovψ. Theorem 7. φ⇒ov φ is derivable iff φ is provably equivalent (in classical logic) to a conjunction of geometric implications. A FORMALISATION OF KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC 31 PROOF. For the right to left direction, it follows from lemmas 11 and 9 that for every conjunction ψ of geometric implications, ψ ⇒ov ψ is derivable. The ov-Cut rule extends this to the case of φ provably equivalent to such ψ. For let γ1, . . . , γn be such that for, φ |= γ1 ∧ . . . ∧ γn, and γ1 ∧ . . . ∧ γn |= φ, then ov-Cut applied to the cut formula γ1 ∧ . . . ∧ γn yields φ⇒ov φ.37 The left to right follows from theorem 4 by soundness (lemma 12).  Theorem 8. LT is complete: Γ ‖−ovψ implies Γ⇒ov ψ. PROOF. If Γ ‖−ovψ , then by Theorem 6 there is a conjunction γ1 ∧ . . . ∧ γn of geometric implications γi such that Γ |= γ1 ∧ . . . ∧ γn and γ1 ∧ . . . ∧ γn |= ψ. By completeness for classical first order logic it follows that Γ⇒ γ1 ∧ . . .∧ γn and γ1 ∧ . . .∧ γn ⇒ ψ are derivable. By theorem 7 γ1 ∧ . . . ∧ γn ⇒ov γ1 ∧ . . . ∧ γn is derivable. The proof is completed by an application of ov-Cut: Γ⇒ γ1 ∧ . . . ∧ γn γ1 ∧ . . . ∧ γn ⇒ov γ1 ∧ . . . ∧ γn γ1 ∧ . . . ∧ γn ⇒ ψ Γ⇒ov ψ  It follows that φ⇒ov φ is not derivable in LT ('contradicts the logic of truth') if and only if there is an inverse system {Ms} with generalised inverse limitM such that all s ∈ T ,Ms |= φ but M 6|= φ ('loses any relation to the object', in the sense that what a sentence says about objects of experience need not be related to what it says about the transcendental object). Our claim is not that the completeness theorem shows that Kant's transcendental logic has now been formalised in its full extent. For example, we did not at all consider his treatment of causality. If we were to do so, the structure of the inverse systems would have to be considerably enriched: the indexed models would have to contain events, and would have to support predicates describing instantaneous and continuous causation,38 perhaps governed by axioms such as the event calculus (van Lambalgen and Hamm [26]). Our main purpose here has been to introduce a formal semantics for judgements based on Kant's notion of object, and in doing so to establish a framework in which further specifications of transcendental logic can be situated. 13. BACK TO THE TABLE OF JUDGEMENTS With these formal results established, we may now consider their implications for Kant's Table of Judgements and its role in the argumentative structure of CPR. It was Kant's intention to enumerate primitive logical forms which each express a particular function of cognition as it attempts to construct objects out of sensory manifolds. Strawson [22] claimed this was a misconceived enterprise, since (a) there are no primitive logical forms due to interdefinability (e.g. the hypothetical judgement is definable using negation and the disjunctive judgement), and (b) based on an (arbitrary) choice of primitives, indefinitely many logical forms can be derived, and one would not want to say that each of these corresponds to a particular function of cognition. The answer to this is that Kant selected 'primitive' logical forms of judgement already with a particular transcendental purpose in mind, a purpose that renders the classical semantics underlying Strawson's objection inapplicable. we have seen on p. 5 that according to Longuenesse 37This explains the peculiar 'symmetric' form of the cut rule. 38Watkins [27] argues that it is especially continuous causation as it occurs in Newtonian mechanics through the concept of force, that led to Kant's particular theory of causality. 32 T. ACHOURIOTI AND M. VAN LAMBALGEN [15, p. 78] Kant selected forms of judgement for inclusion in the Table, not because these were sanctioned by traditional logic, but because they play a role in "bring[ing] given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception,", that is, to relate our representations to objects.39 Thus, there is first a (largely suppressed) general argument selecting particular judgement forms, followed by detailed arguments (mostly in the Transcendental Deduction of the B edition) aligning particular logical forms with particular cognitive functions directed toward the constitution of objects. The results of this paper pertain to the first step in the argumentation. We have seen that in B141-2, Kant provides a functional characterisation of judgement in terms of objective validity: If, however, I investigate more closely the relation of given cognitions in every judgement [...] then I find that a judgement is nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception. That is the function of the copula is in them: to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective. Only in this way does there arise from this relation [between given cognitions] a judgement, i.e. a relation that is objectively valid [...] (B141-2) Theorem 4 can be viewed as the derivation of a structural characterisation – deriving specific syntactic forms – from Kant's functional characterisation of judgement. This characterisation is very closely related to the Table of Judgements. On the one hand, it is easily seen that affirmative categorical judgements are included in our class, as are disjunctive judgements. 40 The extended discussion of hypotheticals in section 4.1 shows that their intrinsic logical complexity can be as high as geometric implication, hence they fit in our class. On the other hand, our class does not include negative particular judgements, but then these types of judgements were probably not intended to be candidates for objective validity, given Kant's views on negation. Furthermore, our characterisation limits the complexity of objectively valid judgements to geometric implication, i.e. the logical complexity of hypotheticals. Thus we have in a sense proved the completeness of the Table of Judgements. This is perhaps the place to address what may be a lingering worry in the reader's mind. Michael Friedman [7] has extensively argued that it is precisely Kant's logic's lack of ability to express the ∀∃ quantifier combination that drove his philosophy of mathematics. For example, because his logic does not allow him to express that a certain domain is infinite (this needs the ∀∃ quantifier combination). Kant was forced to adopt a 'constructive' approach to mathematics that acknowledges potential infinity only. By contrast, we have identified the geometric implication judgement forms as those judgements that should be of interest to Kant, since only they can claim objective validity. Shouldn't we say with Friedman that although Kant should have considered geometric implication judgement forms, he was in effect barred from doing so because the inferences contained in his general logic are too weak? The answer must be the following. 39There is one awkward aspect of this interpretation though; as we have seen negative particular judgements are not objectively valid. 40 With the proviso that one may question whether the meaning given to the disjunctive judgement here exhausts Kant's meaning: his talk of parts and wholes, A73-4/B99, and more elaborately in the Jäsche Logik, §27, 28) suggests his disjunction has some substructural aspects. E.g. the usual introduction rule for ∨ fails for his intended meaning. The simultaneous presence of the disjuncts can perhaps be captured by the par connective of linear logic (see the rules for 'par logic' in [10, p. 282]), or the structural connective "," in Boricic' multiple-conclusion natural deduction system [3]. Note that in these cases the elimination rule for disjunction is not the one familiar from classical (or intuitionistic) logic, but the disjunctive syllogism, as in Kant. We conjecture that the connection between disjunctive judgements and the Category of Community that Kant discusses in the Third Analogy can be made much more transparent by giving disjunction one of the substructural readings. A FORMALISATION OF KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC 33 It is clear that Kant did not conceive of 'all' in the universal categorical judgement and 'some' in the particular categorical judgements as universal and existential quantifiers that can be freely combined among themselves and with other logical operators, for example to generate a ∀∃ judgement. It is also clear that Kants general logic is not complete for geometric logic. This however is not an argument against the claim that Kant's judgement forms are geometric. 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[22] P.F. Strawson. The bounds of sense: an essay on Kant's "Critique of pure reason". Methuen, 1966. [23] R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz. Kants Logik. De Gruyter, Berlin, 1976. [24] M. Thompson. On Aristotle's square of opposition. The Philosophical Review, 62(2):251–265, 1953. [25] A.M. Treisman and G. Gelade. A feature-integration theory of attention. Clarendon Press, 12:97–136, 1980. [26] M. van Lambalgen and F. Hamm. The proper treatment of events. Blackwell, Oxford and Boston, 2004. [27] E. Watkins. Kant and the metaphysics of causality. Cambridge University Press, 2004. [28] M. Wolff. Die Vollstaendigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel. Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M., 1995.

Introduction Patrick Todd and John Martin Fischer This Introduction has three sections, on "logical fatalism", "theological fatalism", and the problem of future contingents, respectively. 1. Logical Fatalism The logical fatalist argues – in a particular sort of way – that no one has free will, understood as the ability to do otherwise than what one actually does. Though there are perhaps various ways of arguing that ought to make one a "logical fatalist", there is one particular recurring pattern of argument that we shall explicitly focus on in this Introduction (and that also recurs in many of the essays in this book). This is, we think, the best argument that moves from time, truth, and logic to the conclusion that no one has free will.1 We find it helpful to separate two aspects of the fatalist's overall argument that no one is free. First, the fatalist argues – in a particular way – that "prior truths" specifying what we will do in the future are incompatible with our having free will. According to this argument, if it was true already, 1000 years ago (say), that you would 1 This raises a difficult question: what is it that makes one a "logical fatalist"? There is, unfortunately, no generally agreed upon definition of this term. Minimally, the logical fatalist argues that necessarily, no human being has free will. But not just any way of arguing that necessarily, no one has free will makes one a logical fatalist. We (tentatively) suggest that what makes one a fatalist is that one argues that, necessarily, no one has free will without explicitly invoking any thesis about causation or causal determinism. There is, of course, a venerable argument – sometimes discussed in the essays of this book (especially in the essays of Perry and Mackie) – that causal determinism is incompatible with free will. But proponents of this argument are not now generally taken to be supporting the cause of "fatalism" or "the fatalist" – even in combination with an argument that determinism is true (or even necessarily true). The logical fatalist thinks we can show that no one has free will with more minimal resources. purchase this book, then you could not have done otherwise than purchase the book. Second, the fatalist claims that, as a matter of logic, or as a matter of common sense, or as a matter of something else, we will have to say that for anything that happens, it always was the case that it would happen. If it is happening, this implies that there was indeed a "prior truth" specifying that it was going to. The fatalist concludes that we are never able to do otherwise than what we in fact do.2 At the most general level, responses to the logical fatalist divide according to whether one rejects the fatalist's argument for the incompatibility of "prior truths" and free will, or instead the argument that there are (or were) such truths in the first place. Broadly, denials of the argument for "prior truths" are most commonly associated with the thesis of the "open future", which we shall define as the thesis that future contingent propositions – roughly, propositions saying of undetermined events that they will happen – systematically fail to be true. (We discuss these positions in more detail in Section 3.) Our focus in the remainder of this section instead concerns by far the most popular way of responding to the fatalist: denying her argument for incompatibilism. According to this response, the mere fact that it was true 1000 years ago that you would purchase this book does not, in itself, tell us that you could not have done otherwise than purchase it. At the outset, however, it is important to note that not all who endorse the fatalist's argument for incompatibilism need themselves be fatalists. For one might endorse the fatalist's argument for incompatibilism about prior truths and free will, but not the fatalist's argument (or any other) for prior truths. Indeed, some have taken the strength of the fatalist's 2 Not everyone is comfortable with talking about "prior truths" in this way; some deny that it makes sense to talk about what was true at a time in the first place. See, for instance, van Inwagen's essay in this volume – and see Merricks's essay for a reply. With Merricks, we believe that the basic argument at issue here can be reformulated without employing the notion of truth at a time. However, for simplicity, we will continue talking about "prior truths" in the indicated way. argument for incompatibilism to be strong reason to deny that there were the relevant prior truths – thereby preserving free will. 1.1. The Logical Fatalist's Argument for Incompatibilism You purchased this book. (Thanks!) Could you have refrained from doing so? If it was true 1000 years ago that would purchase it, apparently not. For consider the following argument: (1) You had no choice about: it was true 1000 years ago that you would purchase the book at t. (2) Necessarily, if it was true 1000 years ago that you would purchase the book at t, then you purchase the book at t. So, (3) You had no choice about: purchasing the book at t. This is the fatalist's argument for incompatibilism, which we shall simply call "the incompatibilist's argument". (More particularly, it is a token of an argument schema – a method of argumentation that we could apply to any candidate free human action – but we set this point aside.) The central idea here is simple. You have no choice about what necessarily follows from what you have no choice about. But since you had no choice about what was true 1000 years ago, before you were ever even born, you had no choice about what necessarily follows from what was true 1000 years ago, namely, that you purchase this book. Or we could put the point this way. By the time you were purchasing the book, it was too late to prevent its having been the case 1000 years ago that you would purchase it. In particular, it was 1000 years too late for that. But what necessarily follows from what is too late to prevent is similarly too late to prevent. Consequently, you had no power to prevent your purchase of this book. Premise (2) of the argument embodies the commonplace idea that it cannot both be the case that it was true 1000 years ago that you would purchase the book, and yet you don't in fact purchase it. So premise (2) seems indisputable.3 There are, then, two crucial points of interest concerning the argument: premise (1), and the "transfer principle" licensing the move from (1) and (2) to (3) – the principle that says that you have no choice about what necessarily follows from what you have no choice about. A denial of the transfer principle would maintain that the mere fact that q is entailed by a proposition one has no choice about does not in itself give us good reason to deny that one has no choice about q.4 And, indeed, some have called the transfer principle into question. However, the principle does seem plausible, and few are inclined to reject it.5 Our focus instead is on the most popular way of disputing the incompatibilist's argument: rejecting premise (1). Why believe premise (1)? Clearly, the thought here has something to do with the nature of the past and the nature of what we could plausibly have a 3 Understood in a certain way, Geachianism (discussed in Todd's essay in this volume) denies this thesis. Since Geachianism is such an extreme minority (even if interesting and neglected) view, we shall set this view aside. 4 Note: here one needs to be careful concerning the modal implications of a rejection of the transfer principle. It is tempting to say that someone who rejects this principle maintains that it is possible that though S does not have a choice about p, and though p obtains and entails q, S does have a choice about whether q obtains. Such a "rejection" would, of course, automatically commit one to the thesis that free will is possible. But this is too quick: one who rejects the transfer principle could think that free will is impossible, but for reasons independent of the validity of the transfer principle. A more cautious way of putting a rejection of the transfer principle is thus the following: the mere fact that S does not have a choice about p and p entails q does not by itself give us good reason to conclude that S has no choice about q. That is, arguments employing the transfer principle are (to the extent that they do so) bad arguments, even if the conclusions of those arguments are true, and, indeed, even if those arguments are sound (in the sense that it is impossible that the premises of the arguments be true while the conclusions are false). 5 For discussion of the transfer principle, see the essays from Perry, Mackie, and Zagzebski in this volume. See also Kapitan 1996. choice about. That is, the incompatibilist recommends that we accept premise (1) on the basis that it is an instance of a more general thesis concerning our lack of power over the past; this is the thesis of the fixity of the past. You could have no choice about what was fashionable (or wasn't) 1000 years ago. You could have no choice about who was king (or not) 1000 years ago. (Or so it seems.) So why think you could have a choice about what was true 1000 years ago? If something was true 1000 years ago, how could one now prevent its having been true 1000 years ago? Isn't it simply too late to prevent its having been true? More generally, isn't it simply too late to prevent anything's having been...anything? We prevent things from becoming things – people from becoming new business partners, say, or propositions from becoming true. But we don't prevent people from having been business partners, or proposition's having been true. It is often alleged that the incompatibilist's argument is simply a non-starter or just obviously defective.6 We think this is a mistake. There is something puzzling about a denial of the transfer principle. And there is also something puzzling about a denial of premise (1). Rejections of premise (1) therefore consist in ways of making (or trying to make) what can seem so puzzling about a rejection of (1) less puzzling. There are, again, various ways of denying premise (1). What is common to all such ways is that they each employ, in their own particular way, the notion of dependence. Those who deny premise (1) will (in general) emphasize the following sort of point: what was true 1000 years ago concerning what you do at t depends on what you do at t. Since what was true 1000 years ago concerning what you do at t depends on what you do at t, this points to the possibility that you, even now, have a choice about what was true 1000 years ago. Look at it this way. Suppose that, 6 No doubt some fatalistic arguments are obviously defective. It is common, for instance, for certain fatalistic arguments to be dismissed on grounds that they employ a modal fallacy, e.g. that they confuse the "necessity of the consequent" and the "necessity of the consequence". But no such confusion is present in the argument considered here. Merricks has a short discussion of some obviously defective such arguments on pg. XX. See also van Inwagen on pg. XX. prior to considering the fatalist's argument, it seems that there is no problem in saying that what you do at t is fully up to you. That is, no one is coercing you, you aren't under some strange spell or hypnosis, no one has implanted a chip in your brain that controls what you do, and so on. Thus, it seems unproblematic, so far, to assume that what you do at t is up to you. Shouldn't we go on to say, then, that anything that depends on what you do at t is similarly up to you? If it initially seems "OK" to say that what you do is up to you, then just by "adding in" something that depends on what you do, we shouldn't deny that what you do is up to you. Rather, it should similarly seem "OK" to say that you have a choice about whatever it is that depends on what you do. This, we think, is the core strategy employed by those who seek to deny premise (1). However, whereas this sort of strategy is, we believe, implicit in a great many discussions of the fatalist's argument, the precise sort of dependence at issue – and the role it is meant to play – has not always been given the detailed attention it would seem to deserve. Recently, however, the notion of "dependence" has begun to receive greater attention, both within the debates concerning fatalistic arguments and in metaphysics more generally. What does it mean to say that what was true 1000 years ago concerning what happens today depends on what happens today? Depends in what sense? What is the nature of this sort of dependence? What sort of picture of time does it presuppose? What does it presuppose concerning the relationship between truth and "the world"? These sorts of questions have begun to be more explicitly treated within the literature on fatalistic arguments.7 Here we aim to continue this development by putting the notion of dependence front and center (in the place it arguably deserves). We suggest (and now aim to develop the idea) that different ways of denying premise (1) involve differences regarding dependence. Again, all denials of premise (1) will maintain (as a 7 In addition to the articles in this book, see, for example, McCall 2011 and Westphal 2011. For a reply to these papers, see Fischer and Tognazzini 2014. first approximation) that the relevant truths in the past in some sense depend on "what you do". (The rationale for the scare quotes will become evident in what follows.) But, as we will see, such truths might depend on "what you do" in different ways – some being stronger than others. For instance, there is counterfactual dependence, the dependence at issue in entailment, and more besides. The question of what sort of dependence is the relevant sort of dependence has, as we will see, important ramifications for the fatalist's argument. Call the relevant sort of dependence "dependence with a capital 'd'": Dependence. More particularly, let us say that Dependence is such that those things that do not Depend on what you do are outside the range of things you might have a choice about. And it is such that those things that do Depend on what you do are inside that range – anyway, so long as nothing else is blocking your free will. That is, Dependence is such that if something Depends on what you do, we have no reason to deny that you have a choice about that thing, again, so long as no other threats to your free will are yet on the table. The point, then, is that if one can establish that the relevant prior truths Depend on what one does, one will have defused the fatalist's argument. We could also specify the nature of Dependence in the following way. Suppose we ask what must be held fixed when evaluating what an agent can do at a given time t. Intuitively, anything that needn't be held fixed when evaluating what you can do at t is something that we have no reason to deny that you have a choice about at t (and vice versa).8 The incompatibilist's 8 Note: we cannot say that anything that needn't be held fixed when evaluating what you can do at t (that is, that Depends on what you do at t) is something you do have a choice about at t. Perhaps the fact that it was true 1000 years ago that you would purchase this book at t needn't be held fixed when evaluating what you were able to have done at t. But this fact, in itself, certainly doesn't tell us that you did have a choice about this truth 1000 years ago – for perhaps your purchase was the result of clandestine CIA manipulation, or perhaps it was otherwise causally determined by factors beyond your control. In this case, though the truth 1000 years ago Depends on what you do at t, you (plausibly) still do not have a choice about that truth at t. The point remains, however: since the prior truth Depends on what you do at t, in itself it tells us nothing concerning what you were able to have done at t. contention can thus be put as follows: insofar as what was true in the distant past is now unpreventable and over-and-done-with, when evaluating what Jones can do at t, we must hold fixed what was true in the distant past relative to t (even regarding what Jones himself would do at t). Those who reject the relevant instance of premise (1), on the other hand, say the following: when evaluating what Jones can do at t, we needn't hold fixed prior truths about what Jones will do at t. Rather, we can let those truths vary. More specifically, those who reject premise (1) maintain that we can let those truths vary because those truths depend on what Jones does at t. Dependence, then, is such that, when evaluating what a person can do at t, we must hold fixed everything that does not Depend on what that person does at t, and nothing that does. We proceed as follows. We identify five different (progressively stronger) accounts of Dependence. The accounts are progressively "stronger" in this sense: that the sort of dependence at issue in a prior account holds does not entail that the sort of dependence at issue in any later account also holds, whereas if the given sort of dependence in a later account holds, this entails that the sort of dependence at issue in any earlier account will also hold. (There will, however, be doubts concerning whether the dependence at issue in the fifth account indeed entails the sort at issue in the fourth.) As we will see, the first two accounts are relatively "weak" – but their failures are nevertheless instructive. We then consider three further accounts: the account suggested by Trenton Merricks (in this volume), (our development of) Ockhamism, and the account suggested by Finch and Rea (in this volume). And we suggest (though certainly do not fully defend) the following thesis: the sort of dependence identified by Merricks is too weak, whereas the sort required by Finch and Rea is too strong. (That is, Finch and Rea [arguably] require too much, whereas Merricks [arguably] does not require enough.) The sort required by Ockhamism, however, is just right – anyway, if premise (1) is to be rejected in the first place. Counterfactual Dependence Suppose Jones hadn't sat at t. Well, then it never would have been true 1000 years ago that he would sit at t. In that sense, then, what was true 1000 years ago depends on what he does – namely, it counterfactually depends on what he does in just the indicated way. Accordingly, one might say: if X counterfactually depends on what you do at t, then X, in itself, is no threat to your ability to do otherwise than what you do at t, and needn't be held fixed when evaluating what you can do at t. Is counterfactual dependence the right sort of dependence? Arguably it isn't. Circumstances may be such that, had Jones stood at t, he wouldn't have been locked up in chains (as he was) just prior to t. But this would hardly show that Jones had a choice about whether he was locked up in chains. The mere fact that, had Jones stood, he wouldn't have been locked up does not thereby tell us that his having been locked up was no threat to his ability to have stood. In other words, suppose I suggest that Jones had no choice about whether to sit or to stand, since he was in chains, and these chains prevented him from standing. I will hardly be moved by the observation that had Jones in fact stood, those chains never would have been there in the first place. Intuitively, when evaluating what Jones could have done at t, we do need to hold fixed that Jones was in chains just prior to t – even if he wouldn't have been had he done otherwise. So counterfactual dependence is (plausibly) too weak. Entailment Necessarily, it was true that Jones would sit at t only if Jones sits at t. So, not only is it the case that, had Jones not sat, it would not have been true that he would sit, it is necessarily the case that, had he not sat, it never would have been true that he would sit. In the "chains" case, perhaps it is true that had Jones not sat, he would as a matter of fact never been in chains, but it is not necessary that had he not sat, he never would have been in chains. It is metaphysically possible that, though he was in chains, Jones nevertheless did not sit, insofar as it is metaphysically possible (say) that Jones should have suddenly acquired superhuman powers, or that a miracle occur, or the like. So though Jones's standing up at t would imply (in the circumstances) that he was never in chains, Jones's standing at t does not entail that he was never in chains. But Jones's standing at t does entail that it was never true that he would sit at t. So the suggestion is this: when evaluating what Jones could have done at t, we needn't hold fixed anything that entailed that Jones would in fact sit at t. For anything that entails that Jones shall sit at t depends on his sitting at t, and anything that so depends on what Jones does at t is, in itself, no threat to Jones's ability to do otherwise than sit at t. Is this suggestion plausible? We think it is deeply problematic. Consider, first, the doctrine of causal determinism. On causal determinism, the (temporally intrinsic; we return to this crucial notion shortly) state of the world in the distant past, together with the laws of nature, entailed that Jones sits at t. More generally, for anything anyone ever does, the past and the laws entail that one does those things. The suggestion here, then, would immediately imply that causal determinism is no threat to free will. For insofar as the past and the laws entail what you do, they therefore depend on what you do (on the current account), and accordingly needn't be held fixed when evaluating what you can do. However, it is at least very plausible that, when evaluating what you can do at t, we do need to hold fixed the past and the laws relative to t. (Classical compatibilists about free will and determinism, however, will disagree.9) Insofar as the current suggestion would imply that causal determinism is no threat to free will, we think many will find this suggestion problematic. Or consider a case involving divine decrees. Suppose God decrees that Jones shall sit at t. Necessarily, God's decrees always come to pass. So God's decree entails that Jones shall sit at t. Intuitively, a divine decree that one shall do a given thing certainly calls into question one's ability to refrain from doing that thing. But, on this suggestion, it does not. For insofar as the decree entails what you do, it depends on what you do, and accordingly needn't be held fixed when 9 For more on this issue, see John Perry's essay in this volume. See also Mackie's essay, pg. XX. evaluating what you can do. But this suggestion seems implausible. When evaluating what Jones is free to do at t, arguably we should take into account (and hold fixed) any divine decrees concerning what Jones does at t. So, again, mere entailment would not seem to be the right sort of dependence.10 Indeed, that the past and the laws and the divine decrees (and the prior truths) entail what you do seems to be the problem – so how could the mere recognition of this fact be the solution?11 The Simple Because (Trenton Merricks) So both counterfactual dependence and entailment seem too weak, insofar as both are susceptible to counterexamples involving causal determinism and divine decrees. And upon reflection the problem with these accounts seems clear: they do not imply anything about the order of explanation. From the mere fact that X entails Y, for instance, we cannot conclude that X obtains because Y does. Indeed, as the decrees case brings out, X might entail Y, and Y obtain because X does. That is, intuitively, it seems clear that, if God decreed that Jones shall sit, Jones sat because of God's decree, and not the other way around. Further, on determinism, it seems clear that you do what you because the past and the laws were the given way – and it is not the case that the past and the laws were that way because of what you do. The lesson, then, would appear to be this: we don't need simple dependence, but explanatory dependence of some kind. We need the proper order of explanation.12 10 There is a development of this point in relation to the Ockhamist reply to the theological fatalist in Widerker's essay in this volume. See pgs. XX. See also Todd 2013a. 11 David Hunt make a similar point in assessing the Ockhamist reply to the theological fatalist (and the "entailment" criterion of soft-facthood) in his essay in this volume. See pgs. XX. 12 A similar point has been widely recognized within the literature on ontological dependence. Suppose we consider what it is for one object to exist in virtue of another object's existence, and thereby depend for its existence on that Enter Trenton Merricks. In his paper, "Truth and Freedom," Merricks emphasizes the following point: truth depends on the world, and does so in the following ("trivial") sort of way: It is true that grass is green because grass is green. It is true that there are no hobbits because there are no hobbits. Now we apply this sort of dependence to "prior truths" about what we will do. Suppose it is true that Jones will sit. Then, Merricks notes, we can say the following: It is true that Jones will sit because Jones will sit. object. Following Kit Fine's 1994 paper, "Essence and Modality," it has been widely accepted that this relationship cannot be captured in purely modal terms (in terms of necessity and possibility) – for example, by saying that one object could exist without the other, but not the other way around. For consider the example (provided by Fine) of sets and their members. Intuitively, singleton Socrates (the set consisting solely of Socrates) depends for its existence on Socrates, and not the other way around. However, Socrates could not exist without singleton Socrates, since, necessarily, whenever anything exists, so does the singleton set of that thing. The general upshot of this sort of example seems to be that the relationship in question – what it is for one thing to exist in virtue of another – cannot be captured modally. A similar sort of point (or perhaps the recognition of this point) seems to be emerging in the literature on fatalistic arguments. (Todd 2013a explicitly draws comparisons between the literature on ontological dependence and the literature on fatalism and free will.) That is, it seems clear that the relevant relationship must be sensitive to the proper order of explanation – and therefore cannot be purely modal in character (as is the notion of entailment). However, just as there are substantive disputes in general metaphysics concerning how this (admittedly not purely modal) relationship should be further characterized, so there are substantive disputes (as we shall see) concerning how the sort of dependence relevant to responding to the fatalist should be characterized. These issues are thus deeply continuous with a recent "trend" in contemporary metaphysics that focuses on the related notions of truthmaking, grounding, fundamentality, and dependence. The literature on these topics is enormous; see Lowe 1998 (ch. 6) Armstrong 2004, and Schaffer 2008 for a (small) start. And, looking backwards, we can say that it was true that Jones would sit because Jones would sit. Call the sort of dependence at issue in these examples "M-dependence". Is M-dependence Dependence? The (rough) suggestion is this. When evaluating whether S could have refrained from doing A at t, we do not need to hold fixed anything that was the way it was (or existed, or obtained, or...) because S would do A at t. Everything else, however, must be held fixed.13 We believe that M-dependence is our first real contender for being Dependence. But there is, we think, substantial reason to worry that it is not. In particular, one might worry about the claim that we do not need to hold fixed anything that M-depends on what you do at t, when evaluating what you can do at t. Perhaps something may M-depend on what you do in this sense, but still must be held fixed. Accordingly, one might worry that M-dependence (like counterfactual dependence and entailment) is still too weak (is insufficient). Consider, first, a case involving divine beliefs. Suppose God believes that Jones will sit at t. On standard assumptions (viz., that God cannot be mistaken), this entails that Jones will sit at t. But suppose we add: God believes that Jones will sit at t because Jones will sit at t. Does this imply that God's prior belief tells us nothing about Jones' ability to refrain from sitting at t, and that we have no reason to deny that Jones has a choice about whether God held that prior belief? It is hard to say. For it is substantially mysterious how Jones now could have any choice at all about whether God (or anyone else) had or lacked a certain belief in the past.14 As Linda Zagzebski notes in this context, there is no use crying over spilled milk. And past beliefs seem as much like spilled milk as anything could be.15 So it is certainly not immediately evident that M-dependence gives us the right result in this case. 13 This is our reconstruction of Merricks's view, or our statement of a "Merricks-inspired" view – but Merricks himself does not put his points precisely in these terms. 14 It is also hard to say for the following reason: it isn't clear what it is for God to believe that p "because p", as in Merricks's constructions. For more on this issue, see Todd and Fischer 2013. 15 Zagzebski 1991: 84. It would, however, be contentious to suggest the case of God's beliefs as a straightforward counterexample to the sufficiency of M-dependence. For, as readers of Merricks's paper will discover, Merricks argues that this precise fact – that God believes that Jones will sit at t because Jones will sit at t – serves to reconcile divine foreknowledge with human freedom. So consider instead someone who believes in divine prepunishment. (Typically, of course, punishment for a crime follows the crime. In a case of prepunishment, however, one is punished for committing a crime before one commits the crime.) Suppose this person maintains the following: in general, God prepunishes someone for committing a given crime because he or she will, in fact, commit it, and not the other way around. Intuitively, this mirrors precisely what we have just been saying about the prior truths and God's beliefs. Now, the question is this. Is there still a good argument that such divine prepunishment would be inconsistent with the freedom of those prepunished? Insofar as one thinks that there still is available such an argument, one should think that M-dependence is insufficient to lincense a rejection of premise (1). We find it at least very plausible that we should be able cogently to argue that divine prepunishment would be inconsistent with the freedom of those pre-punished. If M-dependence is Dependence, however, then no such argument will be available, for the proponent of divine prepunishment can maintain that God's prepunishments M-depend "on what we do," and therefore needn't be held fixed when evaluating what we can do. However, when evaluating whether Jones can refrain from sitting at t, arguably we should hold fixed that God prepunished him for doing so, insofar as this fact is now totally in the past and beyond anyone's subsequent control. However, if we do hold God's prepunishment fixed, then Jones's "alternatives" will be reduced to one, since there is only one "alternative" regarding what Jones does at t that is consistent with God's having prepunished him for sitting at t.16 So, again, it is not clear that M-Dependence is in fact Dependence.17 Determination and the Intrinsic/Extrinsic (Hard/Soft Fact) Distinction (Ockhamism) Here, then, we come to "Ockhamism" – or at any rate, our construal of Ockhamism. We should begin by noting that the term "Ockhamism" has been used in various different ways in various different contexts to refer to sometimes subtly different theses and positions. Of course, what matters most is that, however we use our terms, we are clear about how we are using them. And we aim to be clear about how we shall use the term "Ockhamism". We intend our usage to be both descriptive and prescriptive. On the one hand, we believe that our usage is most faithful (insofar as any such usage can be) to the tradition of usage of this term in the literature regarding fatalism in the last 50 years. However, given recent developments, we further intend to recommend this usage – that is, we maintain that, in order to forestall confusion, the term should be used in this way (to refer to the position we now aim to describe).18 16 For an extensive development of the argument that divine prepunishment would be incompatible with the freedom of those prepunished, see Todd 2013b; see also Todd and Fischer 2013. In a word, the problem can be put as follows. Suppose that we (the authors) believe that you will do something wrong tomorrow, and prepunish you for doing it. It would seem that your only hope for innocence is that you can prove us wrong for having prepunished you for a crime you never in fact commit. But when God is the prepunisher, this possibility evaporates – and with it your freedom. 17 For more, see Todd and Fischer 2013. 18 "Who are you to tell us how to define our terms?" This a good question that we propose to ignore. Note: we ourselves have not always followed our own advice. In our reply to Trenton Merricks in this volume, we suggest that Merricks could take up the mantle of Ockhamism, and maintain that what we call "M-dependence" is the sort of dependence at issue in soft-facthood (which is the core notion employed by the Ockhamist). Subsequent reflection has led us to think instead that the particular sort of dependence we develop here (the sort of Suppose that, instead of putting the problem in terms of true propositions about what someone will do in the future, we put it in terms of true predictions about what someone will do in the future. Suppose Jones just sat down a few minutes ago, at t. Now, we're asked: could Jones have refrained from sitting? Of course, that depends. But suppose someone points out: Smith predicted yesterday that Jones would sit today at t. Accordingly, Jones did precisely what Smith predicted he would do. Thus, not only did Smith predict what Jones would do, Smith truly predicted what Jones would do. However, that Smith had already truly predicted what Jones would do is a fact about the past (relative to Jones's sitting at t) – and thus a fact over which Jones lacked subsequent control. Accordingly, it must be held fixed when evaluating what Jones was able to do at t. Holding fixed that Smith had already truly predicted that Jones would sit at t, Jones could not have refrained from sitting at t. Now, the Ockhamist says the following. Of course, when evaluating what Jones could have done at t, we must hold fixed the fact that Smith had already predicted that he would sit at t. That much seems "over and done with" and beyond Jones's subsequent control. But we need not hold fixed the fact that Smith had truly predicted that Jones would sit at t. Indeed, absent any further reasons to doubt Jones's freedom, we can say that Jones, at t, had a choice about whether Smith's prediction was right or was wrong. That is, whether Smith had truly predicted that he would sit at t was up to Jones at t. The Ockhamist's account of these facts is as follows. That Smith had already predicted that Jones would sit at t was part of the past (relative to t) intrinsically considered, whereas that Smith had truly predicted that Jones would sit at t was only "part of the past" considered extrinsically. More particularly, the Ockhamist's contention is this. When evaluating what an determination at issue in the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction) is essential to Ockhamism, and that Merricks's approach should be distinguished from Ockhamism precisely because it does not employ this sort of dependence, but instead the weaker "M-dependence". agent can do at t, we must hold fixed everything about the past relative to t, intrinsically considered. However, we do not need to hold fixed "everything about the past", considered extrinsically. Or we could put the point this way. If an agent's performing a certain action at t would require an intrinsic change in the past relative to t – that is, would require the past to have been intrinsically different than how it actually was – then the agent cannot perform that action at t. However, that an agent's performing an action at t would require an extrinsic change in the past relative to t tells us nothing, in itself, concerning whether the agent can refrain from performing that action at t. In this case, however, Jones's doing otherwise than sitting at t despite Smith's true prediction that he would sit at t would not require an intrinsic change in the past, but only an extrinsic ("mere Cambridge") change – it would only require that Smith's prediction should have lacked a certain extrinsic property it actually did have, viz. the property of being a correct prediction.19 For whether a current prediction about what you will do counts as correct is at least in part determined by whether you will do that thing. Accordingly, we have not yet encountered any clear obstacle to saying that Smith could have refrained from sitting at t, despite Smith's true prediction that he would. The Ockhamist thus makes a distinction between two sorts of facts about the past: facts that report how the past was intrinsically at a given time, and facts that report (at least in part) how the past was extrinsically at a given time. In the literature, this distinction is called the distinction between "hard facts" about the past (or at times) and "soft facts" about the past (or at times).20 19 Note: it is crucial to see that the Ockhamist does not contend that we can change – even Cambridge-change – the past. Rather, the Ockhamist (who thinks we have free will) contends that we can act in ways that would require such changes. 20 We don't mean to suggest that everyone who has used the "hard/soft fact" terminology has done so in this precise way. The distinction has been "glossed" in many ways in the literature, including as the distinction between those facts that are "solely about" a given time and those "at least in part about the future" relative to that time the distinction between those facts that are "over and done with" as of a given time, and those that are not the distinction between those facts at a time that do not depend on or hold in virtue of the future relative to that time, and those that do (without paying explicit attention to the kind or manner of the dependence here invoked) the distinction between those facts relevant to determining which possible worlds "share the same past as" another given possible world (the hard facts being relevant, and the soft facts being irrelevant) ostensively, as the distinction that correctly explains "the difference" between such facts as (1) – (3) and (1*) – (3*), noted below All of these usages are, we think, at least somewhat "legitimate", insofar as it is no longer clear (if it ever was) who "owns" the soft/hard terminology, and all pick up on results it is meant to capture. (The terminology was first introduced by Nelson Pike in Pike's 1966 reply to Saunders.) Still, we maintain that the best way to use the distinction, if one is going to use the terminology at all, is simply to identify it with the temporally intrinsic/extrinsic distinction. This "gloss" would then leave open various further ways of analysing the distinction. The main constraint we would wish to insist on is only that the distinction, in itself, should not be stated in a way as to analytically entail any results about agency or free will. That is, it is (unfortunately) very common for writers employing this distinction to mistakenly claim that "soft facts" are those facts about the past that someone has or may have a choice about, whereas "hard facts" are those facts about the past that no one has or could have a choice about. This is not a legitimate usage of or "gloss on" the hard/soft distinction. The distinction itself is neutral on this score – indeed, the distinction was drawn (at least in part) in order to help us resolve such questions (though it is need for other purposes as well, such as defining the doctrine of causal determinism) so cannot be defined in terms of them. (For a similar point, see Zagzebski 1991: 67.) In particular, there will be, on any view, any number of soft facts about the past that no one has a choice about – and it is not analytic that no one has a choice about the hard facts about the past. Some may – and some have – maintained that even some hard facts about the past needn't be held fixed when evaluating what agents can do at later times. (See Fischer 1994.) Indeed, Trenton Merricks's view, Given the variety of frameworks one might have about times, facts, and propositions (and the like), there never emerged any "canonical" way of expressing the hard/soft fact distinction. But consider some examples: (1) John F. Kennedy was being shot in Dallas in 1963. (2) Smith predicted yesterday at t1 that Jones would sit tomorrow at t3. (3) Smith believed yesterday at t1 that Jones would sit tomorrow at t3. Intuitively, (1) – (3) report how the past was intrinsically at the relevant times. They thus are (or report) "hard facts" about the past. Consider, however, the following: (1*) John F. Kennedy was being shot in Dallas in 1963, 50 years prior to our writing this essay in 2013. (2*) Smith correctly predicted yesterday at t1 that Jones would sit tomorrow at t3. (3*) Smith truly believed yesterday at t1 that Jones would sit tomorrow at t3. Intuitively, (1*) – (3*) do not simply report how the past was intrinsically at the relevant times, but also how it was extrinsically. They thus are (or report) "soft facts" about the past. For instance, whether an event is taking place 50 years prior to when another event will take place is not an intrinsic feature of that event, but an extrinsic feature – viz., a feature the first event has in virtue of the fact that another event will take place 50 years later. And whether a prediction or a belief counts as correct or true is not an intrinsic feature of that prediction or belief, but an extrinsic feature. insofar as Merricks admits (Merrick 2011) that God's beliefs are hard facts at times, is precisely such a view. (For more on this issue, see our reply to Trenton Merricks in this volume.) Thus, the sort of dependence the Ockhamist appeals to – the sort they say is Dependence – is the sort at issue in the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction. It is the sort at issue in cases like these (which all come out on the "extrinsic" side of the distinction): whether one counts as being an uncle is (at least in part) determined by whether one's sibling has a child whether one's punishment counts as just is (at least in part) determined by whether one commits the given crime whether one's belief counts as knowledge is (at least in part) determined by whether that belief is true whether that mark on Jones's skin counts as a mosquito bite is (at least in part) determined by whether it was produced by a mosquito And now we apply this sort of "determination" to the cases at issue21: whether a prediction about what you will do counts as true is (at least in part) determined by whether you will do that thing whether a proposition about what you do counts as true is (at least in part) determined by whether you will do that thing 21 We are open to the suggestion that the sort of determination at issue in these examples can be found in cases that do not involve the intrinsic/extrinsic property distinction. That is, though it seems that all cases involving the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction will exhibit this sort of "determination", perhaps not all cases of this sort of "determination" are also cases involving the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction. In any case, it is this sort of "determination" that, on our view, the Ockhamist says is Dependence. Thus, according to the Ockhamist, the fact that someone had already truly predicted what Jones would do at t (or that it was already true that he would perform a certain action at t) needn't be held fixed when evaluating what Jones was able to have done at t. The logical fatalist's argument is thereby defused. Note: it is crucial to our understanding of "Ockhamism" that Ockhamism is not committed to any particular thesis about which further facts about the past (beyond the sort of facts just mentioned) are indeed "soft". That is, as we are conceiving it, Ockhamism is itself neutral as concerns which further facts about the past are "intrinsic" or "extrinsic" (in the relevant way). It is thus an additional question to which further cases the Ockhamist strategy applies. As we discuss in the next section (on "theological fatalism"), some have sought to apply the Ockhamist strategy even to God's past beliefs about the future; that is, some have maintained that the Ockhamist strategy developed above will apply in this case as well, since, roughly, God's past beliefs (on the appropriate construal of God's past beliefs) are soft facts about the past. (Indeed, for many readers, "Ockhamism" may be a term that refers primarily to a way of attempting to reconcile divine foreknowledge and human freedom by means of the "hard/soft" distinction.) However, it is crucial to see that the core Ockhamist strategy itself is neutral on this score. One might endorse this core strategy, but not the application of this strategy to the argument of the theological fatalist, for one might contend that it is implausible that God's past beliefs are soft facts about the past. Ockhamism itself is just fine, one may think – but not the application of Ockhamism to this further case. Thus, we can note the following. The Ockhamist strategy, in itself, is not automatically susceptible to worries arising from divine beliefs and divine prepunishments. (Recall that a central worry for Merricks's approach is that it might be thought precipitously to reconcile divine foreknowledge and divine prepunishment with human freedom. That is, the worry for Merricks's approach was that M-dependence is, in this sense, too weak.) Someone employing the Ockhamist strategy could say the following. If God believes that Jones will sit at t, then Jones's refraining from sitting at t would not merely require an extrinsic change in the past, but an intrinsic change – it would require that God should never have even believed that Jones would sit at t. For whether someone – even God – counts as believing that one will perform a given action is not even in part determined by whether one will perform that action. (This claim, however, will be denied by those who seek to apply the Ockhamist strategy [as we have developed it] to God's past beliefs.) Similarly, if God (per impossible, perhaps) has prepunished Jones for sitting at t, then Jones's refraining from sitting would require an intrinsic change in the past – it would require that Jones should never have been punished by God at all. For whether one counts as being punished (unlike justly punished) for committing a given crime is not even in part determined by whether one will ever in fact commit that crime. In other words, someone employing the Ockhamist strategy could maintain that the relevant facts (that God had believed that Jones would sit at t or had prepunished Jones for sitting at t) are hard facts about the past relative to t. Accordingly, they must be held fixed when evaluating what he can do at t. Is Ockhamism plausible? We believe it is (so construed). We believe that it captures the intuitive thought that our freedom – if we have freedom at all – is the freedom to extend the actual past one way or another. That is, in the words of Carl Ginet, our freedom is the freedom to add to the given past.22 But not simply anything gets to go into a statement of the "given past" relevant to this thesis. Rather, what seems intuitively very plausible is that our freedom is the freedom to add to what has really happened in the basic sense – to add to the real history of the world, intrinsically considered. We will, however, consider a challenge to the sufficiency of the Ockhamist's sort of dependence in the next section (that is, that the fact that this sort of dependence holds is sufficient to license a rejection of premise (1)). And, as we've seen, Merricks would of course wish to challenge its necessity (that the holding of this sort of dependence is necessary to license a rejection of premise (1)). Merricks will contend that this sort of 22 Ginet 1990: 102 – 103. dependence does not need to hold in order to license a rejection of premise (1), because Merricks will contend that even some things (in particular, God's past beliefs about what you will do) do not display this sort of dependence on what you do, but nevertheless, according to Merricks, needn't be held fixed when evaluating what you can do. Whether one here sides with Merricks or with the Ockhamist would seem to be a matter (at least in part) of where one stands on the cases of divine belief and divine prepunishment – but this is a matter we cannot here further aim to resolve. "Because of" (Finch and Rea) From the fact that it is true that Jones will sit because Jones will sit, it does not follow that it is true that Jones will sit because of Jones's sitting. And from the fact that whether the proposition that Jones will sit counts as true is determined by whether Jones will sit, it similarly does not follow that that proposition is now true (if it is) because of Jones's sitting. For we should distinguish between two things: the fact that Jones will sit, on the one hand, and Jones's sitting on the other. This is not an essay on fundamental ontology, and we will not sketch any sort of theory about the ontological distinctions between propositions, facts, states of affairs, and events. These are complicated questions. Still, there would seem to be ample room to treat "Jones's sitting" as an event – a concrete event. And from the fact that something now depends on the fact that a concrete event will come to exist, it does not follow that anything now depends on the existence of that concrete event. For to suppose that a concrete event will exist is not – many will maintain – thereby to suppose that any such event does exist. So here we come to the rationale for the scare quotes concerning the phase "what we do at t" (and the like). For such a phrase is ambiguous between two readings: "what we do at t" could refer to (something like) the fact that we will perform some action at t, or it could refer to the concrete event of our performing that action at t. And these are importantly different things. It is tempting to write – and we have as a matter of fact written – that on Merricks's approach, the relevant prior truths (and God's beliefs/prepunishments) "M-depend on what we do". It is also tempting to write that, on Merricks's approach, the truth that Jones will sit at t "M-depends on Jones's sitting at t". But here we must be careful – for arguably these constructions are misleading. Suppose we grant to Merricks the claim that it is true that Jones will sit at t because Jones will sit at t. Do we thereby grant that this truth in any sense depends on "Jones's sitting at t", where Jones's sitting at t is construed as a concrete event? No. And some will contend that precisely this sort of dependence is the sort that is required. That is, some will contend that, if the relevant prior truths are to be no threat to Jones's free will, then Jones's very action – that concrete event – must in some sense be "explanatorily prior to" or otherwise "ground" those prior truths. Accordingly, M-dependence and the Ockhamist's "determination" are not the relevant sort of dependence. They are not Dependence. In their paper in this volume, Alicia Finch and Michael Rea suggest (in a somewhat different guise) precisely this sort of view, and thereby connect these issues with an important and related set of issues within the philosophy of time.23 More particularly, Finch and Rea maintain that whereas it is clear how eternalists can capture the right sort of dependence, it is far from clear how presentists or growing-block theorists might attempt to do so. We certainly cannot here engage in an extended discussion concerning presentism, growing-block theory, and eternalism. Roughly, however, presentists maintain that only present objects exist (nothing exists 23 They do so in the name of calling into question whether presentists can be Ockhamists – that is, whether presentists can employ the Ockhamist strategy of responding to the arguments of the logical and theological fatalists. They thus construe "Ockhamism" more broadly than we do in this essay. On their construal, any response to these arguments that employs the notion of "explanatory dependence" is a version of Ockhamism. As we have it here, the Ockhamist does not "own" the point about dependence – only a particular version thereof. In our favored framework, then, their point can be put as follows: the sort of dependence the Ockhamist appeals to is insufficient; a more robust sort is required. at a temporal distance from the present), growing-block theorists maintain that past and present (but no future) objects exists, and eternalists maintain that past, present, and future objects are all on an ontological spar.24 Now, Finch and Rea point out that, prospectively at least, eternalists can give a more robust account of the relevant sort of dependence than their presentist and growing-block counterparts. Eternalists are in a position to say, whereas presentists and growing-blocks theorists are not, that Jones's very action (construed concretely) was itself ontologically (though of course not temporally) prior to its being true that he would perform that action. Noneternalists, however, can tell no such story. Suppose it is true now, at t1, that Jones will sit at some future time t10. According to the presentist/growing block theorist, there simply is no such thing as the concrete event of "Jones's sitting at t10". But insofar as no such action exists at t1, if it is true at t1 that Jones will sit at t10, then this truth at t1 is not now "grounded in" or true "because of" the concrete (future) event of Jones's sitting at t10. We do not have any particular name for (or further way of characterizing) the sort of dependence Finch and Rea take to be Dependence. This is, as they admit, a difficult question about which we can remain neutral. Their main point, we take it, is that the dependence must hold between the right sorts of entities. We can thus interpret their suggestion to be the following. When evaluating what an agent can do at t, one need not hold fixed anything that held (or existed, or obtained...) because of that agent's concrete action at t. Anything else, however, must be held fixed. Accordingly, eternalists can reject the logical fatalist's argument. Presentists and growing-block theorists, however, cannot. We could also put the point this way. According to Finch and Rea, eternalism is necessary for the relevant sort of dependence to hold. Insofar as presentists and growing-block theorists can appeal to the sort of dependence at issue in (our developments of) M-dependence and Ockhamism, these sorts are therefore insufficient to license a rejection of premise (1). (Presentists can say that it is true that something will happen 24 For more, see Rea's essay in this volume, pgs. XX. because that thing will happen; presentists are also seemingly entitled to the distinction between what is intrinsic to a time and what is not.)25 We shall not here take issue with the sufficiency of Finch and Rea's sort of dependence (for licensing a rejection of premise (1)). The problem with this account, plausibly, is not that the relevant sort of dependence (like counterfactual dependence and entailment) is too weak. Rather, we wish to question its necessity (for licensing a rejection of premise (1)). The problem with the account, arguably, is that it requires too much – it requires that one's very action be "ontologically prior" to the relevant past truth, and thus the truth of eternalism. But is this really required? It is hard to know how to settle this question. But we suggest the following. It seems that the Ockhamist's story in itself is sufficient to make it intuitively plausible that the given past truths needn't be held fixed. That is, insofar as it is intuitively plausible that, say, Jones now might have a choice about whether Smith's prior prediction was (then) right or (then) wrong, this is plausible because whether it was then right or wrong was then determined by whether Jones will in fact sit – and whether Jones will in fact sit is, in turn, determined by Jones himself (or so we might suppose). No appeal is made in this account to Jones's very action (construed concretely). So, again, we suggest that, even on eternalism, what makes it the case that such prior truths needn't be held fixed is nothing uniquely licensed by eternalism itself. It is not, one might 25 Earlier we remarked that the five accounts are progressively stronger in the sense that if the sort of dependence at issue in a latter account holds, this entails that the sort at issue in any previous account will also hold. And we noted that there will doubts that the sort of dependence at issue in the 5th account – the one we are now considering – indeed entails the sort at issue in the 4th, namely, Ockhamism. And perhaps we can now see why this might be so. Certainly someone sympathetic to Finch and Rea's position might maintain that God's prior belief is somehow "grounded in" one's concrete future action, without also wishing to maintain that God's prior belief is somehow extrinsic or relationally determined (that is, that the fact that God holds this belief at this time is a soft fact at or about this time). Whether this strategy can succeed depends on whether we can make sense of the idea that a current belief is "grounded in" a concrete future action. suggest, the eternalist-qua-eternalist that can block the fatalist's argument, but the eternalist-quaOckhamist. Summary We hope the preceding discussion has brought out the subtlety, complexity, and difficulty of the issues here at stake. The most popular way of rejecting the fatalist's argument for incompatibilism is to reject the premise that we could have no choice about what was true in the distant past. Those who reject this premise reject it because, they think, what was true in the distant past regarding what we will do (in some sense or other) depends on our doing those very things. We have suggested that rejections of the fatalist's premise (1) should be individuated according to the nature of the dependence here invoked. And we have further argued that it is not immediately obvious precisely what sort of dependence is necessary to license a rejection of (1), nor what sort is sufficient to license that rejection. Counterfactual dependence and mere entailment, we think, are too weak. But once we move to Merricks's account, and other accounts that are explicitly sensitive to the "order of explanation," matters become substantially more difficult. Nevertheless, we have suggested that Merricks's sort of dependence is insufficient, whereas the sort required by Finch and Rea is not necessary. But certainly we have not here resolved this question, and part of the aim of this book is to put this issue at the front and center of the debate. Here ends our discussion of the logical fatalist's argument for the incompatibility of "prior truths" and free will. Before moving on, we wish to note that most think (for good reasons or not) that the fatalist's argument is a failure. But here we must be very careful in stating our conclusion. It is tempting to add: "That is, most think that prior truths about what you do are perfectly compatible with your ability to do otherwise." But this would be a dangerous addition, and indeed a gratuitous and unjustified leap from the failure of the fatalist's argument. From the fact that the logical fatalist does not succeed in showing that prior truths are incompatible with free will, it does not follow that they indeed are compatible with free will. For they might be incompatible for a different reason – a reason the logical fatalist's argument for incompatibilism fails to bring out. For instance, they might be incompatible with free will because prior truths require deterministic grounds – a position advocated, for instance, by Hartshorne's essay in this volume (and rejected by Rosenkranz's) – and determinism is incompatible with free will. (We discuss this position further in Section 3.) Or prior truths might be incompatible with free will because God necessarily exists and is essentially omniscient. On this view, p will be logically equivalent to God believes p. Thus, if there is a good argument that such prior divine beliefs would be incompatible with free will, one would have a good argument that prior truths in turn are incompatible with free will, for anything incompatible with p is incompatible with anything logically equivalent to p.26 Whether there is indeed a good such argument is the topic of the next section. 26 This point is crucial in seeing what is problematic with the following argument: Everyone agrees that the logical fatalist's argument is a failure: everyone agrees that prior truths about what you do are compatible with your ability to do otherwise than what you do. But anything compatible with p is compatible with anything logically equivalent to p. But, if God necessarily exists and is essentially omniscient, then a truth such as that you would purchase this book is logically equivalent to God's having believed that you would purchase it: God believes p is logically equivalent to p. So God's having believed that you would purchase the book is in turn compatible with your ability to do otherwise than purchase it. So divine foreknowledge is compatible with freedom. This is not a compelling argument. And it is not compelling at least in part due to the following: one cannot move from "the fatalist's argument is a failure" to "prior truths about what you do are compatible with your ability to do otherwise than what you do." Someone could easily – and with no shred of implausibility, we think – maintain the 2. "Theological Fatalism" Return to the logical fatalist's argument discussed above. You purchased this book. Could you have refrained from doing so? If it was true 1000 years ago that would purchase it, apparently not. After all: (1) You had no choice about: it was true 1000 years ago that you would purchase the book at t. (2) Necessarily, if it was true 1000 years ago that you would purchase the book at t, then you purchase the book at t. So, (3) You had no choice about: purchasing the book at t. following. The logical fatalist's argument is an unconvincing failure. However, prior truths about what you do are nevertheless inconsistent with your ability to do otherwise, since God necessarily exists and is necessarily omniscient, and the theological fatalist's argument (to be discussed shortly) is not a failure. That is, one might maintain that "adding in" a divine prior belief to the argument makes the argument importantly different – and importantly better – in virtue of introducing a genuinely hard, temporally intrinsic fact about the past that entails what you do. If one thinks that God necessarily exists and is essentially omniscient, one would then reason as follows. There is no "possible world" in which both (1) it is true that one will perform some action and (2) one can refrain from performing that action. For in any world in which it is true that one will perform an action, God believes that you will perform it. And since you cannot so act that God would have been mistaken, you cannot do otherwise than perform it. One might attempt to ridicule proponents of this position by saying that "They think that prior truths are inconsistent with free will! But who thinks that?" But what would be important to keep in mind is that the proponent of this view is not thereby saddled with defending the logical fatalist's argument. Prior truths are indeed inconsistent with freedom, but the reason for endorsing this inconsistency is indirect: it goes via the theological fatalist's argument and the necessary equivalence of p and God believes p. For more on these topics, see Warfield 1997 (the argument of which, if not identical to the one provided above, anyway inspired it), Hasker 1998, Brueckner 2000, Warfield 2000, Speaks 2011, and Hunt's essay in this volume, pg. XX. And recall: the most popular way of responding to this argument is to deny (or say that we have no reason to accept) the relevant instance of premise (1). Once we see, many suppose, that the given truth in the past depends on what you do (in the relevant way), we'll see that we have no reason to accept (without further argument) that you had no choice about that truth. Consider, now, a parallel argument, an argument that moves not from prior truths about what you do, but from prior divine beliefs about what you do. This is the argument of the theological fatalist. Accordingly, suppose that God's beliefs cannot be mistaken, and suppose that God believed 1000 years ago that you would purchase this book. Could you have refrained from doing so? Apparently not. After all: (1*) You had no choice about: God believed 1000 years ago that you would purchase the book at t. (2*) Necessarily, if God believed 1000 years ago that you would purchase the book at t, then you purchase the book at t. So, (3) You had no choice about: purchasing the book at t. Now, nearly everyone agrees that this argument (for the incompatibility of prior divine beliefs and free will) is importantly better than the parallel argument of the logical fatalist for the incompatibility of prior truths and free will. And this is because, on reflection, (1*) seems more plausible than (1). That is, it can seem clearer that there is nothing you could now do about someone's having had a belief in the past than it is that there is nothing you could now do about something's "having been true" in the past. That someone once had a certain belief seems to be a real feature of the past in some important way in which something's "having been true" in the past does not. Or we can look at it this way. Suppose someone now believes that you will perform some given action tomorrow. That this person has this belief would now seem to be part of the concrete circumstances in which you are operating. The question, then, is simply whether you can prove this person wrong for having had the relevant belief. When God is the believer, however, this possibility evaporates – and with it your freedom. For you cannot prove God wrong for having believed that you would perform an action you do not, in fact, perform. How might one seek to reply to such an argument? Recall the strategy for denying premise (1) in the logical fatalist's argument: maintain that the given truths depend on what we do. One might seek to employ the same strategy with respect to God's beliefs: God's beliefs depend on what we do, and therefore needn't be held fixed in evaluating what we can do. Other things being equal, then, we may have a choice about God's having had the given beliefs. Above we considered five different accounts of the relevant sort of dependence ("Dependence") as applied to prior truths about what we do, the latter three of which seemed particularly promising. Here we briefly sketch how these accounts may be applied to God's past beliefs. Note: we here take some liberties in considering what Merricks and Finch and Rea would say in these contexts – these are, in any case, positions inspired by their essays in this volume. M-dependence (Merricks) If God believes (say) that Jones will sit at t, God believes that Jones will sit at t because Jones will sit at t. Anything that depends on what Jones does in this sense needn't be held fixed when evaluating what Jones is able to do at t. Accordingly, God's prior belief that Jones would sit at t does not tell us that Jones cannot do otherwise than sit at t. True, Jones's refaining from sitting at t would require that the past have been intrinsically different from how it actually was, viz., it would require that God should have never held the relevant belief, and that would amount to an intrinsic difference in the past.27 However, so long as the thing that would have to be different 27 Merricks admits that God's beliefs are hard facts about the past (in this sense) in Merricks 2011. in the past depends (in the indicated way) on Jones's sitting at t, it is no problem that the past would have to different in that way, in order for Jones not to sit at t. Ockhamism (as applied to God's past beliefs) The trouble with Merricks's account is his admission that, if God believed that Jones would sit at t, Jones's refraining from sitting at t would in fact require an intrinsic difference in the past relative to t. Whereas Jones's refraining would require that God should never have held the relevant belief, this is not an intrinsic difference in the past, but rather merely an extrinsic difference. For on the best account of God's beliefs, and the distinction between what goes into a statement of the past, intrinsically considered, and what does not, that God held the relevant beliefs will not belong in such a statement. Rather, God's past beliefs are "soft" facts at or about past times. Accordingly, those past beliefs may depend on what we do in the sense relevant to soft-facthood, and needn't be held fixed when evaluating what we can do at later times. In a word, they do not belong in a statement of the "circumstances" in which one is now operating. The Ockhamist strategy as developed above will also apply to God's past beliefs.28 Finch and Rea The trouble with "Ockhamism" (as characterized in this Introductory essay) as applied to God's past beliefs is that it is implausible that, given God's past belief that he would sit at t, Jones's refraining from sitting would not require an intrinsic difference in the past relative to t. Of 28 See Widerker's and Hunt's essays in this volume for further discussion of this position. For interesting recent discussions of Ockhamism (as applied to God's past beliefs), see Pendergraft and Coates 2014 and Arnold forthcoming. course it would. God's beliefs are hard facts about the past in this sense. However, Merricks's basic insight is correct: when even a "hard fact" about the past depends in the relevant way on the future, and in particular on the future actions of agents, this fact about the past needn't be held fixed when evaluating what such agents are able to do at later times. The problem with Merricks's account, however, is simply that he has the wrong sort of dependence. In particular, Merricks's account says nothing concerning whether Jones's very action is explanatorily or ontologically prior to God's prior belief that he would perform that action. However, if Jones's very action is prior to God's belief in the indicated way, it needn't be held fixed when evaluating what Jones is able to do at t.29 We believe that each of these accounts faces significant problems. The central problem for Ockhamism (as applied to God's past beliefs), as noted, is that it is hard to see how Jones's refraining from sitting, given God's belief, would not require an intrinsic difference in the past. The central problem for the other accounts, however, is that they maintain that we can act in ways that would in fact require such differences. They thus must give up what seems like a compelling principle: that freedom is the freedom to add to the given past. This is the principle of the fixity of the past. Anything you can do at t must be consistent with the given past relative to t – the past, intrinsically considered. Why believe the fixity of the past, so construed? It is hard to say, or anyway to say more about what would justify the fixity of the past would take us far beyond the scope of this Introduction. Nevertheless, the principle does seem plausible. As we noted in section 1, it seems to capture part of common sense: the scenarios that represent 29 This is a big "if", one might say. We believe that it is substantially mysterious how God's present belief could be held "because of" or be "grounded in" some future event, even on eternalism. For presumably that (future) event does not cause God's prior belief: this would be to invoke widespread backwards causation. possibilities for us are scenarios that branch off from our actual past. Those and only those scenarios are the ones we may now have it within our power to actualize. At this stage, we wish to consider a somewhat conciliatory line of thought that might be pursued by those sympathetic to the thesis that divine foreknowledge is compatible with human free will. Initially, the fixity of the past does seem very plausible. We naturally arrive at the fixity of the past via consideration of ordinary contexts: if, say, someone already believes that you will commit a given crime tomorrow, the question whether you can avoid committing the crime is pretty clearly the question whether you can prove this person wrong. And now we consider the case of divine foreknowledge, or divine forebelief. Now, we (the authors) are seeming to suggest that we should simply keep applying the natural, common sense idea that the past is fixed, and so to arrive at the conclusion that, given God's belief, you cannot avoid performing the action God believes you will perform, since you can't prove God wrong. But now the complaint. Aren't we simply failing to give any credit to the thought that this is God we're talking about? Doesn't introducing God into the picture – a person with, we might grant, an entirely different mode of knowing than our own – count for something? Doesn't introducing God into the story here call into question the propriety of continuing to apply a principle arrived at via reflection on ordinary contexts in which no foreknowing God is presumed to be present? But introducing God into the picture introduces an extraordinary context – akin to introducing a crystal ball. And why then should the fixity of the past still apply? On reflection, then, yes: maintaining that divine foreknowledge and human free will are consistent requires a denial of the thesis of the fixity of the past. But this is acceptable, and further, just what we should expect, at least in certain cases, given the truth of theism: we should expect that, given theism, the structure of reality will sometimes not be as it seems to us to be. Why shouldn't the existence of a foreknowing God imply that the structure of time and agency are perhaps not what they might initially appear to be? We don't know what to say, precisely, to this line of thought. Indeed, the resolution of these questions appears to implicate an entire metaphysics. Instead, we should simply like to suggest that this is, in part, where the debate concerning divine foreknowledge might make progress. What justifies the fixity of the past? Or what is it in virtue of which the past is fixed, if it is? And what would justify rejecting it? Perhaps, until such questions are further resolved, we should simply be agnostics concerning the compatibility of foreknowledge and freedom. For now, however, we set these issues aside. If one were confident, however, that the past is fixed, and that divine foreknowledge is thus incompatible with free will, one might wish to seek a way to avoid the conclusion that, given God's existence, we are not, in fact, free. We now turn to one such strategy. 2.1. Open theism Just as there are two aspects to the logical fatalist's overall argument that no one is free, there are two aspects to the theological fatalist's argument that no one is free. The first is that, for anything we do, God always knew (and believed) that we would do that thing. And the second is that (as is shown by the argument above) God's having had such beliefs is incompatible with our having free will. One strategy of responding to the theological fatalist that has become more popular recently is to reject this first aspect of the theological fatalist's overall argument. On this view, it does not follow from the fact that you bought this book that God always knew that you would buy it.30 To reject the first aspect of the theological fatalist's argument is to endorse open 30 Strictly speaking, views that maintain that God is "outside time" also endorse this thesis, insofar as they deny that God (strictly speaking) "foreknows" anything at all. This view, is, of course, one of the historically most prominent ways of "dissolving" the problem of freedom and foreknowledge. For some contemporary developments of this sort of view, see Pike 1970, Leftow 1991, and Stump and Kretzmann 1981. We assume in this section that God is not "outside time". theism. There are, however, two importantly different ways of being an open theist. The first is to maintain that though it was true 1000 years ago (say) that you would purchase this book, this was simply a truth God did not then know or believe. We might call this view "limited foreknowledge open theism".31 On this sort of view, though some future contingent propositions are in fact true, these are not truths that God knows. The second is to maintain that there was no such truth 1000 years ago in the first place, given that you freely purchased this book; this view endorses the "open future" view to be discussed in the next section, according to which all future contingents fail to be true. And God, of course, fails to believe what isn't true. We might call this view "open future open theism".32 Perhaps the primary challenge for limited foreknowledge open theism is to explain why God fails to know (and believe) the relevant propositions, when they are, in fact, true. Perhaps the most natural thought for the limited foreknowledge open theist would be this: though truth itself concerning the future does not require deterministic grounds, infallible belief about the future nevertheless does. That is, on this sort of view, it needn't be the case that something now causally determines that a given event will occur in order for it to be true that that event will occur.33 However, in order for anyone – including God – now to infallibly believe that an event will occur, there would have to be something about now that grounds that belief – that is, there would have to be deterministic evidence now accessible to God that the event will occur. In the case of a future contingent, however, ex hypothesi there is no such evidence. So, we might imagine, even 31 For defences of this version of open theism, see Swinburne 1977, Hasker 1989, and van Inwagen 2008. 32 For defences of this version of open theism, see Prior 1962, Lucas 1989, Rhoda et. al. 2006, Rhoda 2007, Tuggy 2007, and Todd 2014. 33 Skipping ahead: the limited foreknowledge open theist thus endorses what is called "Ockhamism" in the next section (according to which there can be truths about the undetermined future), though not what was called "Ockhamism" in the previous section as applied to God's past beliefs: the limited foreknowledge open theist will typically contend that God's past beliefs are "hard facts" about the past. though it was true 1000 years ago that you would purchase this book, this was not something God then believed – and not because of any epistemic (or some other) defect in God, but instead precisely because of God's epistemic perfection. Not even God could "just see" that a future contingent proposition is true, if in fact it is.34 We set aside the question of whether this is a plausible picture of God's beliefs and future contingents. What about the difficulties attending open future open theism? The chief philosophical difficulties for the open future open theist are simply those facing open futurism more generally. Such problems are the topic of Section 3 below (on the problem of future contingents). 2.2. Hunt and Augustine's Way Out Before moving on to the problem of future contingents, we wish to consider a different sort of reply to the arguments of the logical and theological fatalist. One might simply concede that one or both of the relevant arguments show that we lack free will in the sense at issue – that is, that we lack the ability to do otherwise than what we actually do. One might contend, however, that free will (so construed) is not necessary for what we typically care about when we care about "free will". What matters is that we have the sort of control with respect to our behavior that is necessary for moral responsibility. (The connection between the ability to do otherwise and moral responsibility is one of the main reasons the issues of this book have taken on such historical importance.) But having the ability to do otherwise is not necessary for moral responsibility. Accordingly, one could be "free" in the sense we care about, but lack the sort of free will targeted by the fatalist's arguments. 34 Todd suggests this account on behalf of the limited foreknowledge open theist in Todd 2014. This is precisely the strategy pursued by David Hunt in his essay in this volume ("On Augustine's Way Out") – a strategy Hunt finds in the writings of Augustine on this topic.35 Needless to say, this sort of position has various attractive features, one of which is that it is not committed to finding fault with any of the fatalistic arguments we have considered. We wish, however, to mention at least one difficulty with Hunt's own development of this sort of position. It is crucial to Hunt's "Augustinian" solution to the problem that though God's prior beliefs imply that one's future actions are unavoidable, they do not do so because God's prior beliefs imply that one's future actions are causally determined. In the contemporary parlance of the "free will" debate, Hunt wishes to be a so-called "source incompatibilist". That is, Hunt wants to maintain that though the ability to do otherwise is not necessary for moral responsibility, nevertheless causal determinism is still incompatible with moral responsibility, because causal determinism is incompatible with one's being the proper "source" of one's behaviour. Thus, since Hunt wishes to maintain moral responsibility, Hunt cannot maintain that the ultimate reason divine foreknowledge implies that one lacks free will (the ability to do otherwise) is that it implies that one's actions are causally determined. For Hunt, divine foreknowledge in itself rules out one's free will, even though one's actions remain causally undetermined. Nothing at all causally determines you to do what you do – nevertheless, you lack the ability to do otherwise than what you actually do. Upon reflection, there can seem to be something puzzling about Hunt's position here – something that raises a crucial set of issue often ignored in discussions of fatalistic arguments. Hunt's position, again, is that, given God's foreknowledge, though nothing causally determines you to do what you do, you nevertheless lack the ability to do otherwise than what you do. But 35 Hunt thus follows in a tradition that has emerged in discussions of free will in the wake of Harry Frankfurt's famous 1969 attack on the "principle of alternate possibilities", according to which one is morally responsible for performing a certain action only if one could have done otherwise. For more on this important topic, and for a defense of Frankfurt's strategy, see Fischer 1994, Fischer and Ravizza 1998, and Fischer 2012. the question here is simple. How could God's foreknowledge, in itself, have any such effect? That is, how could God's foreknowledge, in itself, make you unable to do otherwise than what you actually do, if it neither causes what you do nor implies that something else causes what you do?36 On this latter score, one strategy for a theological fatalist would be to maintain that though God's foreknowledge shows (via the argument considered above) that you lack the ability to do otherwise, such foreknowledge is not itself what makes you unable to do otherwise. Rather, what makes you unable to do otherwise are the causal conditions that would have to be in place in order for God to have such infallible foreknowledge in the first place. 37 On this sort of picture, God's foreknowledge and one's own actions are both (though in different ways) effects of a common cause: it is the presence of the relevant causal factors that explain both God's foreknowledge of your actions and your actions themselves. That is, on this picture, though the fatalistic argument considered above provides good epistemic reason to conclude that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with free will, the metaphysical account of this incompatibility is that divine foreknowledge would ultimately have to be explained by deterministic causes. But this is not a position available to proponents of Hunt's Augustinian solution. Again, Hunt must maintain that God's foreknowledge, in itself, could make one's actions unavoidable, even if it doesn't (and nothing else does) causally determine those actions. But again we can ask: 36 This is a question Hunt explicitly considers concerning the freedom required to be morally responsible – but not considering the ability to do otherwise. That is, Hunt maintains (pg. XX) that it is mysterious how God's prior belief could "transform" an action that might otherwise be a perfect candidate for a free, morally responsible action into one that is not free (in that sense) at all. But Hunt seemingly does not find it mysterious how God's prior belief, in itself, could render one's future actions unavoidable (i.e. could make one lack the freedom to do otherwise). Our point here is that the question Hunt addresses on pg. XX (namely, how God's beliefs could have the relevant result) also arises for the sort of free will Hunt does think is ruled out by God's foreknowledge. 37 This is a possibility considered by Trenton Merricks (inspired by Jonathan Edwards) in this volume on page XX. For more on this topic, see Craig 1987, Anderson and Watson 2010, Byerly 2012, Byerly 2014, and Todd 2014. how could it have any such effect? If no causal factor makes one unable to do otherwise than what one does, precisely what sort of factor does accomplish this result? Are we to believe in some sort of "metaphysical force field" that makes one unable to do otherwise than what one does? But what could that be? We do not claim that this problem (as developed thus far) is decisive against Hunt's position. However, we do think these issues raise a crucial question for those sympathetic to fatalistic arguments. If prior truths or prior divine beliefs are incompatible with free will, how are they incompatible with free will? What, if anything, does the work in making us unfree, given such truths or such beliefs? What is the relationship between such truths or beliefs and our unfreedom? Do such truths and beliefs themselves make us unfree, or do they merely show that something else makes us unfree? If the latter, what is it that they show makes us unfree? And it is plausible that the given truths or beliefs have this sort of consequence? These are deep questions proponents of fatalistic arguments seemingly must further address. 3. The Problem of Future Contingents We turn now to the problem of future contingents. Future contingent propositions are propositions saying of contingent, presently undetermined events that they will happen.38 (The events must be neither determined to occur, nor determined not to occur.) The problem of future contingents arises from the following conflict. On the one hand, we have what we might call the grounding problem. If nothing about present reality – and the laws governing how reality unfolds over time – settles it that the relevant events will happen, how and why is it true that they will happen? What, in short, accounts for the truth of future contingent propositions? Or if nothing does account for their truth, how are they nevertheless true? On the other hand, we have what we might call the logical problem and the prediction problem. If, instead, such propositions are never true, 38 No doubt a more rigorous definition could be provided. See, e.g. Rosenkranz (this volume) pg. XX what are they – neither true nor false? But then we seem to be denying classical logic. Or are they simply false? But how could that be? This is the logical problem. Further, if such propositions are never true, how are we to make sense of the common practice of retrospectively predicating truth to predictions that in fact come to pass? If you predict that a horse will win a race, and then that horse does win, we will typically say that "you were right". If future contingents are never true, however, then it is not clear how this practice can make sense. This is the prediction problem.39 As we shall use the terms, "open futurists" deny that future contingents can ever be true, and thus face the logical problem and the prediction problem.40 "Ockhamists" maintain that there can be truths about the undetermined future, and thus face the grounding problem.41 Here, however, we must pause to discuss how Ockhamism – so defined – relates to the "Ockhamism" discussed in the previous sections on the arguments of the fatalists. As Sven Rosenkranz's article in this book makes clear, there is a usage of the term "Ockhamism" to refer simply to the thesis that there can be truths about the undetermined future. So construed, Ockhamism is simply a thesis about the status of future contingent propositions, and in itself says nothing about free will, the fixity of the past, or anything concerning agency at all. In particular, you could be an Ockhamist in this sense, without endorsing what we called the "Ockhamist" reply to the fatalist's argument for the incompatibility of "prior truths" and free will discussed above. 39 Richard Taylor presses both the logical problem and the prediction problem in his essay in this volume, pg. XX. 40 We don't mean to suggest that only "open futurists" (so defined) can capture the familiar, pre-theoretical idea that the future is "open" to our agency in a sense in which the past is not. Whether "open futurism" (as defined by us) is indeed required to account for this intuition is a substantive, controversial matter. 41 As we are defining Ockhamism here, the Ockhamist is committed to the possible truth of indeterminism. However, one might think this result to be problematic, if one thought that Ockhamism itself has nothing to do with this issue. For our purposes, however, it will be easier simply to say that Ockhamism is the view that it is jointly possible that it be true that an event will occur and it be undetermined that that event will occur. For instance, one might instead endorse Merricks's response to that argument; for that matter, one might think that though there can be truths about the undetermined future, nevertheless the fatalist's argument for the incompatibility of such truths and free will is successful. On this view, the truth of future contingents would be compatible with indeterminism, but nevertheless not with freedom. Before moving on, it will be helpful to state another way one might characterize the difference between Ockhamism and open futurism, a way that employs a familiar way of modelling our thought and talk about time and the future. Assume indeterminism. Intuitively, on indeterminism, there are many distinct (maximal and complete) "ways" things could go from a given time t, consistently with the past (relative to t) and the laws of nature. These are the causally possible futures at t. Now, on open futurism, all we have, so to speak, are the various futures – but what we do not have, on this model, is a privileged future, the one that is "going to obtain". On Ockhamism, however, not so. According to the Ockhamist, when we're assessing whether a future contingent such as "It will be the case that p" is true, we simply need to go forward along the privileged "branch" (or look at the "actual" future of those that remain causally possible) and see whether that branch (or future) features p. Both Ockhamism and open futurism allow for various causally possible futures, but only the Ockhamist allows the further claim that one such future is now-privileged – lit up, as it were, with "the thin red line".42 Looked at from this point of view, those who press the "grounding problem" maintain that the existence of a "thin red line" marking a privileged future would be ungrounded – unacceptably arbitrary or brute. However, as Ockhamists may point out, without a "thin red line", we face the logical problem and the prediction problem. We turn first to the logical problem and the prediction problem. We then consider the grounding problem for Ockhamism. 42 This terminology was introduced in Belnap and Green 1994. 3.1. The Logical Problem There are, as far as we are aware, two different potential open futurist responses to the logical problem. The first is to maintain that though future contingents are neither true nor false, and though we must therefore deny classical logic, denying classical logic in the requisite way is not, in the end, an unacceptable result. This response to the logical problem has a long, venerable pedigree, going all the back to Aristotle's famous discussion of the sea-battle tomorrow in On Interpretation 9.43 It has been developed with considerable sophistication by logicians such as Jan Łukasiewicz and A.N. Prior.44 This response has also been developed in connection with issues concerning vagueness and compared to so-called supervaluationist positions on that topic.45 Here, and in this volume, we wish instead to highlight a different (and relatively unknown) response to the logical problem, one that seeks to preserve classical logic: this response does not maintain that future contingents are neither true nor false, but that they are simply false. As far as we are able to determine, the view at issue was first articulated and defended in 1941 by Charles Hartshorne, who later further developed the view in his 1965 Mind paper, "The Meaning of 'Is Going to Be'", reprinted in this volume.46 The view was also (it seems independently) developed (though not explicitly endorsed) by the founder of tense logic himself, A.N. Prior, in the 50s and 60s.47 Prior's only non-technical discussion of this view, in his posthumously (and somewhat obscurely) published essay, "It Was to Be", is also printed in this volume. Part of our aim in publishing these essays here is to draw increased attention to this view, which we feel has been unjustly neglected in the vast literature on free will, fatalism, and future contingents. 43 For an excellent discussion of the history of this topic during the medieval period, see Knuuttila 2011. 44 See Łukasiewicz 1957 and 1967 and Prior 1957 and 1967 45 See Thomason 1970. For a helpful overview, see Øhrstrøm and Hasle 2011. 46 See Hartshorne 1941: 100 – 101. 47 See Prior 1957 and 1967. But what is the view? In brief, if we say that something will happen if and only if that thing is determined to happen, and that something will not happen if and only if that thing is determined not to happen, then future contingents will all turn out false. After all, a future contingent says of an event that is neither determined to happen nor determined not to happen that it will happen. In this case, however, it is false that the event will happen (since it is false that it is determined to happen), and it is false that the event will not happen (since it is false that it is determined not to happen). On this view, then, "will" and "will not" are contraries (both can be false, but both can't be true) rather than contradictories. Thus, a statement such as that "It will be the case that p, or it will not be the case that p" is not an instance of p v ~p. This is because one cannot move from "It is not the case that it will be the case that p" to "It will not be the case that p", for the same reason as one cannot move from "It is not the case that X is determined to happen" to "X is determined not to happen". This latter move is, of course, plainly illegitimate (an event could be, as yet, undetermined to happen either way) – and consequently, according to this view, so is the former. Despite the seeming elegance of this view, many writers on future contingents (and related matters) do not seem to be aware of it. For instance, in his essay in this volume (which, we hasten to add, has many compensating virtues), Michael Rea maintains, roughly, that "presentists" cannot adequately respond to the logical fatalist's argument for the incompatibility of prior truths and free will, and accordingly must either give up such truths by denying bivalence, or instead give up free will. In fact, however, what Rea's argument shows, if it succeeds, is not that presentists who maintain free will must deny bivalence, but that they must deny bivalence or adopt the "all false" view of future contingents.48 That is, Rea writes as if there is only one option in regard to maintaining that future contingents are never true: that they are 48 Seymour also makes this point in (manuscript). neither true nor false. There is, however, also the view developed by Hartshorne and Prior (and others): that they are simply false. At this point, we will leave the Hartshornean/Priorean development of the "all false" view to Hartshorne and Prior.49 Before moving on, however, we wish briefly to note that there is a yet further, distinct way of getting to the "all false" view of future contingents, a way recently developed by one of the current authors (Todd).50 Instead of defining "will" to mean "determined", this view takes its cue from the famous debate between Russell and Strawson concerning bivalence and 'the present King of France'. According to the Strawsonian view, "The present King of France is bald" is neither true nor false, whereas, on the Russellian view, that proposition is simply false, since its logical form (roughly) is "There exists a present King of France, and that person is bald", and there does not exist any such king. Now, on the relevant "Ockhamist" semantics for 'will', something 'will' happen (as a first approximation) if and only if 'the unique actual future' features the thing happening – the privileged future of those that remain causally possible. But if there is no such privileged future (no "thin red line"), as open futurists contend, then (on a Russellian analysis) such a proposition simply comes out false, for precisely the same reason as that "The present King of France is bald" comes out false, according to Russell. In short, the sense of "will" at stake – the sense Ockhamists claim that the Hartshornean/Priorean semantics is failing to capture – implicitly quantifies over a privileged future. But, if Russell is right, in the absence of a privileged future, such a proposition simply comes out false. This, anyway, is the very basic idea. If successful, we arrive at the "all false" 49 The most thorough discussion and defense of Hartshorne's views concerning future contingents is the excellent Shields and Viney 2003. Hartshorne's writings on this topic have not attracted much attention, but see this essay for a defense of Hartshorne's view against criticisms in Cahn 1967 and Clark 1969; see further Shields 1988 and Viney 1989. Rhoda et al. defend a similar "all false" view in their 2006, as does Seymour (manuscript). 50 For an extensive development of this view, see Todd forthcoming. view (and thereby preserve classical logic) without (implausibly, it seems) simply defining "X will happen" to mean "X is determined to happen". 3.2. The Prediction Problem So much for the logical problem for open futurists. We turn now to the prediction problem for open futurists. Prior expresses the problem nicely in his essay in this volume: Nevertheless, the way of talking that I have just sketched [on which future contingents all come out false] shares with the three-valued way of talking [on which they are neither true nor false] one big disadvantage, namely that it is grossly at variance with the ways in which even non-determinists ordinarily appraise or assign truth-values to predictions, bets and guesses. Suppose at the beginning of a race I bet you that Phar Lap will win, and then he does win, and I come to claim my bet. You might then ask me, 'Why, do you think this victory was unpreventable when you made your bet?' I admit that I don't, so you say, 'Well then I'm not paying up then – when you said Phar Lap would win, what you said wasn't true – on the three-valued view, it was merely neuter: on this other view of yours, it was even false. So I'm sticking to the money.' And I must admit that if anyone treated a bet of mine like that I would feel aggrieved; that just isn't the way this game is played. (Prior, this volume, pg. XX) This problem is widely regarded to be the most difficult problem facing open futurists. One strategy for dealing with it is explored at length in John MacFarlane's essay in this book. Roughly, according to MacFarlane, relative to the context of utterance, one's prediction that Phar Lap will win is neither true nor false; relative, however, to the context of assessment (now, once Phar Lap has won), one's prediction is true. MacFarlane's "relativist" solution to the prediction problem is ingenious – and controversial. Certainly the jury on MacFarlane's solution is still out.51 If one does not go in for MacFarlane's relativism, however, then how should one respond to the prediction problem? It isn't clear, and certainly there is no canonical open futurist response to the difficulty at hand. Hartshorne addresses this problem in his essay in this volume, though how successfully we leave an open question. There are, however, at least two avenues of reply that we wish briefly to suggest as worthy of further development. First, the open futurist might insist that we pay close to attention to another thing we are liable to say in contexts of prediction. One thing we say is that "you were right". Another thing we say, however, is that "what you said came true". And the open futurist might see in this latter construction an opening for her position. After all, on this construction, we do not say that what you said was true, but that it came true – and what that seems to mean is simply that the thing one predicted to happen in fact ended up happening. But certainly the open futurist is entitled to "what you predicted would happen in fact happened." If, however, the open futurist is entitled to "what you predicted to happen in fact happened", then, arguably, she is entitled to "what you predicted came true". And if she is entitled to "what you predicted came true", then she can plausibly argue that, though we do say, "you were right", this commits us to nothing over and above what we're committed to in saying (or just is a way of saying) that "what you predicted came true", which, we just saw, is something the open futurist can happily accept. One sometimes sees open futurists making this sort of point (or a similar one) in the literature, but, to our knowledge, no one has developed it with the sort of care it would seem to deserve. Second, though we aren't aware of anyone who has done so, the open futurist might seek to employ the resources of a (relatively) new area of metaphysics and philosophy of language to 51 For criticism of MacFarlane's relativism, see, e.g. Heck 2006 and Moruzzi and Wright 2009. MacFarlane develops his view further in his 2014. the prediction problem: fictionalism.52 Broadly speaking, fictionalism regarding a range of discourse maintains that claims made within that discourse are best regarded as engaging in a fiction, not as aiming at the literal truth. Fictionalism, roughly, is a way of maintaining that although we may say a great many things that appear to commit us to some problematic entities, we are not really committed to those entities, since, when we are engaged in such talk, we are engaged in talk about a fiction. In short, it is a way of escaping certain unwelcome ontological commitments. In general, one can apply the fictionalist strategy whenever: (a) one has some folk claims that seem to be true; (b) their truth seems to entail the existence of an object or objects of a given type; and (c) the existence of objects of that type seems metaphysically extravagant (or otherwise problematic).53 So construed, fictionalism would seem to have a natural application to the problem of future contingents. First, we have some folk claims that seem to be true, claims such as that "you were right". Second, their truth seems to entail the existence of an object (broadly construed) of a certain type: namely, a metaphysically privileged future of those that were causally possible, or a so-called "thin red line". Third, the existence of a "thin red line" seems – anyway to some – to be metaphysically extravagant. Accordingly, it would seem that the fictionalist strategy should be on the table. On this approach, one interprets "you were right" as something like, "According to the fiction of the thin red line, you were right." That is, when, looking backwards, we engage in such talk, we are engaged in a fiction; we take up a point of view on which there existed a fictional "thin red line", and assess matters from that point of view. It is, of course, perfectly natural, and perfectly understandable, that this practice should arise; it is, equally, perfectly natural to see it as imbued with less than full ontological seriousness. Needless to say, we have only hinted at how to develop this sort of proposal; however, given the 52 For more on fictionalism, see Eklund 2011. 53 We thank Mark Balauger for this construal of the fictionalist strategy. similarities between this context and other contexts in which ficitionalist strategies have been applied, we believe that these connections deserve more attention than they have received. And, regarding the prediction problem, it isn't as if the open futurist already has a wealth of other plausible options on the table. 3.3. The Grounding Problem As we've just seen, open futurism faces problems – the logical problem and the prediction problem. What, then, motivates the view? As we saw in Section 1, one set of motivations is "indirect", going via the fatalist's argument for the incompatibility of the truth of future contingents and free will. But another is "direct", and this is simply that the alternative view, Ockhamism, seems to face a serious grounding problem. What accounts for the truth of future contingent propositions? One way to press the grounding problem for Ockhamism is to invoke some version of "truthmaker theory". According to "truthmaker maximalism", every truth has a truthmaker – roughly, some feature of the world that makes the relevant proposition true.54 According to this line of thought, future contingents would lack truthmakers: there is no feature of the world that would make such propositions true. For instance, one could not cite current causal conditions and laws as truthmakers for the relevant truths, for ex hypothesi such conditions and laws fail to secure the given outcomes. Another way to develop this objection would be to invoke the related thesis that "truth supervenes on being", the thesis that, for any true proposition, if that proposition were instead false, there would have to be some difference somewhere in reality.55 Intuitively, however, true future contingents would seem to fail to supervene on reality. If some true future contingent were instead false, this would seem to require no difference at all in the 54 For a defense of truthmaker maximalism, see Armstrong 2004. 55 For an overview of truthmaker theory and the thesis that "truth supervenes on being", see MacBride 2013. "facts on the ground", so to speak: such facts could be just as they are, and yet that proposition be false instead of true. For instance, suppose it is a true future contingent that Hillary Clinton will be the next President of the United States. The objector says: the facts on the ground could be just as they actually are, given indeterminism, and yet it be false that Hillary will become president. The falsity of the future contingent would not require any discernible difference in the way things are. The objection is thus that the truth that Hillary will become the next president seems problematically "disconnected" from reality: it "floats free" of reality in some allegedly objectionable way. Of course, these objections are only as good as the principles that truths require truthmakers and that truth supervenes on being. And they are only as good as the argument that, given indeterminism, we cannot provide "truthmakers" for future contingents or say that truth supervenes on being. Another way to press the grounding objection, however, is to pay attention to the model of the future (or our discourse about the future) that Ockhamists must endorse. Return to the theme noted above: in addition to the causally possible futures at t, the Ockhamist also maintains that there exists a privileged future of those that remain causally possible – a "thin red line". But now we can ask: whence comes the privilege? As John MacFarlane notes in his paper in this volume, don't symmetry considerations push strongly in favor of the conclusion that no such future is now-privileged? After all, whatever one such future could "say" (so to speak) concerning why it is the privileged future, any other such future could also say. That is, all such futures would have, ex hypothesi, an "equal claim" on being "how things go from here". Wouldn't it be simply arbitrary if one such way just were the way things will go from here? There is one final way we could put the grounding objection to Ockhamism – a way that serves helpfully to unite the themes of this book. Assume indeterminism. And assume that there are some true future contingents. Now we ask: how could God know that any such propositions are true? How could God know, in advance, the outcome of a genuinely indeterministic process? Intuitively, there would be nothing at all about the world that God has created on the basis of which God could come to know that the event will occur. In order to know that it will occur, then, it seems that God will have to have some mystical insight into the truth itself: God will have to know what will happen by being immediately and directly acquainted with the truth.56 The Ockhamist, then, is seemingly committed to the following: either God can have this sort of mysterious access to the truth – or instead there is a "metaphysical gap" between what even a perfect knower could know, on the one hand, and what is true, on the other. And it is precisely this sort of "metaphysical gap" that strikes many who press the grounding objection to be so problematic. Neither option thus seems altogether comfortable – though, with respect to the former, one might say that greater mysteries have been associated with God. In this respect, it is perhaps fitting that we should conclude with a quote from Ockham himself, an ardent defender of the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human free will: "It is impossible to express clearly the way in which God knows future contingent events".57 56 For an excellent discussion of this position, see Mavrodes 1988. 57 Ockham in Adams and Kretzmann 1969: 50.

Reti, saperi, linguaggi – 2/2014 – pp. 301-318 ISSN 2279-7777 © Società editrice il Mulino INDIRECT REPORTS, SLURS, AND THE POLYPHONIC SPEAKER Alessandro Capone Abstract: In this paper I address several problems raised by Wayne Davis (p.c.)to my treatment of slurring in indirect reports. Although the paper presents several general considerations on slurs, it is mainly a contribution on indirect reports and the social practice in which they are embedded. The author embraces a Wittgensteinian approach concerning the social praxis of indirect reports and claims that, due to pragmatic principles or conventions of language use, the reported speaker is, in general, responsible for the slurring (in indirect reports), while the reporter is usually complicit, because he could have chosen to sum up the report using a more neutral term. It follows from Searle's Principle of Expressibility that one can report a slurring utterance with the intention of criticizing it – in which case it is important to attribute the slur to the reported speaker. Various revisions of a principle for indirect reporting are offered, in the light of criticism by Wayne Davis. Keywords: pragmatics, explicatures, indirect reports, language games, slurring, Wayne Davis's ideas on meaning. 1. INTRODUCTION Pragmatics goes beyond sentential semantics and may even intrude into it, if we follow the current trends on the semantics/pragmatics debate. In many cases I have demonstrated the importance of pragmatic intrusion, in connection with belief reports, indirect reports, attributive/referential uses of NPs, knowing that vs. knowing how, «de se», Immunity to Error through misidentification, quotation, etc., although I have been somehow reluctant to accept some of the standard examples of pragmatic intrusion found in the literature. Of course, even the use of the term «pragmatic intrusion» (due to Levinson 2000), may be problematic and controversial. A referee once noted that pragmatics is part of truth-conditional pragmatics, while the term «intrusion» may be misleading and may indicate that one takes pragmatics to be of secondary importance. Anyway, theorists may distinguish between linguistic semantics, which may only provide skeletal information to ALESSANDRO CAPONE 302 be integrated with pragmatic information (at a later stage) and truthconditional pragmatics (an admission that semantics without pragmatics cannot be truth-conditional). I quite agree that pragmatics plays an important role in integrating semantic information. In this paper, I deal with the complicated issue of polyphony, pragmatics being involved in the attempt to distinguish voices (the original speaker's voice and the indirect reporter's). As I said about quotation, pragmatics is responsible for allocating quotation marks. In indirect reports, pragmatics is responsible in the complex task of indicating mixed quotation. The structure of this paper is as follows. I follow general considerations on the issue of slurs and then on the issue of indirect reports. I propose that indirect reports are language games involving a polyphonic activity. The problem for the hearer is to recognize different voices. When slurs are injected into that-clauses of indirect reports, we have interpretative ambiguities. My proposal is that the original speaker is assigned responsibility for the slurring expression present in the that-clause of an indirect reports. I justify this claim by a) considerations on processing efforts and contextual effects; b) considerations based on Searle's Principle of expressibility; c) considerations based on the comparison between quotation and indirect reports; d) considerations on critical discourse analysis. Since my pragmatic considerations are based on my paraphrasis/form principle, I have to defend such a principle from reasonable objections by Wayne Davis. 2. THE PRObLEM I would like to make it clear from the start that this is a paper about indirect reporting as a social practice (in other previous papers: Capone 2012; Capone, Salmani Nodoushan 2014), in fact, I discussed indirect reporting as a language game) and this is not a paper about slurs or slurring in general, although I am intrigued by the following question: what happens when one indirectly reports an utterance which contains a slurring expression? An interpretative ambiguity (in the sense of Jaszczolt 1999) is certainly created, as one may have to decide whether the slurring expression belongs to the primary voice (the reporting speaker) or the secondary voice (the reported speaker). Another way of formulating this ambiguity is to say that we have to ascerINDIRECT REPORTS, SLURS, AND THE POLYPHONIC SPEAKER 303 tain whether the slurring expression is part of the reporting utterance or of the reported utterance. Intuitively, this interpretative ambiguity must be captured syntactically, because if the reporting speaker is being attributed the slur, then intuitively the reported utterance must be characterized as containing a neutral counterpart, while the slurring expression must occur in the embedding utterance, probably as a sort of free enrichment (one of the types discussed by Carston 2002 or Alison Hall 2013), being part of an appositive structure: (1) John said that Mary is a nigger could be represented as: John said that Mary is black (which I am paraphrasing as «Mary is a nigger») Instead, the interpretation on which «nigger» only belongs to the reported speaker's voice amounts to something like the following: John said that Mary is a nigger can be represented as: (2) John said that Mary is a nigger and what John said contains the words «Mary» and «nigger». Here too we have free enrichment, which I have characterized as conjunction. But I could have characterized it as I did in Capone (2008) and in Capone (2013a) as a sentential null appositive. I will not go into this, because the topic of this paper is not the issue of «opacity» per se, but the issue of multiple voicing and the issue of who is responsible for the slurring expression in indirect reporting. 3. ON SLURS We need to say a little bit on slurs, but only as a way of getting into a more general problem about indirect reporting. A slurring expression ALESSANDRO CAPONE 304 is an expression which is derogatory and often used with the purpose of inflicting harm to some category of people (see Saka 1998; 2007), of stabilizing a situation of dominance/inferiority, an expression which society as a whole should not use due to some convention that officially bans its usage (a social stipulation according to Anderson and Lepore, who even write about an «edict») even if certain segments of society, in fact, use it. Those who use slurs can be recognized as having racist intentions. Slurs, however, can be used by the members of the categories slurred, because by re-appropriating a slur one can show a sense of solidarity with those who suffer due to an unjust society and neutralize its potential to cause harm. Re-appropriation is an important topic, and I can here recommend two papers by Claudia Bianchi (in press) and Andrew Jacobs (2002) on this. Most importantly, I should say that contexts can take away the bite from slurs, as happens in academic papers and, in particular, in this paper. Of course, it is possible that the menacing features of slurs do not completely dissolve, as they are still associated with a history of injustice and sadism as pointed out by Kennedy (2002) in his magisterial work on slurs (in afro-american communities) and American history. 4. ON THE CONNECTION bETWEEN INDIRECT REPORTS, SLURS AND CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS Now apropos of the issue of making use of examples in academic contexts, consider the following situation: you enter a classroom and read a sentence on the blackboard. You know that this lecture room usually hosts lectures on syntax by a certain professor Higginbotham. You do not know who authored the sentence and specifically you do not know whether the sentence has to be counted as a mere sentence or as an utterance. You need to assign some illocutionary force to that sentence, to make sense of it from a communicative point of view. Now, in this case it is clearly difficult to know what to make of the sentence, but as a default you would tend to think the sentence is merely an example of a sentence if utilized in say a grammar class. In this case, I am utilizing sentences as examples, but even as examples they have the potential to offend. I do not know whether it is enough to profess that I have always been opposed to racism, as the history of these sentences perINDIRECT REPORTS, SLURS, AND THE POLYPHONIC SPEAKER 305 colates up from the blackboard or from the pages of this paper, but at least in these prefatory considerations I will do whatever is in my power to neutralize language's ability to do harm and cause suffering. I believe we can use language to disarm racist discourse and that to do so, we need to be able to make reference to that discourse by a method which is the counterpart of indirect reporting. In a sense I am anticipating the main line of my argument, as it is crucial to my considerations that we need expressive power to disarm slurring expressions and such expressive power needs to be reflected in the ability of talking about slurring utterances without being complicit with those who uttered the slurring utterances. 5. INDIRECT REPORTINg AS A SOCIAL ACTIVITY Indirect reporting is a discourse practice which is social, being learned in the course of interacting with people, although certain presumably innate principles of human rationality determine the direction of the inferential processes that are involved in it. Presumably indirect reporting is different from direct quotation, so the literature says, although in my paper on quotation (Capone 2013b) I have done my best to say that the interpretation of quotation is radically pragmatic and although important cases of mixed quotation in indirect reports are recognized by the current literature. If such considerations are held in mind, it is clear that the border-line between direct and indirect reports is being corroded more and more. To give you an example of the extent to which this demarcating line can be corroded, take the following: (3) Mary: John said: «Louise is very intelligent» However, it is not true that John uttered «Louise» or «intelligent» as literal constituents of what he said. Although I should say that these cases are rare, I would not want to say that they are special or parasitic uses. Even if they were, pragmatics would have to intervene. If the hearer replied: «But John never calls me "Louise"», it would be clear that the presuppositions of discourse would militate towards an interpretation of the direct report as an indirect report, to be reconstructed on the basis of assumptions that are in the air during the conALESSANDRO CAPONE 306 versation. (Now I should probably add that my competence as Italian speaker colors these considerations). This case reminds us of the radical pragmatics involved in Bezuidenhout's (1997) examples in which a NP (in particular a pronominal) which is preferentially associated with a referential interpretation, is interpreted in context as having an attributive interpretation. Context, we know well, has such transformative powers. The problems of mixed quotation (discussed by Cappelen, Lepore 2005) do not scare the pragmalinguist, because the polyphonic game is an essential part of indirect reporting (as I proposed in Capone 2013c). The participants to a conversation can recognize the voice of a certain person, through certain linguistic clues (style may be an important indicator), or through some phonetic qualities (one should not exaggerate to what extent people are capable of imitating a person's voice (this is certainly true for Italian speakers who have great dramatic potential). However, in the absence of such clues, one would mainly have to rely on the cognitive makeup of the speakers/hearers who are capable of drawing inferences that assign by default a certain token of a lexeme to a certain speaker. In any case, rationality principles à la Grice would also make the same kind of predictions, without having to place a burden on the cognitive make-up of the conversationalists. Indirect reporting, as a social practice or a language game, involves a certain number of transformations. Ignoring the most obvious ones, that concern pronominals and tense, there are some transformation on which interesting discussion might focus. An utterance (or rather a sequence of utterances) can be reported by providing a summary. Certain modifiers could be omitted. Syntactic errors could be amended. (However, I exclude that the opposite process of injecting syntactic errors is licit (if the reporting speaker does so, he will be perceived as responsible for the errors). Pauses could be deleted. Identificatory materials might be added (say appositive clauses). Is there a limit to what can be done in indirect reporting? I would like to say that one limit is the speaker's meaning (although there are important qualifications to be made here). Another limit is the reported speaker's perception that the paraphrasis of his or her utterance has not been fair (We shall see here an important qualification, in response to an objection by Wayne Davis). Speaker's meaning, by default, is or should be the aim of indirect reporting (see Wieland 2013, Capone 2013c). This is perhaps most INDIRECT REPORTS, SLURS, AND THE POLYPHONIC SPEAKER 307 evident in the case of the law. When we interpret the law, as a number of scholars including Carston (2013) say, we are basically interested in what the law-maker said – the literal import is not of interest to us, but we need to contextualize what was said to arrive at some plausible intentions (of course speaking of intentions in the case of the law is not devoid of difficulties as pointed out by Marmor 2013). I am interested in the law, because the acts of interpretation after all are nothing but indirect reports of what the law-makers said or decided. Now, the case of the law shows without doubt that indirect reporting involves deciphering the speaker's meaning. In this paper, we are interested in speaker's meanings, but we should say that there are cases in which indirect reports focus on literal meanings. This should not be impossible because if direct reports can be used to produce indirect reports, indirect reports can be used to achieve something similar to direct reports (perhaps with an important difference, direct reports usually provide all of what is said, even small details, while indirect reports cannot promise to deliver all small details of what was said, given the possibility of summing up what was said. In the cases in which indirect reports focus on literal meanings, we expect strong clues (in the sense of Dascal, Weizman 1987) to be there to indicate how the utterance has to be taken. 6. RESPONSIbILITY fOR SLURS IN INDIRECT REPORTS AND PRAgMATICS Anderson and Lepore propose that in indirect reports the reporting speaker, rather than the reported speaker, is responsible for the slurring expression appearing in the embedded that-clause. Now, while I accept that in some cases, the reporting speaker can be complicit in uttering the slurring expression, I am inclined to accept that the reported speaker has greater responsibility than the reporting speaker – intuitively because the indirect report is about the reported speaker and NOT the reporting speaker. I would say that the pragmatic considerations I expressed in Capone (2010; 2012; 2013c) assign responsibility for the slur to the reported speaker, while the responsibility of the reporter consists in not having avoided the slur choosing a more neutral counterpart. However, if a more neutral counterpart had been chosen, how could we know that the original speaker was responsible for slurring? This is a damn ALESSANDRO CAPONE 308 complicated question. We may get the idea that the reporting speaker was complicit in the slurring, however his responsibility for the slurring was inferior. And there are contexts in which the responsibility of the reporter has been completely corroded (take the current paper or a judiciary proceeding). In my opinion, there should be ways to signal that the reporter is not primarily responsible for the slurring expression (here contextual clues could be mobilized to convey that that reporter's standard vocabulary does not include slurs and therefore by deduction, responsibility for the slurring is shifted to the reported speaker. Furthermore, pragmatic default inferences also contribute to assign responsibility to the reported speaker, as the interpretation that the perspective of the reported speaker is being adopted is more relevant – relevance being the ratio between contextual effects and processing efforts. An interpretation according to which either the reported speaker or the reporting speaker or both could be responsible for the slurring is clearly non-economical with respect to the possibility that one alone was responsible. If the reporting speaker was responsible for the slurring (and not the reported speaker), the reporting speaker could certainly be guilty of lack of clarity and the processing efforts would be greater. However, if the original speaker was responsible for the slurring, the interpretation would be the most relevant one since the perspective of the original speaker is what counts and what the hearer is interested in. The hearer does not want to know what the reporting speaker thinks, but only what the reported speaker thinks. In Capone (2010, 2013c) I drew the readers' attention to the following. 7. PARAPHRASIS/fORM PRINCIPLE The that-clause embedded in the verb «say» is a paraphrasis of what Y said, and meets the following constraints: Should Y hear what X said he (Y) had said, he would not take issue with it, as to content, but would approve of it as a fair paraphrasis of his original utterance. Furthermore, he would not object to vocalizing the assertion made out of the words following the complementizer 'that' on account of its form/style (Capone 2013c, 174). INDIRECT REPORTS, SLURS, AND THE POLYPHONIC SPEAKER 309 In Capone (2010) I drew this principle from the principle of Relevance, but this is not at stake here. Now, the paraphrasis/Form principle clearly predicts that if a speaker did not utter a slurring expression in her utterance, she would not like/accept being reported as having uttered that word. Hence the obligation by the indirect reporter to avoid using that word, as such use would cast a sinister shadow on the reported speaker depicting her as racist (when she is not). There is a complication here, because while the reported speaker never uttered the word «nigro» or «nigger», she may have wanted to utter it. The indirect reporter knows well that the slur was not uttered, but she also knows that if she had been permitted, the speaker would have willingly uttered it (she was prevented by political circumstances). Perhaps the reported speaker used the word «black» with derogatory intonation, or perhaps when this word was uttered the speaker's face was illuminated by a sinister grimace. Perhaps the reporting speaker merely guessed at the intention behind the word. So, should we take the reporting speaker who injects «nigger» into the that clause of his report at face value and attribute it to the reported speaker or not? My story predicts that even if the reporting speaker was wrong in his choice of «nigger», pragmatics says that the reported speaker is represented as being racist. That these semantic/pragmatic considerations should be taken into account is obvious, if one considers that accepting the alternative account by Anderson and Lepore (2013) commits one to the view that an indirect report of a slurring expression is subject to a double prohibition (both the original speaker and the reported one are prohibited from uttering the slurring expression) and nevertheless the indirect report of a slurring expression gets by. Why is it that it gets by? Because it is important to someone that she know about the slurring utterance in the first place and this can be achieved only through reporting the slurring expression. It appears that the prohibition was evaded twice. Instead, a view that the reporting speaker is simply quoting (admittedly mixed-quoting) a speaker would ensure that only one person is guilty for the slurring – and this is the desired result, because ideally we would want to make a difference between the original culprit and the reporter who may be non-racist and whose purpose is (possibly) to denounce a racist remark. In Anderson and Lepore's (2013) view accusing someone of slurring is something that can occur in the court (presumably) but not in ordinary conversation. Yet, we have evidence ALESSANDRO CAPONE 310 that in ordinary conversations too we utter pronouncements against immoral and illicit conducts. 8. ARgUMENTS fOR THE VIEW THAT THE REPORTED SPEAKER IS RESPONSIbLE fOR SLURS IN THATCLAUSES Of INDIRECT REPORTS In the remainder of this paper, I will expatiate on the reasons for believing that the story of indirect reports and slurs should proceed the way I have depicted it. I will advance a number of arguments, examining their consequences. The first argument is based on expressivity. We must be able to express what we think. Searle says: «Whatever can be meant can be said» (Searle 1969, 20). In the case of indirect reporting, we must have a way to report an offensive speech event (for the purpose of denouncing it) without committing/repeating the same offence. Clearly, one can resort to euphemistic ways of saying things or one can be indirect and use convoluted sentences that give the hearer an idea of what was done in the offensive utterance. To give you an example, one of our colleagues, who was known by everyone to be crazy, once said in the common room that «Berlusconi ha il pisello piccolo» (Berlusconi has a small dick). I then interpreted this utterance literally, although now it occurs to me that this was probably a way of saying that Berlusconi is not capable of governing the country, if an analogy is followed with another expression which idiomatically means that «Berlusconi non ha le palle (per governare il paese)». Perhaps this teacher had transformed the idiomatic form into an unidiomatic form. Whatever the case, I wanted to tell other colleagues what had happened, but I was terribly embarrassed to let the female teachers know. The taboo associated with this sentence was making its sting felt. However, there was no way to report the utterance without appearing to commit the same offence. But surely, if one had to report the utterance, one had to do so in a way that revealed the words used. Thus, as a consequence of Searle's principle of expressibility, a speaker must be in a position to make an indirect report of something that is obscene relying on the context or pragmatic principles to impute the offensive phrase to the reported speaker. There must be contexts, such as a court, where one must be able to tell the whole truth about what was said. INDIRECT REPORTS, SLURS, AND THE POLYPHONIC SPEAKER 311 The second argument exploits a parallel between quotation and indirect reporting. If we accept Anderson and Lepore's view that there is a societal prohibition against uttering a slurring expression, it is clear that this should apply to quotation as well. Thus a sentence such as (4) Mary said: John is a nigger should be as infelicitous as the corresponding indirect report «Mary said that John is a nigger». Here my opponent may reply that, after all, Anderson and Lepore think of a prohibition against using, rather than against «mentioning» (in the sense of Lyons 1977) a slurring expression. I quite agree that quotative structures, in general, are associated with opacity and sometimes mention, rather than using, certain expressions. However, even accepting the using/mentioning distinction, it should be said that the distinction does not neatly correlate with the distinction between indirect reporting and quoting. In fact, we have seen that quotation structures can, in context, amount to indirect reporting. Furthermore, as Cappelen and Lepore (2005) themselves note, indirect reports exhibit the phenomenon of mixed quotation. Thus there are segments of indirect reports that are mentioned. We can easily have reports such as John said that «apple» has five letters. If anything, we would expect quotations to host slurring expressions, while indirect reporting should not. However, in practice there is not much difference between quotation and indirect reporting. The third argument is based on critical linguistics (on this, see Linda Waugh et al. 2014). If we want to expunge racism, we should be able to denounce it and we should be able to talk about it, rather than being scared to talk about it. Denouncing racism involves describing the kind of speech acts performed by people during their racist practices. It is clear that in doing so, we should be able to report utterances verbatim or close to verbatim, our moral authority sufficing to exclude that we are complicit in this kind of discourse. We should take position in public and this should be enough to label us as non-racists and to bracket the racist linguistic practices. Indirect reporting is a way of bracketing slurring expressions, which appear as enveloped in inverted commas. Contextual considerations combined with default interpretations should be enough to bracket slurring and racist expressions in general. ALESSANDRO CAPONE 312 9. ObjECTIONS bY WAYNE DAVIS The job is done egregiously by my Paraphrasis/Form Principle, which however was attacked by Wayne Davis in a personal communication. There are two fundamental objections. Consider the following example: (5) Billy: The first black person was elected U.S. president in 2008. Tommy: Billy said that the first nigger was elected U.S. president in 2008. Wayne Davis writes: I would say that Tommy's report is false. But your constraint need not be violated. Billy may not object at all to Tommy's way of reporting what he said and may have been just as happy using «nigger» in place of what he said. Billy may take it as a fair paraphrasis of what he said. But it is not, so Tommy's report is false. It is also an unacceptable thing to say, whether or not Billy objects to it. I quite agree that this is a plausible objection. But this is seen from the point of view of a racist speaker. So my prediction makes a difference between racist and non-racist speakers. It works in the case of non-racist speakers but not in the case of racist speakers. We could try to revise my Principle: Should Y hear what X said he (Y) had said, he would not take issue with it, as to content, but would approve of it as a fair paraphrasis of his original utterance. Furthermore, in case he were to accept certain norms that are standard or should be standard in society, he would not object to vocalizing the assertion made out of the words following the complementizer «that» on account of its form/style. (Capone 2013c, 174) Now, I should say that these contextual injections of clauses could go on in case other objections are raised. I doubt that all such clauses should be made explicit, as principles should have a general validity even if they are in need of being constantly enriched through contextualizations. A better treatment of Wayne Davis' objection could be the following: INDIRECT REPORTS, SLURS, AND THE POLYPHONIC SPEAKER 313 An indirect report of an utterance by X cannot be felicitous UNLESS X is inclined to approve if it on account of its content and form/style or some impartial judge is inclined to accept it on account of its content/form/style given what was said by the original speaker. The case by Davis is ruled out because the reported speaker did not utter a slurring expression and although he would probably have approved of it, either he or the impartial judge would agree that what he said did not include a slurring expression: thus, if the slurring expression features in the indirect report, despite the fact that it was not uttered by the original speaker, it must be construed as under the responsibility of the reporting speaker. The upshot of this is the following: if a slurring expression features in the that-clause of an indirect report, assume that the slur is under the responsibility of the original speaker, because if the original speaker had not uttered it, the reporter would not have had the right to report it, given that either the original speaker or the impartial judge would object to its presence in the that-clause of the indirect report. I take that indirect reports typically display the words used in speech by the original speaker. I believe that it is more natural that the indirect report should express the words used by the reported speaker rather than those of the reported speaker, because the indirect report is intended to reflect the utterance of the reported speaker. Wayne Davis objects to this. He says: This may be true in some cases, but only when the reporter is using the same language as the reported speaker. It is also false in the same-language case when the reported speaker uses a lot of contractions or regionalisms that are inappropriate in the reporter's context or uses misspellings or mispronounciations. Let us leave aside the different-language case, as here contextual considerations advert the hearers that it is not possible that the same words uttered by the original speaker are used by the indirect reporter. This is a notable exception, but I never claimed that my principle covers all cases. It is predictable that defaults in interpretation can be overridden by contextual considerations. It is true that as Davis says, indirect reports can change the words, they can eliminate grammatical errors, misspellings, regionalisms etc. However, there is intuitively a difference between an indirect report that eliminates all such problems and an indirect report ALESSANDRO CAPONE 314 that introduces such problems. In the former case, a speaker should not be entirely unhappy about the reporter's charitable attitude and thus my principle may not be refuted by such a case. In the latter case, errors are being introduced on purpose (or perhaps involuntarily). But certainly, the original speaker should not be happy with the result. Such an attitude is clearly reflected in my Principle. Of course, a third case could be pondered on. A person who is particularly proud of belonging to a certain region, objects to the fact that the indirect reporter eliminated a certain regionalism. But this case too is covered by my Paraphrasis/Form Principle. In fact, the original speaker objects to the change or interpolation by the reporter, as I predicted. Whatever the success of my reply strategy, I would like to say that though I greatly appreciate the merit of Wayne Davis's objection, I object to his objection on general grounds. Of course I never said or would like to say that all the words used in the indirect report belong to the original speaker. In some cases, it may not be important to decide whether a word was part of the original speaker's speech or was just a synonym used for convenience. The Paraphrasis/Form principle applies only when it is relevant, that is in the case of problematic words. If a word rather than another makes an important difference, in that the indirect report ends up reporting a different speech act (as I said in Capone 2010) or the indirect report ends up being offensive to the audience, then an interpretative problem arises and the interpretative ambiguity I discussed at the beginning of this paper arises, which needs to be resolved by pragmatic interpretation. So Davis might now be relieved by my conclusion that like him I do not think that every word of the original utterance must be in the that-clause of the indirect report. Consider now a different case. I happened to send a paper to P & C. During the proofs something strange happened. I had no reply to my corrections and no revised proofs were sent to me. The result was that an uncorrected paper was published. Thomas Gray, whom I cited to embellish the paper, became Thomas Grey. Although the Press is now remedying this problem, which really horrified me (but was just one case out of many of bad publishing), I was certainly not happy to have been reported as saying that Thomas Grey and NOT Thomas Gray had written the Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard. I certainly object to my having been reported in that way. I understand that these things happen, but the real problem is when indirect reportINDIRECT REPORTS, SLURS, AND THE POLYPHONIC SPEAKER 315 ers are either inaccurate and sloppy or dishonest. So there must be something general in defense of my principle. 10. ON TRANSLATION Translation may be a problematic area in the issue of indirect reports. While my form/style principle predicts that forms should be as close as possible to those of the original utterances (and utterers), I have allowed, in some cases, that the principle can and must be surmounted in case heavy contextual clues indicate that the words originally uttered cannot be in the language of the indirect report. In other words, it is possible that the original utterance is in Russian, while the reporting utterance is in English or Italian. I have also made it clear that, even when the context does not make us suspicious that the original utterance was in a language different from the one of the indirect report, we should not expect a coincidence between every word in the reporting utterance and every word in the reported utterance (the original utterance). We expect Relevance to be involved in selecting the lexical items which are under the scope of the Form/Style Principle. Now suppose that there are some slurring expressions in the that-clause of the indirect report, which as the context may indicate, is expressed in a language non-coincident with that of the reported utterance. What should we make of those slurring expressions? Should we ignore them altogether, assuming that due to the translation we should give up the hope of reconstructing the original speaker's words? While I must agree that, in this case, things are much more complicated, my intuition is that the words used by the indirect reporter/translator still give us some indication as to the general quality of the words used by the original speaker. The use of a slur in the that-clause of an indirect report, in my opinion, should correspond to a use of a slur in the reported utterance. And this may be imputed to some presumed Principle of Translation: Do not translate an expression occurring in the original utterance (reported) with a word which gives the impression that the original speaker was slurring, using foul language, insulting, etc. unless the original speaker was indeed slurring, using foul language, insulting, etc. ALESSANDRO CAPONE 316 In other words, the form/style principle seems to survive despite the complications of translation. The Principle of Translation, in fact, seems to be necessitated by the Form/Style Principle. In fact, even by translating one can somehow give the hearer some indication about the original voice. It is not a matter of words, but of style, and thus despite the fact that the words may be different, because they come from a different language, the style seems to be preserved despite translation. These may not be the final words on the matter, but I take these to be an important step forward. 11. CONCLUSION The issue of indirect reports is very important in so far as it is a the testing bed for a theory of pragmatics. In this paper, we have seen that indirect reporting is a social activity which can be described in terms of language games that regulate possible transformations. Unlike direct reports, indirect reporting involves – with some notable exceptions – speaker's meaning and can involve transformations such as deletions, additions, syntactic amendments, but most importantly involves the phenomenon of voicing, as an indirect report can express a number of different voices, being a polyphonic language game. The pragmatic task for the hearer is to separate such voices on the basis of abstract universal principles of cognition or of language use or on the basis of heavy contextual clues which orient the hearer towards the right direction. In this paper, my main claim has been that when a slur is present in the that-clause of an indirect report, responsibility for the slurring expression is assigned to the reported speaker. I have offered a complex battery of arguments to prove that this must be acceptable. Alessandro Capone Università di Palermo Dipartimento di Filosofia del linguaggio Viale delle Scienze Palermo [email protected] INDIRECT REPORTS, SLURS, AND THE POLYPHONIC SPEAKER 317 REfERENCES Anderson L., Lepore E. (2013), Slurring words, in «Noûs», 47 (1), 25-48. Bezuidenhout A. (1997), Pragmatics, semantic underdetermination and the referential/attributive distinction, in «Mind», 106 (423), 375-407. Bianchi C. (forthcoming), Slurs and appropriation. An echoic account, in «Journal of Pragmatics». Capone A. (2008), Belief reports and pragmatic intrusion. The case of null appositives, in «Journal of Pragmatics», 40, 2019-40. Capone, A. (2010), On the social practice of indirect reports, in «Journal of Pragmatics», 43, 377-391. Capone A. (2012), Indirect reports as language games, in «Pragmatics & Cognition», 20 (3), 593-613. Capone A. (2013a), The pragmatics of pronominal clitics and propositional attitudes, in «Intercultural pragmatics», 10 (3), 459-485. Capone A. (2013b), The pragmatics of quotation, explicatures and modularity of mind, in «Pragmatics and Society», 4 (3), 259-284. Capone A. (2013c), The pragmatics of indirect reports and slurring, in A. Capone, F. Lo Piparo, M. Carapezza (eds.), Perspectives on linguistic pragmatics, Cham, Springer, 131-152. Capone A., Salmani Nodoushan M. (2014), On indirect reports and language games: Evidence from Persian, in «Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio». Cappelen H., Lepore E. (2005). Varieties of quotation revisited, in «Belgian Journal of Linguistics», 17, 51-76. Carston R. (2002), Thoughts and Utterances. The Pragmatics of Explicit Communication, Oxford, Blackwell. Carston R. (2013), Legal texts and canons of construction. A view from current pragmatic theory, in M. Freeman, F. Smith (eds.), Law and Language: Current Legal Issues, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 8-34. Dascal M., Weizman E. (1987), Contextual exploitation of contextualization clues in text understanding: An integrated model, in J. Verschueren, M. Bertuccelli-Papi (eds.), The Pragmatics Perspectives, Amsterdam, John Benjamins, 31-46. Davis W. (2003), Meaning, Expression and Thought, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Davis W. (2005), Nondescriptive Meaning and Relevance, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Hall A. (2013), Relevance theory, semantic content and pragmatic enrichment, in A. Capone, F. Lo Piparo, M. Carapezza (eds.), Perspectives on Linguistic Pragmatics, Cham, Springer, 99-130. Hom C. (2010), Pejoratives, in «Philosophy Compass», 5 (2), 164-185. Hom C. 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KANT ON THE NECESSITY OF CAUSAL RELATIONS* Toni Kannisto, University of Oslo, [email protected] Forthcoming in Kant-Studien Abstract There are two traditional ways to read Kant's claim that every event necessarily has a cause: the weaker every-event some-cause (WCP) and the stronger same-cause same-effect (SCP) causal principles. The focus of the debate about whether and where he subscribes to the SCP has been in the Analogies in the Critique of Pure Reason (Guyer, Allison, and Watkins) and in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (Friedman). By analysing the arguments and conclusions of both the Analogies and the Postulates as well as the two Latin principles non datur casus and non datur fatum that summarise their results, I will argue for the novel thesis that the SCP is actually demonstrated in the Postulates of the First Critique. 1. Introduction Causality and necessity have traditionally been tightly intertwined, and Kant makes no exception. He frequently connects causality with necessity and holds that 'the very concept of a cause [...] obviously contains the concept of a necessity of connection with an effect' (B5).1 Yet causality and necessity can be connected in many ways. There is, first, no logical contradiction in merely contingent causality: something could produce varying effects without any regularity and still qualify as a cause in the sense of necessarily bringing something about. Kant's claim above does not deny such contingency; it states a mere analytic truth about the meaning of cause: that causes necessarily produce effects. This analytic proposition can be contrasted with the synthetic one that every event necessarily has a cause,2 which in turn can * I wish to thank Karin De Boer, Robert Hanna, Frode Kjosavik, Jonas Jervell Indregard, Camilla Serck-Hanssen, and the audience of the Kant and Modality conference in Berlin for valuable feedback, 1 Translations of Kant's works are from the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. References follow the Akademie-Ausgabe (AA 1–28) pagination, except for the Critique of Pure Reason, for which the original 1781 (A) and 1787 (B) edition paginations are used. 2 Cf. A6/B10, A9/B13. Kant on the Necessity of Causal Relations 2 be read in two ways: that every event necessarily has just some cause or that the same causes necessarily bring about the same effects (and, ceteris paribus, same events). Ever since Lewis White Beck's 'A Prussian Hume and a Scottish Kant' (1978), the two synthetic alternatives have been known as the every-event some-cause and the same-cause same-effect principles – or the weak causal principle (WCP) and the strong causal principle (SCP).3 There exist several competing interpretations of whether and where Kant subscribes to the weak and strong causal principles. Especially the section of the Critique of Pure Reason (Critique for short) called Analogies of Experience (Analogies) that argues for the objective reality of causality remains a great divider among Kant interpretations. According to Henry Allison, the Analogies seek to 'establish the [weaker] every-event-some-cause principle' (Allison 2004, 247).4 Paul Guyer, by contrast, takes the Analogies to explicitly argue for the necessity of particular causal laws and hence for the strong causal principle (Guyer 1987, 252). Michael Friedman, in turn, argues that although in the Critique Kant 'does very little to explain' (Friedman 1992, 176) how the SCP is grounded, in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (Foundations, 1786) Kant establishes it by subsuming particular causal laws under the universal causal principle (the WCP) (Friedman 1992, 185–7). Finally, Eric Watkins argues that although Kant does not explicitly prove the SCP in the Analogies, he is committed to it and grounds it there implicitly (Watkins 2005, 287 ff.).5 Although these interpretations might seem to exhaust the logical space of alternatives, I believe that they underestimate or even overlook the importance of the section in the Critique called The Postulates of Empirical Thinking in General (Postulates).6 In this section, which 3 Cf. Allison 2004, 246, 256, 272; and Watkins 2005, 203, 215f, 286. 4 Cf. Strawson 1966, Buchdahl 1969, and Beck 1978. 5 For further discussion of these views, see Allison 2004, 256–8, and Watkins 2005, 203–4, 287n63. 6 Existing literature on Kant's theory of modality present little relevant discussion about its relation to causality (cf. Schneeberger 1952, Grünewald 1986, Wingendorf 2001, Motta 2007 & 2012, Greenberg 2008, and Mosser 2008). Neither Allison nor Watkins refer to the Postulates (except in passing). Guyer belongs to the long ranks of interpreters that belittle the Postulates (Guyer 1987, 275; 1998, 299; cf. Strawson 1966, 31; Adickes 1889, 233–4n; Kemp Smith 1962, 400). Although Friedman does discuss the Postulates, he does not recognize its decisive role in Kant's overall argument: he grants that Kant 'explicitly emphasizes' the link of 'causal uniformity with necessity' in the Postulates (Friedman 1992, 171; cf. ibid., 180) but does not consider the possibility that Kant is not Kant on the Necessity of Causal Relations 3 immediately follows the Analogies, Kant presents (inter alia) his theory of real or metaphysical necessity and explicates its relationship to causality. In this paper I will argue that while Kant meant for the Analogies to justify the WCP, he in fact intended the postulate of necessity to justify the SCP. Thus, although contra Guyer the SCP is not proven in the Analogies, Kant does contra Allison nonetheless subscribe to it, yet does not contra Friedman postpone its (explicit) justification to the Foundations either. My claim also stands in contrast with Watkins's attempt to seek support for the SCP in what he identifies as implicit theses of the Analogies as well as in Kant's pre-critical doctrines (ibid., 204, 216, 286–8). I will argue for my thesis in two steps. First I will show that the WCP is the explicit principle of the Second Analogy (3.1) and that its argument also supports only the weaker principle (3.2). I will then show that the function Kant assigns to the postulate of necessity requires that it grounds the SCP (4.1 & 4.2) and that its explicit formulation is likewise the SCP (4.3). Note that my only aim in this article is to show where Kant himself sought to justify the SCP. A detailed analysis and assessment of this justification requires a separate treatment.7 2. The Weak and the Strong Causal Principles One way to clarify the modal difference between the weak and the strong causal principles is via de re and de dicto modality. Consider Kant's modally ambiguous claim that 'if [the cause] is posited, [the effect] would necessarily have to follow' (A201/B246). On the de dicto reading of it, the necessity concerns the whole judgement: 'necessarily, if the cause is posited, the effect follows'. On the de re reading, the necessity pertains to the causal relation itself, making it necessary: 'if the cause is posited, the effect follows necessarily'. (Ceteris paribus is presupposed here and throughout.)8 merely emphasising but justifying it in the Postulates. Although Friedman later (2012) assigns a greater role to the Postulates, his main thesis remains intact. I know of only one article that focuses on Kant's theory of necessity in connection with causality: Markku Leppäkoski's 'The Transcendental Must: Kant's Various Notions of Necessity' (2001). 7 I have discussed this in Kannisto 2012. For an analysis of postulation and modality, see also Motta 2012. 8 By denoting 'x causes y' by xCy, the two readings can be formulated as follows. In the de dicto reading the necessity-operator is in front of the quantifiers: □∀y∃x(xCy): 'Necessarily, for all y, there is an x Kant on the Necessity of Causal Relations 4 Although the de dicto/de re distinction clarifies the formal status of the modal operator in the WCP and the SCP, it does not bring out the specifics of the two principles and by no means constitutes a full analysis. One must also ask what kind of entities x and y are – events, objects, or perhaps substances. One might suggest that they are events so that one event causes another – especially since 'event' appears in the standard formulation of the WCP – but I believe Watkins is correct in criticising event-based models of causality for being simplistic (Watkins 2005, 232–42). For Kant, a deeper structure of causal forces of substances underlies events: things (substances) have powers that bring about change (an event) by exerting force on other things. An event occurs when a thing changes its state from A at t1 to B at t2, and so the structure of an event already contains a causal influence that brings about the change in it. For simplicity's sake we can, however, ignore these specifics for now and continue using the event-formulation of the WCP. A further question is whether x and y are types or tokens. For reasons given later, they must be tokens for the WCP and types for the SCP (see section 3). With types the WCP would be too strong and with tokens the SCP would be too weak. Thus the SCP reads: same types of causes produce same types of effects – or similar causes produce similar effects.9 There is a common confusion about the SCP that complicates matters. For example, according to Allison: [W]e can know a priori only that an appearance must stand in a necessary relation to some other appearance, but not that we will be able (even in principle) to determine what that other appearance is and the law connecting them. (Allison 2004, 259.) Although this is correct, the problem is that Allison takes the latter to amount to the SCP, whereas in fact it is a much stronger principle. Let me dub the principle that we can know particular causal laws a priori the extreme causal principle (XCP). The XCP concerns the epistemological question of whether and how we can determine the laws of nature (a priori or only empirically a posteriori), whereas the SCP is the ontological tenet that there are laws of nature, such that x causes y.' In the de re reading the necessity-operator is after the quantifiers: ∀y∃x(□(xCy)): 'For all y, there is an x such that x necessarily causes y.' 9 Cf. Lovejoy 1906, 399–402; Allison 2004, 258; and Watkins 2005, 215. Kant on the Necessity of Causal Relations 5 i.e. that the same cause (whatever it may be) always (ceteris paribus) brings about the same effect (whatever it may be). As Kant points out, knowing that causal relations are invariable laws is different from being able to determine what these laws are: 'Everything in nature [...] takes place according to rules, although we are not always acquainted with these rules.' (AA 9, 11.) Thus Allison conflates the SCP and the XCP, and since in his view Kant does not subscribe to the XCP (Allison's SCP), he erroneously infers that Kant must settle with the WCP.10 When presenting his opponent's view, Friedman makes the same conflation: The Transcendental Analytic does not, however, establish that particular laws are themselves necessary. Indeed, as far as particular causal laws are concerned, the Transcendental Analytic is in basic agreement with Hume: They are established by induction and induction alone. (Friedman 1992, 164.) The view that 'particular causal laws are [...] necessary' is different from the view that they are 'established by induction'. The latter, epistemological point is no ground for denying the former, ontological one. And it is the former that the SCP states, not the latter. Friedman does not make this conflation only in characterising his opponent's view: his reason for seeking proof of the SCP in the Foundations is that he believes a particular empirical law is (ontologically) necessary only if it has been derived (epistemically) using the a priori 'principles of the understanding' (ibid., 172), which is what Kant does e.g. for the Newtonian law of gravitation in the Foundations.11 But since determination of particular laws (XCP) is not required for the claim that the laws (whatever they may be) are necessary (SCP), Kant can well justify the latter in the Critique and leave the former to the Foundations. Watkins perceives this common error: 10 Allison does distinguish between two strong readings of the Second Analogy: Guyer's 'epistemological' and a 'more orthodox version' (Allison 2004, 256–7). The former is the XCP, whereas the latter is the SCP: 'every event falls under some empirical causal law, the precise nature of which must be learned from experience' (ibid., 257–8). Yet Allison goes on to conflate the 'more orthodox version' with the XCP when he argues against it that 'it does not determine what the cause is or guarantee that we shall be able to discover it or the relevant causal law' (ibid., 258). This argument only works against the XCP and does not touch the SCP: the latter makes the (ontological) a priori claim that there are necessary causal laws, not the (epistemological) claim that we could discover them a priori. 11 Friedman 1992, 173–5, 180, 185–6, 190–1. Kant on the Necessity of Causal Relations 6 Accordingly, [Kant's] framework entails only that whatever grounds and causal laws have held in the past will not change in the future [the SCP]. Thus, even if Kant were to establish the metaphysical necessity of causal laws for the determination of the changes that occur in the world, the epistemological question of ascertaining what grounds exist in the world has not been addressed at all. (Watkins 2005, 290.) Watkins is refreshingly candid about the trouble he faces in trying to attribute the SCP to the Analogies, however. Not only does he grant that 'it is tempting to rest content with the weaker reading' (ibid., 286), he also admits – after nonetheless defending the stronger reading (ibid., 288) – that '[e]ven if this interpretation does accurately represent Kant's intentions, it is unclear that Kant's arguments can carry the weight of the strong reading of the Second Analogy at a metaphysical level' (ibid., 290n). Watkins has to rely on two additional principles taken from Kant's pre-critical works and on it seeming 'more attractive to assert that a different ground is active in bringing about different effects' (ibid., 288) – rather than that the very causality of the ground has changed, as could be the case with the WCP. Since Kant explicitly defends the SCP in the Postulates, such speculative measures are, however, unnecessary. 3. The Second Analogy and the Weak Causal Principle It is fairly uncontroversial that Kant's explicit arguments in the Second Analogy support only the weak causal principle – even Watkins agrees on this.12 Whether Kant nevertheless sought to prove the SCP there is another matter, however. Indeed, Lovejoy's famous charge – echoed by Strawson (1966, 137) – that the Second Analogy constitutes 'one of the most spectacular examples of the non-sequitur which are to be found in the history of philosophy' (Lovejoy 1906, 402) is motivated by his (false) belief that Kant sought to prove the 'law of universal and uniform causation' (the SCP) but only succeeds in proving the 'irreversibility of the sequence of my perceptions in a single instance' (ibid., 399) (the WCP).13 Lovejoy's charge can be rebutted 12 See Watkins 2005, 204; Lovejoy 1906, 399; and Friedman 1992, 161–70. 13 Lovejoy is correct when he states: 'But all this has no relation to the law of universal and uniform causation, for the manifest reason that a proof of the irreversibility of the sequence of my perceptions in a single instance of a phenomenon, is not equivalent to a proof of the necessary uniformity of the sequence of my perceptions in repeated instances of a given kind of phenomenon.' (Lovejoy 1906, 399.) Kant on the Necessity of Causal Relations 7 by showing that the explicit principle of the second analogy is the WCP and that Kant's argument in the second analogy is not intended to justify the SCP. My following reading of the argument in the Second Analogy mostly draws on Watkins (2005), as I believe he has presented it correctly. 3. 1. The Principle of the Second Analogy Kant formulates the principle of the second analogy in two ways, which I take to be equivalent (Allison 2004, 247). In the A-edition it is: (SAA) 'Everything that happens (begins to be) presupposes a something which it follows in accordance with a rule.' (A189.) The Bedition version reads: (SAB) 'All alterations occur in accordance with the law of the connection of cause and effect.' (B232.) Especially the SAA suggests the WCP: every event (alteration) presupposes some cause – 'a something' – that brings it about. Kant's claim that the second analogy demonstrates the principle of sufficient reason for all appearances also speaks for the weaker reading (A200f/B246, A217/B264f). According to this principle, everything (here: every event) must have a reason or cause that is sufficient for bringing it about – it does not, as such, decide whether this particular reason has a necessary (rather than merely contingent) connection to the event.14 The words 'rule' and 'law' in Kant's formulations could seem to indicate the stronger reading, however: that everything does not merely have a ground but a rule-like ground. Yet, as has been noted especially by Watkins, this would be hasty, for according to Kant rules are 'either necessary or contingent' (AA 9, 12), and laws are by definition necessary rules.15 If, as seems plausible, the Aand B-edition formulate the same theses, then the 'law of the connection of cause and effect' in the SAB is the same as the whole A-edition formulation SAA, i.e., that it is a law (SAB) that (SAA) '[e]verything that happens (begins to be) presupposes a something But he is wrong when he continues: 'Yet it is the latter alone that Hume denied and that Kant desires to establish [in the Second Analogy].' (Ibid.) 14 For Kant, the principle of sufficient reason has both a logical and a real use. In the Jäsche Logik (1800) Kant explicitly connects the principle of sufficient reason to logical actuality, not to necessity (AA 9, 53; cf. AA 28, 721). Since Kant is careful to maintain a correspondence between the logical and real use of principles, he likely did not mean the real principle of sufficient reason to involve necessity either. 15 See e.g. A126, A216/B263; KU, 184; and Watkins 2005, 203, 215f. Kant on the Necessity of Causal Relations 8 which it follows in accordance with a rule.' Accordingly, the 'law of the connection of cause and effect' should be read as de dicto: it is necessary (a law) that every event (everything that happens) presupposes some cause (a something which it follows in accordance with a rule). Indeed, Kant consistently refers to the causal principle of the Second Analogy as a law.16 That is, the principle of causality – that there is causality grounding all alteration – is necessary.17 In contrast, in the Analogies Kant consistently characterizes the causal connection itself as a rule. In the objective (causal) connection 'the apprehension of one thing (that which happens) follows that of the other (which precedes) in accordance with a rule' (A193/B238). That is, unlike the principle that there be causality to begin with, the causal connection itself is not yet established as a necessary rule (law) but as a rule that might turn out to be contingent. Since Kant calls the causal connection a 'rule' no less than 21 times18 in the Second Analogy, and does not once call it a 'law,' it is not likely that the choice of term is accidental. Thus that Kant uses the words 'rule' and 'law' does not yet imply the SCP. One needs to carefully analyse what Kant takes to be the rules and laws. As I will show in section 4.1, Kant's terminology is consistent also in the Postulates: he distinguishes between rules and laws 16 Cf. B234, A199/B244, A 202/B 248, and A207/B252. 17 There is one digressing passage, yet it is the exception that proves the rule. For when Kant rejects 'everything that has always been said about' how the causal principle is grounded (namely on induction), he says that according to this common view 'we are led to discover a rule, in accordance with which certain occurrences always follow certain appearances, and are thereby first prompted to form the concept of cause' (A195/B240f.). Here the causal principle is characterized as a rule rather than a law. Yet in the very next sentence Kant rejects this common view by pointing out that 'the rule that [the concept of cause] supplies, that everything that happens has a cause [the WCP], would be just as contingent as the experience itself: its universality and necessity would then be merely feigned [...]' (A196/B241). That is, the sole characterisation of the causal principle as a mere rule is connected to its rejection as contingent, i.e., to the incapacity of experience to establish it is a necessary rule – as a law. Thus the passage supports rather than undermines my view that Kant deliberately and consistently distinguishes rules from laws. It also shows that his concern in the Second Analogy is whether the principle 'everything that happens has a cause' is (de dicto) contingent or necessary, not whether we should ascribe (de re) necessity to the causal relations themselves. 18 A188, A193/B238 (4x), A194/B239 (2x), A195/B240 (3x), A196/B241, A196/B242, A197/B242, A198/B243 (2x), A199/B244, A200/B245 (3x), A201/B247, A202/B247. Kant on the Necessity of Causal Relations 9 deliberately so that the Analogies would ground the WCP while the Postulates would ground the SCP.19 It is furthermore right after the three analogies that Kant first makes the distinction between rules and laws explicit and defines the latter as necessary rules: 'By nature (in the empirical sense) we understand the combination of appearances as regards their existence, in accordance with necessary rules, i.e., in accordance with laws.' (A216/B263.) It seems plausible, then, that after having grounded the WCP in the Analogies, Kant clarifies the status of this principle before continuing to the Postulates and to the remaining task of justifying that the causal rules are necessary and not merely contingent. 3. 2. The Argument in the Second Analogy In a nutshell, in the Second Analogy Kant argues that the temporally determined subjective order of our representations necessarily presupposes an objective (and hence causal) order of events (see Watkins 2005, 203 ff.). Kant notes that if I perceive a house, I can perceive first the rooftop and then the ground just as well as vice versa. In contrast, if I perceive a ship driven downstream, I would have to perceive it first upstream and then downstream, and this order could not be reversed. (A192/B237f.) The difference is that, unlike the house, the ship's motion constitutes an event or a happening (Geschehen; cf. Allison 2004, 255f). In the Second Analogy Kant seeks to explain this irreversibility of the order of perception in events and its reversibility in non-event occurrences (Begebenheiten). Kant observes first that the subjective order of representations is reversible. (A192/B237f, A201/B246.) In my thinking and imagination (including memory), I can represent my last day at school and then the first just as well as vice versa. Drawing on complex reasoning that I will not explicate here,20 Kant concludes that therefore no subjective ground can account for the irreversibility of the sequence of perception in events. Hence the ground must be objective and causal. (In accordance with the Transcendental Deduction, this causality is imposed on rather than derived from the world.) 19 Kant seems to use 'rules' and 'laws' similarly throughout his philosophy (e.g. A91/B124, A113, A126; Pro, 312; KpV, 20f, 31, 67; KU, 182–4; AA 9, 12; R 5414, AA 18, 176). Here, however, it suffices to show his consistency in the Analogies and Postulates specifically. Although Kant often speaks of rules when he could speak of laws – which is fine since laws are (necessary) rules – he does not speak of laws when he should speak only of rules. 20 See A192–5/B237–40, A197–200/B242–5, A201f/B246f. Kant on the Necessity of Causal Relations 10 It is important to understand this irreversibility correctly: Kant does not claim that the de facto order of perception could be inverted. If I first happen to look at the rooftop and then at the ground, I cannot as it were go back in time to reverse this order. Kant's point about the difference between reversibility and irreversibility would be moot since I cannot change the perceptual sequence in any case. Rather, the reversibility is counterfactual: whereas I could have perceived the rooftop and the ground in the opposite order, I could not have first seen the ship downstream and then upstream – insofar as it really does move downstream: I see a ship driven downstream. My perception of its position downstream follows the perception of its position upstream, and it is impossible that in the apprehension of this appearance the ship should first be perceived downstream and afterwards upstream. [...] In the previous example of a house my perception could have begun at its rooftop and ended at the ground, but could also have begun below and ended above [...]. (A192/B237f,) Kant's argument – which will not be pursued here – goes on to show that the irreversibility of perceptual order in events requires an objective ground that determines the de facto order of things. It is because there is an objective sequence that I cannot help but perceive events in one determinate order rather than the other. It is in terms of this counterfactual impossibility of reversed order of perception of events that the necessity in the Second Analogy is to be understood. Kant calls this the 'law of causality' or the 'law of the connection of cause and effect' (see note 16). It states that necessarily, in every event there is something that is preceded and determined (according to a rule) by something else, i.e. that every event involves a cause. Otherwise there could not even subjectively be any temporally determinate order of perception, and since in the perception of events there is such order, the law of causality is necessary. But this irreversible temporal sequence hereby only requires that all changes of state (events) are determined by some cause or other, i.e. that there are some causal relations (the WCP), not that they remain constant through time (the SCP). None of Kant's numerous references to necessity in the argument have to be interpreted in the stronger terms of the SCP. Kant's point is simply that if the ship really is driven downstream, which according to his argument shows that there are objective causal grounds for it to do so, then if it is to be perceived at all, it must be perceived first upstream and then downstream. Since his argument thus repeatedly and explicitly requires just the necessity of Kant on the Necessity of Causal Relations 11 perceiving one thing before the other, it offers no grounds for a de re interpretation of such statements as: 'objective significance is conferred to our representations only insofar as a certain order in their temporal relation is necessary' (A197/B243). Kant does not need to say anything about the constancy of the causal connection pertaining between appearances. Thus his arguments justify only the WCP, and his conclusion neither requires nor invokes the SCP. 3. 3. Some Problematic Passages One could object that I have ignored passages that seem to endorse the SCP in the Analogies. Indeed, quite contrary to my view, Watkins notes: [T]here is a textual motivation for the stronger reading that does not sit well with the weaker reading. For in the Second Analogy Kant repeatedly uses terms such as 'universality,' 'always,' and 'invariably,' [sic]21 all of which strongly suggest that Kant has in mind causal laws that would hold over time. Moreover, Kant seems to slide back and forth between the weak and strong meanings of the principle without explicitly acknowledging the considerable philosophical difference between them. (Watkins 2005, 287.) Although I do not think Kant slides back and forth between the WCP and the SCP, at times his words do seem to suggest the stronger reading. Yet the mere occurrence of e.g. 'always' is no more problematic than that of 'necessary'. As we saw, the context and precise formulation of these terms is what matters. That said, I have found the following three passages the most problematic for my reading. (P1) [...] if the state that precedes is posited, then this determinate occurrence inevitably and necessarily follows. (A198/B243f.) (P2) [...] there is therein an order of the successive synthesis that determines an object, in accordance with which something would necessarily have to precede and, if this is posited, the other would necessarily have to follow. (A201/B246.) (P3) [...] if I were to posit that which precedes and the occurrence did not follow it necessarily, then I would have to hold it to be only a subjective play of my imaginings [...]. (A201/B247.) 21 Kant does not use the word 'invariably' in the Analogies. Most likely Watkins means the essentially different 'inevitably' (unausbleiblich) (cf. P1 below). Kemp Smith's unfortunate translation of unausbleiblich as 'invariably' might have contributed to this error. Kant on the Necessity of Causal Relations 12 The distinction – common in secondary literature22 – between types and tokens is crucial for dispelling the worry that these passages would support the stronger reading. Recall the context: I perceive an event in a determinate temporal order, i.e., the state or occurrence a1 appears before a2 and not vice versa. According to the Second Analogy this order is grounded in an objective causal connection so that some cause c grounds the alteration of a1 into a2 (constituting an event) and hence a1 must occur before a2.23 Here the causal determination occurs between token states, not types – it is not as if the type 'ship is upstream' must precede the type 'ship is downstream' so that ships could never sail upstream! Rather, in this particular example the order of representation is what it is because the token ship is moving downstream. In this context it makes sense to say in P1 that if a1 (token occurrence) 'is posited, then [a2] inevitably and necessarily follows'. This is why Kant specifically speaks of 'this determinate occurrence' – of a token, not a type. Similarly for P2: In the sequence of perception P(a1, t1) > P(a2, t2), 'something would necessarily have to precede', i.e., there must be some token occurrence a1 that precedes. If this token a1 is posited, then the token effect a2 must also be posited. As to P3, if there really were a ship upstream ('if I were to posit that which precedes') and the ship would not occur downstream later ('if [...] the occurrence did not follow'), the token ship could not have been moving downstream after all, since if it were, it would have had to occur downstream later. If in the passages P1–P3 Kant is speaking of tokens, then they do not contest my claim that he seeks to prove only the WCP in the Second Analogy. This also serves to deflect Lovejoy's charge that Kant sought to derive the causal uniformity about type-events from the irreversibility of token-events (Lovejoy 1906, 399–402). The SCP holds that the causal rule is an unchanging law so that whenever the same type of condition occurs, the same type of consequence must follow. The WCP dictates just that in case an event (alteration from a1 to a2) occurs, it is connected to its cause by some token rule c. As Lovejoy points out, it is quite 22 E.g. Lovejoy 1906, 399; Friedman 1992, 163f, 170; Allison 2004, 258; Watkins 2005, 215. 23 Since the occurrence a1 changes because of the cause c, it must precede c. Similarly, since a2 is caused by c, c must precede a2. Thus we get the following sequence: a1 > c > a2. Note that Kant argues that a1 must precede a2 even when the two are simultaneous: 'it is the order of time and not its lapse that is taken account of; the relation remains even if no time has elapsed' (A203/B248). Kant on the Necessity of Causal Relations 13 possible for the rule to change across time so that when the next token cause of the same type occurs, the token effect would be of a different type. 4. The Postulate of Necessity The postulate of necessity contains Kant's explication of the real and empirical use of the concept of necessity (in contrast to its logical use). As per my thesis, this use is to ground the SCP on top of the WCP already established in the Analogies. There are essentially three species of textual evidence that show that Kant himself intended the postulate of necessity to establish the SCP: how he presents the role or function of the postulate (4.1); the fact that the postulate is supposed to make prediction possible, which requires more than the mere WCP (4.2); and his explicit formulations of the principles he took the Analogies and the Postulates to establish (4.3). 4. 1. Adding Necessity to Causality According to Kant, the postulate of necessity, as a modal principle, 'adds to the causal determination still [noch]24 the concept of necessity' (A228/B281, translation altered). If one takes the Analogies to already establish the necessity of causal determination (SCP), Kant must come across as confused – and indeed Kemp Smith accordingly calls Kant's postulates 'perverse' (Kemp Smith 1962, 400). However, by asking, as we have done and Kemp Smith not, what kind of necessity the Analogies establish and what kind of necessity the third postulate adds to causal determination, one will find that the postulate is not just a symptom of Kant's architectonical perversion. By adding another sense of necessity (de re) the postulate strengthens the weak causal principle and so, I submit, for the first time grounds the strong causal principle. Kant rejects absolute or unconditional real necessity and endorses only hypothetical or conditional necessity (see 4.3). According to him 'there is no existence that could be cognized as necessary under the condition of other given appearances except the existence of effects from given causes in accordance with the laws of causality' (A227/B279). Although it might seem that he 24 The German word noch can often be left untranslated – as Guyer & Wood do here. Yet as the postulate is accused of being superfluous, Kant's claim that it adds still something is relevant. Kant on the Necessity of Causal Relations 14 is just recapping the Analogies, there is an easily overlooked but significant difference: the plural 'laws of causality'. In the Second Analogy Kant does not once mention laws of causality but employs solely the singular the law of causality (the WCP, cf. 3.1). That the plural is no slip of the tongue is clear from the next sentence that repeats it: we can cognize the necessity of the states of substances 'in accordance with empirical laws of causality' (A227/B280). What is more, the word 'empirical' is added – the expression 'empirical laws of causality' does not appear in the three analogies. Kant does, however, mention transcendental in contrast to empirical laws in the remark to the Analogies (A216/B263). The transcendental laws are the transcendental principles of the understanding, including the analogies and postulates, through which the categories are applied to objects of experience (Friedman 1992, 166–75; Allison 2004, 258; Watkins 2005, 203f). The law of causality of the Second Analogy is one of these 'transcendental laws of nature' (A216/B263) that are required for there to be nature and hence particular empirical laws to begin with (ibid., A228/B280; cf. Friedman 1992, 164–8). After having distinguished transcendental from empirical laws in order to clarify that the analogies are of the transcendental kind, Kant reverts back to rules when characterising the causal relation in both the second and third analogy (A217/B264). Thus neither Kant's reference to 'certain laws [...], which first make nature possible' (A216/B263), nor to 'transcendental laws of nature' (ibid.) contest my observation that Kant switches from causal rules to causal laws consistently and explicitly between the Analogies and the Postulates.25 Quite the contrary, the distinction between transcendental and empirical laws that occurs in the remark between the Analogies and the Postulates seems to rather clarify the roles of these passages and to emphasize the otherwise subtle move from the (transcendental) law to (empirical) laws of causality. That there are causal laws does not merely re-affirm the necessity of there being causal relations ('law of causality') but asserts necessity in these relations, i.e., that the particular causal relations are (empirical) laws of nature. It is not just that alteration requires some cause 25 Kant uses the plural 'laws' here only because he is talking about all three analogies, each of which exhibit a transcendental law. Thus the Second Analogy establishes a transcendental law, not laws. (A216f/B263f.) Kant on the Necessity of Causal Relations 15 (the WCP), but that there is necessity in this alteration, grounded on particular natural laws – such as the law of gravitation. This is, however, not to endorse the XCP – that we could discover or determine e.g. the law of gravity a priori. Rather, it is to affirm that insofar as gravitation is a law of nature – and knowing whether it is requires further investigation – it is necessary and brings about its effect invariably. Kant writes about the postulate of necessity: 'Everything that happens is hypothetically necessary; that is a principle that subjects alterations in the world to a law, i.e., to a rule of necessary existence, without which not even nature itself would obtain' (A228/B280, translation altered). Since the postulate subjects alterations in the world to a law – again equated with a necessary rule – it reinforces the principle of the second analogy (the WCP) that subjects alterations to rules that could be contingent. It thus seems that Kant made the distinction knowingly: he intends the postulate of necessity to literally justify adding necessity to causal determination – to justify treating causal relations as necessary.26 One might still object to the distinction between rules and laws. Standardly a rule is considered unchangeable – rules themselves do not change even if it might change which rule is in effect. Thus e.g. the mathematical rule of doubling, expressed by the function 'f: x à 2x', itself cannot change. Trebling does not change the rule of doubling but rather substitutes it by another rule 'g: x à 3x'. This I grant. Yet the necessity of laws of nature exactly excludes such substitution. A rule can be replaced by another or be suspended for a period of time but a law cannot – at least not in the sense of natural laws.27 If 'L: x à f(x)' is a law of nature, then whenever its condition x occurs, the consequent f(x) does too.28 This suffices to make the relevant distinction (reinforced in the next section): while the WCP just states that for any 26 In terms of the de re/de dicto distinction, the WCP states the de dicto necessity of the law of causality: □∀y∃x(xCy). It subscribes to the necessity of there being causal rules, of x and y being connected by causality that grounds the latter on the former. The SCP adds a necessity-operator to the causal determination itself (xCy) and so reinforces it into a causal law: ∀y∃x(□(xCy)). This is not de dicto necessity of causality but de re necessity in causality. 27 Watkins, too, recognizes constancy across time as a characteristic of the necessity of laws (Watkins 2005, 287). In his schematism Kant also advocates a tight bond between necessity and existence at all times (A145/B184). 28 Natural laws can counter each other. A book on the table does not fall because other forces negate gravity's pull – not because gravity does not affect it. Kant on the Necessity of Causal Relations 16 phenomenon P there exists a ground G that brings it about in accordance with a causal rule C, the SCP requires a law L so that whenever the conditions exhibited by G occur, P also occurs – i.e., the connecting rule C cannot change across time. This Kant seeks to establish in the postulate of necessity by adding necessity to causality, i.e., by demanding that C is a necessary (□xCy = L) rather than a contingent (xCy) relation.29 4. 2. The Strong Causal Principle and the Possibility of Prediction According to Kant, the postulate of possibility fills an important role: Necessity therefore concerns only the relations of appearances in accordance with the dynamical law of causality, and the possibility grounded upon it [darauf] of inferring a priori from some given existence (a cause) to another existence (the effect). (A227f/B280.) There are two things of note here. First, as the necessity here concerns relations of appearances, its scope is de re the (causal) 'relations of appearances', i.e. the relation xCy, rather than the 'dynamical law of causality' that has already been established as necessary in the second analogy. Secondly, according to Kant the postulate of necessity grounds the possibility of inferring from a given existence to another as its effect.30 This is crucial, as the WCP could not justify such an inference, since in the absence of laws nothing would determine beforehand which causal relations pertain between which events, even if we know that some do. For it to be even in principle possible to infer from causes to effects, constant laws 29 Whereas the WCP allows for type-identical grounds with type-different rules and hence typedifferent effects, the SCP dictates that type-identical grounds involve type-identical causal rules and hence bring about type-identical effects. More precisely the WCP states that if at any time ta the token p1 of the type P1 occurs, then there exists a ground-token g1 of the type G1 and a rule-type (function) C1 at tb so that tb < ta and g1C1p1 (p1 is caused by g1 via rule C1). The SCP further stipulates that if there exists a ground-token g2 of the type G2 and a rule-type C2 at tc (tb < ta < tc), and if G1 = G2, then C1 = C2 and thus there exists a token occurrence p2 of the type P2 at td so that P1 = P2 and tc < td. 30 Kant does not and should not make any claims to the possibility of such inference in the Analogies. Paton observes the importance of this point (1976, 363) but does not develop it further. Kant on the Necessity of Causal Relations 17 of nature are required – otherwise it could only at best be determined after the fact that y was caused by x in a particular case.31 This is not an epistemological point: even if there are causal laws and consistency, there could be other factors inhibiting us from knowing the laws of nature and hence from succeeding in prediction – the SCP is a necessary, not sufficient condition of prediction. Indeed, as a testimony to the complexity of Kant's philosophy of causality, the Transcendental Dialectic introduces yet another principle: the regulative causal principle (RCP). (A642/B670 ff.) According to the RCP, we can ground our scientific endeavour to determine the laws of nature only with the presupposition that nature is lawfully uniform.32 Although Kant's discussion of the RCP, scientific investigation and method, as well as induction and hypotheses, is interesting, here it suffices to bracket the RCP out by distinguishing it (as a regulative epistemological principle) from the SCP (as a constitutive ontological principle) and to point out that while the SCP is a necessary condition of inferring from one event to another and so of predicting them, it is not sufficient for us being 31 Arguably, even this would be impossible. As Kant agrees with Hume that causality cannot be directly perceived (B233, B257, A216/B262), in a world governed merely by the WCP we could not know what the cause was even after the fact. Since anything could cause anything, there is no telling what might have caused what, as there are neither laws on which to ground such a claim nor direct perception of causal relations – we cannot simply 'see' that y was caused by x. In case there are laws, however, then every x of the type X would ceteris paribus cause a y of the type Y, so y could be inferred from x, and the occurrence of a y of the type Y could be taken to indicate the existence of an x of the type X. This indication is not certain, however, as even with the SCP y could be caused by something else than x as well – the principle is same-cause same-effect, not same-effect same-cause. Thus the standard procedure of natural science of determining and ruling out other possible causes is needed to isolate x as the actual cause of y. 32 This is Hume's Principle of Uniformity of Nature (Hume 1739–40, 1.3.6, 89). The transcendental principles are constitutive (of experience), for they make experience of nature as well as nature itself possible (A180/B222f, A644/B672, A664/B692). Regulative principles only serve to direct our thinking – they make thinking of nature possible – and so according to the RCP rational faith in, not knowledge of, this uniformity subjectively justifies our use of the inductive method to discover particular laws of nature. We are for the sake of motivating scientific investigation allowed to believe in its validity. Our faith in the manageable complexity of nature is betrayed by our continued attempt to model even such chaotic phenomena as weather. (See Kannisto 2012.) Kant on the Necessity of Causal Relations 18 epistemically capable of doing so.33 What is important is that Kant takes the postulate of necessity to ground the possibility of such prediction – making no such claim of the Analogies – and thus it seems plausible that he was aware of and advocated the stronger nature of the former.34 4. 3. In mundo non datur nec casus nec fatum35 Kant's explication of the respective principles of the Analogies and the Postulates (if not itself exactly a hallmark of clarity) provides further evidence that Kant sought to justify the SCP in the Postulates: Hence the proposition 'Nothing happens through a blind accident' (in mundo non datur casus) is an a priori law of nature; likewise the proposition 'No necessity in nature is blind, but is rather conditioned, consequently comprehensible [verständliche] necessity' (non datur fatum). [...] The first [proposition] is properly a consequence of the principle of causality (under the analogies of experience). The second belongs to the principles of modality, which adds to the causal determination still the concept of necessity, which, however, stands under a rule of understanding. (A228/B280f, translation altered.) 33 The RCP concerns neither the existence nor the necessity but the number of natural laws and the level of fine-tuning in their conditions – which it takes to be manageable (cf. KU, 183; AA 20, 208f). If there were such a variety of natural laws with such fine-grained conditions that even the slightest change in e.g. how I hold a pen when I let it go would have drastic influence on how it falls – sideways, up fast, down slowly, etc. – then we might not be epistemically fit to determine the laws of nature. With reference to note 29, if the number of type-grounds G1, ..., Gn is immense and their rules C1, ..., Cm vary drastically, we might be epistemically unable to determine the rules C1, ..., Cm due to the relative complexity and chaotic appearance of the world – even if we knew that ontologically speaking everything in nature is causally uniform. 34 Note that Kant uses emphasis only two times in the whole postulate of necessity, and he does so when claiming that 'we cognize only the necessity of effects in nature, the causes of which are given to us' (A 227/B 280). It is the next sentence that makes the already cited conclusion that necessity concerns 'the possibility [...] of inferring a priori from some given existence (a cause) to another existence (the effect)' (A 228/B 280). Thus it seems that Kant thought of the possibility of inferring effects from given causes to be a major import of the postulate of necessity. 35 'In the world there is neither chance nor fate.' (R 5978, AA 18, 413.) Kant on the Necessity of Causal Relations 19 The Latin principles in mundo non datur casus (in the world there is no chance) and non datur fatum (there is no fate) are grounded in the Analogies and Postulates that present the principles for the categories of relation and modality, respectively. According to Kant, the modal principle non datur fatum adds something to the causal principle non datur casus – the concept of necessity, no less. The two Latin principles are seldom explicated in the literature.36 While Kant's published works offer little help in decoding them,37 his notes and lectures reveal that they refer to Baumgarten's Metaphysica (1739), which Kant used as his metaphysics textbook and in which the principles are presented as follows: Fate is necessity of events in the world. Fate out of absolute necessity of the world would be Spinozistic, a non-entity, [...] [and] is to be posited neither in this nor in any world. (Baumgarten 1739, §382.) An event in the world, the sufficient reason of which is not known, is a chance. A chance, which has no sufficient reason, would be pure, [and] impossible [...], [and] is to be posited neither in this nor in any world. (ibid., §383.) In these passages Baumgarten connects the principle non datur fatum to necessity and non datur casus to causality (through the principle of sufficient reason). This is mirrored by Kant's contention that the first principle 'belongs to the principles of modality' and the second is 'a consequence of the principle of causality' (A228/B281), i.e. the principle of sufficient reason. Yet in his notes Kant regularly connects both principles to both modality and causality. Consider e.g. the following samples from ca. 1778–1784: 36 Watkins (2001, 72–5) conducts an analysis of the Latin principles, yet he haphazardly connects them both to the Analogies contra Kant's explicit words that the non datur fatum belongs to the principles of modality (the Postulates). 37 The two principles are not found in this form in Kant's other published works. In the preparation for the Transcendental Deduction (§13) Kant does mention fate (Schicksal) as an a priori concept the objective reality of which is to be rejected, as is indeed done later in the Postulates (A84/B117; cf. Paton 1976, 364n). For other occurrences of fate and chance, see A74/B99, KpV, 101; KU, 391–4; AA 6, 186, 298–9, 334, 489; AA 8, 426, 300n; AA 28, 663. Kant on the Necessity of Causal Relations 20 (i) Non datur casus. No event happens by itself, but is rather always determined by natural things. [...] Non datur fatum. All necessity is natural necessity of events, i.e. always determined by other grounds in the same series. (R 5973, AA 18, 410.) (ii) Non datur fatum, i.e., [there is no] absolute necessity in the appearance and its arising [entstehen], though to be sure [there is absolute necessity] in the intellectual cause, which is no part of the sensible world, and also no substrate. (R 5970, AA 18, 409.) (iii) Non datur casus. Everything in the world happens according to the mechanism of nature, namely as a consequence of what itself [in turn] happens, as long as the world is a phenomenon [...]. (R 5975, AA 18, 411.) (iv) Casus is absolute contingency. Fatum [is] unconditioned necessity in the world. (R 5608, AA 18, 250.) The passages (i) and (iii) relate casus to causal determination, whereas (iv) relates it to the modality of contingency. The quotes (i), (ii) and (iv) relate fatum to necessity, and (i) and (ii) also contain a reference to determination by grounds, which should be read as causal grounds, as indicated by (ii) with its 'intellectual cause' (see also: AA 28, 199; AA 28, 200). It is, then, a thoroughgoing feature of Kant's thought that causality is tightly integrated with modality. Since the non datur casus and the non datur fatum both pertain to nature and reign in tandem, necessity and causality go hand in hand. This is why Watkins can find such good philosophical grounds for Kant to adhere to the SCP, and adhere to it he does. Yet, as causality and necessity are nonetheless embodied in two principles, one could hold without the other. Thus Kant is correct in giving them separate justifications in the Analogies and the Postulates, respectively, as I have laboured to show. The principle non datur casus denies two things about the world38: that there could causally speaking be events without a sufficient reason, and that there could modally speaking be absolute contingency. These are really two sides of the same coin: Insofar as every event has a sufficient reason, i.e., some cause, then nothing can be absolutely contingent (without a ground). And conversely, insofar as something is not absolutely contingent, it must have a sufficient reason and thus be brought about by something. 38 The 'in mundo' restricts Kant to nature as an appearance. Cf. also (ii) above. Kant on the Necessity of Causal Relations 21 The principle non datur fatum also denies two things about the world: causally, that something could happen without being determined by something else, i.e., on its own through some intrinsic ground or causa sui, and, modally, that there could be absolute necessity, i.e., necessity that is not dependent on external influence. Again, these are intertwined: Insofar as every event is brought about by some extrinsic cause, i.e., is conditioned on something else, there can be no absolutely necessary events that arise out of their own spontaneity. And insofar as something does not happen unconditionally, it arises only on the condition that something else brings it about (causally). When the two principles are combined, a clear picture emerges (Figure 1). By denying absolute contingency (2a), non datur casus leaves open three alternatives: (1a) conditional contingency, (1b) conditional (hypothetical) necessity, and (2b) absolute (unconditional) necessity. Since non datur casus leaves open the possibility (1a) that there is no necessity at all, it is indeed still lacking necessity that needs to be added to it. Enter non datur fatum: 'No necessity in nature is blind, but is rather conditioned [...] necessity' (A228/B280f). The first part is negative and excludes (2b); the second is positive and affirms (1b) while rejecting (1a). Figure 1: Conditional and unconditional contingency and necessity 1 – Conditional/hypothetical 2 – Unconditional/absolute A – Contingency Conditional contingency Unconditional contingency (casus) B – Necessity Conditional necessity Unconditional necessity (fatum) The non datur fatum thus builds on the non datur casus, and together they leave open the sole alternative that events of the world are governed by conditional/hypothetical necessity, which is what according to Kant the postulate of necessity establishes. This is why non datur fatum 'adds to the causal determination [of non datur casus] still the concept of necessity' (A228/B281). Simply put, it adds to the principle that everything has a reason that the reason is (conditionally) necessary, rather than contingent – the latter option of which was still left open by the Analogies. From this point of view, the postulate that is generally thought as confused, exhibits remarkable – albeit compressed – rigour by listing every possible alternative and ruling out all except one. Kant on the Necessity of Causal Relations 22 Thus, as to modality, Kant's Latin principles deny absolute necessity and set hypothetical or conditional necessity in its stead: 'Everything that happens is hypothetically necessary' (A228/B280). And, as to causality, the principles affirm both the necessity of causal relations in non datur casus (WCP) and in causal relations in non datur fatum (SCP). That is, necessarily, a non-contingent, necessary connection pertains between an event and its cause: 'Necessity therefore concerns only the relations of appearances in accordance with the dynamical law of causality' (A227/B280). This and preceding considerations jointly show that Kant intended the Analogies to ground the weak causal principle and the Postulates to ground the strong causal principle.39 5. Conclusion Existing interpretations have overlooked the importance of the Postulates and thereby either misplaced Kant's justification of the SCP or taken him not to offer a justification for it at all. Careful analysis of the conclusions, arguments, roles, and terminological finesse of both the Analogies and the Postulates shows that Kant was aware of the distinction between the weak and strong causal principles and intended to give them separate justifications in the second analogy and the postulate of necessity, respectively. Although it lies beyond the scope of this article to analyse the exact nature of Kant's justification of the SCP, recognising that he himself intended the postulate of necessity to accomplish this is the first necessary step in that direction. This furthermore shows that the postulate of necessity plays an essential role in Kant's system and that only by understanding it can we properly understand his theory of causality and of (metaphysical) necessity. In this the postulate of necessity is as important as the rest of the transcendental principles, and as an integral piece of Kant's critical metaphysics it merits far more attention and respect than it has hitherto been granted. 39 Together the two principles establish the apodicity or necessary truth of the strong causal principle – the de dicto necessity of the de re necessity of causality: □∀y∃x(□xCy). Kant on the Necessity of Causal Relations 23 Bibliography Adickes, Erich. Immanuel Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Mit einer Einleitung und Anmerkungen herausgegeben von Erich Adickes. Berlin: Mayer & Müller, 1889. Allison, Henry E. Kant's Transcendental Idealism – an Interpretation and Defense. Revised and enlarged edition. 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A Treatise of Human Nature. Second edition. Edited by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. Original work published in 1739–1740. Kannisto, Toni. From Thinking to Being – Kant's Modal Critique of Metaphysics. PhD thesis, University of Oslo, 2012. Kant on the Necessity of Causal Relations 24 Kant, Immanuel. Kants gesammelte Schriften (AA 1–28). Herausgegeben von der Deutschen (Königlich Preussischen) Akademie der Wissenschaften. 29 vols. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1900–. __ Critique of Pure Reason (A/B). Translated and edited by Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. __ Critique of the Power of Judgement (KU). Translated by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. In AA 5. __ Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics that Will Be Able to Come Forward as a Science (Pro). In Henry Allison and Peter Heath (eds.): Theoretical Philosophy after 1781. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. In AA 4. __ Critique of Practical Reason (KpV). In Mary J. Gregor and Allen Wood (eds.): Practical Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. In AA 5. Kemp Smith, Norman. A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason.' 2nd edition, revised and enlarged. New York: Humanities Press, 1962. Leppäkoski, Markku. 'The Transcendental Must: Kant's Various Notions of Necessity.' In Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann, Ralph Schumacher (hrsg.): Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung, Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Band II: 783–790. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2001. Lovejoy, Arthur O. 'Kant's Reply to Hume.' In Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 1906: 3, 380–407. Mosser, Kurt. Necessity and Possibility: The Logical Strategy of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2008. Motta, Giuseppe. Kants Philosophie der Notwendigkeit. Berlin: Peter Lang, 2007. __ Die Postulate des empirischen Denkens überhaupt. 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This is a preprint of a paper that is forthcoming in a Symposium on Keith DeRose's The Appearance of Ignorance (2017, OUP) in the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism. The Disappearance of Ignorance Robin McKenna University of Liverpool [email protected] Abstract Keith DeRose's new book The Appearance of Ignorance (TAI) is a welcome companion volume to his 2009 book The Case for Contextualism (TCC). Where TCC focused on contextualism as a view in the philosophy of language, TAI focuses on how contextualism contributes to our understanding of (and solution to) some perennial epistemological problems, with the skeptical problem being the main focus of six of the seven chapters. DeRose's view is that a solution to the skeptical problem must do two things. First, it must explain how it is that we can know lots of things, such as that we have hands. Second, it must explain how it can seem that we don't know these things. In slogan form, DeRose's argument is that a contextualist semantics for knowledge attributions is needed to account for the "appearance of ignorance"-the appearance that we don't know that skeptical hypotheses fail to obtain. In my critical discussion I will argue inter alia that we don't need a contextualist semantics to account for the appearance of ignorance, and in any case that the "strength" of the appearance of ignorance is unclear, as is the need for a philosophical diagnosis of it. Keywords DeRose; contextualism; skepticism; ignorance; sensitivity; safety 2 1. Introduction Keith DeRose's new book The Appearance of Ignorance (henceforth TAI) is a companion volume to his 2009 book The Case for Contextualism (henceforth TCC). Where TCC focused on arguments for and against contextualism drawn from the philosophy of language, TAI focuses on arguments for and against contextualism drawn from epistemology, with the skeptical problem being the main focus in six of the seven chapters. As one would expect, there is a degree of overlap here; as DeRose is keen to emphasize, it is hard to keep the philosophy of language out of epistemology. But it is safe to say that the reader expecting a deeper degree of engagement with epistemological issues than in TCC will not be disappointed. Taken as a whole, TAI is a salutary reminder that DeRose's contributions to 20th and 21st-century epistemology are hardly confined to a thesis about the meaning of the word 'knows'. I am aware of two models for writing a critical commentary on a substantial piece of work like TAI. The first involves highlighting some central claims without making much of an attempt to show how they fit together, and then subjecting each claim to individual critical scrutiny. The second involves reconstructing the central line of argument and then subjecting that argument to sustained critical scrutiny. Each model has its benefits and costs. The first model allows for in-depth engagement with the nitty gritty of the target work, but runs the risk of missing the wood for the trees. The second model focuses on the wood at the expense of the trees. For better or worse, this commentary will follow the second model. I will start by outlining what I take to be DeRose's central argument in TAI. In slogan form, DeRose's argument is that a contextualist semantics for knowledge attributions is needed to account for the "appearance of ignorance"-the appearance that we don't know that skeptical hypotheses fail to obtain. I will then argue inter alia that we don't need a contextualist semantics to account for the appearance of ignorance, and in any case that the "strength" of the appearance of ignorance is unclear, as is the need for a philosophical diagnosis of it. 3 2. The Two Tasks for a Theory of Knowledge The central aim of TAI is to deal with what DeRose calls the "argument from ignorance" (AI). Let "O" be a proposition about the external world one would ordinarily take oneself to know (e.g. "I have hands", "That is a zebra") and "H" a suitably chosen skeptical hypothesis (e.g. "I am a handless brain in a vat (BIV)", "That is a mule cleverly disguised to look like a zebra"). AI can be stated as follows: 1. I don't know that not-H. 2. If I don't know that not-H, then I don't know that O. 3. I don't know that O. While DeRose ultimately wants to reject AI, he thinks that it is worth taking seriously. Here he is making the case for the plausibility of each premise of AI: AI does present us with a puzzle because ... each of its premises is initially plausible, when H is well chosen. For however improbable or bizarre it may seem to suppose that I am a BIV, it also seems that I don't know that I'm not one. How could I know such a thing? And it also seems that if, for all I know, I am a BIV, then I don't know that I have hands. How could I know that I have hands if, for all I know, I'm bodiless (and therefore handless)? (p. 2)1 The first premise is plausible because it seems incredible to suppose that I could know that I'm not a BIV. The second premise is plausible because it is backed up by the principle that 1 Unless otherwise stated, all references are to TAI. 4 knowledge is closed under known entailment. While there are difficulties formulating this principle (which DeRose discusses in Chapter 5 and Appendix D), the intuitive idea is that competent deduction is a way of extending what we know. While DeRose doesn't see himself as being overly dogmatic about closure, he does think there are serious costs involved in rejecting it. We have something approaching (though maybe not quite) a paradox: two plausible premises entail a conclusion that we find incredible. While DeRose sets out to resolve this nearparadox, not just any old resolution will do: [W]e should hope for a better treatment of the argument than simply choosing which of the three individually plausible propositions-the two premises and the negation of the conclusion-seems least certain and rejecting it on the grounds that the other two are true. In seeking a solution to this puzzle, we should seek an explanation of how we fell into this skeptical trap in the first place, and not settle for making a simple choice among three distasteful ways out of the trap. We must explain how two premises that together yield a conclusion we find so incredible can themselves seem so plausible to us. (p. 2) DeRose is therefore wary of any solution to the skeptical problem that merely consists in rejecting one of the two premises. Any such solution fails to explain why AI seems so plausible in the first place, and so doesn't explain the appearance of ignorance. So, for DeRose, there are two tasks a solution to AI must accomplish. It must, first, tell us how the conclusion of AI is to be resisted and, second, explain the appearance of ignorance. This conception of the skeptical problem puts a constraint on the appropriate methodology for solving it. It isn't enough to come up with a theory of knowledge, motivate it via non-skeptical considerations such as fit with intuitions about ordinary cases of knowledge, 5 then apply it to AI, yielding the result that one of the premises is to be rejected. This would complete the first task of telling us how the conclusion of AI is to be resisted, but it wouldn't even begin on the second task of explaining why both premises-including the one to be rejected-seem so plausible.2 3. DeRose's "Picture" of Knowledge In this section, I will outline how I take DeRose to think the first task should be carried out. It will be helpful to work with this concrete instance of AI, which I'll call BIV: 1. I don't know that I'm not a handless BIV. 2. If I don't know that I'm not a handless BIV, then I don't know that I have hands. 3. I don't know that I have hands. One way of resisting the skeptical conclusion of BIV would be to develop a theory of knowledge on which one of the premises is false. On this approach, the aim would be to come up with necessary and sufficient conditions on knowledge (or at least approximations to such conditions) according to which I do know that I have hands. But this way of going has the drawback that most (or all) candidate sets of necessary and sufficient conditions seem subject to counter-example. DeRose's response to this is to invoke a distinction between "theories" and "pictures". In Naming and Necessity, Kripke doesn't see himself as defending a new theory 2 DeRose might be read as proposing a stronger constraint to the effect that any solution to the skeptical problem must be motivated by reflection on the problem itself, rather than imposed on the problem "from outside". Consider, for instance, his discussion of Nozick's (1981) theory-driven denial of the second premise on (pp. 202–203). Whether this is his intention or not, I don't find this stronger constraint compelling, and it is hard to see why the initial plausibility of AI would support it. 6 of reference but rather as presenting a new picture of reference. The problem with theories is that, as Kripke tells us, they tend to be false. The nice thing about pictures is that they are more malleable. Following Kripke, DeRose sees the epistemologist as in the business of presenting pictures of knowledge. This picture does not pretend to offer necessary or sufficient conditions on knowledge, or to be free of counter-examples. Let's start with how we can know common-or-garden propositions. DeRose's account here is a variant on a standard safety account. On the standard safety account, put roughly, one knows some proposition p only if one's belief that p is safe, where one's belief that p is safe if and only if it could not easily have been false. DeRose favours what he calls a "double safety" account, on which one knows that p only if one's belief as to whether or not p is the case is "doubly safe", where one's belief that p is doubly safe if and only if one's belief as to whether p could not easily have been false (p. 211). To see the difference, it is helpful to put both conditions in terms of possible worlds: SAFETY: One's belief that p is safe iff there are no nearby possible worlds in which one believes that p but p is false. DOUBLE SAFETY: One's belief that p is doubly safe iff there are no nearby possible worlds in which one's belief as to whether or not p is the case fails to match the fact of the matter. Imagine that, for whatever reason, Catriona is very prone to abandoning her belief that she has hands when she takes drugs, and she takes drugs all the time. But she has no tendency to falsely believe that she has hands. Catriona's belief is safe, because there are no nearby worlds in which she believes that she has hands even though she doesn't. But her belief isn't doubly safe, 7 because there are plenty of nearby worlds in which she has hands yet doesn't believe that she does (worlds in which she took drugs). So DeRose's double safety account would say Catriona doesn't know that she has hands, even though her belief is safe. As is familiar, the safety condition is the basis of a simple account of how it is that we can know common-or-garden propositions. Take the common-or-garden proposition "I have a hand.", There are no nearby possible worlds in which I believe that I have a hand yet my belief is false. So my belief is safe. DeRose's double safety account can offer a very similar account of how it is that we can know common-or-garden propositions, with the slight difference that it will rule that people like Catriona don't know that they have hands. Setting aside this minor difference, DeRose's account of how we can know common-or-garden propositions is identical with the standard safety account.3 As is also familiar, one can extend this account to explain how we can know the denials of skeptical hypotheses (Sosa 1999). Our beliefs that we're not BIVs are safe: there are no nearby worlds in which we believe that we're not BIVs yet this belief is false, for the simple reason that there are (we assume) no nearby worlds in which we're BIVs. Our beliefs that we're not BIVs are also generally doubly safe.4 One might think this gives DeRose what he wants; we can (and do!) know the denials of skeptical hypotheses. But DeRose is unwilling to simply extend his double safety account in this way. As I understand him, the basic reason is that our beliefs that we're not BIVs are vacuously safe, and so this sort of account sheds no light on 3 Well, it isn't quite identical, given that DeRose is a contextualist. Everything I say here about what we can know on DeRose's account should be understood as indexed to the sorts of ordinary epistemic standards that many of our beliefs meet. 4 There will be people, like Catriona, whose belief that they are not BIVs will be safe but not doubly safe, but Catriona is very unusual. 8 how it is that we can know that we're not BIVs (see especially pp. 220–222).5 These beliefs are vacuously safe precisely because there simply are no nearby worlds in which we are BIVs.6 This leads DeRose to develop a more complex account of how we can know that we're not BIVs. This account holds that, in order to know that one is not a BIV, one must: i. Truly believe that one is not a BIV; and ii. Doubly safely believe that one is not a BIV; and iii. Have no good reason to think that one is a BIV. DeRose bases (iii) on a defense of a form of epistemic conservatism: the epistemic conservative thinks (put roughly) that, absent good reason to think that things are otherwise to how they seem, one is justified in believing what seems to one to be the case.7 While one could endorse epistemic conservatism across the board, DeRose seems to want to restrict it to whatever "seemings" are relevant to our belief that we're not BIVs (p. 229). So his view is that, absent good reason to think that we're not BIVs, we are justified in believing that we're not. In order to turn this into knowledge, our beliefs that we're not BIVs have to also be (i) true and (ii) 5 It strikes me that DeRose is assuming that the two tasks for a theory of knowledge are a little more onerous than stated in Section 2. A theory of knowledge must not only tell us which premise of AI is to be resisted, it must also do so on the basis of a genuinely explanatory account of what knowledge is. The problem DeRose sees with a standard safety account of how we know that we're not BIVs is that it offers no explanation at all, because the safety condition is vacuously true in this case. 6 While DeRose is clearly displaying internalist sympathies here, it is important to note that he defends these sympathies rather than simply assuming them. 7 For defenses of such views see, Huemer (2007) and the essays collected in Tucker (2013). 9 doubly safe. Because we can assume they are true, and if they are true they are going to be doubly safe, we can know that we're not BIVs. DeRose's account of how we can know that we're not BIVs is therefore a hybrid of the standard safety account and an epistemic conservative account. This raises several questions. In particular, why are there two different conditions on knowledge (at least, knowledge of the denials of skeptical hypotheses)? While DeRose surely has multiple ways at his disposal of explaining how such a seemingly disjunctive account of knowledge has some sort of underlying unity, I won't pursue this issue here.8 So far, we just have a substantive picture of knowledge with clear potential to disarm the skeptical problem. But where's the contextualism? 4. DeRose's Contextualist Semantics As I read him, DeRose's substantive picture of knowledge is primarily intended to carry out the first task for a theory of knowledge. It serves to explain how it is that we can know the denials of skeptical hypotheses, and so how the conclusion of AI can be resisted. His contextualist semantics for knowledge attributions is primarily intended to carry out the second task. It serves to explain how it can seem like we don't know much if anything, and so why AI can seem so plausible. So the task for contextualism is to explain the appearance of ignorance. 8 While some might think the way to go is to distinguish between "internalist" and "externalist" forms of justification, and hold that knowledge (at least of the denials of skeptical hypotheses) requires both forms, I think a better way to go would be to embed this within Sosa's (2009, 2007) animal/reflective knowledge distinction. Animal knowledge of the denials of skeptical hypotheses requires simple safety, whereas reflective knowledge requires that one has no good reason to think one is a BIV. For discussion and defense of the epistemological value of Sosa's distinction see, Carter and McKenna (forthcoming). 10 We can start with the basic idea behind contextualism and contextualist solutions to the skeptical problem. The contextualist holds that the word 'knows' is context-sensitive; it can mean different things in different contexts. In one context (a context governed by ordinary standards), to say "I know that I have hands" might mean that I know by ordinary standards that I have hands. In another context (a context governed by very high standards), to say "I know that I have hands" might mean that I know by very high standards that I have hands. Because I may know by ordinary standards but not by very high standards, both of these utterances might be true. The contextualist also holds that, while the word 'knows' is contextsensitive, ordinary speakers are often ignorant of this fact (in much the same way that ordinary speakers are often ignorant of the fact that words like 'flat' and 'empty' are context-sensitive).9 This yields the basic contextualist solution to BIV. The contextualist says that, in some contexts-contexts governed by very high standards-the first premise is true. Because the second premise-"If I don't know that I'm not a handless BIV, then I don't know that I have hands"-is true in all contexts, it follows that, in contexts governed by very high standards, the conclusion is true.10 That is, in such contexts it is true to say that we don't know that we're not handless BIVs, and that we don't know that we have hands. But in other contexts-contexts governed by more ordinary standards-the first premise is false. Indeed, in such contexts it is true to say that we do know that we're not handless BIVs, andthat we have hands. Before moving on to the ways in which DeRose goes beyond the basic contextualist solution to BIV, it is worth noting that the basic contextualist solution already does quite a good job of explaining the appearance of ignorance. Because ordinary speakers are often 9 DeRose (2009) mounts an extensive defense of this "semantic ignorance" claim. 10 One of the central claims in Chapter 1 of TAI (which is a reprint of DeRose 1995) is that closure holds in all contexts. 11 ignorant of the fact that the word 'knows' is context-sensitive, it is no surprise that considering arguments like BIV (and more generally arguments of the form AI) can lead them to think they know very little, if anything. DeRose's development of the basic contextualist solution builds on this. The central idea of his solution is contained in this passage (from Chapter 1, which is a reprint of his 1995 classic, "Solving the Skeptical Problem"): When it is asserted that some subject S knows (or does not know) some proposition P, the standards for knowledge (the standards for how good an epistemic position one must be in to count as knowing) tend to be raised, if need be to such a level as to require S's belief in that particular P to be sensitive for it to count as knowledge (p. 27). DeRose calls this the "rule of sensitivity". The idea is that, when you assert that S knows (or does not know) that p, the standards tend to rise to a level such that S's belief that p must be sensitive, where S's belief that p is sensitive just in case, if p were false, S wouldn't believe that p. This goes beyond the basic contextualist solution to the skeptical problem in (at least) two respects. First, it provides some insight into the mechanism by which considering skeptical arguments might lead to an increase in standards, and so generate the appearance of ignorance. When the skeptic asserts "You don't know that you're not a handless BIV", this tends to raise the standards to a level such that your belief must be sensitive in order to count as knowledge, and because your belief is not sensitive-if it were false, you would still believe it-your belief does not count as sensitive in this context. Second, it provides more of an explanation of the appearance of ignorance. Some (e.g. Nozick) hold that sensitivity is a necessary condition on knowledge. That is, they hold that: 12 SENSITIVITY: S knows that p only if S's belief is sensitive, where S's belief that p is sensitive iff, if p were false, S wouldn't believe that p. DeRose holds that sensitivity isn't a necessary condition on knowledge, but that there is a conversational rule to the effect that asserting that someone knows (or does not know) some p tends to put into place standards for attributing knowledge such that their belief that p must be sensitive in order to count as knowledge. In slogan form: sensitivity is not a necessary condition for knowledge, but rather for knowledge attribution. Because of the operation of the rule of sensitivity, it is no surprise that we can seem to not know the denials of skeptical hypotheses, and so why considering arguments like BIV can lead us to deny we know much if anything. Much more could be said about the details of DeRose's contextualist semantics. In particular, one of the main themes in TAI is that contextualism-or at least DeRose's version of it-is far less "even-handed" than many suppose (see especially Chapter 4). More generally, TAI clears up a wide range of misunderstandings, confusions and mistakes that are often made in discussions of contextualism in general, and contextualist solutions to skepticism in particular. But we already have what we need for my purposes. To recap: DeRose thinks that a solution to AI should do two things. First, it should explain how we can know common-orgarden propositions and the denials of skeptical hypotheses which these propositions entail. Second, it should explain how it can seem like we don't know such things. His substantive picture of knowledge carries out the first task; his contextualist semantics for knowledge attributions the second. Put together, this seems an effective "proof by example" that contextualism is not an "evasion" of epistemology (Kornblith 2000) or irrelevant to epistemological (in particular skeptical) concerns (Sosa 2000). I will now turn to critical evaluation of DeRose's package of views. 13 5. Alternative Explanations of the Appearance of Ignorance DeRose's picture of knowledge combines a standard safety account of how we can know common-or-garden propositions with a slightly more complex epistemic conservative account of how we can know the denials of skeptical hypotheses. To epistemologists of a more externalist bent, this might look a little like overkill: why do we need to add something "extra" to explain how we can know the denials of skeptical hypotheses? But let's set this to one side. Perhaps the right response to this is to say that, while there may be a form of cognitive achievement that only requires safe belief, there are other forms of cognitive achievement that require a little more (see n. 8). What is more important is that DeRose doesn't think that even the combination of the safety account and the epistemic conservative account is sufficient to deal with the problem posed by AI. This is because he thinks his contextualist semantics for knowledge attributions is required to account for the appearance of ignorance. One can challenge this in two ways. The first is by challenging whether one needs his contextualist semantics to account for the appearance of ignorance. The second is by challenging whether there is much of an appearance to account for in the first place. In this section, I will look at the first challenge. In the next, I will look at the second. One odd feature of TAI is that, while it spends a lot of time (especially in Chapter 1) arguing that the skeptical "response" to AI (scare-quotes because the response is to just accept the argument and its conclusion) is to be rejected, it spends little time arguing that nonskeptical, non-contextualist responses to AI are inferior to contextualism. This absence is made more troubling by the fact that, as we have seen, DeRose combines his contextualist semantics with a substantive picture of knowledge. This prompts a question: what, exactly, does the contextualist semantics add to the sort of explanation of the appearance of ignorance that can 14 be given by a combination of a standard safety and an epistemic conservative account of knowledge? We can start by looking at the resources that the standard safety account and the epistemic conservative account have, taken individually, to account for the appearance of ignorance. In "How to Defeat Opposition to Moore," Ernest Sosa argues that, not only does the standard safety account have the resources to explain how it is that we know the denials of skeptical hypotheses (the first task for a theory of knowledge), it can also explain the appearance of ignorance (the second task).11 The basic thought is that, while knowledge requires safety rather than sensitivity, it is very easy to confuse safety with sensitivity. It is therefore not difficult to see how a skilled skeptic could lead us to deny that we know the denial of skeptical hypotheses (or for that matter to deny that we know anything at all) by appealing to reasons for thinking that our beliefs are insensitive. It takes skilled philosophical diagnosis to reveal that knowledge requires safety, not sensitivity, and so the skeptic's reasons should be rejected. To Sosa's explanation we can add the following: the standard safety account is an externalist account of knowledge, and to the extent that skeptical arguments rely on internalist assumptions and/or sympathies (e.g., that there is something lacking from our epistemic 11 I focus on Sosa (1999) here, but one could make similar points about neo-Moorean appeals to the pragmatics of knowledge attribution (see Pritchard 2002). To be fair to DeRose, he does respond to Sosa in DeRose (2004b), and he deals with pragmatic moves in TCC. But one would expect a booklength treatment to at least acknowledge this issue, and give some indication of how DeRose thinks it can be tackled. And at any rate, my objection below is based not just on the explanatory power of standard safety accounts, but on the explanatory power of a combination of the standard safety and the epistemic conservative account. 15 position if we lack an awareness of the facts in virtue of which our beliefs are justified/qualify as knowledge, or that in order to know/be justified you have to be able to provide reasons in support of your belief), it is no surprise that many of us (especially those of us who haven't read the recent epistemological literature) can be brought by skeptical argument to question our beliefs. So the externalist seems to have a more general explanation of the appearance of ignorance, which the defender of the standard safety account can appeal to. What about the epistemic conservative account? I am not aware of a "standard" epistemic conservative explanation of the appearance of ignorance and the "allure" of skepticism, but let me venture a suggestion. At the base of the epistemic conservative picture- at least, as DeRose understands it-is an appeal to what we can call "Reidian common sense." Here's Thomas Reid articulating what I mean by Reidian common sense: The sceptic asks me, Why do you believe the existence of the external object which you perceive? This belief, sir, is none of my manufacture; it came from the mint of Nature; it bears her image and superscription; and, if it is not right, the fault is not mine: I even took it upon trust, and without suspicion. Reason, says the sceptic, is the only judge of truth, and you ought to throw off every opinion and every belief that is not grounded on reason. Why, sir, should I believe the faculty of reason more than that of perception?-they came both out of the same shop, and were made by the same artist; and if he puts one piece of false ware into my hands, what should hinder him from putting another? (Reid 1764: 168– 169) On this picture, certain beliefs-like the belief that we're not being constantly deceived by our senses-are not supported by reasons, but rather are parts of our nature. The skeptic's mistake is to ask for reasons for them, as if they need to be given. 16 Perhaps the epistemic conservative is right that such reasons don't need to be given, and so right that the skeptic's argument should not move us to abandon our most basic beliefs. Yet, if DeRose is right, we can be moved to at least consider abandoning them due to skeptical argument. (If DeRose doesn't think we can be moved to at least consider abandoning them due to skeptical argument, I don't know what the appearance of ignorance amounts to.) It would seem to me that the Reidian commonsensical picture provides a pretty good explanation why we might be drawn to take these arguments seriously, even though we have no reason to: we have nothing to pit against them other than our trust that their conclusions are false. Now, it may be that we can mount a philosophical defense of the propriety of pitting this trust against the skeptic's arguments. But it would hardly be a surprise if many of us, lacking any awareness of that defense, were inclined to go along with the skeptic. So it seems like the epistemic conservative account can do a pretty good job of explaining the appearance of ignorance all by itself. The appearance of ignorance is generated by the sorts of suspicions about the propriety of trusting to "our nature" or "constitution" that philosophical defenses of epistemic conservatism are meant to dispel. I take this to at least make it plausible that, taken individually, the defender of the standard safety account and the defender of the epistemic conservative account have ample resources to explain the appearance of ignorance. If we combine these accounts, as DeRose does, we get the power of both these explanations. Indeed, we may get more than that. One can see DeRose's combination of the standard safety account and the epistemic conservative account as in part motivated by the felt inadequacy of either account taken in isolation. The standard safety account seems to run into trouble when it comes to justifying our most basic 17 beliefs (consider the problems of easy knowledge, and bootstrapping).12 The epistemic conservative account seems too weak as an account of knowledge in general: surely knowledge requires a little more than the absence of reason to doubt! For someone who hasn't considered the possibility of combining these views, whether because they think they can't be combined, or because they have never considered doing so, it is, again, no surprise that skeptical argument might take hold, and the appearance of ignorance be generated. 6. The Disappearance of Ignorance So far I have argued that the non-contextualist part of DeRose's overall picture might be enough to explain the appearance of ignorance. In this section, I want to say something about the appearance of ignorance itself. In particular, I want to address three issues: 1. How widespread is it? That is, how many people can be brought to doubt whether we know anything at all by considering AI? 2. How robust is it? That is, for those who can be brought to doubt whether we know anything at all by considering AI, is this doubt only fleeting, or more permanent? 3. How rational is it? That is, do those who are brought to doubt whether we know anything at all by considering AI brought to do so on the basis of (good) reasons? As we will see, somewhat surprisingly, DeRose doesn't think that the appearance of ignorance is particularly widespread, robust, or rational. In this section, I will outline why DeRose thinks this, and explain why I take this to pose a problem for the central argument of TAI. The 12 These problems have been forcefully articulated by DeRose's fellow contextualist, Stewart Cohen (2002). DeRose seems happy to go along with Cohen on this (see p. 217). 18 problem, in short, is that if the appearance of ignorance isn't that widespread, robust, or rational, why should a solution to AI have to account for it? We can start with DeRose's take on how widespread the appearance of ignorance is. DeRose presents a decidedly mixed picture here. On the one hand, he tells us that, in his experience, undergraduates can very easily be led to see the power of AI (pp. 55–56). On the other, he reports a study he carried out with Joshua Knobe in which ordinary adults didn't generally find AI particularly persuasive (Appendix B). More generally, DeRose seems willing to grant that, for many, AI holds little power at all, whether intuitive or not. But, DeRose tells us, this doesn't matter: It is important to emphasize ... that not only does the value of studying skeptical arguments not depend on their being so powerful as to truly constitute "paradoxes," but that these arguments can be well worth studying even if one's initial reaction to them places one toward the extreme Kelly end of the continuum at which one judges them to be inadvance doomed. For even if an argument were not nearly powerful enough to have any hope of establishing its conclusion, if it were nonetheless even a fairly strong argument, it would still be a likely source of important information about the argument's subject matter-knowledge, in the case of AI. (p. 62) The idea seems to be that, to the extent that AI is powerful, that power needs to be explained. Turning now to how robust the appearance of ignorance is, DeRose says this about the durability of the appeal of AI's first premise (the premise that says we don't know the denials of skeptical hypotheses), which he takes to be the weak link in the argument: 19 My attempts to ascertain non-philosophers' assessments of what I take to be AI's weak link have if anything increased the extent to which I thought an account of that premise's appeal was desirable. That there are settings where that appeal seems very strong would tend to show that the premise (and then the argument of which it is the weakest link) can be very powerful, even if there are other settings where that appeal is quite diminished. (And perhaps when it is presented by an actual skeptic, or a teacher doing a good job of playing the role of a skeptic, its power is significantly greater still than it is when presented by a philosophy professor who is trying to be as neutral as possible about the matter. (p. 59) DeRose's view seems to be that even those who do see the appeal of skeptical arguments only see them as appealing in certain settings or contexts. While some of us can be brought to see the argument as very powerful in some settings, in others this power is rather more limited. Finally, what is DeRose's take on the rationality of going along with the skeptical argument? Throughout TAI (and especially in Chapter 4) DeRose goes to great lengths to dispel the common idea that contextualists propose an "even-handed" solution to the skeptical problem according to which both the skeptic and the anti-skeptic are right "in their own context." While many interpret the contextualist in this way, DeRose's considered view is that, while the skeptic makes conversational moves intended to put very high standards into place, standards such that all (or almost all) of our beliefs fail to meet them-perhaps by exploiting DeRose's rule of sensitivity-there is no need for anyone to go along with this. Skeptics may 20 try to raise the standards, but we can-and maybe should-resist.13 This rejection of "evenhandedness" presumably goes with a denial that there is any reason to go along with the skeptic who wants to raise the standards, if not the view that it would be positively irrational to go along with the skeptic. Putting all this together, DeRose holds the appearance of ignorance isn't that widespread, robust, or rational. Somewhat surprisingly, he doesn't seem to see this as a problem: The conviction that there's bound to be something important to learn about knowledge from a puzzle as sharp as is the one presented by AI need not be driven by an opinion that there is some deeply important (and perhaps menacing) skeptical truth somehow standing behind the skeptic's position. The lessons to be learned may instead have to do with what knowledge is, and how knowledge claims work, in such a way as to dodge menacing forms of skepticism. (p. 98) Let's grant DeRose that, even if AI were not generally regarded as particularly powerful-as having widespread, robust, or rational acceptance-and as not revealing some important truth behind skepticism, it might still be a source of information about knowledge and knowledge claims. But this seems to fall a long way short of justifying the claim that a central task for a solution to AI is to explain the appearance of ignorance. You can learn something important about knowledge (and maybe knowledge attribution) by reflecting on the shortcomings of all 13 While DeRose discusses this issue in TAI, what he says is essentially a reiteration of points made in Chapter 4 of TCC, which is itself a reprint of DeRose (2004a). One can understand his frustration that his position is still so regularly misinterpreted! 21 sorts of arguments for views in epistemology that fail to establish their conclusions. Take, for instance, arguments to the effect that knowledge doesn't require belief (Radford 1966), or that knowledge just requires true belief (Sartwell 1992), or that knowledge (or "knowledge") isn't factive (Kusch 2002, Hazlett 2010). It is unclear why there need be any requirement to explain away any lingering misleading impressions that these conclusions are true. This makes the task for non-contextualist anti-skeptics all the easier. Maybe it is enough to have an explanation of how it is that we know so much without also having much of an explanation of how it is that we can seem to not know anything at all. Maybe we can seem to not know anything at all for much the same reason that it can seem that knowledge doesn't require belief, or only requires true belief, or that knowledge isn't factive. 7. Concluding Remarks DeRose's central argument in TAI is that there are two things that a solution to the skeptical problem must accomplish. First, it must explain how we can resist AI's skeptical conclusion: how is it that we can know common-or-garden propositions? Second, it must explain the appearance of ignorance: how is it that it can seem that we don't know common-or-garden propositions, or indeed anything at all? I have argued that one part of DeRose's solution-his substantive picture of knowledge-threatens to render the other part-his contextualist semantics for knowledge attributions-explanatorily redundant. We can explain any appearance of ignorance via the picture of knowledge, without recourse to contextualism. Further, the appearance of ignorance is-as DeRose seems to freely admit-not necessarily that widespread, not necessarily that robust, and not particularly rational (and perhaps downright irrational). I have also argued that this makes trouble for DeRose's central argument for contextualism. If the appearance of ignorance is not widespread, robust, or rational, it is unclear the fact (if it is a fact) that contextualism can explain it does much to advance the case 22 for contextualism. This conclusion might sound a little like the complaint that contextualism is irrelevant to epistemology that I have said DeRose rightly rejects. But it is importantly different. My claim is not that contextualism is in principle irrelevant to epistemology, but rather that it is unclear what it adds to DeRose's solution to the skeptical problem, once his substantive picture of knowledge is on the table. So the complaint is not that DeRose is doing philosophy of language rather than epistemology. Rather, the complaint is that he does so much epistemology his philosophy of language might look a little redundant. References Carter, J. Adam, and Robin McKenna. Forthcoming. "Kornblith versus Sosa on Grades of Knowledge," Synthese. Cohen, Stewart. 2002. "Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2): 309–329. DeRose, Keith. 1995. "Solving the Skeptical Problem," Philosophical Review 104 (1): 1–52. DeRose, Keith. 2004a. "Single Scoreboard Semantics," Philosophical Studies 119 (1–2): 1– 21. DeRose, Keith. 2004b. "Sosa, Safety, Sensitivity, and Skeptical Hypotheses." In J. Greco (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics, 22–41. Oxford: Blackwell. DeRose, Keith. 2009. The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press. DeRose, Keith. 2017. The Appearance of Ignorance: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hazlett, Allan. 2010. "The Myth of Factive Verbs," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3): 497–522. 23 Huemer, Michael. 2007. "Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1): 30–55. Kornblith, Hilary. 2000. "The Contextualist Evasion of Epistemology," Noûs 34 (s1): 24–32. Kripke, Saul. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Kusch, Martin. 2002. Knowledge by Agreement: The Programme of Communitarian Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nozick, Robert. 1981. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Pritchard, Duncan. 2002. "Resurrecting the Moorean Response to the Sceptic," International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (3): 283–307. Radford, Colin. 1966. "Knowledge-by Examples," Analysis 27 (1): 1–11. Reid, Thomas. 1764. An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense. Edited by Derek R. Brookes. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. Sartwell, Crispin. 1992. "Why Knowledge Is Merely True Belief," Journal of Philosophy 89 (4): 167–80. Sosa, Ernest. 1999. "How to Defeat Opposition to Moore," Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13): 137–149. Sosa, Ernest. 2000. "Skepticism and Contextualism," Noûs 34 (s1): 1–18. Sosa, Ernest. 2007. A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume I. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sosa, Ernest. 2009. Reflective Knowledge: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume II. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tucker, Chris (ed.). 2013. Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press.

T h e V e d a n t a K e s a r i N O V E M B E R 2 0 1 6~ ~ Sri ramakriShna and hiS GoSpel Vol 2 by Swami Bhuteshananda. Trans by Swami Vimohananda and Dharitri Kumar Das Gupta. Published by Advaita Ashrama , 5, Dehi Entally Road, Kolkata 700 014. E-mail: [email protected], 2007, Hardbound, pp.552, Rs.125 Swami Bhuteshanandaji Maharaj, the 12th President of the Ramakrishna Order, conducted weekly Bengali classes on the "Sri Sri Ramakrishna Kathamrita" (The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna) for nearly a decade. These classes were transcribed in Bengali and brought out in book form in seven volumes. These have been translated into English and published in three volumes. The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna has an almost stenographic record of various conversations with Sri Ramakrishna. It also gives vivid descriptions of the environment and people, which brings the scene to life in the mental eye of the reader. This, combined with the lively and illuminating words of Sri Ramakrishna makes the book exceptional. To fully grasp the context and spirit of the conversations in the Gospel, it is necessary for the reader to have some knowledge of the social conditions of that time, some background about the people involved in the conversation, some insight into the philosophy or spiritual practice being discussed, scriptural references to the teachings, etc. These are very beautifully fulfilled by Swami Bhuteshanandaji in these books. The flow of the narration follows the flow of the Gospel. So there is a repetition of topics, like in the Gospel. However, every time the same topic is dealt with, it is fresh and the reader gets additional insight, like in the Gospel. The flow is fluid and spontaneous. Not every word in the Gospel is discussed. Thus, this is not a commentary on the Gospel. Only the topic being discussed, with some important quotations from the Gospel, is explained. However, the flow of topics is maintained. The explanations are very deep and comprehensive. Swami Bhuteshanandaji brings in incidents from the lives of various people, whom he has met, to explain the discussions in the Gospel. This helps the reader to see how the topics in the Gospel are applicable to today's life. He also brings in quotations from Gita, Upanishads, Bhagavata, Mahabharata, Ramayana, Chandi and other Hindu scriptures and stotras to match with the ideas discussed by Sri Ramakrishna. This has the great value of bringing in the scriptural authority for the teachings in the Gospel. Reading this book is very helpful to have a deeper understanding of The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna. ___________________________ GOKULMUTHU.N, BANGALORE hinduiSm The FaiTh eTernal by Dr. Satish K. Kapoor. Published by Advaita Ashrama , 5, Dehi Entally Road, Kolkata 700 014. E-mail: [email protected], Hardbound, pp.528, xxi, Rs.360. Swami Shuddhidananda and Satish K. Kapoor have done the nearly impossible . They have in one affordable volume introduced The Faith Eternal in all its heteroglossic majesty to the English speaking world. The genius of the author, Satish K. Kapoor, is evident through two examples. In pp185-86, Kapoor traces the origins of Kauai Aadheenam. This is no small feat. It is very difficult to clearly contextualize Hindu movements of such importance within two pages. In page 188 Kapoor mentions Book Reviews For review in The VedanTa Kesari, publishers need to send us two copies oF their latest publication. 43 441T h e V e d a n t a K e s a r i N O V E M B E R 2 0 1 6~ ~ 44 the Aghoris and comments rightly that "Majority of them [Aghoris] do not trace their lineage to any of the four hierarchical orders among the Hindus and are outside the varna system." Satish Kapoor does not miss commenting on any aspect of the sanatana dharma. Kapoor's research on women is worthy of being made part of women's studies curricula the world over. After all, Hinduism's truths are self-evident and thus, universal. This is the passage which both law-framers in our country and patriarchal satraps would do well to memorize (sic): 'Female foeticide was not in vogue in ancient India. . . The girl. . . was invested with the sacred thread. . . the girl could choose to be a life-long student of the sacred texts [and remain single or choose to marry].' (334) It is doubtful whether Wendy Doniger will ever cite this single-volume self-contained encyclopedia, but both the author and the editor show their cosmopolitanism by citing Doniger for the status of women in ancient India (339). Hinduism: the Faith Eternal should be gifted to fanatics, especially those who hate women and humanity in general. Musa Cerantonio will do well to read this book. Swami Shuddhidananda has fulfilled his mandate well as an editor. The annotated references at the end of each chapter; the thoughtfully selected appendices, the glossary and the select bibliography at the end of the book are meticulously done. Not a single diacritical mark is wrongly used or missed. ______________ PROF SUBHASIS CHATTOPADHYAY, KOLKATA eGo GoeS: diViniTy GrowS by J. P. Vaswani. Published by Gita Publishing House, 10, Sadhu Vaswani Path, Pune – 411 001. E-mail: gph@sadhuvaswani. org Pages 136. Paperback. Price not mentioned. S r i R a m a k r i s h n a explains two states of ego, the 'ripe' and 'unripe'. Sankaracharya retained the 'ego of knowledge' and Chaitanyadeva, the 'ego of devotion'. 'Ego Goes: Divinity Grows' by Dada Vaswani is a study of the most common malady, the human ego. The revered author has analysed the subject from various angles and his wisdom will serve as a useful lesson to the present generation. Ego, defined as the opinion one has about him/herself, needs to be handled with utmost care. After explaining with anecdotes and stories the book helps to realize that unrestrained ego will not let Divinity in. Attention is drawn to our 'obsession with the physical body' that keeps us in bondage. The ego acts like a behemoth preventing rational thinking, '. . .like a cataract that blocks the inner vision'. The guru becomes the surgeon to remove the block. Often '. . .the sense of separation, the sense of exclusion and isolation, is what makes the ego a negative force'. The remedy is to realise that we are 'an intrinsic part of a larger whole. . .' Learn to 'Be in the world but not of the world'. The selflessness of Urmila in Ramayana, taking over her husband's nidra for fourteen years to enable him to serve Rama and Sita uninterruptedly, is remarkable. She was also a symbol of humility. ________________________________P. S. SUNDARAM, MUMBAI dhyanabindupaniShaT by Dr. K.S. Balasubramanian and Dr.T.V. Vasudeva. Published by The Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute, No.84, Thiru Vi. Ka. Road, Mylapore, Chennai – 600 004. E-mail: [email protected], 2015, paperback, pp.60 +x Rs. 50. The book mainly focuses on 'dhyana' (meditation) and the other essential features associated with it. A transliteration of the Sanskrit texts in Roman script has been provided for the benefit of those who are keen in knowing the text through the script. The text commences with the greatness of Meditation on Brahman, the Highest Reality, which act alone can alleviate all afflictions accrued in this world. 'Bindu' means a 'drop' or a 'point', but in Saiva and Sakta traditions it represents 'sakti' or consciousness. The subtle and all-pervasive nature of Brahman is described and yoga of meditation enables the aspirant to realize that Ultimate Self which transcends human comprehension otherwise.

Disappearing Diamonds Fitch-Like Results in Bimodal Logic∗ Weng Kin San forthcoming in the Journal of Philosophical Logic Abstract Augment the propositional language with two modal operators:  and . Define  to be the dual of , i.e.  ≡ ¬¬. Whenever (X) is of the form φ→ ψ, let (X) be φ→ ψ. (X) can be thought of as the modally qualified counterpart of (X)-for instance, under the metaphysical interpretation of , where (X) says φ implies ψ, (X) says φ implies possibly ψ. This paper shows that for various interesting instances of (X), fairly weak assumptions suffice for (X) to imply (X)-so, the modally qualified principle is as strong as its unqualified counterpart. These results have surprising and interesting implications for issues spanning many areas of philosophy. 1 Introduction Augment the propositional language with two modal operators:  and .1 Define  to be the dual of , i.e.  ≡ ¬¬. Whenever (X) is of the form φ → ψ, let (X) be φ → ψ. (X) can be thought of as the modally qualified counterpart of (X)-for instance, under the metaphysical interpretation of , where (X) says φ implies ψ, (X) says φ implies possibly ψ. This paper shows that for various interesting instances of (X), fairly weak assumptions suffice for (X) to imply (X)-so, the modally qualified ∗I owe thanks to Jeff Russell, Gabriel Uzquiano, Tim Williamson, and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments. 1Where no risk of confusion between use and mention arises, we omit quotation marks. 1 principle is as strong as its unqualified counterpart. These results have surprising and interesting implications for issues spanning many areas of philosophy. The Church–Fitch Theorem-or as it is more commonly known, 'Fitch's Paradox' or the 'Paradox of Knowability'-is a well-known instance of the kind of result just outlined.2 The theorem is often described as the result that if every truth is possibly known, then every truth is known. Although the result is often explicated in epistemic-alethic terms, we can abstract away from specific interpretations of the modal operators. From a technical point of view, the result (as formalised in a propositional bimodal logic) simply shows that any logic (satisfying certain weak assumptions) that contains (S) p→ p also contains (S) p→ p. (S  ) differs from (S) only in that it qualifies the consequent of (S) using . The Church–Fitch Theorem shows that such a qualification is redundant-weak assumptions suffice to make the  in (S) disappear. It is for this reason that Jenkins (2009) describes the air of paradoxicality surrounding the result as one concerning "The Mystery of the Disappearing Diamond". Borrowing from Jenkin's apt description, we shall refer, more generally, to cases of principles of the form (X) implying their unqualified counterparts (X) as cases of 'disappearing diamonds'. This paper shows that interesting cases of disappearing diamonds extend beyond the Church–Fitch case and are more widespread than is commonly recognised. For instance, one case concerns (4) p→ p and (5) ♦p→ ♦p, and their qualified counterparts, (4) p → p and (5  ) ♦p → ♦p. In §3, we show that given fairly weak assumptions, (4) and (5  ) jointly imply (4) and (5). §4 and §5 note some other cases of disappearing diamonds and finally, §6 concludes by raising some outstanding questions. But first, we begin by introducing some preliminaries. 2 Preliminaries We assume in the background a propositional bimodal language whose sentences are defined recursively as follows: φ := p | ¬φ | (φ ∧ φ) | φ | φ where p ranges over the members of a countable set At of propositional letters. We take ¬ and ∧ to be our only primitive connectives, from which 2In Fitch's original 1963, he attributes the result to an anonymous referee, who was later discovered to be Alonzo Church (see Church (2009)). 2 Name Principle Frame Condition (K) (p→ q)→ (p→ q) Trivial (D) p→ ♦p Serial (T) p→ ♦p Reflexive (U) (p→ p) Shift-Reflexive (B) p→ ♦p Symmetric (4) p→ p Transitive (5) ♦p→ ♦p Euclidean (S) p→ p Subidentity Table 1: Some common principles and their frame conditions the other connectives are defined. ♦ abbreviates ¬¬ and  abbreviates ¬¬. We call  and ♦ (and similarly,  and ) each other's duals. We use φ, ψ, . . . as metavariables ranging over sentences of the language. A modal logic L is a set of sentences which contains all truth-functional tautologies and is closed under modus ponens (MP) and uniform substitution (US). φ is a theorem of L (`L φ) iff φ ∈ L. If L ⊆ L', we say that L' is an extension of L. Table 1 lists some common modal principles and their corresponding frame conditions.3 (The corresponding principles for  can be obtained by substituting each occurrence of  and ♦ with  and  respectively.) L is -congruential if it is closed under: (RC) If ` φ↔ ψ, then ` φ↔ ψ. -congruential logics are also closed under: (RC♦) If ` φ↔ ψ, then ` ♦φ↔ ♦ψ. We use M , M1, M2, . . . to denote arbitrary modalities, where a modality is a string O1 . . . On, with each Oi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) being either  or ♦, for any n ≥ 0 (with the case where n = 0 being the empty modality). M denotes the dual string of M (e.g. if M = ♦♦, then M = ♦♦). More precisely, if M = O1 . . . On, then M = Õ1 . . . Õn (where Õi is the dual of Oi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n). In the case of the empty modality, its dual string is itself. 3The frame condition of 'subidentity' for (S) is the condition that for each point in the frame, either it accesses no point or it accesses only itself. 3 We will make use of the following familiar facts about -congruential logics (see, for instance, (Chellas, 1980, 233)): Proposition 1. Let L be closed under (RC). Then, `L Mp↔ ¬M¬p. Proposition 2 (Duality). Let L be closed under (RC). If `L M1p→M2p, then `L M2p→ M1p. In sufficiently strong modal logics, modalities distribute over conjunctions, i.e. ` M(p ∧ q) → (Mp ∧ Mq). Let (DIST) be the modally qualified counterpart of that fact. That is, let it be the following schema (ranging over arbitrary M):4 (DIST) M(p ∧ q)→ (Mp ∧Mq). And let the Necessitation Rule for  be: (RN) If ` φ, then ` φ. We can now prove the following key lemmas: Lemma 3 (Moore Lemma). Let L be closed under (RC) and (RN), and let it contain (DIST). If `L M1p→ M1M2p, then `L ¬M1(p ∧ ¬M2p). Proof. Assume `L M1p→ M1M2p. (1) `L M1p→ M1M2p assumption (2) `L ¬(M1p ∧ ¬M1M2p) (1) (3) `L ¬M1M2p↔M1¬M2p Prop 1 (4) `L ¬(M1p ∧M1¬M2p) (2), (3) (5) `L ¬(M1p ∧M1¬M2p) (4), (RN) (6) `L M1(p ∧ ¬M2p)→ (M1p ∧M1¬M2p) (DIST), (US) (7) `L ¬(M1p ∧M1¬M2p)→ ¬M1(p ∧ ¬M2p) (6), contraposition (8) `L ¬M1(p ∧ ¬M2p) (5), (7) 4It will turn out that at all the points where we appeal to (DIST), its unqualified counterpart also suffices. The reason that we focus on (DIST) instead is that on various interpretations, (DIST) is intuitively weaker than its unqualified counterpart. The focus on (DIST) is to emphasise that the results to follow don't depend on the actual distributivity of the modal operators over conjunctions (for discussions on the role of the assumption of distributivity in the derivation of the Church–Fitch Theorem, see, for instance, Williamson (1993) and Chapter 4 of Kvanvig (2006)). 4 Lemma 4 (Church–Fitch Lemma). Let L be closed under (RC) and (RN), and let it contain (DIST). If `L M1p → M1M2p and `L M3p → M1p, then `L ¬M3(p ∧ ¬M2p). Proof. Assume `L M1p→ M1M2p and `L M3p→ M1p. (1) `L M1p→ M1M2p assumption (2) `L ¬M1(p ∧ ¬M2p) (1), Moore Lemma (3) `L ¬M1(p ∧ ¬M2p) (2), (RN) (4) `L M3p→ M1p assumption (5) `L ¬M1p→ ¬M3p (4), contraposition (6) `L ¬M1(p ∧ ¬M2p)→ ¬M3(p ∧ ¬M2p) (5), (US) (7) `L ¬M3(p ∧ ¬M2p) (3), (6) A version of the Church–Fitch Theorem easily follows: Theorem 5 (Church–Fitch Theorem). Let L be closed under (RC) and (RN), and let it contain (DIST). If `L p→ ♦p and `L p→ p, then `L p→ p.5 Proof. Assume `L p → ♦p and `L p → p. Let M1 = , M2 = , and M3 be the empty string. Then, `L p → ♦p is `L M1p → M1M2p and `L p→ p is `L M3p→ M1p. Thus, by the Church–Fitch Lemma, `L ¬M3(p ∧ ¬M2p), which is `L ¬(p ∧ ¬p)-or equivalently, `L p → p. The reason that the Church–Fitch Theorem follows so easily from the Church–Fitch Lemma is because the lemma is really just a generalisation of the reasoning that underlies the usual proof of the Church–Fitch Theorem. However, as we are about to see, it isn't an idle generalisation; it will allow us to prove other similar results of philosophical interest. 5Standard proofs of the theorem appeal either to the factivity of  (i.e. (T) p → ♦p) or the limited factivity of  (i.e. p → ♦p, as above). In another paper, I prove a generalisation of the Church–Fitch Theorem which shows a more general assumption suffices. In particular, let |M1−M2| = n be the difference in the number of modal operators in M1 and M2 (e.g. if M1 =  and M2 = ♦♦♦, then |M1−M2| = 3). I show that given weak background assumptions, if `M1p→M2p (where |M1−M2| = n) and `L p→ p, then ` p↔ np (where n abbreviates n iterations of  and 0 is the empty string, and similarly for ♦n). An upshot is that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the modal collapse identified in the Church–Fitch Theorem does not rely fundamentally on the factivity or limited factivity of  or on Moorean sentences of the form 'p∧¬p'. Rather, the modal collapse has to do more generally with modal level-bridging principles of the form M1p→M2p, of which p→ ♦p and p→ ♦p are mere instances. 5 3 Disappearing Diamonds 1: Recovering S5 Recall the notation introduced earlier: if (X) is of the form φ → ψ, (X) is φ → ψ. Thus, since (4) is p → p, (B) is p → ♦p, and (5) is ♦p→ ♦p, (4) is p→ p, (B  ) is p→ ♦p, and (5  ) is ♦p→ ♦p.6 In this section, we will show that given fairly weak assumptions, we can recover (4) and (B) from their qualified counterparts, (4  ) and (B). An immediate consequence of this will be that we can also recover (4) and (5) from their qualified counterparts, (4  ) and (5  ). We start by sketching a quick informal proof of the result for normal modal logics. L is normal if it contains (K) and (K) and is closed under the Necessitation Rules (RN) (φ/φ) and (RN) (φ/φ). We let KX1 . . .Xn ⊕ KX1 . . .Xn ′  denote the smallest normal modal logic containing (X1), . . . , (X n ) and (X 1 ), . . . , (X n′  ). Thus, K ⊕ K is the smallest normal modal logic and KT ⊕ K4, for instance, is the smallest normal modal logic containing (T) and (4). Sometimes, we use more common notation-e.g. S4 for KT4, S5 for KT5, and Triv for KTS. We want to show: Theorem 6 (S5-Recovery). Let L be a normal extension of KT⊕K. If L contains (4) and either (B  ) or (5  ), then L extends S5 ⊕ K. Informal proof: Suppose L contains (4) and (B  ). First, we will show that `L p→ ♦p. Suppose p∧¬♦p for a contradiction. By (B), ♦(p∧ ¬♦p). Thus, by (4), ♦(p ∧ ¬♦p). Distributing '♦' over the conjunction, (♦p∧♦¬♦p). By the duality of  and ♦, (♦p ∧ ¬♦p). Thus, by (T), (♦p ∧ ¬♦p). Contradiction. Thus, `L p→ ♦p. 6A note of caution: Proposition 2 (Duality) shows that axioms of the form M1p→ M2p have equivalent dual formulations of the form M2p→ M1p (equivalent in the sense that any -congruential logic contains one iff it contains the other). For instance, (T) can be taken to be either p→ ♦p or p→ p. Often, there is no canonical formulation- which formulation is identified with (T) depends on which interpretation of  one has in mind. For instance, under the metaphysical interpretation, perhaps p → ♦p might be preferred to capture the thought that anything actual is possible, whereas under the epistemic interpretation, p→ p is preferred since it captures the idea that knowledge is factive. But, having introduced the (X) notation, care needs to be exercised since which formulation we take (T) to be will affect whether we take (T  ) to be p→ ♦p or p→ p-which we cannot assume to be equivalent, even though p→ ♦p and p→ p are. Thus, given the (X) notation, we need a canonical formulation of (T). The same point applies to (4), (B) (5), and so on. For instance, one should not confuse (4  ) as defined above with ♦♦p→ ♦p. With this in mind, we take the canonical formulations of the principles to be as presented in Table 1. 6 Then, by (T), it follows that `L p → ♦p. So, L contains (B). Furthermore, by Duality, it follows from (B) that `L ♦p → p. So, by the normality of L, `L ♦p → p. Furthermore, from `L p → ♦p, it follows by (US) that `L p → ♦p. Thus, `L p → p; so, L contains (4). And since KT4B = S5, L extends S5⊕K. This also holds if we had assumed (5) instead of (B  ), since given (T), the former entails the latter. That concludes the informal proof of Theorem 6. But as we will see, the assumption of normality is dispensable. A similar result holds in extremely weak non-normal modal logics. And from that result, Theorem 6 immediately follows. In sufficiently strong modal logics, n distributes out of conjunctions, i.e. ` (np∧nq)→ n(p∧q). Let (DIST∗) be the modally qualified counterpart of that fact. That is, let (DIST∗) be the schema:7 (DIST∗) (np ∧nq)→ n(p ∧ q). We can show: Lemma 7. Let L be closed under (RC) and (RN), and let it contain (DIST∗). For any n ≥ 0, if `L ¬n(p ∧ ¬Mp), then `L np→ ♦nMp. Proof. Assume `L ¬n(p ∧ ¬Mp). Then, by (RN), `L ¬n(p ∧ ¬Mp). Given (DIST∗), it follows by (US) that `L (np ∧ n¬Mp) → n(p ∧ ¬Mp). So, by contraposition, `L ¬n(p ∧ ¬Mp) → ¬(np ∧ n¬Mp). Thus, from `L ¬n(p ∧ ¬Mp), it follows that `L ¬(np ∧ n¬Mp)- or equivalently, `L np → ¬n¬Mp. By Proposition 1, `L ♦nMp ↔ ¬n¬Mp. Thus, `L np→ ♦nMp. Lemma 8. Let L be closed under (RC) and (RN), and let it contain (DIST), (DIST∗), and (T). If L contains (4  ), then `L p→ ♦np, for any n ≥ 0. Proof. Assume L contains (4), i.e. `L p → p. The proof that `L p→ ♦np is by induction on the number of iterations of . The base case where n = 0 (i.e. `L p→ ♦p) follows immediately from the familiar fact that (T) implies (D). 7As with (DIST), it will turn out that at all the points where we appeal to (DIST∗), its unqualified counterpart also suffices. The reason that we focus on (DIST∗) instead is that on various interpretations, (DIST∗) is intuitively weaker than its unqualified counterpart. The focus on (DIST∗) is to emphasise that the results to follow don't depend on n actually distributing out of conjunctions. 7 For the inductive step, let the inductive hypothesis (IH) be `L p→ ♦np. We will show that `L p→ ♦n+1p. (1) `L p→ ♦np (IH) (2) `L p→ ♦n+1p (1), (US) (3) `L p→ ♦p (T) (4) `L ♦n+1p→ ♦♦n+1p (3), (US) (5) `L p→ ♦♦n+1p (2), (4) Now, letM1 = , M2 = n+1, andM3 = . So, (5) is `L M1p→ M1M2p. Furthermore, by assumption, `L p → p, which is `L M3p → M1p. Thus, by the Church–Fitch Lemma, `L ¬M3(p∧¬M2p), which is `L ¬(p∧ ¬n+1p). Thus, by Lemma 7, `L p→ ♦n+1p. Lemma 9. Let L be closed under (RC) and (RN), and let it contain (DIST), (DIST∗), and (T). If L contains (4  ) and (B  ), then `L p → n♦p, for any n ≥ 0. Proof. Assume L contains (4) and (B  ) (i.e. `L p → p and `L p→ ♦p). By Lemma 8, `L p→ ♦n+1p, for any n ≥ 0. So, by (US), `L ♦p→ ♦n+1♦p. Now, letM1 = ♦, M2 = n♦, andM3 be the empty string. So, `L ♦p→ ♦n+1♦p is `L M1p→ M1M2p and `L p→ ♦p is `L M3p→ M1p. Thus, by the Church–Fitch Lemma, `L ¬M3(p∧¬M2p), which is `L ¬(p ∧ ¬n♦p)-or equivalently, `L p→ n♦p. We can then easily show that (4) and (B  ) imply their unqualified counterparts. Theorem 10. Let L be closed under (RC) and (RN), and let it contain (DIST), (DIST∗), and (T). If L contains (4  ) and (B  ), then L contains (4) and (B). Proof. Assume L contains (4) and (B  ). Then, by Lemma 9, L contains (B) (simply let n = 1). Furthermore, L contains (4): (1) `L p→ ♦p Lemma 9 (2) `L ♦p→ p (1), Prop 2 (3) `L ♦p→ p (2), (US) (4) `L p→ ♦p Lemma 8 (5) `L p→ p (3), (4) 8 From this, it follows that (4) and (5  ) also imply their unqualified counterparts: Theorem 11. Let L be closed under (RC) and (RN), and let it contain (DIST), (DIST∗), and (T). If L contains (4  ) and (5  ), then L contains (4) and (5). Proof. Assume L contains (4) and (5  ). Since (5  ) implies (B  ) given (T), L contains (B  ). So, by Theorem 10, L contains (4) and (B). All that's left to show is that L contains (5). Given (T) and (4), `L p↔ p. So, by (RC♦), `L ♦p↔ ♦p. And by Duality, `L ♦p↔ ♦♦p. Now, by (US) and (B), `L ♦p→ ♦♦p. Thus, `L ♦p→ ♦p. From Theorems 10 and 11, Theorem 6 easily follows.8 The upshot is that given some weak background assumptions, accepting (4) and (B  ) or (5  ) is tantamount to accepting their unqualified counterparts (4), (B), and (5)-and thus, in the setting of normal modal logics, tantamount to accepting an S5 logic for . In the monomodal setting, S5 can be obtained by adding to KT either (4) and (B), or (5). The results above show that, to obtain an S5 logic for  in the bimodal setting, it suffices to add to KT ⊕ K the axioms (4) and either (B  ) or (5  ). This result might seem surprising. On various interpretations of  and , (4) and (5  ) can appear extremely weak. How could it be that they turn out to have the full logical strength of their unqualified counterparts? However, the initial surprise diminishes upon reflection on the Church– Fitch Theorem. The Church–Fitch Theorem shows that the Church–Fitch principle, p → p, is much stronger than it appears. In particular, for normal modal logics satisfying weak assumptions, the Church–Fitch principle gives rise to an extremely strong Triv logic for . In light of this, the results above are not so surprising. After all, conceived as schemas, the (4)-schema (φ → φ) and the (5  )-schema (♦φ → ♦φ) are really just restrictions of the Church–Fitch schema (φ→ φ) to φ and ♦φ sentences, respectively. Given the dramatic strengthening effects of the Church–Fitch schema, it is not so surprising that the restriction of it to φ and ♦φ sentences should remain fairly strong. Several things are worth noting. First: We have shown that given KT⊕K, (4) and (5  ) are jointly sufficient to give rise to an S5 logic for . But we can also show that neither is individually sufficient. That is, (4), on 8While normal extensions of KT ⊕ K need not contain (DIST) or (DIST∗), they contain their unqualified counterparts, which as has already been noted, also suffice for proving everything that we used (DIST) or (DIST∗) to prove. 9 its own, is not strong enough to generate an S5 logic for . And neither is (5) (see Appendix A). Second: The results above have straightforward implications for monomodal logics. Let L be the fragment of our bimodal language without any occurrences of . A monomodal logic (in L) is a set of L-sentences containing all truth-functional tautologies and closed under (MP) and (US). A monomodal logic is normal if it contains (K) and is closed under (RN). KX1. . . Xn denotes the smallest normal monomodal logic containing (X 1 ) ,. . . ,(Xn). An immediate consequence of our results is: Corollary 12. The smallest normal monomodal extension of KT containing p→ ♦p and p→ ♦♦p is S5.9 Proof. Same as the proof of Theorem 6, since nothing in the proof depended on  and  being distinct operators. Thus, instead of adding (4) and (B) to KT, S5 can already be axiomatised using the weaker axioms p→ ♦p and p→ ♦♦p. Finally, it is worth noting briefly that the results above have interesting and important implications for philosophical issues ranging across many different areas. For instance, interpreting  in terms of knowledge, (4) corresponds to the much-debated kk-principle: if one knows p, then one knows that one knows p. And (5) corresponds to the almost universally rejected k¬k-principle: if one doesn't know p, then one knows that one doesn't know p. And interpreting  in terms of logical necessity, (4) corresponds to an extremely weak variant of kk: if one knows p, then it's logically possible that one knows that one knows p. And (5) corresponds to an extremely weak variant of k¬k: if one doesn't know p, then it's logically possible that one knows that one doesn't know p. By our results, given weak assumptions, these extremely weak variants in fact have the full logical strength of kk and k¬k. This has many important implications for foundational epistemological issues to do with the nature and structure of knowledge and knowability, their limits, and so on. I explore these issues in greater detail in another paper. For another application of the results, consider the interpretation of  in terms of metaphysical modality. According to the orthodoxy, S5 is the logic for metaphysical modality. However, some, like Chandler (1976) and Salmon (1989), challenge this orthodoxy, rejecting both (4) and (5). 9In fact, it is easy to see that instead of p→ ♦p and p→ ♦♦p, this also holds more generally given p→ ♦mp and p→ ♦n♦p, for any m,n. 10 Under the metaphysical reading, (4) is the principle that whatever is necessary is necessarily so and (5) the principle that whatever is possible is necessarily so. By Theorem 6, rejecting metaphysical S5 requires rejecting at least one of (4) and (5  ), for any interpretation of  for which the assumption of normality is justified. Thus, for instance, interpreting  in terms of logical necessity, opponents of metaphysical S5 must deny either that whatever is metaphysically necessary is logically possibly metaphysically necessarily so or that whatever is metaphysically possible is logically possibly metaphysically necessarily so. 4 Disappearing Diamonds 2: Recovering KT This section shows that given (U) (p → p) and some other weak assumptions, (T) p → ♦p can be recovered from its modally qualified counterpart, (T) p → ♦p. Thus, given normality and (T  ), a KT logic for  can be recovered from KU ⊕ K. Theorem 13. Let L be closed under (RC) and (RN), and let it contain (U). If L contains (T  ), then L contains (T). Proof. Assume L contains (T). (1) `L (p→ p) (U) (2) `L ¬♦(p ∧ ¬p) (1) (3) `L ¬♦(p ∧ ¬p) (2), (RN) (4) `L p→ ♦p (T) (5) `L ¬♦p→ ¬p (4), contraposition (6) `L ¬♦(p ∧ ¬p)→ ¬(p ∧ ¬p) (5), (US) (7) `L ¬(p ∧ ¬p) (3), (6) (8) `L p→ p (7) (9) `L p→ ♦p (8), Prop 2 It follows that: Theorem 14 (KT-Recovery). Let L be a normal extension of KU ⊕ K. If L contains (T), then L extends KT ⊕ K. And: Corollary 15. Let L be a normal extension of K5 ⊕ K. If L contains (T), then L extends S5 ⊕ K. 11 Proof. By Theorem 14 and the fact that K5 ⊕ K is a normal extension of KU ⊕ K. As before, nothing in the proofs depended on  and  being distinct operators. So: Corollary 16. The smallest normal monomodal extension of KU containing p → ♦♦p is KT. And the smallest normal monomodal extension of K5 containing p→ ♦♦p is S5.10 The results above also have interesting implications. For instance, doxastic logic is standardly taken to be KD45. So, where  is given a doxastic interpretation, (T) must be rejected for every interpretation of  for which the assumption of normality is justified. For otherwise, by Corollary 15, we would end up with an S5 doxastic logic, in which belief is factive. Thus, for instance, the principle that whatever is necessarily believed is true must be rejected.11 For another application, consider the interpretation of  as 'normally'. The logic for normalcy is also sometimes taken to be at least as strong as KD45 but not S5 (see (Smith, 2007, 114)). If so, then by Theorem 14, (T) must be rejected for every interpretation of  for which the assumption of normality (in the sense of having a normal modal logic) is justified. Thus, for instance, the principle that whatever is necessarily normal is true must be rejected. Similarly, deontic logic is also sometimes taken to be at least as strong as KD45 but not S5. So, (T) must also be rejected for every interpretation of  for which the assumption of normality is justified. 5 Disappearing Diamonds 3: Recovering Triv For the purposes of this section, let (Y) be an arbitrary sentence of the form M1p→M2p, where M1 doesn't end in  and M2 does.12 For instance, one such principle is the McKinsey axiom, (M) ♦p→ ♦p. Another is (S) p→ p. This section shows that given S5 ⊕ K, (Y) implies (Y) and (Y) gives rise to a Triv logic for . 10In fact, it is easy to see that instead of p → ♦♦p, this holds more generally for p→ ♦np, for any n ≥ 1. 11(T) and p→ p are equivalent, in the sense that normal modal logics containing one also contain the other. 12Where, in general, M = O1 . . . On ends in On. 12 It is a well-known fact that in S5, a modality is reducible to its innermost operator: Proposition 17 (Modal Reduction). Let L be a normal extension of S5⊕ K. If M ends in , then `L Mp↔ p. If M ends in ♦, then `L Mp↔ ♦p. Using this, we can show: Lemma 18. Let L be a normal extension of S5⊕K. If L contains (Y), then L contains (S) p→ p. Proof. Suppose L contains (Y), i.e. `L M1p → M2p, where M1 doesn't end in  and M2 does. By Proposition 17, `L M2p ↔ p. And thus, by (RC), `L M2p ↔ p.13 Thus, it follows from `L M1p → M2p that `L M1p→ p. And by assumption, M1 doesn't end in  so either it is the empty string or it ends in ♦. If it is the empty string, then `L M1p ↔ p. And so, it follows from `L M1p → ♦p that `L p → p. If M1 ends in ♦, then by Proposition 17, `L M1p ↔ ♦p. Thus, given M1p → p, it follows that `L ♦p→ p. But by (T), `L p→ ♦p and so, `L p→ p. Using this lemma, we can prove: Theorem 19 (Triv-Recovery). Let L be a normal extension of S5 ⊕ K. If L contains (Y), then L contains (Y) and L extends Triv ⊕ K. Proof. Suppose L contains (Y). By Lemma 18, L contains (S  ). Thus, by the Church–Fitch Theorem, L contains (S) p → p.14 Thus, L extends Triv⊕K. And in Triv, any modality is equivalent to every other modality so `L M1p→M2p. And so, L contains (Y). 6 Conclusion An insufficiently appreciated lesson of the Church–Fitch Theorem is that principles concerning how different modalities interact can be treacherous.15 13Normal modal logics are closed under (RC): if ` φ↔ ψ, then ` φ↔ ψ. 14While L might not contain (DIST), it does contain its unqualified counterpart, which as we have already noted, also suffices for proving everything that we used (DIST) to prove. 15What is meant by 'modalities' here is not the technical notion introduced earlier, but rather 'modalities' in the sense of alethic modalities, physical modalities, epistemic 13 Though seemingly weak, principles like 'if something is true, then it is possible to know it' are far from innocuous. The aim of this paper has been to further reinforce this lesson. In particular, we showed that, given modest background assumptions, various bimodal principles of the form φ→ ψ have the full strength of their unqualified counterparts, φ→ ψ. Specifically: 1. given KT ⊕ K, (4) and (B  ) entail (4) and (B), and thus give rise to an S5 logic for ; 2. given KT ⊕ K, (4) and (5  ) entail (4) and (5), and thus give rise to an S5 logic for ; 3. given KU ⊕ K, (T) entails (T) and thus gives rise to a KT logic for ; 4. given K5 ⊕ K, (T) entails (T) and thus gives rise to an S5 logic for ; 5. given S5 ⊕ K, (Y) M1p → M2p, where M1 doesn't end in  and M2 does, entails (Y) and gives rise to a Triv logic for . An overarching theme that emerges is that the logical distance between various modal systems is not as great as commonly thought. It does not take much to close the logical gap between KU and KT, KT and S5, K5 and S5, or S5 and Triv. Consequently, it also does not take much to traverse the distance between some of the weakest normal modal logics, like KU, and some of the strongest, like Triv. The results raise various further technical questions. One question concerns whether there is a general recipe that determines when a principle (X) of the form φ → ψ falls out of its qualified counterpart (X) φ → ψ. The hope is that the results of this paper can ultimately be subsumed as special instances of some such general result. A converse question concerns when a bimodal principle of the form φ → ψ doesn't give rise to its unqualified counterpart-or even more strongly, when it doesn't strengthen the underlying logic for  in any way. These questions are topics for future investigation. modalities, and so on. 14 A Appendix Theorem 6 shows that given KT ⊕ K, (4) and (5  ) together give rise to an S5 logic for . We will show that though jointly sufficient, (4) and (5) are not individually sufficient to give rise to an S5 logic for . First, given KT⊕K, (4) isn't strong enough by itself to generate an S5 logic for : Theorem 20. The smallest normal extension of KT⊕K containing (4) does not extend S5 ⊕ K. Proof. As before, nothing depends on  and  being distinct operators. So, it suffices to show that the smallest normal monomodal extension of S4 containing p → ♦p does not extend S5. And that is obvious, since p→ ♦p is already a theorem of S4. Now, we show, by a semantic argument, that (5) also isn't strong enough by itself to generate an S5 logic for . First, some preliminaries: A Kripke frame is a structure F =< W,R, R >, where the domain W is a non-empty set, whose elements we shall refer to as 'worlds', and R ⊆ (W ×W ) and R ⊆ (W ×W ) are binary relations on W . A Kripke model M =< F, V > is a frame with a valuation function V which maps each propositional letter to a set of worlds. If M =< F, V >, we say that M is based on F. A pointed Kripke model <M, w > is a model M together with a world w in the domain of M (by the domain of M, we mean the domain of the frame on which M is based). Satisfaction in a pointed model is defined: M, w p iff w ∈ V (p), for every p ∈ At; M, w ¬φ iff not M, w φ; M, w (φ ∧ ψ) iff M, w φ and M, w ψ; M, w φ iff for every v ∈ W such that < w, v >∈ R, M, v φ. M, w φ iff for every v ∈ W such that < w, v >∈ R, M, v φ. M φ iff M, w φ for all w in the domain of M. And F φ iff M φ for every model M based on F. It is easy to show that any frame satisfying the condition in the antecedent of the lemma below validates (5): 15 Lemma 21. If F  ∀wv(wRv → ∃u(wRu ∧ ∀t(uRt → tRv))), then F ♦p→ ♦p. Thus: Theorem 22. Let L be the smallest normal extension of KT ⊕ K containing (5). Then, L doesn't extend S4⊕K (and thus also doesn't extend S5 ⊕ K). Proof Sketch. Consider the model M below, where the arrows represent R (let R be the universal accessibility relation): ¬p p p w R is reflexive, so M is a KT⊕K-model. Furthermore, checking that the condition in the antecedent of the previous lemma is satisfied is a tedious but straightforward exercise. Thus, the model is an L-model. However, M, w p ∧ ¬p, so M is a countermodel to (4). Thus, L doesn't extend S4 ⊕ K and thus also doesn't extend S5 ⊕ K. References Chandler, H. (1976). Plantinga and the contingently possible. Analysis, 36(2):106–109. Chellas, B. (1980). Modal Logic: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press. Church, A. (2009). Referee reports on Fitch's "A definition of value". In Salerno, J., editor, New Essays on the Knowability Paradox, pages 13–20. Oxford University Press. Fitch, F. (1963). A logical analysis of some value concepts. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 28:135–142. Jenkins, C. S. (2009). The mystery of the disappearing diamond. In Salerno, J., editor, New Essays on the Knowability Paradox, pages 302–319. Oxford University Press. 16 Kvanvig, J. (2006). The Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press. Salmon, N. (1989). The logic of what might have been. The Philosophical Review, 98(1):3–34. Smith, M. (2007). Ceteris paribus conditionals and comparative normalcy. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 36:97–121. Williamson, T. (1993). Verificationism and non-distributive knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 71(1):78–86.

Versão pdf da entrada AbstrActA da Edição dE 2014 do Compêndio Em Linha dE probLEmas dE fiLosofia anaLítiCa 2012-2015 FCT Project PTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010 Editado por João Branquinho e Ricardo Santos ISBN: 978-989-8553-22-5 Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica Copyright © 2014 do editor Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa Alameda da Universidade, Campo Grande, 1600-214 Lisboa Abstracta Copyright © 2014 do autor Gonçalo Santos Todos os direitos reservados Resumo A noção de objecto abstracto desempenha um papel central em diferentes debates filosóficos contemporâneos, da metafísica à estética, passando pela filosofia da linguagem. A sua origem está contudo relacionada com a filosofia da matemática e em particular, com o trabalho de Frege nos fundamentos da aritmética. O nosso primeiro objectivo será assim o de explicar o contributo desta noção para o entendimento Fregeano da realidade matemática. Veremos também que, em virtude de certas dificuldades inerentes ao projeto Fregeano, a dada altura a natureza do universo matemático passou a ser entendida nos termos da chamada teoria dos conjuntos. Com este material à nossa disposição, podemos então discutir o papel desempenhado pela noção de objecto abstracto em certos debates filosóficos contemporâneos. Em particular, procuraremos ilustrar o interesse actual da noção, discutindo a distinção abstracto/concreto. Palavras-chave Objecto lógico, objecto matemático, Logicismo, Teoria dos Conjuntos, objecto concreto Abstract The notion of abstract object plays a central role in different philosophical disciplines, such as metaphysics, aesthetics or the philosophy of language. At its origin, this notion is however associated with the philosophy of mathematics and in particular, with Frege's work on the foundations of arithmetic. Our first goal will thus be that of explaining the role played by the notion on the Fregean understanding of mathematics . We will also see that the Fregean project came across certain dificulties and that as a consequence of these, the set theoretical understanding of the mathematical realm became more widely accepted. With this background material at our disposal, we can then begin discussing the role that abstract objects play in certain contemporary philosophical debates. Namely, we will illustrate the importance of the notion, by discussing an attempt to draw a distinction between abstract and concrete objects. Keywords Logical object, mathematical object, Logicism, Set Theory, concrete object Publicado pela primeira vez em 2014 Abstracta 1 A noção de objecto lógico A noção de objecto abstracto é, em termos filosóficos, relativamente recente, não desempenhando um papel significativo na discussão filosófica anterior ao século passado. É aliás difícil imaginar como é que essa discussão se poderia processar antes do trabalho de Frege, tal foi o contributo deste autor para a definição dos termos nos quais se desenvolve a discussão contemporânea. Esse autor vai assim ser o ponto de partida do presente trabalho. Como a literatura no tema é hoje em dia extremamente abundante, a presente entrada não pode ser exaustiva no seu tratamento da noção. Os seus principais objectivos são apenas explicar o interesse filosófico de objecto abstracto e descrever a evolução no modo como se entendem aqueles que, já para Frege, são os casos paradigmáticos de objectos abstractos. Nomeadamente, os objectos matemáticos. Como veremos na próxima secção, para Frege, os objectos matemáticos são em última análise objectos lógicos. Esta tese é porém a conclusão de uma história e para percebermos como é que se pode chegar aí, devemos começar por descrever a concepção Fregeana da lógica. Um dos aspectos distintivos esta concepção corresponde ao modo como Frege entende aquela que é suposta ser uma das características definidoras da lógica. A saber, a sua generalidade. A lógica pode dizer-se geral na medida em que ela se aplica a todas as coisas. As leis da lógica não são apenas válidas quando aplicadas a uma colecção restricta de objectos. Elas são válidas quando aplicadas a qualquer colecção de objectos. Tradicionalmente, outra das características atribuídas à lógica é a sua formalidade. A lógica pode dizer-se formal na medida em que ela abstrai de todo o conteúdo semântico associado ao nosso uso da linguagem e por meio do qual nos referimos aos objectos no mundo. Se juntarmos generalidade com formalidade, segue-se que a lógica define as formas válidas para podermos estabelecer verdades acerca de absolutamente todos os objectos. No entanto, a lógica ela mesma não estabelece quaisquer verdades acerca de quaisquer objectos. Frege rompe com esta tradição, negando o carácter formal da Gonçalo Santos2 Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica Edição de 2014 lógica. Mais exactamente, ele defende que certas expressões lógicas evidenciam um comportamento semântico semelhante ao das expressões não lógicas e que consequentemente, a lógica não pode abstrair do conteúdo semântico associado a essas expressões. E como ela não pode abstrair destes conteúdos, segue-se que tal como as outras ciências, a lógica também estabelece verdades acerca de certos objectos.1 Segundo Frege, tudo isto se segue do carácter absolutamente geral da lógica. Para substanciar esta última afirmação, Frege precisa porém de desenvolver um entendimento particular da generalidade da lógica. Isto porque, tal como descrita acima, esta generalidade não aparece imediatamente associada ao estabelecimento de verdades acerca de objectos. Na próxima subsecção, procuraremos descrever o entendimento da generalidade associado à concepção Fregeana da lógica. 1.1 A generalidade da lógica As ciências da natureza procuram estabelecer as leis da natureza, as quais se aplicam a certos objectos. Já a lógica procura estabelecer as leis da lógica, as quais se aplicam a toda e qualquer colecção de objectos. Podem estas leis ser equiparadas? Uma dificuldade inicial deriva do facto de que, ao passo que as primeiras se aplicam a certos objectos, o mesmo não parece acontecer com as segundas. Isto é, dado que as leis da lógica permanecem válidas independentemente da colecção de objectos em questão, elas parecem não ser aplicáveis a nenhuns objectos em partícular. Para Frege, contudo, esta aparência é enganadora. Ainda que à primeira vista tal não pareça ser o caso, tal como as leis da natureza, as leis da lógica também se aplicam a 1 Uma linguagem com conteúdo semântico é habitualmente descrita como uma linguagem interpretada. Ao defender que a lógica possui uma linguagem interpretada, Frege entra particularmente em desacordo com Hilbert, o qual defendia precisamente o oposto. Como consequência deste desacordo, Frege e Hilbert mantiveram um aceso debate acerca da forma correcta de entender o papel dos axiomas de uma teoria matemática. Este debate possui implicações profundas para o nosso entendimento filosófico da lógica e o leitor que deseje aprender mais sobre o assunto, encontrará no trabalho de Blanchette (2007) uma excelente introdução. Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica Edição de 2014 3Abstracta certos objectos. Vejamos então como é que Frege procurou, num certo sentido, entender as leis da lógica como as mais gerais de todas as leis da natureza. Dizemos que uma dada afirmação é uma lei, se ela satisfaz um dos dois seguintes requisitos: a afirmação descreve uma certa regularidade na ordem das coisas (normalmente possuindo um elevado valor explicativo relativamente a cenários contrafactuais) ou a afirmação prescreve aquilo que nós devemos fazer, fornecendo um critério para a avaliação da nossa conduta como correcta ou incorrecta. Às afirmações que satisfazem o primeiro requisito chamamos leis descritivas. Às afirmações que satisfazem o segundo requisito chamamos leis normativas. As chamadas leis da natureza são supostas satisfazer ambos os requisitos. Tome-se uma lei da física, por exemplo. Ela diz-se descritiva na medida em que descreve uma certa regularidade no comportamento dos objectos físicos (tentando assim explicar porque é que, em determinadas situações, eles se comportam de uma certa maneira e não de outra). Simultaneamente, essa lei diz-se normativa na medida em que introduz prescrições para uma pessoa que pense acerca de objectos físicos. Nomeadamente, na medida em que uma pessoa pensa acerca de objectos físicos, essa actividade deve ser passível de avaliação à luz das leis da física. Para Frege, tal como as leis da natureza, as leis da lógica também satisfazem ambos os requisitos. Nomeadamente, se as leis da física se dizem normativas por fornecer critérios que nos permitem avaliar o nosso pensamento acerca dos objectos físicos como correcto ou incorrecto, as leis da lógica também se podem dizer normativas ao fornecer os critérios que nos permitem avaliar o pensamento em geral como correcto ou incorrecto. Por outro lado, poderá não parecer tão simples perceber porque é que as leis da lógica também se dizem descritivas. Afinal, que objectos é que elas descrevem e que valor explicativo é que elas possuem relativamente a cenários contrafactuais? Para responder a esta última pergunta, devemos recordar a tese Fregeana mencionada anteriormente. Nomeadamente, de acordo com Frege os objectos matemáticos são, em última análise, objectos lógicos. Esta posição vai ser analisada com mais detalhe na próxima secção. Contudo, podemos desde já notar que, supondo a verdade de uma tal tese, apesar das aparências, a lógica acaba por também desGonçalo Santos4 Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica Edição de 2014 crever o comportamento de certos objectos. Adicionalmente, essa suposição permite-nos atribuir valor explicativo à lógica no que diz respeito a cenários contrafactuais. Isto porque, se por um lado os físicos podem considerar outros mundos possíveis, com leis físicas diferentes das actuais, por outro, ninguém pode considerar um mundo no qual as leis da matemática não se verificam.2 Portanto, ao explicar a necessidade das leis que regulam a matemática, a lógica também acaba por possuir um valor explicativo no que diz respeito a cenários contrafactuais. Nomeadamente, a lógica explica porque é que não podem existir cenários matemáticos deste tipo. Neste sentido, podemos então dizer que as leis da lógica devem ser entendidas como as mais gerais de todas as leis da natureza. 2 Números como extensões de conceitos A distinção entre verdades analíticas e verdades sintéticas será o nosso ponto de partida para a discussão da tese Fregeana de acordo com a qual os objectos da matemática são, em última análise, objectos lógicos. Como veremos, para Frege, todas as verdades matemáticas são verdades analíticas. De modo grosseiro, as verdades aritméticas podem ser explicadas em termos do significado de número natural, o que hipoteticamente permitiria uma redução da aritmética à lógica. Esta é aliás a premissa central do chamado programa Logicista Fregeano. A distinção analítico/sintético foi introduzida por Kant com o intuito de marcar a diferença que intuitivamente parece existir entre juízos como "Todos os gorilas são primatas" e "Alguns primatas vivem em cativeiro". Uma forma comum de explicar esta diferença consiste em fazer notar que, para conhecer o valor de verdade da primeira frase, basta conhecer o significado dos conceitos que nela ocorrem. Isto é, se alguém conhece o significado de primata e gori2 A afirmação de que ninguém pode considerar um mundo no qual as leis da matemática não se verificam, vê-se justificada pelo facto de que a suposição da falsidade de verdades matemáticas conduz a conclusões absurdas. Por exemplo, se supomos uma falsidade matemática como 0=1, vemos que qualquer coisa se pode demonstrar. Como ilustração, considere-se a seguinte demonstração da existência de Deus. Suponhamos que 0=1 e que Deus não existe. Então o número de Deus é igual a 0. Como 0=1, o número de Deus também é igual a 1. Mas então segue-se que Deus existe. Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica Edição de 2014 5Abstracta la, então essa pessoa sabe que a frase em questão é verdadeira. Por outro lado, para conhecer o valor de verdade da segunda frase, não basta conhecer o significado dos conceitos que nela ocorrem. Adicionalmente, é necessário verificar se a realidade é tal como a frase em questão a descreve. Dada esta diferença, Kant sugeriu chamar à primeira frase uma verdade analítica e à segunda uma verdade sintéctica. Antes de descrevermos o modo como Frege entende a analiticidade das verdades aritméticas, deve ser salientado que esta proposta é acompanhada por um entendimento particular da noção de analiticidade.3 Nomeadamente, para Frege, se formos capazes de demonstrar que uma dada verdade se pode demonstrar logicamente a partir dos conceitos associados a uma verdade mais primitiva, segue-se que a primeira é uma verdade analítica se a segunda também o for. Portanto, se formos capazes de demonstrar que as verdades aritméticas se podem demonstrar a partir de verdades lógicas, como as últimas são supostas serem analíticas, as primeiras também o serão.4 Comecemos então por rever algumas das noções e distinções introduzidas por Frege. Provavelmente a mais importante para os nossos propósitos, é a noção de que os conceitos são os correlatos ontológicos dos predicados. Dito de outra maneira, de acordo com Frege, as expressões predicativas denotam conceitos. Por exemplo, se removermos 'Koko' de:5 3 A noção de analiticidade é entendida por Kant e Frege de modos ligeiramente diferentes. O leitor que deseja saber mais acerca das diferenças entre a abordagem Kantiana e Fregeana à analiticidade (e noções associadas), encontra no trabalho de MacFarlane (2002) uma discussão pormenorizada. 4 Ainda que os detalhes técnicos do programa Logicista não sejam discutidos no presente trabalho, valerá ainda assim a pena salientar o seguinte aspecto. Como as verdades da aritmética são infinitas, é impossível demonstrar caso a caso que todas elas se seguem de verdades lógicas. Podemos contudo formular a aritmética em termos de um número finito de axiomas (obtendo a teoria habitualmente conhecida como aritmética de Peano), de onde se seguem todas as verdades aritméticas. Portanto, podemos demonstrar que toda a aritmética se reduz à lógica, se formos capazes de demonstrar caso a caso que todos os axiomas se seguem de verdades lógicas. Foi esta a abordagem ao problema que Frege procurou implementar. 5 Embora tal seja apenas uma curiosidade, 'Koko' é o nome de uma famosa gorila. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Koko_(gorilla) Gonçalo Santos6 Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica Edição de 2014 1. Koko é uma gorila. obtemos o predicado "é uma gorila" o qual denota um conceito. Além desta distinção entre predicado e conceito, Frege nota adicionalmente que devemos distinguir um conceito da sua extensão, isto é, da colecção de objectos relativamente aos quais a aplicação do predicado resulta numa verdade. Embora extensões sejam objectos, os conceitos não podem ser entendidos como tal. Eles são por natureza incompletos, possuindo uma posição que deve ser ocupada. Mais exactamente, Frege entende os conceitos como funções de objectos (ou pares de objectos, triplos de objectos, ...) para valores de verdade. Uma última distinção que devemos ter em conta é a de que, mesmo nos casos em só existe um objecto que satisfaz o predicado, não devemos identificar a extensão de um conceito com os elementos dessa extensão. Portanto, dado o predicado "é a gorila capaz de entender mais de duas mil palavras", devemos distinguir entre o conceito que a Koko faz corresponder o verdadeiro, a colecção cujo único elemento é Koko e a Koko propriamente dita. Com estas distinções à nossa disposição, podemos começar a descrever o programa Logicista com mais algum detalhe. Devemos ter sempre em mente que o principal objectivo deste programa é o de reduzir os objectos aritméticos a objectos lógicos. Ora, é inegável que por vezes o objecto das nossas predicações é um outro predicado. Por exemplo, é isto que acontece quando dizemos: 2. Os gorilas na jaula são dois. Note-se que o predicado "são dois" não é verdadeiro de cada um dos gorilas na jaula. Nenhum deles é idêntico a dois. Esse predicado é antes verdade da colecção dos gorilas na jaula. Devemos pois pensar no objecto da predicação como a extensão do conceito "é um gorila na jaula".6 Predicados cujo objecto de predicação é outro predicado dizem-se predicados de segunda ordem. Frege argumentou que os predicados numéricos são deste tipo, tendo como objecto outros predicados.7 Dado um tal entendimento dos predicados numéricos, 6 O autor agradece ao José Manuel Mestre os seus comentários e sugestões a respeito de uma formulação anterior deste ponto. 7 Embora um tal aspecto do programa Logicista não seja discutido no presente trabalho, deve ser salientado que, ao admitir a existência de colecções de objectos Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica Edição de 2014 7Abstracta a questão que então se coloca é como entender a extensão destes conceitos de conceitos. Para responder a esta questão, comecemos por observar que o nosso último exemplo pode ser reescrito do seguinte modo: 3. Existe um gorila na jaula e outro gorila na jaula e estes são os únicos gorilas na jaula. Esta reformulação pode ser por sua vez ser parafraseada na linguagem lógica concebida por Frege do seguinte modo: 4. ∃x∃y(x ≠ y ∧ Mx ∧ My ∧ ∀z(z = x ∨ z = y)) Para tornar esta abordagem mais explícita, vamos agora introduzir a noção de operador de abstração. Um operador de abstração é uma função que tem como valores objectos abstractos de algum tipo. Por exemplo, podemos definir uma função d que toma como argumento linhas l1, l2 e que tem como valores direcções d(l1), d(l2). Se l1, l2 são linhas diferentes com uma mesma direcção, segue-se que d(l1) = d(l2). Portanto, neste caso, a diferentes linhas corresponde um único objecto abstracto. No caso numérico, o operador de abstração relevante escreve-se # e lê-se "o número de...". Este operador toma como argumento predicados de segunda-ordem como M, tomando nesse caso o valor do número de gorilas na jaula. Adoptando o símbolo ⊢ para expressar a relação de deducibilidade, podemos então dizer que: 5. #xMx = 2 ⊣⊢ ∃x∃y(x ≠ y ∧ Mx ∧ My ∧ ∀z(z = x ∨ z = y)) Isto é, segue-se do número de M's ser igual a dois, que existem dois e só dois objectos que satisfazem o predicado M. Simultaneamente, segue-se de existirem dois e só dois objectos que satisfazem o predicado M, que o número de M's é igual a dois. À semelhança do que acontece com linhas e direcções, podemos predicar "é idêntico a dois" de outro conceito N, se este possui o mesmo número de objectos na sua extensão. Isto é, a diferentes conceitos no domínio de quantificação, a lógica Fregeana precisa de admitir variáveis de segunda-ordem. Assim, enquanto que as variáveis de primeira-ordem tomam objectos como valores, as variáveis de segunda-ordem tomam colecções de objectos como valores. Para o leitor interessado em saber mais sobre lógica de ordem- -superior, um bom ponto de partida é a obra de Shapiro (1991). Gonçalo Santos8 Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica Edição de 2014 pode corresponder um mesmo número. Mais rigorosamente, a ideia é a de que podemos definir uma relação de equinumerosidade R que a cada gorila na extensão de M faz corresponder um certo elemento da extensão de N e que a cada elemento na extensão de N, faz corresponder um certo gorila na extensão de M. Quando tal acontece, dizemos que existe uma correspondência biunívoca entre N e M e que estes conceitos satisfazem a relação R. Esta relação de equinumerosidade tem um papel central num importante princípio logicista habitualmente conhecido como Princípio de Hume:8 6. #xMx = #xNx ↔ ∃R(R faz corresponder 1-1 M's e N's) Fazemos agora notar que R possui três características importantes. Nomeadamente, ela é reflexiva (dado que qualquer conceito é equinumérico consigo mesmo), simétrica (dado que se um conceito é equinumérico com outro, então o segundo é equinumérico com o primeiro) e transitiva (dado que se um conceito é equinumérico com um segundo e o segundo é equinumérico com um terceiro, segue-se que o primeiro é equinumérico com o terceiro). Relações que satisfazem estas três características designam-se de relações de equivalência. Quando aplicada a um domínio de objectos, uma relação de equivalência efectua aquilo que se designa como uma partição do domínio. Informalmente, esta operação divide o domínio em distintas partes (habitualmente designadas de classes de equivalência), com os elementos de uma parte a relacionarem-se com todos os outros elementos dessa parte, ao mesmo tempo que não se relacionam com nenhum elemento de qualquer outra parte. No caso em discussão, a 8 Como veremos de seguida, o paradoxo de Russell demonstra que o projecto Logicista, tal como concebido por Frege, não pode ser executado. Em anos mais recentes, diferentes autores (entre os quais Hale and Wright (2001)) têm procurado desenvolver uma nova versão do logicismo conhecida como neo logicismo. O princípio de Hume assume um papel central no neo-logicismo, dado que ele é aí tomado como uma verdade lógica. Por um lado, este princípio permite aos neo-logicistas a derivação dos axiomas de Peano (um resultado conhecido como teorema de Frege), ao mesmo tempo que evita o paradoxo de Russell. Por outro, é discutível que o Princípio de Hume possa ser considerado como um princípio lógico, entre outras coisas, porque implica sérios compromissos ontológicos. O leitor que procura uma análise critíca do programa neo-logicista pode começar pelo trabalho de Boolos (1997). Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica Edição de 2014 9Abstracta relação de equinumerosidade efectua uma partição do domínio de conceitos, sendo que os conceitos de uma parte são equinuméricos com todos os outros conceitos dessa parte, mas com nenhum dos conceitos em nenhuma das outras partes. Esta observação é crucial para perceber a definição Fregeana de número. Isto porque, com a partição efectuada pela relação de equinumerosidade, obtemos todos os conceitos com um elemento na sua extensão reunidos numa só parte, todos os conceitos com dois elementos na sua extensão reunidos noutra parte, todos os conceitos com três elementos na sua extensão reunidos ainda noutra parte e por aí adiante. Frege propôs então identificar os números naturais um, dois, três e por aí adiante com essas partes do domínio de conceitos. Isto é, em geral: 7. #xMx = a extensão do conceito de ser equinumérico a M. Esta imagem do universo de conceitos está na base do projecto logicista, o qual, como já foi mencionado, procurava entender os objectos matemáticos em termos puramente lógicos. Caso este projecto fosse concluído com sucesso, ele forneceria uma razão para pensarmos que os objectos abstractos podem ser entendidos como existindo de forma tão real quanto os objectos concretos. Objectos abstractos e concretos existiriam assim lado a lado, por assim dizer, na suposta colecção de absolutamente tudo. À primeira vista, uma tal concepção de objecto abstracto pode parecer demasiado literal. Afinal, apesar de falarmos frequentemente do número de variados tipos de objectos concretos, não parece que possamos dizer ter o mesmo número de interacção com objectos abstractos. Não só não os detectamos através dos sentidos, como os nossos instrumentos de observação mais refinados não os detectam. Nem sequer parece que o possam vir a fazer. Pois onde quer que os números naturais possam existir, é certos que eles não vão ser detectados nem ao nível microscópico nem ao nível macroscópico. Ao mesmo tempo, uma tal reacção à imagem do universo de conceitos Fregeanos pode ser consequência de uma visão demasiado simplista da realidade. Afinal, é inegável que apesar de os nossos corpos serem compostos pela mesma matéria (moléculas, átomos, partículas sub-atómicas...) que compõe as estrelas, falamos de indivíduos humanos como existindo lado a lado, por assim dizer, da matéria que Gonçalo Santos10 Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica Edição de 2014 os compõe. Num certo sentido, é como se o próprio concreto fosse composto por diferente níveis de abstração. E se aceitarmos esta visão menos simplista da realidade, porquê rejeitar a existência de um nível de abstração adicional, onde os números naturais existem numa relação com os humanos, idêntica àquela em que os seres humanos existem em relação à matéria que os compõe? Apesar do inegável interesse destas questões, não vamos continuar a discuti-las na presente entrada. Continuaremos isso sim a explorar uma última e importante consequência do projecto logicista. É que como veremos no início da próxima secção, é fácil demonstrar que este projecto conduz a uma contradição e, dado o propósito logicista de fornecer um fundamento sólido para a matemática, isto representa um problema significativo. Na próxima secção veremos como dar conta deste problema, através da descrição de uma concepção alternativa de objectos abstractos. 3 Números como conjuntos Para fins expositivos, convém introduzir a seguinte convenção terminológica e notacional. Em seguida, designamos extensões como conjuntos e como tal, dado um conceito como o de ser um gorila, falamos do conjunto de todos os objectos que caem sob esse conceito, i.e., do conjunto de todos os gorilas. Em símbolos, escrevemos {x: x é um gorila} e lemos, o conjunto dos x's tais que x é um gorila. Acabámos de ver que Frege propõe entender a realidade dos números em termos da realidade dos conceitos numéricos. Em particular, vimos que esse projecto visava fundar a aritmética numa teoria geral de conjuntos. Os objectos matemáticos seriam em última análise analisados em termos de conjuntos e, por hipótese, as verdades matemáticas poderiam ser deduzidas a partir de princípios puramente lógicos acerca de conjuntos. Ora, um dos princípios identificados por Frege é a infamosa Lei Básica V, segundo qual, para quaisquer fórmulas Φ e Ψ da nossa linguagem: 8. {x: Φx} = {x: Ψx} ↔ ∀x(Φx ↔ Ψx) Esta lei diz-nos que se o conjunto dos Φ's é idêntico ao conjunto dos Ψ's, então todo o Φ é Ψ e todo o Ψ é Φ e que se todo o Φ é Ψ e todo o Ψ é Φ então o conjunto dos Φ's é idêntico ao conjunto dos Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica Edição de 2014 11Abstracta Ψ's. Como se pode ver facilmente, esta lei tem como consequência a existência de conjuntos para qualquer fórmula Φ. Dito de outra forma, de acordo com a Lei Básica V, para qualquer fórmula Φ, existe um conjunto com todos os objectos que satisfazem essa fórmula.9 Como veremos em seguida, esta lei revelou-se demasiado liberal, permitindo a existência de certos conjuntos "paradoxais". Para vermos como se deriva o paradoxo de Russell a partir da concepção Fregeana de conjuntos, note-se primeiro que alguns conceitos se aplicam a conjuntos e que as extensões de tais conceitos, são conjuntos que contêm outros conjuntos como elementos.10 Por exemplo, considere-se o conceito con nto finito. A sua extensão F é o conjunto cujos elementos são conjuntos como um número finito de elementos. Simbolicamente: F = {x: x é um conjunto finito} Os elementos de F contêm assim, por exemplo, o conjunto de todos os gorilas na Terra, assim como o conjunto de todas as estrelas na nossa galáxia. Já o conjunto dos números naturais não pertence a F. Este conjunto cai antes debaixo do conceito de con nto infinito, sendo portanto um elemento de: I = {x: x é um conjunto infinito}. Note-se agora que, apesar dos elementos de F serem conjuntos finitos, o próprio F é um conjunto infinito, dado que entre os seus elementos encontram-se todos os conjuntos na lista infinita {0}, {1}, 9 A demonstração consiste basicamente em explorar a direcção da direita para a esquerda do bicondicional, tendo como premissa a verdade lógica ∀x(Φx ↔ Φx). Daí, por eliminação da implicação, segue-se {x: Φx} = {x: Φx}, o que equivale a dizer que existe um conjunto dos Φ's. 10 Como mencionado no início desta secção, com vista ao material a ser discutido no resto deste trabalho, convencionámos começar a falar de extensões em termos de conjuntos. Isto pode soar um pouco estranho, na medida em que não é habitual falar-se da teoria Fregeana nestes termos. Note-se contudo que a chamada teoria ingénua dos conjuntos possui várias semelhanças com a teoria Fregeana de extensões, entre as quais, um axioma equivalente à Lei V. Tal como a Lei V, este axioma, habitualmente conhecido como o axioma ingénuo da compreensão, é demasiado liberal relativamente à existência de conjuntos, nomeadamente, ao permitir a existência de certos conjuntos "paradoxais". Gonçalo Santos12 Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica Edição de 2014 {2}, .... Assim, F não é um membro de si mesmo, mas antes de I. Em símbolos, escrevemos F ∉ F e F ∈ I. Por sua vez, o conjunto I possui como elementos, os conjuntos da lista infinita {0, 1, 2,...}, {1, 2, 3,...}, {2, 3, 4,...},..., pelo que I é um conjunto que é ele mesmo infinito. Como tal, I ∈ I. Vemos assim que, de acordo com a concepção de conjuntos empregue por Frege, alguns conjuntos são elementos deles mesmos, enquanto que outros não o são. Considere-se então o conceito conjunto que não é um membro de si mesmo e seja R a sua extensão: R = {x: x é um conjunto e x ∉ x}. Suponhamos que perguntamos agora se R ∈ R. Por definição, R é um membro de R se e só se ele cai sobre o conceito conjunto que não é um elemento de si mesmo. Simbolicamente: R ∈ R se e só se R ∉ R. Segue-se então que, quer R seja um elemento dele mesmo quer não, as condições de verdade da bicondicional nunca podem ser satisfeitas. Ou seja, a suposição de que o conceito conjunto que não é um elemento de si mesmo tem uma extensão, conduz a uma contradição, pelo que o projecto Logicista Fregeano falha como tentativa de fornecer um fundamento para a aritmética. Este falhanço significa que a lógica, tal como concebida por Frege, é incapaz de garantir a consistência da matemática. Deste resultado não se segue contudo a inconsistência da matemática. Em particular, se pensamos que a matemática necessita de um fundamento, nada nos impede de procurar uma alternativa ao Logicismo. No que resta desta secção, procuraremos introduzir de modo informal aquela que é habitualmente adoptada como a teoria fundadora da matemática. Nomeadamente, falaremos brevemente da teoria de conjuntos Zermelo-Fraenkel (daqui em diante ZF).11 Esta teoria pode ser descrita de duas formas. Por um lado, ZF é a teoria do infinito actual.12 Por outro, ZF é a teoria na qual todas 11 Existem várias alternativas para o leitor interessado numa introdução matemática a esta disciplina. Se o autor deve recomendar apenas uma, esta será a obra de Devlin (1979). 12 A distinção entre infinito act al e infinito potencial basicamente corresponCompêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica Edição de 2014 13Abstracta as outras teorias matemáticas podem ser interpretadas. Este segundo sentido manifesta-se na utilização sistemática que as outras teorias matemáticas fazem de noções definidas em ZF (como conjunto e função, por exemplo). Em última análise, todos os objectos e operações matemáticas podem ser interpretados como conjuntos e operações em conjuntos. Devemos contudo notar que conjuntos não são objectos lógicos, num sentido Fregeano. A teoria ZF é uma teoria matemática que pode ser entendida como fornecendo um fundamento para a matemática, na medida em que ela define um universo de objectos abstractos suficientemente rico para interpretar todas as outra teorias matemáticas. Neste ponto o leitor poderá perguntar-se se, depois de demonstrada a inconsistência de um projecto fundacional que faz uso da noção de conjunto, continua ainda assim a fazer sentido confiar noutro projecto fundacional que faz uso da mesma noção? Em particular, o que nos garante que ZF não nos levará a cair no mesmo erro que Frege? Esta é sem dúvida uma boa pergunta. Ela é contudo passível de ser respondida. Nomeadamente, dado que a desconfiança em torno de a duas formas distintas de entender a colecção dos números naturais. Uma característica distintiva desta colecção é que ela é maior que qualquer colecção finita, independentemente do quão grande esta última possa ser. Assim, se uma colecção finita possui n elementos, o número de elementos da colecção dos números naturais será maior que n. A questão que então se levanta é como entender a colecção de todos os naturais. Uma opção seria a seguinte. Como ela não possui um número maior que todos os outros, a colecção de todos os naturais cresce indefinidamente. E se ela nunca chega a estar completa, então devemos entendê-la como meramente potencial. Basicamente, esta é a concepção de infinito potencial. Apesar de intuitivamente correcta, a teoria dos conjuntos oferece uma outra opção para entender a colecção de todos os números naurais. Em particular, a teoria dos conjuntos permite-nos mostrar que existem colecções infinitas maiores que a colecção dos números naturais (nomeadamente, a colecção dos números reais). E se há colecções maiores que a dos números naturais, então esta tem que parar de crescer depois de um certo ponto. Como tal, mesmo sem possuir um número maior que todos os outros, a colecção de todos os naturais pode ser vista como completa. Basicamente, esta é concepção de infinito actual. Apesar desta opção poder parecer contra-intuitiva, a teoria ZF descreve-a de forma matematicamente rigorosa. O leitor interessado em saber mais acerca da existência de colecções maiores que a dos números naturais, encontra uma introdução rigorosa e filosóficamente informada no segundo capítulo da obra de Giaquinto (2002). Gonçalo Santos14 Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica Edição de 2014 de conjunto resulta do paradoxo de Russell, ela pode ser eliminada se formos capazes de mostrar que o mesmo argumento não levanta problemas no contexto de ZF. Para vermos como é que ZF pode ultrapassar uma tal dificuldade, precisamos de descrever algumas propriedades adicionais de conjuntos. Com vista a um tal fim, seja A o conjunto cujos elementos são os números primos menores que 10, isto é, A = {2, 3, 5, 7}. Seja B o conjunto das soluções da equação polinomial: x4 − 17x3 + 101x2 − 247x + 210 = 0. Como o leitor pode verificar, este polinómio possui quatro soluções: 2, 3, 5 e 7. Portanto, A e B possuem exactamente os mesmos elementos. Quando este tipo de coincidências ocorrem, dizemos que A e B são iguais. Este constitui um dos princípios fundamentais de ZF e é habitualmente conhecido como princípio da extensionalidade. Princípio da extensionalidade Dois conjuntos possuem exactamente os mesmos elementos se e só se eles são iguais. Simbolicamente: ∀z((z ∈ x ↔ z ∈ y) ↔ x = y). Note-se que se a = b, isto quer dizer que o que quer que seja verdadeiro do objecto a também é verdadeiro do objecto b. Por exemplo, se a = b, então é verdade que para qualquer objecto x, x ∈ a se e só se x ∈ b (o que corresponde à implicação da direita para a esquerda do princípio da extensionalidade). Observemos alguns conjuntos particulares. Um conjunto pequeno seria {0}, o qual possui 0 como único elemento. E um conjunto ainda mais pequeno seria {}, o qual não possui quaisquer elementos. Este conjunto é habitualmente conhecido como conjunto vazio, sendo alternativamente representado pelo símbolo ∅. Como primeira aplicação do princípio da extensionalidade, podemos ver que ∅ é o único conjunto nestas condições. Isto é, como os conjuntos se identificam pelos seus elementos, quaisquer conjuntos vazios são idênticos (o mesmo não acontecendo com conjuntos com um elemento, por exemplo, existindo diversos conjuntos nessas condições que não são idênticos entre si). Consideremos algumas aplicações adicionais do princípio de extensionalidade. Primeiro veja-se que, para quaisquer objectos x e y, podemos formar o conjunto {x, y}. Como segunda aplicação do princípio da extensionalidade, note-se que {x, y} = {y, x} dado que em Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica Edição de 2014 15Abstracta ambos os casos os únicos elementos são x e y. Um outro caso que vale a pena notar é o dos conjuntos {x, x} e {x}. Dado que ambos os conjuntos possuem os mesmos elementos, segue-se por extensionalidade que {x, x} = {x}. Apesar da identidade de um conjunto ser definida em termos dos seus elementos, deve-se ter em atenção que um conjunto é um objecto diferente dos seus elementos. O conjunto ∅ ilustra este facto na perfeição, pois ∅ é um objecto ainda que não tenha elementos. Adicionalmente, partindo de ∅ podemos obter uma infinidade de outros conjuntos. Por exemplo, podemos o obter o conjunto {∅}, cujo único elemento é ∅, do qual obtemos {{∅}}, {{{∅}}}, {{{{∅}}}} e por aí adiante.13 Outra forma de obter mais conjuntos é através de certas operações realizadas em conjuntos previamente dados. Duas operações familiares são a união e a intersecção. A união de dois conjuntos a e b é o conjunto a ∪ b. Os seus elementos são todos os objectos que são elementos de a ou de b. Simbolicamente: (x ∈ a ∪ b) ↔ (x ∈ a ∨ x ∈ b). Por sua vez, a intersecção de a e b é o conjunto a ∩ b. Os seus elementos são todos os objectos que são elementos de a e de b. Simbolicamente: (x ∈ a ∩ b) ↔ (x ∈ a ∧ x ∈ b). Dizemos que os conjuntos a e b são disjuntos quando eles não possuem elementos comuns. Num tal caso: a ∩ b = ∅. Por exemplo: {x, y} ∪ {z} = {x, y, z}; {x, y} ∩ {y, z} = {y}; {x} ∩ ∅ = ∅. Como vimos, dois conjuntos a e b são idênticos quando eles pos13 Tendo novamente em atenção o princípio da extensionalidade, podemos ver {∅} ≠ ∅ pois ∅ ∈ {∅} mas ∅ ∉ ∅. Gonçalo Santos16 Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica Edição de 2014 suem exactamente os mesmos elementos. Uma situação diferente é aquela em todos os elementos de a são elementos de b, mas existem elementos de b que não são elementos de a. Por exemplo a = {0} e b = {0, 1}. Uma vez que todos os elementos de a pertencem a b, dizemos que a está incluído em b ou que a é um subconjunto de b e escrevemos a ⊆ b. Apesar de relacionadas, é importante perceber como é que as relações de inclusão (⊆) e de pertença (∈) se distinguem. Quando queremos saber se a ∈ b temos que (ignorando os elementos de a e entendendo-o como um objecto) verificar se a está entre os elementos de b. Por outro lado, quando queremos saber se a ⊆ b temos que (entendendo a como uma colecção de objectos) verificar se todos os seus elementos se encontram entre os elementos de b. Por exemplo: ∅ ⊆ ∅ ∅ ∉ ∅ {∅} ∈ {{∅}} {∅} ⊈ {{∅}} Uma vez clarificada esta distinção, podemos ver que qualquer conjunto possui um ou mais subconjuntos.14 Nomeadamente, ∅ está incluído em qualquer conjunto, visto que todos os seus elementos pertencem a qualquer outro conjunto (incluindo ∅). Adicionalmente, dada a distinção, podemos definir outra operação para obter mais conjuntos. Assim, dado um conjunto a, obtemos um novo conjunto ao reunir todos os subconjuntos de a num único conjunto. Ao conjunto de todos os subconjuntos de a chama-mos o conjunto potência de a e escrevemos !(a). Por exemplo:!(∅) = {∅}; !({∅}) = {∅, {∅}}; !({0, 1}) = {∅, {0}, {1}, {0, 1}}. 14 De facto, se um conjunto a possui n elementos, então a possui 2n subconjuntos. Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica Edição de 2014 17Abstracta Como mencionado anteriormente, para ganhar a nossa confiança enquanto fundamento da matemática, ZF deve ser capaz de evitar o erro do projecto logicista, demonstrando que no seu enquadramento, o argumento do paradoxo de Russell não conduz a uma contradição. Podemos agora começar a ver como é isto possível. Resumidamente, este feito é uma consequência do modo como ZF entende a estructura do universo de conjuntos. De acordo com esta teoria, o universo de conjuntos estructura-se em etapas, as quais podem ser ordenadas ao longo de uma série. Na etapa inicial, juntamos num só conjunto todos os objectos que não são conjuntos, sendo estes habitualmente conhecidos como elementos atómicos. Seja então V0 o conjunto de todos os átomos. Na segunda etapa da série, V1, juntamos todos os átomos com todos os conjuntos possíveis que possuem átomos como elementos. Isto é, em V1 juntamos os átomos com os elementos do conjunto potência de V0. Simbolicamente: V1 = V0 ∪ !(V0). A terceira etapa contém tudo aquilo que está no nível anterior, juntamente com todos os conjuntos de etapas anteriores. Isto é: V2 = V1 ∪ !(V1). Obtemos assim sucessivamente V0, V1, V2, ..., Vn, ..., para qualquer número natural arbitrário n. Note-se porém que, apesar deste método de geração de conteúdos nos garantir a existência de um número arbitrariamente finito de conjuntos, por si só ele não é suficiente para gerar todos os conjuntos de que necessitamos. Por exemplo, os números naturais são infinitos em número pelo que, se o nosso objectivo é entender qualquer objecto matemático como um conjunto, precisamos de conseguir chegar a uma etapa que contenha um número infinito de conjuntos. Para colmatar esta insuficiência, tomamos a união de V0 ∪ V1 ∪ V2 ∪ ... e coleccionamos todos os conjuntos assim obtidos numa etapa Vω. Esta etapa aparece na série previamente descrita, imediatamente após todas as etapas indexadas por um número natural. Isto é, V0, V1, V2, ..., Vω. Uma vez nesta etapa, podemos formar subconjuntos de Vω. Em particular, como anteriormente, podemos formar !(Vω) e chegar à etapa Vω+1, donde podemos chegar à etapa Gonçalo Santos18 Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica Edição de 2014 Vω+2, Vω+3, .... Como anteriormente, podemos chegar à etapa Vω+ω, juntando todos os objectos obtidos nas etapas V0, V1, V2, ..., Vn, ...Vω , Vω+1, Vω+2, Vω+3, .... Procedendo desta forma, podemos então chegar às etapas Vω+ω+1, ... , Vω+ω+ω , ... , Vωω, ...15 Temos assim que a série ao longo da qual se estructura o universo de ZF é tal que, a cada etapa, podemos passar para uma etapa ulterior com mais conjuntos que a inicial. Vejamos agora como esta característica estructural do universo se reflecte no argumento associado ao paradoxo de Russell. Suponhamos que numa certa etapa temos o conjunto de todos os conjuntos, ou mais simplesmente, que numa certa etapa temos o conjunto universal u. Seja r = {x ∈ u: x ∉ x}. Por definição de u, r ∈ u. Mas então r ∈ r ↔ r ∉ r. Como anteriormente, as condições de verdade deste bicondicional não podem ser satisfeitas. Contudo, à diferença do que acontecia antes, esta contradição é agora condicional na suposição de que em alguma etapa temos um conjunto universal. Como tal, este argumento pode ser interpretado como uma redução ao absurdo da premissa inicial e portanto, segue-se dele que em nenhuma etapa temos um conjunto universal. Vemos assim que, o argumento que demonstra a inconsistência da compreensão Fregeana do universo matemático, quando desenvolvido no contexto da teoria ZF, torna-se numa demonstração de um facto acerca do universo de conjuntos. Como vimos, de acordo com esta teoria, o universo matemático estructura-se ao longo de uma série de etapas. E como o argumento Russelliano mostra que não existe 15 O leitor pode eventualmente pensar que, ao passar além dos números naturais, a nossa descrição da série de etapas abarca uma fase já avançada do universo de conjuntos. Mas a verdade é que a nossa descrição apenas abarca uma fase muito precoce deste universo. Por exemplo, tal como descrito, este universo ainda não possui um número de objectos suficiente para interpretar a colecção dos números reais. Além do mais, a questão de saber onde reside exactamente uma etapa com um tal número de objectos, é tal que não admite uma resposta unívoca. Mais exactamente, essa questão é independente dos axiomas de ZF. E tal como essa questão, existem muitas outras afirmações acerca do universo de conjuntos de ZF, cujo valor de verdade não pode ser determinado apenas fazendo apelo aos axiomas da teoria. Este universo de objectos abstractos continua assim, em certa medida, desconhecido, possuindo uma infinidade de questões em aberto. Para uma introdução aos aspectos mais filosóficos da estructura do universo de conjuntos de ZF, o leitor interessado pode consultar o artigo de Boolos (1971). Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica Edição de 2014 19Abstracta um conjunto de todos os conjuntos, isto significa que a série não possui uma última etapa, a partir da qual não existiriam mais conjuntos. Neste sentido, a teoria ZF pode pois ser vista como ultrapassando o obstáculo levantado pelo Paradoxo de Russell. Este resultado parece assim demonstrar que a produção de objectos matemáticos nunca chega a um ponto a partir do qual não se podem gerar mais objectos. Isto porque a série de etapas ao longo das quais estes objectos são gerados, parece continuar indefinidamente. À luz deste facto aparente, soará porventura estranho dizer que em matemática habitualmente se fala de uma colecção de todos os conjuntos. Não acabámos nós de ver que isso implica uma contradição? Como é que poderá existir uma colecção de todos os conjuntos se ZF não admite um conjunto universal? Na próxima subsecção discutiremos este aspecto da teoria dos conjuntos com mais algum detalhe. 3.1 m ni erso indefinidamente e tensí el Vimos há pouco que, à luz do Paradoxo de Russell, parece que devemos entender o universo de conjuntos como uma realidade que continua a crescer indefinidamente. Isto porque, de acordo com um tal resultado, em qualquer etapa do processo de construção de conjuntos, podemos sempre construir mais conjuntos. Ainda que um tal facto pareça impedir a existência de uma colecção com todos os conjuntos, em matemática é habitual fazermos referência a uma tal colecção. Esta é porém uma colecção que não é um conjunto, merecendo por isso uma outra designação. Nomeadamente, a colecção de todos os conjuntos diz-se uma classe própria. Este tipo de colecções é caracterizada de forma rigorosa por teorias matemáticas como a teoria de conjuntos von Neumann-Bernays-Gödel (NBG) ou a teoria de conjuntos Morse-Kelley (MK). Uma característica importante das classes próprias é que elas não podem ser elementos de outras classes próprias. Assim, ainda que possamos ter uma classe própria com todos os conjuntos, por definição, não podemos ter uma classe própria com todas as classes próprias. Em última análise, é esta característica das classes próprias que mantém teorias como NBG e MK a salvo do Paradoxo de Russell. Informalmente, uma classe própria é descrita como uma colecção Gonçalo Santos20 Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica Edição de 2014 que é demasiado grande para ser um conjunto. Uma tal descrição parece contudo pouco esclarecedora. Poderiamos inicialmente pensar ser impossível construir colecções de objectos além daquelas que podem ser construídas num número arbitrariamente finito de passos. Contudo, ZF mostrou ser possível levar a cabo construções que vão além de qualquer restrição ao finito. A questão que então se levanta é, que restrição adicional pode explicar como é que uma colecção pode ser demasiado grande para ser um conjunto? Esta questão foi levantada por Dummett (1991) no contexto de um argumento contra a existência de classes próprias. Em traços largos, o argumento assume que a única razão para aceitar a existência de classes próprias é a ameaça de uma contradição (nomeadamente, a conclusão do Paradoxo de Russell). E como uma contradição não pode funcionar como justificação de nenhuma tese, seguir-se-ia que não somos supostos ter nenhuma razão para aceitar a existência de classes próprias. Recorde-se que, na ausência de classes próprias, só podemos entender o universo de conjuntos como sendo indefinidamente extensível. O argumento de Dummett pretende portanto justificar uma compreensão da hierarquia de conjuntos, onde estes fazem parte de um universo indefinidamente extensível. Como é óbvio, esta conclusão depende crucialmente da ideia segundo a qual uma contradição não pode funcionar como uma justificação para aceitar a existência de algo. Antes de continuar, devemos pois esclarecer este ponto. Para tal, recorde-se que um paradoxo é um argumento com três características singulares: as suas premissas são aparentemente verdadeiras, as suas inferências são aparentemente válidas e a sua conclusão é aparentemente falsa. Ora, por definição, nenhum argumento pode partir de premissas realmente verdadeiras e, por meio de inferências realmente válidas, estabelecer uma conclusão realmente falsa. Como tal, quando nos deparamos com um paradoxo, devemos ser capazes de explicar como é que aquilo que inicialmente parece ser um argumento aparentemente inaceitável, na realidade corresponde a um dos seguintes três casos: um argumento que tem premissas falsas, um argumento que tem uma inferência inválida ou um argumento que tem uma conclusão verdadeira.16 16 Ao longo da história da Filosofia, argumentos paradoxais de vários tipos têm sido uma fonte constante de discussão. Hoje em dia, esta continua a ser uma Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica Edição de 2014 21Abstracta No processo de explicar como é que aquilo que aparentemente é o caso, realmente não o é, podemos obviamente fazer apelo a certas distinções. Estas distinções devem contudo ser passíveis de ser explicadas independentemente do paradoxo. Isto porque se o paradoxo é a única explicação para a distinção, como a distinção é suposta explicar o paradoxo, aquilo que obtemos no final não é mais do que um círculo explicativo. E como tal, nem o paradoxo, nem a distinção acabam por ser explicados. A questão levantada por Dummett pretende reflectir este facto, em particular, procurando mostrar que ao introduzir a noção de classe própria na explicação do Paradoxo de Russell, estamos a introduzir uma distinção entre colecções que são conjuntos e colecções que são classes próprias, para qual a única explicação é o paradoxo. Segundo Dummett, em última análise, a razão pela qual se diz que a colecção de todos os conjuntos é uma classe própria e não um conjunto, é que se essa colecção fosse um conjunto e não uma classe própria, então chegariamos a uma contradição. Contudo, como ele nota, ao raciocinar deste modo, não estamos a explicar o paradoxo, dado que a introdução de classes próprias apenas se limita a deixar-nos num círculo explicativo como aquele que foi descrito acima. No resto desta subsecção vamos considerar duas reacções possíveis à questão levantada por Dummett. A primeira visa responder à questão, negando que o Paradoxo de Russell justifica uma compreensão indefinidamente extensível do universo de conjuntos. A segunda visa responder à questão Dummettiana, sugerindo um entendimento modal da alegada extensão indefinida do universo de conjuntos. Ambas as reacções concordam contudo no facto de que, para responder a Dummett, devemos levar a cabo uma expansão da nossa ideologia lógica. Nomeadamente, a primeira implica a adopção de uma forma de quantificação habitualmente designada de antifica o pl ral (juntamente com termos que referem colecções alegadamente plurais), por meio da qual supostamente podemos falar da colecção de todos os conjuntos, sem estarmos realmente comprometidos com a área de investigação muito activa e onde, além do mais, a filosofia manifesta a sua vertente interdisciplinar, entrando em contacto não somente com a investigação em matemática, mas também em disciplinas como a psicologia, a informática, a linguística e a economia. O leitor que procura saber mais acerca desta área, encontra uma boa introdução na obra de Sainsburry (2002). Gonçalo Santos22 Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica Edição de 2014 existência de colecções que não são conjuntos. A segunda implica a adopção de uma modalidade primitiva, por meio da qual supostamente podemos explicar o carácter meramente potencial da colecção de todos os conjuntos. Passamos então a descrever a primeira destas reacções. A melhor maneira de introduzir as noções de antifica o pl ral e de colecção plural, provavelmente é pensando em algumas das colecções com que nos deparamos quotidianamente. Por exemplo, todas as manhãs o autor deste trabalho gosta de comer cereais ao pequeno almoço. E como normalmente o autor acorda com bastante fome, ele come todos os cereais que coloca na tigela. Podemos assim dizer que todas as manhãs, o autor deste trabalho come a sua colecção de cereais. Segue-se contudo disto que todas as manhãs, o autor ingere um objecto abstracto? A resposta é obviamente negativa. O autor come só e apenas cereais. Este exemplo ilustra como quotidianamente nos deparamos com colecções que a nossa linguagem lógica não tem capacidade para descrever. Esta falta de poder expressivo deve-se ao facto dos únicos termos dessa linguagem serem singulares. Com uma linguagem sem termos plurais, apenas podemos falar de colecções em termos singulares e como tal, uma colecção deve ser entendida como um objecto. Como vimos anteriormente, um conjunto corresponde a um objecto que, por assim dizer, existe acima dos seus elementos.17 Portanto, recorrendo a uma linguagem sem termos plurais para descrever algumas das colecções com que nos deparamos quotidianamente, estamo-nos a comprometer com a existência de objectos abstractos com os quais não nos pretendemos comprometer quando fazemos essas descrições. Para colmatar esta insuficiência do poder expressivo da nossa linguagem lógica, Boolos (1984, 1985) propôs a adopção de uma linguagem lógica que, além dos termos e quantificadores singulares, possui termos e quantificadores plurais. Uma tal linguagem não só permite fazer referência a colecções plurais, como também permite falar de forma geral acerca dessas mesmas colecções. Por exemplo, 17 Vale eventualmente a pena relembrar a natureza singular do conjunto vazio. Este conjunto ilustra na perfeição o facto dos conjuntos existirem acima dos seus elementos. Isto porque o conjunto vazio existe, apesar de não possuir elementos. Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica Edição de 2014 23Abstracta por meio de uma linguagem com vocabulário plural, não só podemos fazer referência à colecção dos cereais na tigela sem nos comprometermos com a existência de conjuntos, como podemos dizer que, de todas as variedades de cereais na estante do supermercado, aqueles que levo na cesta das compras são os mais nutritivos, sem que isso implique uma comparação entre diferentes conjuntos. Simbolicamente, tornou-se habitual escrever aa, bb, cc, ... para constantes plurais, xx, yy, zz, ... para variáveis plurais e ∀xx, ∃xx, ... para quantificadores plurais. Conjuntos e colecções plurais distinguem-se em vários aspectos. Por exemplo, como vimos, é habitual falar dos objectos que pertencem ao conjunto. Já no que concerne a colecções plurais, é mais habitual falar dos objectos que fazem parte da pluralidade. Esta distinção reflecte-se formalmente no que diz respeito à transitividade das relações de pertença e de ser parte de. Nomeadamente, a primeira é transitiva mas a segunda não o é. Portanto, do facto de que um objecto é parte de um segundo e de que um segundo é parte de um terceiro, segue-se que o primeiro também é parte do terceiro. Por exemplo, os tijolos fazem parte de uma parede, a qual faz parte de uma casa, portanto, por transitividade, os tijolos fazem parte da casa. Por outro lado, a ∈ {a} e {a} ∈ {{a}} mas a ∉ {{a}}. Para marcar esta diferença, escrevemos a ≺ aa para simbolizar que o objecto a faz parte da colecção plural dos aa's.18 Regressemos agora à objecção levantada por Dummett e vejamos como é que a expansão ideológica que acabamos de descrever, abre uma via de resposta à mesma. O primeiro passo com vista a uma tal resposta, consiste em reformular qualquer referência a classes próprias em termos de colecções plurais.19 Isto permite-nos falar da colecção de todos os conjuntos, sem estarmos comprometidos com a existência de um objecto que não é um conjunto. Dito de 18 Note-se que a relação ser parte de não faz parte da teoria de conjuntos, tal como tradicionalmente considerada. Esta relação faz antes parte de uma teoria conhecida como Mereologia. Para uma tentativa de reformular a teoria de conjuntos em termos mereológicos, o leitor interessado pode consultar a obra de Lewis (1991). 19 O leitor interessado em saber mais sobre esta abordagem pode consultar o trabalho de Uzquiano (2003) e Burgess (2004). Gonçalo Santos24 Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica Edição de 2014 outra forma, com o vocabulário plural à nossa disposição, os únicos objectos com os quais estamos comprometidos quando dizemos que há uma colecção com todos os conjuntos, são só e apenas todos os conjuntos. Portanto, quando em resposta ao paradoxo de Russell dizemos que a colecção de todos os conjuntos não é ela mesma um conjunto, não precisamos de introduzir nenhuma distinção entre objectos que são conjuntos e objectos que não são conjuntos. Isto oferece uma saída do circulo explicativo Dummettiano, dado que podemos aceitar a existência de colecções plurais independentemente da ameaça de uma contradição. Dito de outra forma, não é o paradoxo que explica a noção de colecção plural, mas é antes esta noção que explica o paradoxo. Consideremos agora a segunda reacção à objecção de Dummett. Tal como a que acabámos de descrever, esta segunda reacção também assume a necessidade de expandir o nosso vocabulário lógico, aceitando como legítimos termos e quantificadores plurais. O proponente desta segunda reacção nota contudo que, ainda que diferentes, as concepções plural e singular de colecções, não são mutuamente exclusivas. Ainda que nos possamos referir a uma colecção de objectos em termos plurais, também nos podemos referir a essa mesma colecção em termos singulares. Esta segunda reacção compromete-se assim com a tese de que se algumas coisas formam uma pluralidade, então essas coisas também formam um conjunto. Mais exactamente, algumas coisas xx formam um conjunto y se todas as partes do primeiro, são elementos do segundo: ∀u(u ≺ xx ↔ u ∈ y).20 Neste ponto o leitor poderá pensar que há algo de errado com a segunda reacção. Isto porque, dada a tese de que todas as colecções plurais podem dar origem a um conjunto, se admitirmos a existência de uma pluralidade de todos os conjuntos, segue-se imediatamente a existência do conjunto de todos os conjuntos, o que nos conduz de volta ao Paradoxo de Russell. Contudo, precisamente porque ela não admite a existência de uma pluralidade de todos os conjuntos, esta segunda reacção à objecção de Dummett não é vítima do paradoxo Russelliano. Este facto é por sua vez consequência da compreensão modal do conceito de conjunto que lhe está associada e de acordo com 20 O leitor interessado em saber mais sobre esta abordagem pode consultar o trabalho de Linnebo (2010) e Studd (2012). Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica Edição de 2014 25Abstracta a qual, a colecção de todos os conjuntos deve ser entendida como meramente potencial. De um ponto de vista informal, a ideia que subjaz a esta segunda reacção é a de que, ainda que não exista uma colecção completamente determinada que corresponde à colecção de todos os conjuntos, podemos ainda assim falar da colecção de todos os conjuntos como uma colecção que nunca para de crescer. A implementação formal desta ideia implica uma extensão da nossa linguagem lógica que vai além da adopção do vocabulário plural anteriormente descrito. Nomeadamente, também devemos adoptar vocabulário modal para poder descrever de forma apropriada a potencialidade evidenciada pelo universo de conjuntos. Como afirmações acerca de todos os conjuntos pressupõem a utilização de quantificadores, uma opção natural consiste em associar a modalidade a este vocabulários lógico. Assim, podemos prefixar o quantificador existencial com um operador de possibilidade (⬦∃Φ) e o quantificador universal com um operador de necessidade (◽∀Φ). Quando dizemos que uma fórmula Φ é válida para algum conjunto x, estamos portanto a dizer que é possível levar a construção da hierarquia até um ponto no qual existe um conjunto x, relativamente ao qual Φ é verdadeira. E quando dizemos que Φ é válida acerca de todos os conjuntos, estamos a dizer que não importa quão longe se continue a construir a hierarquia de conjuntos, Φ será verdadeira de todos os conjuntos construídos até esse ponto. Podemos agora comparar ambas as reacções relativamente ao problema levantado por Dummett. Ao contrário da primeira reacção, em certa medida, a segunda reacção subscreve a interpretação Dummettiana do Paradoxo de Russell. Isto não só porque ela evita um compromisso com uma classe própria (interpretada como um objecto abstracto que não é um conjunto), mas também porque ela evita um compromisso com uma colecção que possui todos os conjuntos como elementos (interpretada como uma colecção plural que não é uma classe própria). Portanto, a segunda reacção preserva a compreensão da hierarquia de conjuntos como sendo indefinidamente extensível.21 21 Note-se que a comparação que acabamos de oferecer, não pretende tomar partido por nenhuma das duas reacções descritas. O principal objectivo da preGonçalo Santos26 Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica Edição de 2014 4 A distinção abstracto/concreto Uma vez introduzido o entendimento mais consensual do domínio de objectos matemáticos, podemos finalmente considerar o papel que a noção de objecto abstracto desempenha na discussão filosófica contemporânea. Uma questão importante é como entender a existência deste tipo de objectos. Por um lado, os objectos matemáticos não são dependentes da mente, como os produtos da imaginação de cada um. A existência de um produto da minha imaginação é contingente da minha vida mental, mas se alguém demonstra um certo resultado matemático, eu não posso dizer que esse facto não é válido para mim, simplesmente porque desconheço a sua demonstração. Outra característica típica dos objectos matemáticos é que uma afirmação matemática não se demonstra/refuta pelos mesmo métodos que verificam/falsificam as verdades empíricas. O valor de verdade de uma conjectura matemática não será determinado por nenhuma experiência física em laboratório, mas antes por uma demonstração matemática de algum tipo. Dadas estas peculiaridades dos objectos matemáticos, uma questão que se levanta é pois de que forma se relacionam os objectos abstractos com os outros tipos de objectos? Em particular, como podemos entender a relação entre objectos abstractos e os chamados objectos concretos? Para respondermos a esta questão, seria obviamente útil possuir uma compreensão mais clara da distinção abstracto/concreto. Contudo, quando procuramos traçar essa mesma distinção, damo-nos conta de que não é óbvio onde é que ela reside. Para ilustrar esta dificuldade, vamos agora percorrer as quatro vias com vista à distinção abstracto/concreto identificadas por Lewis (1986: 81-86).22 A primeira é a sente subsecção é antes oferecer uma descrição do estado da arte das questões que constituíram o ponto de partida do presente trabalho. 22 Talvez valha a pena notar que, no trabalho de Lewis em causa, a distinção abstracto/concreto não desempenha um papel central. O tema central desse trabalho é antes a tese conhecida como realismo modal. Um realista modal não só defende a existência de outros mundos possíveis, mas também a de todos os mundos possíveis (i.e. toda a possibilidade é actual em algum mundo). Relativamente à natureza destes mundos, apesar de causalmente independentes do nosso, todos os mundos são igualmente concretos. Como veremos em seguida, não é imediatamente óbvio como traçar a distinção abstracto/concreto. Com base nessa Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica Edição de 2014 27Abstracta chamada ia da e emplifica o. Segui-la, significa procurar clarificar a distinção abstracto/concreto por meio de exemplos paradigmáticos. A ideia basicamente seria a seguinte. Um objecto macroscópico (como um gorila) pode ser decomposto em moléculas de diversos tipos, uma molécula pode ser decomposta em átomos de diversos tipos e, por sua vez, um átomo pode ser decomposto em partículas subatómicas de diversos tipos. Supondo que esta corresponde à última etapa nesta redução do físico, as partículas subatómicas corresponderiam então a um caso paradigmático de objectos concretos. Um caso paradigmático de objectos abstractos seria o dos objectos matemáticos anteriormente descrito. Ao contrário das partículas elementares, não existe nenhum acelerador de partículas suficientemente potente para detectar a sua existência ao nível subatómico. De igual modo, não existe nenhum radiotelescópio suficientemente potente para detectar a existência de objectos matemáticos em algum ponto remoto do universo. Com estes casos paradigmáticos em mente, podemos então tentar traçar a distinção abstracto/concreto, dizendo que um objecto é concreto se e só se é do mesmo tipo que uma partícula subatómica e que um objecto é abstracto se e só se é do mesmo tipo que um objecto matemático. Apesar de poder ser considerada um primeiro passo com vista à distinção abstracto/concreto, a via da exemplificação não nos pode levar muito longe. O seu principal problema é o seguinte. Dizer que um objecto é concreto se for do mesmo tipo que uma partícula subatómica, não parece ter grande valor explicativo. Isto porque, ainda que em certos sentidos um ser humano possa ser entendido como um objecto do mesmo tipo que uma partícula, em muitos outros sentidos, seres humanos e partículas elementares são de tipos completamente distintos. Por exemplo, por um lado, seres humanos e partículas são constituídos por partes cujo comportamento obedece às leis da física. Por outro, enquanto que seres humanos podem ser descritos em termos de várias partes, partículas subatómica não podem ser descritas em termos de mais partes. Assim sendo, em certos dificuldade, Lewis argumenta que, apesar de poder parecer contra-intuítivo aceitar a existência de outros mundos que não o nosso, não existe um sentido claro de concreto de acordo com o qual não poderiam existir outros mundos possíveis, tão concretos quanto o nosso. Gonçalo Santos28 Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica Edição de 2014 sentidos, seres humanos são como partículas e noutros, não o são. Portanto, para clarificar a noção de concreto por intermédio da via da exemplificação, não basta apontar um exemplo paradigmático. Adicionalmente, devemos ser capazes de identificar o sentido particular de acordo com o qual uma coisa pode ser do mesmo tipo que esse paradigma (sendo a situação semelhante com casos paradigmáticos de objectos abstractos).23 Passamos agora à discussão da segunda via identificada por Lewis para clarificar a distinção abstracto/concreto. Esta é por ele designada de via da subsunção. Neste caso, a estratégia consiste em reduzir abstracto/concreto a uma distinção relativamente à qual possuímos uma melhor compreensão. Lewis discute a distinção indivíduo particular/ conjunto como uma candidata para desempenhar esta função. Supostamente, poder-se-ia dizer que possuímos uma melhor compreensão desta outra distinção, porque a podemos interpretar em termos de uma teoria de conjuntos com elementos atómicos. Em particular, esta escolha permitir-nos-ia identificar os objectos concretos, com os elementos atómicos da teoria de conjuntos. Por sua vez, números naturais e restantes objectos matemáticos poderiam ser interpretados em termos de conjuntos cujos únicos elementos são outros conjuntos (habitualmente conhecidos como conjuntos puros). Consideremos agora outra das vias identificadas por Lewis, nomeadamente, aquela que ele designa de via da negação. De acordo com esta via, objectos abstractos não possuem uma localização espacio23 Um problema adicional com a via da exemplificação seria o seguinte. No que respeita aos objectos matemáticos, ao entendê-los como conjuntos, estamos comprometidos com a tese de que, por exemplo, os números naturais podem ser identificados com certos conjuntos. Existem contudo diferentes formas de definir os números naturais em termos de conjuntos. Uma, proposta por Zermelo, define os números naturais enquanto conjuntos como: 0 = ∅, 1 = {∅}, 2 = {{∅}}, 3 = {{{∅}}}.... A outra, proposta por Von Neumann, define os naturais como: 0 = ∅, 1 = {∅}, 2 = {∅, {∅}}, 3 = {∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}}}.... Ora, é um facto matemático que ambas as definições produzem as mesmas verdades aritméticas. Na impossibilidade de dizer qual delas identifica os naturais, podemos ser levados a pensar que afinal a aritmética não deve ser entendida como o estudo de uma colecção de objectos em particular, mas sim como o estudo da estructura que é comum a todas as colecções que validam os teoremas da aritmética. Este género de argumento foi primeiro proposto por Benacerraf (1965), um trabalho que deu origem à chamada corrente estructuralista na filosofia da Matemática. Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica Edição de 2014 29Abstracta -temporal, não entram em relações causais e nunca são mutuamente indiscerníveis. Se pensarmos nos objectos matemáticos, todos estes requísitos parecem adequados. Por exemplo, tal como mencionado anteriormente, não há nenhum instrumento que nos permita detectar a existência de objectos matemáticos. Além disso, sem uma localização espacio-temporal, não parece existir uma forma dos números participarem em relações causais. Note-se que apesar de inicialmente parecerem plausíveis, quando levadas à letra, as vias da negação e da subsunção entram em conflito a diversos níveis. Tome-se o requísito segundo o qual objectos abstractos não possuem uma localização espacio-temporal. Se considerarmos, por exemplo, conjuntos unitários (i.e. um conjunto cujo único elemento é um elemento atómico), de acordo com Lewis, este localiza-se exactamente onde se localiza o seu único elemento. Mas então, dado que esse elemento se localiza no espaço e no tempo, seguir-se-ia que o seu conjuntos unitário também se localiza no espaço e no tempo.24 Isto demonstraria então que, contrariamente ao que estipula a via da negação, existem objectos abstractos com localização espacio-temporal. No que respeita à alegada ineficácia causal dos objectos abstractos, ela também parece entrar em conflito com a via da subsunção. Lewis pergunta, por exemplo, porque é que não seria correcto dizer que um conjunto de causas origina um certo efeito, ou que algo originou um certo conjunto de efeitos. Por último, o requisito de que objectos abstractos não são mutuamente indiscerníveis também aparenta gerar problemas. Nomeadamente, se dois objectos concretos podem ser mutuamente indiscerníveis, pela interpretação adoptada, a mesma coisa poder-se-ia verificar entre dois elementos particulares. Mas então, dados os elementos unitários cujos únicos elementos são um e um só desses elementos, como poderiam eles ser distinguidos? A quarta e última estratégia considerada por Lewis para clarificar a distinção abstracto/concreto é a chamada via da abstração. Neste caso, 24 Talvez valha a pena notar que este raciocínio não apenas se aplica a conjuntos unitários, mas também a conjuntos com vários elementos atómicos. Adicionalmente, pelo mesmo raciocínio, se um conjunto unitário tem localização espacio temporal, um conjunto cujo único elemento é esse conjunto unitário também possui uma localização espacio-temporal. Portanto, pelo mesmo raciocínio, todos os conjuntos possuem uma localização espacio-temporal. Gonçalo Santos30 Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica Edição de 2014 a estratégia consiste em dizer que um objecto abstracto corresponde ao resultado de ignorarmos alguns dos aspectos em que diferem certos objectos concretos, ao mesmo tempo que destacamos um dos aspectos que lhes é comum. Assim, dados certos conjuntos de objectos, podemos falar do seu número de elementos como algo que lhes é comum e que, como tal, é passível de ser abstraído. Por exemplo, dados dois sacos de supermercado, um com 5 maçãs e outro com 5 pêras, podemos falar do número 5 como um objecto que resulta da abstracção de um aspecto que é comum aos conjuntos de maçãs e pêras. Contudo, como nota Lewis, explicar a existência de objectos matemáticos nos termos da via da abstracção, obrigar-nos-ia a entender nos mesmos termos, objectos que dificilmente podem ser vistos como abstractos. Por exemplo, se ambos os sacos de fruta foram adquiridos no mesmo supermercado, porque não falar de um objecto abstracto que corresponde a essa característica comum a ambos os conjuntos de objectos concretos? Uma tal consequência é porém indesejada, uma vez que queremos dizer que os objectos matemáticos existem num sentido completamente diferente ao desse hipotético objecto. Percorridas as quatro vias identificadas pot Lewis, a que conclusões podemos então chegar relativamente à distinção abstracto/concreto? Duas delas (subsunção e negação) entram em conflito mútuo e as duas outras (exemplificação e abstração) enfrentam problemas que parecem difíceis de ultrapassar. Existirá porém uma forma de os contornar? Ou talvez uma quinta via, capaz de evitar completamente todas as dificuldades discutidas ao longo desta secção? Apesar de continuarem em aberto depois de um já longo debate, estas questões não deixam de ter interesse, desempenhando um papel central em diferentes debates contemporâneos. Como tal, poder-se-ia dizer que uma melhor compreensão desta distinção, corresponderia a um avanço importante numa questão filosófica que acaba por ir muito além da natureza dos objectos matemáticos. Gonçalo Santos LanCog Group, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica Edição de 2014 31Abstracta Referências Benacerraf, Paul. 1965. What Numbers Could Not Be. Philosophical Review 74(1):47-73. Blanchette, Patricia. 2007. The Frege-Hilbert Controversy. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward Zalta. Boolos, George. 1971. The Iterative Conception of Set. Journal of Philosophy 68(8):215-231. Boolos, George. 1984. To Be Is To Be a Value of a Variable (Or To Be Some Values of Some Variables). Journal of Philosophy 81(8):430-449. Boolos, George. 1985. Nominalist Platonism. Philosophical Review 94(3):327-344. Boolos, George. 1997. Is Hume's Principle Analytic? In Language, Thought and Logic: Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett, ed. by Richard Heck. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Burgess, John. 2004. Et Pluribus Unum: Plural Logic and Set Theory. Philosophia Mathematica 12(3):193-221. Devlin, Keith. 1979. The Joy of Sets. New York: Springer Verlag. Dummett, Michael. 1991. What Is Mathematics About? In Mathematics and Mind, ed. by Alexander George. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Giaquinto, Marcus. 2002. The Search for Certainty. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hale, Bob and Wright, Crispin. 2001. The Reason's Proper Study: Essays Towards A New-Fregean Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lewis, David. 1991. Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell. Lewis, David. 1986. On The Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell. Linnebo, Øystein. 2010. Pluralities and Sets. Journal of Philosophy 107(3):144164. MacFarlane, John. 2002. Frege, Kant and the Logic in Logicism. Philosophical Review 111(1):25-65. Sainsbury, Michael. 2002. Paradoxes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shapiro, Stewart. 1991. Foundations Without Foundationalism: A Case for Second-Order Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Studd, James. 2012. The Iterative Conception of Set: A (Bi)modal Axiomatization. Journal of Philosophical Logic 45(5):1-29. Uzquiano, Gabriel. 2003. Plural Quantification and Classes. Philosophia Mathematica 11(1):67-81.

Residential Mobility, Housing Choice, and Price Determinants in Transitional Vietnam: The Case of Ho Chi Minh City Ducksu Seo Graduate School of Civil and Environmental Engineering / Urban Design and Planning Seoul National University July 2018 Ph.D. Dissertation of Engineering Residential Mobility, Housing Choice, and Price Determinants in Transitional Vietnam: The Case of Ho Chi Minh City 도이모이 이후 베트남의 주거 이동, 선택, 가격 결정요인 연구: 호치민시 사례 중심으로 August 2018 Graduate School of Civil and Environmental Engineering / Urban Design and Planning Seoul National University Ducksu Seo i Abstract Residential Mobility, Housing Choice, and Price Determinants in Transitional Vietnam: The Case of Ho Chi Minh City Ducksu Seo Graduate School of Civil and Environmental Engineering (Urban Design and Planning) Seoul National University Vietnam is a transitional country in Asia that has demonstrated remarkable economic growth since the Doi Moi policy was enacted in 1986. As a result of its economic achievements during the last few decades, rapid population increase and urbanization of metropolitan cities have provoked a housing shortage and the degradation of housing conditions. The main purpose of this study is to understand residential mobility, housing choice, and the determinants of housing prices in Ho Chi Minh City, with the aim of establishing recommendations for sustainable housing development in Vietnam. For the empirical part of this study, citizen questionnaire surveys and in-depth interviews were conducted in Ho Chi Minh City, property information was collected, and extensive analyses were carried out using independent tests and hedonic regression modeling. This study mainly constitutes three parts; the study's results and findings are summarized below. The first part of the study is an analysis of housing choice and the determinants of voluntary movement within a market-driven framework. For an empirical study, a citizen questionnaire survey and in-depth interviews were conducted in Ho Chi Minh City, and analyses were carried out. The results indicate that row houses of single-family housing were strongly preferred, but the preference for apartments is also increasing with residential mobility. The popularity of row houses is closely associated with environmental adaptability and spatial flexibility of these mixed-use buildings, which demonstrates Vietnam's innate housing context. However, road conditions and commuting environments resulting from narrow inner roads in the predominantly self-built districts of Ho Chi Minh City were major drawbacks leading to limited accessibility by car and public transportation, and an increase in the crime vulnerability of these neighborhoods. Apartments with multi-family housing attract residents with their accessibility to main roads, spacious parking and open spaces, and community facilities. The row house choice was closely associated ii with life cycle, while behavioral approaches and apartment choice were influenced by environmental and institutional factors. As a further extension, in the second part of the study, the price determinants of apartments were investigated to ascertain whether the reasons for residential mobility were reflected in the price determinants of housing. This study was conducted in an affordability framework of the apartment market of Ho Chi Minh City using the hedonic price model. The results identified common factors for both affordable and unaffordable apartments, such as vertical shared access and proximity to the center of the city. For affordable apartments, housing and location attributes, which are more interrelated with the effects of urbanization, were observed to affect the price, whereas prices of unaffordable apartments were affected by community facilities and quality of life environmental aspects such as swimming pools, mixeduse development, lower-density neighborhoods, and proximity to rivers and international schools. This study also demonstrates that the reasons for moving voluntarily were based on the price determinants of housing in Ho Chi Minh City. The third part of the study is an investigation into residential mobility and housing choice from involuntary movement, specifically observing state-driven urban renewal projects. A rapid increase in the population of metropolitan cities provoked a housing shortage and the degradation of housing conditions, and so slums have become widespread in Ho Chi Minh City. Although the city announced slum renewal plans along with resident resettlement, particularly for the slums alongside the rivers, a slum deficiency survey and subsequent analysis are imperative to achieve sustainable slum redevelopment and successful resettlement of the residents. Through site observations and door-to-door interviews within District 8 (Ward 14), one of the worst slums in Ho Chi Minh City where many people have settled since the Doi Moi, I noticed that the conditions of riverfront slums were inferior to inner block areas in terms of housing quality, infrastructure, and property ownership. In particular, the lack of property ownership was a critical factor in resettlement choice; most residents who did not own property preferred in-situ slum upgrading or "site-and-service" relocation, which includes better housing quality and legal tenure. Other dwellers who obtained property ownership preferred cash compensation with self-relocation. Furthermore, the preferable housing type in resettlement was a row house that enabled property ownership and microbusiness operation. Institutional and behavioral influences of residential mobility can be observed here. In conclusion, residential mobility and housing choice diverge with the varying contexts of a transitional country as Vietnam urbanizes and economic growth develops from a transition economy utilizing market mechanisms. The transition to property privatization significantly affects residential mobility, and there are iii implications for this study. As the ownership of land and housing is an exemplary right of a capitalist society representing a domain of wealth and power, Vietnam requires a stable balance of transition economics and institutional environments for property rights. Although the current flexible institutional framework can generate efficient productivity in the early stages of the transition period, it cannot be a model for sustainable socio-economic and urban growth. Flexibility can weaken the government's management and monitoring system of individual property rights and can cause inequitable socio-spatial distribution with polarization of housing status. This transition does not symbolize flexibility; rather, it can be understood as development in progress. Keywords: Residential mobility, Housing choice, Hedonic price model, Row house, Apartment, Slum, Property right, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam Student Number: 2015-30278 iv Publication Notice This doctoral dissertation includes two published papers (Chapters 4 and 5) and one submitted paper under review (Chapter 6) in academic journals (SSCI) that were completed during my doctoral course at Seoul National University: Chapter 4. Voluntary Residential Mobility and Housing Choice in HCMC Published in the journal 'Sustainability', dated September 27, 2017. Seo, D., & Kwon, Y. (2017). In-Migration and Housing Choice in Ho Chi Minh City: Toward Sustainable Housing Development in Vietnam. Sustainability, 9(10), 1738. Chapter 5. Price Determinants of Apartment in HCMC Published in the journal 'Sustainability', dated January 15, 2018. Seo, D., Chung, Y. S., & Kwon, Y. (2018). Price Determinants of Affordable Apartments in Vietnam: Toward the Public–Private Partnerships for Sustainable Housing Development. Sustainability, 10(1), 197. Chapter 6. Involuntary Residential Mobility and Resettlement in HCMC Submitted on May 31, 2018 and under review in the journal 'Habitat International', titled 'Resettlement Choice on Slum Redevelopment in Vietnam: A Case of Slum of District 8 in Ho Chi Minh City'. Some parts of each published chapter are included in Chapter 1 (Introduction), Chapter 2 (Theoretical Review), Chapter 3 (Urbanization and Housing Development in Vietnam), and Chapter 7 (Conclusions); combined with further studies, they complete this doctoral dissertation. v Table of Contents Abstract ...................................................................................................... i Publication Notice .................................................................................... iv List of Tables .......................................................................................... viii List of Figures .......................................................................................... ix 1. Introduction .......................................................................................... 1 1.1. Background of Study...................................................................................... 1 1.2. Purpose of Study ............................................................................................ 3 1.3. Scope of Study ................................................................................................ 4 1.3.1. Field of Study .......................................................................................... 4 1.3.2. Study Area ............................................................................................... 5 1.3.3. Time Period ............................................................................................. 7 1.4. Research Questions ........................................................................................ 8 1.5. Research Framework ..................................................................................... 9 2. Theoretical Review ............................................................................. 11 2.1. Residential Mobility ..................................................................................... 11 2.1.1. Theoretical Development of Residential Mobility ................................... 11 2.1.2. Approaches to Residential Mobility ........................................................ 15 2.1.2.1. The Life Course Approach ........................................................ 16 2.1.2.2. The Behavioral Approach ......................................................... 17 2.1.2.3. The Environmental Approach ................................................... 18 2.1.2.4. The Institutional Approach........................................................ 19 2.1.3. Housing Choice and Residential Mobility ............................................... 20 2.1.4. Residential Mobility in Developing Countries......................................... 22 2.1.4.1. Theoretical Models ................................................................... 22 2.1.4.2. Residential Mobility in China ................................................... 24 2.1.4.3. Residential Mobility in Vietnam ............................................... 26 2.2. Price Determinants ....................................................................................... 31 2.2.1. Theoretical Basis of Price Determinants ................................................. 31 2.2.2. Hedonic Function Specifications ............................................................ 32 2.2.3. Attributes of Properties .......................................................................... 35 2.2.4. Literature Review of Developing Countries ............................................ 38 2.2.4.1. Price Determinants of Housing in Southeast Asia and China ...... 38 2.2.4.2. Price Determinants of Housing in Vietnam ................................ 39 vi 3. Urbanization and Housing Development in Vietnam ....................... 41 3.1. Socio-Economic Change ............................................................................... 41 3.1.1. Doi Moi Economic Reform .................................................................... 41 3.1.2. Economic Growth .................................................................................. 42 3.1.3. Rapid Urbanization and Housing Shortages ............................................ 43 3.1.4. Institutional Changes in Land and Housing Policies ................................ 46 3.2. Housing Development in Vietnam ............................................................... 49 3.2.1. Classification of Housing Typology ........................................................ 49 3.2.1.1. Official Categories from the Vietnamese Housing Census ......... 49 3.2.1.2. Housing Typology by Other Sectors .......................................... 50 3.2.1.3. Housing Typology in This Study ............................................... 53 3.2.2. Slum Upgrading Programs ..................................................................... 54 3.2.3. Self-Built Housing ................................................................................. 55 3.2.4. Apartment Development ........................................................................ 56 3.3. Urban Growth of Ho Chi Minh City ............................................................ 58 3.3.1. The Epicenter of Urban Development ..................................................... 58 3.3.2. Population Growth and Housing Shortages ............................................. 60 3.3.3. Widespread Slum Settlements ................................................................ 61 3.3.4. Predominant Self-Built Row House Development ................................... 64 3.3.5. Apartment Development Boom .............................................................. 67 4. Voluntary Residential Mobility and Housing Choice in HCMC ...... 70 4.1. Introduction ................................................................................................. 70 4.2. Research Methods ........................................................................................ 71 4.2.1. Sampling Area ....................................................................................... 71 4.2.2. Preliminary Interviews ........................................................................... 72 4.2.3. Questionnaire Design and Survey ........................................................... 73 4.2.4. In-depth Interviews ................................................................................ 75 4.3. Results and Findings .................................................................................... 75 4.3.1. Predominant Single-family Housing ....................................................... 75 4.3.2. Significant Factors of Current Housing ................................................... 76 4.3.3. Housing Choices and Movement Patterns ............................................... 78 4.3.4. In-depth Interviews for Housing Choices ................................................ 81 4.3.4.1. Row House Choice ................................................................... 81 4.3.4.2. Apartment Choice ..................................................................... 84 4.4. Discussions.................................................................................................... 85 4.4.1. Advantages of Row Houses .................................................................... 85 4.4.2. Drawbacks of Row Houses ..................................................................... 86 4.4.3. Increasing Popularity of Apartments ....................................................... 89 4.5. Conclusion .................................................................................................... 91 vii 5. Price Determinants of Apartments in HCMC................................... 94 5.1. Introduction ................................................................................................. 94 5.2. Research Methods ........................................................................................ 97 5.2.1. Data Collection ...................................................................................... 97 5.2.2. Identification of Affordable Housing ...................................................... 97 5.2.3. Variables for Hedonic Regression Model ................................................ 98 5.3. Results and Findings ................................................................................... 100 5.3.1. Descriptive Statistics ............................................................................. 100 5.3.2. Regression Results ................................................................................ 101 5.4. Discussions................................................................................................... 102 5.4.1. Common Price Determinants ................................................................. 102 5.4.2. Unique Price Determinants of Affordable Apartments ........................... 104 5.4.3. Unique Price Determinants of Unaffordable Apartments ........................ 106 5.5. Conclusions.................................................................................................. 107 6. Involuntary Residential Mobility and Resettlement in HCMC ...... 111 6.1. Introduction ................................................................................................ 111 6.2. Research Methods ....................................................................................... 113 6.2.1. Site Selection ........................................................................................ 113 6.2.2. Field Research, Surveys, and Interviews ................................................ 114 6.3. Results and Findings ................................................................................... 116 6.3.1. Inferior Housing Conditions of Waterfront Areas ................................... 116 6.3.2. Settlement Formation in the Waterfront Areas after the Doi Moi ............ 118 6.3.3. Housing-based Relocation and Cash-based Relocation ........................... 119 6.3.4. Legal Property Ownership and Relocation Option Preferences ............... 120 6.3.5. Predominant Preference for Row Houses ............................................... 122 6.4. Discussions................................................................................................... 124 6.5. Conclusions.................................................................................................. 125 7. Conclusions ....................................................................................... 127 7.1. Study Summary ........................................................................................... 127 7.2. Implications ................................................................................................. 129 Bibliography ......................................................................................... 131 Appendices ............................................................................................ 145 Abstract in Korean ............................................................................... 147 viii List of Tables Table 1. Overview of HCMC 2017................................................................................... 7 Table 2. Voluntary and Involuntary Mobility in Household Relocation ........................... 14 Table 3. Price Determinants of Housing ......................................................................... 40 Table 4. Population Change in Vietnam ......................................................................... 43 Table 5. Official Categories by Housing Type in Vietnam 2016 ...................................... 45 Table 6. Institutional Changes in Land and Housing Policies .......................................... 47 Table 7. Vietnam City and Housing Index (2009–2020) ................................................. 49 Table 8. World Bank Categories for Vietnam Housing (2016) ........................................ 50 Table 9. Permanent Housing in Vietnam ........................................................................ 50 Table 10. Semi-permanent Housing in Vietnam .............................................................. 52 Table 11. Temporary Housing in Vietnam ...................................................................... 52 Table 12. Classification of Housing Types for This Study............................................... 54 Table 13. Self-built Housing Production over Time in Vietnam ...................................... 55 Table 14. Economic Landscape of HCMC (2015)........................................................... 58 Table 15. Population Change in Vietnam ....................................................................... 60 Table 16. Questionnaire Contents ................................................................................... 73 Table 17. Data Collection Information ........................................................................... 74 Table 18. Housing Choice Change among Survey Respondents. ..................................... 76 Table 19. Selected Significant Factors Relating to Current Housing Types (I) ................. 77 Table 20. Selected Significant Factors Relating to Current Housing Types (II) ................ 78 Table 21. Housing Choice Reasons and Movement Patterns ........................................... 79 Table 22. Housing Tenure and Movement Patterns ......................................................... 80 Table 23. Monthly Income and Future Housing Choice .................................................. 80 Table 24. Effective Demand of Housing by Household Income in HCMC 2014 .............. 98 Table 25. Variable Descriptions for Hedonic Price Modeling .......................................... 99 Table 26. Descriptive Statistics ..................................................................................... 100 Table 27. Regression Results ........................................................................................ 101 Table 28. Price Determinants by Attributes ................................................................... 102 Table 29. Questionnaire Contents .................................................................................. 115 Table 30. Descriptive Statistics on Selected Housing Traits ........................................... 116 Table 31. Homogeneity for Housing Attributes and Housing Locations ......................... 117 Table 32. Homogeneity for Residence Period and Housing Location ............................. 119 Table 33. Homogeneity for Relocation Options and Housing Locations ......................... 119 Table 34. Homogeneity for Property Ownership and Housing Locations ........................ 120 Table 35. Property Ownership and Relevancy between Locations and Relocation .......... 122 Table 36. Preferred Housing Type for Relocation .......................................................... 122 ix List of Figures Figure 1. Typical Cityscape of Self-built District in HCMC .............................................. 2 Figure 2. Field of Study and Structure .............................................................................. 5 Figure 3. HCMC on the Map of Vietnam ......................................................................... 6 Figure 4. Study Area of HCMC: Urban and Semi-urban Districts ..................................... 7 Figure 5. Emergence and Development of Land and Housing Markets in Vietnam ............ 8 Figure 6. Research Framework and Flow Chart .............................................................. 10 Figure 7. Structure of Migration Research and Main Literature Reviews ......................... 11 Figure 8. Reason for Moving by Distance ...................................................................... 12 Figure 9. Changing Life Histories and Changing Housing Careers in Australia ............... 14 Figure 10. Literature Map of Residential Mobility Studies .............................................. 15 Figure 11. Theory of Planned Behavior .......................................................................... 22 Figure 12. Residential Mobility Patterns after Redevelopment in China .......................... 26 Figure 13. Survey results of satisfaction of relocated THLG residents ............................. 29 Figure 14. Hedonic Price Function ................................................................................. 31 Figure 15. Map of Price Determinants and References.................................................... 37 Figure 16. FDI Growth in Vietnam ................................................................................ 42 Figure 17. GDP Growth in Vietnam ............................................................................... 43 Figure 18. Urban Population in Vietnam ........................................................................ 44 Figure 19. Accumulated FDI Inflows by Sectors 2016 in Vietnam .................................. 44 Figure 20. Rural-urban Migration in Hanoi and HCMC .................................................. 45 Figure 21. Tube House(left) and Alley House(right) ....................................................... 51 Figure 22. Apartment Type 1(left) and Type 2(right) ...................................................... 51 Figure 23. Villa Type 1(left) and Type 2(right) .............................................................. 51 Figure 24. Alley House(left) and Small Single-story(right) ............................................. 52 Figure 25. Rural Old House(left) and Squatter House(right) ........................................... 53 Figure 26. Cityscape with Numerous Self-built Housing in HCMC ................................ 56 Figure 27. Apartment Supply in HCMC(left) and Hanoi(right) ....................................... 57 Figure 28. Apartment Prices in Southeast Asian Cities ................................................... 57 Figure 29. Expansion of Built-up Area in HCMC; 1989(left) and 2015(right) ................. 59 Figure 30. Housing Development in Transitional Vietnam.............................................. 59 Figure 31. Housing Stock by Building Quality in Vietnam and HCMC ........................... 60 Figure 32. Temporary Housing(left), Semi-permanent Housing(middle), Permanent Housing(right) .............................................................................................. 61 Figure 33. Slum Settlement Patterns: Urban District ....................................................... 62 Figure 34. Slum Settlement Patterns: Semi-urban(left), Rural(right) ............................... 62 Figure 35. Temporary and Dilapidated Houses in HCMC ............................................... 63 Figure 36. Self-built Housing Distribution in HCMC ..................................................... 65 Figure 37. Construction of Self-built Housing in HCMC ................................................ 65 x Figure 38. Pervasive Self-built Housing (Row Houses) Areas in HCMC......................... 66 Figure 39. Average Apartment Price Growth in Vietnam ................................................ 68 Figure 40. HCMC Apartment Primary Price Forecast ..................................................... 68 Figure 41. Affordable Apartment Demand and Supply ................................................... 69 Figure 42. Survey Districts in HCMC: Urban and Semi-Urban Districts ......................... 71 Figure 43. Advantages of Row House Residences ........................................................ 81 Figure 44. Drawbacks of Row House Residence ............................................................ 83 Figure 45. Advantages of Apartment Residence ............................................................. 84 Figure 46. Mixed-use Row Houses in HCMC ................................................................ 86 Figure 47. Conventional Row House District in HCMC (District 4) ................................ 87 Figure 48. Conventional Row House District in HCMC (District 4) ................................ 87 Figure 49. Conventional Inner Roads in a Row House District (District 8) ...................... 88 Figure 50. Burglar Poof Windows on Row Houses in HCMC ......................................... 88 Figure 51. Peak Hour Commuting in HCMC .................................................................. 89 Figure 52. Conventional Environment of Apartments ..................................................... 90 Figure 53. Construction of Apartments and Elevated Metro Railway in HCMC .............. 91 Figure 54. Luxury(left) and High-end Apartments(right) in HCMC ................................ 96 Figure 55. Mid-end(left) and Affordable(right) Apartments in HCMC ............................ 96 Figure 56. Peak Hour Commuting(left) and Urban Flooding in HCMC(right) ................ 103 Figure 57. Vertical Shared Access(left) and Horizontal Corridor Access(right) .............. 104 Figure 58. Affordable Apartments in District 12 ............................................................ 105 Figure 59. Residential Mobility and Price Determinants ................................................ 109 Figure 60. Location of the Study Area in HCMC ........................................................... 113 Figure 61. Study Area(top) and Dividing IBA and WFA(bottom) .................................. 114 Figure 62. Primary Road(top) and Inner Block Road (bottom) in Study Area ................. 115 Figure 63. Housing Preference for Relocation ............................................................... 123 Figure 64. Slum Formation and Resettlement Choice for Slum Redevelopment ............. 126 Figure 65. Summary Diagram of the Studies ................................................................. 129 1 Chapter 1 Introduction 1. Introduction 1.1. Background of Study Vietnam has registered dynamic national growth following the introduction of economic reform, the Doi Moi (Đổi Mới: open door) policy, in 1986. It has moved away from the government-led economic structure by opening up the local market. The policy goal was to create a socialist-oriented market economy and to accelerate the economic transition to industrial manufacturing, creating employment opportunities and economic output (Beresford, 2008). This led to a remarkable growth in foreign direct investment (FDI) and spurred industrial manufacturing development in Vietnam. The reforms have achieved a steady annual GDP growth of 5–10% for the last several decades, enabling Vietnam to leap forward as one of the fastest-growing countries in Asia, with falling poverty rates and improved quality of life (UN Habitat, 2014). Accordingly, since the initiation of the Doi Moi economic reforms, Vietnam's urbanization rate has rapidly increased with a great influx of immigrants from rural areas. As the registration system of residence was relaxed, and people's lives became independent from government subsidies and assistance, spontaneous interprovincial and interurban rural-to-urban migrations accelerated (Dang, Goldstein, & McNally, 1997; Dang, Tacoli, & Hoang, 2003; Nguyen & McPeak, 2010). Thus, nationally, the urban proportion of the population increased from 20.5% in 1990 to 34.7% in 2017 (UN Habitat, 2014). The phenomenon was especially observed in Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC), which includes 9.2% of Vietnam's total population as the city served as the largest economic center and financial hub in the country (McGee, 2009). However, this rapid urbanization has led to a rise in the demand for affordable housing for the 2 influx of migrants into the city. The land and housing supply systems were not well organized in Vietnam, and thus predominately self-built housing and informal settlements have become widespread (Gough & Tran, 2009; Waibel, Eckert, Bose, & Volker, 2007). The temporary or dilapidated housing constituted two-thirds of Vietnam's urban housing in the 1990s (Vinh & Leaf, 1996). The rate of permanent housing, which has durable foundations and permanent construction materials, was only about 25% in both 2002 and 2012 in HCMC, and the rest was temporary and semi-permanent housing (UN Habitat, 2014). The housing shortage and organic growth patterns of self-built housing developments (Figure 1) have generated dense neighborhood environments, a lack of road infrastructure, traffic congestion, air pollution, and widespread slum formation threatening public safety and security (Gough & Tran, 2009; Ho & Clappier, 2011; UN Habitat, 2014; Waibel et al., 2007; Zhu, 2012). In this regard, the problems in the housing sector were exacerbated in both qualitative and quantitative terms with urbanization in HCMC. Figure 1. Typical Cityscape of Self-built District in HCMC To increase housing supply and enhance housing affordability, the Vietnamese government not only revised the land laws and housing policies to encourage active involvement of private housing developers and investors, but also launched a subsidized mortgage program as per the regulations of the central banks in June 2013 called "VND 30 Trillion Home Loan Package".1 Since the subsidized program was 1 This is a preferential home loan program for lowand middle-income people who wish to purchase an apartment. The Vietnam government issued Decree 61/NQ-CP to execute the loan packages to increase housing affordability and encourage housing supply from the private sector. The conditions 3 launched, around 80% of apartment buyers in HCMC have taken advantage of the package (JLL, 2016; World Bank, 2015), which underlines the fact that more apartment projects can deliver sustainable housing solutions to meet the rising demand for housing. Furthermore, the government announced a comprehensive urban improvement policy, the National Urban Upgrading Program (NUUP) 2, for the 2009–2020 period to enhance the urban environment, which included massive clearances of slum areas and relocation plans for the original dwellers (Vietnam, 2009). In these contexts, while most researchers have investigated residential mobility on a regional scale, for example, interprovincial rural-to-urban migration in Vietnam (Dang et al., 1997; Dang et al., 2003; Nguyen & McPeak, 2010), few studies of urban-scale residential mobility exist for the transitional cities of the country. While voluntary residential mobility in the housing market is common in the cities of developed countries, Vietnam's housing development is challenged by both voluntary and involuntary mobility, and city authorities have strived to build more public-private partnerships that are capable of covering the various construction projects, such as slum upgrading, urban district redevelopment, and new town projects, that are necessary for this development. Therefore, this study will investigate the determinants of residential mobility and housing choice on an urban scale, with significant policy implications for sustainable housing development in the public and private sectors of Vietnam. 1.2. Purpose of Study The purpose of this study is to review the transitional phenomenon of rapid urbanization in Vietnam since the 1986 Doi Moi policy and investigate the determinants of residential mobility, housing choice, and property prices in HCMC. This has significant implications for both sustainable urban development and housing development in Vietnam. The specific goals are: were a maximum 15-year loan tenure and a 5% fixed annual interest rate. Available apartments must meet the requirements of unit scale and price: less than 70 m2 apartment unit size and less than VND 15 million (USD 714) per m2 unit price. 2 In 2008, Vietnam established the NUUP program, which was financially supported by the Cities Alliance and the World Bank. The program aims to develop economic and social sustainability by improving the basic infrastructure and urban environment of slum-like areas in 96 cities across Vietnam. Phase 1 will focus on the overall demand assessments and cost estimates for urban upgrading in slumlike areas of target cities. The planning and execution of the urban upgrading programs were carried out by local authorities and urban communities. 4 • To review the residential mobility of Vietnam as voluntary and involuntary mobility and examine the key study areas in the context of urbanization. • To analyze housing type choices for voluntary residential mobility, driven by the housing market, and examine the implications of sustainable housing development by the private and public sectors. • To investigate the price determinants of the HCMC apartment market, which recently demonstrated a steep increase in demand within the Vietnamese real estate market, and understand how these are interconnected with the reasons for residential mobility and housing choices. • To analyze the determinants of involuntary relocation from slums, driven by the state, and to discover the implications of sustainable slum redevelopment; and • To discover the implications of sustainable housing development in transitional Vietnam. 1.3. Scope of Study 1.3.1. Field of Study This study began with an interest in how households demonstrate residential mobility and housing adjustment and what influences residential mobility and housing choices and values in HCMC, Vietnam. Two types of residential mobility can be observed in the city: voluntary and involuntary mobility (Figure 2). Involuntary mobility is a state-driven process, such as a slum redevelopment accompanied by the eviction of existing settlers and the renewal of the slum area. Voluntary mobility is a market-driven process of repeated residential mobility in real estate markets. Both segments of residential mobility were investigated to discover the determinants of housing choices. Furthermore, the price determinants of multifamily housing (apartment type), recently highlighted for housing supply and demand in Vietnam's housing market, were investigated to determine whether determinants of housing choice reflected the price determinants of housing. 5 Figure 2. Field of Study and Structure 1.3.2. Study Area HCMC, as the largest city with the highest population in Vietnam, was the study area selected for the investigation of residential mobility and housing choice in Vietnam. This city is one of the best places to conduct this research for the following reasons. First, HCMC has a significant role model of other cities in Vietnam. Vietnam's cities are categorized into 6 classes based on the level of economic development, physical development, population and its density, and infrastructure provision. HCMC was classified as one of the two national "special" cities, a top ranking, due to its significant economic and political contributions to the country (Cira, 2011). As most cities want to climb the city class ladder to receive better recognition and financial support from the central government, they are pursuing growth patterns similar to those of HCMC. Therefore, HCMC is considered a significant reference as a development model in Vietnam. Second, dynamic residential mobility with active housing development has been observed in HCMC. This city comprises 9.2% of Vietnam's total population and is responsible for 20.8% of its GDP (2016). As 155 times more FDI has flowed into HCMC than other provinces of the Northwest area, its remarkable economic growth has caused dynamic residential mobility on both interprovincial and 6 interurban scales (Nguyen & McPeak, 2010). Thus, HCMC has experienced the highest levels of urbanization and industrialization, population growth, and housing development, which crucially influence residential mobility and housing choices. Third, HCMC needs sustainable housing development strategies, as it has been confronted with a serious housing shortage and unmanaged urban growth. While Hanoi, the capital city with the second largest population, consists of 91.8% permanent housing, HCMC has only 27.5%, and the remainder of the housing is semi-permanent and temporary (Vietnam GSO, 2016). This means that HCMC has more complicated housing development and urban management issues for both voluntary and involuntary mobility and thus the city requires viable strategic plans for sustainable growth. Figure 3. HCMC on the Map of Vietnam Source: http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/ mapsonline/base-maps/vietnam 7 Figure 4. Study Area of HCMC: Urban and Semi-urban Districts Table 1. Overview of HCMC 2017 Category Details Area Population Density Total GDP GDP per capita Division Status 2,096 km2 8,611,100 4,100/km2 USD 161.49 billion USD 19,167/capita 13 Urban / 6 Semi-urban / 5 Rural Districts One of Two Special-class Cities in Vietnam Data: General Statistics Office of Vietnam 1.3.3. Time Period This study focused on the period since the Doi Moi (open door) economic reform (1986), after which the urbanization rate of HCMC increased remarkably with a great influx of immigrants from rural areas as a result of the reform policy. The policy goal was to create a socialist-oriented market economy and to accelerate the economic transition to industrial manufacturing, creating employment Source: Google maps 8 opportunities and economic output (Beresford, 2008). The land and housing laws were also revised to allow private property ownership, which caused a housing market boom and residential mobility (Figure 5). Since the policy, the in-migration trend has continued to escalate and caused a large acceleration of urbanization and housing development in HCMC. Housing developments, residential adjustment, and choice of household therefore represented a critical social-economic phenomenon in HCMC after the Doi Moi. Figure 5. Emergence and Development of Land and Housing Markets in Vietnam 1.4. Research Questions This study constitutes three principal parts of empirical investigation of residential mobility and housing choices. The first section examines residential mobility and housing choices in a sector of voluntary mobility in HCMC. The cityscapes of HCMC are dominated by single-family housing, particularly row houses and citizens are still likely to demonstrate a strong preference for these as their housing choice. As the urban density of HCMC is rapidly increasing with the influx of population and urbanization, a number of multi-family housing projects are gradually being spotlighted in housing markets. In this context, the research questions are the following: • What are the main types of housing currently and what have been the main types in the past? What types of housing do citizens prefer for future settlements? • What factors affect residential mobility patterns? • Are residential mobility patterns related to effects of the urbanization of the city? What factors have influenced the reasons for moving and housing choices? 9 The second section of the study extends from the first study, specifically to the apartment type, which has been recently highlighted by the urbanization of HCMC. In this section, I investigate the price determinants of apartments and compare these with the reasons for residential mobility. In particular, affordable apartment segments have recently come to the fore with a remarkable surge of middle-income households in HCMC. This research therefore attempted a new approach to finding answers to the following additional research questions. • Are the reasons for residential mobility reflected in the price determinants of housing in HCMC? • How do price determinants of affordable apartments differ from the unaffordable sector and which are more associated with the transitional context of HCMC? • What are the implications of this study for sustainable housing development and how does this challenge the public and private sectors? The last section of this study is related to involuntary mobility associated with residential mobility for resettlement of slum areas. This is a distinctive product of urbanization encompassing widespread informal slum areas in HCMC. As the city officially announced slum removal plans in the last decade, relocation of the original settlers and compensation negotiations have become critical issues. The related research questions are the following. • When did many slum areas form alongside the rivers of HCMC? • What kind of compensation and relocation housing type do slum-dwellers prefer? • Are there different relocation preferences for the geographical location of slum housing, such as riverbank or non-riverbank, and how? 1.5. Research Framework This research constitutes seven parts that investigate the determinants of residential mobility, housing choices, and price determinants in HCMC. Chapter 1 introduces the study, describing the research background, purpose, scope, research questions, and research frameworks. Chapter 2 refers to the theoretical background and includes a literature review of residential mobility and price determinants. Chapter 3 focuses on an in-depth review of Vietnamese urbanization and housing development in transitional contexts after the Doi Moi (1986). Political economic and socio-economic factors, significantly those that influenced urban growth, are analyzed, and then varying issues of housing development are illuminated in the 10 light of housing typologies. Chapter 4 refers to residential mobility and housing type choices of voluntary mobility in HCMC. It includes an empirical research method, analyses, and findings, with a variety of discussions of the local context. Chapter 5 examines the price determinants of apartments in a frame of affordability. It includes the hedonic price model, noting its analyses and findings, along with various discussions of the local context. Chapter 6 refers to involuntary residential mobility from slum areas in HCMC. It contains empirical research methods and describes the analyses and findings. Chapter 7 refers to the overall conclusions of this study, including a summary of the study, implications, and further research issues. Figure 6. Research Framework and Flow Chart 11 Chapter 2 Theoretical Review 2. Theoretical Review 2.1. Residential Mobility 2.1.1. Theoretical Development of Residential Mobility Research on residential mobility and migration has been extensively conducted by geographers, economists, sociologists, and demographers. For example, labor mobility has been highlighted by economists, while spatial movement of migrants has been underlined by geographers. Demographers attempt to comprehend population shift rates, and they have tried to understand migration in the context of human settlements. The general structure of migration studies has been categorized into international, interregional, and interurban migration (Figure 7), and the division is primarily based on the distance of the mobility and the physical spatial boundaries (Clark, 1982). Figure 7. Structure of Migration Research and Main Literature Reviews Source: Clark, 1982 12 Roseman (1971) divided residential mobility and migration into total displacement and partial displacement. Total displacement is the complete relocation of an entire family leading to completely different daily and weekly moving patterns of the household, whereas partial displacement effects only a partial change in the movement patterns (Roseman, 1971). While international migration is likely to be total displacement, interurban and interregional mobility are dependent on the reasons and circumstances of mobility to be defined as total or partial displacement. Figure 8 illustrates how this tripartite division has been understood, using the reasons that drive mobility. With interurban areas connected by short distances, the main reasons for residential relocation have been adjustments to housing and neighborhoods or changes to life cycles or income levels, whereas interregional or international mobility involving relocation over a longer distance has largely been induced by employment opportunities and economic circumstances (Cordey-Hayes, 1975). Figure 8. Reason for Moving by Distance The seminal work of this study is Rossi's paper, "Why families move: a study in the social psychology of urban residential mobility" (1955), which is cited in many other works. He notes that residential mobility is a broad concept that can generally be considered a change in residence from one place to another under normal circumstances. It can include international migration; however, in terms of geography, residential mobility circumscribes shorter migration boundaries such as internal, interurban, and interregional moving (Rossi, 1955). Rossi's focus is on Source: Cordey-Hayes, 1975 13 migration that occurs in the search for a better dwelling at the level of the household, and his understanding of these processes is associated with housing studies. The next influential study of residential mobility is an article by Brown and Moore (1970), "The intra-urban migration process: a perspective," in which they highlight the two phases of the mobility process. In the first phase, residents recognize unpleasant feelings related to their current settlement conditions. The discomfort arises from their negative residential environment, and this causes residents to move to the second phase. The second phase is the process of searching for housing vacancies that could improve their residential environment. Residents must then decide whether to stay or move (Brown & Moore, 1970). At the household level, these studies still have a strong impact on household studies. However, it is not easy to clearly define the patterns and theories of residential mobility, and its complexity has been a theme of academic debate (Strassmann, 2001). Since 1950, mobility has been regarded as a pathological theme, and a number of scholars have tried to investigate it from different perspectives. Residential mobility motivation is often derived from negative aspects of living conditions. In other words, migration can be characterized as "unsettled" or "unstable" movements (Brednikova & Tkach, 2010). For instance, moving is closely intertwined with unpleasant social issues such as divorce from a partner (De Jong & Graefe, 2008; Feijten & Van Ham, 2008, 2010), family division (Feijten, 2005), unstable housing markets (Ferreira, Gyourko, & Tracy, 2010; Kull, Coley, & Lynch, 2016), dissatisfaction with personal living conditions (Nowok, Van Ham, Findlay, & Gayle, 2013), non-medical use of drugs (Stabler, Gurka, & Lander, 2015), and delinquency among adolescents (Porter & Vogel, 2014). Therefore, migration normally improves life conditions by adjusting housing quality or neighborhood environments (Clark & Onaka, 1983; Clark, Van Ham, & Coulter, 2014). There are extensive studies demonstrating a correlation between residential mobility and household attributes such as family life course, education, and career that require decision-making on whether to stay or move to another house or neighborhood (Clark & Dieleman, 1996; Coulter, Van Ham, & Findlay, 2016; Mulder, 1996; Strassmann, 2001). Furthermore, the literature on residential mobility has extended to include macro approaches that analyze moving behaviors using socio-economic contexts, including the fluctuation of housing markets and investments, income, physical environment changes, climate issues, public policies of urban redevelopment, and financial support such as mortgages (Cadwallader, 1992; Kemp & Keoghan, 2001; Robinson, 1996). As our society is becoming more complicated and interconnected through a variety of technological developments and social issues, the complexity and variability of residential mobility are also hard to define by a specific pattern. 14 Figure 9 indicates that contemporary lifestyles have become more complicated over the last few decades, and this has significant implications for residential mobility. While traditional models demonstrate a relatively simpler life and housing trajectory, contemporary life cycles and their influences have changed in ways that are more complex. For example, higher rates of divorce and an increase in special care services for the post-retirement period create costs that are more substantial. Changes in housing are determined through housing market conditions, but they are closely intertwined with a household's family progression, demographic changes, and economic situation (Beer & Faulkner, 2007). Figure 9. Changing Life Histories and Changing Housing Careers in Australia Clark and Onaka (1983) categorized residential mobility into two groups: voluntary mobility and involuntary mobility (Table 2). Table 2. Voluntary and Involuntary Mobility in Household Relocation Type of Mobility Reasons for Mobility Voluntary Mobility Adjustment Moves Housing: Space, Quality, Design, Cost, Tenure change Neighborhood: Quality, Physical environment, Social composition, Public services Accessibility: Workplace, Shopping, School, Family and friend Induced Moves Employment: Job change, retirement Life cycle: Household formation, Dissolution, Marital status, Household size change Involuntary Mobility Forced Moves Housing: Eviction, Accidents, and Disasters Neighborhood: Urban regeneration projects, Major infrastructure development, Environmental hazards and disasters Source: Clark & Onaka, 1983 Source: Beer & Faulkner, 2007; Williams, 2003 15 Voluntary mobility can be classified further, into adjustment moves and induced moves, based on the reasons for the move. The former indicates a household move that enhances the residential environment, neighborhood, and location of settlement. The latter is a move to enhance careers or life cycle changes. Involuntary mobility, on the other hand, is a forced move that indicates household movement that is not controlled by the household, for example, eviction because of an urban renewal plan or public sector infrastructure development (Clark & Onaka, 1983). 2.1.2. Approaches to Residential Mobility The literature on residential mobility can largely be categorized into four sectors: Life course approach, Behavioral approach, Environmental approach, and Intuitional approach (Figure 10). Figure 10. Literature Map of Residential Mobility Studies 16 2.1.2.1. The Life Course Approach The life course approach to residential mobility began with Rossi's pioneering work, "Why families move" (1955), and is based on the developmental patterns and cultural phenomena of traditional nuclear families. This life course perspective is related to the human development stages of marriage, birth of children, independence of children, change of workplace and economic situation, and retirement. The search for a suitable living space for each phase (Kendig, 1984; McAuley & Nutty, 1982; Morris, Crull, & Winter, 1976; Pickvance, 1973) can trigger residential mobility. Rossi assumed that residential mobility would be seriously considered if the size of the family changed or dissatisfaction and a need for a change in residential space arose. These issues are deeply related to cultural contexts such as housing adjustment and housing ownership to secure appropriate spaces for stability and comfort for family life (Morris et al., 1976). For example, a young adult may desire independence from his or her parents and become determined to move out of their family home (Holdsworth, 2013; Whisler, Waldorf, Mulligan, & Plane, 2008). A married couple might seek a new house in a more family-friendly environment and so move to a new neighborhood (Clark & Lisowski, 2017; Kulu, 2008). In retirement, people consider residential mobility to move to a more environmentally friendly neighborhood with a natural environment (Stockdale, 2006, 2014). There are, however, also negative aspects of life changes that can motivate residential mobility such as divorce from a partner (De Jong & Graefe, 2008; Feijten & Van Ham, 2008, 2010). When a spouse dies, or children leave home, a reduction in the space required for residence can also induce mobility. As our society changes, more complex life events influence residential mobility and housing issues, including escalating rates of divorce, remarriage, and dual-career parenting, as well as higher costs of tertiary education (Winstanley, Thorns, & Perkins, 2002). Furthermore, the life course approach requires a multidisciplinary perspective, since a connected life is illuminated through the household and also through kinship and social networks (Elder, Johnson, & Crosnoe, 2003). For instance, Urry argued that "place" should be redefined, not according to a fixed physical notion but with networks and connectivity over time and space (Urry, 2012). With the development of technology and social ties, places are regarded as "processes" of life events (Massey, 2013; Pred, 1984) rather than stationary paradigms. From this perspective, residential mobility in the life course approach is intertwined with transactional practices and experiences of the environment as a part of the "micro-geographies of everyday life" (Cresswell, 2011). 17 2.1.2.2. The Behavioral Approach The majority of mobility decision-making derived from behaviorism is determined by examining perceptions and actions of individuals based on a cognitive understanding of the environment (Brown & Moore, 1970; Rossi, 1955). People pursue satisfactory economic outcomes and profit maximization attained by using perfect information. However, in reality, it is impossible to access complete information, and so people are sometimes satisfied with lower than optimal profits due to insufficient knowledge and uncertainty. To address this reality, Kirk (1963) proposed a distinctive separation in individual perception between the phenomenal environment and the behavioral environment. While the phenomenal environment is the objective existence of the physical environment itself, the behavioral environment is a subjectively perceived environment where decision behavior occurs. The latter can be influenced by the psychological circumstances of observers, and it can be translated through the quantity and quality of information the observers obtain. In this context, the behavioral approach to decision-making processes is based on an understanding of the behavioral environment rather than a recognition of the phenomenal environment (Timmermans & Golledge, 1990). Therefore, the behavioral approach significantly considers the socio-psychological context of information collection and mobility choices (Roseman, 1983). Behaviorism often underlines the cognitive processes that influence the decision-making of individuals. Tolman (1948) initially coined the term "cognitive map" to determine human behavior, and the map represented the objective reality of an individual's experience (Tolman, 1948). Downs, however, argued that cognitive mapping is a process to create, accumulate, recall, and manipulate the information of the spatial environment for residential mobility (Downs, 1981). In general, with migration studies, cognitive maps include information regarding the location of places, as well as value judgments, and they can be a fundamental reference for locational preference and move decision-making (Robinson, 1996). A concept of behaviorally orientated residential mobility is frequently based on an economic rationality to gain financial profits from move decision-making processes (McLeod & Ellis, 1982). For instance, people research the right time to move and the right place to buy a new house so as to generate capital gains as an investment; they believe that residential mobility results in capitalization from the property modification. Thus, a household could decide to move if the financial profits from changing homes were more than the relocation costs (Clark & Moore, 1982; Hamnett, 2005; Quigley & Weinberg, 1977). However, there are critiques of the behavioral decision-making procedure for moving. A perfect rational determination is not possible due to an incomplete 18 provision of knowledge and information about the time and location of the move. Normally, households obtain data from various intermediaries including real estate agencies, housing market portal websites, advertisements in newspapers or magazines, and oral information from relatives and friends. These always consist of partial information, and so incomplete resources usually result in an imperfect determination of residential mobility that migrants believe is the right decision (Speare, 1974). In addition, another critique is that this model considerably relies on a single decision-maker in the household who has the power to determine residential mobility. A number of empirical studies of this approach do not reflect the collaborative decision-making processes that occur from discussions among families or household members on the residential mobility issue (Winstanley et al., 2002). As residential mobility is not an issue of an individual power-holder or a single informant, this research could investigate holistic perspectives of family members for an in-depth understanding of the decision-making processes of moving (McCauley & Nutty, 1985; Woolever, 1992). 2.1.2.3. The Environmental Approach Unlike the behavioral approach, which focuses on the economic rationality of moving, the environmental approach emphasizes environmental factors such as neighborhood location and conditions for migration that determine moving (Bolan, 1997; De Souza Briggs, 1997; Feldman, 1990; McCauley & Nutty, 1985; Seek, 1983; Woolever, 1992). Rossi's (1955) seminal work on the life cycle theory also noted that families thinking about residential mobility consider the location of residency and its link to prestige (Rossi, 1955). An interesting hypothetical trade-off survey between neighborhood and housing quality was conducted. Participants in this national survey were asked to select one of two residential "packages" of equal price. The first residence was a high-quality house in a less desirable neighborhood, while the second residence was in an excellent neighborhood, but the housing was of low quality. Among the participants, 69% preferred the latter to the former, while 27% preferred the former. This therefore demonstrates the significance of community environment for residential mobility (Butler et al., 1969). There are other empirical studies that highlight the influence of neighborhood quality and community features on residential satisfaction including political participation (Caputo, 1987; Giles & Dantico, 1982), fear of crime and victimization risk (Covington & Taylor, 1991; Smith & Jarjoura, 1989), labor market advantages (Maume Jr, 1984), and socioeconomic achievements such as better education and income (Datcher, 1982; Semyonov, 1981). 19 Additionally, there are "pull" and "push" effects of residential mobility. The "push" effect involves long-term residents hesitating to relocate because of greater familiarity, sentiment, and involvement in their current community. They have become emotionally and cognitively attached to a place and its familiar environment, their communal lives have developed in that area, and they have become accustomed to the shops, parks, schools, and streets of the neighborhood (Kasarda & Janowitz, 1974; Sampson, 1988; Seek, 1983; Tomeh, 1969). As Stokols and Shumaker (1982) argue, when community environments and public amenities satisfy the preferable needs of households, they will have a higher level of attachment to their neighborhood. Residents who move for a particular reason will have a higher level of expectation for attachment to the new environment (Shumaker & Stokols, 1982). The "pull" effect has both positive and negative features that influence moving. On the positive side, Clark (1982) underlined a trend toward moving in search of "quality of life" including moving for climate and public amenities, rather than job opportunities and financial benefits (Clark, 1982; Shumaker & Stokols, 1982). This trend was interpreted as confirming that residential mobility is not "productionoriented" but "consumption-oriented" (Winstanley et al., 2002). On the negative side, the deteriorating quality of a neighborhood environment can often make residents move out of the community. Skogan argues that both physical and social disorders, which undermine community stability, significantly influence the "quality of life" of the residence. The former are visible factors such as misdemeanors, abandoned parks and properties, unmanaged streets, and traffic congestion. The latter are the frequency of incidents and activities implicated in crime rates, such as increasing homelessness, street harassment, youth in gang-related apparel, recreational violence in bars or parks, and nuisance neighbors (Skogan, 2015; Skogan, 1990). 2.1.2.4. The Institutional Approach The institutional approach highlights the influence of institutions such as government organizations, financial sector institutions, and the real estate industry on residential mobility (Flowerdew, 1982). Large government and private intuitions play a significant role in interurban mobility and interregional migration flows (Cadwallader, 1992; Dang et al., 1997; McKAY & Whitelaw, 1977; Nguyen & Locke, 2014). For instance, the national economic reform and its open door policy in China and Vietnam created a large migration toward cities, leading to a boom in housing development from this residential mobility (Nguyen & Locke, 2014; Seo & Kwon, 2017). Mortgages offered by national banks provided financial support to the lower middle-income classes and motivated the development of affordable housing within the private sector. In Vietnam, this meant that more residents had practical 20 opportunities to move into affordable apartments (Seo, Chung, & Kwon, 2018; World Bank, 2015). Knox (1987) highlighted the five principle actors that drive the dynamics of the urban housing market and residential mobility of the institutional approach: financial capital, industrial capital, commercial capital, landed capital, and the public sector (Robinson, 1996). Financial capital includes diverse financial organizations such as banks and mortgage companies that play a significant role in determining the cash flow frequency and intensity of the housing market (Doling & Williams, 1983). Industrial capital mainly involves developers and builders, who affect the housing market through development activities that create the housing supply of various building types. Commercial capital refers to real estate agents who professionally manage the selling, renting, and marketing of properties. As distributors of housing who negotiate profit for buyers and sellers, they often encourage residential mobility through the provision of objective factors and the subjective interpretation of the choice of housing and neighborhood (Palm, 1979). Landed capital indicates landowners and property owners. A property owner is the owner of properties such as a house, condominium, or land that is rented or leased to a tenant. The large rental housing market also influences residential mobility, and it tends to be determined by the personal actions of property owners and their "gatekeeping activities" (Elliot & McCrone, 1975). Lastly, the public sector mainly refers to government policies and regulations that control and operate the housing market. By regulating a stable housing market, the central government strives to boost national economic growth by encouraging construction industries, to ensure that housing supply meets increasing demand and to maintain economic stability (Harvey, 1974). While these policies are enacted at the national level, they are implemented at regional or city levels, and this creates practical variations in their application in local contexts (Murie, Niner, & Watson, 1976). 2.1.3. Housing Choice and Residential Mobility Residential mobility studies are likely to be associated with the determination of whether to move or stay. They often do not include whether the outcome of the housing choice, which is the destination resulting from the decision to move, has been achieved. If migrants decide to move, then the next stage should be housing market research of residential properties and prices that create the final residential selection (Onaka & Clark, 1983). The concept of housing choice, which is widely used in housing research, is different from housing preference. While the latter refers to the relative 21 attractiveness of housing, the former refers to actual behavior. Even if preference strongly influences housing choice, the buyers consider more than just their preferences. Priemus (Priemus, 1984) highlights the fact that various factors restrain housing choices for potential customers, such as official regulations, market and price, household finance, geographic location, and so forth. More factors can be added that affect the customers' behavior, such as perception, family, neighborhood, schedule, and lifestyle (Gibler & Nelson, 2003). Hooimeijer underlines two motivating powers for the choices. The first is the local real estate market and housing supply, and the second is individual lifestyle change with the progressing life-cycle (Hooimeijer, 1994). The dynamic of housing choice has been reviewed in several theoretical publications and has led to several models: the Life-cycle, Planned Behavior, and Decision-Making models (Jansen, Coolen, & Goetgeluk, 2011). All of them are closely related to social, economic, and cultural aspects of Vietnamese housing development. From the perspective of the life-cycle model, housing choice and movement rely on family events such as "formation", "expansion", "contraction", and "dissolution" (Rossi, 1955). Each phase motivates households to choose a form of housing of suitable size and number of rooms. The phases are also intertwined with education levels, available employment, housing careers, local markets, etc. (Clark, Deurloo, & Dieleman, 2003; Goetgeluk, Hooimeijer, & Dieleman, 1992; Mulder, 1993; Mulder & Hooimeijer, 1995). The planned behavior model has been developed from the expectancy-value theory (Mulder, 1993), which is based on behavior being the result of the entirety of the expected values of the characteristics (Figure 11). De Jong and Fawcett (De Jong & Fawcett, 1981) introduced this model for migration decision-making in housing research. The expectancy level is rated via importance evaluation of a set of values, followed by the generation of an attraction score for a specific place and form of housing as a determinant of moving (De Jong et al., 1983). In addition, they note that personal and structural backgrounds directly impact migration. The most important intention factors in deciding whether to move or stay are marital status and financial capability (De Jong, Root, Gardner, Fawcett, & Abad, 1985). 22 Figure 11. Theory of Planned Behavior Another approach to housing choice is viewing the process of decision-making as a series of dynamic problem-solving techniques (Holland, 1989; Newell & Simon, 1972; Rossi, 1955; Simon et al., 1987) In other words, looking for a new residence is the process of resolving a complicated and ill-structured situation into a relatively satisfying situation. In this context, goal-oriented behavior is highlighted in housing choice rather than just preferences. Customers can derive their goals from economic, social, and environmental issues that repeat and backtrack in their lives. Thus, the housing choice is an optimal behavior to pursue a certain desired quality of life such as happiness, freedom, safety, and security, or, in other words, minimizing the experience of negative emotions (Bettman, Luce, & Payne, 1998). 2.1.4. Residential Mobility in Developing Countries As many developing countries have experienced rapid urbanization and a dynamic mobile population seeking economic opportunities in growing cities (Simmons, 1977; Simmons, 1981), the residential mobility of rural-to-urban and interurban levels has been extensively reviewed. 2.1.4.1. Theoretical Models Turner (1968) developed the ecological model of interurban mobility based on rural-urban migration and the growth of the slum environment. He investigated migrants in Lima, Peru, in Latin America and grouped them into three successive classes based on settlement period and gainful employment conditions: "bridge Source: Ajzen, 1991 23 headers," "consolidators," and "status seekers." He determined that residential moves from urban slums to suburbs strongly influences upward social mobility, as residents gained secure housing tenure and quality, and enhanced infrastructure services in the suburbs (Portes, 1972; Turner, 1968). As suburban settlements allowed self-built or self-improved houses, he labeled this "Progressive Development" or a resident-driven, bottom-up approach. This was in contrast to the "Instant Development" of the government-driven, top-down approach (Turner, 1968). Turner's ecological model of residential mobility has influenced the sociospatial mobility studies of developing countries. Hirse (1984) investigated residential mobility of a secondary city, Jos, Nigeria, in West Africa and tested Turner's model. He demonstrated that, compared with Latin America, most West African countries had different patterns of rural-urban migration; in West Africa, urban migrants remained in their temporary settlements and cheap rental houses without attempting to achieve secure tenure and selfimproved housing, as they retained permanent residence and kinship relationships in their rural hometown. Hirse argued that the residential mobility of the permanenttemporary dichotomy in developing countries relies on various perceptions of urban life, housing demand, and the potential of each city (Hirse, 1984). Using a decision-making analysis of the different income expectations between rural and urban areas, Harris and Todaro (1970) developed a migration model of the rural-urban population shift in developing countries (Harris & Todaro, 1968; Harris & Todaro, 1970). They highlighted rational behavioral approaches to the pursuit of "expected earnings" to explain continuous rural-urban migrations regardless of an unstable labor market and employment fluctuations in cities. As long as migrants continued to believe that urban life generated more income, even though it involved temporary jobs and informal residence as opposed to agricultural work in rural areas, then the pattern of rural-urban migration continued, forcing lowincome migrants to strive to adapt to informal residential conditions like slums in the cities (Perry et al., 2007; Porta & Shleifer, 2008). In this context, as Turner argued, they sought "progressive development" (Turner, 1968) for upward social mobility and faced the urban issues of the informal business sector, overcrowding and housing shortages, and temporary housing formations of the major growing cities of developing countries. 24 2.1.4.2. Residential Mobility in China Until the 1970s, under the "hukou" system of the socialist regime of China, the state strictly controlled the movement of citizens to other cities and regions. 3 However, as China moved toward market-oriented economic reform in the 1980s, rural-to-urban migrations increased and market-driven development and economic growth centered on major cities like Guandong, Zhejiang, Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin (Cai, 1999; Chan, 2013; Fan, 2005). The trend in migration patterns contributed to the growth of labor markets in the main cities and also created regional and urban disparities of expected income and living conditions (Fan, 2007, 2011). However, an incomplete hukou system for the large rural-urban migration generated many temporary rural migrants4 who did not gain legal residence permits (local hukou) in their host cities (Chan, 2013). Subsequently, the migrants had serious difficulty securing jobs and housing tenure, and many of them were excluded from the marginal urban areas (Wong, Fu, Li, & Song, 2007). After 30 years of economic reforms, it is now easier to gain local residence permits than before, but there are still obstacles to obtaining these permits and integrating into urban communities (Chan, 2008). At the city level, housing issues from residential mobility can be understood in the context of the last few decades of Chinese pro-market reforms. Many researchers have highlighted that the 1978 economic reform significantly affected urban transformation in the cities. With the open door policy, major urban districts were reshaped by the cooperation between public authorities and the real estate sector (Han, 2000; Ma, 2002; Zhou & Ma, 2000), and households determined their housing choice and residential area based on their income levels. While the upper middleincome class was able to enter the housing market and resettle in urban districts, many urban workers of the low-income class were unable to purchase a house and were marginalized in undesirable neighborhoods. This created a transition of social and economic restructuring resulting in an unfair redistribution of income and welfare to different classes of people and areas (He & Wu, 2007; Shin, 2009; Zhang & Fang, 2004). This trend in the socio-spatial differentiation of mobility and settlements is mainly demonstrated in major cities like Beijing and Shanghai. 3 The hukou system was a registration system of households in China. Family records, including names, ages, parents, spouses, dates of birth, marriages, deaths, and mobility, efficiently managed the population and identified the mobility of family members. The hukou system of the Mao era (1949– 1978) largely categorized people as having city and urban status and then further divided people by birthplace. 4 According to China's 2010 National Census, about 200 million migrants did not gain the local residence permit (local hukou) of their destination cities (Zou, 2011). 25 For further studies on Beijing, Gu et al. (2005) have identified the spatial restructuring and residential mobility patterns in transitional Beijing since 1998. The principal factor determining socio-spatial distribution by residential mobility was socio-economic status such as income level, and family structure was not significant. They also determined that the complex urban mosaic of Beijing was underpinned by these key factors: "land use intensity", "neighborhood dynamics", "socioeconomic status", and "ethnicity". These superimposed four factors affected residential mobility in the city (Gu, Wang, & Liu, 2005). Feng et al. (2008) analyzed population census data and discovered a trend toward suburbanization and urban mobility in Beijing since 1990. Suburban growth and expansion were not driven by the state but by market-oriented development. More condominiums and affordable housing, alongside rising personal car ownership, attracted households to move out of urban centers. Developments of mega-shopping malls and retail parks in the suburbs also spurred suburbanization and residential mobility (Feng, Zhou, & Wu, 2008). Feng (2004) also examined the population shift to outer suburbs and demonstrated that this resulted mainly from housing privatization and resettlement projects in Beijing. Securing housing tenure was a main factor that determined residential mobility (Feng, 2004). A commuting issue was also highlighted by the relocation of migrant workers to outer areas. As long-distance trips created a heavy burden on both city and low-income commuters who moved to affordable housing in the suburbs, both affordability of housing and job accessibility became significant factors for residential mobility (Cervero & Day, 2008; Zhang, 2007). In the case of Shanghai, He and Wu (2007) investigated interurban residential mobility in the post-reform era in neighborhoods of Shanghai where there have been large transformations from property development with increasing involvement of the private sector and state-driven urban renewal projects. Many old neighborhoods of the inner city have been extensively redeveloped, and this has led to the clearance and replacement of dilapidated residential districts with high-rise, mixed-use towers and apartments. The boom of the real estate market has created population redistribution and voluntary and involuntary residential mobility in the city. The researchers identified different mobility patterns during the redevelopment procedures among three different groups of residents with different socio-economic backgrounds (Figure 12). Better off and middle-income households moved to standard resettlements or commodity housing and secured private housing ownership. Some of the low-income households received sufficient compensation and were able to move to standard housing, whereas the remainder were forced to move out to undesirable parts of the city (He & Wu, 2007). Other cities such as Beijing and Yunnan also demonstrated similar patterns of residential mobility (Shin, 2009). 26 Figure 12. Residential Mobility Patterns after Redevelopment in China Wu (2006) examined intra-urban residential mobility of Beijing and Shanghai with housing surveys and in-depth interviews with migrants. He analyzed the determinants of mobility behavior, as well as rate, tenure, and spatial moving patterns, and the main sources of information and support for mobility. The results showed that age and education were critical demographic factors that influenced mobility decision-making and that tenants in public rental housing were less likely to move. The mobility rate was also less likely to interrelate with the need to gain stable housing tenure and secure amenities due to institutional barriers of local residence permits. Many of the migrants, who were not allowed access to the official housing market, relied mainly on informal social networks in their own communities (Wu, 2006). 2.1.4.3. Residential Mobility in Vietnam Like China, which experienced economic reforms based on a socialist regime, Vietnam has similar transitional patterns to other socialist countries that moved toward market economies (Nguyen & Locke, 2014). Since the Doi Moi policy in 1986, which moved away from a government-led economic structure based on market socialism, there has been an acceleration of the economic transition to industrial manufacturing, creating employment opportunities and economic output Source: Wu, 2007 27 (Beresford, 2008). Since then, as in China, the registration system of residence has been relaxed, and citizens have become more independent of government subsidies and assistance. Subsequently, spontaneous interprovincial and interurban rural-tourban migration has accelerated (Dang et al., 1997; Dang et al., 2003; Nguyen & McPeak, 2010). As Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) for industrial development and construction flowed into the cities, particularly into HCMC, Hanoi, Binh Duong, Dong Nai, and Da Nang, they became magnets for mobile residents from rural areas (GSOV, 2010). In an early study, Guest (1998) demonstrated that rural-urban migration was more likely to be seasonal or temporary than rural-rural migration, which was characterized as permanent. More educated, young, and single people moved to the cities. He also highlighted HCMC's popularity due to its having the highest employment rate in Vietnam; widespread social connections facilitated finding jobs there for many Vietnamese people (Guest, 1998). Hoang and McPeak (2010) investigated migration flows and patterns using national datasets collected from 26,000 households of each province and city. They established that the significant determinants of intercity residential mobility were closely associated with distance as a proxy for relocation costs, the large population sizes of urbanized provinces, the disparity of expected incomes, the urban unemployment rate, and the quality of infrastructure and public services (Nguyen & McPeak, 2010). On an urban scale, unlike the rich literature of Chinese urban studies, there are several involuntary residential mobility studies concerning forced relocation of slum residents. Coit (1998) has studied the slum regeneration project5 in the 14 areas of District 4, which is one of the largest slum districts in HCMC. Through site observation and in-depth interviews of the settlers, he analyzed the project procedures and success/failure factors. The slum renewal project, which covered about 7,200 m2 of land, was funded by the Technical Unit Asia from the EU as a project to improve the residential environment for 900 people in 150 households. It is the first slum regeneration project to use a bottom-up approach in that the residents were encouraged to voluntarily participate in improve their own temporary or semipermanent houses, community facilities, and pubic open spaces, based on financial support and the self-help housing principle. The satisfaction level of the residents was significantly high and no residents moved; the residents evaluated the project as 5 The slum renewal project of about 7,200 m2 land, was funded by the Technical Unit Asia of EU as a project to improve the residential environment of the 150 households of 900 persons. It is the first project of bottom-up approach in slum regeneration projects in that the residents were encouraged to voluntarily participate in improve their own temporary or semi-permanent houses, community facilities, and pubic open spaces, based on financial supports and self-help housing principle. 28 a success. However, Coit found that government officials regarded it as a failure as they believed that site clearance and eviction were necessary to attract foreign real estate investment. They imagined high-end developments with modern high-rise, commercial, or luxury apartments, such as in Hong Kong and Singapore, which gain the most tax revenue for the city. This study clearly identified the gap between the local community and the government regarding slum redevelopment (Coit, 1998). Garschagen (2010) studied the project which focused on the redevelopment of slums near the river in the largest city of Con Tho City in the Mekong delta region of Vietnam. In particular, he investigated how many original residents relocated to the new settlement that the project provided. As slum redevelopment was an NUUP project with national support and interest, the river's environment and quality have remarkably improved due to the removal of informal residences along the river. However, it was found that the resident's resettlement rate was surprisingly low since they were not able to meet the financial requirements to relocate to new social apartments, and a large number of outsiders with political connections have settled down in the relocation apartments (Garschagen, 2015). This is a clear example of the loopholes that exist in the slum redevelopment policies in Vietnam. Research from the HCMC government and the World Bank for Tan Hoa-Lo Gom (THLG) project6 also reveals significant implications from riverside slums in Vietnam. The study analyzed the project procedures and also investigated each relocation option and resident's satisfaction since the relocation. The THLG project is the largest pilot program out of the NUUP projects in HCMC, and it aimed to not only improve water treatment and solid waste management but also to redevelop slums with relocation strategies along the 7.5 km of the THLG canal that passes Districts 6, 11, Tan Phu, and Tan Binh. Through the first (1988-2006) and second (2002-2006) phases, the project successfully achieved both its environmental and residential relocation goals (VBN, 2015). This study evaluated several relocation proposals presented to the original residents: 1) slum upgrading focusing on housing renovation and infrastructure improvement; 2) relocation to resettlement apartments within the site; and 3) relocation to a remote site (8 km away) known as "site and services" where they are provided land and infrastructure, such as an access road, electricity, water supply, and sanitation, for self-built housing. However, a group of the original community refused all three proposals and strongly requested a different option: cash 6 The THLG project is a largest pilot program of the NUUP projects in HCMC which aimed to not only improve water treatment and solid waste management but also redevelop slums with relocation strategies along the THLG carnal of 7.5 km crossing to District 6, 11, Tan Phu, Tan Binh. Through the first (1988-2006) and second (2002-2006) phases, the project successfully carried out both the environmental goals and residential relocation. 29 compensation with self-relocation. This option was initially excluded due to expected difficulties in the valuation of uncertain tenure of housing and land for the slum residents; additionally, it could result in property valuation disputes and thus delay the project. According to a post-assessment of the THLG project, it was identified that 381 households received support for residential relocation and environmental improvement. Out of this total, 53% of residents received assistance for their own housing and community upgrading (slum upgrading), and 19% relocated to new resettlement apartments located within the same site. Furthermore, 14% of residents relocated to remote sites for "site and services" with self-built housing. Only 14% agreed to the cash option and self-relocated to other districts. Interestingly, in a survey on the satisfaction of relocated residents, it was observed that households who moved to new settlements such as the apartments and self-built housing with "site and service" were highly satisfied with their choices, but selfrelocated residents who opted for cash compensation had a low level of satisfaction (Figure 13) (Tran & Vo, 2006). Figure 13. Survey results of satisfaction of relocated THLG residents In light of the precedent studies discussed, dwellers' relocation and compensation are critical aspects to ensure feasibility, practicality, and sustainability of the project. Securing new settlements for relocation heightens resident satisfaction with resettlement and prevents additional slum formation caused by the forced eviction of residents. The case of cash compensation is evaluated as a high risk that lowers the efficiency of project finances and causes serious delays in the project schedule. Although voluntarily selected, the cash option does not complement the slum upgrading goals of enhancing the urban and residential environment and amenities. In this regard, conditions in this study of involuntary move are significantly similar to THLG's in terms of adjacency to rivers, proximity to downtown, slum renewal plan by city, and relocation expected. Therefore, it has Source: Tran & Vo, 2006 30 crucial implications in understanding the differences in slum environments and in the investigation of how the specific factors of the slum residence influence decisions regarding involuntary residential mobility. The study will aid in the creation of viable strategies for relocation and negotiation and ultimately assist in the execution of successful slum redevelopment projects in Vietnam. 31 2.2. Price Determinants Residential mobility studies are associated with the determination to move or stay and do not include the outcomes from housing choices, the destination of the mobility decision. If migrants decide to move, then the next stage of the research process should be housing market research to discover residential properties and prices that determine the selection of the final residence (Onaka & Clark, 1983). The study of price determinants is a reference source that can demonstrate the dynamic mechanisms of housing price determination in real estate markets. 2.2.1. Theoretical Basis of Price Determinants Court (1939) was an early pioneer in using the term 'hedonic' to investigate demand and prices for individual sources of pleasure (Court, 1939). He believed heterogeneous commodities contained multiple attributes to meet individual preferences for usefulness and desirability. This significant application of multivariate statistical methods had major implications for housing price studies. Lancaster (1966) then developed the argument further with the theory of consumer demand (Lancaster, 1966). He demonstrated that composite goods contain a variety of attributes; thus, customers make a decision to purchase when the composite attributes meet their specific desires. Rosen (1974) then took the discussion to a new level by applying hedonic theory to a pricing model. He argued that the total price of an item means the sum of the prices of the individual attributes of the item, and that each characteristic can be a unique implicit price in the market (Rosen, 1974). He explained that the theoretical foundation is based on a bid price (φ), which is the maximum willingness to pay for a good by a customer who wants to enjoy a certain level of satisfaction or utility. Figure 14. Hedonic Price Function Source: Hidano, 2003 32 As Figure 14 illustrates, Rosen highlighted the interrelations among market price, bid price, and offer roles. The tangent of the price curve indicates the identical value under equilibrium status, which the customers and suppliers desire for their own profits. The meeting points on the price curve between the customer's bid price (φ) and the producer's offer price (o) is an acceptable market price that satisfies both parties (Hidano, 2003). This provided critical implications for advanced price regression models, a way to find which unique attributes influence total composite prices (Xiao & Webster, 2017). Once Rosen's theory of a hedonic pricing model was generally accepted, regression analysis methods began to be broadly used for housing market analysis and urban studies. The basic hypothesis of the hedonic price model for housing studies is that the total price of a property represents the combined individual attributes of the property and what customers are willing to pay for the package of attributes. 2.2.2. Hedonic Function Specifications To understand the hedonic price model, it is necessary to understand an assumption of the model. The hedonic price model assumes that the value of heterogeneous goods is determined by a variety of the attributes contained in the goods (Rosen, 1974). In this context, the characteristics of goods can be regarded as the components of goods that provide utility to human beings. Buying a heterogeneous good is like buying a bundle of characteristics in a given good. This means the price is determined by the quantity and quality of the attributes in the goods (Triplett, 1987) and thus the price of the attributes are called the hedonic price or the implicit price due to the invisible value of the explicit price. As customers do not purchase each attribute individually but purchase the bundle of the package, the implicit price of each value in the goods cannot be visible. A regression model can estimate the hedonic price of the goods and the function can be described as follows (Xiao, 2017). P=h(S, N, L) In this equation, P is the price of goods, and each attribute is described by S, N, and L. The h( ) is a hedonic function in the form of a regression equation. When individual attributes are regressed to the price of the good, the coefficient of each characteristic is estimated, which is the characteristic price. 33 In general, the hedonic function is a linear, semi-log, or dual log function. The linear function assumes that the independent variable and the dependent variable have the linear relationship, as with the following expression. In this case, there is an advantage, as the interpretation of the estimation result is relatively simple and easy. However, when the quantity of the property increases, it may not be realistic to view the price of the property changing at the same magnification. where The semi-log function is a natural logarithm of the dependent variable. This function appears to be a linear function, but it is actually a non-linear function similar to the second function below. In this case, the interpretation of the estimated results is simple and convenient because it demonstrates an approximate percentage change of the sales price. Malpezzi (2003) suggested five advantages of semi-log functions (Malpezzi, 2003). Triplett (1987) also reveals that semi-log functions are mostly used in hedonic price studies. However, they cannot be realistic because the sales price fluctuates geometrically when the quantity of each property fluctuates by the one-unit change. Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) proposed a more accurate rate of change in the price. In their semi-logistic model, the exact rate of change is e-1. where The dual log function uses the logarithms of both the dependent and independent variables. DiPasquale and Wheaton (1996) argued that the dual log function is more realistic than the linear function as the dual log function can reflect 34 the rule of diminishing returns of utility between property attributes and the sales price (DiPasquale, 1996). With the dual logarithmic function, the estimated coefficient indicates the elasticity of the price with the characteristic variable. However, it is difficult to deal with dummy variables with this function as they can only be 0 or 1 and log 0 cannot be defined. Other options include using 1 and 2 as dummy variable inputs or using no logarithm for the dummy variables. where There is also a more flexible form of the function, the transcendental algebraic function (Capozza, Green, & Hendershott, 1996). The Box-Cox function is also used in hedonic price studies (Halvorsen & Pollakowski, 1981). The model first determines the transformation from the data itself, and then a specific form of the regression model is used for the results. For instance, in this equation, if θ and λ k are equal to 1, it will be a basic linear function. If θ and λk are equal to 0, it will be a log-linear function. If θ is equal to 0 and λk to 1, it will be a semi-log function. However, Cassel and Mendelsohn (1985) argued that this model has an inconsistent mechanism for the transformation, because of 1) the lower accuracy of each coefficient from the numerous coefficients generated from the model, 2) the inappropriate estimation when negative numbers are included, 3) the invalid prediction possibilities because of the unequal feature of the means of untransformed dependent variables and the estimated samples, and 4) the complicated calculation of slopes and elasticities for the non-linear transformation (Cassel & Mendelsohn, 1985). 35 where These kinds of hedonic price modeling functions can be applied by finding the best performance with the dataset and its conditions. There are no strict rules for selecting the forms, and it is recommended to try more than one form to get the best results. Normally, in hedonic studies, the semi-log form is most widely used since the proportionate change of property price can be easily differentiated from the change of individual attributes of the property with its coefficient. In addition, the semi-log function can easily handle dummy variables (0 or 1), which are a predicament of the log-log form. 2.2.3. Attributes of Properties There are numerous empirical studies proving that the hypothesis and the attributes can be categorized into three groups: housing structure, community, and locational attributes. Housing structure describes the physical characteristics and conditions of housing and land. Specific attributes are lot size, unit size, building age, garage, swimming pool, fireplaces, air conditioning, and number of bedrooms and bathrooms (Kain & Quigley, 1970; Sirmans, MacDonald, Macpherson, & Zietz, 2006). The importance of structural attributes can change over time and vary among countries in accordance with culture, tradition, and local climate but the attributes of room number and housing unit size are relatively critical in most nations (Kohlhase, 1991). Community attributes indicate the quality of socioeconomic and environmental characteristics in the neighborhoods. Education is the most influential factor in housing choice decisions. Kilpatrick and Hefner (1998) found an association between school quality and housing price (Kilpatrick & Hefner, 1998). In particular, Gibbons and Machin (2003) highlighted the influence of primary school quality on prices (Gibbons & Machin, 2003). The socioeconomic characteristics of the community population are also significant, such as high-income neighborhoods and the presence of western (as opposed to non-western) residents, as these lead to a 36 presumption of better community quality and amenities (Visser, Van Dam, & Hooimeijer, 2008). Baumont and Legros (2009) investigated the metropolitan districts of Paris and housing prices and found that neighborhood renewal plans and policies can influence housing prices (Baumont & Legros, 2009). In addition, the environmental externalities of neighborhoods can be critical for housing choice and price (Anderson Jr & Crocker, 1971; Murdoch & Thayer, 1988; Wilman & Krutilla, 1981). Aircraft and transportation noise were negative determinants for housing prices (Bateman, Day, Lake, & Lovett, 2001; Day, Bateman, & Lake, 2007; Nelson, 1982; Schipper, Nijkamp, & Rietveld, 1998) while air and water quality were similarly influential (Graves, Murdoch, Thayer, & Waldman, 1988; Michael, Boyle, & Bouchard, 1996; Smith & Huang, 1995; Steinnes, 1992). On the other hand, public open spaces and urban parks increased the value of community environments with more fresh air, recreational facilities, and aesthetic enhancement (Anderson & West, 2006; Lutzenhiser & Netusil, 2001; Nowak & McPherson, 1993; Tyrväinen, 1997). Locational attributes consist of accessibility and proximity to major public facilities and places, such as downtown areas, shopping malls, transportation stations, main roads, highways, and schools (Hanushek & Yilmaz, 2010; Heikkila et al., 1989; Henneberry, 1998; Landau, Prashker, & Hirsh, 1981). The distance to central business districts (CBDs) has been critical for housing choice and prices with the "access/space trade-off" model (Evans, 1985; Hanushek & Yilmaz, 2007) depicting a trade-off between the reduced land cost of suburban areas and the increasing commuting cost of travel and transportation to CBDs. Hwang and Thill (2011) found an association between job accessibility and housing price by measurement of traveltime-based job accessibility in Seattle (Hwang & Thill, 2009). There have been, however, contradictory debates regarding the model due to the assumption limitation, such as monocentric urban structures, the isotropic condition of terrain, and perfect competition markets (Boarnet, 1994; Heikkila et al., 1989; McMillen, 2003). For other attributes, Bowes and Ihlanfeldt (2001) found proximity to railway stations significant for housing prices due to lower costs and better convenience for commuting (Bowes & Ihlanfeldt, 2001), while Debrezion et al. (2011) further developed the impact of the railway network on house prices (Debrezion, Pels, & Rietveld, 2011). Munoz-Raskin (2010) examined the positive significance of proximity to bus rapid transit (BRT) networks for property values (Munoz-Raskin, 2010). There is also a study that shows the significance of spatial accessibility to retail and commercial centers for housing values (Song & Sohn, 2007). As previously noted for community attributes, proximity to urban parks, public open spaces, and education facilities is also critical for increasing prices. 37 Figure 15. Map of Price Determinants and References 38 2.2.4. Literature Review of Developing Countries 2.2.4.1. Price Determinants of Housing in Southeast Asia and China Previous studies on the price determinants of apartments in Southeast Asian countries and China have delivered significant implications for the study of Vietnamese housing. There are several developing countries with similar climate conditions, ongoing rapid urbanization, and dynamic housing development. Chinese cases are also similar to those in Vietnam in terms of transitional economic reform in the context of a socialistic regime. An et al. (2014) studied the price determinants of 171 high-end apartments in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The positive pricing factors were a parking allowance for two cars, being a free holder of land, and location in the downtown district. Locational attributes were also highlighted, such as proximity to a subway station and international schools. The variables of high-rise towers, population density, a swimming pool, or proximity to shopping malls had no influence on price (An, Kim, Choi, & Shin, 2015). Lee and Chung (2010) investigated the sales prices and attributes of nine highend apartments in the Philippines using the hedonic price model. Most positive pricing factors observed were for housing attributes, such as unit area, housing brand, total floors, building age, and penthouse. However, high-rise tower, view, adjacency to main roads, total units, and open spaces had no influence on price (Lee & Chung, 2011). In China, Xiao et al. (2017) examined the price determinants of 6,959 housing properties within the five ring roads of Beijing, where most urban functions are included with housing. They grouped the attributes based on structural, locational, and environmental characteristics and analyzed them using the hedonic price model with eigenvector spatial filtering. Housing attributes that were positive pricing factors were unit size, bedrooms, living room, orientation for natural light, and building age. The locational attributes sector included proximity to local centers and location in inner city districts, which minimize travel time. Proximity to public amenities (convenient stores, metro station, parking lots, primary schools, shopping malls, and gyms) were also interrelated with price determinants. In the environmental section, air quality was significantly critical for price (Xiao et al., 2017) Wen et al. (2005) analyzed 2,473 housing samples of 290 housing communities in Hangzhou City in China. Housing attributes that were factors in pricing were related to floor area, number of storeys, garage, attic, and interior design. They also found environmental quality and community management to be important in the 39 community sector. In the locational sector, the analysis showed the important factors were proximity to the university, entertainment facilities, CBD, and West Lake, as well as traffic conditions indicated by the total number of the bus routes within walking distance (500m) (Wen, Jia, & Guo, 2005). 2.2.4.2. Price Determinants of Housing in Vietnam While housing price determinants in other countries have been intensively studied and analyzed, a few studies of housing price determinants in Vietnam are available. Chung et al. (2014) analyzed 640 samples of 197 HCMC apartment projects using the hedonic regression model and found pricing factors for three groups: whole city, downtown, and the new town district (Phu My Hung city). The result was that positive pricing factors for the whole city were land price, foreign developer's project, swimming pools, and proximity to international schools, parks, new town, and downtown. The negatively significant factors were the age of the buildings and distance to downtown. In the case of downtown apartments, the positive factors were the total number of apartment units in a project, unit area, swimming pools, and unit access structure (vertical shared access), and the negatively significant factors were ward population density and land prices. For the new town apartments, positive factors were land prices, ward population density, and the proximity of parks and international schools. This study found similarities and differences between apartment price determinants among downtown, the new town, and the rest of the city. (Chung, Kim, & Cho, 2014) Huynh's study (2015) analyzed the determinants of the apartment prices of the new town, Phu My Hung city and its surrounding areas, in HCMC. Twenty apartment projects with 263 units in the new town and 16 apartment projects with 172 units outside were analyzed by the hedonic regression model. It was found that the positive factors were apartment project land size, housing unit size, and apartment grade. The negatively significant determinants were building age, floor area ratio (FAR), and distance to downtown (Huynh, 2015). Jung et al. (2013) analyzed the development patterns of foreign and local developers' apartment projects through the factor analysis and logistic regression model. An investigation of 139 foreign and local projects in HCMC found that numerous foreign apartment projects were developed in suburban areas because land prices were relatively cheaper and legal licensing for housing development was easier than in downtown areas. The influential independent variables for the foreign developments were accessibility to downtown, higher sale prices, various public community amenities and their proximity to housing, potential population growth 40 with job opportunities, larger apartment units, and proximity to rivers (Jung, Huynh, & Rowe, 2013). Kato and Nguyen analyzed 1,542 housing properties from 10 districts and 394 streets in Hanoi using the hedonic model. The results highlighted that adjacency to streets was a significant pricing factor in locational attributes. Proximity to parks, schools, and hospitals was not significant since they considered quality of services rather than distance to the services. In the community sector, sufficient road area and water supply were significant for price, while the variables of safety, food, and air quality did not impact price (Kato & Nguyen, 2010). Therefore, according to the literature, the price determinants of housing in Vietnam can be summarized and compared with other countries as follows: housing attributes, community attributes, and locational attributes (Table 3). Each category includes some unconventional determinants reflecting the transitional contexts of Vietnam. As foreign investment inflows into Vietnamese housing development with more professional designs and construction management skills, "Foreign development" in the housing category affects the housing prices of the local market. "Water supply," "Adjacency to main road," and "Road area" can be understood together with the inferior infrastructure conditions that are the negative externalities of urbanization in Vietnam. "Proximity to new town" indicates an interrelation with the local suburban township developments. Table 3. Price Determinants of Housing Categories Studies for Cities Worldwide Studies for Cities in Vietnam Housing Attributes Land size / Unit size / Building age / Number of bedroom and bathroom / Garage / Swimming pool / Fireplace / Air conditioning / Parking facility / Housing brand / Total floors / Penthouse / Orientation to natural light / Interior design Project land size / Unit size / Apartment grade / Building age / Foreign development / Unit access structure / Natural ventilation / Building density / Water supply / Total floors Community Attributes Ethnicity / Income level / Redevelopment policy / Transportation and aircraft noise / Water quality / Pool / Community management Swimming pool / Neighborhood population density / Road area / Mixed-use development / Land price / Community density Locational Attributes Proximity to downtown, local center, transportation station, shopping mall, main road and highway, coast, public open space, school, convenient store, Adjacency to main road / Proximity to downtown, new town, shopping mall, river, work place, international school Notes: The source of the "Studies for Cities Worldwide" section of this table is the literature review of "Chapter 2.2.3. Attributes of Housing," and "Chapter 2.2.4.1. Determinants of Housing in Southeast Asia and China." The source of the "Studies for Cities in Vietnam" section is the literature review of "Chapter 2.2.4.2. Price Determinants of Housing in Vietnam." 41 Chapter 3 Urbanization and Housing Development in Vietnam 3. Urbanization and Housing Development in Vietnam 3.1. Socio-Economic Change 3.1.1. Doi Moi Economic Reform Vietnam has registered dynamic national growth following the introduction of the Doi Moi (Đổi Mới: open door) economic reform policy of 1986. This was launched at the Sixth Party Congress following fierce debate among the politicians of the Party. From the Vietnam War (1955–1975) until 1986, the ruling socialist regime had adopted a traditional socialist economic model. The government-led economic system was enforced with strict regulations to control industries and markets of labor, housing, land, and other areas. It did not allow private sector development in the country. However, the socialist model led to considerably inefficient industrial productivity and outcomes, and the economic situation worsened in that period. Annual inflation rates were more than 700%, and the value of exports was lower than imports. Large amounts of the national budget went into military expenditures and loss-making state enterprises. There was very little foreign investment or foreigners in the market, and few diplomats and aid workers in the country (Van Arkadie & Mallon, 2004). In this context, the Doi Moi economic reform process began in Vietnam and moved away from the government-led economic structure by opening up the local markets. The economic renovation attracted foreign investment and promoted overseas businesses to promote economic growth. The policy goal was to create a socialist-oriented market economy and to accelerate the economic transition to industrial manufacturing, creating employment opportunities and economic output (Beresford, 2008). The key principles of the policy can be summarized by the 42 following: 1) the establishment of a decentralized economic system encouraging business autonomy, 2) the development of a market-oriented monetary system, 3) the development of an agricultural system allowing both individual and group production and economic activities in the market, and 4) the expansion of trade and foreign investment relations. With these objectives, Vietnam has achieved the reduction of macroeconomic instabilities and the acceleration of economic growth. 3.1.2. Economic Growth After the Doi Moi economic reform, there was a transition from a centrally planned economy based on a socialist model to a market-oriented economy based on a liberal model. The shift had a significant impact as a result of the emergence of liberal market mechanisms with the opening up of FDI (Nguyen, Samsura, van der Krabben, & Le, 2016). With the inception of Doi Moi, an increase in international trade and a large FDI inflow was possible due to Vietnam's geographic advantages as an export platform to the EU and USA markets, a stable economic and political environment, an abundance of well-educated young workers, richness of natural resources, a growing domestic market, and government commitment to economic reform (Nguyen & Nguyen, 2007). Despite its short FDI history, Vietnam is now ranked as having the third-largest FDI inflow in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Registered capital and licensed projects rapidly increased, peaking in 2007. FDI contributed 25% of total investment and 20.1% of GDP in 2015. Figure 16. FDI Growth in Vietnam Data: General Statistics Office of Vietnam 43 Accordingly, the gross domestic product (GDP) of Vietnam has increased remarkably, and the annual growth rate of GDP has remained at 6–8% (Figure 17). In 2005, it peaked at 8.4%, which was the second highest growth rate in Asia, just behind China. Figure 17. GDP Growth in Vietnam 3.1.3. Rapid Urbanization and Housing Shortages There has been a dynamic movement of households in Vietnam, preceded by economic growth during the last several decades. The population was approximately 68 million in 1990 and reached 95 million in 2017. The urban population as a percentage of the national population also increased from 20.5% to 34.7% as a result of an influx of migrants (UN Habitat, 2014). Table 4. Population Change in Vietnam Year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2016 Vietnam 71,996 77,631 82,392 (1.17%) 86,947 (1.07%) 92,695 (1.07%) Ha Noi 2,431 2,768 3,133 (2.02%) 6,634 (2.05%) 7,328 (1.74%) Ho Chi Minh City 4,640 5,275 6,231 (3.71%) 7,347 (2.09%) 8,298 (2.09%) Notes: Population growth rates of the year in parenthesis. / Population number unit: thousand Data: General Statistics Office of Vietnam Data: General Statistics Office of Vietnam 44 Figure 18. Urban Population in Vietnam FDI has been a central driver of export-oriented industrialization, particularly for manufacturing and processing industries in Vietnam (Figure 19), with 57.7% of FDI capital invested in fields requiring significant numbers of manufacturing workers. Thus, the labor market has dramatically surged around the emerging industrial zones in HCMC and Hanoi, which served as large magnets that induced people to migrate from rural areas. For instance, HCMC's population increased from 3.92 million in 1988 to 6.25 million in 2005 and approximately 1.9 million of these were migrants to the city. District 12, Thu Duc, and Binh Tan in HCMC, in particular, registered the highest rates of population growth (respectively, +77%, +64%, and +58%) from 1999 to 2005 (GSOV, 2010; Waibel et al., 2007). Over 70% of the migrants of Hanoi and HCMC were between the ages of 15 and 30 (Figure 20). Figure 19. Accumulated FDI Inflows by Sectors 2016 in Vietnam Data: General Statistics Office of Vietnam Data: General Statistics Office of Vietnam 45 Figure 20. Rural-urban Migration in Hanoi and HCMC However, the great influx of in-migrants into the cities led to serious housing shortages and widespread temporary settlements. The housing ownership rate of the migrants was only 8.7% in 2010, and more than 90% of the migrants remained in rented housing and temporary shelters along canals or on agricultural land with relatives (World Bank, 2015). Urban settlement areas expanded horizontally to include the suburban districts on the periphery, which more than doubled over the last 20 years. Most of the development was uncontrolled urban sprawl, and the districts were filled with temporary housing for temporary residents and workers. Table 5 illustrates the major cities that are experiencing ongoing urbanization with huge in-migrations, and this indicates low rates of permanent housing and much higher portions of semi-permanent and temporary housing. 72.5% of HCMC housing and 85.3% of Binh Duong are not permanent housing constructed on durable foundations or with permanent materials such as concrete or brick. This data substantially reflects the housing shortages of the urbanized cities. Table 5. Official Categories by Housing Type in Vietnam 2016 Major Cities Permanent house (%) Semi-Permanent house (%) Temporary House (%) Total (%) Vietnam 52.3 42.5 5.2 100 Ha Noi 91.8 8.1 0.1 100 HCMC 27.5 71.8 0.7 100 Danang 43.7 56.1 0.2 100 Binh Duong 14.7 84.9 0.4 100 Data: General Statistics Office of Vietnam Data: General Statistics Office of Vietnam 46 3.1.4. Institutional Changes in Land and Housing Policies Since the Vietnamese economic reform of 1986, the political economy has significantly influenced land legislation and housing policy, which were the platforms for real estate development by the private sector. The period of post-Doi Moi can be divided into three phases. The first phase (1986–1994) was the period of the "entrepreneurial policy-maker" (Vuong, 2014). In 1987, the government initiated the Foreign Investment Law enabling the inflow of FDI into Vietnam, and by 1994 it constituted 10% of the GDP (Cira, 2011). The Land Law was also initiated to allow farmers to secure land use rights (LUR) for agricultural utilization on their allocated land. In 1993, the Land Law was revised to enable the right to transfer, lease, inherit, and mortgage land (Thu & Perera, 2011). In 1990, the Private Enterprise Law and the Corporate Law were established to develop a platform for the dynamic growth of the private sector. By 1994, more than 17,400 private companies had launched in Vietnam (Vuong, 2014). The second phase (1995–1999) was a period of economic integration of the market economy.7 The annual GDP growth rate of Vietnam peaked at 9.5% and 9.3% in 1995 and 1996, respectively. In 1995, to deepen the foundation of the market economy, the Civil Code was enacted to legally protect industrial properties and activities. In addition, more policies and laws were established to consolidate the market economy such as the Foreign Investment Law (1996), the Credit Institutions Law (1997), the Value Added Tax Law (1997), and the Corporate Income Tax (1997) (Vuong, 2014). The third phase (2000–present) has been a period of economic prosperity and globalization.8 During this period, the average GDP growth rate was 7.5%, and the country was labeled the economic "little tiger" of Southeast Asia; in 2006, it ranked 7 With the normalization of political and trade relations with the United States (the US-Vietnam bilateral trading agreement) during this period, Vietnam could promote political and economic stability by integrating with the global developed market and multi-lateral donors. In 1996, over USD 10 billion of FDI flowed into the country alongside billions of Official Development Assistance (ODA) from the World Bank and the ADB. (Vuong, 2014). 8 The government continued to spur national economic growth within the global market under the support of the US-Vietnam BTA that enabled Vietnam to enter the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2006. This attracted more global investors who considered the country a safe destination for FDI. The financial markets and GDP quickly expanded with low inflation, a faster pace of privatization of SOEs, and the emergence of the stock market (2000). However, the economic boom of the last two decades was not sustained in the late 2000s due to unstable macroeconomics producing higher rates of inflation, budget deficiencies, mismanagement of financial policies, and inefficiencies and corruption within the state-run conglomerates. Unstable situations led to the collapse of the stock, money, and real estate markets after the critical impact of the global financial crisis in 2008. However, the government strived to prevent the sharp economic downturn by implementing monetary policies such as a stimulus package of USD 6 billion to subsidize loan interest payments, to ease the financial difficulties of companies, and to create more jobs and domestic consumption. Despite the tough experiences of this market mechanism, the Vietnamese economy has further opened to the world (Vuong, 2014) 47 58th in the world economy. In this context, the Land Law Act was revised in 2003, and this became a major instrument for the growth of the real estate market. The revisions to this law introduced land use right certificates (LURCs) for the transfer, leasing, inheritance, and mortgaging of land and allocated land for housing development by local and foreign developers. When the government revised the Land Law in 2013, and the Housing Law and Real Estate Business Law in 2015, the real estate market was in the spotlight again, as foreign organizations and individuals could secure property ownership via sales, transfers, leases, inheritance, and mortgages (Thu & Perera, 2011). In particular, the two largest cities, Hanoi and HCMC, have been the focus of the property market due to their rapid economic growth, ongoing infrastructure development, supportive government policies, and low entry costs in recent years. Table 6 illustrates the details of the institutional reforms in land and housing policies. Table 6. Institutional Changes in Land and Housing Policies Year Reform Measures 1975– 1986 [Socialist Regime] State-run, collective, and subsidized economy / Strict regulation of pricing and interest rates / Housing market frozen by the government / New housing delivered by public authorities / Isolated from the global economy 1986 [Doi Moi Reform] Shifted to market-oriented economy / Multi-sector and reformed economy / Price deregulation / Increased external economic relations 1987 [Land Law 1987] Owned by the people, managed by the state / Land Use Right Certificates (LURCs) transferred only through public systems / Transactions between individuals prohibited 1993 [Land Law 1993] The state determines the value of land privately owned / LURCs for transfer, leasing, inheritance, and mortgaging of land / Public land allocation only for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) / Land titling program for agricultural land / Land allocated > 3ha, PM decides on leased land for foreign enterprises (FEs) * Removal of housing subsidies; lease price and housing support in wages established / State-owned houses sold to existing tenants / Ban on land transactions affects trading of houses on state-owned land plots 1994 1994 Decree 60 Building ownership and land use right certificates (BOLURCs) system established, providing combined legal title 48 2003 Land Law 2003 Land owned by people represented by the State / LURCs: transformation, transfer, lease, inheritance and mortgage rights, main instrument of real estate market / Land allocated for domestic enterprises (DEs) and leased for FEs decided by the Provincial Governments / DEs, and FEs allowed with residential projects 2005– 2015 2005 Housing Law Provided a legal framework for housing development, commercial houses, selfbuilt houses, public service houses, and social houses * 2009 – Mechanisms to promote student and worker housing / 2010 – Guidelines for housing development projects (condos and social housing) / 2013 – Migrant housing development investments in urban areas and resettlement housing, social housing / Provisions for inclusionary zoning of social housing in commercial projects 2015 Housing Law Provisions for social housing, foreign ownership, housing transactions, housing data and information systems Source: Thu & Perera, 2011; World Bank, 2015 49 3.2. Housing Development in Vietnam The Vietnamese urban population has rapidly increased to 35 million, and the expected population in 2020 is 44 million. The urbanization rate is still low (38%) but the growth rate is escalating remarkably, and it is predicted to be 44% in 2020. As the number of households in a residence has decreased, and the average residential area per capita has increased, the demand for housing and residential land has steeply increased. Table 7 illustrates the urbanization factors and residential issues of Vietnam. With the acceleration of urbanization alongside increasing nuclear family formation, the demand for housing and land for residential development is escalating. Table 7. Vietnam City and Housing Index (2009–2020) Index Unit Year 2009 2015 2020 Urban population Million 25.43 35 44 Urbanization rate % 29.63 38 45 Average number of households 3.7 3.4 3.2 Average dwelling area m2 / per capita 19.2 26 29 Housing demand Million 6.76 10.2 13.5 Residential land demand Million m2 476 905 1260 Data: General Statistics Office of Vietnam / Source: UN Habitat, 2014 3.2.1. Classification of Housing Typology 3.2.1.1. Official Categories from the Vietnamese Housing Census As Vietnam's main cities have been experiencing the critical issue of housing shortages, a variety of housing types have emerged and evolved both in formal and informal ways. The government officially categorizes these types into permanent, semi-permanent, and temporary (simple) housing based on construction quality. Permanent housing has a durable foundation and a structure made of permanent materials such as concrete or brick. Semi-permanent housing uses durable construction materials for the foundation and has a permanent structure, but the finishing materials on walls and roofs consist of unsubstantial and temporary attachments. Temporary houses are built from scavenged and impermanent materials such as corrugated iron, wood, and pieces of cardboard, and they are based on unstable foundations and structures (GSOV, 2010). 50 3.2.1.2. Housing Typology by Other Sectors The World Bank survey characterizes the housing types in detail by architectural form, structure, and location within the permanent, semi-permanent, and temporary groups (Table 8). Table 8. World Bank Categories for Vietnam Housing (2016) Vietnam Official Classification Permanent House Semi-Permanent House Temporary House World Bank Classification Tube house Alley house Apartment Villa Alley house Small single-story Rural old house Squatter house Source: World Bank, 2015 Permanent housing consists of tube houses, alley houses, apartments, and villas. Table 9 illustrates the characteristics of the different types of permanent housing. Table 9. Permanent Housing in Vietnam Types Characteristics of the Permanent Housing Type Tube house (Figure 21) Narrow and long plots / typical plot size is 4 x 25 meters / 100% plot coverage / normally 3–5 floors / typically a commercial ground floor Alley house (Figure 21) Tube house typology / smaller and located in small alleys / 100% plot coverage / more than 50% of the total permanent construction Apartment (Figure 22) Type 1: Older social or collective housing built between the 1960s and the mid-1980s with funding from the Soviet Union / Mostly in the North and in poor condition / ground floor, plus 7 stories (G+7) Type 2: New high-quality blocks built by developers / Average G+18 Type 3: New resettlement housing and social housing / Typically G+5 to G+12 Villa (Figure 23) Type 1: Older colonial style villas built during the French era / Typically contain gardens or grounds / Refurbished for rental Type 2: New luxury villas / built by individuals and large housing projects built by developers Source: World Bank, 2015 51 Figure 21. Tube House(left) and Alley House(right) Figure 22. Apartment Type 1(left) and Type 2(right) Figure 23. Villa Type 1(left) and Type 2(right) Semi-permanent housing mainly consists of alley houses and small single-story houses. While both are similar in architectural form, they are differentiated by scale and location (Table 10). 52 Table 10. Semi-permanent Housing in Vietnam Types Characteristics of the Semi-Permanent Housing Type Alley house (Figure 24) A precursor to the permanent alley house constructions / Located within deeper alleys / Average plot size of 3 x 20m / Poor construction quality / Typically G+1/ old and in need of an upgrade Small single-story (Figure 24) Average size of 3 x 20m / New informal buildings with single rooms / Typically for rent and located in urban fringe areas Source: World Bank, 2015 Figure 24. Alley House(left) and Small Single-story(right) Temporary housing is made up of two types: old rural houses and squatter houses. They are mainly categorized by their location, as the former are normally situated around urban fringe areas, while the latter are normally situated on urban canal banks or in industrial districts and referred to as squatter housing (Table 11). Table 11. Temporary Housing in Vietnam Types Characteristics of the Temporary Housing Type Rural old house (Figure 25) Older rural houses located in urbanized villages in urban fringe areas Squatter house (Figure 25) Precarious squatter housing located on undesirable and nonresidential areas, such as canals, roadsides, unused industrial areas, or open-air market spaces Source: World Bank, 2015 53 Figure 25. Rural Old House(left) and Squatter House(right) Another World Bank publication provided five categories of housing typology: temporary shelters, old townhouses, new townhouses, apartments, and villas (Cira, 2011). UN Habitat also categorizes Vietnamese urban housing as shophouses, apartments, villas, alley houses, and precarious squatter housing by a functional classification (UN Habitat, 2014). 3.2.1.3. Housing Typology in This Study In this study, housing types were categorized into squatters, row houses, villas, and apartments for survey and analysis (Table 12). The official Census of Vietnam categorizes the typology into permanent, semi-permanent, and temporary housing based on ho using quality and materials (GSOV, 2010). However, this imposes limitations on the understanding of the diverse urban housing situation necessary to investigate residential mobility and housing choices for this study. In the World Bank and UN Habitat housing categories, there is no misconception of the terms "apartment" and "villa," and they can be clearly categorized. Temporary houses are also labeled as squatter houses. However, shop houses, alley houses, townhouses, and tube houses are structurally comparable, as they all have similar narrow and long plot sizes, nearly 100% plot coverage, and an average of two to four floors. These properties also typically belong in the singlefamily ownership category. This study combined these types into the row house category (commonly called "nhà ống" in Vietnamese). Therefore, in the survey, residential housing was classified into four types: squatter housing, row houses, villas, and apartments. 54 Table 12. Classification of Housing Types for This Study This Study Squatter Row house Apartment Villa World Bank 1 Rural old house Squatter house Alley house Tube house Small single story Apartment Old villa New villa World Bank 2 Temporary shelters Old townhouse New townhouse Apartment Villa UN Habitat Precarious squatter Shop house Alley house Apartment Villa Source: Cira, 2011; UN Habitat, 2014; World Bank, 2015 3.2.2. Slum Upgrading Programs The UN Habitat estimates that approximately 9 million population, which is almost 10% of total population, are living in slum areas of Vietnam9 (Vietnam News, 2009). The Vietnamese government has recently attempted to improve the residential environment in the slums. In June 2009, the government announced the first comprehensive urban improvement policy called The National Urban Upgrading Program (NUUP) for the Period of 2009-2020 to enhance the urban environment (Vietnam News, 2009). This policy is a step forward for infrastructure improvement projects such as water quality improvement, the installation of sanitation networking, and waste treatment facilities that have been prioritized in the slums. In addition, the policy supports the relocation of temporary and dilapidated houses into new social apartments or to new lands of "site and services" to improve the residential environment. The mortgage programs are also arranged to provide financial support for the relocation of residents. The first pilot projects were launched in Hanoi, Hi-Pong, Ho Chi Minh City, and Can Tho City. Out of the WorldBank's budget of $418 million, 80% of the budget focused on water quality enhancement in the canals, installation of a water supply system, and the development of a flood management system; in addition, 15% was allocated to the construction of relocation apartments and related infrastructure, the upgrading of semi-permanent houses, and financial mortgage programs to help resettle the lowincome residents of the slums (World Bank, 2016). 9 The UN Habitat evaluates a slum according to the following standards: 1) access to sufficient improved water for family use and drinking at an affordable price, 2) access to improved sanitation such as a private or reasonable public toilet for community sharing, 3) sufficient living space for a maximum of 3 persons per room (minimum area of 10m2), 4) structural durability of housing to protect dwellers from climate conditions and non-hazardous location, 5) security of tenure of housing and land, which is a right to prevent forced evictions (Moreno & Warah, 2006) . 55 Vietnam has forcibly proceeded most slum redevelopment, focusing on the overall renewal of the sites, without consideration of slum resident's living conditions, relocation willingness and preferences. The top-down implementation of the government's policies caused frequent delay of the projects and even casualties during execution of the site clearance due to severe conflicts with the settlers (VBN, 2010). Evicted residents have moved to create another slum or relocated into other slums and these migration patterns have redundantly cycled with degrading urban environment (Waibel et al., 2007). 3.2.3. Self-Built Housing Vietnam can be called a country of self-built housing. As commercial housing development was not legally permitted before, both households and informal microdevelopers have produced most of the housing. This was the most common way to supply housing in the country. Since 1975, the government produced only 5% of total formal housing stocks until 1994 and the other 95% was self-built housing. Then, the state stepped away from housing development when LUR and commercial land markets emerged after the initiation of the Doi Moi economic reform. However, self-built housing has always dominated the housing sector and even today the majority of houses are still self-built (World Bank, 2015) (Table 13). Table 13. Self-built Housing Production over Time in Vietnam Year State-Driven Commercial Self-Built 1994 5.00% 95.00% 1998 10.19% 89.81% 2008 19.57% 80.43% 2014 9.79% 15.15% 75.07% Source: World Bank, 2015 Since the Doi Moi reforms, housing sectors have experienced tremendous growth, particularly in the high-end sectors, in terms of both supply and demand. Eighteen percent of FDI has been invested in real estate development, with the majority flowing to luxury housing developments (GSOV, 2010). As private sectors have led the market-based housing supply system, there were hardly any housing solutions accessible to the lowand middle-income classes. An affordable housing supply was especially critical given the rapid population influx and housing shortages in HCMC and Hanoi. In this period, the government tried to minimize public investment and reduced subsidized housing programs. Not only was the increasing demand for affordable housing far higher than the authorities' housing supply capacity, but the authorities had also shifted their development priority from 56 public housing to industrial development. Instead, they initiated policies to support self-built housing production. The revision of land laws and housing policies served to privatize residential land and encourage its use for self-built row housing (Ha & Wong, 1999). Decree No. 64/2012/ND-CP, indicating exemptions for small-scale building construction permits, shows the government's willingness to support the self-building sectors. As this aspect of the market had rapidly grown, to the extent that entire cities seemed to have been created by micro builders and small-scale developers, it was regarded as the most affordable and accessible housing for lowand middle-income segments (Figure 26). Figure 26. Cityscape with Numerous Self-built Housing in HCMC 3.2.4. Apartment Development The popularity of apartments is associated with urbanization trends and traffic issues in Vietnam. The apartments are the preferred choice of middle-income purchasers, with commuting conditions and transportation being the key factors (Seo & Kwon, 2017). As the economy booms, so does vehicle ownership (Truitt, 2008). Car ownership has increased at over 10% per annum (320% in the period 2005–2014) while there are now more motorbikes (8.5 million) than people (8.2 million) in HCMC (Thanh Nien News, 2016). This overburdening of the city's road capacity has led to massive traffic congestion and declining air quality for commuters. Apartments, therefore, are seen as at least a partial adaptation to this problem. While other forms of housing (e.g., row houses) suffer from urban densification and poor vehicular accessibility, high-rise apartments built with local and foreign investments offer spacious units, open spaces, parking lots for cars and motorbikes, and excellent access to main roads (Chung et al., 2014). 57 In the context of urbanization and dynamic population growth, there has been an enormous demand for apartments particularly in the urban employment hubs of Hanoi and HCMC. In recent years, the apartment market continued to grow and performed well in both cities; approximately 70,000 units were supplied each year, and the growth rate of the market is predicted to increase further (CBRE, 2018). Vertical urbanism is transforming residential culture, and the landscapes of the cities and new towns are now filled with numerous apartments and commercial clusters, such as Vinhhomes Time City in Hanoi and Phu My Hung in HCMC. These will become more populated in the future (Figure 27) Figure 27. Apartment Supply in HCMC(left) and Hanoi(right) Compared to other cities of Southeast Asian developing countries, Vietnamese apartments are less expensive in all segments apart from luxury apartments in HCMC (Figure 28). Figure 28. Apartment Prices in Southeast Asian Cities Source: CBRE, 2018 Source: VinaCapital, 2015 58 3.3. Urban Growth of Ho Chi Minh City 3.3.1. The Epicenter of Urban Development According to Vietnam's regional and urban administration hierarchy system, Vietnam's cities are categorized into 6 classes based on the level of economic development, physical development, population and its density, and infrastructure provision. HCMC was classified as one of the two national "special" cities, a top ranking, due to its significant economic and political contributions to the country (Cira, 2011). Table 14 illustrates the competitiveness of economic development in HCMC. This city comprises 9.2% of Vietnam's total population and is responsible for 20.8% of its GDP. As 155 times more FDI has flowed into this city than other provinces of the Northwest area, this remarkable economic growth has created a large amount of residential mobility of rural residents looking for better job opportunities (Nguyen & McPeak, 2010). Table 14. Economic Landscape of HCMC (2015) Index Descriptions Population Average annual income/person GDP Growth CPI Industrial zones International airport capacity Registered FDI Total transaction value in stock market (HOSE) 8.22 million USD 5,500 9.85% (YoY) 0.23% (YoY) 18 zones 25 million people/year USD 3.64 billion USD 21.6 billion Source: EZLand, 2016 In this context, HCMC has experienced the highest levels of urbanization and industrialization, population growth, and housing development. This trend is also found in other cities. As most cities want to climb the city class ladder to receive better recognition and financial support from the central government, they are pursuing growth patterns similar to those of HCMC. As a result, the city is considered a significant reference as a development model in Vietnam. The acceleration of HCMC's urbanization created physical expansion of the built environment (Figure 29) or "peri-urbanism," a form of urbanization characterized by a fragmented and quick urban sprawl to peripheral areas. A study revealed that from 1990 to 2012, 660.2 km2 of agricultural land in the HCMC area was converted to urban land use while 3.5 million people migrated into the area. A 59 third of all urban development and 50% of population expansion was concentrated in the inner boundary, 40 km from downtown HCMC (Kontgis et al., 2014). Figure 29. Expansion of Built-up Area in HCMC; 1989(left) and 2015(right) This peri-urban expansion has led to several distinctive patterns of housing development in HCMC. The first is the formation of widespread slum settlements in the city. The second is the predominant production of self-built row houses. The third is corporate-driven housing developments of multiple residential types such as apartments, row houses, and villas (Figure 30). Figure 30. Housing Development in Transitional Vietnam Source: AUE, 2018 60 3.3.2. Population Growth and Housing Shortages HCMC is the most attractive city in Vietnam for in-migrants seeking higher expected incomes with better job opportunities, and the city has become the largest economic center and financial hub in the country (Table 15). Subsequently, inmigration rates are the highest in Vietnam, whereas the rapid population shift has caused serious housing shortages in the city. Table 15. Population Change in Vietnam 1995 2000 2005 2010 2016 Vietnam Population 71,996 77,631 82,392 (1.17%) 86,947 (1.07%) 92,695 (1.07%) HCMC Population 4,640 5,275 6,231 (3.71%) 7,347 (2.09%) 8,298 (2.09%) In-migration Rate of HCMC N/A N/A 19.1% 26.2% 10.7% Note: The population growth rate of the year in parenthesis. / Population number unit: thousand Temporary or dilapidated housing constituted two-thirds of Vietnam's urban housing in the 1990s (Vinh & Leaf, 1996). Figure 31 indicates that the rate of permanent housing, which has durable foundations and permanent construction materials, was only about 25% in both 2002 and 2012 in HCMC, the rest being temporary and semi-permanent housing characterized by impermanent structures and temporary finishing materials on walls and roofs. The average housing area per person was only 5 m2 and more than 300,000 citizens lived in 2–3 m2/person during the period. The problems in the housing sectors were exacerbated in both qualitative and quantitative terms. Infrastructure was also inadequate and run down and thus threatened public health, especially in the squatter settlements which were pervasive in the city (UN Habitat, 2014). Figure 31. Housing Stock by Building Quality in Vietnam and HCMC Source: GSOV, 2012 61 Figure 32. Temporary Housing(left), Semi-permanent Housing(middle), Permanent Housing(right) 3.3.3. Widespread Slum Settlements In HCMC, it is estimated that around 25% of the total population is immigrants who have moved from rural areas, and most are living in informal houses that lack structural durability (Waibel et al., 2007). Additionally, more than 2 million of the immigrants are living in boarding houses, which are temporarily constructed with a semi-permanent structure. To save money, many immigrant families are living together as tenants in boarding houses with an average of six people staying in a single room of 8-10m2. Thus, this poor living environment is becoming a critical issue. The 15-30 age group constitutes more than 70% of immigrants, yet only 8.7% own a home; more than 90% have unstable tenure, as they have built temporary, illegal housing in abandoned spaces along the rivers, canals, and farmlands in peripheral areas (UN Habitat, 2014). Varying slum settlement patterns are observed in HCMC in accordance with the urbanization rate of the districts. In urban districts (Districts 4, 6, 8, Binh Thanh, and Go Vap), linear slum communities with high densities are found along waterways, particularly the Kinh Te, Rach Ben, Nghe, and Kinh Doi Canals (Figure 33). Semi-urban districts (Districts 7 and 12) also follow a linear pattern along the waterways, but many of them are not completely linear and are discontinuous; they are fragmented and irregular-shaped clusters with some streets and laneways (Figure 34). In rural districts (Cu Chi, Bình Chánh, Hóc Môn, Nhà Bè, and Cân Gio), the settlements display different patterns than in urban and semi-urban districts: they are more decentralized and fragmented with a number of single detached houses (Figure 34) (UN Habitat, 2008). 62 Figure 33. Slum Settlement Patterns: Urban District Figure 34. Slum Settlement Patterns: Semi-urban(left), Rural(right) In the urban districts of HCMC, slums containing temporary and dilapidated houses have emerged along the Saigon river banks and its branches, encroaching on the water. Since most houses were built from corrugated iron, wood, and pieces of cardboard based on unstable foundations, they are vulnerable to hazardous climate conditions (Figure 35). The slums are frequently flooded in the summer rainy season and the canal water often destroys the banks. Thus, the properties have been damaged and some have even collapsed, causing causalities. As the water rises and falls by the tides and rains, human waste and contaminants in the water gather along the banks of the slums and cause a terrible odor for the dwellers. The situation also threatens public health by leaving layers of mud that breed disease on the canal banks. In addition, the slum districts do not have a secure water supply or sanitation networks from the city since a formal infrastructure system was not established in Source: Google Maps Source: Google Maps 63 the slum areas, making it difficult to have a proper connection to the city's water supply and sewage. The tenure of housing property in the slums is also a critical issue. In cases where informal housing was built on agricultural land in the peripheral area, only 25% of them had acquired land use right (LUR) through the official land use conversion procedure; the rest of did not secure legal titles for their land and housing for proper residential purposes due to a lack of information and financial difficulties (Vinh & Leaf, 1996). Without legal approval documents for the properties, the households were not able to participate in mortgage programs for low-income residents; thus, they were easily targeted for forced eviction and were provided limited compensation during the government-led urban renewal process for the slums (Garschagen, 2015). Figure 35. Temporary and Dilapidated Houses in HCMC The sprawling slum of HCMC presents a huge challenge to the public health. In particular, sewage and toilet waste from slum districts where were built along rivers were poured into the canals without filtration and it caused serious water pollution and filthy conditions. Furthermore, the slum areas near the carnal were recurrently flooded in the rainy season and the informal houses, built with temporary materials, were damaged or even collapsed and the dwellers experienced the loss of life and property (UN Habitat, 2008). HCMC recently announced that it has identified that at least 17,000 households reside in slums and the city has decided the urban renewal procedure for all of the slums within the next five years. In the first phase, the city planned to relocate 11,600 households and improve the water environment along the canals where were most seriously polluted. However, the execution has delayed due to economic difficulties in securing funds since the cost is estimated to be $ 569 million (Thanh Nien News, 2015c). Source: UN Habitat, 2008 64 3.3.4. Predominant Self-Built Row House Development HCMC has experienced particularly rapid horizontal urbanization in the peripheral areas by the conversion of farmland into residential land (Ha & Wong, 1999). However, a lack of property rights management capacity in the local authorities led to chaotic situations. Of the self-built housing units constructed in the peripheral area, 75.4% were built without any complete sets of legal documentation (Vinh & Leaf, 1996). To facilitate the provision of residential land and thereby housing by the provision of legal titles, a new land law was enacted in 1993, creating a legal platform as a foundation for a real estate market where assets could be transacted, rented, transferred, inherited, and mortgaged. Local authorities required those who had been involved in various illegal transactions to submit to a notarization process and issued Land Use Rights Certificates (LURCs) to certify land and Building Ownership and Land Use Rights Certificates (BOLURCS) to certify both the building and the land (Kim, 2004). Thus, the process of creating legal titles resulted in a more transparent land and housing market with huge potential. From the time the land law was enacted, new residential developments gradually tended to appear in the form of projects, particularly in HCMC. The most common housing projects were "site and services" and land subdivision types. These provided only sub-divided plots of land with basic infrastructure for sale and thus the landowners began to create self-built row housing through their own investment based on the government's legal support (Phe, 2002). There were, for instance, 488 residential projects providing 183,410 units and covering an area of 1282.6 ha of the land sub-division type from 1996 to 2000 in HCMC (Vinh & Leaf, 1996). The row houses were largely built from 1999 to 2009 and were estimated to account for about 60% of the total urban housing stock production in that period. High-rise apartment projects by private real estate developers accounted for another 33% (UN Habitat, 2014). This trend continued in the 2000s and the informal "popular row housing" still dominated urban settlement in HCMC (Figure 36). Further laws were enacted, such as the 2005 Investment Law, the 2005 Enterprise Law, the 2006 Real Estate Law, and the 2009 Urban Planning Law. These laws supplied a legal platform to improve the housing market mechanisms. In 2011, the government approved social housing policies to increase the rate of home ownership for the low-income class (UN Habitat, 2014). A recently revised 2015 Housing Law and Real Estate Business Law allowed foreign investors access to the housing market (Savills, 2015a). As a result of all these measures, the Vietnamese housing market has been growing and housing stocks have dramatically increased. According to the Vietnam General Statistics Office, the Census of Population and Housing 2009 indicates that the number of housing units in 1999 was 65 4.03 million and had increased to 6.76 million in 2009. While rural housing units increased by only 22%, urban units increased by 68%. Figure 36. Self-built Housing Distribution in HCMC Figure 37. Construction of Self-built Housing in HCMC 66 Figure 38. Pervasive Self-built Housing (Row Houses) Areas in HCMC 67 The self-building trend had a positive side in the sense of providing affordable and accessible housing for lowand middle-income segments but it resulted in uncontrolled urban sprawl which has been pervasive in the suburban districts of peripheral areas (Figure 38). More than 90% of these self-constructed housing units were built in the 1990s without obeying building guidelines and regulations (McGee, 2009). Large amounts of self-built housing were organically created to maximize their own private spaces and the fast pace of development resulted in serious urban densification and pressure on infrastructure and transportation planning in HCMC. The urban road capacity is not sufficient and inner community roads are too narrow to allow residents to access their housing. Since many districts have grown with the influx of immigrants and informal self-built housing production since the late 1980s, the middleand low-income communities have struggled as a result of the relatively small area devoted to roads and the disorganized road networks. According to the UN Habitat's report, approximately 16% of the developable land in the cities was planned for road infrastructure in Vietnam. This is a much smaller fraction compared to the international average of 20–25%. In the case of HCMC, only 6.2% of the developable land was for roads and in its peripheral area, surprisingly, only 0.4%. Access roads to residential areas are usually 3–5 m wide, internal roads or pathways less than 3 m, and informal roads in self-built housing districts less than 1.5 m (UN Habitat, 2014). This makes it impossible for private cars and public transportation, indeed anything other than two-wheeled vehicles, to access homes. 3.3.5. Apartment Development Boom The dynamic increase in high-rise apartment development is evident in HCMC and Hanoi, which represent 85% of Vietnam's total housing market. With annual GDP growth at or exceeding 10% over the last 10 years and annual urban growth rates in HCMC of 3%, the city's ever-increasing population has placed severe pressure on the housing market, which has also experienced remarkable growth. HCMC has been a leading city in private sector development of apartments. Since 2001, with increasing FDI inflows into real estate development and institutional changes in land laws and housing policies, local and foreign investors and developers have moved into the apartment market (Figure 39). HCMC has been a leading platform city for this dynamic. 68 Figure 39. Average Apartment Price Growth in Vietnam The apartment market consists of four apartment types by price range: Luxury (3000–5000 USD/m2), High-end (3000–2000 USD/m2), Med-end (2000–1000 USD/m2), and Affordable apartments (under 1000 USD/m2). Each type has gradually grown alongside the impact of macro and micro economic policies and market conditions in HCMC, and the apartment market is expected to grow continuously in the future (Figure 40) (CBRE, 2017). Figure 40. HCMC Apartment Primary Price Forecast According to the statistics for 2010–2015, 58% of the total housing supply in HCMC was affordable high-rise housing: 153 apartment projects, containing 79,967 units, were supplied to the middle-income bracket. In 2015, 77 affordable apartment projects with 40,008 units were developed, while growth in the high-end housing market was also strong (EZLand, 2016). Future projections for affordable apartment Source: Savills, 2015b Source: CBRE, 2017 69 demand are remarkable: according to the EZLand study (2016), only 12,128 units were produced in 2013 to meet a demand for 23,838 units. By 2020, demand is expected to reach 130,962 units while the supply will be only 31,042 units (Figure 41), leading to an even more critical housing shortage in HCMC. Figure 41. Affordable Apartment Demand and Supply Source: EZLand, 2016 70 Chapter 4 Voluntary Residential Mobility and Housing Choice in HCMC 4. Voluntary Residential Mobility and Housing Choice in HCMC 4.1. Introduction Vietnam's rate of urbanization has rapidly increased with a great influx of immigrants from rural areas since the initiation of the Doi Moi (Đổi Mới: open door) economic reforms in 1986. The policy goal was to create a socialist-oriented market economy and to accelerate economic transition to industrial manufacturing, leading to employment and economic output (Beresford, 2008). It resulted in a remarkable increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) into Vietnam and became a significant factor for economic growth in industrial manufacturing development. The phenomenon was especially observed in Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC), Hanoi, and their peri-urban areas with enormous inflows from rural areas (McGee, 2009). Nationally, the urban proportion of the population increased from 20.5% in 1990 to 34.7% in 2017 (UN Habitat, 2014). Real estate has been a significant sector of FDI in the last decades, ranking second (18%) behind manufacturing and processing industries (58%) in Vietnam. The foreign investment has focused on luxury housing developments in particular and has increased remarkably since the revision of the housing laws in 2015 to allow foreigners to own property. Real estate experts believe that the housing market will continue to be a focus of FDI and the dynamics of movement and housing choice in Vietnam will increase (CBRE, 2018). The goal of this study is to investigate moving and housing choice patterns in HCMC and to try to find implications for future sustainable urbanization and housing development. Housing choice and migration in HCMC seem to be a mixture of the life-cycle, planned behavior, and decision-making models, with the last having 71 a particularly strong impact on housing choice in the context of Vietnamese urbanization. The following objectives were set for the research: (1) to investigate housing type choices for the migration; (2) to examine factors influencing movement determination; (3) to understand housing preferences and expected movement patterns; and (4) to find implications for public policies to foster sustainable housing development in Vietnam. 4.2. Research Methods 4.2.1. Sampling Area Figure 42. Survey Districts in HCMC: Urban and Semi-Urban Districts This research decided to empirically investigate and analyze housing choice and movement patterns in HCMC using a citizen questionnaire survey. The city officially consists of 24 districts divided into three groups: 13 urban districts, 6 semiurban districts, and 5 rural districts (UN Habitat, 2014). As the rural districts with low population density were relatively unaffected by HCMC's urbanization, they were excluded from this survey. The other districts, however, experienced remarkable changes in their residential environment (Cira, 2011). The questionnaire Source: Google Maps 72 survey therefore targeted the 13 urban districts 10 and 6 semi-urban districts11 (Figure 42). 4.2.2. Preliminary Interviews To increase accuracy and reflect local realities, a preliminary survey was carried during 11–20 June 2016. I selected two urban districts (District 1 and Phu Nhuan) and two semi-urban districts (District 7 and Go Vap) in terms of diversity of density, income, housing typology, and history. District 1 is a downtown and business district mainly crowded with high-end apartments. Phu Nhuan is a low-rise residential area for the upper-middle-income class while Go Vap is a self-built district for the lower-middle-income class. District 7 includes both old and new towns (Phu My Hung) with a good mixture of various housing types. I interviewed about 20 households (row houses and apartments) from the four districts to get a specific understanding of local citizens' housing issues and preferences. Various reasons for moving as well as issues relating to the residential environment were identified by the questionnaire. Many row-households noted such as a story of Mrs. OOO (55). "My family lived in the countryside of the Mekong Delta region and moved to Ho Chi Minh to set up a small business twenty years ago. I lived in temporary housing when we settled down in District 12, a suburban district, and moved to a row house to work and live. My family operated a rice noodle shop on the ground floor and lived on the second floor. The row house was optimal for combining business with living for our family. I will choose a row house again for my business even if I move again." However, an apartment householder, Mr. OOO (45) who is a government official, had a different story. "I have been working as a civic official for 15 years. I had lived in social housing in a middle-rise apartment. Then I moved to my present high-rise apartment five years ago. Commuting to work was a very important factor when choosing this apartment. I commuted by bicycle for a decade but now do so by motorcycle. The motorcycle trip of over an hour is extremely tiring due to serious air pollution and noise on the road. There is very little public transportation and the number of cars and motorcycles has increased too much every year. I am satisfied with the current 10 District 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, Phu Nhuan, Binh Thanh, Go Vap, Tan Binh, and Tanh Phu (UN Habitat, 2008) 11 District 2, 7, 9, 12, Binh Tan, and Thu Duc (UN Habitat, 2008) 73 apartment because of proximity to my office, a spacious parking lot with a security guard, and public facilities like a community park and swimming pool." The questionnaire was updated based on these feedback from the preliminary interview. 4.2.3. Questionnaire Design and Survey The questionnaire mainly consists of four parts. The first is about the interviewee's background and general understanding of urban issues in HCMC. The second indicates housing and neighborhood conditions in their former housing. The third is about current housing and neighborhood. In the last part, respondents were asked about housing type preferences in the future if they could afford any housing type (Table 16). By investigating past, present, and future housing in the survey, I expected to find movement patterns and the reasons for them. Table 16. Questionnaire Contents Category Details Background Age / Gender / Occupation / Income Urban Issues Major Urban Problems / Environmental Issues / Transportation Former Residence Housing Location / Ownership / Housing Price Housing Type / Number of Bedrooms / Toilet / Kitchen / Water Supply / Sewerage / Housing Satisfaction and Reasons Neighborhood Neighborhood Satisfaction and Reasons Current Residence Housing Location / Ownership / Housing Price Housing Type / Duration of Residence / Number of Bedrooms / Toilet / Kitchen / Water Supply / Sewerage / Housing Satisfaction and Reasons / Reason for Moving to Current House Neighborhood Neighborhood Satisfaction and Reasons Future Housing Preference for Housing Type / Number of Bedrooms Housing types in this survey were categorized into squatter, row house, villa, and apartment. The official Census of Vietnam categorizes the typology into permanent, semi-permanent, and temporary housing based on housing quality and materials (GSOV, 2010). However, this imposes limitations in understanding diverse urban housing stocks. The UN Habitat categorizes Vietnamese urban housing as shop house, apartment, villa, alley house, and precarious squatter housing in accordance with a functional classification (UN Habitat, 2014). However, the shop house and alley house are structurally similar in terms of narrow and long plot 74 size, nearly 100% plot coverage, and an average of three or four floors. Both properties also typically belong to the single-family ownership category. The only main difference is whether the ground floor is used for commercial or residential purposes. World Bank research gives five categories of housing typology: temporary shelters, old townhouse, new townhouse, apartment, and villa (Cira, 2011). The old and new townhouses can be recognized as being the same as the shop house and alley house of the UN Habitat's categories in terms of architectural form. Thus, this study combined those types into the row house (also commonly called "nhà ống" in Vietnamese or "tube house" in English) category. Therefore, in this survey, residential housing was classified into four types: squatter, row house, villa, and apartment. The questionnaire survey was performed from 1 September to 30 November 30 2016 in HCMC. The interviewees were selected in popular public places such as streets, squares, parks, and commercial locations in the target 19 districts (13 urban and 6 semi-urban districts). Then personal interviews were conducted. A total of 200 responses were collected evenly across the districts but, following a review of data quality and missing response elements, 194 samples were finally selected. Table 17 shows the detailed information about the survey data collection. Table 17. Data Collection Information Survey Target Districts in HCMC Data Collection Places Samples Urban Districts District 1 District 3 District 4 District 5 District 6 District 8 District 10 District 11 Phu Nhuan Binh Thanh Go Vap Tan Binh Tanh Phu Nguyen Hue Street and Plaza Le Van Tam Park Nguyen Tat Thanh Street CGV Parkson Mall Chợ Bình Tây (Traditional Market) Pham The Hien Street Ba Thang Hai Street Dam Sen Park Centre Point Building (Mixed-use) Co.opmart Shopping Market Lotte Mart Tan Binh Market Aeon Shopping Mall 11 11 10 10 10 10 10 10 11 10 10 10 10 SemiUrban Districts District 2 District 7 District 9 District 12 Binh Tan Thu Duc Vincom Mega Mall Vivo City Plaza Do Xuan Hop Street Ha Huy Giap Street Aeon Shopping Mall Co.opmart Shopping Market 11 10 10 10 10 10 Notes: Six local assistants supported this survey. They are students from the Ho Chi Minh City University of Architecture. 75 4.2.4. In-depth Interviews The questionnaire survey approach for residential mobility has been criticized because of the drawbacks of oversimplifying feedback from respondents (Robinson, 1996). The decision-making processes of moving and housing choices are not simple and require information on a wide range of housing attributes, and diverse members of the household are involved in the decision. The 38 households who were already involved in the questionnaire surveys were reselected, and an in-depth interview was conducted with them to provide more detail and to understand their housing choices. From the single-family housing and multi-family housing groups, 19 households12 joined the in-depth interviews and provided further detailed information, revealing their reasons for moving. 4.3. Results and Findings 4.3.1. Predominant Single-family Housing The majority (82%) of interviewees were 20–49 years old and a large percentage (71.5%) had jobs in the private sector, such as owning their own business, the service industry, and technical fields. The largest single income group (37.8%) earned 10–20 million Dong per month (USD 475–952) and a large percentage (60.8%) of respondents had lived in their current housing for less than 10 years, 12.9% for 10–20 years, and 7.7% for 20–30 years. The survey clearly indicates that residents moved to current housing that is well equipped with utilities and infrastructure. It also shows that overall housing satisfaction improved from 38% to 73% after moving to their current dwellings and neighborhood satisfaction levels also improved from 42% to 58%. The average number of rooms per unit changed from 2.31 in the past to 2.94 in the present and 3.64 for future homes. Respondents considered HCMC's most serious urban problems to be transportation and road problems (31%), air pollution (26%), water pollution (22%), infrastructure shortages (12%), and housing shortages (8%). They also selected the best solutions for the transportation problems as improvement of public transportation (47%), improvement of road conditions (32%), strengthening regulations to control increases in the numbers of registered vehicles (6%), and decentralizing through building satellite cities (14%). 12 Each participant was selected from different 19 districts. Please see the appendix for detail information of the interviewees. 76 In the housing choice section, the predominant housing type is a row house, showing as 68% and 69% of the past and present residential types, respectively. This shows an association with housing development history in Vietnam. In the case of villas, these are a very strong preference for the future, though the percentages formerly and currently occupying villas are very low. Single family housing, such as row houses and villas, would account for 79% in the future based on respondents' expressed ideal preferences. In the case of apartments, while the low-rise apartment share has declined (with 26%, 13%, and 1% of the past, the present, and future preferences, respectively), that of high-rise apartments has increased (5%, 13%, and 19%, respectively) (Table 18). Table 18. Housing Choice Change among Survey Respondents. Housing Typology Past Residence Present Residence Future Preference Single-Family Housing (SFH) Squatter 2% 0% 0% Row House 68% 69% 44% Villa 1% 5% 35% Multi-Family Housing (MFH) Low-rise Apartment High-rise Apartment 26% 5% 13% 13% 1% 19% Notes: The apartment category was divided into low-rise (seven floors or fewer) and high-rise (more than seven floors) blocks for a more detailed understanding. A number of low-rise apartments had been built from the 1960s to the 1980s for social housing. A number of the high-rise apartments have been developed as a result of the FDI inflow into the real estate market (UN Habitat, 2014). 4.3.2. Significant Factors of Current Housing As the questionnaire survey mostly includes nominal and categorical variables, the chi-square test of independence was mainly performed to find significant associations between current housing type and other factors pertaining to residents. The expected frequency count for each cell in the table should be at least five, and a maximum of 20% should be below this on the cross tables for the test to be valid. As the current categorization of housing into four types (squatter/row house/villa/apartment) was not able to meet the condition, the housing types were simply grouped using two different methods for statistical validity. The first divided them into single-family housing (SFH: squatter/row house/villa) and multi-family housing (MFH: apartment) in that an individual residence environment is highly preferred in Vietnam. The second divided them into only row houses and other types since the former has dominated housing development history and this tendency is still observed today in Vietnam. 77 Table 19 shows several factors indicating statistically significant associations with current housing types of the two groups (SFH-MFH and Row House-Others): monthly income, ownership, former housing types, preferred future housing types, inconveniences associated with current housing, and reasons for moving. Table 19. Selected Significant Factors Relating to Current Housing Types (I) Current Residence X2 /p-value SFH (N = 142) MFH (N = 52) Monthly Income13 Low 38/27% 26/51% 10.228 /0.006 *** Middle 57/40.4% 16/31.4% High 46/32.6% 9/17.6% Total 141/100% 51/100% Ownership Owned 112/78.8% 23/45.1% 20.363 /0.000 *** Rent 30/21.1% 28/54.9% Total 142/100% 51/100% Former Housing Type SFH 114/80.3% 32/62.7% 6.264 /0.021 ** MFH 28/19.7% 19/37.3% Total 142/100% 51/100% Future Preferred Housing Type SFH 118/84.3% 34/68% 6.107 /0.022 ** MFH 22/15.7% 16/32% Total 140/100% 50/100% Inconveniences Associated with Current Housing Transportation Infrastructure Safety/Security Affordability 67/47.2% 21/14.8% 39/27.5% 15/10.6% 18/35.3% 10/19.6% 11/21.6% 12/23.5% 6.760 /0.080 * Total 142/100% 51/100% Reason for Moving14 Housing Structure Commuting Safety/Security Affordability 49/37.1% 52/39.4% 7/5.3% 24/18.2% 8/17% 25/53.2% 8/17% 6/12.8% 12.217 /0.007 ** Total 132/100% 46/100% Notes: Chi-square Test was performed. The cells of each factor with a frequency count below five are fewer than 20%. Statistically significant at level is *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.10. SFH stands for Single-Family Housing and MFH for Multi-Family Housing. The results show that the higher income group is more likely to choose the SFH than the lower income group, X2 (2, N = 192) = 10.228, p < 0.01. Housing owners are closely associated with single-family housing ownership while the tenant group are associated with apartments, X2 (1, N = 193) = 20.363, p < 0.01. Other factors show the interrelationship between housing choice and movement. Those formerly living 13 Low-income class salaries are under 10 million (VND), middle income from 10 to 30 million (VND), and high income over 30 million (VND). 14 On the Reason for Moving section on the above table, the reason factors were regrouped into four to increase the statistical validity of the chi-square test. Housing Structure includes housing typological attributes. Commuting means locational features mainly consisting of public transportation availability, main road accessibility, and workplace proximity. Safety and Security means neighborhood environment mainly indicating crime and accident vulnerability of districts, which is a critical social issue in HCMC. Affordability means economic and financial issues for housing choice. 78 in SFHs are more likely to move to the same housing type as opposed to the MFH residents, X2 (1, N = 193) = 6.264, p < 0.05, and this pattern also shows in future preferences X2 (1, N = 190) = 6.107, p < 0.05. In the case of the row house type, the pattern also appears more significantly in preferred migration from present to future, X2 (1, N = 191) = 5.348, p < 0.05, rather than past to present, X2 (1, N = 193) = 3.552, p < 0.10. This demonstrates that the SFH offering multi-story floors and single-family occupancy is still dominantly preferred in housing choice rather than the MFH of apartments (Table 20). Table 20. Selected Significant Factors Relating to Current Housing Types (II) Current Residence X2 /p-value Row House (N = 133) Others (N = 61) Monthly Income Low 35/26.5% 30/49.2% 9.852 /0.007 *** Middle 54/40.9% 19/31.1% High 43/32.6% 12/19.7% Total 132/100% 61/100% Ownership Owned 109/82% 26/42.6% 30.569 /0.000 *** Rent 24/18% 35/57.4% Total 133/100% 61/100% Former Housing Type SFH 106/79.7% 41/67.2% 3.552 /0.072 * MFH 27/20.3% 20/32.8% Total 133/100% 61/100% Future Preferred Housing Type SFH 111/84.1% 41/69.5% 5.348 /0.032 ** MFH 21/15.9% 18/30.5% Total 132/100% 59/100% Inconveniences Associated with Current Housing Transportation 65/48.9% 21/34.4% 9.456 /0.024 ** Infrastructure 18/13.5% 13/21.3% Safety/Security 37/27.8% 13/21.3% Affordability 13/9.8% 14/23% Total 133/100% 61/100% Reason for Moving Housing Structure Commuting Safety/Security Affordability 48/39% 47/38.2% 7/5.7% 21/17.1% 9/15.8% 30/52.6% 9/15.8% 9/15.8% 13.041 /0.005 *** Total 123/100% 57/100% Notes: Chi-square Test was performed. The cells of each factor with a frequency count below five are fewer than 20%. Statistically significant at level is *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.10. SFH stands for Single-Family Housing and MFH for Multi-Family Housing. 4.3.3. Housing Choices and Movement Patterns The questionnaire and interviews revealed a relationship between reasons for moving and current housing choice. According to the Fisher's Exact Test of Table 21, a close association between current housing types and reasons for moving to the 79 current houses was observed, X2 (9, N = 179) = 20.972, p < 0.01. The movement from former SFHs to current MFHs is closely associated with the commuting conditions, meaning organized road networks and transportation accessibility to workplaces. Interestingly, Table 21 also supports that, indicating the association between current housing type and inconveniences associated with the housing, X2 (6, N = 189) = 14.491, p < 0.05. The main difficulties for row housing residents are associated with transportation issues, such as overly narrow roads, an inadequate road environment, and poor accessibility to main roads. The housing structure, meaning typological attributes, is a main reason for the movement from former SFHs to current SFHs. This housing type can normally offer multi-story spaces with mixed use and independent property ownership with land-use right in Vietnam. The safety and security issues are associated with the movement within MFHs. In general, apartments can provide better security systems and safer inner road environments with parking spaces than SFHs. The affordability is mainly observed in the movement from former SFHs to current SFHs. The main affordable housing is the self-built row houses which predominate in HCMC's housing stock (World Bank, 2015). Table 21. Housing Choice Reasons and Movement Patterns Reasons for Moving to Current Housing Former Housing to Current Housing X2 /p-value SFH to SFH SFH to MFH MFH to SFH MFH to MFH Housing Structure 42 (40.4%) 5 (17.9%) 7 (25%) 3 (15.8%) 20.972 /0.008 *** Commuting 39 (37.5%) 17 (60.7%) 13 (46.4%) 8 (42.1%) Safety/Security 3 (2.9%) 3 (10.7%) 4 (14.3%) 5 (26.3%) Affordability 20 (19.2%) 3 (10.7%) 4 (14.3%) 3 (16.8%) Total 104 (100%) 28 (100%) 28 (100%) 19 (100%) 179 Notes: Fisher's Exact Test was performed since six cells (37.5%) have expected count less than 5. Statistical significance at the level is *** p < 0.01. SFH stands for Single Family Housing and MFH stands for Multi-Family Housing. Current housing tenure was also closely associated with the choice of current housing, X2 (6, N = 193) = 20.494, p < 0.01 (Table 22). While the majority of people who moved to SFHs were house owners, the tenant groups selected from current MFHs had moved from SFHs and MFHs. This result is likely to be related to the results illustrated in Table 22. As SFHs, particularly row houses, have diverse positive housing attributes and generate economic profit in Vietnam, housing owners have an advantage. Tenants are likely to be more interested in residences with better 80 neighborhood conditions such as commuting and community security, which are serious social issues in HCMC. Therefore, apartments are considered to meet the desires of tenants if they address these social issues; Table 22 also illustrates the reasons why people moved to apartments. Table 22. Housing Tenure and Movement Patterns Tenure Former Housing to Current Housing X2 /p-value SFH to SFH SFH to MFH MFH to SFH MFH to MFH Owner 90(78.9%) 15(46.9%) 22(78.6%) 8(42.1%) 20.494 /0.000*** Tenant 24(21.1%) 17(53.1%) 6(21.4%) 11(57.9%) Total 114(100%) 32(100%) 28(100%) 19(100%) 193 Notes: Chi-square Test was performed. Statistical significance at the level is *** p < 0.01. SFH stands for Single Family Housing and MFH stands for Multi-Family Housing. Table 23. Monthly Income and Future Housing Choice Monthly Income Current Housing to Future Housing Preference X2 /p-value SFH to SFH SFH to MFH MFH to SFH MFH to MFH Low 29 (24.6%) 8 (38.1%) 18 (52.9%) 7 (43.8%) 14.491 /0.025 ** Middle 46 (39%) 10 (47.6%) 10 (29.4%) 6 (37.5%) High 43 (36.4%) 3 (14.3%) 6 (17.6%) 3 (18.8%) Total 118 (100%) 21 (100%) 34 (100%) 16 (100%) 189 Notes: Chi-square Test was performed. One cell (8.3%) had an expected count less than 5. Statistically significant at level is ** p < 0.05. Low-income class salary is under 10 million (VND) per month, middle income from 10 million (VND) to 30 million (VND), and high income over 30 million (VND). SFH stands for Single-Family Housing, MFH for Multi-Family Housing. Table 23 illustrates the association between future housing choices and movement patterns. Different income groups preferred different movement patterns; high-income groups preferred moving from SFHs to SFHs, middle-income groups from SFHs to MFHs, and low-income groups from MFHs to SFHs. As the SFHs are seen as having economic benefits because of the multi-functional and mixed-use traits of the housing, high-income residents of the SFHs preferred the same type of housing for the future. In addition, low-income households were also more likely to prefer SFHs because they desired the economic benefits of SFHs. MFHs were preferred for the middle-income group, as most people in this group had a salarybased job requiring daily commuting, and so commuting determined their optimal 81 choice of apartment. It is also significant that the government home loan packages15 supported apartment purchases of the middle-income group. 4.3.4. In-depth Interviews for Housing Choices 4.3.4.1. Row House Choice To avoid oversimplification of the questionnaire survey results and to clearly understand the housing choices and residential mobility intentions of respondents, the 38 households already included in the previous survey were reselected from different districts and involved in the in-depth interviews.16 The in-depth interviews demonstrated the advantages of housing attributes of row houses, including spatial flexibility, functional diversity, legal property ownership, environmental adaptability, and human-scaled buildings with traditional forms. With detailed descriptions, the residents of row houses highlighted housing attributes as their reason for moving. Attributes included spatial flexibility allowing family cycle change and business leases, functional diversity enabling mixed-use with business leasing of the ground floor and residential leasing of other floors, and property ownership including ownership of LUR (Figure 43). Figure 43. Advantages of Row House Residences17 15 This is a preferential home loan program of the national banks for low and middle-income people who want to purchase an apartment. Vietnam government issued Decree 61/NQ-CP to execute the loan package to increase housing affordability and encourage more housing supply from private sectors. The conditions are maximum 15 year of loan tenure and 5% of annual fixed interest rate. The available apartments should meet the requirements of a unit scale and price; less than 70 m2 of an apartment unit and less than VND 15 million (USD 714) per m2 of the unit price. 16 See the appendix for detail information of the interviewees. 17 The contents of the bold-outlined box indicate the frequent keywords mentioned in more than 50% Source: Results of the In-depth Interview 82 The structural attributes of row houses that created socio-economic benefits were emphasized. In an in-depth interview, Ms. OOO (58) highlighted spatial flexibility that enabled adaptations to the family cycle changes. "I moved to my current row house in a four-story building 10 years ago. I still love my house because of the flexibility of each floor and the vertical separation. The top floor (4F) is our residence, and my son and his wife live with their child on the third floor. Our son stayed with us on the top floor before the marriage, and a few tenants used to live on the third floor. I want to stay together with my son's family in a building, and there is no need to find another house for them." The financial gain from a row house of mixed-use function was highlighted by Mr. OOO (65)'s interview with a detailed description of the income generated from the house. "I think most of HCMC's residents really enjoy taking advantage of the mixed-use building form for economic profit. I have two row houses in HCMC. One is only for a business lease, as there is high demand for room rentals by students and single workers. I rented out the ground floor to a coffee shop, and the tenant pays about 20,000,000 VND monthly. Each of the six rooms on the upper two floors was also rented out with a payment of 4,000,000 VND per room per month. The total monthly revenue from my row house is about 44,000,000 VND. With my other row house, I have my own retail shop on the ground floor, and my family lives on the upper floors." This economic assessment is extended to the ownership of LUR. The respondents emphasized that purchasing a row house includes obtaining a package of land and a house, whereas an apartment does not include LUR. The enthusiasm to secure property rights from row house ownership was also highlighted in Mr. OOO (47)'s interview. "Land is one of the most significant factors in selecting a row house. A building is not permanent, and it will be demolished one day. However, land never disappears, and its value and price have been increasing every year in HCMC. When I got a Pink Book18 after owning a row house, I felt that a permanent residence in life was like insurance. Because an apartment does not include land, its Pink Book is not sufficient for guaranteeing a stable future." the in-depth interviews. 18 The Pink Book is a legal title and certificate of BOLURCs, which combine land and housing. Since Housing Decree 60, it has represented housing and land property rights. In addition, the Red Book is a legal title specifically for LURC. 83 Additionally, the spatial composition of row houses enabled eco-efficient features with natural lighting and ventilation, and the human-scaled façade and its close integration with the street were discussed as positive and active measures for community connections and social interactions. The interviewees were asked about the drawbacks of row house residences, as the previous survey highlighted this factor. Most complained about the environmental inferiority of their neighborhoods, including narrow inner roads and poor access to main roads, the difficulty of commuting and the high reliance on motorcycles, and the concerns of safety and security arising from burglary and fire vulnerabilities of dense individual houses (Figure 44). Figure 44. Drawbacks of Row House Residence A detailed description of the inferior commuting conditions in the row house neighborhood was given in Ms. OOO (38)'s in-depth interview. "I used to live in a row house as a tenant but moved to an apartment because affordable row houses are mostly located far from downtown and the main roads. To get to my downtown workplace, I needed to drive my motorbike through narrow inner roads to access the main streets. I struggled against traffic on both the inner and main roads every day. I also feared returning home, particularly late at night. Public transportation or car ownership was far beyond my reality, considering the narrow inner streets. There was no way to get through without the motorbike. However, my apartment, which is adjacent to a main road, provides better accessibility in the morning and at night, and I feel quite comfortable, even though the monthly rental fee is a bit more expensive than before." The vulnerability to crime is described in Mr. OOO (55)'s interview, demonstrating the anxiety and experiences associated with the row house neighborhood. "My main anxiety in my row house is the vulnerability to burglary, particularly around the Tet Holiday (Lunar New Year). Most HCMC residents prepare to return to their hometown with money or expensive gifts, so burglaries in the weeks before Source: Results of the In-depth Interview 84 the Tet Holiday occur frequently. During the two-week traditional holiday, the empty houses are exposed to residential burglaries. Row houses are a main target for criminals due to the tight, individual building arrangement allowing easy access to the houses that are hidden from public view. Burglars have a variety of techniques to dismantle security measures. They entered my home twice during my 13-year residence in a row house and took cash, gold, my laptops, motorbikes, and so forth. It was really awful." 4.3.4.2. Apartment Choice Apartment residents were asked about their housing choice and reasons for moving. Interestingly, they highlighted the advantages of the integrated systems and more open spaces of high-density buildings. Many apartment residents have jobs in the city center or sub-centers and were satisfied with the commuting convenience created by the apartments' accessibility to main roads and public transportation. The enhanced safety and security systems that protect their properties were also highlighted. Community facilities and spaces such as diverse courtyards and swimming pools were also attractions. In addition, residents who had moved since 2013 selected their apartment because of the home loan packages available from national banks, and they highlighted the popularity of financial aid in their apartment choice (Figure 45). Figure 45. Advantages of Apartment Residence The environmental advantages of the apartments are well noted in the interviews with Ms. OOO (40) and Mr. OOO (45). "Since I moved to this apartment from the row house in which I lived with my parents, my 7-year-old son and 5-year-old daughter get a lot of pleasure from playing badminton or futsal in the yards and enjoy a year-round swimming pool. It is all free for residents. They easily build friendships with the neighborhood kids and play Source: Results of the In-depth Interview 85 together. Compared with our previous individualized lifestyle in the row house, our current lifestyle has much more of a community feeling, with secure amenities. In addition, there is no more concern about motorcycle parking and security. I just pay 60,000 VND (3 USD) to use the parking garage. Wherever you go in HCMC, motorcycle security is so critical, as many of us have experienced our motorcycles being stolen. I am happy the security guards protect our vehicles in this apartment building. The in-depth interview with Mr. OOO (39) highlights the availability of financial aid programs to apartment buyers that enhance housing affordability. "My family moved to this apartment in 2014 (65 m2) thanks to a loan package program from the Vietcombank. The sale price was about 955,500,000 VND (45,000 USD), but the bank paid 70% of the apartment price-668,850,000 VND (31,850 USD)-with the conditions of a fixed annual interest rate of 5.5% and a loan tenure of 15 years. We only paid 286,650,000 VND (13,650 USD), and my life's dream of owning a house finally came true. I am working at a trade company as a manager, and my salary covers the housing loan." 4.4. Discussions 4.4.1. Advantages of Row Houses The survey results clearly indicate that Vietnam has a high demand for singlefamily housing, particularly row houses, which predominate in HCMC's housing stock. The typology of row house has traditionally been dominant in the urban fabric in Vietnam. While it has evolved with urban growth in terms of plot size, façade, spatial structure, and building materials, it was highlighted for its spatial, environmental, and social advantages. The spatial composition enabled ecosufficient features with natural lighting and ventilation serving as energy-saving factors. It also supported expandable spatial features for the residents' needs. The spatial flexibility enabled not only residential space expansion for family size change, but also a mixed use for living and working. In addition, the human-scaled façade and its close integration with streets created active community connection and social interaction (Kien, 2008). The trend toward row house choice was also clearly observed in the structural features of the housing that emerged in this survey. The archetypal modern row house is extremely efficient for a mixture of residential and commercial services (Figure 46). In spite of very limited street frontage, with a typical plot of 4 m by 20 m, the building fully covers the plot in many cases, and the ground floor is a flexible 86 frontage for homeowners' micro-businesses, such as a shop, small restaurant, café, or retail unit. Some owners even use or lease the second floor for mixed use and earn extra income (Kien, 2008; Park & Cho, 2013; Won, Cho, & Kim, 2015). In addition, the typology features spatial flexibility and environmental adaptability in that most rooms can be adjusted or expanded for various purposes and the buffer space between indoors and outdoors can function as protection from direct sunlight and high precipitation (Park & Cho, 2013). For these reasons, the ground-bound housing type is commonly found in entire cities, from downtown to low-income areas, and along narrow and minor streets. This residential structure is the most attractive for Vietnamese people and has the highest demand in movement and housing choices (Vinh & Leaf, 1996; Won et al., 2015). Figure 46. Mixed-use Row Houses in HCMC 4.4.2. Drawbacks of Row Houses On the other hand, different responses for the row houses were observed in the survey. Road and commuting environments were critical drawbacks of the row house residences. The survey respondents largely highlighted uncomfortable transportation and road conditions and the commuting environment as the main reasons that current apartment residents who had previously lived in a row house had moved. As a number of neighborhoods in HCMC have organically developed with selfbuilt housing, inner roads within these communities were spontaneously generated with an average width of 1.5 m (Figure 47; 49). In the period from 2001 to 2005, for example, the amount of self-built row housing units accounted for 84.8% of total 87 housing constructed in HCMC, while industrialized housing production accounted for only 15.2% (Zhu, 2012). Only two-wheeled vehicles can reach the inner houses of these districts (Figure 49) since the builders tried to maximize land utilization by illegally expanding the floor area (Hansen, 2016; Yip & Tran, 2008). This requires pedestrians and two-wheeled vehicles to share the roads, leaving adults and especially children vulnerable to traffic accidents (UN Habitat, 2014). That condition shows that the current Vietnamese urbanization and housing environment would not be sustainable. Figure 47. Conventional Row House District in HCMC (District 4) Figure 48. Conventional Row House District in HCMC (District 4) Source: Google Maps 88 Figure 49. Conventional Inner Roads in a Row House District (District 8) Another issue is that row houses and their neighborhoods are highly vulnerable to residential crimes such as burglaries. Numerous households of row houses installed individual security measures such as CCTV, deadbolt locks, burglar proof windows, and main gate covers (OSAC, 2017). However, the households were concerned about the dense neighborhood environment, the consequential security vulnerabilities, and the limitations of personal security measures (Figure 50). Figure 50. Burglar Poof Windows on Row Houses in HCMC 89 4.4.3. Increasing Popularity of Apartments With rising family incomes and socioeconomic mobility, the increasing number of vehicles is worsening the commuting environment every year (Truitt, 2008). The total count of motorbikes at 8.5 million thus exceeds the official population of Ho Chi Minh City of 8.2 million (Thanh Nien News, 2016) and motorbikes account for approximately 90% of trips in the city (Van, Schmoecker, & Fujii, 2009) and commuters using motorbikes battle daily against heavy traffic jams and declining air quality (Figure 51). In addition, car ownership has increased by 320% between 2005 and 2014 at an annual growth rate of 10% (OICA, 2014). This creates a higher risk of heavy traffic congestion and overburdening the city's road capacity. Figure 51. Peak Hour Commuting in HCMC In this context, apartments are highly regarded as an adaptation to such changes while predominantly self-built districts of row houses have suffered from severe urban densification and poor accessibility for four-wheeled vehicles. A number of high-rise apartments built with foreign investment offer not only more spacious housing units and open spaces, but also managed parking lots for two-wheeled and four-wheeled vehicles and excellent accessibility to main roads (Figure 52) (Chung et al., 2014). For instance, the Phu My Hung new town construction in District 7 has Source: Thanh Nien News, 2015b 90 led a boom in apartment development in HCMC since 1998. With the construction of the 10-lane Nguyen Van Linh Parkway, the town has produced a series of apartment complexes. They are highly valued real estate today and still attracting the attention of customers as a more comfortable living environment. The key elements for apartment selection are the low-density living environment, better accessibility to downtown, and mixed public facilities, including spacious parking, which are not found in the self-built districts of row houses (Chung et al., 2014; Huynh, 2015; Jung et al., 2013). The results of this survey also clearly show a significant association between environmental advantages and housing choices of current apartments, particularly among those previously resident in row houses. Overall survey data also indicate the popularity of high-rise apartments as can be seen in the increase of this type of housing from 5% of past residences to 13% of present and the expressed preference of 19% of interviewees for the future. Figure 52. Conventional Environment of Apartments The other interesting point is the movement pattern of the current middleincome class. Those of this group currently living in row houses show a strong preference to move to apartments in the future in this survey. Vietnam is one of the countries experiencing a rapid increase in its middle class, with the fastest growth rate in Asia. One report indicates that almost two million people join the middle class every year (Bang, 2016). The popularity of affordable housing for the middle class can be found in market analysis reports. They note that demand of affordable apartments is forecasted to increase by a factor of 5.5, from 23,838 units per annum in 2013 to 130,962 units per annum in 2020. (CBRE, 2016). It underlines the fact that more apartment projects can deliver sustainable urban development with housing solutions to meet the skyrocketing demand for decent affordable housing in HCMC in terms of quality and quantity. Furthermore, more apartment developments are expected in consideration of the Metro Rapid Transit (MRT) project in HCMC. In order to combat surging traffic issues, the city government is proceeding a public metro project as an alternative 91 form of transportation (Figure 53). Metro line 1 is under construction and scheduled to complete in 2021. The MRT should be also a significant factor to influence moving patterns and apartment choice in the future (Arrington & Cervero, 2008; Musil & Simon, 2015). The metro project is already spurring the real estate development boom in that more high-rise apartment projects have been proposed around expected train stations in the last several years and many of them are already under construction. Land prices around the stations are also surging higher than elsewhere (Thanh Nien News, 2015a). These phenomena demonstrate that the public transportation will considerably influence moving to apartments in the future. Figure 53. Construction of Apartments and Elevated Metro Railway in HCMC 4.5. Conclusion Housing choice and movement issues in HCMC have become intertwined with HCMC's rapid urbanization and housing market growth. Since the economic reforms, social and economic changes have led to huge in-migration levels and exacerbated housing shortages, leading to the system for the supply of housing being taken over by the private sector. The government has revised the land use laws, not only for the purpose of privatizing residential land but also to encourage self-built housing through investment by individual households. This development pattern has predominated for the last few decades in HCMC. The self-built row houses have 92 largely covered the city, with organic district expansion and urban densification. This empirical study shows the popularity of the row houses due to the environmental adaptability and spatial flexibility of the mixed-use building, which shows its cultural and social sustainability in Vietnam's innate housing context. However, road conditions and commuting environments in the predominantly selfbuilt districts of HCMC were major drawbacks due to narrow inner roads and limited accessibility by cars and public transportation. Too densified environment also increases crime vulnerability such as a burglary. On the other hand, FDI inflows have produced numerous launches of new apartment projects with a surge in the upper middle-income class. This housing type attracts residents because of great accessibility to main roads, spacious parking spaces, and decent housing quality. It is also considered for economically sustainable housing supply policies aimed at delivering numerous affordable housing units accessible to the lower middle-income class in the dense and compact environment of HCMC. This housing study has implications for public policies aiming at sustainable housing development in Vietnam. As the new 2015 Housing Law provides the framework to support affordable housing segments (with a focus on the housing shortage and the necessity of creating affordable decent housing for the lowermiddle class), support for self-built housing, and encouragement of private sector involvement. The government can consolidate their efforts in the affordable housing sector in the following ways. First, the government can establish national affordable housing initiatives to effectively manage and control incremental informal self-built housing development. Although the row house is regarded as a sustainable housing model for Vietnam from an environmental and socio-economic point of view (Kien, 2008; Kim, 2007; Park & Cho, 2013; Won et al., 2015), the predominant informal self-building trend has had a negative impact on the urban environment with unsustainable densification patterns. Therefore, this development can be well managed and regulated, given that this type of house is a popular choice and in high demand by many Vietnamese. The initiatives can strengthen regulation of row house development and precisely target areas and groups of lower-income households for special assistance who are unable to undertake self-provided solutions. The initiatives can also develop viable strategies for basic infrastructure provision to secure public health and transportation accessibility. In addition, they should enhance accessibility to microfinance and technical assistance for poor households from a formal construction start to incremental self-built housing improvement for their homes. Then, the self-built housing environment can become sustainable in well-serviced and connected neighborhoods. 93 Second, the government can strategically expand "site and services" projects to meet the increasing demand for row houses by the use of public–private partnerships (PPPs). These develop new serviced lands in suitable locations in cities and provide them in sub-divided plots at lower market rates for affordable housing. Based on the delivery of infrastructure and roads, the landowners can create self-built housing through their own investment with the government's legal support. This means that the uncontrolled informal formation of self-built districts and its negative externalities such as public health and traffic issues due to lack of infrastructure and inner roads can be avoided. In addition, it can create a framework of public participation since the "site and services" approach can also be used for various purposes such as neighborhood redevelopment with resettlement, land sharing, and in-situ expansion. In this case, the government and stakeholders can support inclusive planning enabling open discussion and participatory neighborhood design with the people who will finally settle in the area. Furthermore, "site and services" projects can be combined with affordable apartment development within PPPs, thereby making the national housing supply more economically and socially sustainable. Third, Vietnamese housing development can be integrated with urban development strategies, particularly land use planning, and accompanied by major infrastructure and public transportation development. As this study shows a meaningful association between housing choice and commuting environments, the government should ensure that appropriate land for formal and affordable housing developments is allocated to secure connectivity to basic infrastructure and accessibility to public transportation and urban roads. In the case of in-situ resettlement housing development, which avoids evicting low-income residents to the outskirts, the development should also be prioritized to combine with roadwidening plans and transport development. This will minimize negative externalities, such as traffic congestion, pollution, and social segregation. Furthermore, the networked-compact city along with the multi-nuclear model would be necessary to prevent urban sprawl in the sustainable housing development process. It will provide better directions for the style and location of new housing developments as well as site upgrading. These kinds of housing development approaches will help make urban growth in Vietnam more socially, economically, and environmentally sustainable. Therefore, understanding and approaching housing development as part of an inclusive framework is vital for sustainable growth in Vietnam. 94 Chapter 5 Price Determinants of Apartments in HCMC 5. Price Determinants of Apartments in HCMC 5.1. Introduction The housing market in Vietnam has been steadily growing over the last two decades. From 1999 to 2009, 275,000 housing units were supplied in Vietnam and an additional 325,000 are expected between 2009 and 2019 (UN Habitat, 2014). Housing demand has increased by about 10% every year, and reports suggest an additional 394,000 housing units need to be built annually until 2049, considering Vietnam's current urban population growth rate (3%). This is equivalent to 1079 homes per day or 45 homes per hour (UN Habitat, 2014). In particular, with a recent surge in the middle-income class, the popularity of affordable apartment segments for the middle class can be observed in various market analysis reports. The rapid and continuing increase in Vietnam's middle class (the fastest in Asia) means demand for affordable apartments is predicted to increase fivefold between 2013 and 2020, a demand that can only be sustainably met by apartment projects in urban areas to provide the quantity and quality of housing needed (Bang, 2016; CBRE, 2016). Housing affordability generally indicates a ratio approach between household disposable income and housing prices. In other words, the affordability estimates if the household's purchasing power is sufficient to secure a residential property in the housing market. Affordable housing in developing countries is defined with the following criteria: housing-related spending should be no more than 30 to 40% of household income, adequate living space and amenities should be available, and 80% of middle-income residents should be able to afford the housing based on the 95 Housing Affordability Index (Woetzel, Ram, Mischke, Garemo, & Sankhe, 2014). According to the World Bank, household purchasing power has been estimated for each income quantile with regard to payment capacity and access to housing finance in Vietnam. The monthly income of a median quantile household was USD 460 and that of the highest income class USD 1340. In this income structure, it was difficult for the middle-income households to obtain access to housing. To enhance housing affordability for the middle-income class, the Vietnamese government launched a subsidized mortgage program as per the regulations of the central banks in June 2013 called 'VND 30 Trillion Home Loan Package,' which was available at a maximum fixed annual interest rate of 6%, a maximum loan tenure of 15 years, and a loan to the value of 70 to 80% of the purchase price for first purchasers of social housing or apartments. Since the subsidized program was launched, around 80% of apartment buyers in HCMC have taken advantage of the package (JLL, 2016; World Bank, 2015). While most previous studies have analyzed housing price determinants based on locational classifications like downtown, new town, and peripheral areas in cities, this study started by examining the question of the housing affordability framework of the real estate market in HCMC, which is experiencing rapid economic growth. While high-end apartment development has prevailed in Vietnam since the emergence of a privatized housing market, the affordable apartment segment has recently come to the fore with a remarkable surge of middle-income households in HCMC. Since apartments in the Vietnamese housing market are classified as affordable, mid-end, high-end, and luxury apartment segments (Figure 54; 55), this study separates the affordable segment from the mid-end, high-end, and luxury apartments ('unaffordable' segment). 96 Figure 54. Luxury(left) and High-end Apartments(right) in HCMC Figure 55. Mid-end(left) and Affordable(right) Apartments in HCMC This research therefore attempted a different approach to find an answer to the research question of identifying the similarities and differences in price determinants between affordable and unaffordable apartments. By dividing the apartment projects into affordable and unaffordable segments, the housing attributes that affect the market price of each segment will be investigated and compared, and the reasons for the similarities and differences discussed in the urban context of HCMC. This provides valuable references for housing developers and investors to understand the pricing determinants in the Vietnamese housing market, helping them to make 97 decisions for successful investment and development by utilizing appropriate development strategies for various classes of people. This can also help central and local authorities understand improve the quality of a diverse range of developments with public–private partnerships. 5.2. Research Methods 5.2.1. Data Collection This study used a data set covering 714 unit prototypes in 211 apartment projects in HCMC that have been sold since 2000, which covers most apartment projects in the period. We collected the data set in three steps. First, the bulk of raw data on apartments was provided by the National Housing Organization (NHO), which is an affordable housing development institute in Vietnam, and the NIBC Investment and Consulting company (Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam), which conducts professional housing market surveys and feasibility studies for housing development in Vietnam. The series of data sets included apartment unit prices, multiple apartment unit sizes and drawings, project land size, and lists of public facilities. They were restructured for the purpose of this study. Second, additional data on more apartment projects were collected through popular Vietnamese real estate websites (http://khudothimoi.com/ and https://batdongsan.com.vn/)). Third, the information on proximity to urban public facilities was measured based on Google Maps. This data includes distances to urban parks, schools, shopping malls, rivers, main roads, the downtown area, and so forth. When we got the data from the collection procedure, we double-checked the data set with local real estate consultants. 5.2.2. Identification of Affordable Housing As mentioned earlier, it is the ratio between housing prices and a household's disposable income that determines housing affordability, a measurement of whether or not a given household has sufficient purchasing power to secure a residential property. Since the government of Vietnam launched subsidized mortgage programs, such as mortgage finance, the VND 30 Trillion Home Loan Package, and housing microfinance, to enhance housing affordability, the Vietnamese consumer's power has increased remarkably and this has significantly impacted on the housing market (JLL, 2016; World Bank, 2015) (Table 24). In this context, according to the 2016 JLL data for the HCMC real estate market, affordable housing was categorized as having an average price of USD 740 per 98 square meter, with mid-end housing at USD 1343 per square meter in secondary prices (JLL, 2016). A maximum value for affordable housing can be estimated at $ 1041 per square meter, which is the mean of the two average prices. Therefore, we considered the price range of affordable housing as under $1041 per square meter in this study. Table 24. Effective Demand of Housing by Household Income in HCMC 2014 Financial Scenario Income Quintile Monthly Income Payment Capacity Term Rate Loan Amount DownPayment Housing Demand Marketbased (CA) Q5 41,306 40% 16,522 20 10% 1,321,786 30% 566,480 1,888,266 Q4 15,639 30% 4,692 20 10% 375,335 20% 93,834 469,169 Q3 11,760 25% 2,940 15 10% 211,681 20% 52,920 264,601 30 T package (CA) Q5 41,306 40% 16,522 20 5% 1,699,439 30% 728,331 2,427,770 Q4 15,639 30% 4,692 20 5% 482,574 20% 120,643 603,217 Q3 11,760 25% 2,940 15 5% 302,401 20% 75,600 378,001 Notes: CA stands for Constant Amortization. Source: World Bank, 2015 5.2.3. Variables for Hedonic Regression Model In this study, the apartment unit price per square meter is set as the dependent variable. It is a standardized value regardless of the size of the apartment, so it is possible to objectively investigate the factors that affected the apartment price. The independent variables were based on the factors considered from earlier studies on apartments in HCMC. The hedonic regression model uses the following formula: where The dependent variable, Lnp, is the log of sales price (USD/m2) of housing. Using a logarithmic scale for the price makes interpretation easier than other methods (Malpezzi, 2003). The β shows the coefficient matrix of independent variables. The independent variables were selected based on previous hedonic model studies of Vietnamese housing and various discussions with local experts on housing development. Most variables were categorized under general headings, while some 99 were removed due to correlation. In the case of land prices, we considered a special land pricing system for Vietnam as the process here does not follow that normally observed in capitalist systems. The socialist system does not allow private land ownership but provides land use rights in the form of a lease. Thus, the official land price, which the Vietnamese government sets, is not for a permanent property value but a transferrable value. The price estimation is based on the street value evaluation method and we found that the land price of our data set was not closely correlated with other factors. Thus, the independent variables were categorized into three groups: housing unit values, residential community features, and locational proximity to urban public facilities. Table 25 shows the contents and details of each. The formula was structured in a semi-logarithmic form as this is widely used in hedonic regression models for proportional understanding of the interaction between a property's price and its housing characteristics. When sales prices are expressed as logarithms, the coefficients can be interpreted as the percentage change in price. Table 25. Variable Descriptions for Hedonic Price Modeling Categories Variables Code Unit Descriptions Housing Attributes Unit size Building age Natural ventilation Unit access structure Total floors Foreign development Area Year Ventil UnitAccess AllFloors ForeignDev m2 year dummy dummy floor dummy Unit area Building age Two sides of windows Access types to each unit Number of building floors Foreign developer Community Attributes Ward population density Total units of apartment Swimming pool Mixed-use apartment Land price WardDen AllUnits Pool Mixeduse LandPrice person/ha unit dummy dummy USD/m2 Ward of apartment location Total number of units Existence in the project Commercial and residential Street value evaluation Locational Attributes Location to new town Adjacency to main road Dist. to downtown Dist. to park Dist. to river Dist. to international school Dist. to shopping mall Newtown Road Cbd Park River School ShopMall dummy dummy m m m m m Phu My Hung new town Over 4 lane road To the Presidential Palace Formal urban parks Formal urban rivers Primary to secondary schools Corporate shopping malls Dependent Variable Apartment price AptPrice USD/m 2 Sales price per square meter Source: Chung et al., 2014; Huynh, 2015; Jung et al., 2013; Kato & Nguyen, 2010 Based on the literature review for the price determinants of Vietnam housing (Chung et al., 2014; Huynh, 2015; Jung et al., 2013; Kato & Nguyen, 2010) on the 100 chapter 2, the independent variables can be categorized into attributes of housing, community, and location (Table 25). 5.3. Results and Findings 5.3.1. Descriptive Statistics Table 26 shows the descriptive statistics for 714 apartment prototype units in 211 HCMC projects that have been built since 2000; this includes most apartment projects in the period. Table 26. Descriptive Statistics Variables Total Affordable Unaffordable n = 714 n = 427 n = 287 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Apartment price AptPrice 1060 588 718 151 1570 627 Unit size UnitArea 94.7 43.4 83.9 39.7 111 43.8 Years since construction Year 4.06 3.13 3.63 3.12 4.71 3.05 Total floors AllFloors 18.3 6.85 17.2 6.43 19.8 7.17 Ward population density WardDen 178 237 158 218 209 260 Total apartment units AllUnits 562 1014 682 1241 384 466 Swimming pool Pool 0.52 0.50 0.40 0.49 0.68 0.47 Mixed-use apartment MixedUse 0.18 0.38 0.13 0.34 0.25 0.43 Foreign development ForeignDev 0.21 0.41 0.08 0.26 0.42 0.49 Natural ventilation Ventil 0.42 0.49 0.45 0.50 0.37 0.48 Unit access structure UnitAccess 0.14 0.34 0.18 0.39 0.07 0.25 Land price LandPrice 500 414 307 229 789 459 Location to new town Newtown 0.19 0.40 0.10 0.30 0.33 0.47 Adjacency to main road Road 0.42 0.49 0.31 0.46 0.59 0.49 Dist. to downtown Cbd 6298 3069 7687 2829 4230 2096 Dist. to park Park 2441 2959 3348 3469 1094 919 Dist. to river River 1102 1767 1319 2039 780 1192 Dist. to international school School 2439 2811 3454 3197 929 804 Dist. to shopping mall ShopMall 1436 1728 1847 2055 825 725 In the housing unit category, the average price of the apartments is 1060 dollars per square meter, 718 dollars for affordable housing, and 1570 dollars for an unaffordable apartment. The average unit size of unaffordable housing is 24 percent higher than that of affordable housing. In the residence community category, the average land price of the unaffordable group is 61 percent higher than that of the 101 affordable one. The average apartment unit number in the latter is 44 percent higher than that of the former, indicating a far higher building density for the affordable housing project. It was also observed that the unaffordable group has more mixeduse development and foreign development projects and is more closely located to international schools, parks, and riversides. In addition, the affordable group shows more heterogeneous data patterns in the variable of total apartment units and the unaffordable group in foreign development within the community attributes. In the locational sectors, the affordable group is more heterogeneous, particularly for distances to parks, rivers, international schools, and shopping malls (Table 26). 5.3.2. Regression Results The hedonic model produced regression results as shown in Table 27. The stepwise method was applied to the regression model for accurate factor finding. Table 27. Regression Results Independent Variables Total Apts. Affordable Apts. Unaffordable Apts. UnitArea Year AllFloors WardDen AllUnits Pool MixedUse ForeignDev Ventil UnitAccess LandPrice Newtown Road Cbd Park River School ShopMall 0.052 (2.503) * −0.149 (−6.607) ** 0.041 (1.728) −0.061 (−2.717) ** −0.033 (−1.729) 0.084 (3.645) ** 0.103 (5.234) ** 0.272 (11.26) ** 0.002 (0.077) −0.003 (−0.146) 0.429 (16.367) ** 0.081 (3.391) ** 0.031 (1.533) −0.411 (−14.419) ** 0.033 (1.374) 0.013 (0.673) 0.025 (0.928) −0.065 (−3.178) ** −0.035 (−0.896) −0.066 (−1.444) 0.166 (4.575) ** 0.062 (1.53) −0.03 (−0.817) −0.072 (−1.568) 0.048 (1.065) 0.226 (6.171) ** 0.013 (0.296) 0.111 (2.826) ** 0.034 (0.716) 0.046 (1.161) 0.098 (2.574) ** −0.563 (−14.867) ** 0.066 (1.478) 0.069 (1.895) −0.004 (−0.082) −0.137 (−3.595) ** 0.137 (3.89) ** −0.214 (−5.458) ** 0.041 (0.977) −0.322 (−7.086) ** −0.007 (−0.194) 0.304 (7.044) ** 0.072 (2.047) * 0.058 (0.861) −0.101 (−2.622) ** 0.192 (5.462) ** 0.507 (10.324) ** 0.061 (1.342) −0.02 (−0.568) −0.387 (−6.311) ** 0.05 (1.336) −0.078 (−2.238) * −0.16 (−4.426) ** −0.057 (−1.579) n 714 427 287 Adjusted R2 0.761 0.452 0.710 Notes: T-stats in parentheses. ** denotes 1% significance level; * denotes 5% significance level. The Chow test was conducted to verify whether the coefficients in two regressions on the data sets are equal. The test statics is 33.68 and this is bigger than the critical value for F (18,678). Therefore, there was no problem with this structure. 102 In the results, two determinants, unit access structure and distance to downtown, are shown for both the affordable and unaffordable groups. The rest of the significant variables are, however, different for each group. It also indicates that the housing characteristics and environmental factors affect the price structure of housing property in the affordable housing segment, whereas unaffordable segment shows all categories of the attributes of housing, community and locational attributes (Table 28). Comparing to the affordable segments, the price of unaffordable apartments is more influenced by the factors of quality of life such as swimming pool, lower residential quality, mixed-use composition, proximity to better educational and amenity facilities. Table 28. Price Determinants by Attributes Categories Affordable Apts. Unaffordable Apts. Housing Attributes (+)Unit access structure ** (+)Total floors ** (+)Foreign development ** (+)Unit access structure ** (+)Swimming pool ** (+)Unit Area ** (-)Building age ** (-)Natural Ventilation ** Community Attributes (-)Ward population density ** (+)Mixed-use development * (+)Land price ** Locational Attributes (-)Distance to downtown** (-)Distance to shopping malls ** (+)Adjacency to main roads ** (-)Distance to downtown ** (-)Distance to international school ** (-)Distance to river * Notes: ** denotes 1% significance level; * denotes 5% significance level. 5.4. Discussions 5.4.1. Common Price Determinants Both affordable and unaffordable apartment segments display locational influences to downtown. The prices increase as the housing is more closely located to the downtown area, location of District 1 (the central business district). This is related to heavy traffic congestion on roads and poor commuting conditions for citizens, regardless of affordable or unaffordable apartments. Since a high proportion of workplaces in HCMC are concentrated in the downtown districts, accessibility and proximity are critical for housing choice. With insufficient road capacity and increasing numbers of vehicles every year, peak-hour traffic congestion has become appalling (Thanh Nien News, 2015b). Commuters using motorbikes battle daily 103 against not only heavy traffic jams but also contaminated air quality. A report from the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment in Vietnam showed that 70% of pollution gases were generated from motorized vehicles in cities (Hansen, 2016). Motorbikes are the main polluters and the drivers are, consequently, exposed to the contaminants every day (Lan, Liem, & Binh, 2013). In addition, 70% of urban areas will be vulnerable to seasonal urban flooding, further worsening traffic conditions (Eckert & Schinkel, 2009) (Figure 56). In this regard, proximity and accessibility to downtown can be a critical factor for apartment selection. Figure 56. Peak Hour Commuting(left) and Urban Flooding in HCMC(right) The structural attributes of housing also affect housing prices. Apartment developments generally consist of two types of home access: vertical shared access and horizontal corridor access (Figure 57). The former, which allows access to homes organized around a vertical core of elevators or stairs, is a determinant for higher apartment prices in both segments. It shows a greater level of residence individuality than the other and enables more intimate social interaction with neighbors, limiting the number of homes around the core to a manageable number. It can also allow more fresh air and light in communal spaces. However, although the horizontal corridor access carries the benefit of efficient circulation by hallways for more units on each floor, its higher density is a negative factor due to lack of privacy, exposure to noise, and increased feelings of anxiety, stemming from perceptions of insecurity and increased vulnerability to house invasion or robbery which occur frequently in Vietnam. 104 Figure 57. Vertical Shared Access(left) and Horizontal Corridor Access(right) 5.4.2. Unique Price Determinants of Affordable Apartments First, one of the determinants that only applies to affordable housing is foreign development. This means that the prices of apartments built by foreign developers are more expensive than those of local developers. A large portion of affordable housing has been built by the land owners and local builders, who are not professional designers or constructors. The housing unit spaces are not well arranged and the quality of community facilities and open spaces is substandard. However, foreign developers normally supply better-quality affordable housing with superior amenities, and this positively affects their price. The unaffordable apartment segment, on the other hand, is not influenced by whether they have been built by local or foreign developers. Most international developers are focused on the unaffordable segments of the market and there are also professional local developers such as the Vinh Group and Novaland, which have already completed dozens of luxury apartment projects in Vietnam. They are highly appreciated for the excellent quality of their housing developments, which are popular with both foreign and local customers. Therefore, the factor of foreign development only affects the sales price of affordable apartments. Second, proximity to main roads is a critical price factor for this segment. Affordable housing is located farther from CBDs than unaffordable, at respective average distances of 7.6 km and 4.2 km (Table 26). While the downtown districts of HCMC were systemically planned in the French colonial period with a main road network, other districts enclosing the historic downtown districts have grown organically with massive self-built housing developments leading to urban densification and the formation of an unmanaged road infrastructure. Indeed, roads are so narrow (less than 1.5 m in self-built housing districts) that entire areas are inaccessible to either cars or public transport. Thus, since affordable apartments have Source: National Housing Organization 105 normally developed in the self-built dense districts far away from CBDs, proximity to main roads is critical for vehicle accessibility and it affects price determination. Third, high-rise residential towers with more floors also influence prices in the affordable segment of the market. In Vietnam, due to lower land costs, a large proportion of affordable high-rise apartments (with an average of 17 floors; Table 26) were developed within semi-urban districts comprising widespread low-rise townhouses of 2–4 floors. In the physical context, higher affordable apartments located in the low-rise blocks can see their prices increase because of their association with what are seen as conspicuous landmarks in the districts (Figure 58). However, midand high-end apartments are normally located relatively close to downtown comprising numerous high-rise buildings, and thus the attribute of apartment development height is not critical for price determinants in this segment. Figure 58. Affordable Apartments in District 12 Fourth, closer proximity to shopping malls is also a price determinant. This trend more clearly appears in the affordable segment as its coefficient (−0.137) in regression modeling is more than twice as high as that (−0.065) of total apartments (Table 26). As the unaffordable housing is relatively closer to the commercial malls (an average of 0.8 km) than the affordable (1.8 km), this determinant is not critical in that segment. In HCMC, considering the lack of community facilities and a tropical climate with dry and wet seasons, with an average temperature of 28 degrees Celsius, proximity to a shopping mall can be an influential factor for housing choice, particularly for the lower-middle class. Since HCMC is modernizing with an evergrowing boom in supermarkets and shopping malls in recent decades (such as Coopmart, Big C, Aeon Mall, and the Vincom Center), they are positioning themselves not only as commercial centers but also as cultural epicenters for 106 communities of families and friends to enjoy the air conditioning and a variety of entertaining events and performances with free access for the lower-middle class. 5.4.3. Unique Price Determinants of Unaffordable Apartments In the unaffordable housing segment, it was found that the older the apartment, the lower the apartment price. Overall operation and maintenance of apartments in Vietnam is not well managed with a variety of disputes between apartment residents and developers. According to official reports, there is misuse of public areas in the communities, cost disputes over the operation and maintenance of facilities, and issues pertaining to fire prevention and safety, construction quality, unqualified maintenance teams, public security, and inconsistent sales contracts (Tuoitrenews, 2015). These are leading to a rapid aging of apartments and a depreciation of property prices. As affordable apartments have been developed relatively recently (average building age 3.6 years; see Table 26), the building depreciation rate is a less sensitive issue for them. Apartments containing a swimming pool are more expensive in the unaffordable segment. In the tropical climate of HCMC, this is one of the most popular public facilities in the residential sectors. While this is an optional service for the affordable segment, high-end and luxury apartments invariably provide swimming pools as part of a public amenity package, even competing in this area with more advanced outdoor locations and higher quality such as eye-catching rooftop pools. This factor positively influences housing prices. Weather conditions also had a negative significance on the determinant of natural ventilation in the unaffordable apartments. This is not preferred due to both the tropical climate and security issues. To avoid hot weather (an annual average temperature of 28 degrees Celsius with the highest peak of 39 degrees Celsius around noon in HCMC), the residents of unaffordable apartments always opt for airconditioning at home; natural air flow is not a requirement for them. In addition, natural ventilation requires additional windows facing public alleys or corridors in many apartments in Vietnam. This is considered a threat to home security as burglars in Vietnam often break into luxury apartments through windows. It is also found that the larger the unit size of an unaffordable apartment, the more positive its impact on housing price, in that its coefficient (0.137) is twice that of apartments in general (0.052) (Table 27). However, the affordable segment does not show the significance of unit size itself since customers in this segment tend to base their choice of housing units not on unit size but apartment layout, for instance, composed of one room with two toilets or two rooms with two toilets, based on the market price. This means that unit layout conditions are more important than the unit 107 size. According to developers of affordable housing, the bottom line for housing prices is almost fixed for the affordable market at around 50,000 USD and what is most critical in development is more efficient unit layouts enabling more rooms, toilets, and a living room. In sales and marketing brochures, developers frequently use statements such as "An apartment of two bedrooms and two toilets for only USD 40,000," while in the case of high-priced apartments, brochures usually advertise them with comments like "$2500 per square meter in premium New Town". Mixed-use development integrating residential units, commercial units, or offices is becoming a popular trend for property developers in Vietnam since it is considered as a sustainable trend in the compact city concept, minimizing commuters' need to travel and reducing the demand on the urban infrastructure network. While mixed-use structures significantly influence higher housing prices in the unaffordable segment, normally leading to well-managed leasing businesses with secure tenants, the popularity of the trend is not observed in affordable projects due to insufficient mixed-use cases or unsuccessful leasing status with empty retail units or offices, and thus it does not affect housing prices. Proximity to international schools and rivers are also critical determinants in this segment. There are numerous previous studies showing a positive significance of better education facilities and natural conditions, such as parks and rivers, for housing prices. However, in the case of HCMC's affordable housing, an international school with expensive tuition fees is not realistically an influential factor in their lives. Rivers and urban canals near affordable housing in peripheral districts are mostly contaminated and not well managed, so proximity to the environment is not critical for the price of the affordable housing segment. 5.5. Conclusions Apartment development in HCMC has been driven by both the housing shortage caused by the rapid population influx and the boom in real estate investment. Since the opening of the Vietnamese housing market, high-end apartment development has dominated, but the affordable apartment market has also grown gradually in recent decades with the growth of a middle-income class. As demand for this market continues to rise significantly every year, housing developers and policy makers need to understand the market's dynamics and how price determination is affected. According to the hedonic regression model, significant common price determinants were found for both affordable and unaffordable housing segments. Structurally, vertical shared access in apartments creates an upward trend in housing 108 prices because it secures both dwelling individuality and social intimacy with a manageable scale of neighbors, in contrast to horizontal corridor access. In addition, proximity to downtown is also a critical factor in the higher price of apartments in HCMC in terms of proximity to workplaces, given the lack of public transportation, serious traffic congestion caused by enormous numbers of private vehicles, and frequent flooding on roads. Unique price determinants in each segment of housing are related to geographical conditions and their physical environment. Higher multistoried apartments raise the price of affordable housing since they attract premium values as landmarks in low-rise residential districts. Since these districts have developed organically, with urban densification and narrow streets, an apartment's proximity to main roads enabling efficient vehicular access is critical to boosting housing prices. Foreign developments are associated with higher expectations for improved quality of design and construction. However, in the case of the unaffordable housing segment, better housing quality and enhanced amenities in neighborhoods boosted housing prices, as did more recently developed and bigger housing units. Further advanced community facilities and environmental aspects, such as swimming pools, mixtures of residential and commercial development, lower-density neighborhoods, and proximity to rivers and international schools, significantly influence housing values. These results indicate that prices of unaffordable apartments are sensitive to attributes in all three categories, whereas prices in the affordable segment are sensitive only to the attributes of housing and location. Community attributes, like low-density neighborhoods, mixed-use arrangements, and swimming pools, are likely to heighten the quality of life in high-end apartments. Furthermore, as the transitional HCMC creates multiple social and environmental issues with urbanization, such as serious traffic congestion, air pollution, high crime rates, and widespread slums (Gough & Tran, 2009; Ho & Clappier, 2011; UN Habitat, 2014; Waibel et al., 2007; Zhu, 2012), the location of apartments critically impacts price in both segments. In particular, the affordable segment has significant associations with locational traits in the context of urbanization, such as commuting difficulty because of traffic jams, absence of public spaces, and self-built districts that are too dense, so that adjacency to main roads and proximity to downtown are critical for price. These factors are related to the mobility to apartments highlighted in Chapter 4 (Voluntary Residential Mobility and Housing Choice in HCMC). Between the studies, the proximity of public facilities and commuting-related factors were the reasons for residential mobility to apartments (Figure 59). 109 Figure 59. Residential Mobility and Price Determinants The results of this study imply the valuable references for future investors and developers to set up successful housing development strategies and directions in Vietnam, enabling them to understand the different approaches and determinants for multiple classes of residents, and thereby making the national housing supply more economically and socially sustainable. Having largely focused until now on the provision of apartments for the upper-middle classes as a popular and cost-efficient response to housing demand, the government should now strengthen the public– private partnerships to achieve the same result for the lower-middle classes through promoting affordable apartment development. The government and local authorities, who have led regulatory reforms to incentivize further private developer participation and played active roles to encourage an affordable housing supply, should pay close attention to and take account of this study's findings. The regulatory reforms with the revised housing policies and financial aid programs have had a variety of advantageous effects on the housing market in HCMC. They have helped to reorient private housing developers toward the affordable housing market where there are real home ownership needs (World Bank, 2015). They have also reduced vulnerability to investment due to increased household purchasing power and enhanced the variability of the housing market. In particular, since the revised Housing Law of 2015 structured the government's interventions in social housing development, the public and private sectors have been encouraged to work in partnership and this has led to a specific plan for social housing including land selection, housing design, construction, and housing provision. As this study shows key price determinants of locational attributes for affordable housing with proximity to main roads and shopping malls, these partnerships should select available land for social housing construction, securing road connectivity and accessibility to community facilities. As customers prefer affordable housing built by foreign developers because of the more professional quality of design and construction, the partnership should strictly monitor quality management during the course of the development. Therefore, both the private and 110 public sectors need to understand the housing market dynamics associated with customers' preferential interests and urbanization issues in HCMC. This study is, therefore, important in understanding how to pursue housing development in Vietnam on an economically and socially sustainable basis. 111 Chapter 6 Involuntary Residential Mobility and Resettlement in HCMC 6. Involuntary Residential Mobility and Resettlement in HCMC 6.1. Introduction Urbanization and massive population shifts into HCMC resulted in a severe housing shortage and a surge in reckless informal slums around the peripheral areas. Although FDI flowed into residential real estate development, most developers focused on high-end housing developments that were not affordable for lower middle-income residents (Seo et al., 2018). Thus, a serious imbalance in the housing market between the income groups became evident. A number of illegal informal housing arrangements emerged, with slum communities developing in agricultural fields and river banks along urban canals (Du, Tran, Ha, Nhan, & Ry, 2002; Hien, Thanh, Van, Du, & Tran, 2002; Nguyen, 2009; Waibel et al., 2007; Yip & Tran, 2008). Although the economic growth strongly influenced a reduction in the poverty rate by 3%, permanent housing only accounts for about 25% in HCMC and the remaining 75% includes semi-permanent and temporary housing (GSOV, 2012). The sprawling slums became a critical social issue presenting a public health challenge in HCMC. Sewage and toilet waste from slum districts along rivers poured into the canals without filtration, causing serious water pollution and filthy conditions. Furthermore, the slum areas were recurrently flooded during the rainy season; the informal houses built with temporary materials were heavily damaged, some even collapsing, and the dwellers experienced the loss of life and property (UN Habitat, 2008). HCMC recently announced that at least 17,000 households reside in slums, and the city has decided to execute urban renewal procedures for all of the slums within the next five years. In the first phase, the city plans to relocate 11,600 112 households and improve the water environment along the most seriously polluted canals. However, the execution has been delayed due to difficulties in securing funds since the cost is estimated to be $569 million (Thanh Nien News, 2015c). Vietnam has forcibly proceeded with most slum redevelopment without consideration for residents' living conditions, relocation willingness, and preferences. The top-down implementation of the government's policies causes frequent project delays and even casualties while clearing sites due to severe conflicts with the settlers (VBN, 2010). Evicted residents have either created a new slum or relocated into others, and these migration patterns have redundantly cycled with the degrading urban environment (Waibel et al., 2007). In light of the precedent studies 19 discussed, dwellers' relocation and compensation are critical aspects to ensure feasibility, practicality, and sustainability of the project. Securing new settlements for relocation heightens resident satisfaction with resettlement and prevents additional slum formation caused by the forced eviction of residents. The case of cash compensation is evaluated as a high risk that lowers the efficiency of project finances and causes serious delays in the project schedule. Although voluntarily selected, the cash option does not complement the slum upgrading goals of enhancing the urban and residential environment and amenities. In this regard, conditions in our study are significantly similar to THLG's in terms of adjacency to rivers, proximity to downtown, slum renewal plan by city, and relocation expected. Therefore, it has crucial implications in understanding the differences in slum environments and in the investigation of how the specific factors of the slum residence influence decisions regarding relocation and compensation. Therefore, this study will aid in the creation of viable strategies for relocation and negotiation and ultimately assist in the execution of successful slum redevelopment projects in Vietnam. The study empirically examines the slum environment, including demographics, building conditions, infrastructure and accessibility, and the legal property ownership status of the housing structures and land; in particular, slums located near rivers in HCMC are discussed, as the houses are more shanty and thus become the primary target of urban renewal projects by HCMC authorities. Furthermore, I analyze the collected data to understand the dwellers' relocation and compensation preferences in the slum district. Finally, this study explores significant implications for minimizing social conflicts and establishing sustainable strategies for slum redevelopment. The following questions were raised during the activities and have driven this research: 1) When did many slum areas form alongside the rivers of HCMC? 2) What kind of compensation and relocation housing type do slum-dwellers prefer? 3) 19 See the sub-chapter 2.1.4.3. Residential Mobility in Vietnam. 113 Are there different relocation preferences for the geographical location of slum housing, such as riverbank or non-riverbank, and how? 4)What are the implications for sustainable slum redevelopment in Vietnam? 6.2. Research Methods 6.2.1. Site Selection The survey site in District 8 was chosen from representative waterside slums in HCMC, which is enclosed by urban water canals and the Doi River (Figure 60). The population of this area is 431,547 and living conditions are poor in terms of housing and sanitation as well as natural disaster vulnerability compared to other districts in HCMC (UN Habitat, 2008; Vietnam News, 2016). Figure 60. Location of the Study Area in HCMC The site has become widely accepted as one of the typical waterfront slums in HCMC since most of the houses in this area are temporary and its neighborhood infrastructure such as access roads, alleys, and sanitation facilities are fragile. It was observed that the houses alongside the river have outstandingly poor conditions in comparison to the inner area of the block in our site visits. In view of the current Study Area Source: Google Maps 114 situation in adjacent waterfront slums where the redevelopment project had been initiated, it is expected that the target site of this study, especially the waterfront area, will be redeveloped in the near future (Figure 61). Figure 61. Study Area(top) and Dividing IBA and WFA(bottom) 6.2.2. Field Research, Surveys, and Interviews A series of field visits to the target area were conducted for preliminary survey and site observation and to understand the housing conditions and the neighborhood during the first half of 2016. Based on the preliminary research, a questionnaire was 115 designed and on-site surveys through door-to-door interviews were performed from June 22 to July 8, 2016. Local assistants helped to accurately understand the interview and socio-cultural factors of the housing and neighborhood. The questionnaire contained the categories of demographic situation, housing condition, infrastructure, and relocation preference of each household (Table 29). As our research questions sought to highlight why waterfront shanties had inferior conditions, we divided the research site into two parts based on adjacency to the Doi River: the waterfront area (WFA) and the inner block area (IBA). As the primary road (Hoi Thanh) clearly separates the two areas (Figure 61), we first attempted to visit the WFA slum houses (100 units); however, only 29 were available due to the absence of residents or rejection of survey interview. Second, we attempted to use the same sampling strategy and conduct 29 interviews along the primary road on the IBA side. Last, another 29 houses were selected along the secondary inner roads of IBA to understand the housing conditions of the IBA community (Figure 62). In total, 29 samples were collected from the WFA and 58 samples were collected from the IBA. The final data were collected by visiting each house and interviewing the households. Figure 62. Primary Road(top) and Inner Block Road (bottom) in Study Area Table 29. Questionnaire Contents Category Demographic Housing Infrastructure & Public Facilities Relocation Preference Detail Age Family members Marital condition Number of children Education level Occupation Income Location Housing type Building material Residence period Migration reason Area Room Number Tenure LURC BOLURC Toilet Water supply Drinking water Solid waste disposal Sewerage Flood frequency Burglary frequency Waterborne disease Transportation Housing satisfaction Community satisfaction Satisfaction reason Relocation option Compensation option Housing preference Notes: LURC stands for Land Use Right Certificate and BOLURC stands for Building Ownership and Land Use Right Certificate. They indicate legal property ownership in Vietnam. 116 Furthermore, the in-depth interviews were carried out to clarify what sort of housing type they hope to relocate for the resettlements and what the backgrounds of the dwellers are for the housing choice. The 10 interviewees from each IBA and WFA20 explained further detail reasons for their choices. 6.3. Results and Findings The following sections detail the results of the interviews and subsequent statistical analyses. They are divided by major findings. 6.3.1. Inferior Housing Conditions of Waterfront Areas The descriptive statistics for housing attributes and location were used as continuous variables in the data analysis (Table 30). The results of the survey indicate that out of all households surveyed in both locations, the average floor area and number of rooms is 56.43m2 and 1.31 per house, respectively. Furthermore, the average number of people per household was 6.1 and there were 1.51 children per household. From this descriptive data, one significant finding stands out: the houses in the IBA were larger (+28.01m2) and had more rooms (+0.88) than those in the WFA. Table 30. Descriptive Statistics on Selected Housing Traits Variables (continuous) Housing Location Total (n=87) IBA (n=58) WFA (n=29) Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Number of Households 6.10 3.21 6.52 3.37 5.28 2.72 Number of Children 1.51 1.70 1.55 1.79 1.41 1.55 Number of Rooms 1.31 1.50 1.60 1.63 0.72 0.96 Floor Area (m2) 56.43 42.61 66.23 48.77 38.22 17.03 Number of Flood Damage 1.41 2.90 1.10 2.59 2.04 3.44 Notes: IBA stands for Inner Block Area and WFA stands for Waterfront Area. In examining the categorical variables, a chi-squared test of homogeneity was performed to establish the differences in housing conditions according to locational traits (Table 31). The majority (79.3%) of the total respondents replied that they were using some type of toilet. However, when broken down by location, the results reveal that 61.1% of households in the WFA were not using any type of toilet and were directly dumping human waste into the river. This response is directly connected 20 See the appendix for detail information of 20 interviewees. 117 with the household's sewerage condition, in which only half (49.4%) of the total households responded that their houses were equipped with public sewerage. However, most of the households (96.6%) in the WFA were dumping domestic sewage into the river. The results were similar in the condition of the public water supply: even though most of the households (87.9%) were using tap water in the IBA, a large percentage (72.4%) of inhabitants in the WFA was borrowing water from their neighbors who had a public water supply. Additionally, a similar pattern is observed in the housing security category. One-third (33.3%) of interviewees had experienced burglary damage in their current house, and damage from floods occurred 1.51 times per household on average. It appears as though the WFA group is more fragile in terms of housing security because more than a half (51.7%) of respondents reported crime damage with at least two occurrences of flood damage on average. Table 31. Homogeneity for Housing Attributes and Housing Locations Variables (categorical) Housing Location χ2 /p-Value IBA WFA Total Toilet Type*** Into the river 0(0.0%) 18(62.1%) 18(20.7%) 47.305† /0.000 *** Squat toilet 45(77.6%) 11(37.9%) 56(64.4%) Flush toilet 6(10.3%) 0(0.0%) 6(6.9%) Etc. 7(12.1%) 0(0.0%) 7(8.0%) Total 58(100.0%) 29(100.0%) 87(100.0%) Water Supply*** Well 1(1.7%) 0(0.0%) 1(1.1%) 34.136† /0.000 *** Neighbor 6(10.3%) 21(72.4%) 27(31.0%) Tap water 51(87.9%) 8(27.6%) 59(67.8%) Total 58(100.0%) 29(100.0%) 87(100.0%) Sewerage*** River 16(27.6%) 28(96.6%) 44(50.6%) 37.786 /0.000 *** Public sewerage 42(72.4%) 1(3.4%) 43(49.4%) Total 58(100.0%) 29(100.0%) 87(100.0%) Experience of Burglary damage in House*** No 44(75.9%) 14(48.3%) 58(66.7%) 6.621 /0.010 *** Yes 14(24.1%) 15(51.7%) 29(33.3%) Total 58(100.0%) 29(100.0%) 87(100.0%) Household Income Below 5 M VND 9(30.0%) 7(31.8%) 16(30.8%) 2.268 /0.322 5 to 10 M VND 15(50.0%) 7(31.8%) 22(42.3%) Above 10 M VND 6(20.0%) 8(36.4%) 14(26.9%) Total 30(100.0%) 22(100.0%) 52(100.0%) Housing Satisfaction** Unsatisfied 3(5.2%) 3(10.3%) 6(6.9%) 6.550† /0.029 ** Mediocre 32(55.2%) 22(75.9% 54(62.1%) Satisfied 23(39.7%) 4(13.8%) 27(31.0%) Total 58(100.0%) 29(100.0%) 87(100.0%) 118 Notes: Chi-square Test was performed. The cells of each factor with a frequency count below five are fewer than 20%. † Stands for Fisher's Exact Test was performed since more than 20% of cells have expected count more than 5. *** denotes 1% significance level; ** denotes 5% significance level. IBA stands for Inner Block Area and WFA stands for Waterfront Area. M VND stands for Million Vietnamese Dong. The survey results clearly indicate that there are systematic differences in housing conditions between the WFA and IBA groups, and it is concluded that households along the Doi River (WFA) were in worse condition compared to the houses located in the IBA. In line with this difference, we have focused on factors that make differences in housing condition between these two groups. The difference in the levels of satisfaction in each location (13.8% in WFA and 39.7% in IBA) as revealed by the interviewees is quite drastic, and lower levels of satisfaction in the WFA may be related to their inferior housing and environmental conditions. It must be noted that despite the inferiority of the WFA conditions, there is no significant difference in income level between the two areas; the majority of the households (73.1%) earned less than 10 million Vietnamese Dong per month (USD 440). 6.3.2. Settlement Formation in the Waterfront Areas after the Doi Moi The length of residency within each housing location is also examined (Table 32). The majority (56.9%) of the total respondents had lived in their current house for more than 30 years, and many even for more than 50 years (22.2%). However, about two-thirds (68.0%) of households in the WFA had lived in their current neighborhood for less than 30 years. The relevancy between housing location and residence period is clearly observed in a test of independence. Most of households in the WFA had lived there for less than 30 years; thus, they had moved into this waterfront neighborhood at some time since 1986, X2=9.719 (N=72), p<0.01. It is likely that this can be explained in that the migrants who settled within our target site after the Doi Moi (1986) mostly chose the WFA for their new home, since it was not occupied. This is a critical factor in determining why most of the households in the WFA did not have legitimate ownership over their land and house as opposed to the IBA group. This fact could possibly be explained from an institutional perspective. 119 Table 32. Homogeneity for Residence Period and Housing Location Residence Period*** Locations χ2 /p-Value IBA WFA Total Below 30 years (After Doi Moi) 14(29.8%) 17(68.0%) 31(43.1%) 9.719 /0.002 *** Above 30 years (Before Doi Moi) 33(70.2%) 8(32.0%) 41(56.9%) Total 47(100%) 25(100%) 72(100%) Notes: Chi-square Test was performed. The cells of each factor with a frequency count below five are fewer than 20%. IBA stands for Inner Block Area and WFA stands for Waterfront Area. *** denotes 1% significance level 6.3.3. Housing-based Relocation and Cash-based Relocation Table 33 reveals the differences in future relocation preference between residents of the IBA and WFA. Previous studies on slum redevelopment projects in HCMC claim that the satisfaction levels of self-relocated residents who received cash compensation were the lowest when compared to those who chose other options such as in-site relocation and "site and services" (Tran & Vo, 2006). In other words, a self-relocation option with financial compensation was observed as the least sustainable option in similar housing contexts. To determine which factors might influence the respondents to choose the self-relocation option in future redevelopments, we conducted a chi-squared independence test between housing locations and redevelopment options. The results prove that the housing locations in selected sites are closely associated with redevelopment options, X2=6.649(N=84), p<0.05. The households in the IBA are more likely to choose a cash compensation option in redevelopment than the inhabitants in the WBA, and the waterfront group preferred "site and services" or in-situ relocation approaches. Table 33. Homogeneity for Relocation Options and Housing Locations Preferable Relocation Option** Housing Location χ2 /p-Value IBA WFA Total In-situ Relocation 12(21.1%) 10(37.0%) 22(26.2%) 6.649 / 0.036** Site and Service 7(12.3%) 7(25.9%) 14(16.7%) Cash Compensation 38(66.7%) 10(37.0%) 48(57.1%) Total 57(100.0%) 27(100.0%) 84(100.0%) Notes: Chi-square Test was performed. The cells of each factor with a frequency count below five are fewer than 20%. IBA stands for Inner Block Area and WFA stands for Waterfront Area. ** denotes 5% significance level 120 6.3.4. Legal Property Ownership and Relocation Option Preferences The results indicated in Table 33 do not necessarily guarantee that the housing location was a definite factor in redevelopment preference because we cannot clarify the causality based on the given relevancy with housing trait variables. For a detailed analysis, we focused on the distinctive housing traits of each location group with legal property titles, such as a land use right certificate (LURC), building ownership and land use right certificate (BOLURC), and housing tenure statuses. In our analysis, we divided the housing ownership traits into two different variables. The LURC and BOLURC variables identified the households that actually own their house with officially registered certificates. It was noted that the housing tenure does not always align with legal property ownership in that some housing owners do not have any LURC or BOLURC; this means that they have settled in illegal housing. Thus, we clarified the housing tenure with a group of households who own their houses regardless of official housing ownership registration. These variables were chosen not only because they represent characteristics related to property rights, but also because they were identified as contrasting traits in each location group in a statistical significance test. In addition, we formulated a hypothesis that each household's property ownership status is likely to affect their choice for future redevelopment. The results of the chi-squared independent test demonstrate the interrelation between housing locations and property ownership (Table 34). Table 34. Homogeneity for Property Ownership and Housing Locations Property Right Ownership Housing Location χ2 /p-Value IBA WFA LURC*** Unauthorized 4(6.9%) 22(75.9%) 43.884 /0.000*** Authorized 54(93.1%) 7(24.1%) Total 58(100%) 29(100%) BOLURC *** Unauthorized 10(17.2%) 29(100%) 58.538 /0.000*** Authorized 48(82.8%) 0(0%) Total 58(100%) 29(100%) Tenure*** Tenant 1(1.7%) 6(20.7%) 9.399† /0.005*** Owner 57(98.3%) 23(79.3%) Total 58(100%) 29(100%) Notes: Chi-square Test was performed. The cells of each factor with a frequency count below five are fewer than 20%. † Stands for Fisher's Exact Test was performed since more than 20% of cells have expected count more than 5. *** denotes 1% significance level; ** denotes 5% significance level. IBA stands for Inner Block Area and WFA stands for Waterfront Area. LURC stands for Land Use Right Certificate and BOLURC stands for Building Ownership and Land Use Right Certificate. 121 Households living in the IBA were likely to secure proper land use rights (X2=43.884 (N=87), p<0.001), have a housing ownership registration (X2=58.538 (N=87), p<0.001), and most were homeowners whether it was officially registered or not (X2=9.399 (N=87), p<0.01). On the other hand, the WFA group did not retain a certain level of property ownership. While a large percentage (92.0%) of households in the total sample owned their houses, most of the those that were tenants (85.7%) lived in the WFA. To further clarify our hypothesis on the choice of redevelopment methods, we conducted another test of independence. In this case, we regarded property ownership variables, such as LURC, BOLURC, and housing tenure, which are dependent on locations, as independent variables and carried out a test for verifying their impact on redevelopment choices. There is a significant interrelation between the aforementioned housing property ownership traits and redevelopment preferences, except for housing tenure (Table 35 (a), (c), and (e)). The residents obtaining LURC and BOLURC were likely to choose cash compensation in redevelopment; this result was derived from their expectation of a high reward based on their officially secured properties. In other words, if households had strong ownership of their properties, they were more likely to choose instant financial compensation in hopes of obtaining significant financial profit through their secured property rather than "site and services" or slum upgrading, which would provide them with a new residential environment through resettlement. In addition, we questioned whether housing location would still be associated with redevelopment choice preference regardless of property ownership. If the given level of property ownership is equal among households, and housing location remains a factor in their redevelopment preference, then our hypothesis on property ownership may be discredited; in this case, it can be rejected because housing location is a clear factor in choosing one's preferred redevelopment method. To verify its reliability, we introduced verified property ownership traits as control variables on the previously examined test of independence between housing locations and redevelopment preferences. The result clearly indicated that the original relationships disappeared in the LURC and BOLURC variables (Table 35 (b) and (d)). Therefore, it does not necessarily guarantee that the location is a decisive factor for redevelopment preference, because most of the households (92.0%) in our sample group owned their house; thus, the original relationship is repeated in the sample group. This suggests that the original relationship between location and redevelopment preference is spurious, and only property ownership factors such as LURC and BOLURC, affect a household's preference on neighborhood redevelopment regardless of the housing location. 122 Table 35. Property Ownership and Relevancy between Locations and Relocation Property Right Location Relocation Option χ2 /p-Value Housingbased (N=38) Cashbased (N=49) LURC (a)* Unauthorized 14(38.9%) 10(20.8%) 3.286 /0.070* Authorized 22(61.1%) 38(79.2%) (b) Unauthorized IBA 1(7.1%) 3(30.0%) 2.194† /0.272 WFA 13(92.9%) 7(70.0%) Authorized IBA 18(81.8%) 35(92.1%) 1.431† /0.405 WFA 4(18.2%) 3(7.9%) BOLURC (c)** Unregistered 21(58.3%) 16(33.3%) 5.217 /0.022** Registered 15(41.7%) 32(66.7%) (d) Unregistered IBA 4(19.0%) 6(37.5%) 1.568† /0.274 WFA 17(81.0%) 10(62.5%) Registered IBA 15(100%) 32(100%) WFA Housing Tenure (e) Tenant 5(13.9%) 2(4.2%) 2.545† /0.133 Owner 31(86.1%) 46(95.8%) Notes: Chi-square Test was performed. The cells of each factor with a frequency count below five are fewer than 20%. † Stands for Fisher's Exact Test was performed since more than 20% of cells have expected count more than 5. IBA stands for Inner Block Area and WFA stands for Waterfront Area. ** denotes 5% significance level; * denotes 10% significance level. stands for Partial Relation in which no statics are able to be computed. N/A stands for Not Available in which all factors have expected count less than five. 6.3.5. Predominant Preference for Row houses The results of the survey and in-depth interviews indicated that for their resettlement many people hoped to relocate to a row house rather than an apartment. Whether they chose cash-based or housing-based compensation options, 97% selected single-family row houses, which are already predominant in HCMC (Table 36). Table 36. Preferred Housing Type for Relocation Preferred Housing type for Relocation Housing Location Total IBA WFA Row House 56(96.6%) 28(96.6%) 84(96.6%) Apartment 2(3.4%) 1(3.4%) 3(3.4%) Etc. - Total 58(100.0%) 29(100.0%) 87(100.0%) 123 Figure 63 illustrates the main reasons for the row house housing preference, which was available as a resettlement option for involuntary moving. Figure 63. Housing Preference for Relocation They strongly desired an archetypal modern row house, which is extremely efficient as a mixture of residential and commercial services because the ground floor is a flexible space for micro-businesses, such as shops, small restaurants, cafés, or retail units. After the resettlement, the main concern of the households was the loss of informal jobs such as peddling goods or home-based work, and apartments do not provide job opportunities. Mr. OOO (45) highlights this factor in an in-depth interview. "My current house has been a living and working place for the last decade. Half of the space serves as a repair shop to fix motorbikes from this neighborhood. Most people who live in our community know my special techniques for repairing motorbikes, and this is the only way to gain an income to support my family with two kids. If there was an urban renewal project here, a row house is the ideal type of resettlement, as I can keep my job. Many of the slum residents in HCMC know about the previous case of Tan Hoa Lo Gom (THLG) relocation that supported resettlement to apartment blocks, but many of the original slum-dwellers lost their informal jobs and failed to make the repayments on their housing loans. I do not want to go down the same path, and I want to continue my technician job in my shop. So, I would prefer just to have land to build my own row house rather than an apartment unit." In addition, securing property ownership was critical for the relocation of slumdwellers to a row house. A ground-based house includes a BOLURC that certifies ownership of the land and house. Mr. OOO (58) underlines this factor in an in-depth interview. 124 "I have lived in this temporary house by the river for more than 20 years without moving. Even though I have enough money to move, I have stayed here, as I expect there will be an urban renewal project with compensation including the right to get a BOLURC, even for illegal housing. As I do not have any legal property ownership for my residence, government officials visit my current home seasonally, issue penalty fees, and threaten to demolish my house. It has been tiring and stressful to stay, but I will be patient because this area is soon going to be considered for a renewal project. I would enjoy a stable life with a legal residence. A row house is the best option for property ownership because the residential building may go someday, but the land is permanent." Other factors for choosing row houses were underlined by family stories. Half of the interviewees mentioned that they needed a house capable of incremental development as their income increased. They desired to live with their entire family, or relatives moved in together after being separated decades ago during migration from other provinces. The row house is an optimal type of house for incrementally adding more rooms or floors as needed. 6.4. Discussions The survey results strongly suggest that ownership of households in the slum must be considered an important factor in slum redevelopment planning. Even if slums were easily regarded as a homogeneous housing community with poor living conditions in the city, it is observed that the housing condition and the level of property ownership for each household are quite different. From this point of view, if a household has a high expectation of amends in the redevelopment process based on their officially secured property ownership, they are likely to choose cash compensation for higher individual profit. According to this result, and considering previous studies on slum redevelopment in HCMC, the higher proportion of households with secured property ownership in the slum means increased costs a conflict of interest in the decision-making process by residents. This study clearly shows that the level of property ownership is related to housing location, which was presumably affected by the time when the resident first arrived in the slum. Residents that immigrated into the slum after 1986 (Doi Moi) had no choice but to reside along the riverbank in spite of the poor housing conditions, as it was the only area that was unoccupied. It is assumed that housing location had an effect on securing legitimate land use rights and housing ownership registration for the household because the land law revision of 1987 allowed the privatization of land use rights and homeownership. The Vietnamese government 125 enforced the housing policy called "State and the people work together (Nha nuoc va nhan dan cung lam)," which was associated with the land law revision of 1987 and allowed residents to privately own the land that they currently occupied for residential use (Labbé & Boudreau, 2011). Previously, the privatization of property was not permitted since the state adhered to a strong socialist regime. This policy, however, was created to help cope with the housing shortage fueled by rapid urbanization in HCMC because the state scrapped its obligatory housing provision as a socialist country after the Doi Moi (Shin & Choi, 2017). It is assumed that households in the IBA acquired permanent LURCs or BOLURCs from the state for this reason. On the contrary, the WFA did not meet the minimum standards for home sites due to various residential conditions that were inferior to that of the IBA. The poor location of the WFA is evident in the current temporary housing structures present. Most of the houses in the WFA, for instance, extend over the water surface to secure more floor space since there is very limited land for housing construction. It was observed that most of the households in the IBA held legitimate housing ownership registration while those in the WFA did not. It is likely that the state had preferentially allowed property ownership registration to those who had acquired LURCs or BOLURCs by the aforementioned housing policy. The policy also admitted the privatization of housing by residents regardless of their status of residency or legal permission on the land. This type of government intervention in the housing market catalyzed the self-built housing construction boom since the Doi Moi (Quinn, 2014; UN Habitat, 2014). It is for this reason that most of the households (92.0%) own their home whether they hold legitimate LURCs / BOLURCs or not. 6.5. Conclusions Vietnam is a transitional country in Asia that has experienced remarkable economic growth since its market-opening in the late 1980s. As a result of its economic achievements during the last couple of decades, the rapid influx of population into the metropolitan city has provoked a housing shortage and degradation issues. As a result, slums became widespread, particularly along the rivers and canals of HCMC. For this reason, slums have been blamed for the water pollution, poor health conditions, and security issues, all of which threaten the sustainable urban environment. Even though the local government tried to promote a redevelopment plan on the basis of slum demolition, there have been challenges derived from a lack of analysis of the conflicts of interests among the slum 126 inhabitants. In this context, we have discussed the factors contributing to resident preferences in redevelopment options that will encourage sustainable and effective planning. Figure 64. Slum Formation and Resettlement Choice for Slum Redevelopment This study indicates that the level of property ownership in the WFA household group has been differentiated from the IBA group, even though there is no systematic difference in the household monthly income of both groups. Our examination of the detailed factors in slum redevelopment preference among residents shows that the inhabitants who settled before the Doi Moi (1986) were likely to have secured property ownership via LURCs and BOLURCs, and they often chose the cash compensation-based redevelopment approach. On the other hand, relatively new immigrants with deteriorated housing conditions in the slum who are seeking better housing and therefore expecting in-situ relocation (slum upgrading program) or "site and services" have a hard time becoming beneficiaries of redevelopment. Since they were moved into this slum area on account of rapid urbanization triggered by the Doi Moi, it is assumed that the era of economic transition in Vietnam also strongly influences the level of property ownership of households in the slum (Figure 64). In conclusion, it is important that more preferable and sustainable redevelopment options other than cash compensation be considered in slum redevelopment for longterm residents who have retained a high level of property ownership. This will be one of the significant pre-requisites for the sustainable redevelopment of the current waterfront slums in HCMC. 127 Chapter 7 Conclusions of Study 7. Conclusions 7.1. Study Summary Vietnam is a transitional country in Asia that has demonstrated remarkable economic growth since the Doi Moi policy was enacted in 1986. From the economic achievements of the last few decades, a rapid influx into urban areas and the urbanization of metropolitan cities have provoked a housing shortage, widespread slum formation, and the predominance of self-built row house development. To increase housing supply and heighten housing affordability, the Vietnamese government revised the land laws and housing policies to encourage active involvement of private housing developers and investors with financial aid programs. In this context, multi-family housing development has met the housing demand in HCMC, and dynamic residential mobility and housing choices were observed in both voluntary and involuntary moves. From the two main studies carried out, the key factors were demonstrated in residential mobility and housing choice (Figure 65). First, voluntary residential mobility in the housing market was empirically investigated. The main reasons for movement to a row house were related to the housing structure attributes of flexibility and adaptability that enabled households to generate economic gains. The ground-based houses were able to adjust efficiently to life cycle changes and economic rationality. However, the major challenges of the housing were the degraded neighborhood environment that included poor commuting and road conditions, burglary risks, and the absence of community spaces and facilities. The drawbacks drove households to move to apartments using government-backed financial mortgages, for improved accessibility to main roads, security systems, and more community amenities. 128 Second, an extended feature of the study investigated the price determinants of the apartments using a hedonic price model in an affordability frame. With the affordable apartments, housing and locational attributes were observed as affecting the price, whereas the prices of the unaffordable apartments were affected more by advanced community facilities and environmental aspects of the quality of life, such as swimming pools, mixed-use developments, lower-density neighborhoods, and proximity to rivers and international schools. From the urbanization and the transition of HCMC, the location of apartments has had an impact on the price of both types of apartments. In particular, affordable apartments have significant associations with urbanization, including commuting difficulties and traffic jams, and an absence of public spaces. Dense self-built districts adjacent to main roads and with proximity to downtown HCMC were also critical to the price. Third, involuntary residential mobility and housing choices were empirically investigated in a slum to analyze state-driven slum redevelopment. For mobility determination, the key factor was property ownership. The inhabitants who settled before the Doi Moi was introduced in 1986 were likely to have secured property ownership (LURCs and BOLURCs), and they often chose cash compensation-based resettlement, whereas relatively new immigrants who settled in deteriorated housing conditions without property ownership selected in-situ relocation or "site and services" for better housing. As they were moved into this slum area because of the rapid urbanization triggered by the Doi Moi, it can be assumed that the era of economic transition in Vietnam strongly influenced the level of property ownership of households living in the slum. In conclusion, residential mobility and housing issues were associated with the varying contexts of a transitional, urbanized Vietnam that experienced remarkable economic growth by converting a centrally planned economy to a free market mechanism. In particular, the transition of property privatization significantly affected both voluntary and involuntary residential mobility. The predominant preference to move to a row house and secure land and property ownership demonstrated behaviors driven by economics and the phenomenon of market mechanisms within a socialist country. Even for slum redevelopments, the high levels of property ownership were considered the most significant strategy for sustainability of the project. In addition, households focused on the negative externalities of urbanization for residential mobility and housing choices, including dense neighborhood environments, lack of road infrastructure, traffic congestion, air pollution, and widespread slum formation threatening public safety and security (Gough & Tran, 2009; Ho & Clappier, 2011; UN Habitat, 2014; Waibel et al., 2007; Zhu, 2012). These factors were also observed directly or indirectly in the price determinants of the housing. In this regard, the significance of sustainable 129 development in the housing sector was underlined in both qualitative and quantitative terms through urbanization in transitional Vietnam. Figure 65. Summary Diagram of the Studies 7.2. Implications Property ownership has been considered a driving force for development, and it still represents the domain of the wealthy and powerful. Land and housing ownership is an exemplary right of a capitalist society. These studies have implications for understanding urban transitional Vietnam, which was restructured from a state-driven economy to a market-oriented socio-economic society after the Doi Moi in 1986. Before the economic reform, housing was considered as a component of the land value, as markets for land and housing did not exist, and so property transactions were not allowed. However, the notion of housing is now mixed to include a home and economic value with the ideology of capital. The institutional changes of land and housing laws caused the emergence of the real estate market and played a significant role in highlighting capitalist perceptions of housing in Vietnam. With rapid urbanization and serious housing shortages in major cities, people attempted to obtain their own land and houses by securing legal ownership of the properties as a base for economic prosperity. Housing choices for voluntary and involuntary residential mobility were dependent on the mechanisms of settlement and investment, which generated economic profits from the house. As this study clearly demonstrates, the row house was a representative model that prioritized the economic rationality of housing choices in HCMC. 130 However, HCMC is confronted with diverse urban problems and incomplete institutions of private property rights that Vietnam has been recalcitrant to develop. Vietnam is struggling to develop institutions befitting a market economy in transition. With a lack of infrastructure and road networks, illegal expansion or construction, and temporary installation of row houses to obtain property rights or compensation benefits from public land, the city still struggles to develop an adequate number of row houses. Despite incomplete property rights, properties are transacted in the market with various forms of legal documents21 and types of housing ownership 22 (Kim, 2004). Therefore, in addition to economic reform, Vietnam requires institutional property rights reform with policy prescriptions of legal amendments, title regularization programs, and dispute resolution. The clarity of property rights is a crucial prerequisite for the stability of market economies in a transition country such as Vietnam. Unlike other socialist countries, like Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, where the legal system of property rights was based on neo-liberal models, Vietnam, like China, has implemented property right systems based on interventionist policies (Kim, 2004). Some scholars argue that institutional flexibility has played a role in the remarkable growth of transition countries such as Vietnam (Fforde & De Vylder, 1996; Gainsborough, 2002). However, although flexible institutional frameworks can generate efficient productivity during the early stages of the transition period, they cannot be a model for sustainable socio-economic growth. This flexibility can weaken the government's individual property rights management and monitoring system and can cause inequitable socio-spatial distribution with polarization of housing status. 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J U L I O 2 0 1 5 De cómo completar la Tierra. El lugar histórico del pensamiento hispanoamericano según José Gaos (1900-1969) | Héctor Arévalo Benito De cómo completar la Tierra. El lugar histórico del pensamiento hispanoamericano según José Gaos (1900--‐‐ 1969) Héctor Arévalo Benito Universidad Técnica Particular de Loja (Ecuador) [email protected] José Gaos (Asturias, 1900México D.F., 1969) fue un filósofo español que en el verano de 1938 partió en su exilio hacia México. Tras su formación en España1, primero en Valencia, en cuya Universidad inició estudios de Derecho, y luego en Madrid, donde sería discípulo de Ortega y Gasset, Manuel García Morente y Xavier Zubiri2, Gaos alcanzaría su máximo esplendor siendo Rector en la Universidad Central a mediados del mes de septiembre de 1936, prácticamente recién comenzada la fatal contienda fratricida, y unos años antes de su "transtierro" -como gustaba de decir de su propio exilio. Así pues, y tras una sólida educación literaria, filosófica y jurídica, también fue un gran receptor de una vasta tradición fenomenológica, antropológica, psicológica, literaria, religiosa, etc., en primer lugar de raigambre francesa aunque, muy especialmente y originando así sus años de iniciación filosófica3, dentro de la tradición alemana, lengua esta última desde la que traduciría casi un centenar de textos al castellano. Tras su llegada a México, y al reflexionar sobre sus influencias, especialmente las del madrileño Ortega4, pero también las de los mexicanos Samuel Ramos, José Vasconcelos y 1 Para los datos personales y de formación, nos hemos apoyado en: Jesús M. Díaz Álvarez, "Presentación y actualidad de José Gaos", Boletín de estudios de filosofía y cultura Manuel Mindán, n° VI (Junio 2011): 55-66. Especialmente: 55-60 (Otoño 2013 [citado 6 de enero 2014] ed. de Jorge Brioso): disponible en http://apps.carleton.edu/proyecto/equipo/ y en http://www.fundacionmindanmanero.org/images/boletinvi/boletin-vi-4.pdf. También: Agustín Serrano de Haro, "Recuerdo José Gaos en su tierra natal", (Otoño 2013 [citado 9 de enero 2014]) ed. de Jorge Brioso): disponible en http://apps.carleton.edu/proyecto/equipo/. 2 Para conocer con detalle este discipulado de Gaos, con sus maestros Ortega, Zubiri y Morente, véanse los trabajos de Jesús Díaz. 3 Para una panorámica clara y concisa sobre sus lineamientos filosóficos, puede verse con provecho el excelente texto siguiente: Antonio Zirión, "José Gaos (19001969)", en El legado filosófico español e hispanoamericano del siglo XX, eds. M. Garrido, N. R. Orringer, L. M. Valdés and M. M. Valdés (Madrid: Cátedra, 2009), pp. 535544. 4 Puede conocerse de cerca – y muy recientementela relación entre Gaos y Ortega gracias a: José Lasaga, "Prólogo", en José Gaos. Los pasos perdidos. Escritos sobre Ortega y Gasset, ed. José Lasaga (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2013). Asimismo, sobre la fenomenología gaosiana y su relación con la de Ortega, puede verse: Javier San Martín, "La relación de Ortega con la fenomenología como la caja de los truenos de las 182 J U L I O 2 0 1 5 De cómo completar la Tierra. El lugar histórico del pensamiento hispanoamericano según José Gaos (1900-1969) | Héctor Arévalo Benito Antonio Caso, este asturiano universal reparó en las similitudes existentes entre los mencionados autores y desplegó –a mediados de los años cuarenta del pasado siglo-, una novedosa concepción acerca del pensamiento hispanoamericano, concepción desde la que defendió que dicho pensamiento se había ido conformando, desde la Edad Moderna hasta la Contemporánea, tanto en España como en la América de lengua española, partiendo de una hibridación entre literatura y filosofía: la primera, tendente en su contenido al examen de ideas filosóficas; la segunda, y con un estilo deliberadamente estético en su expresión (ensayo, cartas, artículos periodísticos, etc.), encaminándose a tendencias y estilos todos los cuales caracterizan nuestra producción e ideación de nuestro pensamiento en cuanto hablantes de la lengua española. 1. Gaos y el pensamiento del lengua española. Sin embargo, podemos decir que Gaos en sus planteamientos filosóficos, y yendo más allá de estas cuestiones relacionadas con la escritura y la oralidad, propondrá la necesidad de una historiografía del pensamiento de lengua española que aúne el pensamiento liberal (de un corte filosófico más inmanentista), junto al pensamiento tradicionalista (con un marcado acento trascendentalista en lo religioso-filosófico), y elevando ambos por igual en su rango y validez junto con las filosofías cristianas desarrolladas durante la Edad Moderna, y planteando su estudio en conjunción con las filosofías ilustradas que se prolongan desde su inicio en el siglo XVIII –afirma Gaoshasta nuestros días. En consecuencia, defenderá que es de necesidad un estudio, por igual, de tradición y modernidad, historiografiando el pensamiento de autores como: Sor Inés, Gamarra, Feijoo, los jesuitas expulsados, Bolívar, Cadalso, Larra, Balmes, Bello, Sarmiento, Alberdi, Donoso Cortés, Sanz del Río, Lastarria, Barreda, Montalvo, Peralta, Espejo, Hostos, Prada, Martí, Ganivet, Varona, Costa, Rodó, Sierra, Valera, Menéndez y Pelayo, Carlos Arturo Torres, Unamuno, Giner, Ingenieros, Deustua, Korn, Ortega, Vasconcelos, Vaz Ferreira, Caso, Romero y Alfonso Reyes. En definitiva, y aunque no tengamos espacio aquí para entrar a estudiar a los autores mencionados más arriba, la propuesta gaosiana pretende describir cómo el pensamiento en lengua española es un "pensamiento hispanoamericano", e indistintamente de la parte del interpretaciones", Boletín de estudios de filosofía y cultura Manuel Mindán, n° VI (Junio 2011): 11-35. Especialmente: 55-60 (Verano 2011 [citado 10 de enero 2014], Fundación Mindán): http://www.fundacionmindanmanero.org/images/boletinvi/boletin-vi-1.pdf 183 J U L I O 2 0 1 5 De cómo completar la Tierra. El lugar histórico del pensamiento hispanoamericano según José Gaos (1900-1969) | Héctor Arévalo Benito Atlántico desde la que nos llegue su producción, pue ésta entraña en sí mismo una mutua e inevitable imbricación entre literatura, estética, pedagogía, historia, filosofía y religión a que conforma la historia de la cultura occidental escrita en nuestra lengua. Recorrer este giro en el pensamiento, y estudair cómo se ha dado en los distintos autores del pensamiento hispanoamericano, es el objetivo general que tiene nuestro asturiano universal. Por nuestra parte -y sin esperar que el propio D. José Gaos nos otorgue el permiso-, tratemos también a continuación de historiografiar algunas de las ideas filosóficas sobre América y la cultura de lengua española –si entendemos a Gaos como un epígono de su propia propuesta-, y centrándonos en un punto algo desconocido, pero muy original, de su pensamiento panamericanista. 2. Pasado, presente y futuro del pensamiento hispanoamericano. José Gaos y el historicismo. En su texto de 1945, Pensamiento de Lengua Española (reeditado en México en 19905), José Gaos se plantea hacer una "reflexión del pensamiento hispano-americano sobre sí mismo"6. En este sentido, cabe indicar que comenzará planteándose cuál es el tema del pensamiento hispanoamericano: El tema expreso del pensamiento hispano-americano actual es él mismo en su pasado, presente y futuro7. Así pues, Gaos se pregunta cuál ha sido el pasado del pensamiento hispanoamericano –arrancando desde la Edad Moderna-, así como también se interroga acerca del presente y, de manera original, sobre su futuro. Pero nuestro filósofo –asegura8que al "ser la historia negocio de prudencia y no ocio de matemático", hay "un riesgo de errar" que pone en juego "la forzosidad de decidirse". Y así, este urgir verdades que es la vida humana, por muy históricas y provisionales que puedan aquéllas parecer, significa para Gaos que hay que decidirse. Y por ello se decide a creer en "la verdad" del historicismo, pero aún más en "lo absoluto" de la verdad provisional: 5 José Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española. Pensamiento Español. Vol. VI, (México: UNAM, 1990). 6 Como decimos, aquí y ahora citamos por la edición más reciente: José Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española. Pensamiento Español. Vol. VI, (México: UNAM, 1990),104. 7 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 98. Toda la cursiva es de Gaos. 8 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 98. Cursiva nuestra. 184 J U L I O 2 0 1 5 De cómo completar la Tierra. El lugar histórico del pensamiento hispanoamericano según José Gaos (1900-1969) | Héctor Arévalo Benito Del historicismo es superación lo absoluto de la "moral provisional"9. Creemos que para Gaos el historicismo no es que quede obsoleto, sino que más bien al contrario éste se ve reforzado por la verdad de la "moral provisional". Así, estas verdades históricas o provisionales son cruciales en nuestro vivir, que es, digamos, "urgente", pues se hacen obligatoriamente definitivas en la medida en la cual: De la vida hace tema su entrañablemente forzoso problema de decidirse, de decidir de sí10. Pero no sólo en "la vida" urge decidirse –dirá Gaos-, sino también en el pensamiento. Y para decidirse en el pensamiento, debemos ser conscientes de que: [...] todo pensamiento es su pasado, presente, futuro: porque su problema es el de decidir de sí en los tres11. Por eso Gaos quiere resolver este problema del pensamiento hispanoamericano: ¿qué ha de decidir éste de y sobre sí mismo? Y lo plantea de forma radical cuando afirma que "el tema expreso del pensamiento hispano-americano actual es él mismo en su pasado, presente y futuro"12. Debemos tomar la urgente decisión de pensar, pues, sobre el tema expreso actual del pensamiento hispanoamericano, y hacer este tema completamente explícito implica conocer con profundidad cuál fue su pasado, cual está siendo su presente –en la década de los cuarenta, cuando Gaos escribe estas líneas-, y cuál será su futuro. En este sentido, podemos adelantar que Gaos en su toma de decisión a favor de la (hipotética) verdad provisional e histórica hispano-americana, apostará, desde ya y contra todo pronóstico de riesgo, por ella misma: pues está firmemente convencido de que conocer qué es el pensamiento hispanoamericano del pasado, dependerá del "presente" -el de mediados del siglo XX-, y del "futuro", es decir: de nuestro presente. De esta manera, el tema del pensamiento hispanoamericano implica un autoconocimiento de su pasado y presente – apropiándonos de ambos-, así como la proyección de éstos en su futuro. En consecuencias, sobre este problema no hay más remedio que decidir, que decidirse. 9 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 98. 10 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 98. 11 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 98. 12 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 98. Cursiva de Gaos. 185 J U L I O 2 0 1 5 De cómo completar la Tierra. El lugar histórico del pensamiento hispanoamericano según José Gaos (1900-1969) | Héctor Arévalo Benito Y Gaos afirma, para ello, que una "aplicación del criterio" acerca de qué sea filosofía (qué entendamos por ésta), decide obviamente sobre el futuro de la misma. En efecto: considerará así que hay además una manera decisiva en que el futuro afecta al pasado: La filosofía pasada será filosofía o no según las decisiones de la futura. Los maestros son hechos por los discípulos. El pasado, por el presente. Lo anterior, por lo posterior13. Así pues, para Gaos 14 qué abarque lo que denominamos como "filosofía" es, definitivamente, un posicionamiento histórico. Pero dicho posicionamiento considera nuestro autor que no debe de ser inconsciente, sino que estamos obligados a ser consecuentes con las decisiones que hemos tomado acerca de qué consideramos que es "filosofía". En este sentido, dibuja a grandes rasgos dos posibilidades: Decidir que los pensadores contemporáneos tienen razón, que la metafísica está bien superada, que el inmanentismo es la única filosofía posible [...] 15. Es una opción posible, bien definida; pero también, afirma, la contraria: [...] que son las "obras maestras" de la filosofía lo que es "eminentemente" ésta, o, con único sentido histórico pleno, que la filosofía es su pasado entero [...]16. Así, dependiendo de qué opción tomemos, para Gaos17 estamos decidiendo sobre si continuar o no con un inmanentismo moderno y contemporáneo. De este modo, se trata de si nos proponemos "continuar la historia de la filosofía, con una filosofía más o menos nueva" (el primero de los casos), opción la cual ha tomado nuestro pensar como hispanoamericanos; o si, por el contrario, preferimos reiterar una metafísica18 -estrictamente trascendentalista-, proponiendo que lo que define a "la filosofía es las obras maestras de ellas" (el segundo de los casos), y lo cual se podría corresponder con las definiciones tradicionales que sobre filosofía 13 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 99. 14 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 94. 15 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 99. 16 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 99. 17 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 99. 18 Y esta metafísica, matiza, "ni será completamente nueva, ni será completamente la antigua". Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 99. En visto de lo cual, hacer filosofía metafísica significaría un "dar vueltas" si poder salir del círculo vicioso. 186 J U L I O 2 0 1 5 De cómo completar la Tierra. El lugar histórico del pensamiento hispanoamericano según José Gaos (1900-1969) | Héctor Arévalo Benito se han venido transmitiendo -es decir, entendiendo ésta19 como una "filosofía metafísica, sistemática y metódica"-. En definitiva, a Gaos esta dependencia del presente y futuro respecto del pasado, le parece un hecho pues: [...] los metafísicos del pasado [=trascendentistas], los pensadores del inmediato [=inmanentistas], los filósofos de todos los tiempos pasados decidieron, frente a sus pasados respectivos, que la filosofía [auténtica] era la suya, la metafísica o la inmanentista, y [decidieron que] la del futuro fuese fiel a la suya [...]20. En definitiva: Lo que ha sido la filosofía fue decidido, [lo que ha sido] la historia de la filosofía ha sido decidida en cada presente actual por él –y seguirá siéndolo21. Estamos ante un argumento que se puede inscribir dentro de la conocida propuesta gaosiana acerca de la filosofía de la filosofía22. Sin embargo, lo que nos interesa aquí resaltar es que Gaos con esta afirmación quiere mostrar que al lado de las definiciones "clásicas" de la filosofía –iniciadas en un determinado tiempo y lugar-, también hay espacio para una filosofía y pensamiento hispanoamericanos: sólo hay que saber verlo; y esto se hará mejor cuanto antes decidamos que nuestra forma de hacer filosofía, de pensar en definitiva, no tiene por qué ser necesariamente la forma en que se ha venido haciendo filosofía en el pasado y en ciertas partes del mundo. Por esta razón, Gaos nos proponía esa larga lista de "pensadores hispanoamericanos" –que escuetamente relacionábamos más arriba-, que el futuro de nuestro pensamiento debe atender a todas las líneas, con el fin de reconstruir nuestro pensamiento de lengua española tanto desde el liberalismo de un Ortega, Reyes, Montalvo o Bolívar – próximos al inmanentismo filosófico-, así como al tradicionalismo de un Menéndez Pelayo, Peralta o Valera, quizá más inscritos en una concepción filosófico-religiosa de corte más trascendentalista pero igual de necesario en el orbe del pensamiento. Así pues, Gaos nos está dejando entrever en este punto que si sólo hubiera existido un modo de hacer filosofía, entonces nunca habrían nacido el resto de filosofías –y, en definitiva, 19 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 96. 20 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 99. 21 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 99. 22 No vamos a entrar aquí en esta extensa e interesante cuestión, pudiendo ser otro tema distinto de investigación. 187 J U L I O 2 0 1 5 De cómo completar la Tierra. El lugar histórico del pensamiento hispanoamericano según José Gaos (1900-1969) | Héctor Arévalo Benito no se habría desarrollado la historia de la filosofía. Nos está invitando, conminando, a que tomemos partido por un modo nuevo de hacer filosofía, quizá algo más inmanentista que trascendentista (pero sin olvidar el altísimo valor que poseen ambas...), así como también a que nos atrevamos a tomar y entender como filosofía aquello que tradicionalmente no ha sido considerado como tal, pues, para Gaos los tratamientos más literarios del pensar filosófico también son pensamiento, ya sean que tomen temas religiosos, políticos, pedagógicos, éticos o filosóficos. Es decir: no se trata de que no sea filosofía aquello que no coincida con ciertos parámetros; sino, más bien, de que ampliemos estos parámetros. En definitiva –podemos arriesgarnos a decir-, Gaos nos está sugiriendo que, si se quiere decir kantianamente, nos atrevamos a pensar: nos sirvamos de nuestra propia inteligencia y dejemos de ser <<menores de edad>> con relación a la Señora Philosophia. Autonomía frente a heteronomía en lo tocante a lo que consideramos que es o no filosofía. Nos está señalando que al plantearnos el sentido y los temas del pensamiento hispanoamericano, ya estamos haciendo filosofía. Y puede, y debe tener este pensamiento nuestro, unidad, dirección y sentido: pues ambas propuestas –"tradicionalistas" o "liberales"-, se han alimentado unas de otras. En realidad, Gaos considera que esta visión que él ofrece, está planteada desde una perspectiva ilustrada del valor del pensamiento hispanoamericano, estando así en consonancia con el tratamiento especial y la importancia que, para Gaos, tuvo la Ilustración. En este sentido, se puede entender por qué Gaos afirma que: En conclusión: Es porque el pensamiento universal, o si no tanto, el occidental está ahí conceptuándose a sí mismo como filosofía, en parte, una u otra, o en su totalidad, por lo que el pensamiento hispanoamericano le plantea, y singularmente se plantea a sí mismo, el problema de su propia naturaleza y valor, es decir, de su propia conceptuación en relación con él, el occidental 23. Gaos afirmará24 que la solución acerca del mencionado problema estriba en la propia "conceptuación que éste [el pensamiento hispanoamericano] hace de sí mismo", conceptuación la cual "forma parte, y parte fundamental de la historia del pensamiento, pasada y presente [,] y futura". De este modo, entiende que el pensamiento hispanoamericano es parte fundamental de la historia del pensamiento de todos los tiempos; pero para poder 23 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 99.Cursiva nuestra. 24 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 99. 188 J U L I O 2 0 1 5 De cómo completar la Tierra. El lugar histórico del pensamiento hispanoamericano según José Gaos (1900-1969) | Héctor Arévalo Benito reconocerlo como tal, nos vuelve a repetir que hay que tener en cuenta que el pensamiento hispanoamericano: [...] depende de la historia del pensamiento, presente y sobre todo futura, si ya no pasada25. Pero respecto a esta solución Gaos nos advierte26 que la "proposición formal" acerca "de la filosofía que se deba hacer o de la que se va a hacer", escapa a las intención de su texto –es decir, Pensamiento de Lengua Española -, aunque en él queden reflejadas las mismas como uno de los primeros hitos de las reflexiones filosóficas sobre la naturaleza y sentido de la "filosofía americana". Así pues, Gaos sólo va a "apuntar" -en el texto que aquí comentamosuna solución. Por ello nos quiere corroborar que en este apartado final del "Primer Capítulo" de su Pensamiento de Lengua Española, él: [...] se ha limitado a apuntar las condiciones en que se hará la [filosofía] que se haga, [teniendo en cuenta] cómo se ha hecho la que se ha hecho [...]27. Considera 28 entonces que "el problema del pensamiento hispano-americano", es decir, de "la reforma o formación de sus pueblos" mediante su "vocación de pedagogos de pueblos", parece deberse "a la tradición del espíritu de la raza –la raza por la que hablará el espíritu [...][-]", en la medida en la cual: [...] el eticismo y esteticismo ético entrañan una tendencia pedagógica y política29. Casi es parte del espíritu de la raza –y, en efecto, oímos aquí las resonancias alemanas de Martin Heidegger; aunque escuchamos antes, en lontananza, las griegas: la kaloagathía-, decíamos, en cuanto tendencia del pensamiento hispanoamericano hacia temas ético-estéticopedagógico-políticos. Porque, de hecho, el eticismo considera Gaos que: [...] tiende de suyo a traducirse en educación propia y ajena, individual y colectiva [...]30. 25 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 99. 26 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 100. 27 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 100. Con relación a las cuales, hay que decir que Gaos las considera una "primera aproximación al tema, hipótesis de trabajo, [que] están no sólo expuestas, sino dispuestas a todas las rectificaciones". 28 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 100. 29 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 100. 30 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 100. Gaos añade que "aunque no forzosamente", para lo cual, trae a colación una apreciación de Husserl acerca de la ética según Schopenahuer: "Para Schopenahuer, que a consecuencia de su teoría del carácter innato rechaza radicalmente todo moralizar práctico, no hay ética en el 189 J U L I O 2 0 1 5 De cómo completar la Tierra. El lugar histórico del pensamiento hispanoamericano según José Gaos (1900-1969) | Héctor Arévalo Benito Nuestro asturiano universal considera que la mayor parte de la <culpa> de este "problema" debe considerarse atribuible a "la nueva edad histórica, al espíritu del tiempo", en definitiva: [...] la decadencia política y cultural de España, la inferioridad política y cultural de la América española, en comparación con los países vecinos de Europa y América, es el aspecto negativo del problema; la pedagogía política, el positivo31. De esta manera, reconoce el problema, pero sabe que tiene una consecuencia positiva: la pedagogía política. No obstante, Gaos apuesta por que el problema sí tenga solución, a través de [...] el eticismo político, el esteticismo ético y político, con la consiguiente acción política, y el personalismo y verbalismo tan íntimamente unidos [...]32. Y siempre, por supuesto, esta combinación entre ética, política, estética y pedagogía se nos ofrece, e indistintamente del origen de los lineamientos del pensamiento de los que provengan esta soluciones -ya sean pensadores hispanos e hispanoamericanos tradicionalistas/trascendentistas o liberales/inmanentistas-, pero siempre dentro del pensamiento escrito e ideado en lengua española –como categorías propias, si bien no exclusivas a él, de nuestro pensar. 3. Desarrollos y consecuencias del inmanentismo y trascendentalismo en España, Inglaterra y Alemania. En definitiva: Gaos sólo se está preguntando33, en voz alta, si esta tradición que ha descrito se remonta a la "kalokagathía mediterránea"34. Y aunque ya ha explicado –y lo hizo, sentido de un arte, pero sí de una ética como ciencia normativa, que labra él mismo. Pues en modo alguno deja caer también las diferencias morales de valor". 31 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 100. 32 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 100. 33 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 100. 34 La Kalokagathía "desempeña un papel importante en la formulación de muchas concepciones éticas, éticosociales y (en un sentido muy amplio de `políticas ) ético-políticas de la antigüedad. Literalmente, la cualidad de la kalokagathía equivale a la cualidad <<belleza y bondad>>; posee kalokagathía quien es kalós, kagathós, <<bello>> y <<bueno>>. Ahora bien, `ser bello significa aquí primariamente <<ser noble>> en cuanto ser un <<buen ejemplar del propio tipo>>; `ser bello es, por así decirlo, <<ser de raza>>. Por eso kalokagathía se traduce con frecuencia por <<nobleza y bondad>>. Podría asimismo traducirse por <<honra>> y por <<honor>>. En efecto, el kalós kagathós es equiparado con frecuencia la <<hombre honrado>> -u <<hombre de honra>>-, no sólo en cuanto <<un hombre honrado>>, sino más bien en el sentido de ser el modelo de todo hombre [ser humano] honrado, de pertenecer a las selectas filas de los kaloi kagathoi. A la vez, tal hombre 190 J U L I O 2 0 1 5 De cómo completar la Tierra. El lugar histórico del pensamiento hispanoamericano según José Gaos (1900-1969) | Héctor Arévalo Benito en otra parte, muy tajantemente35por qué la historia propiamente dicha del pensamiento hispanoamericano no comienza hasta la Edad Moderna, se plantea ahora, incluso, si los orígenes de este espíritu de nuestro pensamiento como hispanoamericanos, no comenzaron ya con Séneca –y, en buena proporción, la prolongaron los senequistas-: ¿Es que al eticismo del estoico será extrínseco el esteticismo del escritor, del estilista? Del senequismo, ¿no será un ingrediente cierto esteticismo? –al menos del más auténtico, del de Séneca-, pero ¿no igualmente de los senequistas que son grandes escritores?, ¿serán estos casuales? 36. En definitiva, Gaos cree que: El inmanentismo del problema y en la solución, la aplicación a la política y el empleo de una ética, estética y por ende pedagogía incluso inatentas a la trascendencia agazapada tras ellas como tras todo, debe atribuirse con el problema a la nueva edad y su espíritu37. Así, la tradición de Occidente –la Cristiandadera "la de una trascendencia religiosometafísica", y Gaos se va a detener38 en comentar cómo se desarrolló "la acción que emprenden a esta tradición [cristiana] los dos grandes antagonistas del duelo". Esto es importante, porque de este duelo surge un "protagonista creciente de la edad moderna hasta nuestros días". Se está refiriendo a lo que denomina "grandes autodisolutores de la escolástica", es decir, los filósofos del pensamiento inglés: Bien significativo parece el hecho de la ausencia, prácticamente, del pensamiento inglés en los períodos de la gran sistemática metafísico-cristiana y, por el contario, su presencia constante y preponderante en los alternos periodos de disolución de esta sistemática [metafísico-cristiana]39. Así, dirá que aparte de S. Buenaventura, S. Alberto Magno, Sto. Tomás de Aquino (que son "germano-italianos"), en el periodo cartesiano -y que considera "muy internacional"- honrado -<<noble y bueno>>es el <<buen ciudadano>> [...]". Para ampliar sobre este concepto, es una buena introducción la voz "kalokagathía", en el texto de José Ferrater Mora, Diccionario de Filosofía. Vol.III (Barcelona: Alianza Editorial, 1979), 1838. Algunos de los muchos autores que han tratado de cerca esta cuestión han sido Aristóteles, pero también Platón, Sócrates, Jenofonte, Plotino y Shaftesbury, entre otros. 35 "[...] las modernas filosofías nacionales empiezan con el término de la constitución de los modernos Estados nacionales y con el empleo de los idiomas correspondientes. Por tanto, Séneca, San Isidoro, los filósofos árabes y judíos españoles no integran o contribuyen a integrar una filosofía propiamente española, suponiendo que integrasen o contribuyesen a integrar una filosofía, compensando el aislamiento de un Séneca y de un San Isidoro por la serie árabe y la serie judía, culminantes además dentro de las filosofía respectivas". Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 50. 36 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 100. 37 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 100. 38 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 102. 39 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 102. Cursiva nuestra. 191 J U L I O 2 0 1 5 De cómo completar la Tierra. El lugar histórico del pensamiento hispanoamericano según José Gaos (1900-1969) | Héctor Arévalo Benito deducimos40 por sus palabras que se encuentran Descartes, Spinoza, seguramente Leibniz y Hume. Pero también encontramos, finalmente, los pensadores ingleses: en la Baja Edad Media, Duns Scoto, Guillermo de Occam, Roger Bacon; en el Renacimiento, Francis Bacon; en el periodo cartesiano, Hobbes. Posteriormente, en la Ilustración inglesa, más "autodisolutores" aún del escolatiscmo fueron: Locke, Newton, Hume, incluso Berkeley; y los "subsecuentes positivismo y pragmatismo": J.S. Mill, William James y Dewey. Es de este modo cómo Gaos considerará, en consecuencia, que Inglaterra ha contribuido más a la instauración de la modernidad que la propia Alemania, pues Inglaterra "a partir de la Ilustración impone a Occidente el inmanentismo contemporáneo", mientras que Alemania, afirma, "en reacción precisamente a la Ilustración y nominalmente a la suma de la inglesa, a [David] Hume, [y] lleva a cabo la última y más grandiosa sistemática metafísico-cristiana". 41 Es paradójico, según se desprende de lo que plantea Gaos42, que Alemania llegue a dicho inmanentismo, y que además llegue, incluso, algunos siglos más tarde que a España. No obstante, esta es la explicación que Gaos ofrece sobre cómo se construye -desde Inglaterra un inmanentismo, al tiempo que en Alemania un trascendentalismo-, la Edad moderna. Así, estima Gaos que en la tradición alemana sólo cuando se disuelven los elementos de la sistemática metafísico-cristiana (es decir, "con la escuela hegeliana" 43), solamente después será posible que, de forma real, comience con Karl Marx dicho inmanentismo alemán: [...] con la afluencia a su curso mental, primero, del pensamiento francés continuador de la Ilustración y, luego, de la realidad de la vida inglesa con la que estaba íntimamente vinculado el pensamiento inglés: y el inmanentismo se extiende a Alemania hasta nuestros días también44. En resumidas cuentas: que en el caso de Alemania, comenzaría dicho inmanentismo (aproximadamente) a mediados del siglo XIX, mientras que en España y en la América de habla española Gaos considera45 que comenzaría mucho antes –si bien, no antes que en 40 "[...] en el periodo cartesiano, muy internacional, entre dos grandes franceses, un gran judío ibérico-holandés, un gran alemán, el gran inglés es algo aparte, como que es más que nada un ligamen tren dos de los períodos de disolución; la última gran sistemática es exclusivamente teutónica". Con estos últimos, suponemos que se refiere a Kant, Hegel, quizás Marx, etc. Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 102, 41 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 102. 42 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 102. 43 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 102. 44 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 102. 45 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 103.Resumiendo: si bien es cierto que el pensamiento germanoitaliano (repárese en el aristotelismo de San Alberto Magno) en torno al siglo XIII, y el pensamiento inglés (Duns Scoto, Occam, Roger Bacon) tuvieron una apertura entre los siglos XIII y XVI sin parangón, y que 192 J U L I O 2 0 1 5 De cómo completar la Tierra. El lugar histórico del pensamiento hispanoamericano según José Gaos (1900-1969) | Héctor Arévalo Benito Inglaterra, según hemos visto. Y eso que, según Gaos, "el pueblo español aceptó un papel de campeón de la Cristiandad" durante la Edad Media y los comienzos de la Edad Moderna: [...] que primero le condujo a que su pensamiento todo, y con él partes capitales del occidental, la escolástica y la mística, alcanzasen su trascendentismo sumo o nuevas alturas comparables a las sumas, en obra tanta y tal proporción suya como la Contrarreforma, que está diciendo [=sosteniendo] su reacción primaria, espontánea, propia, contra la disolución de la Cristiandad y la instauración de la modernidad y del inmanentismo, pero que luego contribuyó a conducirle a la decadencia política internacional y a la cultura y nacional toda [...]46. Esta es la situación de España e Hispanoamérica, en contraste con el resto de lo que estaba sucediendo en Europa. Así, esta transformación, que puede parecer irrelevante, sin embargo va a ser decisiva para lo que el futuro pueda deparar a los países de lengua española, con la América hispana "a la cabeza": la apertura a un nuevo futuro, pero con un presente vívido y rico en experiencias del pasado de las que aprender. 4. De cómo el inmanentismo hispano (y su trascendencia agazapada) puede arbitrar la filosofía contemporánea. Pero a pesar de esta inicial resistencia al inmanentismo, España acabó entrando en dicha filosofía –y tanto-, pues como decimos el pensamiento hispanoamericano: [...] entra, y aun no sin resistencia ni lentitud, por el inmanentismo y sus efectos materiales, que se creerían instantánea e irresistiblemente confortables47. Y eso que España parecía tener una "misión y destino a un <<más allá>>", sobre todo si se tenía en cuenta que "la revelación de los pueblos es su historia" –afirmaba Gaos48-. Pero a esta (supuesta) misión, España se revelaría con el tiempo como un pueblo en el cual ni "la más vieja tradición ni siquiera a la más reciente" se escaparían al inmanentismo. Es precisamente este punto –esta historia de la gigantomaquia entre el trascendentalismo y el inmanentismo en España y la América española-, el que hace que: desembocó en la filosofía anglosajona en la filosofía de Hume, W. James o J. Dewey, sin embargo en Alemania hubo cierta resistencia al inmanentismo a causa de las sistemáticas metafísico-cristianas que se extendieron hasta el Romanticismo. El caso de España es el que quiere destacar José Gaos, ya que a pesar de no existir tal aperturismo hacia lo inmanente hasta ya muy entrada la Edad Moderna –si lo comparamos con el ámbito teutón-, sin embargo, y a pesar de su catolicidad contrarreformista, fue "lento", pero, digámolo así "seguro". 46 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 103.Cursivas y negritas nuestras. 47 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 103. 48 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 103. 193 J U L I O 2 0 1 5 De cómo completar la Tierra. El lugar histórico del pensamiento hispanoamericano según José Gaos (1900-1969) | Héctor Arévalo Benito [...] justamente por ello pudiera tener el pensamiento hispano-americano la originalidad y plenitud de ser el extremo crítico del inmanentismo contemporáneo49. Ya hemos dicho que este inmanentismo podríamos situarlo como originado en la Edad Moderna. Por ello, Gaos ha visto que el pensamiento hispanoamericano está, literalmente, "a la cabeza" de las filosofías inmanentistas –por su desarrollo desde la Edad Moderna, y por altos sus representantes hasta las fechas en que Gaos escribe esta líneas; especialmente, aquellos más "liberales" que relacionábamos un poco más arriba-, y sólo ella puede guiar, quizás por su experiencia (toda la trascendencia agazapada en el tradicionalismo español, tan antiguo como fundamental para entender nuestro pensar como hispanoamericanos), y por sus grandes autores, el futuro de dicho inmanentismo en la historia del pensamiento universal. Así pues, está convencido que el pensamiento hispanoamericano: [...] pudiera ser el llamado [=elegido] a decidir al menos para sí, eventualmente para el pensamiento contemporáneo, sobre este inmanentismo. De haber de decidirlo en una filosofía, parece que habría de serlo en una expresa filosofía de sí mismo, en función de una filosofía de Hispano-América en general. Tema sobreentendido, tácito, o expreso, de toda filosofía es ella misma: porque a la filosofía es esencia, con la "principialidad", el decidir de sí [...]50. En definitiva, nos parece que Gaos considera que la filosofía hispano-americana puede desempeñar el papel principal de las filosofías "inmanentistas" dentro del inmanentismo de toda la filosofía y del pensamiento contemporáneos, en la medida en la cual aquélla se plantea cuál es su naturaleza y valor, al tiempo que se replantea cuál es el sentido y el alcance de qué significa hacer filosofía hoy. En este aspecto, tomemos un párrafo ya citado anteriormente, pero fijándonos en otra parte del mismo: En conclusión: Es porque el pensamiento universal, o si no tanto, el occidental está ahí conceptuándose a sí mismo como filosofía, en parte, una u otra, o en su totalidad, por lo que el pensamiento hispanoamericano le plantea, y singularmente se plantea a sí mismo, el problema de su propia naturaleza y valor, es decir, de su propia conceptuación en relación con él, el occidental 51. Pensamos que este es el reto conceptual, y con fuertes consecuencias para la acción, que le plantearía, según Gaos, nuestro pensar como hispanoamericanos al pensamiento universal (o si se prefiere, tomado éste en otra porción menor: "el occidental"): si el 49 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 103. 50 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 103. 51 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 99.Cursiva nuestra. 194 J U L I O 2 0 1 5 De cómo completar la Tierra. El lugar histórico del pensamiento hispanoamericano según José Gaos (1900-1969) | Héctor Arévalo Benito "pensamiento occidental" está constantemente conceptuándose a sí mismo como filosofía, en parte, una u otro, o en su totalidad, éste debe tomar radical y definitivamente en cuenta que el "pensamiento hispanoamericano" aporta un inmanentismo que es novedad en el conjunto de todos los inmanentismos existentes del pensamiento occidental, y que dicho pensar hispanoamericano puede representar la parte más pujante de las filosofías inmanentistas occidentales. Pues no sólo supo el pensamiento español entender a tiempo, durante la Modernidad, la necesidad de dar un giro hacia el inmanentismo –si bien lento, pero progresivo-, sino que supo (y quizá sea esto, para Gaos, lo más valioso), mantener viva y preservar toda la sabiduría del ámbito de lo trascendente, que durante siglos había acumulado y había estado patente en nuestro pensar, y, ahora, en nuestros días, al tiempo patente y latente –en cuanto "trascendencia agazapada". Pues Alemania no sólo tardo mucho en dar el giro a comprender la necesidad de la inmanencia; sino que, y lo cual quizá sea peor para Gaos, Inglaterra demasiado pronto se olvidó de la trascendencia agazapada en la antropología constitutiva de la naturaleza humana. Y lo mejor de esta hipótesis gaosiana, es que no se trata de una frase biensonante lanzada al aire, sino que se materializaría en una serie de características en las que consiste, y que se desplegarían a través de las propuestas de los autores que destacan en la historia de nuestro pensamiento en España y la América Española – y que ya ha señalado José Gaos, y nosotros al comenzar este texto. Pero, eso sí, ahora se trata de estudiar cuáles son sus filosofías –las de todos, tradicionalistas y liberales; o, si se prefiere, trascendentalistas e inmanentistas-, y cómo han desplegado las diferentes propuestas a lo largo y ancho del mundo de lengua española. Y esta re-conceptuación constante de sí mismo que sufre la filosofía, dirá Gaos, no es mera quimera, pues es necesario matizar que éste considera52 que el pensamiento y la filosofía occidentales están constantemente, como decimos, conceptuándose a sí mismo como filosofía, en parte, una u otro, o en su totalidad: pues de hecho así sucedió desde "la reflexión sobre la vida" que hizo el mundo griego y que fue "absolutamente original y originaria". Desde ella –creemos que está convencido de ello Gaos-, se han ido actualizando las distintas concepciones. Porque, no olvidemos, esta propuesta gaosiana es consciente y deliberada, y tiene un sentido de filosofía de la Historia: 52 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 103. 195 J U L I O 2 0 1 5 De cómo completar la Tierra. El lugar histórico del pensamiento hispanoamericano según José Gaos (1900-1969) | Héctor Arévalo Benito [...] como el [pasado] del romano imperial, el [pasado] del español imperial ha pasado; como tras el del romano imperial vino el de los pueblos germánicos, incluso el italiano, tras el del español imperial ha venido el de los hispano-americanos, incluso el español; y como los pueblos romano-germánicos se formaron en la cultura grecorromana, así los hispano-americanos se habrían formado en la moderna y contemporánea para crear la futura53. Así pues, apoyado en esta tesis fuerte, podemos decir que Gaos considera que la única metafísica posible sería una: [...] metafísica de "nuestra vida" donde el "nuestra" debe significar "nosotros, los hombres de lengua española de hoy", para significar "nosotros, los hombres en general"54. Así pues, afirma Gaos55, "sólo una metafísica semejante [una metafísica de nuestra vida] podría decidir de la posible vinculación de Hispano-América" al conjunto del pensamiento universal. Pero no dejando atrás la "trascendencia agazapada" en la inmanencia –como vimos-, pues el pasado también puede ser, en este sentido, definitorio del futuro. Por último, y como consecuencia necesaria de todo lo desarrollado hasta ahora, cabe señalar que en este mismo texto tratará Gaos56 de la necesidad de una meditación de utopía –y siguiendo, no cabe duda, el método con el cual Ortega reflexionaba acerca de las "circunstancias" españolas, pero esta vez, aplicado por Gaos a toda la circunstancia americana-, es decir, la necesidad de una meditación a través de la cual: La reflexión del pensamiento hispano-americano sobre sí mismo entrañ[e] una reflexión sobre HispanoAmérica [...]57 Esto querrá decir -en Gaosque meditar "la utopía" está "muy bien localizado" en "un continente de la Tierra" 58: pues "meditar sobre América, [es] hacerlo sobre el utopismo humano", y para justificar que América representa una cantidad ilimitada de los sueños (ora del contexto de lo inmanente, ora del ámbito de lo trascendente), sueños de todos los tiempos del hombre europeo desde que es hombre, va a proponer Gaos, incluso, que el propio 53 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 104. 54 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 104. 55 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 104. 56 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 104. 57 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 104. 58 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 104. 196 J U L I O 2 0 1 5 De cómo completar la Tierra. El lugar histórico del pensamiento hispanoamericano según José Gaos (1900-1969) | Héctor Arévalo Benito "descubrimiento de América" fue obra de "inspiraciones utópicas" (quizá hijas del sueño de encontrar, y poseer, el Cielo en la Tierra). Gaos hará para ello un breve repaso, comenzando por Thomas More durante la Edad Moderna y resaltando que los planteamientos de éste nacen del contraste entre "su inglesa circunstancia y su ideal de <<otra vida>>, de <<otro mundo>>, visto en la Antigüedad pagana y el Cristianismo primitivo"59. Así, Tomás Moro –grafía castellanizada del nombre inglés con el que se refiere José Gaos a Thomas More-, en realidad habría inventado una utopía "aun sin [el] descubrimiento" que se hizo de América. En resumidas cuentas, sostiene Gaos60 que More y su Utopía (1516) fueron obra: [...] de un ideal universal al hombre moderno en auge: hasta el punto de que los descubridores, exploradores y conquistadores primeros ven las imágenes ideales que con su cultura, aspiraciones y presagios [se habían creado]61. Sin ir más lejos, la prueba del viejo deseo que tuvo Tomás Moro (estas "visiones del nuevo mundo"), serán proyectadas hacia Europa -piensa Gaos62-, no sólo en su obra, sino en la de todos los utopistas modernos y contemporáneos. En este punto, Gaos se apoyará en la ideas de su amigo y discípulo, Edmundo O Gorman, pues considera63 que esta primera historia de "América" ha sido tratada por O Gorman como nadie lo ha hecho. De esta manera, Gaos y O Gorman identifican, en un primer momento, a América "con el ideal del viejo mundo"; pero en un segundo momento, O Gorman se planteará una pregunta, crucial, y que Gaos formula así: Las tierras descubiertas, ¿entran dentro de la Weltanschauung del viejo mundo y los convalidan, son verdaderamente un nuevo mundo que se resiste a entrar bajos los "principios", dentro de la Weltanschauung del viejo y los invalidan?64. Esta interesante y vital cuestión65 se suele resolver –afirman Gaos/O Gormana favor del primer cuerno del dilema. Y este es el futuro del pensamiento universal, y por eso Gaos concluye que: 59 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 104. 60 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 104. 61 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 104. 62 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 105. 63 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 105. 64 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 105. 197 J U L I O 2 0 1 5 De cómo completar la Tierra. El lugar histórico del pensamiento hispanoamericano según José Gaos (1900-1969) | Héctor Arévalo Benito América nutre decididamente el utopismo del hombre moderno, el utopismo humano66 La mejor expresión del hombre moderno es para Gaos la Ilustración, pues la constitución -"legal y real", diráde EE.UU. es el mejor y auténtico producto político de este utopismo: y éste está en todas las naciones de la América española (aunque se haya constituido, por ver primera, en la América del Norte). Así pues, para Gaos: El hombre moderno pone en América el lugar del futuro histórico; [...] y se vaticina en América el topos donde el hombre realizará su utopía definitiva67. La utopía la plantea Gaos, en consecuencia, como un tema candente de aquellos días. Pero Gaos arriesgará su propia concepción de "utopía". 5. Razones para una utopía americana. América del Sur y del Norte: topos de la utopía definitiva. Meditación de utopía: hacia una metafísica de nuestra vida. En este intrincado –pero fascinantetexto gaosiano que venimos comentando, debemos señalar que Gaos se remonta68 a la "vida medieval" europea: ésta estaba agotada en sus estertores, y necesitaba otra vida distinta a las concepciones sobre la "Otra vida". Para Gaos, el "agotamiento" de hablar de esta vida en la Tierra, y de la Otra vida en el Cielo, llevó a que el hombre "se echa[ra] a buscarla". Así, afirma sucedería con Cristóbal Colón. Este sería el motivo del descubrimiento –y en el resto de Europa, afirma69, se llevaría a cabo en "los cielos": con Copérnico, Kepler, Galileo, etc.-. 65 Al respecto, apuntar que se puede resumir la cuestión en las siguiente palabras de Bolívar Echeverría: "La tesis que defiendo, retomada en sus rasgos generales de la obra de Edmundo O Gorman [exactamente, de: "México colonial", en A. López, et al., Un recorrido por la historia de México; La invención de América, México, 1961], afirma que la ambigüedad en cuestión proviene del hecho de que el "proyecto" histórico espontáneo que inspiraba de manera dominante la vida social en la América Latina del siglo XVII no era el de un prolongar (continua y expandir) la historia europea, sino un proyecto del todo diferente: re-comenzar (corta y reanudar) la historia de Europa, re-hacer su civilización. El proceso histórico que tenía lugar allí no sería una variación dentro del mismo esquema de vida civilizada, sino una metamorfosis completa, una redefinición de la "elección civilizatoria" occidental; no habría sido sólo un proceso de repetición modificada sobre un territorio vacío (espontáneamente o por haber sido vaciado por la fuerza) – un traslado y extensión, una ampliación del radio de vigencia de la vida social europea (como sí lo será más tarde el que se dé en las colonias británicas)-, sino un proceso de re-creación completa de lo mismo, al ejercerse como transformación de una mundo pre-existente". (Cursivas del autor). Bolívar Echeverría, La Modernidad de lo Barroco, (México: Ediciones Era, 1998; 2a ed.: 2000), 61. 66 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 105. 67 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 106. Cursiva nuestra. 68 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 106. 69 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 106. 198 J U L I O 2 0 1 5 De cómo completar la Tierra. El lugar histórico del pensamiento hispanoamericano según José Gaos (1900-1969) | Héctor Arévalo Benito Para José Gaos, incluso, al resolverse el problema de si el Nuevo mundo debía de adaptarse o no a categorías europeas –afirmando que así debía de ser-, esta resolución trajo la consecuencia siguiente: América desparece durante un espacio de tiempo y en buena medida (la que va de Montaigne a Descartes) del horizonte intelectual de Europa. [De esta manera] Ésta puede volcarse sobre las cuestiones no menos graves –los orígenes profundos son los mismosde su nueva vida, la vida moderna70. Pero, según Gaos, lo que ya despuntaba en el siglo XVIII fue un cambio radical: el historicismo. Esta aparición –y su supuesto básico: "el sentimiento, el conocimiento de la historicidad, de la histórica heterogeneidad del hombre"71-, se va a entrecruzar en aquellos años con la cuestión de América como utopía. Así, sucederá que: La Ilustración implica[rá] una utopía que mueve el pensamiento y la acción americanos de independencia72. Sucederá en consecuencia que ya no será sólo el hombre europeo el que vea América como una utopía, sino que será el "criollo" el que entenderá que: [...] la condición para que América realice el ideal y su vocación, misión, destino se cumpla, es la independencia relativamente a la metrópoli73. Es decir: Ahora es el hombre moderno de ambas orillas del Atlántico quien pone en la de acá [América] el lugar del futuro histórico74. Gaos sabe75 que el hombre "es el único ente utópico", porque el vivir humano consiste en: [...] pasar a otro lugar, a otro mundo, aunque sea el mismo, porque el mismo en otro momento es otro76. 70 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 106.La recepción de Montaigne en España ha sido estudiada, por vez primera, por el prof. Dr. G. Aranzueque Sahuquillo. 71 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 106. 72 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 106. 73 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 107. 74 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 107. 75 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 107. 76 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 107.Primera cursiva de Gaos; segunda cursiva, nuestra. 199 J U L I O 2 0 1 5 De cómo completar la Tierra. El lugar histórico del pensamiento hispanoamericano según José Gaos (1900-1969) | Héctor Arévalo Benito Esta sería la forma concreta y material en la que, para José Gaos, podemos y debemos aproximarnos a una trascendencia: el hombre puede ser un ser "trascendente" a "sí mismo"; el ser humano puede trascenderse, digamos, a sí mismo, sí: pero en América; en el lugar utópico que representa América: América, el último lugar sobre la Tierra para la material utopía humana; y utopía, trascendencia77. Por esta razón quizá pueda el pensamiento hispano-americano "dirigir" el inmanentismo: porque en cuanto que éste es americano, es utópico, lugar en el que reside la posibilidad material –si es que así puede hablarse, en términos teológicosde la trascendencia. América es la única forma ya de trascender al hombre europeo, pues podemos decir que, para Gaos, América "completa la Tierra": América también producirá un pensamiento y filosofías que completarán el pensamiento universal –o acaso, decíamos, "occidental": Mas he aquí que América completa la Tierra –es la última parte de ésta adonde el hombre ha podido transmigrar horizontalmente e intentar la realización de sus utopías.78 Con estas (quizá polémicas), poéticas, y quizá verdaderas palabras, finaliza Gaos su reflexión sobre la interpretación histórico-crítica del pensamiento hispanoamericano, y su papel en el futuro de Latinoamérica. Por fin tiene un lugar en el que desarrollarse, efectivamente, la "metafísica [inmanente y trascendente] de nuestra vida" en cuanto hispanoamericanos: América. Y quizá, y más allá de la mera recreación, sea para crear un mundo que no sea una simple (por usar la magnífica expresión echeverriana) "repetición modificada" de ese (ya demasiado aburrido, y nada halagüeño) "eterno retorno de lo mismo" que parece invadir parte del mundo contemporáneo. Sí, es lo que el lector está pensando: se trata de la lengua española, y toda su vasta y jugosa cultura, como una puerta abierta –y al parecer, con cierto idealismo optimista a la par que con grandes dosis de realismo crítico-, de par en par, hacia el futuro. Atrevámonos a entrar, alegres, sí, pero siempre con la cautela comedida a las que nos invita la razón humana. 77 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 107. 78 Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española, 107. 200 J U L I O 2 0 1 5 De cómo completar la Tierra. El lugar histórico del pensamiento hispanoamericano según José Gaos (1900-1969) | Héctor Arévalo Benito Bibliografía Jesús M. Díaz Álvarez, "Presentación y actualidad de José Gaos", Boletín de estudios de filosofía y cultura Manuel Mindán, n° VI (Junio 2011): 55-66. Especialmente: 55-60 (Otoño 2013 [citado 6 de enero 2014] ed. de Jorge Brioso: disponible en http://apps.carleton.edu/proyecto/equipo/ y en http://www.fundacionmindanmanero.org/images/boletinvi/boletin-vi-4.pdf Bolívar Echeverría, La Modernidad de lo Barroco, México: Ediciones Era, 1998. José Ferrater Mora, Diccionario de Filosofía. Vol.III, Barcelona: Alianza Editorial, 1979. José Gaos, Pensamiento de Lengua Española. Pensamiento Español (Obras Completas Vol. VI), México: UNAM, 1990. José Lasaga, ed., José Gaos .Los pasos perdidos. Escritos sobre Ortega y Gasset, Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2013. Javier San Martín, "La relación de Ortega con la fenomenología como la caja de los truenos de las interpretaciones", Boletín de estudios de filosofía y cultura Manuel Mindán, n° VI (Junio 2011): 11-35. Especialmente: 55-60 (Verano 2011 [citado 10 de enero 2014], Fundación Mindán): http://www.fundacionmindanmanero.org/images/boletinvi/boletin-vi-1.pdf Agustín Serrano de Haro, "Recuerdo José Gaos en su tierra natal", Otoño 2013 [citado 9 de enero 2014] ed. de Jorge Brioso: disponible en http://apps.carleton.edu/proyecto/equipo/ Antonio Zirión, "José Gaos (19001969)", en El legado filosófico español e hispanoamericano del siglo XX, eds. M. Garrido, N. R. Orringer, L. M. Valdés and M. M. Valdés, Madrid: Cátedra, 2009, pp. 535-544.

i (ZEN AND THE ART OF) POST-MODERN PHILOSOPHY: A PARTIALLY INTERPRETED MODEL 1 Monk: "Master, if a tree falling in the forest is heard by no one, does it make a sound?" Master: "I know of no such tree." Monk: "Yet, given such a tree, must it not either make a sound or fail to do so?" Master: "Such, perhaps, is your choice." Monk: "And what is your choice, Master?" Master: "Why must you insist I choose?" 2 _________________ What follows may well be labeled a philosophical essay. I consider it to be a prose poem. You, the reader, may name it prose or poem, noun or verb, stone or setting, as you wish. 3 Many years have passed since Hilary Putnam first asked us to suppose ourselves to be "brains in a vat." 4 According to Putnam, we in no way appear to ourselves to be in a vat because we are subjected to a collective hallucination imposed upon us by an evil scientist who has so obliterated our memories that we are unable to recall _______________ 1 Analysis, analytic philosophy, the analytic paradigm – these terms are used interchangeably herein to refer to that cluster of metaphilosophical methods which collectively define modern philosophy, a methodology logically implied by those theories of reality which take the world to be a single great analyzable complex. Such theories share a single assumption, that of a demonstrable isomorphism between language and the world, and a single ultimate methodological concern, that of clarifying the fundamental structure of language. 1.1 Historically, the analytic agenda has manifested itself most overtly in logical positivism's search for a systematic presentation of the syntax of the ideal language; and, the failure of positivism may be taken to have signaled the logical closure (if not the actual end) of the analytic paradigm. Today, nearly a century after the fall of positivism, a new generation of philosophers continues the search for alternative paradigms, while philosophy itself continues to muddle in the ruins of the old. 2 Cf., "But if someone were to say 'So logic too is an empirical science' he would be wrong. Yet this is right: the same proposition may get treated at one time as something to test by experience, at another as a rule of testing." (Wittgenstein, On Certainty [1969]. 2.1) 3 The present work consists of at least two distinct narrative threads. The first of these dominates the text proper and extends into the footnotes, while the second, a set of formalized fragments elucidating or commenting on selected elements of the dominant thread, is bolded and limited almost exclusively to the footnotes. These two, intertwined threads are comprised of at least seven discrete levels of discourse, beginning with the text proper and continuing through the six levels of footnotes beneath it. Finally, a series of bolded, bracketed, numerical citations (e.g., '[10]'), located exclusively in the work's closing pages, reference entries in the attached "APPENDIX", making it possible for the reader to explore what might be treated as a third narrative thread, another level of discourse or, perhaps, merely an odd, subterranean commentary on the present work. 3.1 4 See, "Brains in a vat", in Putnam's Reason, Truth and History (1981). _______________ 1.1 The earliest assertion of such an isomorphism within the generally accepted boundaries of the Western tradition is found in Plato's Cratylus, written in the 4th century B.C.E., wherein Socrates, here serving as Plato's mouthpiece, states that "a name is an imitation, just as a painting or portrait is." Much later, in his posthumously published Ethics (1677), Baruch de Spinoza maintained that "[t]he order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things." And, more recently, in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, first published in 1921, Ludwig Wittgenstein proclaimed that "[a] proposition is a picture of reality. ¶ A proposition is a model of reality as we think it is." (Tractatus 4.01.) Although the first of Wittgenstein's above-quoted statements fails, at least as it is intended in the Tractatus, the second has yet to be seriously challenged. 2.1 Wittgenstein drafted the individual notes comprising On Certainty over the eighteen-month period immediately preceding his death, making the last such entry just two days prior to his passing on April 29, 1951. Accordingly, subsequent citations herein date the work to 1951. 3.1 A note toward deconstruction: the text proper can be read without reference to either the formalized fragments or the footnotes and should be the sole focus of a first reading, leaving incorporation of the footnotes in their various levels for a second, the formalized fragments for a third, and the bolded, bracketed cross-references to the Appendix for a fourth. ii any life but that of the vat. Thus, we not only seem to ourselves to be as we 'actually' are, we seem so to others as well. That is, the hallucination we are to suppose has been imposed upon us is that of the 'external' world; and now, of course, the question is whether we can ever be certain this supposition is not, in fact, so. 5 Putnam's answer is that we can be certain. He points out that if I am a brain-in-a-vat the proposition 'There is a tree in front of me' when uttered by me does not refer to an actual tree but to a tree "in the image." That is to say, the statement is framed in "vat-English" and is true (in vat-English) if and only if I am presented with an image of a tree. The fact that there is no 'real' tree in front of me has no bearing on the truth-value of the _______________ 5 The present work outlines an epistemological framework coalesced out of the West's slowly evolving understandings of such concepts as the observer,5.1 the reality observed,5.2 and the symbol or sign, 5.3 and of the interwoven relations among these three. 5.4 Accordingly, the question of whether we are, in fact, brains-in-a-vat is, as treated herein, only secondarily a metaphysical question. _______________ 5.1 See, e.g., as to 'the observer', the historical arc beginning with the Cartesian Cogito, i.e., "Cogito ergo sum", or, "I think, therefore I am" (Rene Descartes, "Discourse on Method" [1637]), and continuing on to "[the self is merely] a bundle or collection of different perceptions which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement" (David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature [1739]), then to "[t]he subject who knows cannot be known precisely as such, otherwise he would be known by another subject" (Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea II [1844]), and, finally, to both "I is another" (Arthur Rimbaud, in correspondence [1871]) and "[t]he I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it" (Tractatus 5.64 [1921]). 5.2 As to 'the reality observed': "[I]n common talk, the objects of our senses are not termed ideas but rather things. Call them so still: provided you do not attribute to them any absolute external existence. . . . ¶ I am not for changing things into ideas, but rather ideas into things; since those immediate objects of perception, which according to you, are only appearances of things, I take to be the real things themselves" (George Berkeley, Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous in Opposition to Sceptics and Atheists [1713]); "Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries – not by definition in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of Homer. . . . [I]n point of epistemological footing, the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree not in kind. Both sorts of entities enter our conceptions only as cultural posits." (Willard Van Orman Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" [1951]). 5.3 As to 'the symbol or sign': "The world is the totality of facts . . . ¶ We make to ourselves pictures of facts. . . . ¶ That the elements of the picture are combined with one another in a definite way, represents that the things are so combined with one another. . . . Thus the picture is linked with reality; it reaches up to it" (the early Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus 1.1, 2.1, 2.15, and 2.1511 [1921]); "The mistake we are liable to make could be expressed thus: We are looking for the use of a sign, but we look for it as though it were an object co-existing with the sign. . . . ¶ [But] [t]he sign (the sentence) gets its significance from the system of signs, from the language to which it belongs. . . . ¶ [O]ne is tempted to imagine that which gives the sentence life as something in an occult sphere, accompanying the sentence. But whatever accompanied it would for us just be another sign" (the later Wittgenstein, in The Blue Book [1934]); "It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid" (the last Wittgenstein, in On Certainty [1951]). 5.4 And, as to 'the interwoven relations among them': "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world" (Tractatus 5.6 [1921]); "The fact of the matter is that the 'real world' is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group. No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same worlds with different labels attached" (Benjamin Lee Whorf, "Science and Linguistics" [1940]); "One often hears that successive [scientific] theories grow ever closer to, or approximate more and more closely to, the truth. Apparently, generalizations like that refer not to the puzzlesolutions and the concrete predictions derived from a theory but rather to its ontology, to the match, that is, between the entities with which the theory populates nature and what is 'really there.' . . . ¶ Perhaps there is some other way of salvaging the notion of 'truth' for application to whole theories, but this one will not do. There is, I think, no theory-independent way to reconstruct phrases like 'really there'; the notion of a match between the ontology of a theory and its 'real' counterpart in nature now seems to me illusive in principle" (Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions [1962]). iii vat-English proposition. 6 By the same reasoning, Putnam concludes that in vat-English the term 'vat' refers not to external world vats but to vats in-the-image. Consequently, the thought experiment's foundational supposition, my statement that I am a brain-in-a-vat, is (if true) framed not in English but in vat-English; and, according to Putnam's analysis, the truth-conditions of this vat-English proposition could be satisfied only if it were to appear to me (from the perspective of the vat) that I am a brain-in-a-vat. However, it does not appear to me that I am a brain-in-a-vat. 7 Rather, it appears that I possess a physical body, whole and complete, with a full array of sensory _______________ 6 "[W]hen the brain in a vat (in the world where every sentient being is and always was a brain in a vat) thinks 'There is a tree in front of me', his thought does not refer to actual trees. On some theories that we shall discuss it might refer to trees in the image, or to the electronic impulses that cause tree experiences, or to the features of the program that are responsible for those electronic impulses. These theories are not ruled out by what was just said, for there is a close causal connection between the use of the word 'tree' in vat-English and the presence of trees in the image, the presence of electronic impulses of a certain kind, and the presence of certain features in the machine's program. On these theories the brain is right, not wrong in thinking 'There is a tree in front of me.' Given what 'tree' refers to in vat-English and what 'in front of' refers to, assuming one of these theories is correct, then the truth-conditions for 'There is a tree in front of me' when it occurs in vat-English are simply that a tree in the image be 'in front of' the 'me' in question – in the image – or, perhaps, that the kind of electronic impulse that normally produces this experience be coming from the automatic machinery, or, perhaps, that the feature of the machinery that is supposed to produce the 'tree in front of one' experience be operating. And these truth-conditions are certainly fulfilled." (Reason, Truth and History.) 7 "By the same argument, 'vat' refers to vats in the image in vat-English, or something related (electronic impulses or program features), but certainly not to real vats, since the use of 'vat' in vat-English has no causal connection to real vats (apart from the connection that the brains in a vat wouldn't be able to use the word 'vat', if it were not for the presence of one particular vat – the vat they are in; but this connection obtains between the use of every word in vat-English and that one particular vat; it is not a special connection between the use of the particular word 'vat' and vats). Similarly, 'nutrient fluid' refers to a liquid in the image in vat-English, or something related (electronic impulses or program features). It follows that if their 'possible world' is really the actual one, and we are really the brains in a vat, then what we now mean by 'we are brains in a vat' is that we are brains in a vat in the image or something of that kind (if we mean anything at all)." (Reason, Truth and History.) iv contacts with the external world. Putnam, thus, concludes that the supposition that we are brains in a vat is not only false, it is necessarily so. 8 Putnam's argument rests on the claim that – in order for 'vat' to refer to the vat in which I am attempting to suppose that I reside – the supposition itself would have to be false, since (according to Putnam) the term could so refer only if I were not residing in such a vat. This claim, however, rests on a 'causal' theory of reference, which theories are problematically reliant on a de facto endorsement of logical positivism's (in)famous _______________ 8 "[W]e aren't brains in a vat in the image (i.e. what we are 'hallucinating' isn't that we are brains in a vat). So, if we are brains in a vat, then the sentence 'We are brains in a vat' says something false (if it says anything). In short, if we are brains in a vat, then 'We are brains in a vat' is false. So, it is (necessarily) false." 8.1 (Reason, Truth and History.) _______________ 8.1A statement may be asserted to be necessarily false on a variety of grounds. According to Putnam, the supposition that we are brains-in-a-vat is necessarily false because it is, in a specific way, self-refuting: "A 'self-refuting supposition' is one whose truth implies its own falsity. For example, consider the thesis that all general statements are false. This is a general statement. So if it is true, then it must be false. Hence, it is false. Sometimes a thesis is called 'self-refuting' if it is the supposition that the thesis is entertained or enunciated that implies its falsity. For example, 'I do not exist' is self-refuting if thought by me (for any 'me'). So one can be certain that one oneself exists, if one thinks about it (as Descartes argued). ¶ What I shall show is that the supposition that we are brains in a vat has just this property. If we can consider whether it is true or false, then it is not true (I shall show). Hence it is not true." 8.11 (Reason, Truth and History.) _______________ 8.11 Setting aside the question of whether Putnam's analyses are correct even within the limitations of his stated framework, alternative frameworks are available. Thus, for example, on the p system analysis discussed below, even the general statement 'all general statements are false' would not, in at least certain instances of its use, be considered to be necessarily false. Rather, it would be treated as a metan-p statement uttered with reference to general statements contained within one or more lower-order systems, i.e., within metan-1-p systems and below. 8.111 (See further, footnote 24, below.) _______________ 8.111 This preclusion of self-reference also means that the liar paradox and its structural analogs cannot be coherently posed within the version of the p system framework employed herein. 8.1111 This is not to say that the present text includes a solution to the liar paradox. It does not. But not every paradox need be treated on each occasion of its acquaintance as a puzzle to be solved, and not every paradox impacts equally each and every philosophical explanation in which it might be encountered. _______________ 8.1111 Thus, consider the statements 'The following statement is true' and 'The preceding statement is false'. Let us call the first of these 'x1' and the second 'x2'. Within the p system framework employed herein, x1 may be true only if it is a member of a p system 'higher' than that p system of which x2 is a member. In that event, however, x2 does not and cannot refer to x1 at all, since the p system framework employed herein does not permit propositions of a given p system to refer to propositions which are members of a higher-order p system. That is, if x1 successfully refers to x2, then x2 does not and cannot successfully refer to x1. Moreover, an analogous breakdown occurs if, as with one's first encounter with an M.C. Escher print, one begins one's analysis from the other end, starting with x2 rather than x1. v verifiability principle, 9 which in its strongest forms, at least, may be taken as holding that only empirically verifiable _______________ 9 "The supposition that such a possibility [i.e., that we are, in fact, brains in a vat] makes sense arises from a combination of two errors: (1) taking physical possibility too seriously; and (2) unconsciously operating with a magical theory of reference, a theory on which certain mental representations necessarily refer to certain external things and kinds of things. 9.1 ¶ There is a 'physically possible world' in which we are brains in a vat – what does this mean except that there is a description of such a state of affairs which is compatible with the laws of physics? Just as there is a tendency in our culture (and has been since the seventeenth century) to take physics as our metaphysics, that is, to view the exact sciences as the long-sought description of the 'true and ultimate furniture of the universe', so there is, as an immediate consequence, a tendency to take 'physical possibility' as the very touchstone of what might really actually be the case. Truth is physical truth; possibility physical possibility; and necessity physical necessity, on such a view. But we have just seen, if only in the case of a very contrived example so far, that this view is wrong. 9.2 The existence of a 'physically possible world' in which we are brains in a vat (and always were and will be) does not mean that we might really, actually, possibly be brains in a vat. What rules out this possibility is not physics but philosophy. ¶ Some philosophers, eager both to assert and minimize the claims of their profession at the same time (the typical mind of Anglo-American philosophy in the twentieth century), would say: 'Sure. You have shown that some things that seem to be physical possibilities are really conceptual impossibilities. What's so surprising about that?' ¶ Well, to be sure, my argument can be described as a 'conceptual' one. But to describe philosophical activity as the search for 'conceptual' truths makes it all sound like inquiry about the meaning of words. And that is not at all what we have been engaging in. ¶ What we have been doing is considering the preconditions for thinking about, representing, referring to, etc. We have investigated these preconditions not by investigating the meaning of these words and phrases (as a linguist might, for example) but by reasoning a priori. Not in the old 'absolute' sense (since we don't claim that magical theories of reference are a priori wrong), but in the sense of inquiring into what is reasonably possible assuming certain general premisses, or making certain very broad theoretical assumptions. 9.3 Such a procedure is neither 'empirical' nor quite 'a priori', but has elements of both ways of investigating. In spite of the fallibility of my procedure, and its dependence upon assumptions which might be described as 'empirical' (e.g. the assumption that the mind has no access to external things or properties apart from that provided by the senses), my procedure has a close relation to what Kant called a 'transcendental' investigation; for it is an investigation, I repeat, of the preconditions of reference and hence of thought[.]" 9.4 (Reason, Truth and History.) _______________ 9.1 To be clear, it is not the element of necessity in the so-called magical theories of reference that Putnam finds most problematic but, rather, the absence of the element of causality: "One of the premisses of the argument is obvious: that magical theories of reference are wrong, wrong for mental representations and not only for physical ones. The other premiss is that one cannot refer to certain kinds of things, e.g. trees, if one has no causal interaction with them, or with things in terms of which they can be described." (Reason, Truth and History.) However, Putnam's injunction against taking physical possibility 'too seriously' is misleading, in that it seems to incline him to believe that by de-emphasizing physical possibility while simultaneously decrying magical theories of reference he can somehow thread the unthreadable needle. But what is 'causal' supposed to mean in this setting, if not something which would imply some version or another of the verifiability principle? 9.2 It is wrong, though Putnam has not demonstrated it to be so via his brains-in-a-vat thought experiment. He is completely correct, however, in his insistence that philosophy is more than science's wretched stepsister. 9.3 Putnam's announcement that what he is seeking to establish is merely that it is not 'reasonably possible' we might be brains in a vat is in some ways akin to Descartes' attempt, in the wake of the Cogito, to reconstruct the external world on the shaky foundation of the statement 'God is no deceiver'. In neither instance does the 'explanation' further its stated purpose. In the case of the Cogito, one cannot (at that stage of the analysis, at least) shore up a dubitable assertion by simply inserting beneath it an even more dubitable assertion. In either instance, one may justifiably feel the philosopher has somehow missed the full implications of his own argument. With Descartes, the matter can be resolved by simply ignoring the flimsy, after-the-fact, reconstructive argument (which some consider nothing more than political camouflage, anyway). 9.31 The situation with Putnam, however, is more complex. (See, footnote 32.3, below.) 9.4 Again, Putnam's arguments and conclusions as to such 'preconditions' are inextricably bound up with his 'causal' theory of reference, which itself cannot be explicated in a way so as not to import into his argument one or another version of positivism's verifiability principle. _______________ 9.31 The greatest significance of the Cogito lies in its conclusive demonstration of the fact that the power of our critical tools so far outstrips that of every other tool at our disposal as to necessitate, for any who would not be forced into an absolute scepticism, the adoption of one or more fundamental propositions (each of which must originate in a vision, intuition, or understanding, a leap of faith, or an arbitrary assignment), on the basis of which we must all, philosophers and non-philosophers alike, construct our worlds. Whether any given instance of such adoption is properly treated as philosophically legitimate depends on the use to which the adopted proposition is put, i.e., on the role it plays in a person's life. vi statements are cognitively meaningful. 10 _______________ 10 Beginning in the late 1920s, and arguing largely on the basis of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, the logical positivists maintained that appropriately strict applications of the verifiability principle demonstrate the impossibility of metaphysics and that empirical science is, accordingly, the only method by which we can gain knowledge of the world. However, it was subsequently determined that strict application of the principle as effectively demonstrates the meaninglessness of various propositions essential to the establishment of empirical science as it does those of metaphysics. 10.1 Thus, the later history of positivism became the story of a series of retreats and failed retrenchments behind successively weaker versions of the principle. 10.2 The fall of positivism completed the principle's slide into disrepute; and, it is now considered by many to be invalid in all its forms. In point of problematic fact, the verifiability principle remains one of critical philosophy's most indispensable tools. 10.3 _______________ 10.1 The following comment regarding the verifiability principle, from A.J. Ayer's Language, Truth & Logic (1935), is indicative of both the positivists' aims and the problems they encountered in implementing them: "[I]f we accept conclusive verifiability as our criterion of significance, as some positivists have proposed, our argument will prove too much. Consider, for example, the case of general propositions of law – such propositions, namely, as 'arsenic is poisonous'; 'all men are mortal'; 'a body tends to expand when it is heated.' It is of the very nature of these propositions that their truth cannot be established with certainty by any finite series of observations." 10.11 10.2 By the late 1940s, logical positivism had largely run its course, with every attempt to salvage any version of either a verifiability or a falsifiability principle sufficiently strong to further positivism's goals having seemingly failed. Accordingly, in a short paper published in 1950, Carl Hempel sought to chart a new way forward for the empiricist movement more broadly, locating the failure of positivism in its reliance on natural language as the starting point for its analysis: "[A]s long as we try to set up a criterion of testability for individual sentences in a natural language, in terms of logical relationship to observation sentences, the result will be either too restrictive or too inclusive, or both. . . . ¶ The predicament would not arise, of course, in an artificial language whose vocabulary and grammar were so chosen as to preclude altogether the possibility of forming sentences of any kind which the empiricist meaning criterion is intended to rule out. Let us call any such language an empiricist language. . . . ¶ Now theories of the advanced type here referred to may be considered as hypothetico-deductive systems in which all statements are logical consequences of a set of fundamental assumptions. Fundamental as well as derived statements in such a system are formulated either in terms of certain theoretical constructs which are not defined within the system and thus play the role of primitives, or in terms of expressions defined by means of the latter. Thus, in their logical structure such systems equal the axiomatized uninterpreted systems studied in mathematics and logic. They acquire applicability to empirical subject matter, and thus the status of theories of empirical science, by virtue of an empirical interpretation[,] [with the result that] . . . ¶ a sentence [is properly considered to be] cognitively meaningful if its non-logical constituents refer, directly or in certain specified indirect ways, to observables." ("Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning" [1950].) ¶ Hempel's analysis not only marked the historical endpoint of positivism; it also set a minimum standard for future empiricist theories, establishing that any such theory, in order to be considered successful, would have to adequately explicate the supposed relation between the 'non-logical constituents' of certain 'sentences' in an 'axiomatized propositional system' and the 'observables' to which either (i) those non-logical constituents, (ii) the sentences in which they occur, or (iii) the propositional system in its entirety is supposed to 'refer'. 10.3 Unfortunately, because use of the principle today is frequently unacknowledged by both writers and critics alike, the question of whether any given instance of its application will be accepted by any significant portion of the philosophical community now depends almost entirely on sociological factors surrounding the specific circumstances of its use. _______________ 10.11 This characteristic of universal generalizations led Karl Popper, the 20th century's pre-eminent philosopher of science, to place falsifiability rather than verifiability at the center of his deeply influential mid-century philosophical analyses of the practice of science. However, because existential generalizations – e.g., 'There is at least one red swan' – are no more capable of being falsified than universal generalizations are of being verified, every attempt to substitute falsifiability for verifiability in the positivist analysis failed. 10.111 _______________ 10.111 What is fatal in one context, however, is not necessarily so in another, even where the principle at issue is or appears to be the same. Thus, well after the collapse of logical positivism, Popper addressed both the critical role played by falsifiability in the practice of science and the continuing role played by the falsifiability principle in his philosophy of science by noting that there is an asymmetry between existential and universal generalizations, such that the latter "are never derivable from singular statements, but can be contradicted by singular statements." (The Logic of Scientific Discovery [1959].) vii That Putnam's analysis is both misleading and mistaken can be demonstrated as follows: Consider the vat dweller's utterance of Putnam's vat-English proposition 11 'There is a tree in front of me.' In that situation in which the speaker is presented with the image of a tree, his utterance of the proposition is true whenever he is engaged, merely and accurately, in reporting this sense impression. That is, his utterance is true on precisely those occasions on which he intends to refer only to the presented-image. The reverse is the case with regard to the speaker's utterance of the vat-English proposition 'I am a brain-in-a-vat.' Uttered with the intention of referring only to the presented-image, this latter proposition is, as pointed out by Putnam himself, simply false. A more philosophically significant utterance of the latter proposition, however, is that in which the speaker hypothesizes a frame of reference exceeding any perspective 12 available from the vat. 13 For instance, the speaker may state that he is a brain-in-a-vat with the intention of claiming that Putnam's evil scientist has, indeed, removed his brain and is engaged in imposing various hallucinations upon him. Let us further suppose that this is, in fact, the case. The speaker's utterance, though true, 14 cannot be determined to be so by anyone lacking access to the requisite bird's-eye view 15; and, because neither the speaker himself nor any other member of his linguistic community has such access, the truth-value of the utterance might 'properly' be treated by them a undetermined, though only contingently so. 16 Nevertheless, and contrary to _______________ 11 Unless specifically noted otherwise, and to the greatest extent possible, the terms 'proposition', 'statement', 'sentence', and their near synonyms are intended to function interchangeably throughout the text proper and each of its various levels of footnotes, including the formalized fragments. 12 For informal definitions of both these italicized terms, see footnote 44, below. 13 Let us define a 'p system' as a 'propositional system containing one or more fundamental propositions' 13.1 and a 'metan+1-p system' 13.2 as 'any p system which includes within itself one or more propositions referring to a metan-p system, whether such reference be global or to an individual proposition (or set of propositions) within such system.' This definition of metan+1-p systems is specifically intended to include systems standing in a comprehensive, umbrella-like embrace of another p system, metan-p, such that a given speaker, properly considered to be a fluent speaker, need not (for the purposes of everyday speech) be cognizant of which of his or her utterances are members of metan-p and which are members of one or another higher-order p system. 14 Putnam himself, however, being committed to the claim that the term 'vat' in vat-English can only be used to refer to vats in-the-image, denies that the speaker's utterance would, under these conditions, be true. Thus, Putnam's denial constitutes an endorsement of one of the stronger versions of the verifiability principle, specifically one on which any utterance not immediately verifiable by the utterance's speaker, or, at least, by some actual member of the speaker's linguistic community, expresses a metaphysical proposition and is, as such, meaningless. 14.1 15 That is, lacking access to a perspective from which the utterance's truth-value could be determined. 16 Since the evil scientist could at any moment restore the speaker to his body, thereby giving him access to the previously unavailable bird's-eye view and allowing him to state, at that later point in time, that his earlier assertion of the proposition, 'I am a brain-in-a-vat', had been, at the time of its utterance, true. _______________ 13.1 The concept of a fundamental proposition, like that of referring to, is largely explicated herein through the contexts of its usage; one might note, however, that the concept is similar (though not identical) to that of a 'primitive proposition' as that term is used by Hempel (see, footnote 10.2, above), and that the statement 'I am a brain-in-a-vat' is, under some-but-not-all conditions of its utterance, a fundamental proposition. 13.2 All p systems designated 'meta0-p' are specifically excluded from this definition, in that no proposition within any such system may refer to any other p system, whether in whole or in part. (See further, footnote 19, below.) 14.1It should be noted that such instantiations of the principle are (arguably) themselves metaphysical propositions and, therefore, (arguably) subject to their own, reflexive, sanction. (Cf., footnotes 34 and 34.1, below.) viii Putnam, so long as a possible bird's-eye view exists, the statement itself, it would seem, must be either true or false. 17 That is, so long as there exists a logically possible perspective from which the proposition's truthvalue could be determined, the merely contingent fact of such a perspective's inaccessibility to a given speaker is irrelevant to the metaphysical fact of the proposition's truth-value. 18 Although the possible truth of the vat-speaker's utterance is, of course, logically inconsistent with Putnam's conclusion, simply pointing this out is not in itself sufficient to refute his position. We must address the essential point of Putnam's thought experiment. Were the speaker above to gain access to the appropriate bird's-eye view, he would find the issue of whether he is ultimately a brain-in-a-vat to be in no way settled, for the supposition that he is such a brain could be immediately reformulated and stated again. Although access to a previously unavailable bird's-eye view perspective would give such a speaker a privileged position relative to his former abode (that is, the vat), making available to him a frame of reference within which determination of the truth-value of his original utterance of the supposition would be possible, 19 his ability to determine the truth-value of the newly re-uttered supposition would be in no way enhanced. 20 Thus, our discussion above concerning the truth-conditions of bird's-eye view utterances would appear to miss the mark. What we want to know, and what Putnam denies is possible, is whether we might really be brains-in-a-vat. That is, our interest is in those propositions whose frames of reference go beyond the provisional frameworks discussed above, to an ultimate metaphysical reality. Consider again the vat-English proposition 'There is a tree in front of me,' in this instance uttered with metaphysical emphasis. The proposition no longer claims only that there is a tree in front of me in-theimage, or even that there is a tree in front of me in that sensible world which is external to the evil scientist's vat. Rather, it may be taken to be a far more ambitious statement, a response to the fundamental Cartesian query, that is, as a statement asserting that there is a tree in front of me in some metaphysically ultimate reality. Similarly, when so emphasized, the vat-English proposition 'I am a brain-in-a-vat' makes an assertion concerning my own ultimate metaphysical status, claiming that I am really a brain-in-a-vat. _______________ 17 Let us define a 'quasi-fundamental proposition' 17.1 as 'a proposition, the truth-value of which cannot be determined within the limitations imposed by the perspective(s) available to a given speaker or set of speakers (though such truth-value may well be arbitrarily assigned) but could be determined from some contingently unavailable meta-perspective.' 17.2 18 It should be noted, however, that this claim rests on a pair of well-established logical conventions only qualifiedly endorsed herein – the first being that any sentence expressing a meaningful empirical statement must necessarily be either true or false, the second being that ontology is independent of epistemology. The discussion below will ultimately restrict the valid scope of both these principles. 19 Let us consider meta0-p to be our object language, a system which (i) (by previous definition) includes within itself no proposition(s) referring to meta0-p globally or to any of the individual propositions of which meta0-p is comprised, and (ii) neither includes nor embraces any proposition(s) referring to any other propositional system globally or to any proposition(s) contained in any other propositional system. 20 Again, suppose the evil scientist has returned him to his body. He may still be inclined to wonder if the vat he now looks down upon is real or merely another hallucination imposed upon him by the same (or still greater) scientist. _______________ 17.1 The class of quasi-fundamental propositions and the class of fundamental propositions are discrete classes. 17.2 The present text, with its self-swallowing conventions and logically indeterminate propositions, may fairly be considered to owe something to Kurt Gödel's first and second incompleteness theorems, 17.21 which are frequently taken to establish that: (i) for any consistent formal system of sufficient power and scope, there must be at least one sentence that is formally undecidable (i.e., neither provable nor refutable) within such system, and (ii) the consistency of any such formal system cannot be proved within the system itself. Any such debt, however, is spiritual only, in that the concepts of logical indeterminateness and undecidability are distinct. _______________ 17.21 In "On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems I" (1931). ix Notice, however, that determination of the truth (or falsity) of such a proposition would require access not merely to a bird's-eye perspective but to a God's-eye perspective; 21 and that, should any such God's-eye perspective exist, it must necessarily stand in a relation either congruent with some correspondingly ultimate propositional system or supra-linguistic to any and all possible systems. Yet, neither disjunct is realizable: the ultimate propositional system of the first 22 is a straightforward logical impossibility, since to every possible propositional system [metan-p] there stands a possible metapropositional system [metan+1-p]; and, since truth-value, though a metaphysical property, is a property which can only be determined within the context of propositional systems, satisfaction of the second disjunct would, by locating the God's-eye view in a linguistically inaccessible plane, render also any such perspective necessarily inaccessible to the process of determining propositional truth-value. 23 Thus, the truth-value of this, and every other, metaphysically emphasized utterance is logically indeterminate. 24 _______________ 21 That is, to a perspective co-extensive with that metaphysically ultimate reality referenced above, of which co-extensiveness, it should be noted, the speaker is also somehow aware. 22 Such a system would, presumably, be identical to the 'ideal' language long sought by such spiritual successors to the logical positivists as Carl Hempel, whose discussion of a 'hypothetico-deductive', 'artificial' language in footnote 10.2, above, serves to illustrate both the post-positivist quest and the philosophical agenda which drove it. 23 Regardless of whether one is inclined to seek one's metaphysical beginnings 'in heaven or on earth', 23.1 Wittgenstein's private language argument delineates the limits of that quest. 23.2 24 Suppose now a series of hypotheses, a series of H-type propositions, each of which states that the truth-value of any fundamental proposition is logically indeterminate. Let us now explicitly state that a proposition cannot be a member of any p system to which that proposition refers. 24.1 Thus, being about metan-1-p systems, where 'n' represents that system of which a given H-type proposition is a member, H-type propositions are possible members of only meta1-p systems and higher. That is, H is a possible member of meta1-p systems, H is a possible member of meta2-p systems, H is a possible member of meta3-p systems, and so on. _______________ 23.1 That is, whether in the supraor ante-linguistic. 23.2 "Let us imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign 'S' and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation. – I will remark first of all that a definition of the sign cannot be formulated. – But still I can give myself a kind of ostensive definition. – How? Can I point to the sensation? Not in the ordinary sense. But I speak, or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation – and so, as it were, point to it inwardly. – But what is this ceremony for? For that is all it seems to be! A definition surely serves to establish the meaning of a sign. – Well, that is done precisely by the concentrating of my attention; for in this way I impress on myself the connexion between the sign and the sensation. – But 'I impress it on myself' can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connexion right in the future. But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'." (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations.) 24.1 From this it follows that the p system model employed herein does not permit self-referential propositions. 24.11 Instances of apparent self-reference are treated the same as are H-type propositions above. For example, consider the sentence 'This sentence contains five words.' Pursuant to the version of the p system model here employed, the sample sentence – let us call it 'proposition G' and designate it a member of system metan-p – would refer not to itself but to a G-type proposition in another, lower-order p system, metan-1-p. 24.12 (See, further, 8.11 et seq., above.) _______________ 24.11 The p system model's handling of seemingly self-referential statements is somewhat similar to that of Alfred North Whitehead's and Bertrand Russell's theory of types, which asserts that because a class is of a different logical type than its members and because logical types must not be confused or intertwined, no class can be a member of itself. 24.111 However, there are significant differences between the problems the theory of types was intended to solve and the circumstances the p system model is here employed to illustrate. 24.12 This preclusion of self-reference is, of course, contrary to the accepted conventions of natural language; and, accordingly, one might well prefer an attempt at incorporating self-reference into an alternative version of the p system model. However, such alternative analyses, when conducted competently and in good faith, do not arrive at materially different conclusions from those arrived at herein; they merely arrive there via different paths. 24.121 _______________ 24.111 In Principia Mathematica (1910). 24.121 The treaded ground is not new. Numerous reasons (beyond those discussed herein) have been given historically for denying the possibility of genuine self-reference, many of which have little on their surface to do with propositional self-reference at all. One of the more resonant of these is Schopenhauer's assertion regarding self-knowledge, that "[t]he subject who knows cannot be known precisely as such, otherwise he would be known by another subject." (The World as Will and Idea II.) x The possible truth-value assignments for the vat-English proposition 'I am a brain-in-a-vat' can now be summarized as follows: A given utterance of the proposition is (i) false, where its frame of reference is limited to the presented-image; (ii) either true or false, though which is not verifiable by the speaker, where its frame of reference exceeds the presented-image but stops short of metaphysical emphasis; and, (iii) logically indeterminate, where such metaphysical emphasis is given. That is, if we consider vat-English to be a metan-p system and assume the statement to be uttered without metaphysical emphasis (as in (i), above), then the statement is plainly false, and could be known by the speaker to be otherwise, only if he somehow appeared to himself to be a brain-in-a-vat. If, on the other hand, we assume the statement to be uttered with reference to a bird's-eye view perspective contingently unavailable to the speaker 25 (for example, the perspective of Putnam's evil scientist) (as in (ii), above), the truth-value of the statement is either true or false, but which of those two values is unknown to the speaker. Thus, any version of the statement 'I am a brain-in-a-vat' uttered with reference to a bird's-eye view perspective of the sort posited by Putnam is neither plainly false nor logically indeterminate, in that the truth-value of any such utterance might possibly be discovered to be true (if, for instance, the evil scientist later placed the speaker back in his 'real' body). 26 Finally, if we assume the statement to be uttered with metaphysical emphasis (as in (iii), above), it is a fundamental proposition, the truth-value of which could be ascertained only from within the logically impossible, ultimate propositional system, metax-p. 27 Returning to Putnam and his thought experiment, then, the fact that we presumably refer to 'real' trees and vats when we describe our phenomenal world, while the vat speaker is able to refer only to trees and vats in-theimage, is ultimately not significant. Although this fact, if true, implies that we have access to a bird's-eye view (that is, a perspective) unavailable to the vat speaker, it does not imply that we successfully refer to anything in the metaphysical sense. Nor could such reference be analytically validated if it did occur. Putnam's failure to fully grasp the implications of these two points constitutes the essential mistake in his analysis. Putnam maintains that the entry-and-exit rules 28 by which we relate language to the world allow us to refer to real trees (unless we are, in fact, brains-in-a-vat, in which case they allow us to refer to trees in-the-image). What these rules do not allow us to do, according to Putnam, is refer to extra-linguistic objects existing beyond reach of the rules. For instance, because the vat dweller cannot "point" to the vat in which he dwells, he is unable to refer to that vat. His metaphysically speculative utterance 'I am a brain-in-a-vat' is, therefore, false (or meaningless) in the only language available to him. As noted in footnotes 9 and 9.1, above, for Putnam the vat dweller's belief that his utterance is intelligible is the result of two fundamental errors: (1) The acceptance of one _______________ 25 That is, from a perspective associated with a p system of higher-order than metan-p but of lesser-order than the logically impossible, ultimate p system, metax-p, referenced in the immediately following sentence of the primary text. 26 Let us now consider H', a possible member of meta2-p systems. Because H' is itself a member of meta2-p, it cannot refer to the propositions of meta2-p. The referential scope of H' is limited to those fundamental propositions which are members of the meta1-p or meta0-p systems embraced by the meta2-p system(s) of which H' is a member. Thus, in order to demonstrate the lack of a logically determinate truth-value for a given fundamental proposition which is a member of meta2-p, it would seemingly be necessary to demonstrate the truth of H'', the H-type proposition which is a possible member of meta3-p systems. 26.1 27 Or, to put it another way, from within the ideal language associated with the linguistically inaccessible God's-eye view perspective discussed in footnotes 21-24, above, and their related sections of text and footnotes. 28 The most widely accepted examples of such rules center around the ostensive definitions by means of which we learn our native languages as children, and on which we continue to rely as adults to relate word to object. This much is seemingly fact. And yet, the roles played by such definitions in the acquisition and use of language are both mysterious and deeply problematic. See, e.g., footnote 23.2, above. _______________ 26.1 While any given H-type proposition is properly classified as a quasi-fundamental proposition, the set of H-type propositions, taken as a whole, may be understood to imply a fundamental assertion. Where the speaker's utterance of an H-type proposition is with metaphysical emphasis, the speaker may be taken to intend to assert that each fundamental proposition in every possible p system lacks a logically determinate truth-value, the truth-value of which assertion is, of course, itself logically indeterminate. xi or another 'magical' theory of reference 29 and (2) the belief that the possibility of 'causal interaction' is unrelated to the preconditions of reference. 30 _______________ 29 "Some primitive people believe that some representations (in particular, names) have a necessary connection with their bearers; that to know the 'true name' of someone or something gives one power over it. This power comes from the magical connection between the name and the bearer of the name[.]" 29.1 (Reason, Truth and History.) 30 In fact, Putnam goes further, suggesting it is not possible but actual causal interaction that is a necessary precondition of reference, that is, the word, 'x', must actually (in some, unspecified way) causally interact with the extra-linguistic object, x. 30.1 _______________ 29.1 The first modern theory of reference was put forward in the last decade of the 19th century, when Gottlob Frege drew a distinction between an expression's sense (i.e., connotation) and its reference (i.e., denotation), asserting that a sentence may be meaningful even where one or more of its component expressions lacks a referent, so long as we are able to grasp the sense of the denotatively empty expression: "It can perhaps be granted that an expression has a sense if it is formed in a grammatically correct manner and stands for a proper name. But as to whether there is a denotation corresponding to the connotation is hereby not decided." ("Sense and Reference" [1892].) A Fregean analysis would, thus, attribute the intelligibility of such false existential statements as "The largest prime number is even" to our ability to grasp the sense of the expression 'the largest prime number' despite the fact that the expression has no referent. However, the Fregean analysis of such sentences was considered inadequate by some; and, in 1905's "On Denoting", Bertrand Russell took up the matter again, using the sentence "The present King of France is bald" as his working model. According to Russell, this sentence conjunctively asserts three distinct things: (i) that there is an x such that x is presently the King of France; (ii) that, for any x and y, if x is currently King of France and y is currently King of France, then x = y; and (iii) that, for every x that is currently King of France, x is bald. On Russell's analysis, the entire statement is false, because the first conjunct is false. 29.11 ¶ The theory of descriptions introduced in "On Denoting" marks a significant step in the development of propositional logic and, as importantly, of logical atomism, the metaphysical and methodological model suggested (if not logically implied) by Russell's and Whitehead's propositional logic. Logical atomism posited a 'mapping' or 'mirroring' relation between language and world, as in the 'picture theory' of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, referenced in footnote 1.1, above. 29.12 However, in the years immediately following atomism's development, neither Russell nor Wittgenstein sought to demonstrate the existence of the supposed 'picturing' relation between word or symbol, 'x', and the extralinguistic object, x. In fact, it is Wittgenstein's much later acknowledgment (in the Philosophical Investigations) of the impossibility of such demonstration which stands as the clearest line of demarcation between his early and later work. 29.13 30.1 Setting aside for the moment the question of whether a coherent and non-circular explication of the concept of causal interaction in the context of a theory of reference is even possible, while simultaneously acknowledging that Putnam's focus is on empirical statements, it is still at this point worth noting that, with regard to certain specific propositional types, 30.11 one may well demonstrate the truth-value of an entire class of propositions, some members of which correspond to unavailable frames of reference (such unavailability presumably precluding any 'causal interaction' whatsoever, regardless of the term's explication), from the values of those particular members of the series whose truth-values are fully determinable from within the available frames of reference. _______________ 29.11 Russell's three-part conjunctive statement can be represented in a variant of the propositional logic he himself played a significant role in developing as 'x{[Kx & y(Ky → y = x)] & Bx}'. Although Russell tends to receive the lion's share of the credit for the development of modern symbolic logic, he did not accomplish the task alone. Alfred North Whitehead, co-author with Russell of Principia Mathematica, the first comprehensive work on the subject of symbolic logic, was a full and equal partner in the work. 29.111 Moreover, many of Russell's and Whitehead's conclusions were significantly dependent on the work of others, most notably for present purposes the mathematician David Hilbert. ¶ Over the course of the two decades preceding publication of Principia Mathematica, Hilbert had made a series of breakthroughs relating to axiomatic mathematical systems, including the identification of such now familiar elements of propositional systems as the well-formed formulae or grammatical correctness requirement (i.e., the concept of propositional syntax), the requirement that a proposition functioning as an axiom in a given propositional system not be derivable from other propositions which are members of the system (i.e., the concept of independence), and the internal consistency requirement, meaning that it must not be possible to derive a contradiction from a system's axioms. 29.112 29.12 Russell first discussed the principles of logical atomism in a 1911 paper published only in French titled "Le Réalisme analytique"; but the ideas therein were not made readily available to the English-speaking public until 1918, when Russell delivered a series of lectures titled "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", which lectures were then published in England later that same year. This later version of logical atomism, however, was significantly influenced by the thinking of Russell's former student, Wittgenstein, whose working notes for the Tractatus go back to at least 1914. 29.121 29.13 See, e.g., footnote 23.2, above, and footnote 31.1, below. 30.11 See, e.g., footnote 26.1, above, regarding H-type propositions. _______________ 29.111 Whitehead, the older of the two by more than a decade, came first to the subject, publishing his A Treatise on Universal Algebra in 1898, with the younger Russell not publishing his own The Principles of Mathematics until five years later. Shortly thereafter, the two men began collaborating on what would become the massively ambitious Principia Mathematica, the first volume of which was published in 1910. 29.112 Russell and Whitehead incorporated each of these rules into the propositional logic of Principia Mathematica, wherein they claimed to have reduced mathematics to logic. This claim was soon determined to be mistaken. However, the system of propositional logic they developed continues, with very minor changes, to be commonly employed today. 29.121 See, Wittgenstein, Notebooks, 1914-1916. xii It is Putnam, however, not the vat dweller, who is mistaken. Putnam fails to realize that it is not only so-called 'magical' theories of reference which are precluded; Wittgenstein's private language and beetle-in-a-box arguments demonstrate that all theories of extra-linguistic reference, including Putnam's own 'causal interaction' theory, are equally 'magical'. 31 Thus, unless we are willing to assume the existence of an unverifiable relation between word and object, we cannot even endorse the first step in Putnam's analysis – i.e., the claim that we refer to real trees, or even that vat speakers refer to trees in-the-image. 32 _______________ 31 That is, the causal interactions which Putnam would permit, on which his theory relies, and to which his entry-and-exit rules would apply, are as inherently speculative as any other alleged relation between word and extra-linguistic object. 31.1 32 Putnam, like the later Wittgenstein (though to somewhat different purpose), maintains that it is language use, not the private or inner experience, which constitutes understanding, that to understand a sentence means to be master of a technique. 32.1 However, as Quine's principle of the indeterminacy of translation 32.2 suggests, another's use of a word is ultimately no more accessible to us than is his or her inner meaning or experience. 32.3 Moreover, the principle applies not only to 'translations' of the sort Quine discusses but to every possible entry-and-exit rule, not even excluding those ostensive definitions which have, we must yet believe, enabled each of us to learn his or her native language. 32.4 _______________ 31.1 See, again, the private language argument, footnote 23.2, above; see also, the beetle-in-a-box argument: "Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a 'beetle.' No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. – Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. – But suppose the word 'beetle' had a place in these people's language? – If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty." (Philosophical Investigations.) 32.1 "[N]o matter what sort of inner phenomena we allow as possible expressions of thought, arguments exactly similar to the foregoing will show that it is not the phenomena themselves that constitute understanding, but rather the ability of the thinker to employ these phenomena, to produce the right phenomena in the right circumstances. ¶ The foregoing is a very abbreviated version of Wittgenstein's argument in Philosophical Investigations. If it is correct, then the attempt to understand thought by what is called 'phenomenological' investigation is fundamentally misguided; for what the phenomenologists fail to see is that what they are describing is the inner expression of thought, but that the understanding of that expression – one's understanding of one's own thoughts – is not an occurrence but an ability." (Reason, Truth and History.) 32.2 "[M]anuals for translating one language into another can be set up in divergent ways, all compatible with the totality of speech dispositions, yet incompatible with one another." (Quine, Word and Object [1960].) 32.3 In fact, Putnam's concept of use as here employed serves a philosophically illegitimate function. Like Descartes attempting to reconstruct the world on the basis of God's being no deceiver (discussed in footnote 9.3, above), Putnam introduces an unexplained explainer, i.e., a weight-bearing element of explanation which is at least as problematic as that which it purports to explain. 32.31 However, the same element that is illegitimately employed when used to surreptitiously plug a gap in a philosophical explanation may be transmuted when employed openly, as road signage, to mark the spot where a leap of faith, an intuition, a vision, or a moment of understanding is required if explanation is to be meaningful. 32.4 Quine's essential point may, perhaps, be best understood if we imagine (with Quine) attempting to establish first contact with an isolated tribe, the members of which speak a language utterly unrelated to any previously encountered. Here, translation must begin not with words but with sentences having a comparatively direct relation to those conditions that we, the translators, suppose stimulated the speakers' utterances. That is, we are forced to hypothetically equate segments of native speech with English words and phrases. We might, for example, translate the native utterance 'Gavagai' as 'Rabbit'. Unfortunately, we find there are many possible sets of analytic hypotheses that fit all observable native speech behavior yet lead to mutually incompatible translations of this native utterance. 32.41 As a matter of fact, each and every hypothesis we record turns out to be subject to the same uncertainties as afflict our translation of 'gavagai'. Quine concludes that there is an infinite multitude of possible 'manuals of translation,' each equally consistent with the speech dispositions of a given linguistic community, and that we cannot, therefore, ever be certain of the meaning of any specific native utterance. 32.42 _______________ 32.31 Each and every philosophical explanation necessarily incorporates at least one such element. Precisely which concept(s) in a given philosophical explanation, and for a given writer or reader, so functions often depends on the order of operations employed by the person seeking to craft or grasp the explanation. 32.41 "Who knows but what the objects to which this term applies are not rabbits after all, but mere stages, or brief temporal segments of rabbits? In either event the stimulus situations that prompt assent to 'Gavagai' would be the same as for 'Rabbit'. Or perhaps the objects to which 'gavagai' applies are all and sundry undetached parts of rabbits; again the stimulus meaning would register no difference. When from the stimulus meanings of "Gavagai' and 'Rabbit' the linguist leaps to the conclusion that a gavagai is a whole enduring rabbit, he is just taking for granted that the native is enough like us to have a brief general term for rabbits and no brief general term for rabbit stages or parts." (Word and Object.) 32.42 See also, Henri Poincaré, in Optics and Electricity (1913): "If, then, a phenomenon admits of a complete mechanical explanation, it will admit of an infinity of others, that will render an account equally well of all the particulars revealed by experiment." xiii The problem with Putnam's claim that the proposition 'I am a brain-in-a-vat' is either false or selfrefuting can now be stated directly: Where the proposition is uttered under the conditions defined by his thought experiment, Putnam is committed to denying the truth of the proposition in each of the three possible contexts of utterance enumerated on page x, above. The first context need not present Putnam with any difficulty: Where the speaker's frame of reference is (i) limited to the presented-image, the utterance may simply be taken (for the moment) as simply and plainly false. Putnam's problem, however, becomes evident when we examine the other two possible contexts of utterance, namely, where the speaker either (ii) intends a frame of reference that exceeds the vat but stops short of metaphysical emphasis 33 or (iii) utters the statement with metaphysical emphasis. Here, too, Putnam is committed to maintaining that the proposition is false or (self-refuting). But, as has been shown over the course of the immediately preceding paragraphs, the only grounds which would support Putnam's position with regard to both (ii) and (iii) are much too powerful for his purpose, in that they would imply a broad-based scepticism incompatible with Putnam's analysis. Although the unverifiable nature of any claim of reference to the extra-linguistic object itself (as established by the private language and beetle-in-a-box arguments) offers an analytic basis for Putnam's claim, that basis is inconsistent with his first disjunct (i.e., his claim that the proposition is demonstrably false in significant contexts of its utterance) and incompatible with any meaningful interpretation of his second disjunct (i.e., his claim that the proposition is self-refuting), for it would imply the meaninglessness of 'I am a brain-in-a-vat' in every context of its utterance, including when uttered by the vat speaker with reference to the presented-image only, i.e., under the conditions of (i), above. Accordingly, since it is clearly not his intention to embrace absolute scepticism, but rather to assert the meaningfulness (and truth of) such everyday empirical utterances as those, Putnam's analysis gets us nowhere. 34 Wittgenstein once wrote, "a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism." 35 Perhaps Putnam's essential point, like that of Wittgenstein and others both before and after, is only that metaphysical emphasis cannot be meaningfully given. Yet, it is not meaning that metaphysically emphasized utterances have been shown to lack, only the traditional, and unnecessarily restrictive, true or false truth-value; and, though logically indeterminate, such utterances _______________ 33 That is, for example, where the speaker intends to assert that there is an evil scientist who has removed the speaker's brain from his or her body and placed it in a vat, but stops short of asserting that he or she is a brain-ina-vat in any metaphysically ultimate reality. 34 Putnam's claim that the proposition 'I am a brain-in-a-vat' is either false or self-refuting in both of these two later possible contexts of utterance [i.e., (ii) and (iii), above] rests on his denial, in those contexts only, of any possible causal interaction between language-user and extra-linguistic object, i.e., between word and object. However, each and every ground on which such interaction could be denied, for example, the inaccessibility of the extra-linguistic object to the speaker generally, would apply equally well to the first possible context of utterance [i.e., (i), above], and even to such everyday ordinary English real-world observations as 'There is a tree in front of me.' 34.1 35 Philosophical Investigations. _______________ 34.1 See further, "Introductory Comments to Dissertation Defense," The Linguistic Limitation, Mark A. Koehn, unpublished dissertation, University of Iowa (1987): "I will save my opponents the trouble and openly admit that the argument is, in some sense, self-refuting. If the argument's scope were not universal, the accusation of selfrefutation could be a serious criticism. However, the argument is, in effect, a reductio of each and every set of premises. My working assumptions are assumptions that my opponents cannot give up without accepting my conclusion. The only constructive or positive claim that I make is that of the proof's conclusion: 'There can be no legitimate fundamental philosophy.' To point out that that claim is self-refuting is no criticism of my view." 34.11 _______________ 34.11 Cf., "Every noble and gifted man . . . when he reaches the periphery of the circle of science and sees, to his horror, how logic here turns back upon itself and bites its tail, breaks through to a new form of experience – tragic experience – which requires, in order to be endured, the shelter and remedy of art." (Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy [1872].) xiv need not be so either psychologically 36 or sociologically. 37 In fact, were we to somehow become capable of treating the ______________ 36 Psychologically, a given individual's belief in the truth of certain metaphysically-emphasized propositions is the first step in the creation of a mythology. 36.1 Although such mythologies serve a multiplicity of functions, 36.2 their origin is singular, being rooted in the individual's acceptance as true of a set of logically indeterminate propositions. 36.3 Both vatand ordinary English are, in this sense of the term, mythological systems, as also each and every p-system, the analytic paradigm itself, and this very text. 36.4 37 Sociologically, the periodic waxing 37.1 and waning 37.2 of cultural mythologies parallels that of the analytic paradigm (see, footnote 38, below), the cyclic rise and fall of which is perhaps the inevitable consequence of the deep grammar of the human brain, through which the world is perceived as a template for language. 37.3 While social change is made possible only by the uprooting of previously unquestioned absolutes, i.e., by the transgressing of that which was once taboo, this process brings with it not only the realization of new possibilities but the erosion of societal belief systems, the passing of traditional institutions, and, in the individual, a decline in the efficacy of moral stricture. It may, consequently, be argued that our present societal value crisis, that all too familiar clime of epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical scepticism, in which little is certain and nothing, certainly, is sacred, is a necessary byproduct of what we, in the West, commonly term 'progress'. _______________ 36.1 "'Truth': this means, in my way of thought, not necessarily the opposite of error but, in the most fundamental cases, only position of different errors relative to one another. Perhaps the one is older and deeper than the other, and hence uneliminable because an organic being of our sort cannot live without it. Other errors, meanwhile, do not tyrannize over us as conditions of life . . . [and] can be laid aside or contradicted" (Nietzsche, Nachlass [circa 1880-1889]); "But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness . . . No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false. . . . The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a kind of mythology. 36.11 . . . It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened and hard ones became fluid. . . . The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movements of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other. . . . And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away." (On Certainty.) 36.2 "Mythology has been interpreted by the modern intellect as a primitive, fumbling effort to explain the world of nature (Frazer); as a production of poetical fantasy from prehistoric times, misunderstood by succeeding ages (Müller); as a repository of allegorical instruction, to shape the individual to his group (Durkheim); as a group dream, symptomatic of archetypal urges within the depths of the human psyche (Jung); as the traditional vehicle of man's profoundest metaphysical insights (Coomaraswamy); and as God's Revelation to His children (the Church)." (Joseph Campbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces [1949].) 36.3 "There are no facts, only interpretations." (Nietzsche, Nachlass [circa 1880-1889]. 36.4 That is, the truth-values of the fundamental propositions upon which is based this text's assertion of the logical indeterminacy of fundamental propositions are as logically indeterminate as those of any other fundamental propositions. 36.41 37.1 "At the beginning of every springtime period, philosophy, intimately related to great architecture and religion, is the intellectual echo of a mighty metaphysical being, and its task is to establish critically the sacred causality in the world-image seen with the eye of faith." [1] (Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West [1918/1922].) 37.2 "This is a matter not of mere political and economic, nor even of religious and artistic, transformations, nor of any tangible or factual change whatsoever, but of the condition of a soul after it has actualized its possibilities in full." [2] 37.21 (The Decline of the West.) 37.3 See further, footnote 1, above. _______________ 36.11 Here, Wittgenstein goes on to say: "And their role is like that of rules of a game; and the game can be learned purely practically, without learning any explicit rules." As noted above, this emphasis on the use or practice of language is an aspect of the later Wittgenstein's thought adopted, modified, and then heavily relied on by Putnam in his analysis of the brains-in-a-vat scenario. The problem is not that what Wittgenstein says about use is wrong; it is not. Rather, it is that Putnam's employment of the concept does not further either Putnam's own explanation or, more pertinently, the project of the present work. 36.41 One might be tempted at this point to echo Wittgenstein, objecting that a doubt which would call into question the truth of the very propositional system of which it is a part need not be heeded, that even doubt requires a context. In the present instance, however, this reflexive doubt or uncertainty as to truth-values has a context, one forced upon us by the system itself. 37.21 Spengler's theory of history is, perhaps, permanently out of fashion, but the poem that is The Decline of the West should not be. In it, Spengler articulates a vision of the great Culture-Civilizations as organisms, subject to a natural arc of development and decline, passing from youthful vigor (Culture), through the slow decline and increasing rigidity of middleand old-age (Civilization), before ending in a second barbarism. [3] Spengler was not the first to articulate such a vision, of course. Giambattista Vico, for one, anticipated much of Spengler by nearly two hundred years, though the two differ on one important point. Vico, too, foresaw a second barbarism, but one that will be worse than the first, because the people of the second barbarism will lack even the simple virtues of the first: "Men first feel necessity, then look for utility, next attend to comfort, still later amuse themselves with pleasure, thence grow dissolute in luxury, and finally grow mad and waste their substance." [4] (Vico, The New Science [1725].) xv truth-values of certain of our metaphysically-emphasized propositions as undetermined, all of our epistemological edifices would tumble down about us. 38 It is only the act of interpreting propositions creates meaning; and, the interpretation of any propositional system requires the interpreter to take as true (or false) one or more primitive propositions the truth-value(s) _______________ 38 Here, at the intersection of metaphysics and epistemology, we find the solipsistic I, the very cornerstone of both modern philosophy and most institutionalized monotheisms. 38.1 Yet, it is the solipsistic I which in its articulation most obviously violates the private language argument's stricture against criterionless reference, 38.2 the solipsist whose every word must somehow refer to that which is linguistically inaccessible. Nevertheless, the solipsist has available the reply of silence, a silence 38.3 which shrouds equally the blank slates of absolute solipsism and pure realism. Through silence, the absolute I of solipsism becomes the eye of realism 38.4 and, no longer visible to itself, vanishes from the realm of discourse, 38.5 only to be reborn, again and again, at the correspondent point of successive incarnations of the analytic paradigm. 38.6 [8] _______________ 38.1 Cf., "The I makes its appearance in philosophy through the world's being my world" (Notebooks, 1914-1916); "I am the alpha and the omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end." (Revelation 22:13.) 38.2 That it was not the private language argument but the color exclusion problem which marked the fall from grace of Wittgenstein's Tractatus is a matter of historical accident. Confronted with the color exclusion problem, Wittgenstein need not have rejected the Tractarian position. He might as easily have denied that the Tractarian object can be colored at all, or that a color can constitute such an object, maintaining instead that the object is nothing more than an unspecified, metaphysically irreducible referent of the ideal language.38.21 ¶ No such object, however, could have played any part in scientific explanation. Endorsement of it would have created an unbridgeable gap between philosophy and science, making the question of the relationship between Tractarian objects and colors (or physical objects in general) unanswerable in principle. But, acceptance of such an object would have had other consequences as well. ¶ Such a view, by virtue of the Tractarian object's continuation as the eternal foundation of each and every language-game, would also have carried forward later into the 20th century, and in far stronger form, Western philosophy's historical insistence on a strong (though now completely invisible) link between the metaphysical and epistemological realms. 38.22 38.3 "In fact what solipsism means is quite correct, only it cannot be said, but it shows itself." 38.31 (Tractatus 5.62.) 38.4 Cf., "Standing on bare ground, my head bathed by blithe air and uplifted into infinite space, all mean egotism vanishes. I become a transparent eyeball; I am nothing, I see all; the currents of the Universal Being circulate through me; I am part or parcel of God" (Ralph Waldo Emerson, Nature [1836]); and, from Emerson, it is only a short step to Thoreau, who wrote, "There is nothing inorganic; this earth is not, then, a mere fragment of dead history . . . but living poetry like the leaves of a tree – not a fossil earth – but a living specimen" [5] (Henry David Thoreau, Journal, February 5, 1854). 38.5 "Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it." 38.51 [6] (Tractatus 5.64.) 38.6 The role of the verifiability principle parallels that of the solipsistic I. Implicit application of the principle leads inevitably to scepticism, while explicit application subjects the principle to its own reflexive sanction. And yet, it gets at something. ¶ Viewed in the context of the principle's ultimate failure, this isomorphism might be taken to reveal the principle as the I's assertion of its own exclusivity, an exclusivity so all-encompassing as to ultimately allow the intelligible assertion of neither the principle nor the solipsistic I itself. _______________ 38.21 See, footnote 44.22, below, for an outline of the beginnings of such a position. 38.22 Any proposition asserting the existence of any such link, and, too, any proposition asserting the nature of any such link, or any link whatsoever between word and object, would of course itself be a fundamental proposition. 38.31 Cf., "The Tao that can be told is not the eternal Tao; the name that can be said is not the eternal name" (Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching [circa 500 B.C.E.]); "He has a form whereby the universe is preserved, and yet has no form, because he cannot be comprehended" (Moses de Leon, Zohar [circa 1275]); "For he can well be loved, but he cannot be thought" (Anonymous, The Cloude of Unknowing [circa 1375]). 38.51 Cf., "When the pot is broken, the space within it is absorbed in the infinite space and becomes undifferentiated" [7] (Dattatreya, Avadhuta Gita 1.31 [circa 900]); "The 'I' does not at all exist as its own reality" (Nāgārjuna, Madhyamaka [circa 150]). xvi of which cannot otherwise be determined intra-systemically. 39 If this act of interpretation is to be anything but arbitrary, the interpreter's assignment of truth-value to such propositions must be guided in some way or another by a something-I-know-not-what exceeding the scope of the system itself. 40 [10] Where the propositional system to be interpreted is embedded within another system, however, it may well be that the only immediate requirement for interpretation is conventional knowledge, i.e., propositional knowledge rooted in a system, just not this system. But an embedded system does not function independently of the system(s) in which it is embedded; and, thus interpretation finds no resting point there. It must continue; and, at some point, the interpreter will reach a system that is not wholly embedded, where interpretation can only be guided by a vision or intuition of the beetle-in-the-box – that is, by an understanding of that which is not itself the meaning of anything, but upon which the very possibility of meaning depends. 41 And to what- _______________ 39 Let us now consider a community of speakers 39.1 to whom all metan-p (and higher) frames of reference are unavailable. Let us further suppose that the members of this linguistic community behave as if they hold the Htype proposition which is a member of metan-p to be strongly false. That is, the speakers of this community treat every fundamental proposition within the frame(s) of reference available to them as being, by necessity, either true or false. 40 This something 40.1 and the means by which it is apprehended – call it vision, intuition, understanding, or what you will – may be pre-, post-, or non-linguistic, and our awareness of it is distinguished on that basis from conventional knowledge, which is propositional in nature and possible only within linguistic or representational systems more generally. 40.2 41 Cf., "The first, and perhaps the only, outcome of man's will-to-understanding is faith. "I believe" is the great word against metaphysical fear, and at the same time it is an avowal of love. Even though one's researches or accumulation of knowledge may culminate in sudden illumination or conclusive calculation, yet all one's own sense and comprehension would be meaningless unless there were set up along with it an inward certainty of a 'something' which as other and alien is." 41.1 (The Decline of the West.) _______________ 39.1 This might almost be our own linguistic community or, at least, one of them. But, do the speakers of this community also agree as to the specific truth-value to be assigned to each and every such proposition? If so, what mechanism(s) do they use to make and maintain such assignments? ¶ The set of propositions a given speaker, in any community, treats as fundamental – meaning here, 'the set of propositions a given speaker treats as logically indeterminate or subject to a somewhat personal assignment of true/false truth-value' on any particular occasion of utterance is unlikely ever to be identical to the set so treated by any other speaker, or even by that same speaker on any other occasion. ¶ In the end, then, the supposition that any actual p system of significant scope might be shared by an entire community of speakers breaks down and must be understood as a fiction posited for illustrative purposes only, i.e., a stepping-stone of sorts. [9] 40.1 "There is to be sure the ineffable. This shows itself, it is the mystical." (Tractatus 6.522.) 40.2 One might say that at the root of every p-system, prior to both epistemology and metaphysics, there must be at least one point where that which is known is made so only by that which sees, intuits, or understands. 40.21 41.1 Cf., "I wish to stress that the true meaning of life is to be discovered in the world rather than within man or his own psyche, as though it were a closed system. . . . [B]eing human always points, and is directed, to something, or someone, other than oneself – be it a meaning to fulfill or another human being to encounter. The more one forgets himself – by giving himself to a cause to serve or another person to love – the more human he is and the more he actualizes himself." [11] (Victor Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning [1946].) _______________ 40.21 Cf., "The supreme task . . . is to arrive at those universal elementary laws from which the cosmos can be built up by pure deduction. There is no logical path to these laws; only intuition, resting on sympathetic understanding of experience, can reach them" (Albert Einstein, "Principles of Research" [1918]); "Continued appeals to . . . intuition are necessary. . . . [This] follows from the fact that for every axiomatic system there are infinitely many undecidable propositions of this type" (Gödel, "What is Cantor's Continuum Problem?" [1947]). xvii ever extent such intuition, vision, or understanding can be made public, it is made so only indirectly, 42 as reflected in a given speaker's (i.e., interpreter's) endorsement of certain metaphysically-emphasized propositions. 43 Thus, contrary to the quotation from Wittgenstein, metaphysically emphasized propositions are meaningful, and they are so precisely because they are a part of the mech_______________ Cf., "I certainly have composed no work in regard to [the actual nature of things], nor shall I ever do so in the future, for there is no way of putting it in words like other studies. Acquaintance with it must come rather after a long period of attendance on instruction in the subject itself and of close companionship, when, suddenly, like a blaze kindled by a leaping spark, it is generated in the soul and at once becomes self-sustaining" (Plato, "Seventh Epistle" [circa 400 B.C.E.]); "My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: Anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as senseless, when he has used them – as steps – to climb beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) . . ." (Tractatus 6.54). 43 With this assertion the analytic paradigm has been left behind, for this act of interpretation is both creative and extra-linguistic, and that which is beyond words must remain forever beyond the scope of the paradigm. 43.1 _______________ 43.1 Cf., "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must remain silent." (Tractatus 7.) xviii anism. They reflect the inarticulable value choices 44 upon which our propositional systems rest, choices each must make if _______________ 44 The vision, intuition, or understanding on which is based a given interpretation of a propositional system may be said to define a perspective, while the set of primitive propositions belonging to such a system (that is, the articulation of this vision) defines a frame of reference. 44.1 Every frame of reference so defined is a partial model of a possible world, and a given individual's experience of such a frame of reference may be said to define a metaphysical space. 44.2 While a single individual may occupy a variety of such spaces in the course of even a single day, no two individuals ever occupy identical metaphysical spaces for even a single moment. 44.3 _______________ 44.1 Far from contaminating the philosophic process, such vision, intuition, or understanding is essential to it, in that it is only to the extent that the primitive propositions of such a system reflect an actual speaker's or community's vision, intuition, or understanding that the propositional set as a whole may be said to be scientifically, mathematically, or philosophically justified. (See,footnote 40.21, above.) 44.2 For this reason, an authentic philosophy, no less than an authentic art, is always personal, developing always to meet a personal need; 44.21 and, just as an artist may well articulate multiple, seemingly exclusive visions, so too may a scientist, mathematician or philosopher. 44.22 44.3 Nevertheless, it is the act of articulating such a space, of giving public expression to the private experience, which defines the proper realms of science, mathematics, philosophy, and art. 44.31 _______________ 44.21 "Gradually, it has become clear to me what every great philosophy has been: namely, the personal confession of its creator and a kind of involuntary and unperceived memoir." (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil [1886].) 44.22 We must be able to speak to and for ourselves before we can speak intelligibly to others. Such space defining speech is sometimes thought to be solely the task of the religious visionary or the artist 44.221 rather than of the mathematician, scientist, or philosopher. 43.222 But the borders marked by these terms are neither fixed nor precise, so that such speech can always be read philosophically, just as it can always be read artistically: 1 A sign may be understood as a substitute for an object, but it may also be understood as the means of the object's creation. 1.1 By 'object' I mean not a physical object but a logico-metaphysical object. 1.2 Each instance of a sign's use is an act of metaphysical creation. 1.3 All words are signs, but some signs are not words. 1.31 All signs, and metaphysically all signs equally, bear many of the properties traditionally associated with names. 1.4 What can, or cannot, be said is a function not of signs but of speakers. 1.41 That speakers imbue signs with meaning is a given. The question of how they do so is a meaningless question. 1.411 A meaningless question is a question whose answer is a meaningless proposition. 1.4111 A meaningless proposition is a proposition whose truth-value can be ascertained only from the perspective of an unavailable metalanguage, a term which must be defined in relation to the object language in which the proposition at issue is framed. 1.4112 A meaningless proposition is not necessarily a proposition without sense. 1.41121 Sense, too, is imbued by speakers. 1.41122 Propositional truth-value is the primary concern of the philosopher, propositional sense that of the poet. 1.41123 The concepts of truth-value and sense are not wholly distinct. 1.4113 A proposition whose truth-value can be ascertained only from the perspective of a logically unavailable metalanguage, a God's-eye view, is a proposition of fundamental philosophy. 1.41131 The propositions of fundamental philosophy are meaningless. 1.41132 If there were objects more simple than those referred to by language (and which, perhaps, might be thought to be the constituent elements of referenced objects), the truth-value of any proposition asserting the existence (or, the non-existence) of such objects would be a proposition of fundamental philosophy. 2 What-is is a subset of what-is-possible, and what-is-possible is made so only by its articulation. 2.1 Language, including here any system of signs, is the means by which the what-is-possible is made so; and, it is a part of both the what-is-possible and the what-is. 2.2 The creation of language is an artistic task. Where the system is linguistic, it is a poetic task. 2.21 A poem may be understood as the point of entry into a metaphysical space. 2.22 The poetic creation of language does not create the world but creates, instead, the what-is-possible, the possible worlds of which the what-is is but one. 2.3 The what-is-possible is made the what-is by means of the articulation, whether to others or to oneself, of a private vision. 2.31 The act of reading is also an instance of the act of speaking. 2.32 Because language creates objects (that is, creates the what-is) only when it represents the articulation of a private vision, a poem has no truth-value unless it is given such by an individual speaker. 2.321 A poem does have sense. 2.3211 That is, the poem does not assert, it expresses; it does not say, it shows. 3 'I' is a literary construct, both in literature and in life. . . . . . . 44.31 Cf., "[T]he background linguistic system . . . of each language is not merely a reproducing instrument for voicing ideas but rather is itself the shaper of ideas, the program and guide for the individual's mental activity, for his analysis of impressions, for his synthesis of his mental stock and trade. Formulation of ideas is . . . part of a particular grammar, and differs, from slightly to greatly, between different grammars. . . . ¶ We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar, or can in some way be calibrated." (Whorf, "Science and Linguistics" [1940].) _______________ 44.221 See, "[A]rt, if it means awareness of our own life, means also awareness of the lives of other people – for style for the writer, no less than color for the painter, is a question not of technique but of vision: it is the revelation, which by direct and conscious methods would be impossible, of the qualitative difference, the uniqueness of the fashion in which the world appears to each one of us, a difference which, if there were no art, would remain forever the secret of every individual. Through art alone are we able to emerge from ourselves, to know what another person sees of a universe which is not the same as our own, and of which, without art, the landscapes would remain as unknown to us as those that may exist in the moon. Thanks to art, instead of seeing one world only, our own, we see that world multiply itself and we have at our disposal as many worlds as there are original artists, worlds more different one from the other than those which revolve in infinite space, worlds which, centuries after the extinction of the fire from which their light first emanated, whether it is called Rembrandt or Vermeer, send us still each one its special radiance." (Marcel Proust, Remembrance of Things Past [1913-1927].) xix he or she is not to be reduced to the impossibility of absolute scepticism. 45 Such utterances are, in _______________ 45 Cf., "Ethics must be a condition of the world, like logic. Ethics and aesthetics are one." 45.1 (Notebooks, 19141916.) _______________ 45.1 Cf., "In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason." 45.11 (David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature [1739].) _______________ 45.11 This is Hume's is-ought fallacy, known to those familiar with the work of G.E. Moore as the 'naturalistic fallacy.' It arises from the failure to recognize what is sometimes referred to as the 'is-ought gap', i.e., the failure to recognize that the fact asserted by an ought statement cannot be derived from an is statement. 45.111 It was his own recognition of this gap, coupled with his commitment to the central importance of ethics to life, which led the early Wittgenstein to identify ethics as a transcendent 'condition of the world.' Here, we might opt to state it only slightly differently: The gap between is and ought statements cannot be bridged; if the gap is to be crossed at all, it must be leaped. [12] _______________ 45.111 The is-ought gap is well known in philosophical circles; but most such gaps are not, though they are everywhere. In fact, there are at least as many instances of such gaps as there are philosophical explanations. Every explanation, not excluding that (or those) of the present work, has embedded within it at least one fundamental proposition, arrived at and assigned a truth-value by fiat, faith, vision, intuition, or understanding. 45.1111 (See further, footnote 9.31, the primary text on page xvi, and footnote 44, above.) For each such proposition, we choose whether to believe it or not; and, it may well be the wholly contingent tendency toward an incidental consistency in our day to day choices is sufficient to explain our otherwise illusory sense of even our own persisting underlying selves. [13] Reason can guide us forward from such choices, but it does not and cannot guide us in the choices themselves. _______________ 45.1111 The last three terms above have been used largely interchangeably herein, though one might well distinguish among them. In some usages, for example, 'vision' and 'understanding' are tinged with an air of certainty less commonly associated with 'intuition'. With that in mind, it is worth noting that debate as to the proper role of intuition in the realms of science and mathematics is long-standing. 45.11111 _______________ 45.11111 Intuition's role in the identification of the axioms on which a given propositional system is to be founded may be either restrictive or expansive, and for either good or ill. Thus, for instance, the parallel postulate was identified by Euclid and included in his geometry in approximately 300 B.C.E., on the basis of intuition; but, it was also intuition which served over the ensuing millennia to prevent the serious consideration of alternatives to the parallel postulate. It was not until 1830, when János Bolyai and Nikolai Ivanovich Lobachevsky, working and publishing separately, founded the field of hyperbolic geometry, now known as Bolyai-Lobachevskian geometry; and 1854, when Bernhard Riemann founded the field of elliptic geometry, now known as Riemannian geometry, that it was discovered that geometries rejecting Euclid's parallel postulate were not necessarily inconsistent; and, the discovery and development of those geometries, too, was driven by intuition. xx fact, the very heart of the mechanism, the shapers of every propositional system, the wheels in whose turnings are created the interwoven universes of actuality and possibility, 46 and, of them, one might even say: 'Tis neither the Eye of God nor His Voice _______________ 46 For any system interpreted in accord with the broad linguistic conventions discussed in footnote 39, and subject to the limits of both the system's specific conventions and its speakers' criteria for assignment of truth-value, there exists more than one equally satisfactory assignment of truth-values to the system's propositions. 46.1 _______________ 46.1 Although the precise number of truth-value assignments possible to any particular p system's propositions is incalculable absent specific information regarding the conventions and criteria affecting that particular system, there exist 2n possible combinations of truth-value assignments to the fundamental propositions included within a given p system, where (1) 'n' represents the number of fundamental propositions which are members of that system and (2) the truth-value assignments allowed to a given proposition within the system are limited to either true or false. 46.11 _______________ 46.11 Cf., "Perhaps we need to be much more radical in the explanatory hypotheses considered than we have allowed ourselves to be heretofore. 46.111 Possibly the world of external facts is much more fertile and plastic than we have ventured to suppose; 46.112 it may be that all these cosmologies and many more analyses and classifications are genuine ways of arranging what nature offers to our understanding, 46.113 and that the main condition determining our selection between them is something in us rather than something in the external world." 46.114 (E.A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science [1925].) _______________ 46.111 See, e.g., "[T]he Hopi language contains no reference to 'time,' either explicit or implicit. ¶ [Yet], the Hopi language is capable of accounting for and describing correctly, in a pragmatic or operational sense, all observable phenomena of the universe. . . . Just as it is possible to have any number of geometries other than the Euclidean which give an equally perfect account of space configurations, so it is possible to have descriptions of the universe, all equally valid, that do not contain our familiar contrasts of time and space. The relativity viewpoint of modern physics is one such view, conceived in mathematical terms, and the Hopi Weltanschauung is another and quite different one, nonmathematical and linguistic." 46.1111 (Whorf, "An American Indian Model of the Universe" [1936].) 46.112 "[I]s sensory experience fixed and neutral? Are theories simply man-made interpretations of given data? The epistemological viewpoint that has most often guided Western philosophy for three centuries dictates an immediate and unequivocal, Yes! . . . Yet [the Cartesian framework] no longer functions effectively, and the attempts to make it do so through the introduction of a neutral language of observations now seem to me hopeless. 46.1121 . . . ¶ [T]hree centuries after Descartes our hope for [such a language] still depends exclusively upon a theory of perception and of mind [that is failing]." (Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions [1962].) 46.113 Cf., "What is the relationship between hallucination and worldview? . . . [R]eality 'in itself,' as Kant put it, is really unknown to any sentient organism; the categories of organization, time, and space are mechanisms by which the living percept-systems, including the portions of the brain that receive the 'raw' sense data, require the imposition of a subjective framework in order to turn what would otherwise be chaotic into an environment that is relatively constant, with enough abiding aspects so that the organization can imagine, on the basis of memory (the past) and observing (the present), what the future probably will be. . . . ¶ A good deal of this organization is done within the percept system itself; that is, by less-than-conscious portions of the neurological apparatus, so by the time the 'self' receives the sense data it has so to speak been automatically structured into the idiosyncratic worldview. The self . . . is therefore presented with material a good deal of which originated within its own being, at one level or another. In the light of this, the idea of hallucinating takes on a very different character; hallucinations, whether induced by psychosis, hypnosis, drugs, toxins, etc., may be merely quantitatively different from what we see, not qualitatively so. . . . No-name entities or aspects begin to appear, and since the person does not know what they are – that is, what they're called or what they mean – he cannot communicate with others about them. . . . ¶ But the crucial question as to where, at what stage, these perplexing aspects, augmentations, or warpages away from the commonly shared view begin, is not answered by any of this. . . . Up until the last three or four years it would have been generally agreed that these invasions of the orderly continuity of world experience beyond doubt originate in the person, at some level of the neurological structure, but now, for the first time, really, the body of evidence has begun to swing the other way. Entirely new terms such as 'expanded consciousness' are heard, terms indicating that research, especially with hallucinatory drugs, points to the probability, whether we like it or not, that . . . the percept system is overperceiving . . . but the overperception emanates from outside the organism. . . . The problem actually seems to be that rather than 'seeing what isn't there' the organism is seeing what is there – but no one else does, hence no semantic sign exists to depict the entity and therefore the organism cannot continue an empathic relationship with the members of his society. And this breakdown of empathy is double; they can't empathize his 'world,' and he can't theirs." (Philip K. Dick, "Drugs, Hallucinations, and the Quest for Reality" [1964].) 46.114 "May the universe in some strange sense be 'brought into being' by the participation of those who participate?" 46.1141 (Charles W. Misner, Kip S. Thorne, John Archibald Wheeler, Gravitation [1973].) _______________ 46.1111 Whorf ultimately concluded that (1) all higher levels of thinking are dependent on language and (2) the structure of the language within which one habitually thinks influences one's understanding of one's environment (i.e., 'the world'). Different natural languages may, then, be associated with discernibly different understandings of the world; and, multiple understandings may be equally, though differently, successful. 46.1121 See, footnote 10, above. 46.1141 Cf., "It's as though the world were a dream dreamed by a single dreamer in which all the dream characters dreamed you." (Joseph Campbell, in conversation with Bill Moyers, aired as Joseph Campbell and the Power of Myth [1988], paraphrasing from Schopenhauer's "Transcendent Speculation on Apparent Design in the Fate of the Individual" [1851].) xxi creates the world, but the tongue of man; 47 or, if God it is, a god residing in the dreams of men. 48 _______________ 47 One might here argue, of course, that man's freedom is constrained by the limitations of his tools, that his language, and the logic arisen therefrom, has a metaphysical bias. And, this much, at least, must be admitted: The omnipresent I is not an accidental god of analysis, to be easily left behind in the ruins of the analytic paradigm; 47.1 its ghost haunts each language without exception, and each and every logical system; that is, man's very soul. [15] 47.2 48 Cf., "In the beginning was the Word, 48.1 and the Word was with God, and the Word was God" (John 1:1); but see: " . . . and, when I say that I believe in Him, I mean that I believe primarily in his words and only secondarily in the man; and, when I say that I believe in the Word, I mean that I believe primarily in that which it represents and only secondarily in the words themselves; and, when I say that I believe in that which must remain beyond the grasp of words, what can I say?" 48.2 (Johnson Hanson, Truth, Man & God in PostModern America [1983].) _______________ 47.1 The I's privileged position, however, is limited to the epistemological realm. The self is neither more nor less sacred metaphysically than are time and the object, the other two points of the modern ontological tripod. 47.11 Berkeley's refutation of the object is beyond dispute; and, Hume's refutation of the I is similarly unassailable. 47.12 Taking these refutations as his beginning, Jorge Luis Borges goes further, offering a refutation of time, 47.13 in which (he states) he does not believe, but which is, nevertheless, as effective in its way as those of Berkeley and Hume, who of course did not themselves believe in their own sceptical refutations. 47.14 47.2 "That the world is my world shows itself in the fact that the limits of the language (the only language which I understand) mean the limit of my world." (Tractatus 5.62.) 48.1 Cf., "In the universe now there was no longer a container and a thing contained, but only a general thickness of signs superimposed and coagulated, occupying the whole volume of space; it was constantly being dotted, minutely, a network of lines and scratches and reliefs and engravings: the universe was scrawled over on all sides, along all its dimensions. There was no longer any way to establish a point of reference: the Galaxy went on turning but I could no longer count the revolutions, any point could be the point of departure, any sign heaped up with the others could be mine, but discovering it would have served no purpose, because it was clear that, independent of signs, space didn't exist and perhaps had never existed." 48.11 [16] (Italo Calvino, Cosmicomics [1965].) 48.2 Cf., "Far away in the heavenly abode of the great god Indra, there is a wonderful net which has been hung by some cunning artificer in such a manner that it stretches out infinitely in all directions. In accordance with the extravagant tastes of deities, the artificer has hung a single glittering jewel in each "eye" of the net, and since the net itself is infinite in dimension, the jewels are infinite in number. There hang the jewels, glittering like stars of the first magnitude, a wonderful sight to behold. If we now arbitrarily select one of these jewels for inspection and look closely at it, we will discover that in its polished surface there are reflected all the other jewels in the net, infinite in number. Not only that, but each of the jewels reflected in this one jewel is also reflecting all the other jewels, so that there is an infinite reflecting process occurring" (Francis H. Cook, recounting the story of Indra's net, a story first documented in the Atharva Veda, dating from approximately 1200 B.C.E., in his Hua-Yen Buddhism: The Jewel Net of Indra [1977]). _______________ 47.11 Some might expect that causation, causal interaction, or causal connection should be added to the set or substituted into it in replacement of one of those identified above. However, Hume as effectively disposes of causal connection as he does of the I, pointing out that no such connection is ever observed, only a 'constant conjunction' of one event with another: "It appears that, in single instances of the operation of bodies, we never can, by our utmost scrutiny, discover any thing but one event following another, without being able to comprehend any force or power by which the cause operates, or any connexion between it and its supposed effect. . . . ¶ One event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between them. They seemed conjoined, but never connected. . . . ¶ It is allowed on all hands that there is no known connexion between the sensible qualities and the secret powers; and consequently, that the mind is not led to form such a conclusion concerning their constant and regular conjunction, by anything which it knows of their nature." 46.211 (Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding [1748].) 47.12 See, respectively, footnotes 5.2 and 5.1, above. 47.13 "Each moment is autonomous. Neither vengeance nor pardon nor prisons nor even oblivion can modify the invulnerable past. To me, hope and fear seem no less vain, for they always refer to future events; that is, to events that will not happen to us, who are the minutely detailed present. I am told that the present, the specious present of the psychologists, lasts from a few seconds to a minute fraction of a second; that can be the duration of the history of the universe. In other words, there is no such history, just as a man has no life; not even one of his nights exists; each moment we live exists, but not their imaginary combination. . . . ¶ [T]he number of . . . human moments is not infinite. The elemental ones . . . are even more impersonal. . . . ¶ [W]e can postulate, in the mind of an individual (or of two individuals who do not know of each other but in whom the same process works), two identical moments. Once this ability is postulated, one may ask: Are not these identical moments the same? . . . ¶ Is not one repeated term sufficient to break down and confuse the history of the world, to denounce that there is no such history?" (Borges, "A New Refutation of Time" [circa 1945].) 47.14 The point being that it does not matter which concept(s) we might seek to take as our foundation: Because none of them will hold, we must learn to live without foundations. [14] 48.11 A note as to attribution: Excepting a single, intentional instance, the words of others when used herein are invariably cited as such, the ideas of others perhaps less perfectly so, but with the same good intention. It is possible, however, that some of the external sources cited are not genuine. _______________ [email protected] Iowa City, Iowa/Palo Alto, California/New York, New York/Los Angeles, California/Rapid City, South Dakota June 1982-January 2020 xxii APPENDIX [1] Walt Whitman: Here I Am [2] Eliot, the Elder (1961): London [3] Marguerite Yourcenar: The Last Testament of Hadrian [4] Thoreauvian Economics [5] Dancing in Tongues [6] Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 5.64 [7] This Saltwater Waltz [8] "Once I had a dream" [9] "Some cultures never invent the wheel" [10] Triptych [11] Möbius Strip [12] Dramatis Personae: Fragmentum Dialogus [13] I & I & I . . . [14] Letters: August-November 1987 [15] The Delany-Yourcenar Intersection [16] Jean-Michel Basquiat: The Ontologies of Absence xxiii [1] Walt Whitman: Here I Am * "I am large, I contain multitudes." Walt Whitman, "Song of Myself" _______ Here I am, Waking with a laugh and a smile! Opening my merry eye, my rising sun, Casting my warmly glistening nets, singing Here I am! My toes spread wide against bare sand, Chest rising falling with deep windy breaths, Greeting everyone I meet Here I am! Here I am! Rippled abdominals and raised veins On heavy hands, with labor-thickened thumbs, Here I stand, fist on one raw hip, Pouring sweat and shouting Here I am! Here I am! Here I am! Here I am, Sunset firelight caressing my face, Illuminating My last waking whisper Here I am, Slipping off to sleep. Mountain View, California October 2-6, 1992 * "In the far South the sun of Autumn is passing/ Like Walt Whitman walking along a ruddy shore./ He is singing and chanting the things that are part of him,/ The worlds that were and will be, death and day./ Nothing is final, he chants. No man shall see the end./ His beard is of fire and his staff is a leaping flame." Wallace Stevens. xxiv [2] Eliot, the Elder (1961): London I am moved by fancies that are curled Around these images, and cling: The notion of some infinitely gentle Infinitely suffering thing. T.S. Eliot – "Preludes" (1917) A sober man, His weathered face shadowed by some deep regret, Stares steadily in front of him, and draws upon his cigarette: One cannot say; no, one certainly cannot say I lacked the courage of my convictions; For did I not choose the Church of England Over the foolish fancies of my youth? Have I not foregone romantic fantasy For intellectual honesty? In truth, There are some who say I have chosen The Church of England over God himself. Well, if so, what of it? As if God were somehow available, Were somehow one's own to choose! Blue smoke drifts up to wreathe his face: Of course, there are always, will always be Those who accuse the righteous, the few, Of some shadowy weakness of the will. The age of revelations is not ours. Can it be weakness to face the truth? To hold fast to what is left In an age not granted, so seldom granted, The tokens of proof? And yet . . . And yet, Something in this small vignette Offers me a mortal glimpse Of hopeless and peculiar grace, And something else I can't relate. Rapid City, South Dakota July 9-23, 2004 xxv [3] Marguerite Yourcenar: The Last Testament of Hadrian Just when the gods had ceased to be, and the Christ had not yet come, there was a unique moment in history, between Cicero and Marcus Aurelius, when man stood alone. * ____________ When I look back on my life, a single face appears to my mind's eye, a single form, caught in countless images of activity and repose. – And yet, memory, when quarried too often, ceases to be the means to what was, becoming instead yet another funeral mask interposed between the living and the dead. . . . At times, I feel I am no longer the man, Hadrian, who loved a boy, Antinous. That man remains in Egypt, holding a still and lifeless body, trapped in a silent, unabating scream, while I have been changed into someone else, an older man, separated from both my former self and the boy by time – and by my own memories. . . . This older man I have become, does he relate the story as the younger would have? I am sure he does not, for I have left many Hadrians in my past, but only one Antinous. . . . To tell my life as a story – is it to find form in, or to give form to, that which has engaged me these many years? – Historians have already recorded the details of my life, and I shall not quibble with them at this late date. Let it suffice to say that I was granted a childhood far from the environs of Rome, though privileged by the standards of the ordinary citizen; that my early adult years were spent enjoying not only the material and sensual riches, but also the responsibilities and fears that accompany the status of being but one of an aging emperor's favorites; and, that I have in the years since the Emperor Trajan's death been the undisputed ruler of the known world. – These are the essential facts of my life; but, no mere recitation of facts can reveal a life's meaning. Still, it is in such facts as these I must look to find my beginnings. * * * As a child I dreamed of being a hero, of giving my life for Rome. This, I believed, would be the ultimate sacrifice. But the hero's feats cost him little; when he dies, he dies a hero's death, his soul, if not his body, unmarked. As a soldier I learned, only too well, of other, more difficult forms of courage, exacting a far greater price. – In the Germanic wars, where I served as a young officer, our enemies tortured their prisoners, releasing them outside our encampments so that we might watch them die. We, in turn, lined the palisades of those same encampments with the severed heads of the hostages we had taken. Where the inhabitants were suspected of sympathy with the Roman cause, the enemy burned entire villages; we burned villages in return. Women and children were put to the sword by both sides, each insisting it was responding to the atrocities of the other. – I have inflicted death and, more importantly, torture. I have used terror as a tool. Thus is war fought, requiring from its protagonists either the brutality of the beast or that harder * Marguerite Yourcenar, quoting from the correspondence of Flaubert, in her "Reflections on the Composition of Memoirs of Hadrian". xxvi courage of which the hero knows not. – On my return to Rome, I prayed, my prayers made the more fervent by my fundamental scepticism, that I would never again be forced to discover whether the capacity for either such brutality or such courage still lay within me. My prayers, of course, went unanswered. It was during the Germanic wars that I first encountered the cult of Mithras. Brought back from the Asian campaigns, it survived transplant to Europe in the shape of a secret society of young officers. Through a succession of hot, humid summers and bitterly cold winters, I discovered that its ascetic teachings – transmitted amid the trappings of blood and iron – brought me ever closer to that soldier's god which unites slayer and slain. Such identification grants the god's followers a special strength, preparing them equally to kill or be killed, requiring of them only that they be prepared to perform either task with equal distinction. – My own religious beliefs did not survive my career as a soldier. Yet, I have continued to believe that our experience of the sacred is genuine; it is only the interpretations we give to such experience that are false, perhaps necessarily so. Accordingly, it has been my policy throughout my reign to honor the religious beliefs of the various peoples over which I rule, in the conviction that each man should be permitted to worship at that altar he has found to be sacred. * * * In the years immediately following my succession, my life was richly chaotic, as I struggled to impose my will on this most unwieldy of empires. Eventually, the time came when my fulfillment was complete, when I and my world were in such accord that I was happy without being aware that I was so. With each passing hour, my vision of Rome became more fully realized; and, day and night, Antinous was at my side. – Little did I know, but I was blessed, as only one fortunate enough to be loved by one's own beloved can be. Only then can one fully enjoy the fruit of experience, only then can one truly taste the sensual and intellectual joys life has to offer. Only then is one's attention not diminished by desire for what one lacks. Yet, there are dangers, even in happiness – complacency, arrogance, a forgetting of what life had been before one's beloved. – Of impending loss, there were signs – signs I chose not to read as I busied myself hurrying to reap my harvest, to gather to myself all that life offers a popular and powerful emperor at the height of his reign. * * * I have heard men argue that the institution of slavery is intrinsically evil. Perhaps. But it is not unnatural. There is, in fact, no clear line to be drawn between slavery and other forms of servitude. Slavery is but an emblem; and, many who do not wear the emblem bear the weight of subjugation. Indeed, all men are slaves to the needs of life. And yet, this much is true: As the State must, by its very nature, impose special burdens on its subjects, it ought, in return, to bestow benefits; and, any ruler who would forget this fact, needlessly divesting thereby any significant part of the populace of its natural interest in the State's continued existence, is a fool, for the State over which he rules is then vulnerable, to an extent precisely xxvii calculable by combining the degree of the divestiture with the relative weighted proportion of the population so divested. – I have, therefore, made it my task to ensure that not even the lowest classes, whether slave or free, have reason to wish Rome to be less than eternal, insisting that the institution of slavery be regulated by laws and imperial edicts providing certain basic protections and guarantees. * * * Yet, nothing, not even Rome, is, in fact, eternal. My first visit to Athens overwhelmed me with melancholy. Its past glories cast the city in a golden light, granting an air of autumn to what is become, in actuality, an endless winter. I knew then, in a moment, that Rome must one day suffer the same fate. . . . Even now, our harvest is almost complete, what fruit remains already past its prime. Though not yet evident to the average citizen, Rome is slowly rotting from within. Like a bird, making its nest in the upper branches of a great tree, I am, perhaps, uniquely positioned to sense the rigidity that is prelude to death. There may well be greater spectacles, greater conquests yet to come; but the soul of Rome is already less vital than it was. – Our creativity is already dead. Even at its best, Roman artistic inspiration amounted to little more than a synthesis, a well-organized application of Greek ideals. Yet, where once we might have been inspired to see the possibility of new works in the pieces of a glorious past, now we merely copy, too often badly, what has been done before. Some say this is simply the inevitable consequence of our past successes, that we have exhausted the possibilities of form. But, I do not believe this to be so. The world of form, like the world of ideas, is inexhaustible. Somewhere, between the Roman insistence on a literal accuracy that renders invisible the god within and the Greek desire to represent only that which is of the god, is the still unrealized art of the human. There, existing as yet only in potentia, is the art of Man and his relationship to all that is and, of equal importance, all that is not. The world does not weary of us; but, in a sense we cannot fully grasp in youth, or even middle age, we weary of the world. We are born containing within us the seeds of our own destruction; and, it is we who exhaust our own possibilities. This is, perhaps, as it should be. My own exhaustion is evident; Rome's may be less so. Both, however, are genuine. * * * There are no words to convey the madness which came upon me at the death of Antinous. One day I was utterly fulfilled, a ruler wanting for nothing. The next, my beloved was gone – leaving only the empty vessels of body and name, his absence draining all else of its previous worth. – Some of our philosophers teach that death is simply life's reabsorption of its own latent possibilities – hence the greater pain caused by the death of one who dies young, leaving so many possibilities forever unrealized. It is said that such dead are xxviii the beloved of the gods, particularly those who choose, as did Antinous, to make of themselves sacrifices to love of the living. But what of those the dead leave behind? Nothing is said, and there is little to say. The world seen through the weave of a fine cloth appears softened, but still the world. Seen suddenly without the cloth, the world was, for a time, too much. * * * It is not an emperor's prerogative to withdraw from the active life as age advances, though such may be man's natural course. Nevertheless, I have in recent years secluded myself to a greater degree than before, indulging an ever greater part of myself in contemplation. I have come to believe that truth is various, and that each instance of it must be understood to have arisen from one or another limited perspective. Where the philosophers, with their abstract arguments, claim to have discovered countless instances of absolute truth, I have found only infinite mystery, but mystery within which is hidden the essence of life: My world is not the world; and yet I feel within me the presence of that which is eternal – meeting and affecting, somehow, that which is in constant flux. Man partakes of both the eternal and this whirl of constant change; and, I believe, it is up to each man to find his own balance in between them. * * * I have also come to believe that all we claim to know is rooted in our desires. Such desires may take many forms. One man's desire may be the acquisition of mathematical skills; another's may be to assemble a complete collection of the works of a particular sculptor; and, for a third, the object of greatest desire may be a person, a beloved, without whom life's meaning is lost. . . . Without desire there can be neither knowledge nor action. Thus, even if there were, as some claim, a singular God, subject not at all to human desire, I do not believe he could be an active agent in the world. It is for this reason that, while accepting neither God nor gods, my sympathies have always fallen nearer those who place their hope in the latter, for the gods seem merely men and women of great appetite, and the possibility of their existence is, accordingly, less incomprehensible to me. * * * If all knowledge is, in fact, rooted in desire, then no man's view of the world can be fully understood unless one first understands his desires. – Of all human desire, eroticism is the most important, and the most mysterious. I do not, however, go so far as to assert all knowledge to be erotic in nature. The knowledge of the old man and that of the small child, for instance, are both largely free of eroticism, though the memory of a world passed on casts a shadow over the former different from that cast by premonition over the latter. Nevertheless, I cannot claim to have encountered a single instance of human opinion or knowledge not xxix seasoned, to at least some small degree, by eroticism. Throughout our lives, lessening only slightly after physical release, eroticism colors even the least sensual of our encounters. In some instances, even ignorance may be seen to be erotic in nature, a failure of the understanding that is the inverse of that insight oft times granted by passion. * * * My life, in this time of dying, has led me to believe that even the wisest must live out their lives in what is, at best, a dimly lit room, understanding far outweighed by ignorance. . . . Solitude and the dark of night make up much of what we are. And yet, it is the mystery inherent in the night that gives us cause to wonder, and it is solitude that grants us opportunity. I have been many men over the decades and varying circumstances of my life, some of whom would be strangers to the man I am today, so much have I changed. Of late, these differences have led me to wonder whether all differences between one man and another do not, in the end, result wholly from mere differences in time and circumstance. – After all, were these not sufficient unto themselves to create the old man I am today out of the endless series of younger men I have been? – Yet, is it not also true, as the philosophers tell us, that the soul itself is eternal? If so, might it not be that we all partake of a single soul, unchanging in itself, its eternal singularity masked by those differences in time and circumstance that separate us one from another, and from our own previous selves? – And, if this too were so, would I not, in potentia at least, be both an aging emperor, dying in his bed, and that small child who once ran through the woods of his native Spain? – And, might I then not also be Antinous, with the knife in his hand? * * * If love is to survive, it must change, like a river, slowing, but deepening in its course, as the ages pass and it becomes an intimate part, the defining characteristic perhaps, of the surrounding landscape. Such love requires a lifetime to grow, and lovers who are wise enough to surrender love's fire, without abandoning love itself. What was it I did not see? Was I blinded by my love or by my failure to love enough? I have asked myself these questions time and again, in a thousand different ways, spent these last years of my life reliving his last moments, as if I were the boy alone on that Egyptian riverbank, with the first light of dawn about to break on eternity. But to no avail, no answers are given. * * * Memory is an artist, juxtaposing events transpired months and years apart, one remembrance triggering another, and then another and another, the entire chain related not by reason but by a metaphor or a series of metaphors – the identity of which is only sometimes evident to the soul that is the medium of the artist's compositions. . . . In the end, I find myself oft returning to that time of childhood when the words to xxx articulate the world's great secrets seemed to circle just out of reach, soon to alight on the tip of my tongue – "There are no gods, and yet no God, to baffle or purify what lies within . . ." – Yes, this, perhaps, or something like it . . . There are no gods, and yet no God, to baffle or purify what lies within. The round structure of the human skull, fit for neither hierarchy nor the singular truth of the Word, dooms the quest for meaning to ultimate failure, and prepares us for another quest, less well-defined, with outcome less certain. Comment attributed to the Roman emperor, Hadrian, on his deathbed. Rapid City, South Dakota October 7, 2001 – October 30, 2003 xxxi [4] Thoreauvian Economics: "The value of a basket of fruit" "[T]hough private property appears to be the source, the cause of alienated labor, it is really its consequence, just as the gods in the beginning are not the cause but the effect of man's confusion." Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. The value of a basket of fruit is, if we are to be precise, that very basket of fruit; and yet, even though the most closely similar basket is, thus, but an approximation of the first, the very concept of value is rooted in the original substitution, the first such approximation. "It is not the orange of Cuba but rather the checkerberry of the neighboring pasture that most delights the eye and the palate of the New England child. For it is not the foreignness or size or nutritive qualities of a fruit that determine its absolute value. . . . The value of these wild fruits is not in the mere possession or eating of them, but in the sight and enjoyment of them." – Henry David Thoreau, Wild Fruits (1859-1862).* And will even this basket be the same basket of fruit in a month? No, most certainly not. Will it be so tomorrow? Or even an hour from now? No, though we may, of course, determine to speak, as if it were so . . . ". . . Thoreau writes of this very thing in Walden, stating, 'I respect not his labors, his farm where everything has its price, who would carry the landscape, who would carry his God to market, if he could get anything for him; who goes to market for his god as it is; on whose farm nothing grows free, whose fields bear no crops, whose meadows no flowers, whose trees no fruits, but dollars.' The fact that Thoreau himself does not here go so far should not prevent us, his spiritual heirs, from giving to the set of all non-fungible values the name of the Sacred, and to the things which partake of those values, and to that very extent to which they partake of those values, the name of God." – Monique-Mŷstālya Honeychurch, Thoreauvian Economics: Notes Toward a Sustainable Global Economy (1989). New York, New York May 14-16, 1991 xxxii [5] Dancing in Tongues "There is nothing inorganic; this earth is not, then, a mere fragment of dead history . . . but living poetry like the leaves of a tree – not a fossil earth – but a living specimen." – Henry David Thoreau, Journal. The lungfish still swims in the saltwater pool of our palms Its chances still random as rainfall And a turtle's heart still beats its reptilian logic In the fossil bone cage of our ribs We are dancing in tongues! Yes, dancing in tongues! We have dined on the lark's song And are dancing in tongues! "We are rag dolls made out of many ages and skins, changelings who have slept in wood nests or hissed in the uncouth guise of waddling amphibians. We have played such roles for infinitely longer ages than we have been men. Our identity is a dream. We are process, not reality, for reality is an illusion of the daylight – the light of our particular day." Loren Eisley, "The Star Thrower". New York, New York March 19, 1991 xxxiii [6] Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 5.64 "In my end is my beginning." T.S. Eliot, Four Quartets. _______ Dawn, her ottered o yawns across a young god unable to bear the expense of skin Turning, turning, turning, Slowly turning, to tigress-petalled, evening's eye. Shadows porpoise her sunset lip, her face childbirth's ecstatic sister Vancouver, Washington December 18-19, 1991 xxxiv [7] This Saltwater Waltz (in 3⁄4-time) "Other dances, they say, are for people who are falling in love, but the tango is a dance for those who have been in love – and are still more than a little angry about it. It is a truism to say that life shapes art and, then, art turns around and influences our understanding of life. But it is true, at least of certain forms of art. The tango is just such a form. Thus, for example, I wonder whether our understanding, even our experience of a work such as Federico García Lorca's "Little Viennese Waltz" would be the same if we lived in a world that had never known the tango. Because, as every tango aficionado who has ever read it knows, Carcia Lorca's poem, despite tempo and title, is at its center no waltz at all, but among the very rawest of tangos." – Gustavo Jorge Merello, The History of the Tango, from Montevideo to the 21st Century (2003). There's a cry where the window of sunrise Meets the têar in the sky's tissue seam A faint echo of still-born laughter Eloped from some delicate dream The pigeon soot hands of my evening The yolkless white flesh of your eyes A stone lizard which stood in the garden And now gasps in the sweat of our thighs The blue flute I kept buried in the closet Of your fear of its forbidden tune Your lost paintings of unfabled fountains All swim in a heavy perfume Distilled from the musk of some meeting Of these sheets upon which we are bled No sweet scent of a meadow's encounter Masks this odor which hangs from our bed As I grasp the high waist of your pitiless vase We have filled with a cognac of flowerless stems And we drink the moon's glance of its bittersweet dance Beneath cobblestone shadows of rags dressed as men And swallow the tongues of our fathers With their cries of cathedralless love Tasting each tēar of our firefly years We weave of them glistening gloves And glide across marble floor memories Before coming to rest hand in hand There's a face I will fasten for the lamplight To your voice full of sadness and sand Palo Alto, California/Minneapolis, Minnesota July 8-14, 1990/October 27, 2019 xxxv [8] "Once I had a dream" A child is sleeping: An old man gone. O, father forsaken, Forgive your son! * Once I had a dream in which I created a world so real its existence precluded my own, a metaphysical instantiation whose reality, once created, would be inconsistent not only with my continued existence but with my having ever existed. Upon awakening, I determined, in my omniscience, omnipotence and love, to make this dream reality. Now, in the deafening roar of my last waking moments, I hear the harsh voice of my newborn son taking its place in the infinite chorus: "I am the Lord, your God! You shall have no other gods before me!" "Do you hear the little bell tinkle? Kneel down. They are bringing the sacraments to a dying god." ** Los Angeles, California October 3, 1993 * James Joyce, "Ecce Puer" (1932). ** Heinrich Heine, On the History of Religion and Philosophy in Germany (1834). xxxvi [9] "Some cultures never invent the wheel" Some cultures never invent the wheel. The city in which I was born was completely innocent of maps. Each inhabitant found his way about by reference to his private, mental image of the city, an image developed by simple trial and error. When two people wished to meet, or when one gave directions to another, the parties would attempt to discover a common landmark, someplace known to both. Once discovered, this landmark in fact, two or even three sites known to both parties were preferred allowed speakers to translate information from the 'language' of one to that of the other. Thus, the absence of maps led to no great difficulties in the daily affairs of the people. In spite (or, perhaps, because) of our lack of maps, the poetry of my city was geographic. By this, I mean simply that reading a poem involved going to specific places in the city (often, at specific times). For instance, a poem's first line might read "The shadows moving across the churchyard in winter sunrise." The second might state "The sounds of the fish market heard from the hills above the harbor." Such lines would be considered directions to a poem. Although the poem was read by following such directions, only the set of experiences which ensued was considered to be the poem. Of course, without maps a certain amount of ambiguity in our poetry was unavoidable. I remember that certain poets those whose work was most dependent on subtle nuances of experience refused to commit the directions to their poems to paper. Instead, they gave personally guided tours to their poetry, sometimes going so far as to grasp their readers by the shoulders or tilt each successive reader's head to the proper angle in a (perhaps, futile) effort to ensure that the experience of the reader was, indeed, that intended by the poet. I have not seen it, but I have been told that somewhere there is a city without even the concept of a dictionary. Of course, each inhabitant carries a private, linguistic roadmap, a de facto dictionary of sorts, in his mind. Since each such map is shaped by the individual's trial and error utterances, no two maps are quite alike. * Nevertheless, for practical purposes, such differences cause the city's inhabitants no great difficulties. Like the people of my native city, these people, too, treat a poet's written lines as mere directions to his work. However, the poetry of this city is not primarily a poetry of geographic or perceptual experience but, rather, one of linguistic experience. A poem includes not only the broad meaning of the poet's words but * The man who told me of this city told me also a story of two brothers who lived in it. For the elder, the distinction between the internal and external worlds was a central landmark of his cognitive map. For the younger it was not. Though both brothers were said to speak the same language, and to speak it fluently, the younger treated the words 'ambiguous' and 'ambivalent' as near synonyms. To the elder, however, these concepts were as far apart as the distance between the city's eastern and western gates. xxxvii also all of the associations, all of the linguistic colors, shadings, and echoes experienced by the reader in connection with those words. Of course, in a city without dictionaries, such experiences must vary widely from reader to reader. Those poets whose work is most dependent on subtle nuances of experience are said to have wrestled long and hard with the problem of how to grasp the reader by the shoulders, how to tilt his head to the proper angle. Sacramento, California March 8, 1992 xxxviii [10] Triptych ". . . and we will go down to the water with the poor." ________ I. Sign * Sign becomes symbol and object myth when that which is signified remains too long beyond the linguistic community's grasp. At just this point must discourse lose its literal meaning, becoming permanently metaphorical. Notice that the meaning of a sign is never that which is signified but always (an)other sign(s). The object itself is without meaning. Nevertheless, it is that in which one must believe if signs are to have meanings. The smile, the touch, the kiss sometimes object, sometimes sign . . . sometimes merely symbol. II. Michelangelo Twin orbs in pale orbits reign O'er fluted lips unsplit by sun In flawless face unworn by wind Adorned by neither pain nor love This, the sacred visage of That utterly untouched by time . . . No. These lines are false. Their David was broken within me long ago. These fragments I would have shored against my ruins are but empty shells, bits and pieces of an old man's memory, echoes of a lingering rhyme. III. Soliloquies 1st Do we wait then Here, fearing even the ghosts of war, In this, this most rotted of Gothic cathedrals? We Who, though born in no church, have been fed a steady diet Of its dark-spotted fruit, its disease and decay, * The difference between signified and signifier belongs in a profound and implicit way to the totality of the great epoch covered by the history of metaphysics, and in a more explicit and more systematically articulated way to the narrower epoch of Christian creationism and infinitism when these appropriate the resources of Greek conceptuality. . . . The sign and divinity have the same place and time of birth. The age of the sign is essentially theological. Perhaps it will never end. Its historical closure is, however, outlined. – Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology. xxxix We wait. Like castled rooks We watched as they waited If only Mind and hand did go together! You! Once as much like me as I to I The two drawing ever closer: In what hell have we not already coupled? What crutch can now carry us through our days? Time! Its hours now more yours than mine, Speaks now its effortless chimes! Would you speak to it what you would not Speak to me? Speak, then! Complete your pregnant pause! Here! In this state of undress, Speak! Has bile formed about your tongue? Tell me, I ask you, what love has withstood Those chimes, time's passage? What human love could ever withstand The orbits of its hands? Speak! Or, would you now Hold the gift of tongues to yourself? Yes, triple speed, indeed Will be the passing of my memory Of your tears! 2nd Have you found of late the hard fact of our father's funeral To be too much in you? Too much and too little! Who knows, But some would call it love. Love, but only human. Would you that its mercies Extended so far as to embrace your pain? Such tenderness A saint's to bestow, and so only to be found in a higher circle, Not here where the geometry of less celestial shapes rules, Rules, and needs be, will rule for yet some time to come. Shapeliness unshaped by time Its chimes sound, and will sound yet Again and again, through this unending fog 3rd What emptiness awaits me now Beneath this coming sea-cliff's high horizon? xl How cold the bones of this bare coast! What spell within us undoes, Unpins, the cloak of even the closest desire (Especially those closest!) Removing even the possibility of union? Or, Is our fate, perhaps, to guard these cliffs Lest others plummet, like stones, like us Into the sea? 4th Yes, my father, I am flawed! Flawed, yes And weak! But in these dead soliloquies, (Although they are, indeed, thoughts of love!) I will not, cannot, create my fate. The splinters of your language are too easy, too easy And too hard, the price of your words too high, For they contain within them the blueprints Of your church, the foundations Of your dark and bloody altar. Yours is not the only church, nor yours the only language. I was not born in this cathedral. I am not yours to hold. Santa Barbara, California August 3, 1991 xli [11] Möbius Strip I. Since Experience unremembered is nothing And Memory without experience is illusion, True memory is all There is, And not a single sliver of the little I remember is remembered the same by any other. II. She Reaches out to touch, with God's fingertips, he who Bends down to kiss her, this time with His lips, And so is Creation re-enacted through an act, though wholly human, Today so sacred, so pure, that we, Who are but sense organs of God, Are, in this moment, the envy of heaven. Redwood City, California January 28, 1990 Not only is the philosophical problem of the other unsolvable; it is necessarily so, because the problem is regressive. Were we not, as individuals, so isolated, the 'problem' would arise again, now in relation to the multi-organism's (the we's) perception of its isolation. xlii [12] Dramatis Personae: Fragmentum Dialogus * Standing on the threshold of daylight's imminent departure, Alone but for the evening, Lonely only in the sweetest sense, I offer up my soul in the cupped palms of my hands. _____ Son: Your blinded eyes stand wide tonight As twice-full barren moons, While the music from your daughter's wedding Plays on without you in the inner rooms. You die, dear Father, a pauper, Rich in gold and jewels, perhaps, But forgotten already by the living, Graced only with death's peasant scraps. Your tremulous voice, your trembling hands, Cracked skin and broken teeth Are these the only crown death grant A king to take his ease? Father: The wealth of my loins I have deeded my children, And by that deed hath death denied, Although, indeed, each world so deeded Must itself soon wither and die Yet , in this, too, there lurks a pleasure, A painful, bitter knowledge, without which life's measure Could not have been so sweet. This crown of thorns that age bestows 'Tis not death's, but life's greatest boon. For when sweet simple pleasure of innocent youth Doth yield to the far more difficult truth That age be a treasure, earned with the years, A pleasure whose essence the bittersweet tear, When pain be learned not the price of our joys But the salt in life's sweet recipe, You will eagerly greet your next bittersweet tear, 'Tis this we are born to be! For if life be naught but a prelude to parting (And 'tis no more than this for all that we know!), 'Tis naught but life's thorns warn the journey is starting And to savor each moment we share as we go. (Extends hand to son, who takes it in his own. Father dies.) Son: This funeral of a friend too dear To bear the muffled drums: * ". . . what is happiness except the simple harmony between a man and the life he leads? And what more legitimate harmony can unite a man with life than the dual consciousness of his longing to endure and his awareness of death?"Camus, Nuptials. xliii How can I find the words to say That what will come is come? Father, seek a dearer father in a further room, For I must leave your hollow host Here in the cold, dark tomb. Rapid City, South Dakota March 1997-October 1998 xliv [13] I & I & I . . . The man of yesterday has died in that of today, that of today dies in that of tomorrow. Plutarch He had dreamed his own death. Or, had it been a dream? He tried to move a shattered limb, and failed. I remember a ditch, with people gathered round, staring and whispering among themselves. The accident had been followed by a dark tunnel and, beyond, a light of indescribable perfection. After the light, there had been nothing. Understanding came to him then, not in degrees, but clear and complete. I am alive, but dressed in dead flesh. This body is a suit animated only by my presence. And among the many things that are mine but are not me are these memories: I am not the one who suffered the accident. I am not that which traveled through the tunnel, nor that which was encompassed by the light. I am that which is, but I am not that which was; nor will that which inhabits this flesh tomorrow be me. He died here in this ditch a few minutes ago. Later tonight, I will die in a hospital bed, leaving this, our corpse, to an unknown successor who, in his turn, will meet his fate tomorrow. I exist in that measure in which Thou art with me, and, since Thy look is Thy being, I am because Thou dost look at me, and if Thou didst turn Thy glance from me I should cease to be. Nicholas of Cusa Palo Alto, California/Rapid City, South Dakota May 23, 1990/November 17, 1997 xlv [14] Letters: August-November 1987 I listen to the voices in my head, Care not for who they are but only what is said. Through the day and in the night, Secret source of all my sight, Create a lifelike mask from what is dead, Sifting . . . Sifting . . . Who creates this lifelike face here in my stead? _______ God came to visit, stayed here awhile, left in the morning, left us a child. . . . Turn your gaze from the sun while you still can. Truth is nothing more than an after-image seared onto the blind eyes of a madman. . . . Time in his pocket, hand up his sleeve, he delivered his warning, "I shall let the crime fit the punishment." . . . Who of us would recognize a god even as he walked among us on the street? . . . Finding no one home he turned and looked again. Finding no one home he turned and looked again. Finding no one home he turned and looked again. . . . Consider the Tractarian relationship between solipsism and realism. What does it teach you about egocentricity and selflessness? . . . Don't let the Clown out! . . . Opposing teams of sycophants agreeing to vociferously disagree. . . . He wanted to retell the sacred stories. He wanted you to repeat them as your prayers. . . . Only God lacks a soul. That is the price one pays to become God. . . . Pesticide for the bugs in my brain. Novacaine to numb the pain. . . . You thought I would take you by the hand and simply lead you through it all? Fuck you! Let it bleed, the next one can follow the trail. . . . The insane are the ones who most convincingly fake insanity. . . . What did you expect with your face buried firmly in the lap of luxury? Did you think she would respond in kind? . . . You can search for value, but where in this land of literate itinerants can you hope to find it? . . . Even as you look the other way the world continues to paint reflections on the mirror. And time will still tell if only someone will listen. . . . Time in my pocket, blood on my hands, I watched the trees grow, heard the stones crack, felt the earth shift; and, in that moment, madness took my hand. . . . When we were young the machine studied them how they move, how they grow, the relationships among them. Since he has gone I only watch them. After all this time I'm finally alone again, stumbling through these fragmented memories left behind in the ruins of my mind. . . . His memories, my mind. . . . Was it like this before the machine came? How could I be lonely if I'd always been alone? No, it wasn't like this. . . . We danced a dance of chanceless circumstance, before owls dreamed and while gods gave answers to the night. But dances end, and gods must fall; chance today it rules us all. Alone we wander, eyes unseeing. . . . But times ago I saw the singer, heard her voice, had to linger; and dreams returned with sharpened vision. Now both voice and owner long since died away, only memory fragment echoes remain, long past hope that at death's door the dance regained. . . . Would I give it all gladly just to have it all back? I both love and hate him. Everything I have I owe to him, but---people call my name when it is him that they want, and it is him they want, they don't xlvi know me. How could they? . . . Yet I pity him as well. On a morning long ago he had said, 'Let the Games begin', not knowing, not suspecting, finding only later that hell is not the burden that cannot be carried but the one that can, that just barely can. Then he screamed, with my voice, to let them end, to please let them end. . . . The machine is gone now; it had to end this way. He passed the sentence on himself, but what else could he do? He had to be unique, to go further than anyone else ever had. But with strength came isolation, and in the quiet of the solitude he had created for himself he began to hear voices whispering to him from the dark. . . . He was captured by a vision of the perfect language, the language of Rimbaud's dreamed of alchemy, the long-sought ideal language of the philosophers. Such a language as would be a magical instrument that, when played upon by one gifted with vision and skill, would reveal the world as it truly could be; and, in so revealing, create a reality. We both dreamed of this language of the gods, but while he remembered I have only the mirror splinters of his memory and my own scattered memories of things he told me. . . . He said that incomprehension was the lot of the Babelites well before their fall into private languages. Why build a tower to ascend to heaven when you can build a god and let heaven come to you? God is in his heaven, waiting still for a worthy opponent, a momentary companion; he waits, a hollow idol praying to the void for a single instant of value. Where does this God live? Ask those of your artists who caught but a glimpse of that homeland and came running back. Ask Nietzsche, if you dare, he lives there even now. God lives but a single step beyond genius. And there he stays, awaiting redemption, awaiting a worthy successor, a worthy son, the true Christ. . . . Another time he told me that they walk among you having nothing in common save each's isolation from all else he meets. There is no difference between an unworshiped and unrecognized god and the lowest beggar on the street. And while there might be a difference between the beggar and a god who is worshiped but unloved it is not apparent to the god. Yet, who could love a god? Gods may be worshiped or cursed but they cannot be loved. Now do you see how Christ suffered for your sins? . . . Some of the memories are almost whole. His or mine? I cannot tell, can no longer remember. . . . Only, with this axe, I, he, we . . . When he was finished I bathed in her blood. After I had washed I saw that she was still alive so I gave her some of the blood to drink. I thus absolved myself of her sins. . . . She, of all of them, knew what I was, but she wouldn't tell me. She said only that I could tell the one by the sign of the cross and the other by the mark of the beast. But when I asked her how to distinguish the two symbols she laughed at me and said there could be only a single symbol. . . . Sometime later he offered me this: Do not begrudge the god his position. Love is only possible between equals, and there can be no equality where there can be nothing shared. Whether his uniqueness appears to you as the sign of the cross or the mark of the beast it is the sole visible indication of his solitary personal hell. God gives to the worthy, to each, a hell of his own, for we are made in his image. . . . I remember him as an androgynous Methuselah who wore, in youth, any face he chose. His days were spent anesthetizing butterflies and placing them in piles. Yet nights when he was able to sleep he slipped into visions. Visions xlvii of you/me/her/him, of now/what will be/then. But mostly visions of what can't be or what won't be again. I heard him cry, Where is she? . . . Where is she? . . . Now that he is gone the visions come to me, but they must be meant for him, I don't understand them. In one I see a trio of couples. She, red-haired and slight, runs ahead across the commons; they follow. He, dreadlocked and dark, points among the scattered trees; they look. He, blonde and unwashed, seats himself near the fountain in the light of the setting sun, where they join him. But he isn't among them and she is not the one he remembered. . . . In the other dream I see him. Watching a flight of passenger pigeons fly into a huge red sun, he patiently waits for the Lord's last priest to be flung down from the tower, dismembered by the old gods. Earlier, beneath an orange moon, he saw a tall black wolf standing in the shadows near the edge of the forest. The wolf waits only for the fall of the priest to walk through the streets of the city in the light of the noon-time sun. . . . When he left he told me that if I ever chose to seek for the finest to go to Earth's final evening. There I would find all the best and worst the world had to offer. And would I find him there? And which would he be? He laughed at me then. While I will never forget, it is already hard to remember just how it was. The only memory which remains clear is a fragment of his, one single mirror splinter has remained bright as the others have clouded, one thing he said: A new day is coming and these the words left, the words I leave behind. See the sights, the play of light, the light of day under a new sun. Palo Alto/Santa Barbara, California August 28-November 10, 1987 xlviii [15] The Delany-Yourcenar Intersection "I have sometimes thought of constructing a system of human knowledge which would be based on eroticism, a theory of contact wherein the mysterious value of each being is to offer to us just that point of perspective which another world affords." – Marguerite Yourcenar, Memoirs of Hadrian (1951). _______ Alone, I loosen the drawstring of a scrotal sack filled with stones of pitted glass to feel my fingers examine its memories of youthful glories. Behind the solipsistic veil of ignorance, mask across the new moon's face, My heart beats hard against my ribs, saying something I want to say . . . and can't. Tonight . . . the wind awaits resolution as well. Barefoot, well-cobbled boots in hand Loneliness lingering my groin Night-barbed wire dressed in white, its desert sands surround pools of vegetation. A thin feeling, premature, this understanding of the myriad pains which define self. Yet, in her harmonica's phrasing I am Judas, Peter, Christ himself Gandhi and Charles Manson Moses at the threshold Sound gives form to shadows behind my eyelids, As laughter, tasting of an infant reality, peals back darkness's edge. Light explodes my eyes Everyman's daughter and every daughter's son I am the window Through which you see the world Colors her flowering hips, flooding her deep-sculpted body in braille. Her breasts come bleeding into my hands, In creation, In evening's ruins, Behind the solipsistic veil of ignorance. Inside the tattooed city I waited, loved, and waited again. Vancouver, Washington September 9, 1991 – November 6, 1991 xlix [16] [Jean-Michel Basquiat: The Ontologies of Absence] Minneapolis, Minnesota/Rapid City, South Dakota October 3, 2019 – January 1,

Lawson, B. E. and Brincker, M. (forthcoming) "Subverting the racist lens: Frederick Douglass, humanity & the power of the photographic Image" in Bernier & Lawson (eds.): I Am Only the Painter: Imaging and Imagining Frederick Douglass. Liverpool University Press. 1 Subverting the racist lens: Frederick Douglass, Humanity and the Power of the Photographic Image Bill E. Lawson and Maria Brincker It may be said that a picture is a very small thing. This is a great mistake. Man is a picturemaking animal, and the only picture-making animal in the world. Pictures do play and have played an important part in the grand drama of civilization. Pictures have a power akin to song. Give me the making of a nation's ballads and I care not who has the making of the laws. The same may be said of pictures.1 Frederick Douglass 1. Introduction Frederick Douglass, the abolitionist, the civil rights advocate and the great rhetorician, has been the focus of much academic research. Only more recently is Douglass work on aesthetics beginning to receive its due,2 and even then its philosophical scope is rarely appreciated.3 Douglass' aesthetic interest was notably not so much in art itself, but in understanding aesthetic presentation as an epistemological and psychological aspect of the human condition and thereby as a social and political tool. He was fascinated by the power of images, and took particular interest in the emerging technologies of photography. He often returned to the themes of art, pictures and aesthetic perception in his speeches. He saw himself, also after the end of slavery, as first and foremost a human rights advocate, and he suggests that his work and thoughts as a public intellectual always in some way related to this end.4 In this regard, his interest in the power of photographic images to impact the human soul was a lifelong concern. His reflections accordingly center on the psychological and political potentials of images and the relationship between art, culture, and human dignity. In this chapter we discuss Douglass views and practical use of photography and other forms of imagery, and tease out his view about their transformational potential particularly in respect to combating racist attitudes. We propose that his views and actions suggest that he intuitively if not explicitly anticipated many later philosophical, pragmatist and ecological insights regarding the generative habits of mind and affordance perception5: I.e. that we perceive the world through our values and habitual ways of engaging with it and thus that our perception is active and creative, not passive and objective. Our understanding of the world is simultaneously shaped by and shaping our perceptions. Douglass saw that in a racist and bigoted society this means that change through facts and rational arguments will be hard. A distorted lens 1 Frederick Douglass, "Collection of Funds: An Address Delivered in Washington, DC on April 11 1873," in The Frederick Douglass Papers, vol.4, One (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 355-360 2 See, for example, the following scholars who have discussed Douglass writings on photography: Celeste Bernier, Sarah Blackwood, John Stauffer, Donna Wells, Marcus Woods, and Zoe Trodd. 3 Roderick M. Stewart, "The Claims of Frederick Douglass Philosophically Considered," in Frederick Douglass: A Critical Reader (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1999. 4 Frederick Douglass and Henry Louis Gates, "Life and Times of Frederick Douglass, Written by Himself," in Autobiographies: Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave; My Bondage and My Freedom; Life and times of Frederick Douglass, pg. 939. 5 See e.g. philosophers within the European phenomenological tradition such Husserl, Bergson and Merleau-Ponty, American Pragmatists like James and Dewey, later philosophers like Langer and Sontag, psychologists like Gibson etc. Lawson, B. E. and Brincker, M. (forthcoming) "Subverting the racist lens: Frederick Douglass, humanity & the power of the photographic Image" in Bernier & Lawson (eds.): I Am Only the Painter: Imaging and Imagining Frederick Douglass. Liverpool University Press. 2 distorts and accordingly re-produces and perceives its own distortion. His interest in aesthetics is intimately connected to this conundrum of knowledge and change, perception and action. To some extent precisely due to his understanding of how stereotypical categories and dominant relations work on our minds, he sees a radical transformational potential in certain art and imagery. We see in his work a profound understanding of the value-laden and action-oriented nature of perception and what we today call the perception of affordances (that is, what our environment permits/invites us to do). Douglass is particularly interested in the social environment and the social affordances of how we perceive other humans, and he thinks that photographs can impact on the human intellect in a transformative manner. In terms of the very process of aesthetic perception his views interestingly cohere and supplement a recent theory about the conditions and consequences of being an aesthetic beholder. The main idea being that artworks typically invite an asymmetric engagement where one can behold them without being the object of reciprocal attention. This might allow for a kind of vulnerability and openness that holds transformational potentials not typically available in more strategic and goal-directed modes of perception. As mentioned, Douglass main interest is in social change and specifically in combating racist social structures and negative stereotypes of black people. He is fascinated by the potential of photography in particular as a means of correcting fallacious stereotypes, as it allows a more direct and less distorted image of the individuality and multidimensionality of black people. We end with a discussion of how, given this interpretation of aesthetic perception, we can understand the specific imagery used by Douglass himself. How he tried to use aesthetic modes to subvert and change the racist habitus in the individual and collective mind of his society. We suggest that Frederick Douglass, the human rights activist, had a sophisticated philosophy of aesthetics, mind, epistemology and particularly of the transformative and political power of images. His works in many ways anticipate and sometimes go beyond later scholars in these and other fields such as psychology & critical theory. Overall, we propose that our world could benefit from revisiting Douglass' art and thought. 2. Discovering the power of images Art, and images in particular, was for Douglass, both an aesthetic and political medium. His understanding of art as a powerful tool for change was arguably awoken by his reading of the Columbian Orator, a widely used text in American schoolrooms in the early 1800s. It was used to teach reading, writing, and speaking skills. Douglass, in his own writings, draws our attention to the Orator, and how the political selections influenced him. But the Orator also included prose, verse, and plays, and thus showed Douglass the aesthetic power of the written and spoken word as well as the importance of how those words are presented.6 As Donna Wells aptly notes: "In the section titled "General Directions for Speaking," guidelines are provided that direct the speaker on using body language, facial expression and hand gestures to convey a point, depending upon the tone of the discourse."7 Douglass might here have 6 Historian David Blight speculates: "Douglass may also have been captivated by other selections he neglected to mention in the various recreations of his youth." Blight, David (1998-02-01). The Columbian Orator (Kindle Locations 344-348). NYU Press reference. Kindle Edition. 7 Donna Wells, "Pictures and Progress: Frederick Douglass and the Beginning of an African American Aesthetics in Photography" this volume Lawson, B. E. and Brincker, M. (forthcoming) "Subverting the racist lens: Frederick Douglass, humanity & the power of the photographic Image" in Bernier & Lawson (eds.): I Am Only the Painter: Imaging and Imagining Frederick Douglass. Liverpool University Press. 3 learned that speaking is also an artform. He certainly came to understand the intimate connection between the art of presentation and the reactions and images that words could evoke in the minds of people. Douglass writes in Pictures & Progress that "poets, prophets, and reformers are all picture-makers-and this ability is the secret of their power and of their achievements."8 As a public intellectual Douglass used the written and spoken word to challenge negative images of black people, and became as such himself a performance artist.9 While much could be said about Douglass the performance artist, what we are investigating in this paper is his broader interest in the creation and power of images, particularly concrete visual objects, like photographs and paintings. It is their status as works of art that can be used to promote moral and social attitudes that interest us. We find him speaking explicitly of this power of art to influence morality in Lectures on Pictures were he writes: As to the moral and social influence of pictures, it would hardly be extravagant to say of it, what Moore has said of ballads, give me the making of a nation's ballads and I care not who has the making of its laws. The picture and the ballad are alike, if not equally social forces-the one reaching and swaying the heart by the eye, and the other by the ear. As an instrument of wit, of biting satire, the picture is admitted to be unrivalled. It strikes human nature on the weakest of all its many weak sides, and upon the instant, makes the hit palpable to all beholders. The dullest vision can see and comprehend at a glance the full effect of a point which may have taken the wit and skill of the artist many hours and days.10 Douglass was concerned with the manner in which art impacted the emotional, spiritual and intellectual faculties of humans. Art, for him, had the potential to touch and transform us at our deepest and most human level. 3. Pictures as central to our humanity and our ability to improve It is worth highlighting that Douglass took the very ability to create and enjoy images as one of the defining features of our humanity, an ability that set us apart from all other animals. He writes"...man is everywhere a picture making animal, and the only picture making animal in the world."11 He thus argues that only humans are capable of making and being impacted by pictures. Not only do we create pictures, our minds are repositories of pictures.12 This, he writes, "bears additional emphasis," because the question is, what it is about picture-making and picture perception that is so special. Here Douglass hypothesize that pictures allow us to externalize our inners: The process by which man is able to posit his own subjective nature outside of himself, giving it form, color, space, and all the attributes of distinct personality, so that it becomes the subject of distinct observation and contemplation, is at [the] bottom of all effort and the germinating principles of all reform and all progress. But for this, the history of the beast of the field would be the history of man. It is the picture of life contrasted with the fact of life, the ideal contrasted with 8 Douglass, "Pictures and Progress," John Stauffer et al., Picturing Frederick Douglass: An Illustrated Biography of the Nineteenth Century's Most Photographed American, pg. 171. 9 See also John Stauffer, "Frederick Douglass and the Aesthetics of Freedom," Raritan 25, no. 1 (2014): p 115. 10 Douglass, "Lectures on Pictures," John Stauffer et al., Picturing Frederick Douglass: An Illustrated Biography of the Nineteenth Century's Most Photographed American, pg. 129. 11 Douglass, "Pictures and Progress," p.167. 12 If we grant Douglass this link between images and humanity, then we can see how he as a performer and creator of images in sense made a de facto refutation of the many racist arguments that blacks are somehow not fully human. See n35. Lawson, B. E. and Brincker, M. (forthcoming) "Subverting the racist lens: Frederick Douglass, humanity & the power of the photographic Image" in Bernier & Lawson (eds.): I Am Only the Painter: Imaging and Imagining Frederick Douglass. Liverpool University Press. 4 the real, which makes criticism possible. Where there is no criticism there is no progress, for the want of progress is not felt where such want is not made visible by criticism. It is by looking upon this picture and upon that which enables us to point out the defects of the one and the perfections of the other.13 This idea of picture making as an externalization, which allows for juxtaposition in the perception is very interesting. Words, objects and images exist outside the mind and again shape the pictures in the mind. These mental pictures not only help us make our way in the world but also help to shape our understanding of the world.14 This he specifies also has to do with how art and images allow for a process of criticism and hence transformation and progress. We shall return to this in the following. Douglass explains that this externalization can work for both transformation of self and other: We can criticize the characters and actions of men about us because we can see them outside of ourselves, and compare them one with another. But self-criticism, out of which comes the highest attainments of human excellence, arises out of the power we possess of making ourselves objective to ourselves-[we] can see our interior selves as distinct personalities, as though looking in a glass. Men drunk have been heard addressing themselves-as if speaking to a second person-exposing their faults and exhorting themselves to a higher and better life.15 The further question here is how to understand this vulnerable openness to self-criticism and transformation – why do we not change similarly when we engage in dialog or are met with a logical argument or a demand? Are these modes of perception not also somehow an externalization? Douglass often repeats that pictures can touch us in the deepest parts of our soul suggesting by implication that other forms of perception are different. But how does this soul touching work? 4. Aesthetics stance and the asymmetry of beholder and beheld We propose a way to read Douglass's work on images that draws on a recent embodied and ecological proposal about aesthetic perception, referred to in the following as the "Aesthetic Stance theory."16 This theory, we suggest, along with its concepts of aesthetic and social affordances, can help us understand Douglass' views about images as well as his own particular use of photography and literary imagery. A brief overview of the key concepts will be given in this section. Most theories of aesthetic perception and appreciation focus on the nature of the artwork or aesthetic object and/or the particularly aesthetic emotions or judgments that the perception gives rise to. One can call these respectively input-focused (object of perception) and output-focused (emotions, judgments) accounts. Following the aesthetic stance theory we focus instead on what is special about the overall dynamic process of aesthetic perception and read Douglass thoughts on the powers of imagery through 13 Douglass, "Lectures on Pictures," John Stauffer et al., Picturing Frederick Douglass: An Illustrated Biography of the Nineteenth Century's Most Photographed American, pg. 133. 14 Douglass here anticipates many of Langer's ideas about the non-discursive reifying form and rationality of images. Susanne Langer (1942) Philosophy in a new key – a study in the symbolism of reason, rite, and art. Harvard University Press. See also n20. 15 Douglass, Pictures & Progress, p. 171. 16 Maria Brincker, "The Aesthetic Stance: On the Condition & Consequence of Becoming a Beholder," in Aesthetics and the Embodied Mind: Beyond Art Theory and the Cartesian Mind-body Dichotomy (2012), Lawson, B. E. and Brincker, M. (forthcoming) "Subverting the racist lens: Frederick Douglass, humanity & the power of the photographic Image" in Bernier & Lawson (eds.): I Am Only the Painter: Imaging and Imagining Frederick Douglass. Liverpool University Press. 5 this lens. The core question is if images are special because they allow for a special kind of engagement and learning that many other kinds of perception and interaction do not. It is worth stressing, as we shall discuss the photographic medium, that the human eye and visual perception are not camera-like.17 The account we propose follows the currently empirically reinvigorated traditions of pragmatists like James and Dewey and ecologists like von Uexkull, James & Eleanor Gibson etc.18 and insists that visual perceptions are not passive imprints but rather that all perception is active. First, we are active agents as we perceive, and our sense organs are always in motion, from the microsaccades of our eyes to the tilted head and searching fingers. Secondly, the object of perception is not given and predefined but brought into focus by our experienced sensorimotor systems. Human beings are neither empty nor aimless vessels, rather we categorize our perception through our experiences, knowledge, and memories. Our perception is always situated and pragmatically rooted in our goals, capabilities, ideas and values. This notion that we always come to the perception with presuppositions, desires and fears etc. is running through many of Douglass' essays as we shall show in the following. He explicitly talks about how certain "theories" of the mind works both in our artistic creations and in our perceptions of these. In Age of Pictures he writes "it is man's relation to the objects about him that clothes them with all the interest they possess."19 One can say that our perception is practically attuned, and that we always perceive what kinds of actions, interactions and engagements that a given situation or environment invites or allows us to do. Gibson calls this the "affordances" of things, people and situations. He writes: The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill. The verb to afford is found in the dictionary, but the noun affordance is not. I have made it up. I mean by it something that refers to both the environment and the animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the complementarity of the animal and the environment.20 As highlighted by Gibson, his notion of affordances refers to a practical complementarity between a person and their environment. We can add that to be able to perceive an affordance there needs to be some kind of habituation and generalized experiential history that allows the person to recognize the action possibility afforded. In contemporary neuroscience of perception these habits of mind are often referred to as "priors."21 Note that categorization into "kinds" or "types" of events, things or persons can have a strong influence on affordance perception, as it works as a powerful principle by which we generalize possible interactions from one case to another.22 In our cultural worlds we also perceive social affordances, that is, the kind of interactions that other people afford us. A stretched-out hand by a newly 17 http://techin.oureverydaylife.com/differences-between-human-eye-camera-lens-1186.html 18 See e.g. Dewey, John. "The reflex arc concept in psychology." Psychological review 3, no. 4 (1896): 357, Gibson, James. "J.(1977). The theory of affordances." Perceiving, acting, and knowing: Toward an ecological psychology: 67-82. and Langer (note 12). 19 Douglass, "Age of Pictures," John Stauffer et al., Picturing Frederick Douglass: An Illustrated Biography of the Nineteenth Century's Most Photographed American, pg. 152. 20 Gibson, p. 67-68. 21 The term 'priors' comes from Bayesian modeling, and refers to the aspect of past experience in our predictive expectations, and it is then modeled how these priors both inform current perceptions but also are updated by these. 22 See here the parallel to Langer's view: "The eye and the ear must have their logic – their "categories of understanding"...An object is not a datum, but a form construed by the sensitive and intelligent organ, a form which is at once an experienced individual thing and a symbol for the concept of it, for this sort of thing." (n 12), chapter 4, p. 89. Lawson, B. E. and Brincker, M. (forthcoming) "Subverting the racist lens: Frederick Douglass, humanity & the power of the photographic Image" in Bernier & Lawson (eds.): I Am Only the Painter: Imaging and Imagining Frederick Douglass. Liverpool University Press. 6 encountered person for example is typically perceived as affording a handshake. However, perceptions of race, gender, class, ability etc. can have very strong influences on perceived affordances and accordingly on ensuing judgments and interactions. This notion of social affordance perception will be very important for our interpretation of Douglass's view of stereotypes and the notion that there can be a racist "theory" in the minds of artist and perceivers. But first we need to consider the general question about artworks, performances and images. Can it help us to analyze these in term of affordances? Are there specific kinds of aesthetic affordances and if so what is it that they afford? The proposal of the aesthetic stance theory is that a core feature of aesthetic perception is an asymmetry between a beholder and something beheld (typically an artwork). Further, this asymmetry relies on situated conditions where the beholder is not being reciprocally perceived, addressed or interacted with by the beheld. I.e. you can attend to a painting, drawing, photograph, or even a theater play, spoken word or musical performance as a beholder, without that artwork or performer attending to you in a similar way, or at all. In terms of affordances, the idea is that the representational picture, screen or stage, and other typical media of presenting art provide concrete relational conditions that are particularly suited for allowing the perceiver to "become a beholder". The key factor is that the beholder is not demanded to reciprocally react, and thus that the presentation affords a sort of non-action. The theory is that this lack of typical action demand allows the perceiver to engage in a different and perhaps deeper and more receptive kind of perception. This mode of perception thus allows one to listen, to channel, to be a beholder who takes in and plays along with what is being beheld. Kant suggests that art allowed for a special kind of "free play of the imagination,"23 and Douglass also repeatedly suggests that aesthetic forms of perception, imagery and music can reach the deepest aspects of our spirituality. These claims are now to some extent something that we can both explain and empirically test.24 As we have already seen Douglass adds to his thoughts on the power of images a quite specific theory also about how we via images can externalize our inner ideas, hopes assumptions. He sees imagery as crucial to our very humanity and our ability to improve and change, not just because of the role of the beholder as we have talked about here, but also do to the kind of content that can be beheld, the kind of affordances that can be perceived. 5. Imagery objectifying the subjective a powerful tool for good of for ill The inner generative powers of the subject, which are based in habits and anchoring priors, are to a large extent unknown to us as agents. We are not as the computational metaphors of the mind misleads us into thinking – self-transparent.25 We know ourselves through our actions and memories of actions.26 Douglass' idea, introduced above, of externalization and objectification of the subjective through 23 Kant also suggested that there was a certain distance and disinterestedness in aesthetic perception. Note that on aesthetic stance theory this is not an emotional distance or a general disinterestedness but only a dis-interestedness into of immediate executive and strategic action response. 24 See e.g. Vessel, Starr & Rubin (2012) The brain on art: intense aesthetic experience activates the default network, Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, Vol.6, Article 66. 25 Johnson talks about the "focal disappearance" of the body. Mark Johnson (2008). The meaning of the body: Aesthetics of human understanding. University of Chicago Press. pp.3-7. See also n26. 26 One could suggest that our thoughts simply are the ability to navigate spaces that where once outside but have now been internalized (Brincker 2014). Lawson, B. E. and Brincker, M. (forthcoming) "Subverting the racist lens: Frederick Douglass, humanity & the power of the photographic Image" in Bernier & Lawson (eds.): I Am Only the Painter: Imaging and Imagining Frederick Douglass. Liverpool University Press. 7 imagery, can now be understood as a way to behold that, which is typically producing and thus hidden in our actions. We can now see actual and ideal selves, and this for Douglass means that we can improve and judge ourselves. But as we know all to well in our current world of braggadocios spin and selfbranding, self-criticism can be dangerous as it leaves us vulnerable of attack. However given the beholder-beheld asymmetry, aesthetic perception seems to provide a sort of safe space, where we are not being watched and not called upon to react. It gives us room (and privacy) to engage in selftransformation. Douglass's theory is even more specific here: Could the joy imparted by the contemplation of pictures be analyzed, it would be found to consist mainly in [the] self tenfold much, a gratification of the innate desire for self-knowledge with which every human soul is more or less largely endowed. Art is a special revelation of the higher powers of the human soul. There is in the contemplation of it an unconscious comparison constantly going on in the mind, of the pure forms of beauty and excellence, which are without to those which are within, and native to the human heart. It is a process of soul-awakening self-revelation, a species of new birth, for a new life springs up in the soul with every new discovered agency, by which the soul is brought into a more intimate knowledge of its own Divine powers and perfections, and is lifted to a higher level of wisdom, goodness and joy.27 It is thus not just that we can allow ourselves to be vulnerable and better listen to that which is perceived, but that we can compare ourselves to our ideals and hopes – to our projections of who we want to be. This is important. First, this idea fits with the notion of how our actions and perception are driven by experience-based habits. Douglass writes that there is an "unconscious comparison constantly going on in the mind." This can in contemporary terms be seen as one process by which our habitual 'priors' are being updated.28 Note that aesthetic perception might allow for this kind of objectification and recognitions of self through simply the absence of the need to respond to the other. When face-to-face we often put a lot of attention towards predictively judging and responding, towards an agenda, towards steering where we are headed and evaluating if things are turning sour etc. When side-by-side or not engaged in practical tasks with strategic goals we are not "put on the spot". We can allow ourselves to neither predict nor counter, but to let down our guard and feel through what is presented, and how it might or might not resonate with our broader and often unconscious tastes and affects. We suggest that this receptivity of beholding is key to the power of imagery. Further, Douglass stresses the role of ideals of beauty, excellence and perfection. We want to be viewed by both self and others as good, as pleasing, as excellent. But this is not all, we also take pleasure in seeing and improving our own relational powers. Above Douglass points to our discovery of new aspects of our own agency and "divine powers." This is crucial for curiosity, imagination and affordance learning. We learn new possibilities of not only who we are, but also the possibilities of what we can do in various situations, i.e. of how we can transform the world. 27 Douglass, Pictures & Progress, p. 169, our italics. 28 Shaun Gallagher has made the distinction between a "body schema" – pretty close to the generative habitual priors describe here, and "body image" as various aspect of how we know and represent ourselves (Gallagher 2005. How the body shapes the mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press). Given this division one might characterize Douglass as suggesting that images can help us know our own otherwise unconscious body schemas. See also n23. Lawson, B. E. and Brincker, M. (forthcoming) "Subverting the racist lens: Frederick Douglass, humanity & the power of the photographic Image" in Bernier & Lawson (eds.): I Am Only the Painter: Imaging and Imagining Frederick Douglass. Liverpool University Press. 8 We can, however, also in perception in general, and via images in particular, learn unpleasant things about ourselves, about how we are perceived by others, and actions that we might want to do but which are not afforded to us. We can become aware of stereotypes and discriminatory social affordances. We have so far talked about aesthetic perception on a single perceiver basis and not about how the objectification that happens in images also means that the inner habits of some become imposed on the souls of others. Douglass as we have seen suggests that images can be a transformative power for good – but is well aware of the oppressive potentials of images as well. He writes: This picture-making faculty is flung out into the world like all others, capable of being harnessed to the car of truth or error: It is a vast power to whatever cause it is coupled. For the habit we adopt, the master we obey, in making our subjective nature objective, giving it form, color, space, action and utterance, is the one important thing to ourselves and our surroundings. It will either lift us to the highest heaven or sink us to the lowest depths, for good and evil know no limits.29 Imagery and its aesthetic perception is not enough to guarantee positive change – it is rather "a vast power to whatever cause it is coupled." And once again Douglass has a profound understanding of the effect on the habituations of our minds, and how these will replay themselves in future perceptions and interactions. He continues: "Once fully started in the direction of evil, man runs with ever increasing speed, a child in the darkness, frightened onward by the distant echoes of his own footfalls." This echo phenomenon is also in contemporary psychology called "confirmation bias." We see what we expect and we like what we know. This can be understood at a purely pragmatic affordance level: We see what our habits recognize, what we know what to do with. At a low-level of biology one can say that our senses have evolved and adapted to detect that which we can act on.30 However, when we have to deal with our heterogeneous and yet co-constructed social and cultural world problems arise, as there is often a tension between habitual facts and ideals. And the passions are often on the side of habit. Humans will fight violently to keep their habitual ways of life, and to maintain or create the physical and social affordances environments that supports these.31 Thus it is not just that the social world is not as it "should be" but that our preferences diverge. Further there is the epistemic issue that we experience the world through our own perspectival affordances and often overlook – and deny the tensions and harms that others face. Positions of privilege precisely make this invisibility stronger, where as marginalization lays it bare.32 6. Imagery and racist stereotypes Douglass thus saw art and images as particularly human and inherently powerful – but also as a tool that could be used for either good or evil. Precisely for those reasons he also insisted that it had to be the "right" kind of pictures. One feature that Douglass repeatedly highlights is that art should represent the world unfiltered and presented as it is. He suggests that we are drawn to the real essence of objects as 29 Douglass, Pictures & Progress, p. 171. 30 This is a crucial notion in the philosophy of Henri Bergson and in the tradition of semiotics coming from the neo-Kantian evolutionary biologist Jacob von Uexkull. 31 "Conscience itself is often misdirected-shocked at delightful sounds, beautiful colors, and graceful movements, yet smiles at persecution, sleeps amid the agonies of war and slavery, hangs a witch, burns an heretic, and drenches a continent in blood!" Douglass, Pictures & Progress, p. 171. 32 George M. Fredrickson, The Black Image in the White Mind; the Debate on Afro-American Character and Destiny, 1817-1914 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971) Lawson, B. E. and Brincker, M. (forthcoming) "Subverting the racist lens: Frederick Douglass, humanity & the power of the photographic Image" in Bernier & Lawson (eds.): I Am Only the Painter: Imaging and Imagining Frederick Douglass. Liverpool University Press. 9 depicted in artworks. However, he is also acutely aware that the truth is not singular, and further that the "true" in the sense of the existing social reality can be "wrong" in a moral sense. Douglass writes: "It is perhaps fortunate that truth is too large to be described by one man. It belongs, like the earth, to all the Earth's inhabitants. The possessions of one are often too distant, and too obscure, to be seen and appreciated by another."33 Thus Douglass views on truth and authenticity are complicated terrain. Perhaps a way of understanding Douglass is that truth even if perspectival and partial can serve as an undeniable corrective when presented in contrast to false or biased or otherwise misleading representations. His reflections on the representation of black bodies during chattel slavery attest to this point. American slavery gave rise to cruel art works. Images and paintings that represented the slave or any black person were usually distorted or made to resemble apes. White artists did everything it seemed to demean the social status and humanity of Blacks. Douglass realized that as long as whites controlled both black bodies and the representation of those bodies, black humanity would be denied. Thus, while Douglass fought to end slavery, he also comprehended the need to control and put on display images of black people that captured their humanity. He was particularly leery of white artists' representation of Blacks: Negroes can never have impartial portraits, at the hands of white artists. It seems to us next to impossible for white men to take likenesses of black men, without most grossly exaggerating their distinctive features. And the reason is obvious. Artists, like all other white persons, have adopted a theory respecting the distinctive features of Negro physiognomy. We have heard many white persons say, that 'Negroes look all alike,' and that they could not distinguish between the old and the young. They associate with the Negro face, high cheekbones, distended nostril, depressed nose, thick lips, and retreating foreheads. This theory impressed strongly upon the mind of an artist exercises a powerful influence over his pencil, and very naturally leads him to distort and exaggerate those peculiarities, even when they scarcely exist in the original.34 At least two key ideas are expressed by Douglass in this passage: 1) That there is something like a generative "theory" in the mind of the artist which has been "impressed strongly upon the mind", and that this "exercises a powerful influence over his pencil". 2) That Blacks in a racist society will be both represented and seen through a narrow theory of "the other", a "white gaze," where the images of blacks are both systematically distorted and made general and impersonal such that all "look alike" and there is little difference between "old and young". The first point, about the theory as a "prior", a habit of mind, a sort of culturally self-fulfilling prophecy of perception, we have discussed already in the previous section. Now Douglass adds how this works with racist stereotypes in portraiture, how when our imagery and cultural artifacts are left to a certain group to control it will be their image, their priors – however distorted that will be impressed on the minds of us all. This second point has to do with the particular distortion that blacks are victims of. Douglass here describes how A) blacks are victims of an extremely narrow and de-personalized "one size fits all" image 'prior' and B) that it is a systematically distorting stereotype – which highlights that which is distinctive of what we might call "the racial other" as a type or category seen from the perspective of the white gaze. 33 Douglass, "Age of Pictures," p.148. 34 Excerpt from an article by Douglass published in the April 7, 1849 edition of his newspaper The North Star (our Italics). Lawson, B. E. and Brincker, M. (forthcoming) "Subverting the racist lens: Frederick Douglass, humanity & the power of the photographic Image" in Bernier & Lawson (eds.): I Am Only the Painter: Imaging and Imagining Frederick Douglass. Liverpool University Press. 10 In other passages he add details of how C) this stereotype is negative, and representing blacks as subhuman and inferior in various quite systemic ways. Here is a passage from Douglass's speech "The claims of the negro – ethnologically considered": The European face is drawn in harmony with the highest ideas of beauty, dignity and intellect. Features regular and brow after the Websterian mold. The negro, on the other hand, appears with features distorted, lips exaggerated, forehead depressed-and the whole expression of the countenance made to harmonize with the popular idea of negro imbecility and degradation. I have seen many pictures of negroes and Europeans, in phrenological and ethnological works; and all, or nearly all...have been more or less open to this objection. I think I have never seen a single picture in an American work, designed to give an idea of the mental endowments of the negro, which did any thing like justice to the subject; nay, that was not infamously distorted.35 We shall in the following return to all these three aspects of the pictorial stereotypes of blacks. 7. Transformation & the "right" kind of pictures It seems that Douglass suggestion is that to transform this racist "theory" we need to create – and thus impress upon the mind a different kind of imagery that somehow can bypass the theory of the white/racist artist and get to the specificity of the individual. It is on this background we might understand his fascination with photography. But before turning to photography it bears highlighting that Douglass of course was painstakingly aware of not only of the negative attitudes towards blacks but also the amount of intellectual labor that went into maintaining these white supremacist attitudes. Douglass thus often engaged in explicit arguments to show the fallacious nature of these prevailing attitudes.36 Donna Wells writes: "Stereotyping, racial injustice, slavery, and progress were major themes in much of Frederick Douglass's writings. Throughout his life, Douglass would challenge popular notions of African American inferiority, painstakingly researching the subject matter before presenting his argument."37 He took on the so-called science of craniologists, Egyptologists, physicians and a host of other ethnologists of his day who all argued for the inferiority and often even non-humanity of blacks. The content of Douglass arguments refuting this sort of white supremacist evidence is very important. He clearly saw how the negative attitudes about black people were propped up with inconsistent arguments and pseudo-science about the mental and moral worth of persons with dark skin. It was an intellectual and moral battle over the humanity of black people, particularly slaves. Further he realized that he had to confront and refute three differing but interrelated kinds of argumentative attacks: The political, the philosophical, and the aesthetic. The political arguments questioned the legal and social standing of black people; the philosophical questioned the humanity of black people, while the aesthetic questioned the social standing and beauty of black bodies. All of these arguments had one aim: To conclude that black people were not fully human and deserved no rights and privileges as United States citizens. 35 Frederick Douglass, Philip Sheldon Foner, and Yuval Taylor, "The Claims of the Negro Ethnologically Considered, Address Delivered at Western Reserve College," in Frederick Douglass: Selected Speeches and Writings (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1999), pg. 290. 36 Roderick M. Stewart, "The Claims of Frederick Douglass Philosophically Considered," Douglass illustrates his philosophical acumen as he deconstructs the logic of arguments meant to show the inferiority of black people.. 37 Donna Wells, this volume Lawson, B. E. and Brincker, M. (forthcoming) "Subverting the racist lens: Frederick Douglass, humanity & the power of the photographic Image" in Bernier & Lawson (eds.): I Am Only the Painter: Imaging and Imagining Frederick Douglass. Liverpool University Press. 11 Our main focus here is the question of what the aesthetic forms can add to the methods of proof, logic and rational argument.38 What is it that Douglass thinks that images and photography in particular can do to shake the deep-seated dehumanizing and oppressive stereotypes of Blacks? Douglass thought that bad visual representation disrupted the understanding in the same manner that bad rhetorical arguments did and that black people were victims of both. These negative images not only attacked the humanity of black people, but also positioned blacks as inferior within the arena of humanity. We can call these negative images racist pictorial arguments. Such pictorial arguments are paintings or photographs that visually support the conclusion that black people, particularly Black Americans, are not human or not fully human, or distorted humans. As the rhetorical arguments, the negative pictorial representations also had to be countered. Speaking in 1854 Douglass says: If the very best type of the European is always presented, I insist that justice, in all such works, demands that the very best type of the negro should also be taken. The importance of this criticism may not be apparent to all;-to the black man it is very apparent. He sees the injustice, and writhes under its sting.39 Thus we see that Douglass use of images is political, strategic and future-oriented. Given our story of affordances it is not just that images touch and changes us at the depth of our souls but that this transformation is generative. It changes how we produce action. The person that is represented as inferior will be treated as inferior. The social affordance types produced by demeaning racial imagery determine actions. This is why black people literally "writhes under its sting". White artists, as Douglass noted, put these negative conclusions forth in their caricature of black people. Douglass therefore saw both the power of having black artists produce the images of black people and the power of those images. White artists rarely took black people as artistic subjects seriously. As Celeste Bernier notes in her discussion of Douglass: Warring against a white racist notion that one size, shape and form fits all regarding black humanity, Douglass's visual aesthetic took at its starting point the formal, political and ideological importance of representing Black subjects as psychologically complex individuals rather than as generic types, flattened icons or caricatured non-entities. At the heart of Douglass's theory of portraiture was his conviction that all likenesses of African American subjects, enslaved and free, must do justice to "the face of the fugitive slave" by conveying the "inner" via the "outer man" and thereby work with emotional depth rather than physical surface in order to extrapolate a full gamut of lived realities otherwise annihilated out of existence. 40 We shall return to this key issue of how what we could call positive pictorial arguments would show the complex individuality of black people with the "full gamut of lived realities." This is precisely what is 38 Note that Douglass' form of logical argumentation often includes clearly performative aspects. As in his commencement speech "The Claims of the Negro Ethnologically Considered." at Case Western where he points to the irony of the invited speaker having to justify their own humanity. It thus becomes a sort of performative redictio ad absurdum of the claim that blacks are sub-human. 39 Douglass, The Claims,1854, p. 290. 40 Celeste Bernier, A Visual Call to Arms against the "Caricature [sic] of My Own Face:" From Fugitive Slave to Fugitive Image in Frederick Douglass's Theory of Portraiture. Journal of American Studies, Volume 49, Issue 2, May 2015, pp. 323-357. Lawson, B. E. and Brincker, M. (forthcoming) "Subverting the racist lens: Frederick Douglass, humanity & the power of the photographic Image" in Bernier & Lawson (eds.): I Am Only the Painter: Imaging and Imagining Frederick Douglass. Liverpool University Press. 12 "annihilated out of existence" by the demeaning but also narrow "all blacks look a like" caricaturing representation.41 8. Objects versus agents of change: transforming the distorting lens Douglass's writings can be seen as refutation of all sorts of arguments of black inferiority. However in his aesthetic work he also takes on many of the more subtle oppressive social and political dynamics that are so important in our current world. The humanly co-created social environment can maintain and induce the negative reaction of many white people to black people. As philosopher Rita Nolan notes, "It is unproblematic that some things are socially contingent phenomena: They would not exist or would not be the kinds of things that they are, but for the fact that there are certain types of interpersonal relations."42 The de facto and de jure racist laws and racist social practices form an important part of the interpersonal and interracial relations in the United States. Frederick Douglass understood this very well. He argued that the social environment produced attitudes that hindered the full acceptance of black people.43 This had to be changed. However, he also understood that non-ideal subversive practices might be needed. Importantly, the very social and political policies and practices impeding the ability of black people to improve their situation, or to be seen as full members of the political order, also works to make the viewing of a black person in a positive light difficult. An example of the complexity of change can be seen in Douglass opposition to minstrel shows. He was vehemently opposed, particularly to those in which whites donned blackface.44 In 1848, he called white minstrels "the filthy scum of white society, who have stolen from us a complexion denied to them by nature, in which to make money, and pander to the corrupt taste of their white fellow-citizens." In seeming tension with this view, a year later Douglass gives his approval to a black minstrel troupe, Gavitt's Original Ethiopian Serenaders.45 The question is what drove Douglass to this apparent aboutface. In his own words: "It is something gained when the colored man in any form can appear before a white audience; and we think that even this company, with industry, application, and a proper cultivation of their taste, may yet be instrumental in removing the prejudice against our race."46 Douglass thus suggests that the very fact of black people performing on stage – as art, as something worthy of beholding – is a positive event with the potential of ameliorating prejudice. He was quick to note that the performance would have been better if the Serenaders had not exaggerated the exaggerations of our 41 Douglass would give credit to those whites that represented the black man as a human being. For example, he applauded white US artist, Louis Prang's print of African American senator, Hiram Revels, as a talisman against white racist discrimination by ensuring that, "Whatever may be the prejudices of those who may look upon it, they will be compelled to admit that the Mississippi Senator is a man, and one who will easily pass for a man among men." Douglass, "Letter to Louis Prang," 1870. Rpt. Katherine Morris McClinton, The Chromolithographs of Louis Prang. New York: Crown Publishers, 1973: 37 42 Rita Nolan, Cognitive Practices: Human Language and Human Knowledge (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1994), 151 43 Frederick Douglass, Philip Sheldon Foner, and Yuval Taylor, "The Color Line," in Frederick Douglass: Selected Speeches and Writings (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1999), pp. 648-656. 44 Sarah Meer, Uncle Tom Mania: Slavery, Minstrelsy, and Transatlantic Culture in the 1850s (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2005) 45 "Gavitt's Original Ethiopian Serenaders," Uncle Tom's Cabin & American Culture, 2009, section goes here, accessed May 16, 2014, http://utc.iath.virginia.edu/. 46 Frederick Douglass, The North Star, 29 June, 1849, http://utc.iath.virginia.edu/minstrel/miar03at.html Lawson, B. E. and Brincker, M. (forthcoming) "Subverting the racist lens: Frederick Douglass, humanity & the power of the photographic Image" in Bernier & Lawson (eds.): I Am Only the Painter: Imaging and Imagining Frederick Douglass. Liverpool University Press. 13 enemies and presented the colored man as is. He, as always, was concerned with negative bodily representations of black performers as they presented the race to the world. Douglass reasoned that all art forms evoked images in the minds of the perceivers of the work of art. He wanted the images of Blacks to be positive and pondered the relationship between racism, art, representation, and political and social status.47 In this case, given the pervasive structural conditions in the US with both prevailing extremely negative images of the blacks and a shortage of opportunities to show a positive image, he must have weighed that simply being on stage was a net positive. Another complex case for Douglass was the use of various pictures to document the welds of scaring from whiplashes on the backs of many slaves. Frederick Douglass, in My Bondage and My Freedom, comments on slave overseers that could without mercy whip their slaves. He writes that the overseer's moral character was written on the "living parchment" of the backs of their slaves.48 The floggings were a testament to the slaveholder's belief that the slave was less than human. The scars were a physical manifestation of the cruelty of slavery and slaveholders. The welts on the backs of slaves were also the creation and as such "the artwork" of the slaveholder. Photographs and prints of the slave's scourged back, were circulated on both sides of the Atlantic. Abolitionists saw the propaganda value of these and used images of the slave's scarification as a way to attest to the brutality of slavery.49 Douglass realized that the "artwork" represented more than physical brutality. He understood that the slave's mutilated body was a representation of his or her status in the slave community and, indeed, within the United States. The slave's body became a representational work of art, but what exactly did it represent? The slave's disfigured body was a revealing representation of the humanity denied Blacks. Thus as a mere negative, it did little to reinstate that humanity and could as such be used also in some ways to keep status quo. It might show other blacks a rebellious honor, but was mostly used – by white abolitionists to present blacks as victims, or – by white supremacists to habituate people to seeing the black body in an inferior and "thing like" position. Douglass admits to showing the "living parchment" of his own body. In Life and Times, he writes: "I was called upon to expose even my stripes, and with many misgivings obeyed the summons ..."50 He, of course, was not happy about showing his scars, but it reinforced his understanding of the power of bodily representation as a form of moral suasion.51 However he also saw the need to represent black people as agents and individuals not just as victims or bodily "evidence" of wrongdoing. Forms of imagery were needed that positioned the black individual as the full member of society that they deserved to be. Stauffer 47 Rosenberg, Cory '12 (2013) "Ole' Zip Coon is a Mighty Learned Scholar: Blackface Minstrelsy as Reflection and Foundation of American Popular Culture," The Gettysburg College Journal of the Civil War Era: Vol. 3, Article 6. Available at: http://cupola.gettysburg.edu/gcjcwe/vol3/iss1/6 48 Frederick Douglass and Bill E. Lawson, My Bondage and My Freedom (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2002), pg. 201. 49 Celeste-Marie Bernier, "A 'Typical Negro' or a 'Work of Art'? The 'Inner' via the 'Outer Man' in Frederick Douglass's Manuscripts and Daguerreotypes," Slavery & Abolition 33, no. 2 (2012): pg. #. 50 Frederick Douglass and Henry Louis Gates, "Life and Times of Frederick Douglass, Written by Himself," in Autobiographies: Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave ; My Bondage and My Freedom ; Life and times of Frederick Douglass, 939. 51 See, for example, Bill E. Lawson, "Douglass Among the Romantics," in The Cambridge Companion to Frederick Douglass (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) Lawson, B. E. and Brincker, M. (forthcoming) "Subverting the racist lens: Frederick Douglass, humanity & the power of the photographic Image" in Bernier & Lawson (eds.): I Am Only the Painter: Imaging and Imagining Frederick Douglass. Liverpool University Press. 14 writes: "Like Dubois, the Douglass of My Bondage seeks to become "a co-worker in the kingdom of culture," to dwell above the veil of race and to merge his double self – a black man and an American – "into a better and truer self".52 Douglass saw art and imagery as a place where he could insist on this position of respect and full agency, humanity and personality. Stauffer writes: In print, speech and images he sought to fashion himself in a way that would confer upon his persona and his white perceivers the "gift of life," to borrow from Elaine Scarry, which would link them together and dissolve social barriers. The slave, a "thing" acquired life and humanity when it was represented as a performer or an art object.53 9. The particular value of photography As we have seen already Douglass sees art and pictures as holding transformative powers in general. However simply as a powerful tool imagery does not guarantee any progress towards social justice. As a matter of fact most depictions of blacks in art as already highlighted were seriously distorted, caricatured and generally demeaning. Douglass's appreciation of the power of photographs was a natural extension of his understanding of the role of the representation of the body in shaping the views of humans about other humans.54 For Douglass, photography, as an art form, could present the truth about the humanity of Blacks, which was lacking in the representation of black bodies and faces by white artists. "Douglass believed that true art could break down social barriers. True art, for him, meant accurate and "authentic" representations of blacks, rather than caricatures such as blackface minstrelsy."55 Accurate and authentic photographs, Douglass reasoned, could serve as a correction of the negative pictorial arguments and advance the appreciation of black humanity, even in the racist culture of the United States. Along with some forms of live performance, photography was not liable to the same problems as for example painting which allows the artist another kind of control of that which is depicted.56 The distorting lens could to some extent be bypassed in the presentation of the object, and could in that way help correct the distorted lens of the perceiver. In other words, it is not that photography guarantees the full or impartial truth but that it to some extent bypasses specific "filters" that are typically biased. Douglass thus saw photography as an art form that was extremely good as a corrective in an already bigoted world. Partially because of its concreteness and variation: "Pictures of life are about as varied as they are numerous."57 But again, even photographs and other forms of "seeing with ones own eyes" are complicated, and can be used to defend the bigoted and dehumanizing status quo. They pick out and represent one truth. In a racist world many truths exist that can be photographed and which do not move us towards social justice. This 52 Stauffer, p 122. 53 Stauffer, p 115. 54 Jr. John S. Haller, "Race and the Concept of Progress in Nineteenth Century American Ethnology," American Anthropologist 73, no. 3 (1971) 55 John Stauffer, "Frederick Douglass and the Aesthetics of Freedom," Raritan 25, no. 1 (2014): p 115. 56 Douglass here also anticipates some of Sontag's views: "A photograph passes for incontrovertible proof that a given thing happened. The picture may distort; but there is always a presumption that something exists, or did exist, which is like what's in the picture. Whatever the limitations (through amateurism) or pretensions (through artistry) of the individual photographer, a photograph - any photograph - seems to have a more innocent, and therefore more accurate, relation to visible reality than do other mimetic objects." Susan Sontag (1977) On Photography, Macmillan. p.175. 57 Douglass, "Age of Pictures," p 147. Lawson, B. E. and Brincker, M. (forthcoming) "Subverting the racist lens: Frederick Douglass, humanity & the power of the photographic Image" in Bernier & Lawson (eds.): I Am Only the Painter: Imaging and Imagining Frederick Douglass. Liverpool University Press. 15 is why Douglass stress the role of the black artist and the black acting subject, as opposed to the black object, in correcting and shaping our collective imagery – and thereby society. Photography is an important vehicle of change precisely because the white artist, white producer etc. can be sidelined. Photography – and his own public appearances for that matter – can be perceived and beheld unmediated. Donna Wells was one of the first to draw our attention to Douglass's use and understanding of the role of photography to combat the these negative presentation of black people. Douglass, as Wells notes, in 1861 makes it clear that for him photographs have a liberating aspect that can be used as a rebuttal to the antihumanity arguments about black people. She writes: This lecture and several variations were given throughout the years of the Civil War and was the pinnacle of his argument that photography documented truth, having the potential to be a formidable social equalizer when juxtaposed next to depictions of racial types and stereotyped drawings by artists and scientists. Even more important, his is probably the earliest African American voice added to the ongoing discussion about truth and beauty in nature fostered by the birth of the daguerreotype.58 Wells here puts her finger on a crucial notion – it is not that individual photographs simply give us the truth or each count equally in our representation of the world. It is rather that they can serve to correct the stereotypes already there. In other words it is their role in changing the existing presuppositions or "priors". Thus we can sum up here that photography can serve as a corrector of misleading imagery, it can present evidence of humanity, worth and concrete individuality. But it can also be used for bigoted evidence. Truth and accuracy are complicated things. Further, as we have seen the notion of accuracy does not exhorts Douglass fascination with photography or his interests in art and images and their transformational power. It is also about hope and inspiration, of seeing what could be, about ideals and perfections – and a higher kind of being. Lastly, Douglass was well aware of this as well as the contextual nature of how images are both represented and received. He writes: Success is the admired standard of American greatness, and it is marvelous to observe how readily it also becomes the standard of manly beauty. There is marked improvements in the features of the successful man, and a corresponding deterioration in those of the unsuccessful. Our military heros look better even in pictures after winning an important battle than after loosing one. The picture do not change, but we look at them through favorable or unfavorable prevailing public opinion.59 This contextuality and reliance on prior opinion, suggests that photos no matter how truthful, can always only be one ingredient among many in the process of social change.60 With this in mind we now turn to the concrete ways in which Douglass, as both artist and aesthetic subject, sought to use imagery. 10. Douglass own imagery and artistry 58 Wells, this volume, our italics. 59 Pictures and Progress, 1861 60 Note that the context generally shapes the affordances perceived – and that this is a key factor in our perception of art and in taking an aesthetic stance in general. I.e. seeing Douglass photograph in a museum as opposed to in a newspaper changes the kind of beholding that is likely to ensue. Prior knowledge about the artist and/or content – as in the case of the battle victory described by Douglass – also interacts with the overall affordances of the image. Lawson, B. E. and Brincker, M. (forthcoming) "Subverting the racist lens: Frederick Douglass, humanity & the power of the photographic Image" in Bernier & Lawson (eds.): I Am Only the Painter: Imaging and Imagining Frederick Douglass. Liverpool University Press. 16 Douglass is one of the most photographed people of the 19th century. It is now time to analyze the images that he posed for, and approved off, and thus was the subject rather than the object of. He clearly put thought into the photographs he sat for, and the imagery he thus created of himself. He was performing an artwork, and paid attention to the minute details of how his pictures came across and thus the kind of impact it could have on its beholder. In other words, the concrete social affordances of the specifics of the imagery. Wells writes about Douglass self-choreography: "Douglass may have deliberately constructed this image of himself...Always impeccably dressed and well groomed, Douglass appears enraged and glares into the camera with brows crossed and forehead creased with anger."61 Douglass always presented himself as perfectly dressed and groomed and thus as a successful member of society. But what is of particular interest is that Douglass did not simply want to be a success story, a role model showing other black people that the world is okay as it is and that they can make it too. He did not simply want to be seen in a positive light. This could have been achieved with a smile and a light-hearted demeanor, and as referenced by Wells, Douglass explicitly expressed his dismay of drawing of him where he was appearing as "good natured, smiling pleasantly at the viewer."62 Douglass wrote that such imagery "has a much more kindly and amiable expression than is generally thought to characterize the face of a fugitive slave"63 Douglass when in control of his image, when photographed and not drawn by others, presented himself as stern and serious, sometimes even angry. Wells refers to the passages in the Columbian Orator specifically on body language, which she sees a potential inspiration for this characteristic pose: Anger and resentment contract the forehead, draws the brows together and thrust out the lips . . . So likewise in anger, a certain vehemence and intenseness appears in the eyes, which, for want of proper words to express it by, we endeavor to represent by metaphors taken from fire, the most violent and rapid element; and say in such cases, the eyes sparkle, burn, or are inflamed...The hands should generally be open; but in expressions of compunction and anger, they may be closed.64 The question is, what is the social affordance of this kind of body language, and accordingly what are the transformations that Douglass is seeking to impose upon the minds of the viewers? Given his remark about what is fitting for a fugitive slave, one thing this pose does is to show his righteous indignation with the crimes of slavery. A positive demeanor would allow his viewer to forget these injustices, to put them aside and say – as they do – "he is one of the good ones."65 Further, we 61 Wells, p. 234 62 See Zoe Trodd, "The Abolitionist and the Camera: Frederick Douglass's Photographic Half-Century," This volume 63 Douglass. "A Tribute for the Negro," The North Star April 7th, 1849, reprinted in Foner, ed., LWFD 1, pp. 379-84. quotation at p. 380. 64 Wells, p This volume 65 Much of Phia Slater's work in social psychology is interesting here. Salter & Adams (2016) study the affordances and forward directedness of various cultural "historical memory" creating artifacts used for Black History Month in elementary schools. They found that materials generally stressed diversity and individual accomplishment and that racism and discrimination was rarely stressed particularly in majority white schools, Frederick Douglass, circa 1860 Lawson, B. E. and Brincker, M. (forthcoming) "Subverting the racist lens: Frederick Douglass, humanity & the power of the photographic Image" in Bernier & Lawson (eds.): I Am Only the Painter: Imaging and Imagining Frederick Douglass. Liverpool University Press. 17 would like to speculate more generally that discontent and any kind of aggression are emotions that black people are not allowed to express. In terms of affordances, anger confronts, accuses and lays a claim on the viewer. Anger does not step down, it is not submissive and it will not be silenced. The anger of the oppressed is always unsettling for the existing power structures, as it suggests that appeasement is past and change is coming. Of course what often ensues is that the privileged attempt to delegitimize the anger. Where women are hysterics, childish victims of their irrational emotions, black people are accused of being beastly, unintelligent, docile etc. Douglass photographs precisely preempts this typical attack and defense of the stereotypes of the status quo. His images are serious, intense, wise and dignified, and about as far away from beastly and blunt as one can get. In terms of affordances, these pictures demand that the viewer sees, not only the humanity, but Douglass' beauty, poise and equal/high social standing. In other words, they demand that the beholder listen to his claims and offer a respectful and dignified response. The pictures also present Douglass as unapologetically black, both in his facial features and his wellgroomed big Afro hair. This is important, as he knows that whether he likes it or not, he is "representing the race" in the beholders mind. This is not to say that race is real and that there are categorical visual features but that in a society already divided by race, race is the first thing we see. As Douglass writes: "When I come upon the platform the Negro is very apt to come with me. I cannot forget him: and you would not if I did."66 One can take Douglass's imagery as acknowledging that racial categories will be focal in the mind of the perceiver, and instead of merely agonizing over this denial of individuality he precisely uses that categorization to make his individual image have a strong impact on the stereotypes of black people. He thus strategically contributes to a shift in the categorical perception of black people. The existing categorization according to race is systemically denying black full agency and equal standing. One can be tolerated but is not allowed to participate in the "co-creation of culture". We see Douglass photographs, as well as his literary images, as debunking and refusing this exclusion from full citizenship. Douglass literary portrait of Madison Washington in The Heroic Slave is 1) a very clear example of this sort of pictorial counter-argument to stereotypes, and also 2) of the specific transformational power of the aesthetic stance, and why art and images perhaps has a better chance of transforming the lens than more typical rational arguments. He writes: Madison was of manly form. Tall, symmetrical, round, and strong. In his movements he seemed to combine, with the strength of the lion, a lion's elasticity. His torn sleeves disclosed arms like polished iron. His face was "black, but comely." His eye, lit with emotion, kept guard under a brow as dark and as glossy as the raven's wing. His whole appearance betokened Herculean strength; yet there was nothing savage or forbidding in his aspect. A child might play in his arms, or dance on his shoulders. A giant's strength but not a giant's heart was in him. His broad mouth and nose spoke only of good nature and kindness. But his voice, that unfailing index of the soul, though full and melodious, had that in it which could terrify as well as charm. He was just the man you would choose when hardships were to be endured, or danger to be encountered,--intelligent and brave. He thus contributing to the (re)-production of white ignorance and denial of past and present discrimination. Phia Salter and Glenn Adams (2016) "On the Intentionality of Cultural Products: Representations of Black History As Psychological Affordances" Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 1166. 66 Douglass, Pictures and Progress, p. 163. Lawson, B. E. and Brincker, M. (forthcoming) "Subverting the racist lens: Frederick Douglass, humanity & the power of the photographic Image" in Bernier & Lawson (eds.): I Am Only the Painter: Imaging and Imagining Frederick Douglass. Liverpool University Press. 18 had the head to conceive, and the hand to execute. In a word, he was one to be sought as a friend, but to be dreaded as an enemy.67 Stauffer writes about this description: "Washington is characterized in sublime terms that evoke both terror and joy."68 However, we argue that the Kantian notion of sublimity is too imprecise to capture the neatly choreographed aesthetic activism of Douglass in this passage. We shall here linger a bit on the exact word images used to show how these each pushes the existing harmful stereotypes that Black people face: Douglass says that Washington's motions are "strong" but "elastic", thus refusing that the black mans strength somehow made him inflexible, crude or inelegant. His face is "black but comely", which insists on bridging the barrier of otherness that impedes interaction. Eyes as "lit with emotion kept guard" under a "dark brow", show that neither beauty nor an alert and receptive mind is reserved for Whites. His "Herculean strength" not "savage" or "forbidding", insists that Blacks do not have to refuse their strength to gain their humanity. "A child might play in his arms" shows him as caretaker and protector. Combining "strength" and "heart" adds moral value such that the courage is heroic righteousness not foolishness. "His broad mouth and nose spoke only of good nature and kindness," again highlights black features as friendly and good. But Douglass in the same breath admonishes not to confuse friendliness with submission: The voice as an "index of soul" is "full and melodious" and could both "terrify" and "charm". Douglass then proceeds to write that Madison Washington was "intelligent and brave. He had the head to conceive, and the hand to execute". And lastly, in terms of social affordances, he explicitly tell us what kind of social interaction we would want to have with him: "He was one to be sought as a friend, but to be dreaded as an enemy". How can we keep any notion of human excellence and deny it to the man described in this passage? How are you not going to meet and treat Washington with respect? The argument that splits humanity into dominant and inferior cannot proceed in the face of this image. The beholder in the heroic slave is the White man, Listwell, who one could interpret as taking an aesthetic stance as he watches Washington from a far. As Stauffer points out, Listwell is perfectly named as someone who listens well, someone capable of receptivity, of seeing what is actually there and being impacted by it. And in Douglass vision Listwell is precisely dually transformed for life: 1) The crime of slavery and the humanity of Blacks are forever certain in his mind, and 2) the individuality of Washington is imprinted, "daguerreotyped" in his memory. The genius of Douglass pictorial approach lies in his understanding of how our interactions are rooted in habitual theories of the mind but also of how the pragmatic logic of these habits cross-pollinate on a subconscious level. We interact not with pixels but with overall impressions, and these overall impressions are highly contextual and rooted in extra-situational knowledge and experience. This can be terrible when negative "theories" poison people's perceptions of certain groups. However it can also precisely be used to refuse such categories and presuppositions. Subtle tensions within our habitual categorizations can be brought out by conflicting perceived affordances. Scientists study the hierarchical cognitive dynamics of 67 Frederick Douglass, Philip Sheldon Foner, and Yuval Taylor, "The Heroic Slave," in Frederick Douglass: Selected Speeches and Writings (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1999), pg. 222. 68 Stauffer, p. 119. Lawson, B. E. and Brincker, M. (forthcoming) "Subverting the racist lens: Frederick Douglass, humanity & the power of the photographic Image" in Bernier & Lawson (eds.): I Am Only the Painter: Imaging and Imagining Frederick Douglass. Liverpool University Press. 19 this kind of affordances in e.g. the famous stoop test. Here a subject is presented with color words, such as "red," written in a different font color, say blue, and asked what color the letters of the word are. The fact that it is hard not to read the word "red" shows the strong response affordance of reading words. At a social level we are also disposed, not only as we saw earlier to see the successful as more beautiful, but also to interpret quite specific interaction possibilities. If structural racism systemically positions blacks as inferiors and as "others" then that is going to have a strong influence on the perceptual responses and overall actions of people living in such a society – to some extent even independently on one's own racial identity. We referenced earlier three interrelated aspects of racist image "priors" that Douglass points to: their A) narrow generality and depersonalization, B) systematic distortion as other and contrast with whites and C) negative and demeaning nature. The point here is that each of these will inform perception and behavior in different ways. If we take as an example the phenomenon Douglass mentions that whites often misjudge the ages of Black people. This could at first be seen as uniquely a product of A) however it typically interacts with B) and C) such that protections and acts of compassion and protections afforded whites of young and old age are too often denied blacks. Here it is not clear what comes first: a general lack of respect and callous non-empathic attitude, the distortion of combined dehumanization and superhumanization or the inability to decipher the particularity of the specific person due to their race. The point is that Douglass method of using the social affordances of images lets us work on all of these simultaneously. Madison Washington affords both respect and compassion. He stands as an individual, yet not an outlier but a representative member of a group. Another aspect of the interpersonal appeal in Douglass photography is that it brings differences into conversation. In his portraits we so often see Douglass direct his strong gaze right into the eye of the beholder. There is an insistence on the dignity of self and at the same time an appeal for interaction. Mickaella Perina has written about the dangers of the tendency to bifurcate self and other and white/ "western aesthetics" and "non-western aesthetics". She writes: It is my contention that in today's cosmopolitan, transnational world, race, aesthetics, and otherness must be understood as interconnected. In our global era I see an inflation of otherness, a rise of the quality of being different and excluded from the making of standards, values, and judgments, including aesthetic standards. Ways of establishing a demarcation line between self and other, between ours and theirs may vary, but the tendency to regard the Other as a stranger and his or her culture as fundamentally foreign remains a constant. Furthermore, the tendency to reject otherness by projecting it exclusively onto outsiders, and to refuse to acknowledge ourselves as others, appears invariable.69 Perina advises pluralist interactions rather than binary divisions. We see Douglass pictorial arguments as putting forth a similar request. 11. Conclusion 69 Mickaella Perina, 2009. Encountering the Other: Aesthetics, Race and Relationality. Contemporary Aesthetics, (2), p. 1. Lawson, B. E. and Brincker, M. (forthcoming) "Subverting the racist lens: Frederick Douglass, humanity & the power of the photographic Image" in Bernier & Lawson (eds.): I Am Only the Painter: Imaging and Imagining Frederick Douglass. Liverpool University Press. 20 We have in this chapter tried to present Douglass views about imagery and how it shapes both individual minds and the shared fabric of society. We suggested that his theories show a profound insight into the dynamic workings of racist stereotypes, and how these simultaneously and continuously shape and are shaped by our minds, actions and shared society. Writing in the later part of the 19th century Douglass work can be seen as anticipating work of many later and current philosophers and psychologists. He writes about how both our perceptions and actions are shaped by our minds habitual "theories" or "priors" as researchers would call these today. Images are interesting to Douglass because of their dual capacity to make these priors visible and also in imprinting such on the minds and thus transforming us in a profound way. We here analyzed his theories of aesthetic perception in relation to a recent theory of aesthetic affordances as inviting an asymmetry between beholder and beheld, and thereby allowing for a kind of plasticity in the mind of the perceiver. Most importantly, Douglass takes this psychological level theory to the level of co-inhabited and constructed and yet power-skewed cultural societies. As highlighted through out the chapter Douglass main goal was to fight to end slavery and for social justice, human dignity and equal social standing for freed Black Americans. He here understood also the propagandistic role of art and imagery in the life of the political state. Indeed the type of artwork supported by the state showed the nature of the moral character of the state. The enemy in war is often shown to be sub-human, and how individuals and groups were/are portrayed indicate the character of the state's attitude toward the humanity of those persons. We discussed Douglass multipronged attempts to change the racist pictorial stereotypes of his day. Importantly Douglass acted both as theorist and a performance artist. He theorized and explained the potential of imagery as a powerful tool for creating and maintaining as well as combating discriminatory practices. The latter is harder than the former, and only art that subverts the existing "theory" can serve to transform a bigoted world. Anachronistically we can say that such art works need to change the "priors" and the perceived socially affordances of those targeted with discrimination. We here discussed what Douglass saw as the "right kind" of pictures, and his particular fascination with the new technology of photography. He sees photographs as allowing for an authenticity and truthful representation of the black subject as white artists and their distorted and distorting white gaze to a large extent can be bypassed. Wells notes: "For Douglass, photography was an invention that would provide proof of what African Americans truly look like...a tool that would counter the tendency to portray black people as something less than human and show instead the progress they have made in spite of enslavement and consequent alienation."70 In this regard, Douglass's also used his own image to help foster a change in how black people were viewed. Thus, Douglass also acted as an artist and an artwork himself, throughout his career creating performances, essays and images aimed at transforming racist minds and societies beholding these. He carried himself as a gentleman but was by no means submissive or apologetic in his struggle. He presented us with an individual, an American, a black man that afforded respect, love, honor, friendship and awe, and yet would not be appeased or allow us to forget the past and present injustices. 70 Wells (This volume) Lawson, B. E. and Brincker, M. (forthcoming) "Subverting the racist lens: Frederick Douglass, humanity & the power of the photographic Image" in Bernier & Lawson (eds.): I Am Only the Painter: Imaging and Imagining Frederick Douglass. Liverpool University Press. 21 Douglass's art was to make the impossible possible, to play into the broader social habits by which respect, equal treatment and human dignity is afforded – and by way of that very social reception make the humanity and worth of black people already enacted-and thus undeniable. In Lectures on pictures Douglass writes: Of all things the mental atmosphere surrounding us is most easily moved in this or that direction. The first causes of its oscillations are too often too occult for the most subtle. The influence of pictures upon this all-surrounding and all-powerful thought element may some day furnish a theme for those better able that I to do it justice. It is evident that the great cheapness and universality of pictures must exert a powerful, though silent, influence upon the sentiment of present and future generations.71 We believe he might not be giving himself enough credit here. It seem that he understood the influence of pictures on the mind and the shared "mental atmosphere" better than most both at his time and ours. Douglass pictures and writings are works of poignant political activism just as he intended them to be. As we look at our current American society, it is hard to say whether they have worked-or will work-in a more ultimate sense. This will depend also on the receptivity of the beholders and our shared practices of cultivation of the distorting lens. Douglass himself was well aware that while pictures are important the struggle for human dignity and equality must be fought on multiple fronts.72 71 Douglass, Lectures on pictures, p. 130. 72 Bill E. Lawson, "Memories in Time: From Frederick Douglass to Ferguson and Beyond," The Critique, November 06, 2014, section goes here, accessed September 20, 2015, http://www.thecritique.com/articles/memories-in-time-from-frederick-douglass-to-ferguson-and-beyond/.

Geert Keil, "Naturalism", in: Dermot Moran (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophy, London: Routledge 2008, Ch. 6, 254-307. https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-Companion-to-Twentieth-CenturyPhilosophy/author/p/book/9780415299367 NATURALISM Geert Keil 1. Introduction 2. Naturalism in the First Half of the Century 3. Three Eminent Figures 3.1 Husserl 3.2 Wittgenstein 3.3 Quine 4. The Nature of Naturalism 5. A Classification of Naturalisms 5.1 Metaphysical Naturalism 5.2 Methodological, or Scientific, Naturalism 5.2.1 Naturalism with a Leading Science: Physicalism and Biologism 5.2.2 Naturalism without a Leading Science 5.3. Analytic, or Semantic, Naturalism 6. Three Fields of Naturalisation 6.1 Naturalising Epistemology 6.2 Naturalising Intentionality 6.3 Naturalising Normativity 7. Naturalism and Human Nature 8. Scientific naturalism quo vadis? 8.1 Scientia mensura and the Disunity of the Special Sciences 8.2 The Business of Philosophy 6 NATURALISM Geert Keil Introduction "We are all naturalists now," declared Roy Wood Sellars (1880–1973) in 1922.1 A bold assertion then, it had come closer to the truth by the end of the century. During the course of the twentieth century, "naturalism" seems to have become a synonym for a respectable philosophical methodology. On the other hand, there are a number of distinguished philosophers who advise against paying too much attention to what they view as a long series of unsuccessful naturalistic endeavors. As Peter Geach (1916– ) has written: When we hear of some new attempt to explain reasoning or language or choice naturalistically, we ought to react as if we were told someone had squared the circle or proved √2 to be rational: only the mildest curiosity is in order – how well has the fallacy been concealed?2 This clash of opinions is remarkable. For Geach, it goes without saying that the series of naturalistic approaches is a series of failures, whereas Sellars takes it for granted that we are all naturalists now. It appears that the parties are not talking about the same thing. Sellars described naturalism as "less a philosophical system than a recognition of the impressive implications of the physical and biological sciences."3 This characterization is typical for naturalists from the first half of the century. John Dewey (1859–1952) described a naturalist as "one who has respect for the conclusions of natural science."4 If this kind of respect suffices to be converted to naturalism, then one can easily accept Sellars's view. It seems silly to deny or belittle the unprecedented success of the natural sciences since the Enlightenment. Or, in the words of Bouwsma, "Who then would not accept scientific method, and prefer to go to Babylon by candlelight? Scientific method is successful."5 If the only alternatives to naturalism are obscurantism, superstition, and supernaturalism, then naturalism seems to be the only game in town in our scientific culture. Although there still exist enclaves of religiously motivated supernaturalism, particularly in the United States, naturalism has become the most forceful metaphilosophical trend of the twentieth century. NATUR ALISM 255 When Geach takes any "new attempt to explain reasoning or language or choice naturalistically" to be doomed to failure, he has more specific and demanding tasks in mind. Sellars and Dewey give general vindications for the natural sciences, whereas Geach refers to specific projects of naturalization. Now, having respect for the natural sciences and their methods does not yet guarantee the success of specific naturalistic projects. When it comes to these projects, naturalism does not compete with obscurantism and supernaturalism, but rather with well-established philosophical theories that purport to explain phenomena with the use of non-empirical methods. Some naturalists hold that non-empirical methods are unscientific. But if this were true, then, not only philosophy but also neither mathematics nor logic could contribute to our scientific picture of the world. The attractiveness of philosophical naturalism crucially hinges on the available alternatives. As long as naturalists confine themselves to selling their position as a bulwark against irrationality, obscurantism, and superstition, they insinuate that any kind of philosophy not committed to naturalism must be obscurantist.6 So let us take a step back. The Oxford English Dictionary defines a naturalist as "one who studies natural, in contrast to spiritual, things," or as "one who studies, or is versed in, natural science."7 This non-philosophical meaning can be traced back to the medieval Latin expression naturalista. Secondly, a naturalist is someone who believes in philosophical naturalism, which is characterized by the OED as "a view of the world, and of man's relation to it, in which only the operation of natural (as opposed to supernatural or spiritual) laws and forces is admitted or assumed." Finally, in literary theory and the history of art, "naturalism" is a term for a certain style or epoch. Zola was a naturalist in the third sense of the word, Quine in the second, and Darwin in the first. Only naturalism in the second sense is a philosophical position. It is this second sense that this chapter addresses. Naturalism in the first half of the century As a philosophical trend, naturalism has played a prominent role since the late nineteenth century. Of course, the term is older. Christian apologetics from the seventeenth century used it in a pejorative sense. Naturalists were labeled with the epithets "blasphemous" and "atheistic," where a naturalist was simply someone who refused Christian supernaturalism. As quoted above from the OED, naturalists aimed to explain all phenomena with "the operation of natural (as opposed to supernatural or spiritual) laws and forces." Philosophical naturalism in the present sense of the word has been characterized thus: "The closest thing to a common core of meaning is probably the view that the methods of natural science provide the only avenue to truth."8 Understood in this sense, the term has been in use on a larger scale since the late nineteenth century. Unquestionably, Hobbes and Hume would today call themselves "naturalists," and so would Holbach and LaMettrie. We have to keep in mind, however, that the geography of those debates was described in different terms. Throughout the nineteenth century, other -isms covered what is subsumed under "naturalism" today: materialism, mechanism, positivism, empiricism, and monism.

A model for multiple appearances based on Williamson's GCEL Irene Bosco Abstract Human epistemic subjects cannot but employ imperfect and limited tools to gain knowledge. Even in the seemingly simple business of acquiring knowledge of the value of a physical quantity, what the instrument reads or perception tells more often that not does not correspond to real value. However, even though both our perceptual apparatus and measuring instruments are sensible to background noise, under certain conditions, collecting more information of the same quantity using the same tools leads to an improvement of the subject's epistemic condition. The aim of this paper is to formalize this intuition employing a model which extends Williamson (2013) on the arising of Gettier cases in epistemic logic. From a model where each world is univocally represented by the pair 〈r, a〉 defined by the real value and the apparent one, I will be considering a scenario wherein the subject has collected n appearances of the real parameter, so that each world is identified by a n+ 1-tuple. On the assumptions that the n data are all independent and regarded by the subject as equally reliable, a plausible model should be able to describe three phenomena. First of all, the more coherent and closer to represent the real value the set of n appearances is, the more knowledge of the real value is gained. Secondly, the more the subject goes on acquiring "good" data, the more she knows. Thirdly, the world where the n apparent values and the real one match is the best world for the subject. Following Williamson, I shall put forth a system for multiple appearances in epistemic logic that aims at modeling these phenomena by describing the interval within which the real value is known to lie. 1 Motivation and desiderata It is common practice in physics and the natural sciences to establish the magnitude of a given physical quantity relying not just on a single measurement but on a collection of values obtained through the same measuring process in similar conditions. For example, to gain knowledge of the temperature of a room, several measurements taken using thermometers of the same brand would be collected and their data analyzed. The result will be a value, or more realistically a range, for the temperature. Similarly, a person trying to tell the height of a tree would be willing to consider what people around her looking at the same tree would have to say, and would gain confidence in her judgment as more people agree 1 on it. The intuitive idea behind these phenomena is that the number and the quality of the set of data affect what the subject knows about the real value. In this paper I shall attempt to provide a model that formalizes this intuition, restricted to cases where I believe our pre-theoretical intuitions to be more uniform and less controversial. However, a formal system that works for simpler cases is a valid starting point should one be willing to expand and investigate cases that are not as straightforward. On measuring Before digging into the technical details of the model, it is important to pause for a moment on an essential feature of the process of measuring and of gaining knowledge of the external, sensible world more in general. Our measuring tools, be them complex instruments or perceptual apparatuses, are not perfect. Assuming that there is a real value of the magnitude of a physical quantity that could be known, the value returned by a tool, the so-called apparent value, does not necessarily match the real one. Moreover, this mismatch is usually not deterministic: the process of measuring is affected by small background noises that, even in similar conditions, make it the case that whenever we perform a measurement, we could get a different value each time. Likewise, a group of people with similar perceptual capacities and abilities is likely to report different heights of the same tree. If the instrument is well-designed, the gap between reality and appearance is rarely wide; under the assumption that the measurements are independent and that the differences in the data set are due to random errors with expected value zero, we should be confident that for a big enough number of appearances, the errors will cancel out and that the average value of the appearances will converge to the real value. However, as a matter of metaphysical possibility, we don't want to rule out that it could be possible to be in a case where not just random errors, but systematic ones or perceptual illusions may occur as well. As a result, appearance might substantially diverge from reality, and apparent values in turn might or might not diverge from each other. The case I will be considering assume that all the apparent values collected are independent of each other and that we have no reason to judge that a measuring tool is particularly worse than another. In these cases, all the apparent values are assumed to have the same weight: there is no reason to regard one more or less reliable than another. This is indeed an idealization; nonetheless, given the restricted family of cases that will be the target of the model, it is a fairly plausible one. 2 Three desiderata More specifically, our model is designed to capture three phenomena that should take place in idealized scenarios where a subject is gaining knowledge of an environmental parameter just by relying on some apparent values, which are all independent and equally reliable. Intuitively, how far away reality is from appearance is given by the reality-appearance gap. To help our discussion, we shall introduce the following taxonomy for the cases I will try to model. The "Observationally good" case (OG). A case wherein the appearances collected have all identical values. The "Extremely good case" (EG). An OG case where reality matches appearance. The "Statistically good case" (SG). A case where the mean of the appearances matches reality. Therefore, the results of this paper will be mainly limited to OG cases; although pretty rare in real life, finding a way to formalize our pre-theoretical intuitions about knowledge in these cases is a prerequisite for any more general system that aims at modeling other cases as well. Two basic conditions must be met by any such a model: The Fitter, The Merrier In OG cases, for a fixed number of appearances, a set of values with a smaller reality-appearance gap allows the subject to acquire more knowledge than a set that displays a greater gap. The More, The Merrier In OG cases, for a fixed reality-appearance gap, the more appearances the subject collects, the more knowledge she gains. If the first condition is not peculiar of a multiple-appearance model, the other is meant to capture the point of collecting more measurements or asking for the opinion of peers, keeping in mind that quantity is not always the key to knowledge. To illustrate the above points more precisely, let us consider the following scenarios. Suppose we have collected three measurements of a physical quantity, all with the same value, e.g. a1 = 5, a2 = 5, a3 = 5 and suppose that the real value is actually 5: we are in an EG case. Then consider the case where the real value is 5, however the apparent values are a1 = 3, a2 = 3, a3 = 3. Our intuition is that more knowledge of the real value is gained in the former case than in the latter. This intuition is conveyed by The Fitter, The Merrier desideratum. 3 Now imagine that an extra appearance is collected. If the appearance-reality gap has not changed, viz. if the value of the extra appearance is a 5 or a 3 respectively, more knowledge has been gained; this is the point of the The More, The Merrier requirement. Lastly, a third desideratum could be added as well, which concerns the best case for the subject who has collected n data, not necessarily all matching: The Best-Case Principle For a fixed number of appearances, the EG case is the world wherein the subject knows the most. The subject knows more when she sees only 5s than in any other possible case with the same number of appearances. The aim of this paper is to design a model that satisfies these conditions. 2 Starting point: Williamson's model The model that I shall advance will be a generalization to multiple appearances of the model that Williamson designed to show the possibility of Gettier cases (Williamson, 2013); as such, it is helpful for our discussion to recall that model and its details, especially regarding the constraints. We are asked to imagine an ideal subject who is gaining knowledge of an environmental parameter just by learning about its apparent value, which is maximally specific: exactly one value is displayed. To formalize this, Williamson designs a model in epistemic and doxastic logic which consists in a frame 〈W,R, S〉 where each possible world in W can be uniquely identified by the pair 〈r, a〉 where r, a are the real and apparent value respectively. For ease of exposition, I shall follow Williamson1 and take r, a ∈ R, so that each possible world could be univocally identified with a pair of real numbers. Propositions are subsets of W and R and S denote the epistemic and doxastic accessibility relation respectively; R(w) and S(w) refer to the strongest proposition that a subject knows and is justified in believing2 at a world w. Before defining the accessibility relations, thus establishing what is known or believed at a world, it is important to pause on the constraints of this model, for our model will rely heavily on them in order to get the desiderata right. Luminosity The subject knows the apparent value, so that any world with a different apparent value is not epistemically accessible. Note that sameness of appearances is not a sufficient condition for 1I shall be using Williamson's notation as well, so that w, u, v... range over worlds. The only difference is in the choice of letters to denote the reality-appearance pair, which for me will be 〈r, a〉 2Williamson needs the doxastic accessibility relation to track not merely the belief operator but the stronger one of "justified belief". This stronger sense is plausible in the multiple appearance model as well, but it is not an essential feature of the model 4 accessibility; if that were the case, for all we know the real value could be any value on the real line, yielding to crass skepticism. Actuality The real value r is always epistemically accessible. Inexactness Even when the apparent value matches the real one, for all that the subject knows, she could be in a world wherein the real value is different from the apparent one. Convexity If a world is accessible from another, then all in-between worlds are as well: by Inexactness, for all I know I could be in a world where r is different than a, say it is a bit higher; Convexity implies that I could also be in a world where r′ is greater than a and less than r3 Distance For a given apparent value, if the reality-appearance gap in w1 is wider than the gap in w2, then the subject knows less in w1 than in w2. Appearance-centering Knowledge of the real value is cashed out as an interval centered on the apparent value. Distance imposes that a subject in a world where reality and appearance diverge substantially knows less than what she would know in world wherein the gap is narrower. Since in principle there are no metaphysical limits to how much reality and appearance could come apart, the wider the gap grows, the the less the subject will know; however, unless the gap were infinitely large, scenario that we can rule out a priori, the subject will still come to know something non-trivial about the real value r. Through the use of the metric d : R2 → R, the reality-appearance gap could be easily quantified, for example as the absolute value |r − a|. Given two arbitrary worlds w = 〈r, a〉, w′ = 〈r′, a′〉 the epistemic accessibility relation R envisaged by Williamson is: wRw′ ⇔ d(r′, a′) ≤ d(a, r) + c ∧ (a = a′) where c is a positive, non-zero constant real number; I shall call c the "inexactness value". It is straightforward to see that this definition satisfies all the above constraints. As a result, what the subject will know is that the real value falls within a certain range. This is crucial, for it follows that gaining knowledge will be cashed out in terms of coming to know an interval I ⊂ R, which I shall dub 3Note that Convexity is an idealization that is more plausible in scenarios where the set of the real/apparent values is continuous, like R. Indeed, in a case of a discrete set, Convexity loses its appeal: suppose that the subject wants to know on which day of the week a particular event is, if a Thursday-world is accessible from a Tuesday-world, it does not make much sense to allow for the Wednesday-world to be accessible as well. 5 the "accessibility interval". A nice upshot is that the phenomenon of gaining more knowledge, i.e. of improving one's epistemic condition, could be neatly quantified. Acquiring knowledge amounts to reducing the length of the accessibility interval, which is uncontroversially represented by the absolute value of the difference of the two endpoints. When the subject is at world w, reads a and the real value of the environmental parameter is r = a, for all that she knows she could be in a world w′ where r′ = a± c. Therefore, the strongest proposition known by a subject at w is R(w) = r ∈ [a− c, a+ c], whereas the strongest proposition known at a generic world w = 〈r, a〉 where r 6= a is that r ∈ [a− |r − a| − c, a+ |r − a|+ c]. The length of the accessibility interval I at world w is: |I(w)| = |a+ |r − a|+ c− (a− |r − a| − c)| = 2(|r − a|+ c) As such, it depends entirely on two factors: the inexactness value c and the reality-appearance gap |r−a|, which I shall be denoting by the function G(r, a). 3 Moving on: multiple appearances Recall that the scenario we are trying to model is that of a subject or a group who is acquiring knowledge of an external parameter with value r by collecting a finite number n of data, the appearances, which are supposed to be independent from one another but caused by the same environmental parameter. For the sake of simplicity, I shall assume that the case is that of a single epistemic subject who has access to a finite number n of appearances. For example, the value of the temperature as read using n different thermometers the subject has no reason to trust one more than another. A further constraint that we might want to add at this point is that the order in which the subject has been presented with the n appearances does not matter: we have no reason to consider a particular order of appearances more significant than another. Thus, we want the sample of appearances to form a multiset S of cardinality n; for the sake of simplicity we shall be talking about the set of appearances, with the understanding that multiple instances of the same elements are allowed. Formally, a world is defined as an equivalence class of n + 1-tuple: 〈r, a1, a2, ..., an〉 where the first element is the real value of the physical quantity and the following n are the apparent values. The equivalence relation ∼ is defined on the set of ordered n+1-tuples as 〈r, a1, a2, ..., an〉 ∼ 〈r′, a′1, a′2, ..., a′n〉 if and only if the real values are the same, r = r′, and the respective sets of appearances S and S′ are the same. This means that, given the ordered n+1-tuples 6 w = 〈r, a1, a2, ..., an〉 and w′ = 〈r, a′1, a′2, ..., a′n〉, there is a permutation τ : [1, n] → [1, n] such that aj = a ′ τ(j) ∀j ∈ [1, n] ∀aj ∈ S. For ease of exposition, henceforth the term "world" and the letter w will denote an equivalence class of ordered tuples, so that the accessibility relations are to be understood as holding for n + 1-tuples in different equivalence classes as well. Now let's turn to the implications of Williamson's constraints for our model. Some requirements will naturally carry over: Luminosity For n appearances, it implies that a necessary condition for a world to access another is that the sets of the n appearances are exactly the same. If this were a sufficient condition as well, then for all the subject knows, the temperature could be any real value: this consequence is obviously unwanted. Moreover, since our measuring tools are not perfectly discriminating, we need also: Actuality The actual value is always epistemically accessible. Inexactness Given a set of n appearances, for all that the subject knows she could be in a world where the real value is not exactly the one conveyed, somehow, by such a set. Convexity Given that our scale to measure the environmental parameter is the real line, it seems natural to assume that all those real values that fall between the real value at the subject's world and that of one accessible from there are epistemically possible. Moreover, since the real value of the temperature is given by a single value, when we have several appearances, possibly distinct, the natural analog to Williamson's model is to take their arithmetic mean as central point. Mean-centering The accessibility interval is centered on the mean value of the appearances. Distance is the constraint that is the least easy to generalize to a case of multiple appearances. The underlying idea that more knowledge is lost as reality and appearance diverge remains, yet now the reality-appearance distance itself is a strange gap between a single value and a set of apparent ones. In OG cases, the set could be easily represented by the repeated apparent values, so we would have to take into account the fact that it is repeated only. The matter becomes much more complex for arbitrary cases; in the next section I shall provide a somewhat general discussion of how much the subject knows could respect Distance in multiple-appearance scenarios. 7 4 Describing the accessibility interval Recall that the initial desiderata regard a change in the amount of knowledge; in the light of the above considerations, knowledge is cashed out as an interval centered on the mean. According to Williamson's model, the total width of the accessibility interval |I| is a function of c and G. Recall that for OG cases, all that we need is to have c and G depend on the real value r, the apparent value a and the number of appearances n. For less good cases, more inventive work has to be done. As we shall see in this section, the definition of the accessibility interval must take into account not only the number of appearances, but also their variance σ and their mean ā. A viable mathematical definition of both functions c and G will be advanced in the last section; here I shall limit myself to justifying my choice in less formal terms. 4.1 The reality-appearance gap G The purpose of this value is to represent of how far away the set of appearances, somehow regarded as a whole, is from reality. In Williamson's model, G was simply the distance between two points, r and a. The natural extension of this definition to a case of n apparent values is to take the distance of the real value from the mean: G = d(ā, r). Thus, if we follow Williamson and keep the inexactness value c constant, the accessibility interval at a world w(r, ā) ∈Wn is defined as: |I| = 2(|ā− r|+ c) Unfortunately this model would not satisfy the desiderata. Suppose the subject is in an OG world where the real temperature is 82F and she has collected 2 appearances: a1 = a2 = 80F . Since ā = 80F , the reality-appearance gap is G = 2. Then she keeps measuring and her data sample grows into 100 appearances, all with value 80F . I think that the intuitive response is that the subject has gained knowledge by performing 98 measurements more. However, if the accessibility interval depended only on G and a constant c, in both worlds the strongest proposition known would be that r ∈ [78−c, 82+c]. The reality-appearance gap has not varied, thus this model clearly fails to meet the The More, The Merrier condition; as such, it is not a viable one. Neither would do to consider the total distance of r from the set of apparent values, viz. the total sum of each distance |r − ai|, so that G = ∑ i∈[1,n] |r − ai|. Then G2 = 4 and G100 = 200, so that we would reach the absurd conclusion that the subject's knowledge has decreased. To conclude, so far the best way to describe the reality-appearance gap G is to cash it out as the distance between the real value and the 8 mean of the apparent ones. 4.2 The inexactness value c Once established a viable definition of G and learned that, contrarily to Williamson's model, c cannot be a constant value, we are left with the more creative task of providing a description of the inexactness value that lets the model satisfy the desiderata. Arguably, in the case of a single apparent value, the choice of the inexactness value has to do with the sensitivity of the measuring tool or of the subject's perceptual apparatus. For example, if we are measuring the temperature of a room, we expect c to have an order of magnitude of one; on the contrary, if the temperature of a star is the physical quantity at hand, then the order of magnitude of c would be at least twice higher. In brief, we can think of the inexactness value as depending on a given value C that is meant to subsume all these features, which depends on a given scenario but that is constant at every world. Moreover, the inexactness value has to decrease, as n gets larger: one could be tempted to define c as: c = C n However, this option is not feasible. Imagine a scenario where the real value r = 7 and the subject has collected four perfectly matching appearances of 7 at world w. Then consider a world u with the same r = 7 where the sample is comprised of four appearances, a1 = 4, a2 = 5, a3 = 8, a4 = 11. Then cw = C 4 = cu This identity still obtains when we take the reality-appearance gap G = |ā− r| also into account, for both are SG cases, so that Gw = Gu = 0. Thus, the total lengths of the accessibility intervals is |Iw| = C2 = |Iu|. Thus, according to this model, the subject would not know more in w, which is an EG case: this model fails to meet The Best-Case Principle. As a consequence, our definition of c has to take into account another feature of the sample of data, which helps discriminating among cases with same number of appearances and identical mean. The variance Intuitively, the closer a single appearance is to the real value, the better. In statistics, the variance represents how far a set of numbers are spread out from their average value; likewise, we can define a variance with respect to the real value, which represents the spreading out of appearances from the real 9 value. This value, denoted by σ, encodes the difference between the two cases in the example above: given the same number of appearances and identical mean value, we can say that we know more in an EG case for the variance is smaller, actually null. The mathematical definitions will be advanced in the last section; for the time being, we could informally conclude that, other factors being equal, a smaller variance is better than a greater one. Moreover, in OG cases the variance is exactly the value of G, so that the reality-appearance gap and the number of appearances are all that matters, in accordance with what claimed by the first two desiderata. Any OG world could be univocally characterized just by the real value, the apparent one and the number of appearances. It is natural to wonder whether we could design a model where the accessibility interval depends just on variance and number of appearances, viz. on the inexactness value c(n, σ, r). Thus we could have c = |I|, disposing of the G-factor altogether, and rephrase the initial desiderata in terms of variance instead of the reality-appearance gap. This would be tempting, but a model that disregards G would be feasible for OG cases only. Yet, OG cases in themselves are not that interesting: they serve us as a starting point, but a model that could naturally be expanded to cover also more general cases should be our final goal. For such cases, we need G. Consider two worlds, w and u, where the real value is r = 4; at w the subject has collected six apparent values, a1 = 3, a2 = 3, a3 = 3, a4 = 5, a5 = 5, a6 = 5, whereas at u she had 6 appearances of a ′ = 3. Computing the variances, it turns out that σw = σu = 1. Since the number n = 6 is they same, we have that cw(6, 1, 4) = cu(6, 1, 4). However, intuitively the subject knows more in w than in u. In order to achieve this result we would need to add the respective reality-appearance components Gw = 0, Gu = 1, for the mean values are ā = 4 and ā′ = 3 respectively. To conclude, in light of the introduction of variance, we can put forth a fourth desideratum that goes a little beyond OG cases: Supremacy of Statistics For a fixed number of appearances, for a fixed variance, the SG case is the world wherein the subject knows the most. Note that if we limit ourselves to OG cases, then the only SG case is the EG one, so The Best-Case Principle is exactly a special case of the above. 10 5 A model for multiple appearances Once we have described the components that make up the length of the accessibility interval, it is time to describe how this interval is actually generated, i.e. to see why it corresponds to the strongest proposition known by the subject at a specific world. In order to do that, we need a definition of an epistemic accessibility relation for a model of multiple appearances. I will now advance the general relation, then discuss how it fares with respect to single-appearance cases. 5.1 Generalized R For any n ∈ N, let 〈Wn, Rn〉 be a frame, with Wn ⊆ Rn+1 a non-empty set of possible worlds univocally represented by n + 1-tuples where the first element is the real value r, and the other a1, ..., an are the values of the appearances: w = 〈r, a1, a2, a3, ..., an〉 ∈Wn. Let w = 〈r∗, a1, a2, a3, ..., aN 〉, w′ = 〈r′, a′1, a′2, a′3, ..., a′N 〉. For a world to be accessible from another, the sets of multiple appearances S1 = {a1, ...aN} and S2 = {a′1, ..., a′N} have to be the same. Let σ∗, σ′ be the variances of the sets S1, S2 respectively, and let ā∗, ā ′, be the respective mean values. Note that σ = σ′ and ā∗ = ā′; let G(r, a) be the measure of the reality-appearance gap, and c(n, σ, r) be the inexactness value as described above. For any N ∈ N0, the epistemic accessibility relation RN is a binary relation on WN defined as: wRNw ′ ⇔ G(r′, ā∗) ≤ G(r∗, ā∗) + c(N, σ∗, r∗) This definition of epistemic accessibility is a natural generalization of Williamson's, to the extent that it is straightforward to prove that all formal properties of R carry over into RN . For any natural N , RN is reflexive, yet neither symmetric nor transitive. The logic is closed under entailment, and the strongest proposition known at w, RN (w) = {u : wRNu}, is that r lies within an interval centered on the mean value ā∗, whose length is |IN (w)| = 2(G(r∗, ā∗) + c(N, σ∗, r∗)) 5.2 Generalized S We can expand the model with a doxastic accessibility relation that is a natural generalization of Williamson's. In his model, Williamson defines the doxastic accessibility relation in terms of the epistemic 11 one and of the Good Case wG: wSw′ ⇔ wGRw′ I follow suit, and for any w,w′ ∈ WN as above, for any N ∈ N0 the generalized doxastic accessibility relation SN is defined as: wSNw ′ ⇔ wSGRNw′ What the subject at w is justified in believing is what she would know were she in the corresponding Statistically Good case, where r = ā∗. Hence, since GSG = 0, the strongest justifiedly believed proposition at w is that r ∈ [ā∗ − c(N, σ∗, ā∗), ā∗ + c(N, σ∗, ā∗)] Note that the value of the inexactness value in this world could be know: c depends on the variance computed using the mean of appearances and their number, indexes that are available to the subject. Also, if a world is doxastically accessible, then it is epistemically accessible from one with the same set of appearances. The principle that Knowledge entails Belief also follows, as well as the principles of Weak Positive and Negative Introspection. Therefore, in either case the subject knows that she is justified in believing the real value to be within an interval centered at the mean of the appearances, whose length is given by a certain inexactness value which depends on the quality of her data sample. No matter in what particular world she currently is in, a skeptical case or an EG one, the strongest proposition believed is across all worlds with the same appearances. In the rest of the section I will show that Rn and Sn are a continuous extension of Williamson's R and S. In the next one we shall see the model at work. 5.3 Case n = 1 For our model to be continuous with Williamson, Rn reduced to the case of a single appearance must be equal to R, ditto for Sn. When we have a singleton S = {a}, where a 6= r, then σ = (r − a) 6= 0 and ā = a. Let w = 〈r, a〉, w′ = 〈r∗, a′〉 and a = a′. G(r, a) = |r − a|, then wR1w ′ ⇔ |r∗ − a| ≤ |r − a|+ c(1, r − a, r) The only difference regards the inexactness-value component. Recall that Williamson envisaged a constant inexactness value, whereas now c depends on the distance of the apparent value from reality: the 12 inexactness value is different at each world. Williamson's initial constraints would be met anyway; however, the difference in knowledge required by Distance will grow faster. The strongest proposition know is that r ∈ [a− |r − a| − c(1, |r − a|, r), a+ |r − a|+ c(1, |r − a|, r)] and the interval has length |I1(w)| = 2(|r − a|+ c(1, r − a, r)). Clearly, as a gets closer to r, the interval will get shorter and shorter. The "Good case". When appearance matches reality, at the world wG = 〈a, a〉, we have that σ = 0 and ā = a: the average corresponds to the real value, and we are trivially in an EG case. It follows that c(1, 0, a) = C, thus the value of c, being independent from r, could be known by the subject. Since only those worlds wherein G(r, a) ≤ C are accessible, the accessibility interval is |I1(wG)| = 0+2C = 2C. This is the shortest interval for n = 1, exactly as it is the case in Williamson's model. Moreover, given that Sn is defined in terms of Rn and the SG case, it follows that the generalized doxastic relation restricted to a case n = 1 is defined in terms of R1 and wG, yielding exactly Williamson's relation S. 6 A satisfactory model? To get a better idea of whether the one advanced above is a viable model, I shall put it to work, and asses how it deals with more concrete examples. To work out the exact numeric values I will be using the function for the inexactness value c(n, σ, r) and the reality-appearance gap G given in the following section. For ease of exposition, in line with the order of magnitude of the data in the examples, I will be assuming that the constant C = 1. Some concrete examples Recall the first two examples given in section one to arise our intuitive responses. In this section I shall formalize them, to see if the model conveys the original intuitions, hence if it meets the initial desiderata. In addition, I will consider a world v where the appearances are all distinct. This world is helpful to test the potential of the model with respect to cases that are not so intuitively settled. 13 Same n Let's start by analyzing the three worlds when the number of appearances is kept fixed. As before, assume n = 3, r = 5; apparent values for w, u, v and relative statistics are reported in the tables below, where K|I|,B|I| denote the width of the accessibility and doxastic interval respectively. 3-appearance case w u v r 5 5 5 a1 5 3 5.5 a2 5 3 3.5 a3 5 3 5 3-appearance case Statistics w u v σ2 0 4 0.83 ā 5 3 4.66 c 0.33 0.39 0.34 G 0 2 0.33 K|I| 0.66 4.78 1.34 B|I| 0.66 0.66 0.68 Strongest Proposition K and B world K B w [4.66,5.33] [4.66,5.33] u [0.60,5.38] [2.67,3.33] v [3.98,5.32] [4.32,5.00] It's no surprise that the world showing the smallest variance and the smallest reality-appearance gap is the EG case w. On the contrary, u has the highest variance, and also the widest reality-appearance gap. Since K|I(w)| < K|I(u)|, the first desideratum of The Fitter, The Merrier is met. Unbeknown to the subject, w is a fitter world, for the appearances match reality: she knows more of the environmental parameter by being in w than by being in u. Yet, the width of the interval of what the subject is justified in believing is the same in both worlds: this is the case because in the eyes of the subject the two worlds are exactly equally good. Even though v is not an OG case, it could be beneficial to compare it with the other worlds. Again, K|I(w)| < K|I(v)|, so that the The Best-Case Principle is satisfied. Indeed, we did not have any initial expectations regarding which case between u and v would give the subject more knowledge; our intuitions have been regarded as silent on this sort of arbitrary cases. However, our model seems to suggest that the appearances collected at v are not much worse than those of w. The variance is not much higher, and the value for the inexactness value differ by a 0.01. That said, in w the reality-appearance gap is null, whereas in v it is a fifteenth of the real value. As a result, the accessibility interval in v is clearly shorter than in u, for both the values of c and G are: appearances available in u, as a whole, are further away from reality than in v. Therefore, if one is willing to carry over the idea of The Fitter, The Merrier desideratum beyond OG cases, then our model seems to be on the right track. 14 Gaining an extra appearance Now suppose, that the subject in each of the worlds above is presented with another appearance; the numbers are the following: 4-appearance case w u v r 5 5 5 a1 5 3 5.5 a2 5 3 3.5 a3 5 3 5 a4 5 3 4 4-appearance case Statistics w u v σ2 0 4 0.875 ā 5 3 4.5 c 0.25 0.29 0.26 G 0 2 0.50 K|I| 0.50 4.58 1.50 B|I| 0.50 0.50 0.52 Strongest Proposition K and B world K B w [4.75,5.25] [4.75,5.25] u [0.71,5.29] [2.75,3.25] v [3.75,5.25] [4.24,4.76] At world w, gaining another matching appearance resulted in gaining more knowledge: K|I4| < K|I3|. This is the case since c4 < c3, although the variance has not changed. Note that the variance has not changed in u either: here as well more knowledge has been gained thanks to the extra 3, and indeed the subject is more justified in believing the real value to be closer to 3 than before. It is clear that the more coherent appearances one has, the smaller both intervals become, until we reach a limit point. Suppose the subject in u has an infinite number of appearances of 3: the strongest proposition she could ever come to know if she keeps collecting 3s is that r ∈ [1, 5] and her strongest justified belief is that r = 3. To sum up, the The More, The Merrier condition is satisfied in both worlds w and u, where the distance reality-appearance has not varied. Discussing what happens in v is not so straightforward. First of all, compared to the case of just 3 appearances, the variance has slightly increased, yet c has decreased anyway. This is due to the fact that a minor change in σ cannot make up for a change of the factor n. Admittedly, a constant C = 1 seems a bit too high: after-all it is a fifth of the real value, it is not very realistic; if we were adopting a smaller C, c(4), although less than c(3) would be much smaller than G: a smaller inexactness-value component would not reduce the width of the interval. However, the average as well has moved further away from the real value. Thus, it looks like the subject's epistemic condition has slightly impaired since the 3-appearance case. The intuitions that I have is that she does not know more, even if she has collected more appearances. Thus if one is willing to retain the intuition behind the The Fitter, The Merrier principle for a case of distinct appearances and different numbers, since K|I4| > K|I3| in v, our 15 model would satisfy it. The power of Statistics Lastly, let us consider also a world s of four distinct appearances where the mean matches the real value r = 5 and the variance is the same as in v. s and v s v r 5 5 a1 5.6 5.5 a2 6.2 3.5 a3 4.3 5 a4 3.9 4 s and v Statistics s v σ2 0.875 0.875 ā 5 4.5 c 0.26 0.26 G 0 0.50 K|I| 0.52 1.50 B|I| 0.52 0.52 Strongest Proposition K and B world K B s [4.74,5.26] [4.74,5.26] v [3.75,5.25] [4.24,4.76] Clearly, s is a SG case, hence Supremacy of Statistics is satisfied for K|I(s)| < K|I(v)|. Finally note that K|I(s)| ∼ K|I(w)|: it follows that under the same conditions as above, as the number of appearances increases, K|I(s)| approaches to K|I(w)|, so that knowledge in a SG case is equal to knowledge in a EG case. However, the SG case is the case one would expect to represent a scenario where the difference of appearances is due to small errors randomly distributed, for example when all thermometers are actually equally good at measuring the temperature. Thus, under suitable, though realistic, conditions, the subject's knowledge derived from a set of multiple and distinct appearances is the same as that conveyed by a realistically more improbable set of all-matching apparent values. 7 Mathematical details of the model In the previous two sections I have been working with a description of the accessibility interval that depended on the inexactness value and the reality-appearance gap, on the understanding that there was a mathematically description of them. Finally, in this conclusive section I shall introduce two functions meant to describe G and c. They are by no means the only possibilities, nor maybe the best one. However, I will defend my choice by showing that the resulting model represents a natural extension of Williamson's and that, as informally anticipated already in the previous section, the desiderata mathematically follow. Let S = {a1, ..., an} be a set of n appearances available to the subject, and assume as above that set 16 S ⊂ R and that r ∈ R; we can define the square of variance as σ2 = ∑ i∈n(ai−r)2 n and the mean ā = ∑ i∈n ai n . 7.1 The reality-appearance gap Let d : R2 → R+ be the metric described by Williamson, viz. d(a, b) = |a− b|. Let ā be the mean of the data in Sn; if we regards ā as representative of S, then a natural option would be to define the distance as G = d(r, ā) = |r − ā|. If ā = r, then G = 0. 7.2 The inexactness value My option for the inexactness value c is: c(n, σ, r) = Ce σ2 r2 n Where C is the value specific for each scenario, as discussed in an earlier section. Note that in order to get a pure multiplicative factor for C, we need to divide the variance by the real value. Taking the square of this ratio ensures that the exponent is going to be a positive number, regardless of the sign of r. Clearly, c(n, σ, r) > 0 for any n, σ, r, and c→ 0 as n→∞ 7.3 The accessibility intervals in simple cases Now I shall analyze what happens to c and G as we move across worlds with the same real value but letting the number of appearances and their variance vary. Case n = 1 If a 6= r, σ = (r − a) 6= 0, and c(1, (r − a), r) = Ce (a−r)2 r2 . |I1(w)| = 2(|r − a|+ c(1, r − a, r)) The "Good case". If wG = 〈a, a〉, we have that σ = 0; it follows that c(1, 0, a) = C, |I1(wG)| = 2(|r − a|+ C). Note that Ce (a−r)2 r2 ≥ C Case n > 1 The "Observationally good" case (OG). All values of multiple appearances match: a1 = a2 = a3 = ... = aN ; call this value α. Suppose α 6= r: clearly, ā = α and G = |r − α|, and σ2 = N(α−r) 2 N = (α− r) 2. Then c(N, (α− r), r) = Ce (α−r)2 r2 N = Ce( α−r r ) 2 N . Thus, |IN (wOG)| = 2(|r − α|+ Ce (α−r)2 r2 N ). 17 The "Extremely good case" (EG). r = α = a1 = ... = aN . In this case σ = 0, so c(N, 0, α) = C N and G = 0. |IN (wEG)| = 2CN . This is the shortest interval for n = N . Also, |IN (wEG)| < |IN+1(wEG)|: the more appearances α the agent collects, the more she knows. The "Statistically good case" (SG). The N data available to the subject are not all the same, so that σ 6= 0, yet ā = r. Then c(N, σ, ā) = Ce σ2 ā2 N . For a fix set Sn of not-all-matching appearances, this case has the smallest value of c. G = d(r, α) = 0, thus |IN (wSG)| = Ce σ2 α2 N Meeting the desiderata In conclusion, the above definitions of G and c are such that the resulting model satisfies all the fourth desiderata I listed. • The Fitter, The Merrier : Let n = N , then I(|r − α|) = 2|r − α| + 2Ce (α−r)2 r2 N it's a monotonically increasing function of |r − α|: as this reduces, so does the length of |I| • The More, The Merrier : Let |r − α| = k, then I(n) = 2k + 2Ce k2 r2 n it's a monotonically decreasing function of n: as n increases, the length of |I| reduces • The Best-Case Principle Let n = N , then I(σ, ā, r)N = 2(|r − ā|+ Ce σ2 r2 N ) ≥ 2C N = IN (EG)(|r − α|) for any |r − α| and for any N , IEG = I ⇔ r = α = a1 = ... = aN • Supremacy of Statistics Let n = N , σ = s, then ISG = Ce s2 r2 N ≤ 2|r − ā|+ 2 Ce s2 r2 N for any |r − ā| and for any N, s we have that ISG = I ⇔ r = ā References T. Williamson. Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic. Inquiry (United Kingdom), 56(1):1–14, 2013. ISSN 0020174X. doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2013.775010.

Available online at www.sciencedirect.comwww.elsevier.com/locate/cogsys Cognitive Systems Research 9 (2008) 33–51A conceptual and empirical framework for the social distribution of cognition: The case of memory Action editor: Leslie Marsh Amanda J. Barnier a,*, John Sutton b, Celia B. Harris a, Robert A. Wilson c a Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW 2109, Australia b Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW 2109, Australia c University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada Received 4 April 2007; accepted 5 July 2007 Available online 15 August 2007Abstract In this paper, we aim to show that the framework of embedded, distributed, or extended cognition offers new perspectives on social cognition by applying it to one specific domain: the psychology of memory. In making our case, first we specify some key social dimensions of cognitive distribution and some basic distinctions between memory cases, and then describe stronger and weaker versions of distributed remembering in the general distributed cognition framework. Next, we examine studies of social influences on memory in cognitive psychology, and identify the valuable concepts and methods to be extended and embedded in our framework; we focus in particular on three related paradigms: transactive memory, collaborative recall, and social contagion. Finally, we sketch our own early studies of individual and group memory developed within our framework of distributed cognition, on social contagion of autobiographical memories, collaborative flashbulb memories, and memories of high school at a high school reunion. We see two reciprocal benefits of this conceptual and empirical framework to social memory phenomena: that ideas about distributed cognition can be honed against and tested with the help of sophisticated methods in the social-cognitive psychology of memory; and conversely, that a range of social memory phenomena that are as yet poorly understood can be approached afresh with theoretically motivated extensions of existing empirical paradigms.  2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. Keywords: Distributed cognition; Memory; Autobiographical memory; Transactive memory; Collaborative recall; Social contagion1. Introduction Paradigms in which human cognition is conceptualised as ''embedded'', ''distributed'', or ''extended'' have arisen in different areas of the cognitive sciences in the past 20 years. These paradigms share the idea that human cognitive processing is sometimes, perhaps even typically, hybrid in character: it spans not only the embodied brain and central nervous system, but also the environment with its social or technological resources (Clark, 1997, 2007; Haugeland, 1998; Hollan, Hutchins, & Kirsh, 2000; Hutch-1389-0417/$ see front matter  2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2007.07.002 * Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (A.J. Barnier).ins, 1995, 2006; Kirsh, 1996, 2000, 2006; Norman, 1993; Sutton, in press-a; Wilson, 1994). Such views of cognition share a scepticism about the adequacy of conceptualizing cognition as a process that begins and ends at the skull. One motivation for adopting a perspective in which cognition is embedded, distributed, or extended begins with reflection on the fact that neural systems do not operate in causal isolation from their environments. Moreover, the nature and level of causal integration across the divide between individual and environment suggests that cognitive systems themselves often involve the coupling of neural, bodily, and external systems in complex webs of continuous reciprocal causation. Through evolution and ontogenetic development we have gained capacities skilfully 34 A.J. Barnier et al. / Cognitive Systems Research 9 (2008) 33–51to hook up with or incorporate external physical and cultural resources that over time have themselves become apt for incorporation into more encompassing, extended cognitive systems. In this way, we form temporarily integrated larger cognitive units that incorporate distinct but complementary inner and outer components, often making ''the world smart so that we can be dumb in peace'' (Clark, 1997, p. 180). Embodied human minds extend into a vast and uneven world of things-artefacts, technologies, and institutions-which they have collectively constructed and maintained through cultural and individual history. Often-cited examples of distributed cognition include studies of the instruments and procedures involved in navigation; the physical objects and epistemic tools used in processing orders in a café; the tangle of notes and records with which an academic paper is written; the way skilled bartenders employ unique glasses to remember cocktail orders; or the sketchpads without which abstract artists cannot iteratively re-imagine and create an artwork (Beach, 1988; Clark, 1997, 2001; Hutchins, 1995; Kirsh, 2006; van Leeuwen, Verstijnen, & Hekkert, 1999). Developing research programmes in distributed cognition and the extended mind are being tested and applied in disciplines ranging from science studies (Giere, 2002) to cognitive archaeology (Knappett, 2005), computer-supported cooperative work (Halverson, 2002), and Shakespeare studies (Tribble, 2005). Philosophical defenses of the extended mind (Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Rowlands, 1999; Wilson, 2004) have generated a robust, critical, ongoing debate about the conceptual foundations of the approach (Adams & Aizawa, 2001, 2007; Clark, in press; Menary, 2006; Rupert, 2004). This literature on ''the cognitive life of things'' (Sutton, 2002a) has fuelled a rather technophilic style in distributed cognition research, occasionally resulting in a preoccupation with technology to the relative neglect of social systems (Clark, 2003; Clark & Chalmers, 1998). Yet in most complex real-world contexts, distributed cognitive processes involve the skilful interactive simultaneous coordination of things and people. One natural strategy to address the methodological challenges this poses is to seek insight from and integration with research traditions that focus on interpersonal interaction in cognition. This is to draw attention to the social aspects of distributed cognitive processes, to cases in which other people-rather than artefacts-are the more-or-less enduring partners in coupled or transactive distributed cognitive systems. In this paper we thus aim to show that the distributed cognition framework offers new perspectives on social cognition by applying it to one specific domain: the psychology of memory (see also Tollefsen, 2006). In particular, we argue that independent lines of research on memory- about relations between individual memory and social groups-can be better understood and developed by reconceiving them within this theoretical framework. This focus on the social distribution of cognition is particularly appropriate in thinking about memory, since encoding, storage,and retrieval in real-world contexts all frequently involve the cognitive activities of more than a single individual. This integrative project should have benefits both ways. On the one hand, ideas about distributed cognition can be honed against and tested with the help of sophisticated methods in the social-cognitive psychology of memory; conversely, a range of social memory phenomena that are as yet poorly understood can be approached afresh with theoretically motivated extensions of existing empirical paradigms. The empirical work on transactive and collaborative remembering that we survey below covers just one of a number of fields to which the framework of distributed and extended cognition can be brought to bear: we could also refer to studies of multi-agent interaction in AI (Koning & Ling, 2003), small-group research in social psychology (Fiske & Goodwin, 1994), or (closer to our concern with memory) the flourishing social-interactionist tradition in the developmental psychology of autobiographical memory. In this last field, for example, 20 years of research has built up a rich picture of early personal memory capacities emerging from the dynamical interaction of distinct components in a social-cultural-cognitive-neural system (Nelson & Fivush, 2004), where the relative influence of multiple concurrent processes can vary across cases (Griffiths & Stotz, 2000; Reese, 2002; Smith & Thelen, 2003; Sutton, 2002b). Early joint attention to the past between carers and children slowly helps the child achieve a grasp of the causal significance of the order of events, of the availability of distinct perspectives on the same past time, of the uniqueness of actions, and of the affective and social significance of the sharing of memories (Campbell, in press; Hoerl & McCormack, 2005). Independent work on children's explanatory knowledge, and particularly on their knowledge about the social division of cognitive labour (Lutz & Keil, 2002; Rozenblit & Keil, 2002; Wilson & Keil, 2000), is also relevant here. While we will not discuss this developmental work further in this paper, the picture of early personal memory as socially distributed clearly dovetails with the view of the cognitive psychology of memory that we offer below. The conceptual and empirical benefits that flow from this exploration of the social distribution of memory might also include the forging of new multidisciplinary middleground for memory studies. While mainstream philosophy of mind has largely neglected social aspects of remembering, studies of ''collective memory'' and ''cultural memory'' abound in a burgeoning interdisciplinary field spanning sociology, anthropology, history, political theory, and media theory (Bloch, 1998; Kansteiner, 2002; Klein, 2000; Olick, 1999; Wertsch, 2002). We think that such social memory studies are potentially relevant for cognitive science and philosophy, and believe that both psychologists and humanities scholars can contribute directly to better understandings of the relations between broader studies of national or cultural memory and the typical individual or small-group focus of cognitive psychology with its A.J. Barnier et al. / Cognitive Systems Research 9 (2008) 33–51 35empirical methods (Sutton, 2004, Suttonin press-b; Wilson, 2005a). Since the phenomena in question in social memory studies do not recognize disciplinary boundaries, it is particularly important to seek both conceptual clarity on key terms and effective shareable methods (see also Hirst & Manier, in press). In the next section we flesh out the kind of memory phenomena in which we are particularly interested. We specify some of the key social dimensions of cognitive distribution, and some of the basic distinctions between cases that our psychological studies need to respect and investigate. We also briefly show how our approach to distributed remembering can be interpreted within stronger or weaker versions of the general distributed cognition framework. Then in Section 3 we examine studies of social influences on memory in cognitive psychology, identifying the valuable concepts and methods to be extended and embedded in our framework. Here we focus in particular on three related paradigms: transactive memory, collaborative recall, and social contagion. In Section 4 we sketch our own early studies of individual and social memory developed with the framework of distributed cognition in mind. 2. Memory as a test case for distributed cognition 2.1. Autobiographical memory and external influence While remembering past experience is an activity of intense personal significance, the functions and expressions of autobiographical memory are, equally obviously, deeply embedded in our social world, in adult life as well as childhood. Recollecting specific episodes from the personal past can play many different cognitive, emotional, and interpersonal roles. Alongside the importance of forging, maintaining, and sharing an accurate grasp of past events, the activity of remembering itself keeps the past alive for a variety of present purposes, which is one reason why the qualitative and affective tone of our memories is often entangled and renegotiated in our practical reasoning over time. For example, autobiographical memory shapes and in turn is shaped by our self-conceptions: my decision-making, my choices, and my values are driven in part by the content of ongoing activities of remembering which have themselves been sculpted in part by my working selves, with their goals and their motivations (Barnier et al., 2007; Barnier, Hung, & Conway, 2004; Conway, 2005; Nelson, 2003). We also rely on personal memory to teach or inform others, to develop and maintain intimacy, to elicit or show empathy, and to share mundane or significant stories. In short, autobiographical memory is not simply about accurately recalling episodes from one's past; it is also enmeshed in our broader ongoing cognitive lives. In general, we live these cognitive lives, and engage in the activities that constitute them, in the company of others. Our experiences, especially our significant experiences, are often joint experiences with others of importance to us, such as friends and family. And when our experiences havenot been shared by family or friends, we often relate those experiences to them. Sometimes we learn (often to our delight or relief, sometimes to our dismay) that others have had similar experiences. And when we have experienced something alongside other people-for example, when a group of us went through some phase of life together as a cohort, or when we have deliberately engaged in a course of joint action-our later accountings and attempts to understand ''how it went'' can be of great emotional importance for both individuals and the enduring group. In the strongest such cases, long-standing groups return often to rethink or talk through the same shared past events and experiences, perhaps reevaluating their lives or their relationships in part on the basis of, or by way of, reinterpretations of the shared past. Significant reconsideration and redirection of values and plans can be not only triggered by but also enacted in renegotiation of some still-live past. But in more mundane cases too, as Campbell (in press) puts it, ''sharing memory is our default'' (p. 4). Even those occasions when we are silent about our pasts ''have some of their meaning in relation to our natural habit of sharing the past'' (p. 4). How much does this fact matter? What does it imply about the nature of autobiographical memory? And does it suggest that there is room for a social ontology of memory, as there may be for intention, belief, or action (Gilbert, 1989; Searle, 2006; Velleman, 1997), or for empirical research into memory in social groups? On many dominant views in both philosophy of mind and cognitive psychology, the sharing of memories is only of limited significance. The presence and contribution of other people as real or imagined participants in activities of remembering is seen, at best, as only one external causal trigger for and influence on the real memory processes in the individual; or, at worst, as a disrupting or contaminating influence on individual autobiographical memory. In the powerful tradition of cognitive psychological work on false memory, for example, evidence for the constructive nature of remembering is typically interpreted in an individualist fashion. Elizabeth Loftus writes, for example, that ''misinformation has the potential for invading our memories when we talk to other people'' (Loftus, 1997, p. 51). Construction is equated with distortion, thus minimizing the adaptability of memory's intrinsic dynamics, by which the very mechanisms that underlie generalization can in certain circumstances lead us astray (McClelland, 1995; Schacter, 1999). And external influence is typically characterized as primarily negative, the relentless intrusion of the social into malleable individual memory. Such views fail to do justice to the extraordinary diversity of social memory phenomena, especially to the ways in which sharing our past can facilitate our access to it and our capacity to negotiate its legacies. Truth, and related values like accuracy and fidelity in memory, need be neither simple nor singular: ordinary and successful remembering, far from being inevitably compromised and corrupted by other people, may be ''relational'', depending 36 A.J. Barnier et al. / Cognitive Systems Research 9 (2008) 33–51directly on the support and uptake of other people (Campbell, 2003, 2006). A more nuanced picture of the complex and often positive roles of external social influence in remembering need not, however, remain distant from the best work in cognitive science. The versions of distributed cognition and extended mind hypotheses on which we draw are entirely compatible with computational and representational theories of mind (Rowlands, 1999; Wilson, 1994, 1995, 2004). Computational efficacy is often enhanced by allowing information to remain outside the brain, and by thus exploiting environmental and social resources rather than having to encode everything relevant internally. A robust integration of the social sciences of memory with the cognitive sciences in this area will require better conceptual resources, empirical methods, and more precise distinctions which align with (even if they do not mimic) the central distinctions between modes and kinds of memory developed in cognitive psychology. The experimental work described below is a natural extension of existing ways of studying the episodic and autobiographical forms of long-term declarative memory. Investigations into other forms of memory may also be of considerable interest, going beyond the ''collected memory'' (Olick, 1999) approach that views the memories of groups summatively (e.g., Schwartz & Schuman, 2005). To convey a better sense of the spaces of possibilities for research on the social distribution of memory, we need to be explicit about some of the dimensions to that space. 2.2. Dimensions of distribution in remembering On the distributed cognition view, remembering agents may gain new capacities when they hook up and coordinate with, or rely on specific other people or resources, or when trained with particular learned techniques. We can examine such distributed memory systems and identify the dimensions on which they vary. For example, some distributed memory systems may be little more than aggregates of individual rememberers, while others involve collective agents as truly emergent entities (Poirier & Chicoisne, 2006; Wimsatt, 1986). In other words, in some cases it is appropriate simply to sum individual memories, for instance those of a bunch of strangers who happened to witness the same accident. But in other cases-if, for example, these witnesses later discuss or debate intensely the details of the accident among themselves-the account of the past which emerges may differ significantly from such an additive mere juxtaposition of individual memories. This is the strategy we want to deploy: refining a theory with a range of specified dimensions on which individual cases can vary, and simultaneously refining our empirical methods for working out just where on each dimension the cases fall. In the case of social interactivity, as our development of the notion of collaborative recall will show, there are many different group contexts of recall, and many different ways in which the shortor longer-term outcome of social interaction canbe something quite other than the mere sum of pre-existing individual memories. We should expect no general answer to the question of whether social effects bring greater or lesser accuracy, qualitatively richer or thinner memories, more or less agreement, or more or less confidence. These are all independent dimensions that have to be teased apart for each kind of interaction, because different forms of collaboration have different costs and benefits, different functions, and different effects on the subsequent fate of the memories which each individual takes away from the interaction with others. The most fruitful approach, in our view, is one that seeks to articulate the conceptual and empirical space in which socially distributed memory can be explored. The initial empirical studies reported in Section 4 begin to do so: here we set out more explicitly some of the dimensions of this space. As we have already suggested, we can distinguish between experiences that are in some way held in common, jointly experienced at the time of encoding, and those that are not. There are then further distinctions among varieties of such unshared and shared experiences. Some of the experiences that we do not share are nonetheless similar, such as common, major events in high school (final exams, graduation dance), while others are entirely unique to each of us. And of those that are shared with others (at encoding), some are merely accidentally shared, as when we all hear separately about some news item of general public interest, while others are shared because we acted together, as (for example) a tightly knit group over our last year at school. Again, turning our attention to retrieval, remembering can be done in isolation (in various ways and for various purposes), or under a range of increasingly collaborative conditions with other people. Even unshared experiences can be remembered collaboratively with some particular audience or interlocutors, when others play some part (helpful or intrusive, supporting or misinforming) in the processes of recall; while shared experiences can be remembered in company in merely minimal ways, such as when we all just take turns to remember parts of the past, or in more transactive and interactive fashion, when we are jointly involved in a collective project of revisiting and reevaluating what we once went through together. Collaboration takes many forms, and can be supportive of good remembering as well as a source of distortion. In effect, this is to claim that there is no single characterization of what it is either to ''share an experience'' or to ''collaboratively recall'', since these will vary along the dimensions we have specified. The same is true of what it is to be a member of a social group, a question usefully informed by recent work in both social theory and the philosophy of biology. Margaret Gilbert, for example, argues that even a fairly transitory collectivity can form a genuinely plural subject-potentially the subject of memories as well as intentions, beliefs, and actions-as long as its members pool their wills and share certain forms of common knowledge of their mutual awareness (Gilbert, 1989, A.J. Barnier et al. / Cognitive Systems Research 9 (2008) 33–51 372003). Philip Pettit, in contrast, requires a genuinely integrated collectivity to have more enduring mechanisms of self-regulation, so as to be (for example) answerable as a group to its past actions and judgements (List, in press; Pettit, 2003; Pettit & Schweikard, 2006). Meanwhile, the revival of work on group selection in the philosophy of biology has reinvigorated discussion of what groups need to be like in order to be ''units of selection'' and, more generally, causal agents in the process of natural selection (Okasha, 2007; Sober & Wilson, 1998; Sterelny, 1996; Wilson, 2005b, 2007). So understanding the nature of the group matters in the study of social memory phenomena both in relation to the experiences encoded, and in identifying particular forms of collaboration in recall. Some distributed systems are oneoffs, establishing transient and easily dissoluble relations, which may yet exhibit high degrees of emergence: as we noted, people who have been thrown together by chance, for example, in witnessing the same accident or being together when they hear of a public figure's death, may find their memories strongly linked in and by discussion of this incident alone. But in other cases we can identify transient but regularly repeatable integrated groupings of people who come together in thinking and talking about the past for a range of present purposes. The narratives revisited in the context of the family unit, or among a tightly knit group of colleagues or old allies, have their own familiar flavour, both constrained and enabled by the ongoing uptake and interests of the various interlocutors. The stories of the shared past, of the events that we remember, are continually renegotiated as we improvise and riff around them with more or less control, and thus they come to have their own autonomy and integrity and internal tensions and lacunae. From the point of view of theories of distributed cognition, here we are studying ''the durability and reliability of the extended cognitive system that results from the functional integration'' of distinct resources (Wilson & Clark, in press). We aim at richer taxonomies which allow us to identify variously stronger cases of collaborative remembering of shared experiences. From this perspective, the ''extended mind'' label naturally marks not a metaphysically distinct set of cognitive systems, but simply those which score more highly on these dimensions of durability and reliability, and in which the new capacities of the coupled system are ''sufficiently robust and enduring as to contribute to the persisting cognitive profile'' of an individual (Wilson & Clark, in press). As the work on transactive memory described below suggests, socially distributed memory systems will often be more efficient and more appealing if they are more enduring: a partner or a lifelong friend holds more of my past, and can often help me negotiate it more appropriately, than a new acquaintance. By using the inclusive labels ''social memory phenomena'' and ''collaborative remembering'' here, we intend not only to mark out the space for such multidimensional enquiry, but also explicitly to resist the urge towards anagreed advance definition of ''collective memory''. ''Collective memory'', whatever it may be, is unlikely to differ from individual memory on just one criterion. We need to map, both conceptually and empirically, a range of increasingly strong cases before we decide whether we have found anything worthy of such a label. By acknowledging the reality of many weaker cases, in which (for example) unshared experiences are remembered in one of many less interactive ways, we make room for stronger cases that score more highly on more of the dimensions of distribution we have sketched. With this in mind, and adapting an earlier discussion of the group mind hypothesis in the biological and social sciences (Wilson, 2004, 2005b), we now consider in turn three different theses that might direct research on social memory phenomena: • The Triggering Thesis: remembering is a cognitive process that takes place inside individuals, although it can be initiated, at either the encoding or the retrieval phase, by social phenomena. The Triggering Thesis may be true of some activities of remembering. But it has also come to play a global, structuring role in how many cognitive scientists and philosophers think about the place of ''the social'' in memory. In fact, many cognitive psychologists in particular would take the Triggering Thesis to provide an exhaustive, capsule statement of the way to conceptualise the role of social phenomena in the process of memory. On this view, social phenomena are merely external contexts, triggers or inputs to in-the-head remembering. We suggest that this view, construed as a global view about social memory phenomena, is mistaken. Although the Triggering Thesis may provide an appropriate background assumption for some investigations of social influences on memory, we illustrate below our reasons for thinking that our empirical and conceptual frameworks need to go beyond this thesis in order to do justice to the full range of social memory phenomena. • The Social Manifestation Thesis: remembering is a cognitive process that can only be manifested or realized when the individuals engaged in that process form part of a social group of a certain kind. While the Social Manifestation Thesis shares with the Triggering Thesis a view of remembering as an individual-level process, a process whereby it is individuals who are the agents of acts of remembering, these two theses differ in terms of whether they view memory as an individual-bound phenomenon or one that crosses the bodily boundary. The Social Manifestation Thesis could be read as saying that remembering is essentially social in that it is only individuals in groups (of certain kinds) who remember. But just as we believe that the Triggering Thesis is wrong if understood as a global claim about the essence or nature of memory in general, so we prefer a more 38 A.J. Barnier et al. / Cognitive Systems Research 9 (2008) 33–51modest reading of the Social Manifestation Thesis: we recommend understanding of this thesis as saying that certain kinds or episodes of remembering are social in that only individuals in groups (of certain kinds) remember in these characteristic ways. This is the view which operates as background to our discussion of empirical studies of social memory phenomena in the rest of this paper. • The Group Mind Thesis: remembering is a cognitive process that groups themselves, rather than the individuals that compose those groups, engage in. The Group Mind Thesis contrasts importantly with the other two theses, in suggesting that remembering is actually a group-level phenomenon, one where it is groups that are the agents of memory. Like the Social Manifestation Thesis, it will seem wildly implausible to cognitive scientists, especially psychologists, if read as making global, essentialist claims about memory. We concur, although we will not be defending or exploring the Group Mind Thesis here: but we again note that this is not how the Group Mind Thesis should be understood, when considered as part of an attempt to broaden the space of possibilities for studying the social distribution of memory. Either the Social Manifestation Thesis or the Group Mind Thesis may be right about the nature of certain types of remembering, even if neither has any prima facie plausibility when regarded as views of memory in general. Precisely the same, as we noted above, is true of the Triggering Thesis. Once the three theses have been redescribed in the ways we recommend, as potentially applying only to certain kinds or episodes of remembering, they are compatible (at least potentially) rather than in conflict. We do not then have to make a once-and-for-all theoretical decision about which of the three is true: in principle at least, each might be true of different phenomena which could all be explored empirically. Although we do see the Group Mind Thesis, in certain forms, as worthy of further clarification and reconsideration, we have nothing more to say about it here, save to point out that it is independent of the Social Manifestation Thesis. But we do think that the Social Manifestation Thesis expresses an important truth about a range of social memory phenomena. Although the methodological and conceptual amendments to existing psychological paradigms which we suggest below do not yet take us far towards a demonstration of its scope, which would require more thorough empirical exploration of the space of possibilities in question, they do point towards some of the types of remembering which are socially manifested. 3. An empirical framework In this section we review studies on social influences on memory from cognitive psychology. We focus in particular on research that has sought to explore the relationship between individual memory, individual memory in smallgroups, and some notion of small-group ''collective'' memory. The purpose of this review is to identify the valuable concepts and methods from three research traditions: transactive memory, collaborative recall and social contagion, which can be extended and embedded in our application of the distributed cognition framework to autobiographical memory. Each of these traditions has its own assumptions about the differences between remembering alone and remembering in a group, each has its own way of measuring this group influence, and each focuses on certain kinds of groups and certain kinds of memories (see also Harris, Paterson, & Kemp, in press). Although each has been explored primarily against the theoretical backdrop summarized by the Triggering Thesis, we think that research in each tradition can be profitably reconceptualized and extended under the umbrella provided by the Social Manifestation Thesis. 3.1. Transactive memory According to Wegner (1987) and Wegner, Giuliano, and Hertel (1985), transactive memory is a ''set of individual memory systems in combination with the communication that takes place between individuals'' (Wegner, 1987, p. 186). That is, transactive memory involves the sharing across individuals within certain kinds of relationships or social groups of the encoding, storage and retrieval of individual memory. Wegner's theory is important because, in comparison to more individualistic theories, it captures a truly shared memory system and speaks to the kinds of social memory phenomena that we are most interested in. However, his theory has failed to generate broad empirical attention and has mainly been tested in applied, organisational settings and with non-autobiographical stimuli. Transactive memory theory predicts that memories recalled by the individuals in the transactive system will be more than the sum of individual memory. That is, transactive memory systems should have emergent properties (properties which differ from the mere sum of the properties of their parts), either in terms of the amount of information recalled or the quality of that information. For instance, Wegner et al. (1985) described a couple discussing a shared party experience. The male partner says that he noticed that a male friend of theirs (''Tex'') was depressed and hardly talked, while the female comments that earlier in the evening Tex seemed over friendly. This prompts the male partner to remember a previous occasion where Tex mentioned he was thinking of splitting from his wife. Together, the couple concludes that Tex was flirting with the female partner and was embarrassed about it when he encountered the male partner. This version (regardless of its accuracy) will now become their memory of the events, and it is quantitatively and qualitatively different from what each remembered alone. Transactive systems might be possible amongst casual acquaintances, people thrown together by chance, or strangers, since individuals routinely make assumptions A.J. Barnier et al. / Cognitive Systems Research 9 (2008) 33–51 39about the expertise of others based on factors such as their age, race, gender, or profession. However, the most efficient systems are likely to develop over time among people who repeatedly remember together, such as couples, families or colleagues (Wegner et al., 1985; see also Tollefsen, 2006) since communication is the key to an efficient transactive system (Hollingshead, 1998a). People in close relationships have information that each alone is responsible for knowing (differentiated, non-redundant information), as well as information that is shared by all members of the group, whether between a couple or among a family (integrated, redundant information). Wegner argued that a successful relationship requires some differentiation of information, for the sake of efficiency, but also some integration of information, or ''common knowledge''. Differentiation means that the group, as a unit, can store and access more information than the individuals could alone. Integration means that the group can produce new information, since group members can cue each other to produce more information about that topic than they each would alone (for more on redundancy and information sharing see Ohtsubo, 2005; Tindale & Sheffey, 2002). In a typical transactive memory experiment, individuals are paired with someone they know (e.g. intimate partner, co-worker) or with a stranger to complete a memory task that involves learning and recalling information in different knowledge areas (e.g. science, sport, history, etc.). Participants rate the extent to which they believe that they and the (known or unknown) person they are paired with know about each category, and are told that they will be remembering with the person they are paired with, and that their responses will be pooled. They then learn information individually and, subsequently, recall with the other person (see Fig. 1). The limited work conducted so far has shown that people in long-term relationships perform better on these cat-Paired with known partner RATE EXPERTISE LEARN INFORMA Paired with stranger RATE EXPERTISE LEARN INFORMA I I I I I I I I Fig. 1. Transactive megorised memory tasks than pairs of individuals (Wegner, Erber, & Raymond, 1991). However, this advantage is only apparent when pairs are allowed to use their own structure at learning; pairs of strangers perform better when structure is imposed (Wegner et al., 1991). Interestingly, collaboration during learning (rather than only during recall) impairs the recall of couples compared to strangers. Hollingshead (1998b) found that couples who learned alone but collaborated at recall performed better than pairs of strangers. However, when the groups collaborated at learning as well as at retrieval, pairs of strangers performed better than couples (Hollingshead, 1998b). Hollingshead (1998b) argued that the attempt to discuss and develop explicit learning strategies impeded the couple by encouraging them to depart from their usual implicit, transactive system. Transactive memory experiments have mainly used simple stimuli, such as knowledge pooling tasks or categorised word lists. So far, little research has examined transactive systems for the kinds of information that a couple or family may encounter daily, such as performing household tasks or remembering autobiographical events. Applied organisational research has tended to focus on group task performance, such as assembling a radio (Ren, Carley, & Argote, 2006) or more ecologically valid performance measures of fulfilling company objectives (Austin, 2003), but everyday social applications of transactive memory generally have not been explored. Despite this limitation and unlike many other cognitive memory paradigms, experiments on transactive memory consider what happens in real, established groups. And unlike other cognitive paradigms that see social influence only in terms of contamination or misinformation, transactive memory assumes that group memory can be positive; Wegner's theory focuses on the functional and adaptive nature of sharing memory work in stable groups.TION RECALL INFORMATION TION RECALL INFORMATION C C C C Compare number of items recalled emory procedure. 40 A.J. Barnier et al. / Cognitive Systems Research 9 (2008) 33–513.2. Collaborative recall In a typical collaborative recall experiment, participants are presented with stimuli (usually words) on a computer screen and instructed to remember them. Subsequently, participants recall these words either individually or in a group (recall 1). Finally, all participants recall individually again (recall 2). The effect of collaboration on recall is indexed by a (between groups) comparison between the number of items recalled by individuals alone and groups on recall 1, as well as between the number of items recalled by collaborative groups and nominal groups. Nominal group recall is calculated by pooling the non-overlapping items recalled by the same number of individuals as in the collaborating group, but recalling alone. For example, imagine there are three participants in each group. Nominal group recall would be taken by pooling the recall of sets of three participants who recalled individually. If participant 1 recalls items A, B, C, D, participant 2 recalls items A, D, F, and participant 3 recalls items B, C, G, H, the pooled non-overlapping recall is items A, B, C, D, F, G and H. This is then compared to collaborative group recall to index the effects of collaboration on items remembered vs. forgotten (see Fig. 2). The effects of collaboration on recall can be conceptualised in terms of costs and benefits (Basden, Basden, & Henry, 2000). Typically, collaborative groups recall more than individuals alone, but less than nominal groups. This deficit is termed collaborative inhibition. However on subse-Individuals LEARNING RECAL I I Collaborative groups LEARNING RECAL I I I C C C Nominal Groups LEARNING RECAL I I I I I I Fig. 2. Collaborativequent individual recall, those who previously recalled in a group are more likely to remember additional items than those who recalled individually, but only those items that were introduced by another group member. People who recall in groups are less likely to recall items that did not appear in the group recall (Basden et al., 2000). The focus of these comparisons is on the amount of information recalled. Although the collaborative recall procedure was introduced by Weldon and Bellinger (1997) as a measure of ''collective memory'' and the emergent properties of group memory-the title of their paper was ''Collective memory: Collaborative and individual processes in remembering''-the most commonly cited explanation for collaborative inhibition focuses on individual rather than group processes. Basden, Basden, Bryber, and Thomas (1997) argued that recalling information in a group setting interrupts people's individual retrieval strategies, making them less efficient. This hypothesis was supported by a series of experiments that manipulated interruption of retrieval strategies (Basden et al., 1997; Finlay, Hitch, & Meudell, 2000; Wright & Klummp, 2004). Across these studies, researchers essentially treat social processes and the social context as analogous to any other (withinthe-head) disruption of recall strategy. The exact procedure used across studies has varied greatly, and while some of these variations may be important in understanding collaborative recall, their effects have not been systematically tested. One set of important variations has been the nature of the group:L 1 RECALL 2 I L 1 RECALL 2 I I I L 1 RECALL 2 I I I Compare number of items recalled recall procedure. A.J. Barnier et al. / Cognitive Systems Research 9 (2008) 33–51 41their collaboration, their size and make-up, and their dynamics. Given our comments above, this dimension is crucial. For example, group recall in collaborative recall experiments has either consisted of non-interactive collaboration, ''turn-taking'' (e.g., Basden et al., 2000), or more genuinely interactive collaboration, reaching a consensus (e.g., Finlay et al., 2000). Other research has compared collaborative recall in groups of acquaintances and groups of strangers, with mixed results. Anderson and Ronnberg (1995) reported less collaborative inhibition in groups of friends, while Gould, Osborn, Krein, and Mortenson (2002) reported no difference between married and unacquainted dyads. Most recently, Cuc, Ozuru, Manier, and Hirst (2006) examined the effects of group dynamics (specifically, a dominant narrator) on the collaborative recall of stories by families. Families with a dominant narrator were more likely to develop ''collective'' or convergent memories than families with more egalitarian conversational dynamics. These findings indicate that the type of collaboration, the nature of the group, and the roles adopted by group members during collaboration may all be crucial predictors of group memory performance. Another important feature of real-world social remembering is that it usually occurs for personal and potentially emotional and significant autobiographical events. In the first study of its kind, Yaron-Antar and Nachson (2006) examined collaborative recall for more complex emotional material. They asked Israeli students to collaborate in remembering the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin and found that groups showed the standard collaborative inhibition effect. Although Yaron-Antar and Nachson (2006) argued that collaborative inhibition occurs for personal, emotional material, the questions they used were largely semantic rather than autobiographical (e.g. ''Who accompanied the prime minister to the hospital?''). Thus it remains unclear whether groups will invariably show costs of collaboration, even for more emotional and important everyday memories. Overall, the findings from collaborative recall experiments are limited by the types of groups and the types of stimuli studied so far. Researchers have also tended to focus primarily on individual cognition and on the negative outcomes of group remembering (i.e., does the group remember less than the individual?). But in realworld group remembering, accuracy is only one goal of recall, and operates alongside social goals, such as establishing relationships or making a good impression, developing and maintaining intimacy, teaching and informing others, and eliciting or providing empathy (Alea & Bluck, 2003). Thus, group memory may be qualitatively, not just quantitatively, different from individual memory. Laying aside these limitations, the collaborative recall paradigm offers a robust methodology for indexing the effects of discussion on memory, both during the discussion itself and on subsequent individual recall.3.3. Social contagion of memory The social contagion paradigm measures the impact on an individual's memory of recalling the same event with one or more other people. Procedurally, this paradigm is very similar to collaborative recall. In a typical social contagion experiment, participants first learn material, together with a confederate. Second, they recall with the confederate who introduces some incorrect details about the material. Third, participants recall again individually (see Fig. 3; e.g., Meade & Roediger, 2002; Roediger, Meade, & Bergman, 2001). In a variation of this paradigm, labelled the ''memory conformity'' procedure, participants in a group learn what appears to be the same material. However, unknown to them, each individual is shown a slightly different version of the same material (e.g., they see the same video of a robbery, but with slightly different details for the offender). Second, they recall together. Third, participants recall again individually (e.g., Gabbert, Memon, & Allan, 2003). Whereas the collaborative recall paradigm focuses on the amount of correct information that is forgotten, the social contagion (and memory conformity) paradigm focuses on the amount of incorrect information that is remembered. Roediger et al. (2001) found that people came to falsely remember items from a slideshow when they were suggested by a confederate during collaborative recall. In this experiment, final recall was private and individual, and accuracy was emphasised. In other experiments, participants were warned that the confederate may have mentioned false items (Meade & Roediger, 2002). Thus, these participants did not simply add the suggested items to their recall to conform with the experimental demands or with the confederate, but rather because they genuinely believed the suggested items were present in the slideshow. Gabbert et al. (2003) extended this paradigm to a more natural setting, in which the participants engaged in discussions with other participants who, unknown to them, had seen a slightly different video of a crime. They found that 71% of witnesses who had discussed the event went on to recall individually items they had not themselves seen. Roediger et al. (2001) also reported benefits for social contagion similar to collaborative recall. Participants' subsequent individual recall was higher for the correct items introduced by the confederate, as well as the incorrect items. In other words, participants incorporated both correct and incorrect information into their recall following group collaboration. Similar to the collaborative recall paradigm, the focus of comparisons within this paradigm is on the amount of information recalled; specifically, the number of contagion items recalled. Some research has indicated that the qualities of the suggested information can influence the social contagion effect, with false items that are more consistent with the genuine items more likely to be incorporated into recall (Roediger et al., 2001). However, other qualitative Control Items LEARNING RECALL 1/DISCUSSION RECALL 2 Contagion Items LEARNING RECALL 1/DISCUSSION RECALL 2 misinformation C I confederate C no misinformation C I confederate C Compare number of contagion items recalled Fig. 3. Social contagion of memory procedure. 42 A.J. Barnier et al. / Cognitive Systems Research 9 (2008) 33–51factors that are relevant to real world, autobiographical remembering, such as emotion and motivational value, have not been examined. Social contagion effects often have been accounted for by a source monitoring explanation. According to the Source Monitoring Framework (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993) information from many sources can be utilised to construct a memory for an event. People are often not aware of where this information has come from, and may wrongly attribute information provided by someone else to the original event. In the context of the social contagion effect, the source monitoring framework suggests that people recall the information introduced by confederates because the source of this information is wrongly attributed to the original learning (Roediger et al., 2001). Some experiments in this paradigm have examined the effects of different types of groups and group processes on the social contagion effect. For example, Meade and Roediger (2002) found that the social contagion effect was stronger when a real, present confederate introduced the incorrect items, compared to when participants read a written summary that included the misinformation. Also, the presence of dissenters in the group weakened the social contagion effect (Walther et al., 2002). Additionally, there is some evidence that memory contagion effects may be more likely to occur in discussion with a romantic partner than a stranger (French, Garry, & Mori, 2006). Whereas some experimenters have attempted to extend this social contagion paradigm to more ecologically valid stimuli, particularly in the forensic context (e.g., Gabbert et al., 2003), this research has not yet examined emotional, personally experienced autobiographical memories (but for examples of other false memory research see Garry & Gerrie, 2005; Loftus, 2005, 1997; Sharman, Garry, & Beuke, 2004).3.4. What needs to be measured Looking across these approaches and methods, there is much that we can fruitfully adopt and adapt. For example, the transactive memory literature suggests ways in which memories might be shared across individuals in some, but not necessarily in all types of groups. The collaborative recall and social contagion literatures highlight useful ways to index the varying influences of collaboration. As already noted, these literatures, as they currently stand, have their limitations. In terms of explanations, in the collaborative recall and social contagion literatures in particular there is a large gap between what researchers claim or hope to study-collective memory processes- and the Triggering Thesis explanations they typically invoke, whereby remembering is seen as a cognitive process that takes place only and completely inside the heads of individuals (although it can be influenced by social phenomena). In terms of cases, although transactive memory theory, for instance, makes clear predictions about the kinds of groups that should show benefits of collaboration, there has been no real attempt within other cognitive paradigms to survey across a full range of memory cases and remembering groups. Most research in these traditions has involved individuals learning mundane, identical material and then recalling it collaboratively in convenience groups of mere acquaintances or strangers (undergraduate students); this does not really capture the full range of human remembering experiences. In terms of assumptions, while transactive memory assumes that collaboration can be positive, collaborative recall and social contagion are pessimistic about social influences on memory (but see Roediger et al., 2001). In these paradigms, memories are counted up and a lower number is invariably considered a poorer outcome for the group. Finally, in terms of what is measured, dependent variables in collaborative recall and social conA.J. Barnier et al. / Cognitive Systems Research 9 (2008) 33–51 43tagion paradigms are often limited to the amount recalled and its accuracy. This not only neglects the qualitative effects of collaboration, but completely misses the function of collaborating in groups about memories. We believe that existing concepts and methods from cognitive psychology can be significantly extended and applied to a whole range of social memory phenomena when they are embedded within the theoretical framework of distributed cognition. In order to account adequately for the complete range of cases, we need studies that vary on at least the following six dimensions: • Does the social distribution of memory concern the experiencing (encoding) or the remembering (retrieving) of an event?  Is the experiencing of an event shared or unshared?  Are the shared experiences generated accidentally or through more meaningful, intended joint activities?  Are unshared experiences distinct or similar across the individuals who have them?  Is the activity of remembering undertaken or manifested individually or as a member of a group?  Is the activity of remembering as a member of a group minimally collaborative (e.g., turn-taking) or collaborative in some deeper sense (e.g., joint revisions)? Considered together, these dimensions delineate a space of possibilities for further studies of social memory phenomena along the lines of the studies that we report below. And in developing a fruitful empirical framework within which to explore the role of social processes across this range of cases, we should design experiments that measure the following (independent and dependent) factors and variables, which we discuss in turn below: • the costs and benefits of remembering in groups • the parameters of group influence • the fate of memories • the function of group memory Costs and benefits. In contemporary culture, external influences on personal memory often have been demonised as necessarily negative, leading inevitably to forgetting or distortion. But collaborating in remembering has clear benefits. Although research involving collaborative recall and social contagion has more typically focused on the costs of remembering in groups, these paradigms can measure the benefits as easily as the costs (e.g., Basden et al., 2000). Research needs to index whether people recall more, less, accurately, inaccurately, differently after collaborating. With collaborative recall and social contagion, we can index variables including: memories recalled vs. forgotten (since good forgetting is as important as good remembering), accurate vs. inaccurate recall (since groups are just as likely to misremember as individuals) and mem-ory quality (since memory quality, not just accessibility, may change). Parameters of group influence. As noted in Section 2, and emphasised by our review of different research traditions, there is no agreed canonical definition of what counts as a group. Across the transactive memory, collaborative recall and social contagion literatures, group membership has varied from people who meet for the first time in their experiment to people in long-standing relationships. Similarly, group dynamics, in terms of the type of ''sharing'' that the group members engaged in, have varied from the minimal collaboration of enforced turntaking to the more genuine collaboration of a married couple remembering or problem solving as they would at home. Research should systematically investigate the effect of variations in the size, nature, aims, coherence and deliberative procedures of groups on the ways in which they and their members deal with the past. With collaborative recall and social contagion procedures, we can and should extend manipulations of the parameters of group influence, including the size and type of group, the manner of collaboration, the similarity (or sharing) of memories and retrieval strategies, and social and motivational factors. The fate of memories. Some discussions of ''collective memory'' have focused on the ways in which individuals' disparate memories of an event may become more similar over time-more shared-by talking together about the past. The possibility of such ''mnemonic convergence'' (Hirst, Manier, & Cuc, 2003) demands that research map how individuals' memories change over time, especially after group collaboration. Although collaborative recall and social contagion have focused mostly on the costs of collaborating, these paradigms can map the fate of memories across repeated tests and as groups form, part, and reform: what did the participant remember vs. forget individually at time 1, collaboratively at time 2, then individually at time 3? Even studies of simple word lists indicate that as individuals lose memories, groups gain them (Basden et al., 2000). With collaborative recall and social contagion we can index the epidemiology of remembering; why, in Hirst et al. (2003) terms some memories spread quickly, but other die off. The function of group memory. As noted in Section 2, autobiographical memory plays an important role in the daily life of individuals and groups: in defining identity, in teaching and communicating, in developing and maintaining relationships, in representing (individual or group) self to self and to others. By extending cognitive memory paradigms outside the relatively contrived social context of the laboratory and among real groups-to families, school friends, couples, business associates, etc.-we can consider the function of group memory. What do the memories mean to the individuals and to their groups? How do memories contribute to a sense of (individual and group) identity? Is remembering in groups motivated in the same way as individual memory? 44 A.J. Barnier et al. / Cognitive Systems Research 9 (2008) 33–514. Early empirical evidence In Sections 2 and 3 above we laid out a conceptual and empirical framework for investigating social influences on memory. In this Section we describe early empirical work in which we are putting this framework into action. The aim of our early work has been to adapt and use collaborative recall and social contagion paradigms in ways that build on their extensive existing database, that significantly extend the range of memory cases studied to date, that focus on personal and significant autobiographical memories across a range of ''shared'' and ''unshared'' cases, and that develop the features of our empirical framework. 4.1. Social contagion of autobiographical memories Our first study adapted the social contagion paradigm to recent, significant autobiographical events experienced and remembered by 48 (28 female, 18 male) university students from the University of New South Wales. In our version of the paradigm (based closely on Roediger et al., 2001), participants were (individually) prompted to recall and describe memories of important recent events: their 19th birthday, their first HSC exam,1 their school graduation dance, and their first day of university. In a session 1 week later, they took turns with a confederate to describe their autobiographical memories of the different events. For instance, the participant described his or her (genuine) memory of their 18th birthday, and then the confederate described his or her (apparent) memory of their 18th birthday; the confederate's ''memories'' were standardised scripted versions that we wrote. In the next phase of the study, the participant and the confederate took turns to describe back to their recall partner the five or six most important parts of the other person's memory of each event. So, the participant described the five or six most important points of the confederate's (apparent) 18th birthday memory, then the confederate described the five or six most important points of the participant's (genuine) 18th birthday memory. Notably, as one of the five or six points, the confederate included a contagion item (for two of the four events): a piece of either positive or negative information that the participant had not generated about their event (e.g., for the 18th birthday memory, the confederate might say that the participant recalled ''you thought that this was a big turning point in your life''). In the final phase, the participant and confederate separated for a final individual recall; the confederate did not recall (Fig. 4). In terms of our distinctions and dimensions, participants' experiences were unshared, but similar. Although each participant did not experience the events (e.g., their 18th birthday) with their collaborating partner (the confed-1 HSC refers to ''Higher School Certificate''. It is the group of major exams sat by all final year high school students in New South Wales, Australia.erate), the confederate described similar events. But their remembering was in a group; their collaboration was moderately interactive-it was more than turn taking but less than truly co-constructing a joint past. This study also allowed us to index the costs and benefits of remembering in a group (what and how they remembered vs. what and how they forgot). We found a strong social contagion effect for autobiographical memories. Overall, approximately 30% of participants included in their final recall at least one social contagion idea unit for at least one event where the confederate introduced a contagion item (cf., Meade & Roediger, 2002; Roediger et al., 2001). For example, participants who received the contagion item for their 18th birthday memory, ''you thought that this was a big turning point in your life'', often included either this exact piece of information or the gist of it in their final recall. Sometimes the effect was more subtle: at initial recall one participant said there were 30 people at her birthday party, after the contagion item of ''a big turning point'', she said there were 70 people at her birthday party. There was no difference in the ''take up'' of positive and negative contagion items, although contagion was more successful for some events than others (e.g., 18th birthday party vs. first day at university). We also found a very high level of unsuggested contagion, whereby the participant incorporated into their final recall new information that appeared to come from the confederate's ''memories''. Of course, the confederate's memories might simply have prompted recall by the participant of a previously unmentioned genuine element of their experience of the event, as the Triggering Thesis would suggest. But alternatively, our findings may indicate a form of Social Manifestation, in that brief collaboration with a virtual stranger, the confederate, was sufficient to slightly alter the later remembering of participants' private experiences. Of particular note, some participants adopted and elaborated on information presented by the confederate into their own autobiographical memories. This highlights the robust nature of the social contagion paradigm and its value in exploring the consequences of collaborative shaping of shared and even unshared autobiographical events. 4.2. Collaborative flashbulb memories of the death of Steve Irwin Our second study adapted the collaborative recall paradigm to focus on another way that events become socially shared-when they are culturally important and receive extensive media coverage. Memories of events like these can become ''flashbulb memories'' (Brown & Kulik, 1977; Conway, 1995), where individuals maintain longstanding vivid (but not necessarily accurate) memories of hearing about the event (e.g., for flashbulb memory studies of the Challenger space shuttle disaster, of the death of Diana, Princess of Wales, and of 9/11; see Curci & Luminet, 2006; Kvavilashvili, Mirani, Schlagman, & Kornbrot, Control Events ELICITATION LISTEN TO SUMMARY FINAL RECALL Contagion Events ELICITATION LISTEN TO SUMMARY FINAL RECALL C I I misinformation C I I no misinformation Compare overall amount recalled and number of items consistent with contagion Fig. 4. Social contagion of autobiographical memory procedure. A.J. Barnier et al. / Cognitive Systems Research 9 (2008) 33–51 452003; Neisser & Harsch, 1992). Such events are experienced both individually and socially, and are remembered both individually and socially. Another feature of culturally significant events is that one's social group can dictate a set of norms about how we should react or think about such an event (Skowronski & Walker, 2004). On the afternoon of the 4th of September 2006 news broke that Steve Irwin, Australian entertainer and ''wildlife warrior'', had been killed by a stingray while filming a documentary in far North Queensland. Both in Australia and worldwide, the news of Steve Irwin's death was met with large-scale public grief. His death and its aftermath dominated the media for weeks afterwards, was the subject of tributes and memorials, and any criticism of Irwin was treated harshly by the media (Coultan, Coorey, & Tadros, 2006; Wainwright & Baker, 2006; Williams & Hearn, 2006). In this context of public mourning and commemoration, we asked 69 university students from the University of New South Wales to come to our laboratory and discuss their memories of hearing about Steve Irwin's death and their reactions to the news. These interviews took place over a period of 5 weeks, between 2 and 7 weeks following Irwin's death (Fig. 5).Collaborative groups INITIAL RECALL (1) FREE RECALL RE Individuals INITIAL RECALL (1) FREE RECALL RE I I I C C C I I Compare themes Fig. 5. Collaborative recall of StFirst we asked all participants to complete a survey about their memory for the events of Steve Irwin's death. We asked them to provide: personal autobiographical details (e.g., where they were, how they found out), semantic knowledge about the event (e.g., how Irwin died, how the media responded), and ratings of their beliefs and feelings about the impact and significance of Irwin's death, both for themselves and for Australians in general. Following this survey, half of the participants took part in collaborative recall of Irwin's death. In groups of three, we asked them to discuss together for 10 min their experiences of the events surrounding Irwin's death and their reactions to his death. The other half of the participants took part in individual recall. Individually, we asked them to think for 10 min about their experiences of the event and their reactions and to write down on a piece of paper whatever came to mind. We emailed all participants 1 week after this session and again one month after this session and asked them to complete a second and then a third version of the original survey. In other words, participants provided autobiographical details, semantic knowledge, and ratings about Steve Irwin's death on three occasions: (1) at the beginning of the experiment and before collaborative or individualCALL 2 (1 week later) RECALL 3 (1 month later) CALL 2 (1 week later) RECALL 3 (1 month later) I I I I I II I I Compare change in memory and attitude ratings eve Irwin's death procedure. 46 A.J. Barnier et al. / Cognitive Systems Research 9 (2008) 33–51recall, (2) 1 week after the session and after collaborative or individual recall, and (3) one month after the session and after collaborative or individual recall. In terms of our distinctions and dimensions, participants experienced the events surrounding Steve Irwin's death individually (or at least not with their collaborating partners), but their experiences were similar and knowledge about and reactions to this event were extensively shared in the public domain. Our participants' remembering, at least within the context of our experiment, was either in a group or individual. But of course, most participants had talked about-had shared-their reactions to Irwin's death before they arrived in our laboratory. Those who collaborated in the study did so very interactively, as we'll see below. This study also allowed us to index the costs and benefits of remembering in a group (what and how they remembered vs. what and how they forgot) and the fate of memories (how their memories changed over time, especially after group interaction). In the free recall session, we noticed that the themes that emerged during the discussion were quite different from those that emerged when participants thought and wrote about the event alone. Participants who thought and wrote about the event alone were more likely to say they were personally upset by Irwin's death, while participants who discussed the event were likely to minimize their own personal emotional reaction to the event. However, both groups of participants were likely to mention that they were sad for Irwin's family. Both groups of participants mentioned experiencing shock and disbelief when hearing of Irwin's death, but during discussion participants frequently mentioned that the event was not surprising, given the dangerous nature of Irwin's job. Whereas people who thought and wrote about the event alone often emphasised the significance of the event and Irwin's 'hero' status, participants who discussed the event often said that the media exaggerated Irwin's importance; these participants minimized the significance of the event. The following excerpt from a discussion demonstrates the process of negotiation that occurred during the group discussion, where the appropriate reaction to the event and its meaning were established: K: I know people who cried when they were watching the memorial service when Bindi was doing her speech E: Yeah, that was really sad! I don't know anybody who actually cried. . . M: Did you cry? K: Can't say that I did. M: Do you know anyone who cares at all? E: I don't think people. . . K: I think people feel bad for him, a lot of people. . . M: People die every day. . . One notable feature of this exchange is the lack of personal identification with the emotions mentioned; emotions are attributed to ''people'' in general, rather than to individualparticipants. This contrasts with the comments made by individuals, who wrote things like: ''[Irwin] will be remembered throughout Australia and worldwide history forever''; ''it feels as though you know him, and maybe that is why his death is so sad''; ''It is unbelievable how much he affected everybody's lives''; ''to this day, I still feel shock and sadness, simply because why him? He is such a good person''. Collaborative recall not only influenced the content of recollections during the free recall session, but it influenced the way participants later remembered their reaction to hearing the news of Steve Irwin's death. One week after the initial recall and free recall session, participants who discussed the event had significantly reduced their ratings of how shocked and how upset they had been when they heard the news, while those who thought and wrote about the event alone had not significantly changed their ratings. One month later, all participants rated themselves as being less upset upon hearing of Irwin's death than they had initially. However, participants who discussed the event had even further reduced their ratings of how shocked they had been when they heard the news, while the rated shock of participants who thought and wrote about the event alone remained the same as at initial recall. Similarly, one month later, participants who discussed the event rated Steve Irwin's death as less significant for Australia than they had initially, while the ratings of people who thought and wrote about the event alone remained unchanged. Collaborating with others also influenced confidence. One month after their discussion, participants who collaborated remained as confident about the semantic details of the event as they had been in the initial session. Although participants who thought and wrote about the event alone were no less accurate than their collaborating counterparts, they felt less confident about the semantic details of the events surrounding Steve Irwin's death one month after the session. There was no evidence that participants revised their ratings simply to meet perceived experimental demands. They had no access to their initial ratings, they didn't seem aware that their 1 week and 1 month ratings changed, and the ratings of those who collaborated and those who did not were different; this all argues against an explanation on the basis that participants explicitly referred back to their earlier ratings (rather than to their memories). These early results suggest that collaborative recall can be quite easily and usefully extended to more complex and personally relevant memories. We revealed clear differences between those who collaborated in memory and those who remembered alone, especially in terms of the fate of their memories. Interestingly, these differences were not in terms of how much or how little was recalled (we did not focus on accuracy) over repeated tests, but rather in terms of the qualitative features of individuals' remembering- especially during collaboration-and the emotional reactions recalled later about the target event. In this study, collaborative recall yielded robust differences between people who we simply brought together to discuss a culturally A.J. Barnier et al. / Cognitive Systems Research 9 (2008) 33–51 47shared event. We predict even stronger results when we turn to focus on established, real-world groups, as in our next study, Study 3. 4.3. Memories of high school at a high school reunion In our third study, still underway, we approached former students of a Sydney high school at their 20 year high school reunion and asked them to complete a survey about their memories of high school. We asked participants: to list their school friends and to tell us whether they had kept in touch, to indicate how often they had thought about or discussed events that happened in high school (either with high school friends or with other friends and family), to describe their memory experiences at the reunion, to recall the most memorable events from high school, and to recall as much as possible about four significant events (a football match, a school musical, their first HSC exam, their graduation dance). In terms of our distinctions and dimensions, these former high school students experienced the same events, often together. For many, their experiencing was not accidental, but rather intentional and truly shared. However, their remembering was either in a group or individual. We were particularly interested in the memories of former students who maintained contact with their classmates over time and those who did not. Thus, this study allowed us to index the parameters of group influence. This study also allowed us to index the fate of memories (how their memories changed over time, especially depending on group interaction) and the function of group memory (what the memories meant to the individuals and to their groups) (Fig. 6). One male former student reported only occasional contact over the past 20 years. When describing the reunion he said: ''I thought it interesting that in most conversations INot kept in touch EXPERIENCE (LEARNING) REMEMBERING Kept in touch EXPERIENCE (LEARNING) REMEMBERING C C C C C C C C C I I I Fig. 6. School reunionheard or overheard were mainly discussing current lives and experiences since school. There was little fond reminiscing of school times or discussions of school events.'' When asked about an important football match that took place in 1985, this former student wrote: ''I went and I recall we lost. That's it.'' In contrast to this student's limited contact with his former classmates and lack of details in remembering, another former female student reported regular contact over the past 20 years. In fact, she married one of her classmates. She wrote: ''It is an advantage having my school friends as my dearest friends & husband as we often recall our school days but usually just revisiting the same classic stories''. Her survey responses described many events in great detail. When asked about the football match, she wrote: ''Thank God they made the final as they (Rugby bods) were a bit precious at school. Our Captain and the rest of the footyheads up against the slick outfit from St. Eddy's including a young Ricky Stuart who was playing in the final again after repeating yr 12 but shows up driving a lovely new Honda. [Our Captain] played v. well but was always overshadowed by Ricky, even when Australian Schoolboys team was selected. . . .Don't remember much of the game spent more time socialising as I (& everybody else) never expected us to win. It was a school spirit/support event with a friend in the team, classmates too . . . otherwise I wasn't that interested.'' Another former student, a male, who maintained regular contact with classmates over the past 20 years and who had friends in the football team similarly described the football match in great detail. When asked whether being at the reunion triggered specific memories of high school, he wrote: ''Looking at the new sports hall and the trophy cabinet standing with my mate bought back a memory of how the First 15 [the rugby team] made it toOVER TIME RESPONSES TO SURVEY OVER TIME RESPONSES TO SURVEY I I I I I I Compare qualities of memories study procedure. 48 A.J. Barnier et al. / Cognitive Systems Research 9 (2008) 33–51the Waratah Shield Final in 1985. My two mates who I kept in contact with after school played in that match, and I was there to support. The trophy cabinet jogged that memory.'' When asked specifically about the football match, he wrote: ''[The School's] First 15 made it to the Waratah Shield Final in 1985. Two mates were in the team. It was played at the SCG as the curtain raiser to the Australian V Fiji Rugby Test. We played St Edmonds from Canberra. We were beaten by them and in particular one player. Their half back was Ricky Stuart who went on to be a great halfback in rugby league and is currently the Australian Rugby League Coach. We had a bus supplied to take the supporters to the SCG. We had to go down in our uniforms. We sat on the old hill to watch the game.'' One interpretation of these individual differences in recollection, consistent with the Triggering Thesis, is that these former students simply had different experiences at the time and different memory styles now. However, the sharing of experiencing and the sharing of remembering seemed to flavour the quantity and quality of their recollections of high school events, findings more consistent with the Social Manifestation Thesis. For instance, when asked about their first HSC exam, the first male student who mostly fell out of contact with school friends wrote: ''I think it was English. Arrived at the hall for the exam, took the test and drove home to prepare for my other exams. Nothing special really.'' In contrast, the second male student who (interestingly) had friends in common with the first male student, but who kept in contact and indicated that he and his friends regularly discussed school events during the past 20 years, described this first exam in colourful detail. He wrote: ''I got to my exam early-English. At the time we had ID cards that had to be on you so to sit the exam. My best mate forgot his ID card. I had a car-red Holden HR-so I drove my mate to his home in [name of suburb] to pick up his ID card. We drove like a bat out of hell as time was running out. We got back to the school and everyone had entered the hall. We were the last two in. Everyone was seated-the exam had not started. My mate sat relatively close to the door (surname starting with M) but for me surname starting with A I had to walk right across the whole hall to my seat. Most embarrassing. Got through the exam OK, had a big laugh about being late after the exam.'' He and his mate remained close friends for 20 years and one can imagine them revisiting this event again and again and laughing. In the next phase of this study we plan to invite the following groups of former classmates back to the laboratory for a collaborative recall study in which we explore their individual and group remembering: (a) groups of former students who were friends and who kept in touch, (b) groups of former students who were friends but who fell out of touch, and (c) groups of former students who were not friends at school. In this way, we can start to map the impact of the group on the fate and function of shared and unshared autobiographical memories, and whether new capacities emerge when people remember with others.5. Concluding remarks Sue Campbell has recently argued (in press) that many philosophers are attracted to what we have called the Triggering Thesis-the idea that social and other external factors are merely cues or triggers to the individual's internal memory processes-both because it seems to shore up epistemological confidence in our autonomous access to truths about the past, and because it draws clean lines around the boundaries of the person. They are nervous, Campbell suggests, that if the sharing of memories ''amounts to more than cuing, then somehow the integrity of the self as a record of its own history has given way and is giving way all the time and in ways that we cannot even track'' (p. 4). We agree with Campbell, in contrast, that such alarmism should be resisted, because it is ordinary and appropriate for both self and memory to be socially manifested (Campbell, in press, p. 3): Sharing memory is how we learn to remember, how we come to reconceive our pasts in memory, how we come to form a sense of self, and one of the primary ways in which we come to know others and form relationships with them, reforming our sense of self as we come repeatedly under the influence not only of our own pasts as understood by others but of the pasts of others. To this salutary reminder of the range of social memory phenomena, in this paper we have added, firstly, a distinct theoretical basis for understanding the social distribution of cognition, which can place different cases in a multidimensional space, and, secondly, a number of extensions and new applications of existing paradigms in the cognitive psychology of memory. Our initial empirical studies, reported in Section 4, are first steps towards broader investigations into the costs and benefits of remembering in groups, the parameters of group influence, the fate of memories over time, and the function of group memory. As we seek to apply the distributed cognition framework to more complex real-world examples of the social distribution of remembering, further conceptual and methodological innovations will be required, and the resources of cognitive psychology and the philosophy of mind will need to be still more thoroughly integrated. Acknowledgements The preparation of this paper and the research we report is part of a larger long-term project by the first two authors on individual and group memory, and was supported by: (1) an Australian Research Council Australian Research Fellowship to Amanda Barnier, (2) an Australian Research Council Discovery-Project Grant (DP0770271) to Amanda Barnier and John Sutton, as well as by (3) an individual 3 year grant from the Social Sciences and Humanties Research Council of Canada to Rob Wilson. We are grateful for that support. We are grateful also to Rochelle Cox for A.J. Barnier et al. / Cognitive Systems Research 9 (2008) 33–51 49assistance with the manuscript, and to three anonymous reviewers for Cognitive Systems Research for their useful suggestions. References Adams, F., & Aizawa, K. (2001). The bounds of cognition. Philosophical Psychology, 14, 43–64. Adams, F., & Aizawa, K. (2007). The bounds of cognition. Oxford: Blackwell. Alea, N., & Bluck, S. (2003). 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Terence Rajivan Edward / Taking the concepts of others seriously 143 META: RESEARCH IN HERMENEUTICS, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY VOL. VIII, NO. 1 / JUNE 2016: 143-153, ISSN 2067-365 Taking the concepts of others seriously Terence Rajivan Edward The University of Manchester Abstract This paper assesses an argument against the representationalist tradition in anthropology: the tradition of reporting how a cultural group represents the world. According to the argument, anthropologists working within this tradition cannot take the concepts of those they study seriously. I defend the representationalist tradition against this argument. Keywords: concepts, taking concepts seriously, representationalist tradition, science, realism. Introduction There is a tradition in anthropology of informing us about how a group represents the world. An anthropologist studies a group as part of their fieldwork and tells us about how that group represents the world. For example, E. EvansPritchard studied the Azande and told us that the Azande make assertions which imply that witchcraft is a real phenomenon (Evans-Pritchard 1976, 244). In doing so, they represent the world as if there is witchcraft. The authors of the Introduction to a book entitled Thinking Through Things, Amiria Henare, Martin Holbraad and Sari Wastell, make an argument against this tradition.1 Their argument is as follows. If anthropology provides us with information about how different groups of people represent the world, the question arises as to which representations are correct: which representations, if any, identify what there really is? There is no option for the anthropologist except to take the sciences as identifying what there is (Henare et al. 2007, 11). META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – VIII (1) / 2016 144 But then an anthropologist will generally have to say that the people they are studying use some concepts in their representations which do not refer to anything real. Perhaps there are exceptions, for instance if the people studied by an anthropologist are scientists or have a worldview that is profoundly influenced by science. But for most groups, the anthropologist will have to say that these groups rely on at least some concepts which do not refer to anything real, such as the concept of witchcraft. To say this is to not take the concepts of others seriously, when anthropologists should be taking these concepts seriously. We can break this argument down into four premises, which together entail a conclusion against the representationalist tradition of anthropology – the tradition of an anthropologist telling us about how a group represents the world. Here are the four premises: (1) An anthropologist studying a group of people should take all the concepts of this group seriously. (2) If the anthropologist aims to inform us about how the group they are studying represents the world, then the anthropologist must take our scientific culture as identifying what there actually is in the world. (3) If the anthropologist takes our scientific culture as identifying what there actually is in the world, then aside from certain exceptional cases, they imply that at least some of the concepts used by the group they are studying do not refer to anything real. (4) If the anthropologist implies that some of the concepts used by the group they are studying do not refer to anything real, then the anthropologist is not taking these concepts seriously. From these premises we can deduce the following conclusion: aside from certain exceptional cases, an anthropologists working within the representationalist tradition cannot take all the concepts of a group they are studying seriously, when this is what they should do. Here I wish to defend this tradition, which I think is mistakenly being devalued. Although a conclusion against it follows from these premises, some of the premises are very questionable.2 In this paper, I object to premises (2) and (4). I object mostly by Terence Rajivan Edward / Taking the concepts of others seriously 145 drawing upon research and considerations that are already familiar to anthropologists. In the course of discussing these premises, textual evidence will be provided that the argument above is being made. Premise (2) Recall the content of premise (2): if an anthropologist aims to inform us about how a group they are studying represents the world, then the anthropologist must take our scientific culture as identifying what there actually is in the world. In this premise 'the world' means reality and it is supposed by anthropologists with this aim that there is just one world. The relevant part of our scientific culture consists of those propositions currently regarded as established within biology, chemistry, physics and other sciences. (I am not sure if the social and psychological sciences ought to be included in this list, but what is said below can survive different readings of the scope of science.) According to premise (2), the anthropologist with the aim of informing us about how a group they are studying represents the world must accept the following point: those propositions which are currently regarded as established within the sciences succeed in identifying what there is. They must accept this point in the sense that, if they are to be consistent, they must not deny it or say anything that implies a denial of it. The following quotation provides textual evidence that the authors of the Introduction to Thinking Through Things are committed to premise (2): For, if cultures render different appearances of reality, it follows that one of them is special and better than all the others, namely the one that best reflects reality. And since science – the search for representations that reflect reality as transparently and faithfully as possible – happens to be a modern Western project, that special culture is, well, ours. (Henare et al. 2007, 11) According to the authors, if an anthropologist supposes that there is a single world which is represented differently by different cultural groups, they are committing themselves to our scientific culture providing the best representations of this META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – VIII (1) / 2016 146 world. As I understand the authors, the claim that our scientific culture has the best representations of reality is a claim not just that the established representations within this culture are better than representations from all other cultures for identifying what there is, which may not be such a great thing if the other cultures are especially bad at this, but also that these established representations are the best in that they achieve the goal of identifying what there is. On this reading, the quotation is evidence for premise (2). The main objection to this premise is that it seems entirely consistent for an anthropologist to report how some group represents the world yet deny that our scientific culture identifies what there is in this world. To illustrate this point: there is clearly a contradiction in saying, "The Azande represent the world as if there is witchcraft and it is not the case that the Azande represent the world as if there is witchcraft." But there is no apparent contradiction in saying, "The Azande represent the world as if there is witchcraft and our scientific culture does not have authority over whether this representation is correct." An anthropologist who tells us that the Azande represent the world in this way might very well think that there is witchcraft and also that current science is mistaken if it says otherwise. They might be wrong to think this, but as far as I can see they are not logically inconsistent. Talking about how others represent the world does not logically entail that current science provides the best account of this world. Such talk is neutral on this issue (see Frazer 1913, 1). In response to this objection, it may be said that although the representationalist anthropologist can reject science as a guide to what there is without logical inconsistency, there are no plausible alternatives to giving science this role. But there are plausible interpretations of the relationship between science and reality apart from the realist interpretation, and below I shall present one. By the realist interpretation, I mean the interpretation according to which our current scientific culture is successful to a significant degree in identifying what there is. (It is called the 'realist' interpretation purely because it asserts that the sciences Terence Rajivan Edward / Taking the concepts of others seriously 147 reveal reality, and not because the interpretation is more likely to be correct.) Suppose, for the sake of argument, that reality is divided into kinds of things in a certain way, regardless of what human beings believe. Even if we go so far as to suppose this, there is room for doubt over whether science identifies these kinds of things. For it is conceivable that a scientific theory is successful in terms of its predictions and the puzzles it can solve without the concepts of this theory picking out the independently existing kinds. (See the quotation from Thomas Kuhn below in support of this point.) And we can conceive of other theories that are equally successful at predicting and puzzle-solving yet rely on incompatible accounts of what these kinds are (e.g. Liggins and Daly 2013, 606). In light of these points, one might think of established scientific theories as successful in these respects while remaining neutral over whether the concepts involved in scientific theories identify the kinds of things that there are. This is a plausible competitor to the realist interpretation of science. Note that it was the representationalist tradition itself which promoted this other interpretation. Consider what Kuhn says in his Postscript to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: A scientific theory is usually felt to be better than its predecessors not only in the sense that it is a better instrument for discovering and solving puzzles but also because it is somehow a better representation of what nature is really like... [As] a historian, I am impressed with the implausibility of the view. I do not doubt, for example, that Newton's mechanics improves on Aristotle's and that Einstein's improves on Newton's as instruments for puzzle-solving. But I can see in their succession no coherent direction of ontological development. On the contrary, in some important respects, though by no means in all, Einstein's general theory of relativity is closer to Aristotle's than either of them is to Newton's. (Kuhn 1996, 206-207) It may be said that Kuhn is appealing here to history not to anthropology. Historical research into how scientists have represented the world casts doubt on the realist interpretation of science. My response to this point is that anthropology also played an important role in casting doubt on the realist interpretation of science by asserting the possibility of incompatible yet equally pragmatically META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – VIII (1) / 2016 148 successful theories. Benjamin Lee Whorf famously claimed that Hopi words for describing reality presuppose a certain theory, and that these words adequately meet their needs for conveying information, yet the theory presupposed is incompatible with the theory which Western languages presuppose. He invites us to think of these theories as comparable to scientific theories (Whorf 1950, 67). The authors of the Introduction show awareness of this alternative to the realist interpretation of science, but they do not regard it as a genuine alternative. They briefly dismiss it, in a way that I find hard to understand. They say that an anthropologist who advocates it must commit themselves to the words of others being translatable, and so the anthropologist privileges their own representations as much as the person who takes Western science as revealing reality (2007: 11-12). I cannot see how the 'and so' follows here. Furthermore, there is only a translatability commitment in a very weak sense: representationalists write as if that they can, to a valuable degree, convey what others have said by providing sufficiently long explanations. Representationalists do not have to treat the concepts of others as combinations of Western concepts. Premise (4) Recall the content of premise (4): if an anthropologist implies that some of the concepts used by the group they are studying do not refer to anything real, then the anthropologist is not taking these concepts seriously. Here we can simplify a little and understand concepts as the meanings of individual words. For example, the word 'witch' in its literal use has a meaning and this meaning is the concept of a witch. To be familiar with this meaning is to have the concept of a witch. The quotation below is textual evidence in favour of attributing premise (4) to the authors of the Introduction, though its content needs some unpacking in order for this to be apparent: [...] our concepts (not our 'representations') must, by definition, be inadequate to translate different ones. This, it is suggested, is the only way to take difference – alterity – seriously as the starting point for anthropological analysis. One must accept that when Terence Rajivan Edward / Taking the concepts of others seriously 149 someone tells us, say, that powder is power, the anthropological problem cannot be that of accounting for why he might think that about powder (explaining, interpreting, placing his statement into context), but rather that if that really is the case, then we just do not know what powder he is talking about. (Henare et al. 2007, 12) This quotation focuses on the example of Cuban diviners who say that a particular kind of powder they use is their divinatory power. The quotation expresses an opposition to two ways of responding to the Cuban diviners. Firstly, an anthropologist should not say that the diviners use entirely familiar concepts to us but make false representations with them: saying that this powder is divinatory power, when it is not. Secondly, an anthropologist should not commit to the following combination: (i) the Cuban diviners are working with an unfamiliar concept to classify some powder; (ii) to use this concept to classify some powder is to imply that the powder is divinatory power; (iii) whoever uses their concept in this way is making a false representation of the world, because it is just some powder and lacks any divinatory power. In place of these approaches, the authors of the Introduction recommend saying that the Cuban diviners live in a different world to us, a world in which there really is this powder that is divinatory power: The world in which powder is power is not an uncharted (and preposterous!) region of our own. It is a different world, in which what we take to be powder is actually power [...] (Henare et al. 2007, 12) I will not provide more details about this radical replacement approach here, which is puzzling at first sight. From what has been said so far, it seems clear that the authors of the Introduction are against an anthropologist treating any concept of a group studied as both used in the group's representations of what there is and as not referring to anything real. This for them is to not take the concept in question seriously. Unfortunately, the authors do not explain why this amounts to not taking the concept seriously. There are two objections I shall make to premise (4). To grasp the first objection, consider a certain hypothetical situation. You are eating some cake and someone asks you if they can have some too. You attribute to them a desire for cake and a belief that you can provide them with some. On the basis META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – VIII (1) / 2016 150 of these attributions, you predict that if they are offered cake, they will accept the offer. Now some people think that the concepts of belief and desire do not actually refer to anything real. They think that these concepts do not refer to brain states and that, for an accurate understanding of what there is, we should replace them with scientific concepts that do refer to brain states (e.g. Churchland 1986, 395-399). Even if we ignore the concerns about scientific realism raised in the previous section and even if we also say that these people are right, we might still value the concepts of belief and desire. We might value these concepts as tools in prediction. Indeed, we might wonder whether there are any alternatives available in our everyday lives which are comparably good for the job of making predictions such as the one you make in the example. We are not treating these concepts as adequate means for referring to what there is, but are we not taking them seriously? Since we value them, there is some reason to say that we are taking them seriously. Concepts are used not just in attempts to identify what there is, but also to communicate, to predict, to hope, to fear and more. The authors of the Introduction need some justification for why valuing them for one of these other ends is not enough to be taking them seriously, for why only valuing them as referrers is enough for this. I doubt that there is any compelling justification regarding this. The second objection I shall make is, more precisely, an objection to the combination of premise (1) and premise (4), rather than to premise (4) in isolation. Premise (1) tells anthropologists to take the concepts of those they study seriously. Premise (4) says that this goal cannot be achieved if an anthropologist says that a concept used by those studied to represent the world fails to refer. Premises (1) and (4) together entail a requirement of anthropology. The requirement is that a work of anthropological research should not say, "The group I have studied use a concept in their representations of what there is but this concept does not refer to anything real." However, what happens if there is a disagreement within the group studied over whether a certain concept refers to something real, for instance the concept of a witch? Some members of the group think that this concept can be used to Terence Rajivan Edward / Taking the concepts of others seriously 151 pick out a kind of person while others think that it cannot be used in this way, because there are no witches. Anthropologists are commonly urged not to overlook diversity of belief within the groups they write about, so it matters to consider situations of this kind. From what the authors of the Introduction say, we can extract a proposal for dealing with this situation: an anthropologist should say that those group members who think that the concept refers to something real inhabit one world, a world in which there are witches, whereas those who think that the concept does not refer to anything real inhabit another world, a world without witches. Both parties are therefore right about the world in which they live. However, leaving aside puzzles about the very notion of different worlds, this seems to treat the disagreement as if it were a mere verbal confusion. If only parties to it understood that they are talking about different worlds, there would be no disagreement. For convenience of expression, I shall introduce a piece of terminology. A substantial disagreement about concept reference, rather than a mere verbal confusion, is a disagreement about whether a concept refers in which there is a single world that both parties are talking about and both cannot be right about this world: at least one party is making a mistake. 'World' here means reality. With these definitions in place, we can ask a question: why should an anthropologist prioritize taking concepts seriously, in the way required by premises (1) and (4), over allowing for substantial disagreements about concept reference? Surely we are asked to take the concepts of others seriously as part of respecting them,3 but it seems that this kind of respect comes at the price of respecting their disagreements about concept reference and no reason has been given as to why we should accept this price. My second objection then is that the combination of premises (1) and (4) does not allow anthropologists to admit that there are substantial disagreements over concept reference, and this approach has not been adequately motivated. It is understandable that some anthropologists made the argument that I have been evaluating, from a concern to respect the concepts of others. If the argument succeeds, it META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – VIII (1) / 2016 152 would be momentous for anthropology. The objections I have raised do not show that the argument fails. They show that at present certain premises have been inadequately supported. My objections leave open whether those premises can be provided with the missing support in the future. But my impression is that it will be very hard to make the argument a compelling one. To state my impression more fully: at best, a more justified version of the argument will provide a stronger reason to pursue a different kind of anthropology, if such an anthropology is possible, while still being too disputable to provide a conclusive blow against the tradition of reporting group representations. NOTES 1 To say that there is a tradition within anthropology of informing us about how a group represents the world seems to imply that there could be other traditions in anthropology, traditions which do not involve this. But is providing such information simply essential to anthropology? The argument I shall evaluate is made by authors who deny this essential status. I grant this denial here. 2 The argument I evaluate is made as part of the ontological movement in anthropology. My focus is limited to this argument. I do not aim to evaluate the entire movement here. 3 Readers may wonder whether debate over the argument made by Henare, Holbraad and Wastell is a mere repetition of earlier debates in anthropology over relativism. My evaluation draws upon familiar material. But to my knowledge, earlier relativists do not make the argument I have been evaluating. Furthermore, some efforts from earlier debates to explain relativist talk of different worlds do so in terms of a single world that is perceived or is conceptualized or is cognizable differently (Hollis and Lukes 1982, 6-8; Sperber 1982, 154). REFERENCES Churchland, Patricia. 1986. Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain. Cambridge (MA): The MIT Press. Daly, Christopher and Liggins, David. 2013. Animalism and Deferentialism. Dialectica 67: 605-609. Evans-Pritchard, Edward Evan. Abridged by Eva Gillies. 1976. Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Terence Rajivan Edward / Taking the concepts of others seriously 153 Frazer, James George. 1913. The Belief in Immortality and the Worship of the Dead. Volume 1. The Belief Among the Aborigines of Australia, the Torres Strait Islands, New Guinea and Melanesia. London: Macmillan. Henare, Amiria, Holbraad, Martin and Sari Wastell. 2007. "Introduction." In Thinking Through Things, edited by Amiria Henare, Martin Holbraad and Sari Wastell, 1-31. London: Routledge. Hollis, Martin and Steven Lukes. 1982. "Introduction." In Rationality and Relativism, edited by Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes, 1-20. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Kuhn, Thomas. 1996. Third edition. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Sperber, Dan. 1982. "Apparently Irrational Beliefs." In Rationality and Relativism, edited by M. Hollis and S. Lukes, 149-180. Cambridge (MA): The MIT Press. Whorf, Benjamin Lee. 1950. "An American Indian Model of the Universe." International Journal of American Linguistics 16: 62-72. Terence Rajivan Edward teaches Ethics and Political Philosophy at The University of Manchester. He conducts research into philosophical issues arising from social anthropology. He has a PhD on the idea of a conceptual scheme and currently pursues research in the follow ing areas: the possibility of alternative conceptual schemes, modularity and theory-laden experience, and the distinction between science and pseudo-science. His recent publications are, "Feminist Research and Paradigm Shift in Anthropology" (2012), "The Dualism of Conceptual Scheme and Undifferentiated Reality" (2012), "Anthropology in the context that produced it" (2014) and "Cartesian dualism and the study of cultural artefacts" (2015). Address: Terence Rajivan Edward School of Social Sciences Arthur Lewis Building The University of Manchester Manchester. M13 9PL. Email: [email protected]

Practical Realism about the Self Carolyn Dicey Jennings University of California, Merced (7041 words) In Explaining Attitudes, Baker argues that we should treat our everyday practices as relevant to metaphysical debates, resulting in a stance of realism with respect to intentional explanations. In this chapter I will argue that if one is going to be a practical realist about anything, it should be about the self, or the subject of attention. I will use research on attention combined with the stance of practical realism to argue in favor of a substantive self. That is, I will present an account of the self that directs and controls attention, in line with our everyday view of the self. I will contrast this account with what I call the "illusion view," which presents the self and its apparent causal power in the case of attention as an illusion. My account of the self will make use of several of Baker's ideas, including non-reductive materialism and broad supervenience. 1. Introduction Baker's later writings on the self and her property constitution view inspired my own work on a brain-based account of the self, or the subject of attention (see Baker 2009, 2016 and Jennings 2012, 2020). While we differ on some of the details, we share a non-reductive materialist approach that takes as central the role of the body and its environment. In this chapter I wish to go further in support of my account of the self, using some of Baker's earlier work (e.g. Baker 1995). Namely, I will use her work on practical realism as further evidence in support of my view. This work takes seriously the commitments of our everyday interactions, which she sees as including a role for beliefs. More fundamental than our commitment to beliefs, however, is our commitment to the holders of those beliefs-persons or selves. I will thus argue that if we should be practical realists about anything, it is the self, or the subject of attention. Along the way I address the opposing view, which I call the "illusion view"-the idea that the existence of a self with its own causal powers is an illusion. My account of the self, supported by some of Baker's reasoning, provides a remedy to such skepticism. 2. Baker on Practical Realism In her early work, Baker espouses a theory that she dubs "Practical Realism." It is "practical" because it concerns our everyday practices (Baker 1995, 19). Specifically, it holds that we should be realists about the existence of that which is implied by our everyday practices, even in the absence of validation by the sciences (Baker 1995, 21). Baker focuses her discussion on the existence of beliefs, contrasting her position with what 2 she calls "the standard view." According to the standard view, Baker says, beliefs are reducible to brain states; if a belief cannot be so reduced, then it doesn't exist (Baker 1995, 6). She claims, instead, that our everyday practices serve as independent evidence for beliefs. Moreover, this independent evidence supports an understanding of beliefs as not reducible to brain states. Baker's description of the standard view is intended to capture the most popular theories in philosophy of mind at the time of writing. These are listed as including type and token identity theories, constitution theories, functionalism, eliminative materialism, and certain relational views (Baker 1995, 8-12). Baker sees such theorists as committed to the standard view because they embrace naturalism: they see the standard view as the only alternative to dualism, they see science as supporting the standard view, and they think the standard view is the only way to explain how beliefs can have causal power (Baker 1995, 12-17). Baker rejects these claims, while nonetheless embracing naturalism. She calls her own view "radical relationism," which she takes to be a type of "non-reductive materialism" (Baker 1995, 156). Take, for example, what Baker calls "the most detailed attempt to provide an explanatory role for belief": Dretske's relational account (Baker 1995, 62). Dretske's view is a version of the standard view because beliefs are taken to supervene on states or properties of the brain (Baker 1995, 57); it is a relational view because beliefs have meaning only in virtue of their role in bringing about a behavior by indicating something (Baker 1995, 58). Despite its virtues, Baker finds Dretske's account to fail due to a vicious circularity. Specifically, in Baker's description, Dretske finds beliefs to have causal power because they have meaning, and he finds them to have meaning because of their causal role in behavior (Baker 1995, 59). For Baker, this is one example of how the standard view has failed to find a non-circular explanation of beliefs. Yet, she finds that instead of abandoning beliefs we should abandon the standard view, in favor of practical realism. If we are practical realists-that is, if we are realists about the existence of that which is implied by our everyday practices-then we should accept the existence of beliefs, according to Baker. This is because our everyday practices depend on belief attributions, which are committed to the existence of beliefs. When we, for example, use a crosswalk to cross the street we are committed to the existence of nearby drivers' beliefs: the belief that we are in the crosswalk, that we have right of way, and that they should stop. If we were not committed to the existence of these beliefs, then it would be difficult to explain our behavior. For Baker, the commitments of these everyday practices trump our inability to explain the physical basis of belief; even if we can't make sense of belief within a naturalistic worldview, we should accept the existence of beliefs. Further, Baker finds that our everyday practices support a radically relational understanding of belief. This form of relationism is "radical" because it rejects the microphysical reduction inherent in the standard view. 3 Baker thinks we have focused on microphysical reduction due to a conflation of constitution with supervenience. That is, we think of beliefs as microphysically reducible because we believe they are constituted by brain states, and so must supervene on brain states. Baker argues forcefully against this idea using the concept of multiple realizability: certain processes or mechanisms can be realized in multiple ways, such that even if an instance of such a process or mechanism is constituted in a particular way it need not supervene on that particular constitution (Baker 1995, 132). Take the example of physical currency: the United States dollar may be constituted by paper, but it does not supervene on paper, since it might be constituted in other ways (e.g. plastic). As with currency, Baker sees beliefs as multiply realizable. This is because "one's state of believing that p depends on global properties...of whole organisms" (Baker 1995, 22). In other words, beliefs are states held by persons, not their parts: "belief is a global state of a whole person, not of any proper part of the person, such as the brain" (Baker 1995, 153). We don't say that necks or knees believe, we say that people believe. We might hold that specific beliefs are constituted by specific parts of a person, such as specific neural circuits in the brain, while also holding that they could be constituted by other neural circuits. Put another way, the reason that currency and beliefs are multiply realizable with respect to their constituent parts is that they concern phenomena at a different scale than those parts, that engage with other phenomena at their own scale. That is, Baker sees beliefs as relational, holding between persons and their environments. It is because beliefs are relational at this scale that they "do not supervene on local microstructure" (Baker 1995, 63). That is, they may be constituted by particular neural circuits, but they do not supervene on those circuits, since they have to do with the relationship between those circuits as part of a person and the environment of the person in question. As Baker sees it, constitution has to do with objects and their parts, whereas supervenience has to do with the properties of those objects, which may depend on other objects: thus, "supervenience relations (among properties) diverge from constitution relations (among things)" (Baker 1995, 132). So, for Baker, beliefs may be constituted by brain states, but they are not reducible to brain states. This is because the distinctive properties of beliefs depend on the relationship of those brain states with other objects and states. This is what it means for beliefs to be held by persons in particular environments. This is a naturalistic view of beliefs, but one that differs significantly from the standard view that beliefs depend only on brain states; it is an early instance of externalism, the view that mental phenomena may depend on or be constituted by events that occur outside of the brain and body. 4 Inspired by Baker, I apply her ideas to attention and the self. That is, I find that the self is constituted by brain states but is not microphysically reducible. I argue for this position below, first confronting an opposing position on the self: that it is an illusion. Like Baker, I see my project as an important remedy for skepticism, albeit in this case for skepticism about the existence of a self, rather than beliefs. I see practical realism about the self to be more basic than practical realism about beliefs, since beliefs are held by persons or selves. Thus, if we should be practical realists about anything, it is the self. I believe this coheres with Baker's own philosophical commitments, as I will explain below. 3. Illusion View The illusion view, as I am calling it, has to do with the concept of a self with causal power. That is, it has to do with the concept of mental causation by a self. Many have argued that this is an illusion, in part due to empirical evidence. They argue that the self is a mental construct, and that there is no reason to think of the self as something that does things. Instead, as Baker puts it, this view is that "selves are illusory products of the brain" (Baker 2016, 8). Take, for instance, Wegner and Wheatley's now classic paper on the experience of mental causation (Wegner and Wheatley 1999). They show that when two people have control over a process, a participant can be fooled as to how extensive their own role was in that process merely by inducing a thought that aligns with the outcome of that process. In Wegner and Wheatley's view, which is inspired by Hume, causation is inferred from the conjunction of two events that are close to one another in time, when other explanations of the "caused" event are not available. In the case of mental causation, we might infer that a thought that occurred before an action is a cause of that action if it is related to that action and other potential causes are not apparent. In their experiment on the topic, Wegner and Wheatley found that participants who were induced to have thoughts regarding a particular outcome were more likely to judge themselves as having a larger role in the process of bringing about that outcome, depending on the timing of that induction. Wegner and Wheatley think that in the normal case we mistake our conscious thoughts as being effective, when really only unconscious mechanisms have an impact on our behavior: "the real causal mechanisms underlying behavior are never present in consciousness. Rather, the engines of causation are unconscious mechanisms of the mind" (Wegner and Wheatley 1999, 490). Wegner and Wheatley are likely inspired, in part, by Libet's research a decade earlier (Libet 1985). Namely, Libet found a delay between unconscious mechanisms that predict our choices and our own awareness of making those choices: "the brain 'decides' to initiate or, at least, to prepare to initiate the act before there is any reportable subjective awareness that such a decision has taken place" (Libet 1985, 536). Given the ability 5 for others to predict our choices before we are subjectively aware of them, it seems reasonable to see unconscious mechanisms as having the real causal power here. Yet, some have argued that the apparent neural tendencies that these predictions are based on are an artefact of the data processing in this study: Libet lines up the neural oscillations prior to the act, and background neural oscillations tend to ramp up before an act of this kind (i.e. a "spontaneous" act that is allowed to occur only when background oscillations have ramped up in this way; cf. Schurger, Sitt, and Dehaene 2012). Further, Libet found that these tendencies can be vetoed by the participant (Libet 1985; see also Schultze-Kraft, et al. 2016). So Libet's finding shows that there are unconscious influences on our choices before we make them, but not that our conscious experience is ineffectual. Thus, even if we align the self with consciousness, Libet's findings do not show us that the self does not have causal power. For that we would need further evidence, such as that put forward by Wegner and Wheatley. From within philosophy, Metzinger likewise argues that the self is a construct, drawing in part on Wegner and Wheatley's findings (Metzinger 2004, 406). For Metzinger, this illusion extends to all phenomenal objects: "what you subjectively experience as an integrated object possessing a transtemporal identity (e.g., the book you are holding in your hand) is being constituted by an ongoing process" (Metzinger 2004, 23). Similarly, he thinks we reify the self in our experience, seeing it as something substantive, rather than something we are in the process of creating. Yet, the illusion of self is different from that of other objects, Metzinger argues, since the self does not exist: "There is no one whose illusion the self could be, no one who is confusing herself with anything" (Metzinger 2004, 634). The existence of the self is rejected by Metzinger, in part, because of the homunculus problem posed by Dennett (Metzinger 2004, 307). As Schneider puts it, "Dennett is clearly opposed to... theories purporting to explain cognitive capacities by generating a decomposition that ultimately boils down to an internal agent, or homunculus... the consciousness of the homunculus would itself need to be explained, so this sort of explanation is circular" (Schneider 2007, 317). In other words, posing a new internal agent cannot by itself help us to explain phenomena such as conscious perception, since the problem is how any agent can consciously perceive, including an internal one. But note that this problem does not show that the self does not exist, or even that an "internal agent" does not exist, only that introducing new selves does not by itself explain other phenomena. In arguing against the existence of a self with causal power, Dennett goes further than the homunculus problem, citing evidence from split brain studies: "A central clue comes from the sort of phenomena uncovered by Michael Gazzaniga's research. According to Gazzaniga's view, the mind is not beautifully unified, but rather a problematically yoked together bundle of partly autonomous systems" (Dennett 1992, 6 111). Instead of saying that a new self has been created in the process of severing the corpus callosum in these patients, he argues that it makes more sense to see these studies as revealing that a person's "center of narrative gravity," or self-concept, can be split in two (see also Nagel 1971). Dennett argues that split-brain phenomena reveal that the brain is normally disunified, and that a unified self is an illusion. Yet, these patients also retain some unity, as Dennett illustrates through pain: "pain stimuli go to both hemispheres," so a painful stimulus is easily reported by these patients, regardless of the side of stimulation (Dennett 1992, 113). In fact, more recent work has claimed that "severing the cortical connections between hemispheres splits visual perception, but does not create two independent conscious perceivers within one brain" (Pinto, et al. 2017, 1231).1 Thus, we might simply say that the unity of selfhood is relative and that split-brain patients have a relatively disunified self, rather than two selves, avoiding the metaphysical problem (see also Schechter 2014). In my view, we have ample evidence for the existence of a self that isn't well countered by the above. Like any substantive thing, we can be wrong about the self, mistaking something as due to the self when it is due to someone or something else, which I think is the best explanation of Wegner and Wheatley's findings. Further, there is a way in which our understanding of the self is constructed, just as our understanding of other substantive things (e.g., this book) is constructed; This does not mean that the self is constructed by us, anymore than other substantive things are constructed by us, which I think is the best way of responding to Metzinger. Finally, the self can be more or less disunified, but this doesn't by itself show that there isn't a self, against the claims of philosophers such as Dennett. We might, for instance, pin the question of whether there is a self on whether there are non-reducible causal powers attributable to the self, rather than on whether there is sufficient unity. In the next section I will discuss the evidence I take to point to the existence of a substantive self, later comparing this to Baker's own view of the self. 4. The Subject of Attention In line with Baker's stance of practical realism regarding beliefs, I see a case for practical realism regarding the self. Namely, the existence of the self is assumed in the way we interact with others. Specifically, the existence of a self with causal powers is so assumed. Take, for instance, our hesitation at the crosswalk, even when we obviously have right of way, and even when we are sure the driver has seen us-we hesitate because we are unsure what the driver will do with this information. We treat this as up to the driver, to a certain extent. And, if the driver chooses to speed on through, we might blame them for their behavior, perhaps even shout at them. This is because we think of them as responsible for this choice, and we want to have an impact on 1 Interestingly, those born without a corpus callosum likewise reveal that information can still be shared across the hemispheres in its absence, although perhaps due to physiological changes not present in the split-brain case (Tovar-Moll, et al. 2014). 7 their future choices. We might think of the driver's beliefs as having an impact on their decision, but we also think there is more to their decision, that it depends on the person, or self, in question. The everyday assumption of the existence of a self with causal powers is especially evident, I think, in the way we think and talk about attention. Attention is said to be something that can be both "paid" and "grabbed." It is, for example, "paid" in the classroom but "grabbed" by advertising. The distinction between one's attention being paid or grabbed depends on a self who is either doing the paying or whose attention is being grabbed. In both cases, attention is a way of bringing about behavioral change. In one case, we pay attention to change our behavior in a way that aligns with our goals; in the other case, our behavior is changed by others in order to better align with theirs. So the assumption of a self that can pay attention is the assumption of a self with causal power. Beyond speech, our everyday practices distinguish between attention that is driven by the self and attention that is driven by external forces. When we want to grab attention, we resort to fast movements, bright colors, and loud sounds. Social media use, for example, the sudden onset of red notifications. When we want someone to pay attention we try to be interesting to them, or to show them why they should be interested. Teachers do this, for example, by connecting classroom material with everyday life. We take something extra to be involved in the latter case due to the assumption that we are interacting with a self, who has the power to control attention. We tailor our behavior toward someone's attention depending on whether we need to involve the self or undermine it. In this way, our everyday practices assume the existence of a self. Philosophers and scientists have long recognized that attention might be the place to look for mental causation by the self and have debated whether attention truly is evidence of a self. This comes up in a dispute between Bradley and James over one hundred years ago, and between Indian philosophers a couple millennia before that (Jennings 2020; Ganeri 2017; Jennings in press). In contemporary scientific debates, mental causation by the self is replaced with "executive control," and the question is whether there is a plausible account of attention based in executive control that is not reducible to local neural interactions. As I argue in my book, there is such an account: attention is directed by the self when the neural firing that occurs over a larger region and over a longer time period cumulates into oscillations with higher amplitudes than those of feedforward processing, such that the higher frequency, lower amplitude oscillations have power over the organism's behavior only at certain intervals in the lower frequency, higher amplitude oscillations (i.e. in the troughs; Jennings 2020).2 2 This is closely related to Thomas Hills' account of "neurocognitive free will," except that his account involves a construct of self, rather than a true self (Hills 2019). 8 To draw out this idea a bit more, my view is that when attention benefits from executive control that this is best explained by a whole-brain phenomenon. This aspect of attention is typically picked out by feedback from the deeper layers of the prefrontal cortex, which requires a delayed response (Connor, et al. 2004; Lakatos, et al. 2005; Wilken, et al. 2009; Baluch and Itti 2011). This delayed response allows for input from a broader spatio-temporal range of neural activity: more areas of the brain, covering a larger spatial area, and over a longer time span. Due to the scale-free relationship between neural oscillations that maintains smaller amplitudes for higher frequencies, a process that allows for input from a broader spatio-temporal range of neural activity will correspond with neural oscillations of larger amplitudes (see, e.g., Buzsáki & Draguhn 2004). This then allows for such a process to control local, feedforward processing. That is, local feedforward processing would not be able to have an impact on behavior unless it occurred at certain time intervals, due to the larger amplitude of the feedback oscillations (Lakatos, et al. 2008). In fact, when attention benefits from executive control it has been found to correspond with lower frequency oscillations (Buschman and Miller 2007). The self corresponds, in this picture, to the pattern of wave activity that occurs for longer intervals and larger regions of the brain, sometimes called "global" brain activity. I see this pattern as comprised of the tendencies and interests of the organism. Insofar as this pattern is responsible for the direction of attention, I call it the "subject of attention." I think that this understanding of the self can satisfy the assumptions of our everyday practices, described above. If the subject of attention corresponds with the whole-brain pattern of wave activity, one might wonder how it has control over local neural processing. It might seem absurd, or even paradoxical, to claim that something can have control over itself in this way. Yet, I think we can make sense of this using some conceptual tools developed by others, such as machretic determination and contextual emergence. These tools differentiate the view on offer from the circular causation of strong emergence and the causal collapse of weak emergence, as I explain below. Contextual emergence is a concept developed by Harald Atmanspacher (2007), who contrasts it with forms of emergence that rely on supervenience. Supervenience is a relationship between a whole and its parts such that changes in the whole depend on changes in its parts. One might thus think of any causal power of the whole as being driven by the parts. Contextual emergence is a case of a whole with causal power that is not reducible to its parts, a denial of supervenience. Atmanspacher situates contextual emergence as in between a "weak" emergence view, in which a whole merely appears to have properties that go beyond those of its parts, and a "strong" emergence view, in which 9 the parts are neither necessary nor sufficient for the whole that emerges from them. Both strong and weak emergence have been argued to have significant philosophical problems. In the case of strong emergence, the main problem is that it seems to rely on a form of causation that is circular, such that the parts bring about the whole that causes changes to its parts. In the case of weak emergence, the main problem is that any causal power is reducible to the parts, and so the whole seems metaphysically unnecessary (see the discussion on Kim, below). In contextual emergence, the parts are necessary for the whole that emerges from them, but not sufficient, since emergence only occurs in a particular context. Similarly, in my view, the self is the sort of thing that relies on context. The self is a set of interests, or tendencies to seek out and respond to stimuli in a particular sort of way. Only embodied beings have interests. Thus, it makes sense to suppose the context necessary for the self to be the body. After all, the body is necessary to provide the stimuli that interests govern, and the body has limitations that make governance necessary. But I think it is this last thing, in particular, that is required for the emergence of the self: the constraints faced by a body in a world of its approximate spatio-temporal scale. Only in such a scenario would you have a self, or a set of interests with its own causal power. In this way of thinking, the parts of the self are the parts of the pattern of neural oscillations, or individual neural oscillations that correspond with individual interests. So a particular pattern of neural oscillations is necessary for the self, but that pattern is not sufficient for the self. To bring about something with its own causal power, like a self, the pattern of neural oscillations must be part of a body; the self exists only so long as there is a body with constraints that the self can serve. The self thus does not supervene on these neural oscillations but is nonetheless intimately connected to them. The self, in my view, is a solution to the problem of conflicting interests-when two or more interests, or tendencies to seek out and respond to stimuli in a particular way, come into conflict, the self is what resolves that conflict for the good of the organism (see Jennings 2017). The self is, in this picture, the set of all interests, or tendencies to seek out and respond in a particular way to stimuli. So the resolution of conflict occurs through a weighing of all interests or tendencies, such that one is supported at the expense of the other because it is a better fit with the rest. We can understand this process through the concept of machretic determination. Machretic determination was developed by Carl Gillett (2016) to explain how an emergent entity might control its parts in a non-causal way. Specifically, an emergent entity might determine the contribution of its parts insofar as the parts are only able to make that contribution if they are brought into a relationship that allows for a new property at the level of the emergent entity. So the emergent entity does not cause the parts to have 10 that relationship, but the emergent entity can control the parts by determining that they will only be part of an emergent entity if they have that relationship. Gillett encourages us to think of the directional forces of parts that must all be lined up in a particular way to get a new, larger force at the level of the whole. Thus, the parts make up that larger force only when lined up in that way, and so the whole "controls" the contributions of its parts. Applying this to the view of self on offer, I consider the self to have power insofar as it resolves the conflicts between its component interests. Those interests are thus only part of the self insofar as they "line up" with one another-the self "machretically determines" the contributions of its component interests. This need not be seen as a causal power, since the self need not have causal power over its parts to determine which parts are component parts. Yet, this control can be a way for the self to exert causal power: by controlling its parts, the self alters the landscape of neural activity, and by altering the landscape of neural activity, the self alters bodily responses to stimuli. The self thus has causal power over the body through machretic determination over its parts. (I discuss this view at greater length in Jennings 2020.) That a self with causal power is responsible for resolving conflicting interests through attention is implied, I think, by our everyday understanding of the self and attention. In this way my approach is one of practical realism with respect to the self. Further, it is a more basic practical realism than Baker's since beliefs are held by persons or selves. Yet Baker's own view of the self was somewhat different, as I will explain in the next section. 5. Baker's "self" and property constitution In putting forward his illusion view of the self, Metzinger cites Baker as inspiration (Metzinger 2004, 395). Baker had, several years prior, argued that the existence of a first-person perspective challenges reductive materialism (Baker 1998). To answer this challenge, Metzinger provided a reductive materialist account of the first-person perspective, which Baker called "the most comprehensive theory of the first-person perspective that I know of" (Baker 2007, 204). Yet Baker goes on to argue that his illusion view is incoherent, in part because the illusion would have to be held by something, such as a subject (recall Metzinger's claim that "there is no one whose illusion the self could be..."). Further, in her view, the "experience of being a conscious subject is evidence that I am a subject, and this evidence overwhelms any possible evidence that I may have for any scientific theory to the contrary" (Baker 2007, 221). That is, much like Moore's two hands, Moore's certainty of which cannot be undermined by something of which he is less certain, Baker's certainty of being a subject cannot be undermined by the commitment to reductive materialism, or other positions of which she has less certainty (Moore 1939). 11 Baker's way of talking about the subject is, again, through the notion of a first-person perspective. As she sees it, a weak first-person perspective is one in which experience is perspectival, but a strong first-person perspective is one that is also conceptualized as such, and it is the latter that is essential to being a person. In Baker's view, the first-person perspective is relational, much like beliefs, which is why it doesn't fit well with reductive materialism: it is "a perspective from which one thinks of oneself as an individual facing a world, as a subject distinct from everything else" (Baker 2007, 203). Her view is thus also externalist, in that a firstperson perspective would not exist without objects or persons apart from the subject. One distinction between Baker's view and my own is that she does not think a first-person perspective requires a self: "the idea of a self is much richer than the idea of a first-person perspective. A self is the locus of personal integrity and coherence, but such a self is not required for a first-person perspective" (Baker 1998, 342). She uses the example of someone with brain damage trying to discover who they are, which she describes as a case of first-person perspective without a "coherent and comprehensive" self. As I say above, a self might be more or less unified, and a relative lack of unity may not point to the absence of self. Further, the example in question appears to pertain to an absence of memory and one's conception of self, and not necessarily an absence of self. In fact, Baker closes that passage by claiming that a first-person perspective is necessary, but not sufficient, for "an idea of a self." As I said in response to the Wegner and Wheatley experiment, we should separate the self from any construct, model, or idea of the self. In my view, a construct, model, or idea of the self is based on an actual self, and it aids us in recognizing the impact of our own self on our behavior, as well as the impact of other selves on their behavior. Baker has a similar view in the vicinity regarding persons, which, for her, are necessarily embodied: "When I deny that there are selves, what I deny is that the bearers of psychological properties are proper parts of persons or animals" (Baker 2016, 14). (Recall also her earlier claim: "belief is a global state of a whole person, not of any proper part of the person.") Given that my own, brain-based account of the self also requires constraints at the level of the body, it might be difficult to find light between our views. Yet, I essentially base the self in the brain, seeing it as constituted by patterns of brain activity, whereas Baker sees a person as constituted by the body. So Baker and I diverge on certain points, while sharing some important commitments. The most central of those commitments is to non-reductive materialism. As Baker makes clear, she finds the existence of a first-person perspective to challenge reductive naturalism. She urges us to embrace nonreductive materialism, in its stead. She helpfully demonstrates in a book chapter on the topic how such a 12 perspective might establish the possibility for mental causation, against Kim's influential arguments to the contrary (Baker 2009; Kim 2009). Kim argues that we have to choose between a reductive physicalist account of the mind and a dualist account, since a supervenience-based account is untenable (see, e.g., Kim 2009). He claims that a supervenience-based account is untenable because mental causation, as distinct from physical causation, is untenable. Without causal power over the physical, the supervening entity either collapses into a reductive physical one or is relegated to the role of Huxley's whistle: an epiphenomenon, separate from the physical without influencing it (Huxley 1874). Mental causation is untenable due to the causal closure of the physical, or the view that all physical events have a sufficient physical cause. Since all physical events have a sufficient physical cause, any additional mental cause would result in overdetermination of physical events, which Kim rules out as absurd given the required number of such events. While Kim's argument may be used against supervenience-based accounts, I have argued so far for a different perspective on the mind. In this perspective, the emergent self does not supervene on its microphysical basis. Kim seems to have been unaware of this possibility, claiming that all accounts of emergence are forms of supervenience. For this reason, Kim's argument fails. Baker was the first, I believe, to make this point. According to Baker, Kim's argument depends on at least one false supposition (Baker 2009). That is, Kim supposes that if the mental is not reducible to its microphysical basis and yet has causal power over, say, other mental events, then it must do so through downward causation. This is because the mental event in question must itself have a microphysical basis it supervenes over, so to change the mental event the mental would have to change the event's microphysical basis, thus requiring downward causation from the mental to this microphysical basis. As I argue above, contextual emergence does not rely on supervenience, so this inference does not hold. Baker uses the language of "property constitution" to make the point: "A property's constituter on a given occasion may be a proper part of a supervenience base for the property, but the constituting instance...does not suffice for the constituted instance" (Baker 2009, 121). Certain circumstances are necessary to bring about the emergent property, just as a certain context is necessary in contextual emergence. Yet, as Baker also points out, this may only be a denial of local supervenience; global supervenience may yet hold. This is, in fact, what allows Baker to hold onto the causal closure of the physical. That is, it may be that all cause and effect within the physical world is contained, while the causes and effects regarding a particular object within that world are not: "The supervenience base will be very broad-too broad to be specified or to 13 be useful in explanation-but it will be metaphysically sufficient for the constituted property instance" (Baker 2009, 123). In the same vein, the subject of attention might be thought to deny local, but not global supervenience, countering Kim's argument that an emergent entity could not have causal power so long as we accept the causal closure of the physical. The subject of attention could be an emergent entity with causal power without violating that principle, in line with Baker's reasoning. In my view, this is further support for a stance of practical realism regarding the self, or the subject of attention. 6. Conclusion I have argued for the existence of a self, or a brain-based subject of attention, to counter a skeptical position with regard to the self-the illusion view. Baker found herself in the vicinity of this view, denying the existence of a self while embracing the existence of persons and their first-person perspectives. Yet our views are closely aligned. We each embrace non-reductive materialism, finding persons or selves to depend on bodies in a world. For Baker, persons are constituted by bodies, whereas I see selves as constituted by brain activity. Baker nonetheless joins me in resisting those, like Metzinger and Dennett, who deny the existence of a self, calling it an illusion. Against the illusion view, I have proposed that we use Baker's earlier work, on practical realism, to support the existence of a substantive self. While Baker used practical realism to support her account of beliefs, I see the self as more fundamental than beliefs, since beliefs are held by persons or selves. Further, the same argumentative tactics used by Baker in favor of beliefs can support the self: the existence of a self is assumed in our everyday interactions with others. Thus, we should not reject the self simply because we do not yet have a scientific understanding of the phenomenon. Instead, we should see its use in everyday life as evidence for its existence. This, together with brain evidence as to the causal power of the self over attention, should be enough to stymie such skepticism, at least for now. 14 References Atmanspacher, H. (2007). Contextual emergence from physics to cognitive neuroscience. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 14(1-2), 18-36. Baluch, F. and Itti, L. (2011). Mechanisms of top-down attention. Trends in Neurosciences, 34(4):210–24. Baker, L. R. (1995). Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind. Cambridge University Press. Baker, L. R. (1998). The first-person perspective: a test for naturalism. American Philosophical Quarterly, 35(4). Baker, L. R. (2007). Naturalism and the first-person perspective. In: Gasser, G. (ed.) How Successful is Naturalism? Ontos-Verlag. Baker, L. R. (2009). Non-reductive materialism. In: McLaughlin, B., Beckermann, A., & Walter, S. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Clarendon Press. Baker, L. R. (2016). Making sense of ourselves: self-narratives and personal identity. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 15(1), 7-15. Buschman, T. J. and Miller, E. K. (2007). Top-down versus bottom-up control of attention in the prefrontal and posterior parietal cortices. Science, 315(5820):1860–2. Buzsáki, G., & Draguhn, A. (2004). Neuronal oscillations in cortical networks. Science, 304(5679), 1926-1929. Connor, C. E., Egeth, H. E., and Yantis, S. (2004). Visual attention: Bottom-up versus top-down. Current Biology, 14(19):R850–2. Dennett, Daniel C. (1992) The self as a center of narrative gravity. In: F. Kessel, P. Cole and D. Johnson (eds.) Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Ganeri, Jonardon (2017). Attention, Not Self. Oxford University Press. Gillett, C. (2016). Reduction and Emergence in Science and Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. Hills, T. T. (2019). Neurocognitive free will. Proceedings of the Royal Society B, 286(1908), 20190510. Huxley, T. H. (1874). On the hypothesis that animals are automata, and its history. Jennings, C. D. (2012). The subject of attention. Synthese, 189(3), 535-554. Jennings, C. D. (2017). I attend, therefore I am. Aeon. Retrieved from: https://aeon.co/essays/what-is-theself-if-not-that-which-pays-attention Jennings, C. D. (2020). The Attending Mind. Cambridge University Press. Jennings, C. D. (in press). Too much attention, too little self? 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Brain bisection and the unity of consciousness. Synthese, 22(3):396–413. Pinto, Y., Neville, D. A., Otten, M., Corballis, P. M., Lamme, V. A., De Haan, E. H., ... & Fabri, M. (2017). Split brain: divided perception but undivided consciousness. Brain, 140(5), 1231-1237. Schneider, S. (2007). Daniel Dennett on the nature of consciousness. In: The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, 313-324. Schechter, E. (2014). Partial Unity of Consciousness: A Preliminary Defense. In: Bennett, D. and Hill, C. (eds.) Sensory integration and the unity of consciousness. MIT Press. Schurger, A., Sitt, J. D., & Dehaene, S. (2012). An accumulator model for spontaneous neural activity prior to self-initiated movement. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109(42), E2904-E2913. Schultze-Kraft, M., Birman, D., Rusconi, M., Allefeld, C., Görgen, K., Dähne, S., ... & Haynes, J. D. (2016). The point of no return in vetoing self-initiated movements. 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Nietzsche, Freedom, and Writing Lives TOM STERN Of all their various qualities and achievements, why is it apparently most important to Nietzsche that Socrates was ugly, and that Caesar suffered from terrible headaches? And how do Caesar's headaches contribute to his status as "the highest type of free man"? This paper presents an interpretation of the concept of freedom in Nietzsche's late book, Twilight of the Idols.1 A main focus will be the passage Twilight "Skirmishes" 38, entitled "My Conception of Freedom." It is helpful to pick out only one of Nietzsche's texts, because he changes his mind so much throughout his writings.2 However, by focusing on Twilight, I do not mean to suggest that this represents Nietzsche's best or most mature account of freedom. Nor do I present this as something like his "considered position" on freedom, whatever one takes that dubious phrase to mean. While Nietzsche isn't consistent across his various texts, I will be assuming for the purposes of this paper that he is consistent within Twilight. So, for example, if he says something about a particular person in one place, I'll assume that it is connected to what he says about that same person in another place (and that the reader is meant to make that connection). This will be significant later on. I intend, furthermore, to emphasize an aspect of Nietzsche's writing which has received relatively little attention from critics: namely, the way he writes about famous people. A very helpful way of approaching Nietzsche is to look at the kinds of questions that he asks, rather than the kinds of answers that he gives. More often than not, he isn't interested in the internal structure of a metaphysical, religious, or arion 17.1 spring/summer 2009 moral view; rather, he's interested in the kind of person who holds such a view. The question is not: "Is view X correct?" Rather, Nietzsche asks, "What kind of person would hold view X?" or "What kind of psychological (or physiological) need might be served by becoming an adherent of X?" This is particularly effective (and this is not often brought out) because the views Nietzsche discusses most frequently (e.g., Christianity, Kantianism, liberalism) are, he thinks, obviously and comprehensively false. This obvious falsity motivates the switch from questions about empirical evidence and internal logic to questions about why on earth somebody would believe something so stupid. A beautiful example of this is the comment about Christianity in The Anti-Christ: "One is not 'converted' to Christianity-one must be sufficiently sick for it."3 Christianity is so evidently false that one must look to the underlying lack of health in the Christian to explain his worldview. Of course, if this is Nietzsche's general outlook-that philosophies, religions, and values often come after or in response to the needs of the people who hold them-then we shouldn't be too surprised to find him writing about real people and how they relate to their value systems. That is one of the reasons why Nietzsche's writing is littered with the names of the famous. Often these do not function merely as examples, but have a more intricate connection with the subject matter. In The Anti-Christ, Paul's psychology is intimately connected with Christianity such that the two are inseparable: in a certain sense, Christianity is just a function of Paul's asceticism.4 The same might be said for Wagner and modern music in The Wagner Case, or for Euripides and the decline of tragedy in The Birth of Tragedy. This paper concentrates on individuals in Twilight who relate to freedom: Caesar, Napoleon, and Catiline. We can't understand freedom (in Twilight) unless we take time to understand these individuals; and, I'll go on to argue, an understanding of them helps us to understand the most significant character in Twilight: Socrates. nietzsche, freedom, and writing lives86 Finally, I'll try to say something about Nietzsche's writing and his style. To put it roughly, I argue that Nietzsche doesn't really know why he's writing Twilight; that correspondingly, we don't as readers understand how to respond to it; and finally, that Nietzsche expresses an awareness of this in the text. I want to present Nietzsche in a dilemma: for certain reasons, he wants to change the way the world is; for other reasons, he suggests that he doesn't know quite how to achieve this, and perhaps that it isn't even possible. As I say, this third claim must remain vague for the moment; I shall return to it towards the end. My interest in Nietzsche's reasons for writing Twilight (and in how readers might respond to it) arises, in part, as a response to a certain kind of Nietzsche criticism which is prevalent at the moment. It is common to offer an analysis of Nietzsche which ultimately produces an "ought" or a take-home message of some kind. There is a sense that Nietzsche must be telling us what to do and it's just a question of reading him carefully or selectively enough to draw this out. One problem here is that the resultant "oughts" are often rather peculiar. Anybody who has been to a Nietzsche talk and been told to "become what you are" or "lay yourself down for the Superman" may have an inkling of what I'm getting at. It would be foolish to say that Nietzsche never gives his readers moral instruction. However, one of my interests here lies in presenting a case in which he very definitely does not. Thus, in the present case, Nietzsche's conception of freedom does not give us a "you-ought-to-become-free-like-this" answer. Of course, if Nietzsche isn't writing in order to get us to do something, then one may well ask why he is writing at all. Writers may in general have a wide variety of reasons for writing, and they needn't have only one reason. We might imagine Nietzsche's writing as a kind of self-exploration, although that doesn't seem to be the pose he strikes in Twilight. More likely, Twilight might be written to unsettle its readership, rather than to offer them a take-home message. Its subtitle-"How to PhilosoTom Stern 87 phize with a Hammer"-would certainly suggest that much. I'll return to these considerations, with respect to freedom in Twilight, towards the end. Two background concepts which are crucial to understanding Nietzsche's conception of freedom in Twilight are those of "the Unzeitgemässe" and "decadence." As we shall see, the two are related. The word unzeitgemässe is normally translated into English as "untimely." Hence we know the Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen as the "Untimely Meditations." The section of Twilight which provides much of the material for this paper is called Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemässen: "Skirmishes of an Untimely One." The English fails to capture the German. We rarely use "untimely" except to speak of an "untimely death," meaning usually that the person died young. We could, I suppose, speak of the "untimely" death of a very old man if he died as the result of a clinical error or was murdered. Still, the point is that the death occurred sooner than it should have. Conversely, a "timely intervention" is one which happened at just the right moment. The German carries a slightly different connotation. To be zeitgemäss is, literally, to correspond to or be appropriate to your time. So, whereas in English one only really speaks of specific "timely" events or actions, in German a person or institution might be zeitgemäss-appropriate to its particular time. The German (and my English explanation of the German) nonetheless carries with it an ambiguity, which is worthy of consideration. What is it to be appropriate to your time? This could mean either (i) a typical product of your time or (ii) just exactly what your time needs. When Adorno wrote that the V1 rocket-bomb was the perfect symbol of the times (i.e., the Second World War),5 he meant that it was an embodiment of everything that characterized the modern world as he saw it; he didn't mean that the V1 rocket was "appropriate" in the sense that it was just what everyone needed. The V1 rocket, then, was zeitgemäss in the first and not the second sense. One can imagine an appropriateness that was exnietzsche, freedom, and writing lives88 actly the other way around. It might be appropriate for a university faculty which has an extremely narrow focus to expand and to become more diverse; but this is very unlikely to come from within the faculty, and even if it did, it would hardly be a typical product of the latter. (If it were a typical product, then there wouldn't have been a problem in the first place.) Hence this kind of "appropriateness" would be of the second kind, but not of the first. Finally, we can imagine an appropriateness which is both a product of its time and what its time needs. Nietzsche seems to have thought that the right kind of society or social environment will do just that. Hence, one way of interpreting Nietzsche's admiration for Greek culture (as expressed in The Birth of Tragedy) is that it typically produced the very things that it needed, in the form of certain works of art. When it comes to the modern era (Nietzsche thinks) these two ideas fall apart: it is characteristic of the modern age precisely to fail to produce that which it needs. The Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen-an early collection of essays-are meditations which express untimely ideas; but they are also meditations on the subject of the untimely, on the need for untimely kinds of thinking. In that respect, the Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen are a timely (i.e., much needed) intervention in what Nietzsche sees as a modern catastrophe of culture. It is appropriate (in the second sense, above) to our time that we take an interest in that which is not of its time (in the first sense): "If you want biographies, do not desire those which bear the legend 'Herr So-and-so and His Age,' but those upon whose title-page there would stand 'A Fighter against His Age.'"6 Although the term (un)zeitgemäss is ambiguous in the manner described, for the rest of this paper I'll use it (as I think Nietzsche most often does) to mean "(not) a typical product of the time." That is, corresponding to the first of the two senses given above. In Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche gives, as an example, the zeitgemäss man who grows up in the wine country and decides to become a wineTom Stern 89 drinker.7 The point is clear enough: that's exactly what we'd expect of someone who grew up in the wine country. I want to say a little more about the notion of the Unzeitgemässe (i.e., the atypical, etc.), which also carries with it the sense of something unfashionable, unusual, out of place, unexpected. There's something distinctly uncomfortable about being ein Unzeitgemässer: The Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen have therefore been rendered the "Thoughts out of Season" or "Unfashionable Observations."8 Although much changed in Nietzsche's thought, two broad ideas seem to have remained constant with regard to the Unzeitgemässe. First, Nietzsche thinks (and this is surely right) that in general your values are the product of what we might call your "context," where that includes (among other things) your education, century, language, nationality, and inherited traits.9 However, more often than not, our values do not seem to us to be context-dependent; instead, we feel as though we have chosen them because they are right, just, or true; we even think that we haven't chosen them at all-that they have chosen us. Perhaps the most famous example from Nietzsche's work lies in On the Genealogy of Morals.10 There, he argues that Christian values claim to be universal and context-independent, but in fact they are highly contingent. The project of the Genealogy is to explain the contingent, psychological history of how these values came about.11 The Unzeitgemässe is, for Nietzsche, a pro tanto cause for admiration. Whoever you are, and in whatever respect, if you are unzeitgemäss then Nietzsche shows respect for you. But note that being unzeitgemäss in itself isn't sufficient for full, unqualified admiration. As we shall see, Nietzsche's Catiline is unzeitgemäss, but he is also a degenerate, dysfunctional wreck. Similarly, Nietzsche accords Jesus some credit for being unzeitgemäss;12 but given that he does so in a book called The Anti-Christ, we may be justified in thinking that his admiration is somewhat qualified. Second, there's often some specific conception of what is nietzsche, freedom, and writing lives90 zeitgemäss, what is typical of the age, in the pejorative sense. That is to say: although Nietzsche always thinks that there's something wrong with the modern world, and that this wrongness is passed from the context to the individual, he doesn't have a unitary conception of just what the problem actually is. Hence, although he respects ein Unzeitgemässer in general, he is often more interested in a particular kind of Unzeitgemässe, which corresponds to a particular conception of what is wrong (and zeitgemäss) in our society. This specific and problematic feature of the time changes, and sometimes directly switches throughout his work. Hence, for example, in the second of the Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen, "On the Uses and Abuses of History for Life," Nietzsche argues that what is wrong with our society is that we are much too scientific: ein Unzeitgemässer in this context will set himself free with certain kinds of artistic and philosophical activity. Conversely, in Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche wastes no time in telling us that it is characteristic of our times to ignore science in favor of art, philosophy, and religion: to be unzeitgemäss in that context is to take seriously the lessons of science and the scientific method-this is a key feature of Human, All Too Human's "free spirit." If the Unzeitgemässe is to play a part in our analysis, then it is important to identify the relevant feature of our society which Nietzsche considers zeitgemäss. In Twilight, I argue, one is zeitgemäss if one is "decadent." Hence, I now turn to Nietzsche's concept of decadence. In Twilight, Nietzsche thinks that the negative and zeitgemäss feature of mankind is to be something he calls "decadent." What is this decadence? One way to answer this might be to look at who Nietzsche thinks is decadent and then work from there. But this approach is flawed, mostly because he seems to think that everybody is decadent. Drawn from across Twilight, Nietzsche's list of decadents includes: Socrates or Greek contemporaries of Socrates;13 Christians and those with Christian values;14 Kant or Kantians;15 Schopenhauer or Schopenhauerians;16 those who Tom Stern 91 make mistakes or are unable not to react to a stimulus;17 liberals;18 socialists and anarchists;19 the German Reich;20 Herbert Spencer;21 those who are excessively rational;22 and those who are immoderate towards an enemy.23 It's more helpful to look at what seems to lie behind Nietzsche's conception of decadence. In common with much of his later work, Nietzsche's interest lies not in the beliefs of the various decadents but in their psychology. (It is no accident that the working title for Twilight was "A Psychologist's Leisure.") It turns out that decadence is a psychological configuration. Nietzsche puts this most concisely when he describes Socrates' decadent Greek contemporaries: "No one was any longer master of himself, the instincts were mutually antagonistic."24 We all have instincts: instincts to eat, drink, fight, flee, and so on. These have evolved to suit our environment. However, Nietzsche offers a kind of history of our instincts and society, according to which these instincts turn on each other and compete for control over us. This antagonism can have a weakening effect upon us: we no longer have a unitary purpose and must cope with conflicting instincts. Nietzsche's history of the instincts seems to pan out as follows: • We used to be instinctive and aggressive creatures. • Civilized and urbanized, we can no longer rely on our instincts, which turn against each other. • The result is weakness, confusion, desperation, dissatisfaction: "decadence." Obviously, there's an important difference for Nietzsche between "having instincts" and "acting instinctively"; both play a part in this story. We all have instincts or drives which make demands upon us. However, we do not all live instinctively; that is to say, our instincts do not combine to guide us in a particular way, so that we can act upon them without reflection. In a sense, Nietzsche is outlining a history of what happens to our instincts such that we can no longer act innietzsche, freedom, and writing lives92 stinctively. In our pre-civilized past, we could live and be guided by our instincts (i.e., act instinctively). Note also that Nietzsche wants to say something about what those instincts were like: to survive, we had to be aggressive-aggressive to catch prey, aggressive towards predators, aggressive towards competitors. In the modern context, we can no longer rely upon these aggressive instincts, because no society could function with such hostility allowed free rein. However, we still feel the force of these aggressive instincts: they find expression by turning on each other. Nietzsche often uses the phrase "disgregation of the instincts": the image is one of a herd, which used to move and react together, but has disintegrated into a mass of conflicting individuals. The disgregation, the lack of unity and purpose, makes us weak, because we can no longer rely on ourselves. We can no longer live instinctively. For Nietzsche, decadence is intimately connected with the "herd morality." The choice of disgregation of the instincts as a cause for the herd morality is instructive: humans in fact behave like a herd-and develop a herd morality-due to the break-up of an inner herd of instincts. Once understood in this way, some (at least) of the decadents on the long list above become more comprehensible. Take liberalism, for example. The decadent man must rely upon others, because his instincts are no longer a guide to life. This other-reliance has, for Nietzsche, a further undesirable consequence. If I rely upon you for my survival-if I cannot survive on my own-then there is a limit placed upon the extent to which I am able to feel superior to you. A natural consequence of the decadent psychology might well be a commitment to the notion that all men are equal-that all should have equal rights or that all opinions ought to be taken into consideration and are equally valid. The liberaldecadent commitment to equality goes against a fundamental belief for Nietzsche about the strong (and thus good) society. In Twilight, "Skirmishes" 37, Nietzsche summarizes his attack on the value of equality: "The chasm between Tom Stern 93 man and man, class and class . . . the will to be oneself, to stand out-that which I call 'pathos of distance'-characterizes every strong age." The great are great in virtue of the feeling of difference between them and the ordinary. To make all equal is not to raise the lowest to the level of the highest, but rather to level down. Hence: "Liberalism: in plain words, reduction to the herd animal."25 Note that this criticism of liberalism uses just the format I described above. Nietzsche doesn't discuss the internal complexities of liberal theory; instead, he concludes that needing to adhere to such a view is a sign of weakness. I have said that the Unzeitgemässe remains important for Nietzsche throughout his writing, but that his particular focus for what is zeitgemäss varies greatly. The relevant sense of zeitgemäss in Twilight corresponds to Nietzsche's conception of decadence, of the instincts that have turned on each other, and the resultant breakdown of the instinctive life. So it is significant to note that Catiline, Napoleon, and Caesar-the three figures used by Nietzsche to present freedom in Twilight-all have instincts which are unzeitgemäss in their strength. The decadent/zeitgemäss man has conflicting, confused, mutually antagonistic instincts; Catiline, Napoleon, and Caesar are exceptions to this rule: they all have unusually strong, unified, wild instincts. The "Lives" Nietzsche writes for them trace their development in the context of these strong instincts. Nietzsche tells the story of three different lives which share the same starting point (i.e., unusual strength and unity of instinct). Catiline (the typical criminal) is destroyed by his own strength; Napoleon (the "exception") uses his strength to dominate those around him; Caesar (the "free man") presents a combination of the admirable features of the other two. Catiline26 was a member of the Roman senatorial nobility who tried to seize Rome by force, and he eventually died at the hands of the senatorial army in 62 bc. Catiline and Caesar are often compared as examples of how differently hisnietzsche, freedom, and writing lives94 tory will treat you if you have the misfortune to lose rather than win. Catiline died just thirteen years before Caesar crossed the Rubicon-to succeed in taking control of Rome where Catiline failed. History, it is argued, remembers Caesar as a glorious hero; but if he'd lost he might have been remembered very differently. Catiline suffered particularly in this regard. We have two main sources: first, Cicero, whom Catiline tried to murder and whose main claim to fame was his defeat of the Catalinarian conspiracy; second, Sallust, who delights in presenting Catiline's life as a tale of how bad things happen to an Evil Man. Hence Sallust tells us immediately that Catiline was "evil": he had "a vicious and depraved nature" which was "possessed by an overpowering desire for despotic power."27 He "delighted in civil war, bloodshed, robbery, and political strife"28 and kept the company of "debauchees, adulterers and gamblers . . . cutthroats and perjurers."29 I mention the Catiline/Caesar comparison not merely out of interest, but also because (I'll go on to argue) Nietzsche is playing on this connection when he talks about Caesar. For the moment, however, consider what Nietzsche says about Catiline, who represents the "criminal type": The criminal type is the type of the strong human being under unfavorable conditions, a strong human being made sick. What he lacks is the wilderness, a certain freer and more perilous nature and form of existence in which all that is attack and defense in the instinct of the strong human being comes into its own. Catiline is a "strong human being made sick": he would be at home in the wilderness, just as all human beings (or their ancestors) in the long-distant past would have been. However, whereas most are born weakened, decadent, and fit for civilization, Catiline has the misfortune to be born ready for the "attack and defense" of pre-civilized existence. Catiline acts instinctively and aggressively, but he must confront a society which does not welcome such aggression: "It is society, our tame, mediocre, gelded society in which a huTom Stern 95 man being raised in nature . . . necessarily degenerates into a criminal. . . . He has never harvested anything from his instincts but danger, persecution, disaster"; hence "his feelings . . . turn against these instincts." Catiline meets nothing but "danger, persecution, disaster" when he trusts his own instincts (acts instinctively). Hence, of course, he begins to mistrust his instincts. In most cases, the antagonism of the instincts among regular decadents leads to weakness-a low-level but functional life devoid of any great purpose or strength. However, when someone as strong as Catiline experiences a turning inwards of the instincts, the result is much more volatile. Rejected by society, Catiline is completely destroyed. We might summarize Nietzsche's account of his life as follows: • Catiline's instincts were too strong for his time. • Therefore he was punished by society. • Therefore he began to mistrust and turn against himself. • Therefore he became "anemic" and "physiologically degenerate." Catiline's case is typical of the criminal. Stronger, aggressive, more purposeful than those around him, he is crushed by society's hostility, which he eventually internalizes. Where Catiline is "typical," Napoleon's case is the exception to the rule: "A human being raised in nature30 . . . necessarily degenerates into a criminal. Or almost necessarily: for there are cases in which such a human being proves stronger than society: the Corsican Napoleon is the most famous example."31 Nietzsche's reference to "the Corsican Napoleon" is meant, I think, to draw our attention to the very previous section, in which he claims that Napoleon's Italian heritage enables him to take control of post-revolution France. France after the revolution could never have produced a Napoleon (perhaps because it was riddled with weak notions such as Liberty and Equality, but Nietzsche isn't explicit about this); nietzsche, freedom, and writing lives96 but the Corsican Napoleon, who spoke French with an Italian accent, was "different." Napoleon simply masters France, due to his outsider's strength. His similarity with Catiline therefore ends at the first stage: • Napoleon's instincts were too strong for his time. • Unlike Catiline, he was very much stronger than those around him. • Therefore, he was able to become master in post-revolution France. Nietzsche is clearly impressed with the "genius" of Napoleon.32 However, it is not Napoleon who is named the free man (that title goes to Caesar). Why isn't Napoleon free? The answer is that he never had to face and overcome the kind of self-doubt or inner conflict associated with the experience of Catiline. This implicit criticism of Napoleon is an instance of a larger trend in the way Nietzsche attacks his targets: namely, to take the property of the target which he (i.e., the target) considers most secure and defining and then to attack him for being insufficient in precisely this regard. Hence, for example, Nietzsche accuses Wagner (who had effectively created a festival in his own honor) of not thinking big enough;33 and elsewhere he attacks secular scientists for being too religious.34 In this case, Nietzsche accuses Napoleon, victorious in some forty battles, of not seeking out conflict. Of course, the accusation is that Napoleon did not experience inner conflict. One can compare Nietzsche's Napoleon with Tolstoy's on this question of lack of inner conflict. As might be expected, Nietzsche (in general) shows much more respect for Napoleon than does Tolstoy; but both agree that he acts instinctively and without any self-doubt. Thus Tolstoy describes a meeting between Napoleon and Balashev, the Russian envoy. Balashev had met him earlier that day-a meeting during which Napoleon exploded into an embarrassing fit of petulant rage. Balashev now expects to find him ashamed and apologetic. Instead: Tom Stern 97 [Napoleon] not only showed no sign of constraint or self-reproach on account of his outburst that morning, but, on the contrary, tried to reassure Balashev. It was evident that he had long been convinced that it was impossible for him to make a mistake, and that in his perception whatever he did was right, not because it harmonized with any idea of right and wrong, but because he did it.35 This might be helpful in understanding what Nietzsche is getting at: Napoleon may have shaped the nineteenth century (though Tolstoy would, of course, disagree with that), but there's something rather unimpressive about somebody who achieves even such greatness without ever stopping to question himself. Napoleon and Catiline reflect two different features of freedom. In Catiline, we find strong inner conflict without outward mastery; his self-doubt crushes him. In Napoleon's case, we find outward mastery but a lack of inner conflict. Caesar, the free man, combines the inner conflict with the outward mastery. Another way of looking at this would be to speak in terms of a "productive tension." Nietzsche is concerned with productive tension throughout his life, beginning most famously with the tension between Apollo and Dionysus in The Birth of Tragedy. Like Heraclitus, Zarathustra speaks of productive tension in terms of a bow and arrow:36 too little tension and the arrow won't fly; too much tension and the bow will break. It seems to me that in Catiline's case the bow has snapped and in Napoleon's case it has never been strung. We shall return to this important concept of productive tension towards the end of the paper. For the moment, I turn to what Nietzsche says about Caesar, in the passage entitled "My Conception of Freedom": "One would have to seek the highest type of free man where the greatest resistance is constantly being overcome: five steps from tyranny, near the threshold of the danger of servitude. This is true psychologically when one understands by 'tyrants' pitiless and dreadful instincts, to combat which demands the maximum of authority and discipline towards oneself- finest type Julius Caesar."37 nietzsche, freedom, and writing lives98 The freest man is constantly overcoming a great resistance: he is constantly in danger of being dominated and destroyed, in this case by his inner instincts. Nietzsche connects Caesar with the Catiline/Napoleon schema when he claims that Catiline is a "phase of his development."38 Earlier, I pointed out the traditional relation between Catiline and Caesar: that Caesar represents what Catiline would have become, had he been successful.39 Nietzsche internalizes this structure within Caesar's psychological development: that is, he presents Caesar as having the same psychic configuration as Catiline-but whereas Catiline was destroyed by this inner turmoil, Caesar was able to overcome it. Hence, Nietzsche claims, Catiline is "the antecedent form of every Caesar." Being Caesar (being free) requires overcoming the Catalinarian existence. In this respect, the free Caesar does represent the combination of the better parts of Napoleon and Catiline: • Caesar's instincts were too strong for his time. • He suffered as a result of having such strong instincts. • Therefore he began to mistrust and turn against himself (all stages so far identical to Catiline). • Under normal circumstances, this would have led to physiological degeneration and decadence. • However, Caesar continued to struggle against these instincts and he remained "aloft" and free. Note that Caesar is not free-because-strongest or -noblest. Instead, Nietzsche suggests that Caesar is somehow internally unstable. It takes all his effort to maintain control of himself and he's free because he (just) manages. I have already shown why Nietzsche considers liberalism a symptom of decadence: unable to live instinctively and fend for ourselves, unable to feel stronger and superior in relation to others, we have to cling to equal rights for all. Nietzsche's conception of freedom is carefully contrasted with the liberal (decadent) conception of freedom as equal rights. Before libTom Stern 99 eral policies are put in place (Nietzsche thinks), while liberals fight for their liberal institutions, liberals are in fact free. But they are free because they are fighting for something, against other people. However, the moment they succeed in implementing their policies, they undermine freedom precisely because they make everyone equal and hence reduce all to the same level. Again, it's helpful to think in terms of productive tension. The tension between liberals and their enemies is productive; during this struggle, they are in fact free in the Nietzschean sense. But once in power, they undermine productive tension between individuals by claiming that everyone is equal; hence they lose the freedom they had while fighting. Nietzsche wants to emphasize that freedom is not, for him, something a government or ruler can give to his subjects. It is a feeling one has when one is struggling and fighting for something. With this in mind, I turn to one of the most enigmatic characters in Nietzsche's writing. While Caesar, Napoleon, and Catiline feature relatively little in Twilight, their lives (and their relationship to Nietzschean freedom) help us shed light on the most important "Life" of Twilight: Socrates. Socrates had already played a key role in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche's earliest book, and in Twilight, the last book Nietzsche saw through to publication, he is given his own chapter. A clear understanding of Nietzsche on freedom in Twilight enables us to take a fresh look at Nietzsche's claims about Socrates in that book. I have already named Socrates among Nietzsche's long list of decadents. This identifies him as one whose instincts are in conflict, one who can no longer live instinctively. In fact, Nietzsche had already, in The Birth of Tragedy,40 linked Socrates to the decline of the instinctive life in Athens. Aeschylus and Sophocles were instinctive artists; but it is very important to Nietzsche (in The Birth of Tragedy) that Socrates dislikes precisely that which is done "only by instinct": "'only by instinct': the phrase goes to the heart and nietzsche, freedom, and writing lives100 center of the Socratic tendency. With these words Socrates condemns existing art and existing ethics in equal measure."41 For Socrates (in The Birth of Tragedy), everything must be rationalized, nothing instinctive. Initially, Twilight looks the same. Socrates the decadent, his instincts in conflict, unable to live instinctively, struggles among the noble, instinctive Athenians. Nietzsche describes a weak, poor, bitter, ugly Socrates in a society which values strength, wealth, and beauty. In a pure and noble society, Socrates entertains "every foul vice and lust." Deprived of the usual means of achieving power or greatness, he adopts the dialectic method. This is a sign of weakness among the Athenians, who used to warn their children against it.42 The dialectic method also allows Socrates to engage with the beautiful Athenian youths: "Sokrates war auch ein grosser Erotiker."43 In an essay on the epigram,44 Lessing argues that modern epigrams internalize the role of the ancient epigram-the latter being found on statues and monuments. In the ancient world, the passer-by saw a monument and asked himself what the monument represented or commemorated; the epigram existed to satisfy his curiosity. The modern epigram, says Lessing, miniaturizes this structure. The writing itself (acting as the monument) must arouse the curiosity of the reader; then (performing the function of the ancient inscription) it must satisfy this curiosity. For Lessing, then, a modern epigram should have a kind of natural break: before the break the text arouses curiosity, and after the break the curiosity is satisfied. The Nietzschean aphorism-prose, unlike Lessing's poetic epigram-retains something of this two-part structure. Typically, the second part not only explains the first part, but also casts it in a new light. The break becomes a kind of twist or sting in the tail. Consider this aphorism from the earlier Human, All Too Human: "Das Leben des Feindes-Wer davon lebt, einen Feind zu bekämpfen, hat ein Interesse daran, dass er am Leben bleibt." (The life of the enemy-Whoever lives to fight an enemy has an interest in keeping the enemy alive.)45 Tom Stern 101 The second part of this aphorism ("has an interest . . .") not only provides more information; it also forces us to reconsider the first part. Whoever lives to fight an enemy had better make sure the enemy isn't destroyed, or else he would lose his reason for living. Bearing that in mind, we come to see "whoever lives to fight his enemy" in a completely new light: namely that he isn't trying to destroy his enemy, but rather keep him alive so that life retains its significance. This thought is given further attention in Twilight, when Nietzsche explores the notion of being "fruitful in opposition."46 Although Twilight is not written in the strictly aphoristic style that Nietzsche had previously employed,47 it retains certain aphoristic features. Notably, Nietzsche is extremely fond of this twist or break in the text, which forces the reader to look back on the previous passage in a completely revised light. This is one of the reasons why Nietzsche quotations, taken out of context, are liable to give the wrong impression-and why quotations from unpublished notes are even more liable to mislead. Taking the Socrates chapter as a whole, we find two such turns. Nietzsche is clear that Socrates is a decadent. He is unable to rely upon himself and we are told explicitly of the conflicting forces within him. Yet Nietzsche doesn't leave things there. At Twilight "Socrates" 9, we find the first turn. Socrates looks around him and realizes that "his case, his oddity of a case, was already unexceptional . . . old Athens was coming to an end." The picture until Twilight "Socrates" 9 presents a Socrates in inner conflict, where the other Athenians are strong and unified. Yet at Twilight "Socrates" 9, we realize that Socrates was typical: everyone else was decadent too. Socrates appears exceptional only in that he appears to present a "cure" for decadence: namely, fanatical devotion to reason and radical rejection of the passions (i.e., the subjects of the following two chapters of Twilight). If the first "turn" reveals to us that Socrates is unexceptional, the second "turn" makes us think that perhaps he is exceptional after all, but for different reasons. Nietzsche renietzsche, freedom, and writing lives102 minds us in Twilight "Socrates" 12 that Socrates "chose to die": he could have escaped his death sentence, but he opted out of life. Nietzsche interprets this death wish as a decision by Socrates to escape his decadence. Having persuaded Athens to follow the "Socratic methods" of reason, Socrates himself realizes that this won't work: "Rationality at all costs . . . this itself was just an illness, a different illness. . . . Did [Socrates] himself understand this, that cleverest of all self-out-witters? Did he ultimately tell himself this, in the wisdom of his courage unto death? . . . Socrates wanted to die."48 Socrates understood what the so-called "Socratics" failed to understand: that dying was the only way he could escape decadence.49 How does this relate to the question of freedom in Twilight? Nietzsche, I would argue, intends for us to make a connection between Socrates and Caesar. Consider what Nietzsche says about the psychology of the Socratic Greeks: "Everywhere the instincts were in anarchy; everywhere people were but five steps from excess: the monstrum in animo was the universal danger. 'The instincts want to play the tyrant; we must devise a counter-tyrant who is stronger.'"50 Caesar, we are later told, is free because he is "five steps from tyranny"51 and he struggles successfully to avoid being tyrannized by his inner instincts. Yet this is also the position of the Greeks who take on the Socratic methods. They too are "five steps from excess," which turns out to be the excess of the tyrant-instincts. Nietzsche's language here ("five steps . . .") suggests that he intends us to make this connection. Socrates and the Socratics find themselves threatened with inner tyrant-instincts. Caesar is unusual both in the strength of the inner tyrants and in his ability to overcome them. Yet notice what Socrates claims when he is accused of being plagued by the most terrible inner vices and lusts: "'That is true,' he said, 'but I have become master of all of them.'"52 Socrates is claiming precisely Caesar's freedom. He is claiming that although he has the utmost inner conflict to contend with, he has been able to overcome it. Tom Stern 103 Of course, the methods we see Socrates employ in his lifetime (fanatical devotion to reason and radical opposition to the passions) are a failure; much of Twilight is devoted to explaining how and why they are harmful. But by eventually choosing death, Socrates does in a very limited sense achieve Nietzschean freedom-or, at least, he faces up to its challenge. As he dies, Nietzsche's Socrates acknowledges that "Socrates is no physician": he can't cure the people of their decadence.53 In Twilight "Skirmishes" 36, Nietzsche offers a "morality for physicians." In certain circumstances, he argues, when nothing is left for them, certain people ought to choose death "accomplished at the right time, brightly and joyfully, among children and witnesses." Socrates didn't exactly die among children-he died among other philosophers; but he surely gives us the most famous example of a conscious, bright, joyful decision to die. For someone without other options, Nietzsche claims, such a death is "the most admirable thing there is: it almost earns you the right to live." It would be a "death chosen freely." In the Socrates chapter, Nietzsche asks the question, "Was Socrates a typical criminal?" but he is careful not to answer it. Only later do we understand the implications of this question. As we have seen, the "typical criminal" is much later defined via Catiline: unusually strong, he is broken by a society which cannot support this strength. If Nietzsche is employing that term with the sense he would later give it (an assumption, certainly, but not an unreasonable one), then this question raises the possibility that Socrates was a strong figure made sick by his decadent, weak contemporaries-precisely the opposite, then, of the Socrates of The Birth of Tragedy. Just like Caesar, Socrates confronts the resultant sickness; but he can only succeed by choosing to end his own life. In suicide, he achieves a certain kind of freedom, and "almost earns the right to live." In spite of what he says, Socrates is a physician, but he is a physician who "heals" only himself. Those around him fail to understand the meaning of his death; they cling to the methods which he himself discarded. nietzsche, freedom, and writing lives104 If Socrates achieves his (limited) freedom by choosing to die, we may well wonder what Caesar does to stay free: what are his methods for remaining aloft with respect to his terrifying inner conflicts? In fact, Nietzsche does say something about how Caesar copes with such troubles. The list consists of going on "long marches," the "simplest form of living," "uninterrupted sojourn in the open air," and "continuous toil."54 I trust I am not alone in finding this something of an anticlimax. Surely there must be more to Nietzschean freedom than joining the Boy Scout movement? I suggested at the beginning that deriving a take-home message from Nietzsche's texts often seems to do them a severe disservice. It's not clear what the "message" should be and it's even less clear whether we can really take it to heart. Nietzsche's list of Caesar's methods to combat his inner tyrants is taken from Plutarch's Life of Caesar. In fact, Plutarch is an instructive place for us to begin this discussion. Plutarch is clear that he writes the Lives to offer psychological insights into his subjects. He selects those sayings and anecdotes which offer "signs of a man's soul." Yet Plutarch has a further aim in mind: he wants his reader to become more moral. The virtue of his subjects, he claims, "by the bare statement of its actions, can so affect men's minds as to create at once both admiration of things done and desire to imitate the doers of them."55 Plutarch's Lives are often taken to have a morally beneficial effect upon the reader. Hence: "Plutarch taught me high thoughts; he elevated me above the wretched sphere of my own reflections to admire and love the heroes of past ages." So, at least, says Dr Frankenstein's creature.56 The case with Nietzsche is much more confusing. Does he, like Plutarch, intend that we come away with an idea of how to act or, if not to act, then how in general to live? On a careful reading of Twilight, this question doesn't yield a yes or no answer. There is a conflict embodied in the text: on the one hand, Nietzsche is careful not to offer a freedom we can realistically aim for; on the other hand, he doesn't present a Tom Stern 105 value-neutral account of freedom and decadence. I'll say a little more about each of the horns of this dilemma. On the one hand, then, it's not clear how we could realize Nietzschean freedom. The three "free" people discussed in this essay remain somewhat elusive as objects of aspiration. Yes, the liberals are in a sense "free," but only when they aren't in power (when they are in power, they undermine freedom). Socrates achieves a limited freedom-but only by ending his own life. The best option looks to be Caesar, the "highest type" of free man. Obviously, it wouldn't be appropriate to copy Caesar. We don't have Caesar's inner psyche; nor do we face the same challenges, environment, background, and so on. More specifically, we can't even aim for the general structure of Caesar's freedom. It's not enough to seek out conflict, as is clear from the Napoleon case. If we tried to turn Caesar's case into a general formula, it would go something like this: "Be born stronger than those around you; then make sure that your strengths lead you into trouble, so that you begin to doubt and mistrust them; see that the resultant inner turmoil nearly destroys you, such that you constantly overcome it (but only just)." I don't have to spell out the absurdity of trying to act on such a principle. On the other hand, we can't read Nietzsche as a neutral describer of states of affairs. I doubt any reader of Twilight, or any other Nietzsche text, could conclude that Nietzsche doesn't wish to influence us with his writing. That, presumably, is why he chooses to speak in terms of "decadence" and "freedom"; after all, these are not value-neutral terms, and he could easily have chosen others. Twilight, and its exploration of decadence, amounts to a description of what is wrong with the world. I don't say we have to choose between these two options: we don't have to say that Nietzsche definitely does or doesn't want us to act in response to his analysis. But I do present this as a problem for Nietzsche and one of which he demonstrates a certain awareness. I have said that Caesar represents a kind of productive tension: not too little (Napoleon) and not too much (Catinietzsche, freedom, and writing lives106 line). Nietzsche contrasts productive tension with "'peace of soul,' the Christian desideratum." "Peace of soul" represents the aim of having no tension at all, which Nietzsche ridicules. "Peace of soul," he tells us, is more often than not "something else which is just unable to give itself a more modest name," for example, "laziness persuaded by vanity to dress itself up in moral garb." Note that this is an example of the typical Nietzschean argument I discussed at the start. What kind of person could possibly want "peace of soul"? The answer (for example): a lazy person who wants to pretend that he's doing something moral. The section ends: "Twilight of the Idols: who knows? Perhaps just another kind of 'peace of soul.'"57 Admittedly, this passage is far from lucid. But it is explicable in the context of my claims about Twilight. We might expect Nietzsche's freedom to furnish us with some kind of goal or aim, but Twilight offers us nothing of the sort. Why did Nietzsche write it, then? Here, I think, Nietzsche seems to acknowledge that Twilight is itself unproductive, just a kind of "peace of soul." Hence, not only does Twilight give us no specific moral instruction-it doesn't even leave us confident that such a thing is possible; and yet it reminds us again and again of the lamentable, decadent state of modern life. Freedom in Twilight isn't something you can aim for, and this must call into question Nietzsche's reasons for writing it. I don't necessarily see that he has a solution to this problem: "But in the end," he laments in the final section of the Streifzüge, "who knows if I even want to be read today?"58 notes I'm very grateful to the following for their insightful comments on versions of this paper: James Conant, Raymond Geuss, Stephen Mulhall, Robert Pippin, and David Wellbery-and to audiences in Chicago, London, Oxford, and Southampton. 1. Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-Christ, R. J. Hollingdale, trans. (London 1968). Tom Stern 107 2. I suspect that other attempts to explain Nietzschean freedom may have suffered in this regard-and the specificity of this project may mean that I am unable to engage with them fruitfully. 3. The Anti-Christ, §51 in Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-Christ (note 1). 4. The Anti-Christ, §41–47. 5. T. W. Adorno, Minima Moralia (Berlin 1951), §33. 6. "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life," §6. This is the second of the Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen (Untimely Meditations, R. J. Hollingdale, trans. [Cambridge 1983]). 7. Human, All Too Human, R. J. Hollingdale, trans. (Cambridge 1996), vol. 1, §226. Nietszche doesn't use the word zeitgemäss here; my point is that this is typical of his concerns. 8. Or Unmodern Observations, William Arrowsmith, gen. ed. (New Haven and London 1990). Arrowsmith also discusses the meaning of (un)zeitgemässigkeit in his forward. 9. It should be obvious, then, that I'm not taking the Zeit (i.e., "Time") in zeitgemäss too literally. In one year, there may be different, say, intellectual trends in different continents, countries, communities. These may be a question of different places, not times. My use of the word "context" is meant to make this clear. 10. On the Genealogy of Morals in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, W. Kaufmann, trans. (New York 2000). 11. As I understand it, the tension between context and the individual forms the heart of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. For a full discussion, see my "Nietzsche on Context and the Individual," Nietzscheforschung 15 (2008). 12. The Anti-Christ, §32. 13. Twilight, "Socrates." 14. E.g., Twilight, "Skirmishes" 34–36. 15. Twilight, "Reason" 6. 16. Twilight, "Skirmishes" 36. 17. Twilight, "World" 2. 18. Twilight, "Skirmishes" 37. 19. Twilight, "Skirmishes" 34–37. 20. Twilight, "Skirmishes" 34–37. 21. Twilight, "Skirmishes" 34–37. 22. Twilight, "Skirmishes" 34–37. 23. Twilight, "World" 2. 24. Twilight, "Socrates" 9. 25. Twilight, "Skirmishes" 38. Again, humans in fact behave like a herd-and develop a herd morality-due to the break-up of an inner "herd" of instincts. 26. All quotations about Catiline are taken from Twilight, "Skirmishes" 45. nietzsche, freedom, and writing lives108 27. Sallust, The Jugurthine War and The Conspiracy of Catiline, S. A. Handford, trans. (London 1963), 177–78. 28. Sallust (note 27), 178. 29. Sallust (note 27), 184 30. Ein naturwüchsiger Mensch implies something more than merely "a human being raised in nature"; it suggests a man grown vigorously and without excessive cultivation. This, of course, is part of Nietzsche's point about Napoleon. 31. Twilight, "Skirmishes" 45. 32. Napoleon is the star of Mein Begriff vom Genie, where Caesar is the star of Mein Begriff von Freiheit. 33. The Case of Wagner, §7 in The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of Wagner, W. Kaufmann, trans. (New York 1967). I'm grateful to David Wellbery for first pointing this out to me. 34. Notably in the third essay of On the Genealogy of Morals. 35. Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace, L. and A. Maude, trans. (Ware, Herts. 1993), book 9, chapter 7. 36. Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, R. J. Hollingdale, trans. (London 1961), prologue, §5. Compare "The cosmos works by harmony of tensions, like the lyre and bow" in Heraclitus: Fragments, B. Haxton, trans. (London 2001), fragment 56, page 37. 37. Twilight, "Skirmishes" 38. 38. Twilight, "Skirmishes" 45. 39. Not to mention the hints in Sallust and Plutarch that Caesar himself may have been implicated in Catiline's plot. 40. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, R. Speirs, trans. (Cambridge 1999). 41. The Birth of Tragedy (note 40), §13. 42. Twilight, "Socrates" 5. 43. Friedrich Nietzsche, Sämtliche Werke, G. Colli and M. Montinari, eds. (Berlin 1967– ), 6.71. 44. Reprinted and translated as "Essay on Epigram" in Lessing, Fables and Epigrams (London 1825). 45. Menschliches, Allzumenschliches 1.531, Kritische Studienausgabe vol. 4.2, G. Colli and M. Montinari, eds. (Berlin 1988). My translation. 46. See Twilight, "Morality as Anti-nature." 47. E.g., in Human, All Too Human and Daybreak. 48. Twilight, "Socrates" 11–12. 49. A similar point is suggested in W. Dannhauser, Nietzsche's View of Socrates (Ithaca, ny 1976), 221–22. 50. Twilight, "Socrates" 9. 51. Twilight, "Skirmishes" 38. 52. Twilight, "Socrates" 9. Tom Stern 109 53. Twilight, "Socrates" 12. 54. Twilight, "Skirmishes" 31. It may be relevant to note that Nietzsche himself was a man of notoriously ill health, and that he would combat this ill health with long walks and simple living. 55. "Pericles," Plutarch's Lives, vol. I, J. Dryden, trans. (New York 2001), 1.3. This and other relevant passages are discussed in A. J. Gossage, "Plutarch," in Latin Biography, T. A. Dorey, ed. (London 1967). 56. Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, chapter 15. 57. Twilight, "Morality" 3. 58. Twilight, "Skirmishes" 51. nietzsche, freedom, and writing lives

The Construction of Empirical Concepts and the Establishment of the Real Possibility of Empirical Lawlikeness in Kant's Philosophy of Science © 1987 Jennifer McRobert Table of Contents Abstract 3 Introduction 4 Chapter I: 6 (i) Introduction (ii) Transcendental Lawlikeness (iii) Reason and Empirical Lawlikeness Chapter II 21 (i) Introduction (ii) The Schematism of Pure Concepts of the Understanding (ii)b The Temporal Dimension of Schematization (iii) The Schematism of Pure Sensuous Concepts of the Imagination and Empirical Schematism (iv) Butts' Interpretation: The Schematism as a Semantical Rule Chapter III 40 (i) Introduction (ii) General Aspects of Constructing the Concept of Matter (iii) The General Framework of MFNS (iv) The Construction of the Concept of Matter in MFNS (iv)a The 'Two Grand Hypothesis' (iv)b The Non-Constructibility of Fundamental Forces (v) Butts on the Construction of the Concept of Matter in MFNS (vi) The Establishment of Metaphysical Lawlikeness in MFNS Footnotes 64 Bibliography 66 Abstract In Chapter I, I discuss Buchdahl's view that the possibility of empirical lawlikeness could not have been established in the Principles of the Critique given the differences between transcendental, metaphysical and empirical lawlikeness, and the connection between the faculty of Reason and empirical lawlikeness. I then discuss the general conditions for empirical hypotheses according to Kant, which include the justification of the method by which an empirical hypothesis is obtained and the establishment of the general and specific constructability of the empirical concept. In Chapter II, I discuss the nature of the general construction of concepts which is treated in the Schematism of the Critique, surveying the views of Pippin, Allison, Bennett and Butts in an effort both to make sense of a difficult part of the Critique and to demonstrate that the Schematism is indeed where Kant demonstrates how the construction of empirical concepts in general is possible. In Chapter III, I discuss Brittan's and Butts' views on the nature of the specific construction of empirical concepts, defending Butts' interpretation as compatible with Buchdahl's view that gaps exist between kinds of lawlikeness for Kant and, because of its connection with an interpretation of how metaphysical lawlikeness figures in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, insofar as it helps us to establish the possibility of empirical lawlikeness and natural science. Introductory Remarks This thesis concerns the constructability of empirical concepts insofar as it is a condition for the possibility of empirical concepts and lawlikeness, and natural science in general, in Kant's philosophy of science. The observed regularities in the natural world that we tend to think of as evidence of the conformity of objects to laws, or, more specifically, as evidence of empirical lawlikeness, was not established in the Critique of Pure Reason, although the demonstration of the possibility of empirical lawlikeness is begun there with the establishment of another kind of lawlikeness; transcendental lawlikeness. In Chapter I of this thesis we discuss Buchdahl's argument to this effect, after which we explore his claim that an independent foundation was required in order to bridge the gap between transcendental and empirical lawlikeness. In Chapter I, we also discuss the role of the faculty of Reason in determining the possibility of empirical lalwlikeness. As a faculty which seeks to unify experience, Reason is shown not only to urge us to embody particular laws within a coherent network expressive of a scientific theory of reality, but in the third Chapter it is also shown to be the element which encourages us to create idealized mathematical constructions of empirical concepts. In Chapter II, we begin the investigation into the nature of the construction of empirical concepts. Chapter II concerns the establishment of the possibility of the construction of concepts in general. Here we will see that there are three types of concepts that are possible to construct; transcendental, sensuous and empirical concepts. Given the possibility of constructing empirical concepts generally-that is, given that they can be shown to be subject to the general conditions of space and time, we then move on to Chapter 3, where we continue to investigate the constructibility of empirical concepts, although at a much more detailed level. In Chapter III we compare two views on the construction of empirical concepts. We consider Brittan's view that Kant was concerned to show that matter could be thought of as possessing certain ontological features, but that Kant's usage of two different methodological approaches to demonstrate the ontological features of matter led to certain difficulties in the demonstration of the possibility of the concept of matter. For, in order to demonstrate the real possibility of matter, Kant had to rely on a dynamical methodology, but this methodology was unable to provide the essential requirements of concept construction. Paradoxically, the mechanical approach, which can provide the latter, cannot provide us with the empirical determinations of the concept of matter which enable us to determine that the concept is a `really possible' one. Butts' view, which is the other view that is considered in this Chapter, resolves this tension in that Butts argues that Kant's concerns are those of establishing the epistemological conditions for the possibility of the concept of matter. On Butts' view, we do not regard Kant as being particularly troubled by the two different methodological approaches, but merely as demonstrating the conditions that we are subject to in attempting to establish the possibility of empirical knowledge. Thus we can resolve Brittan's paradox if we view Kant as simply concerned with the demonstration of the epistemological conditions of empirical knowledge and as perhaps ultimately holding to a kind of transcendental idealism wherein the reality of empirical science must be viewed in terms of the internal conditions for knowledge. Finally, in Chapter III, we also return to Buchdahl's notion that an independent foundation is required to establish the possibility of empirical lawlikeness and compare this to Butts' view of the nature of the construction of the concept of matter. I argue that the independent foundation that Kant provides is actually that of metaphysical lawlikeness, which can be thought of as that kind of lawlikeness which legitimates the transition from our empirical determinations of the concept of matter to the idealized mathematical construction of the concept of matter required if natural science is to be possible. If this argument is acceptable, then the establishment of metaphysical lawlikeness is related to the construction of the concept of matter in MFNS, just as the establishment of transcendental lawlikeness is related to the general construction of the concept of matter in the Critique of Pure Reason. In this paper then, the possibility of both the general and specific level of constructing empirical concepts, and the establishment of transcendental and metaphysical lawlikeness have all been linked to the possibility of empirical lawlikeness and natural science, the latter of which Kant tries to establish in MFNS. Chapter I (i) Introduction In 'The Conception of Lawlikeness in Kant's Philosophy of Science', Gerd Buchdahl offers a perspective on what Kant intended to accomplish in parts of The Critique of Pure Reason (Critique) and in The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (MFNS) via an account of how the conception of lawlikeness figures in the Critique and MFNS.1 'Lawlikeness' simply refers to a conformity to law, a law being what is predicated of an invariant, observed regularity. According to Buchdahl, Kant actually referred to three separate conceptions of lawlikeness: transcendental lawlikeness, metaphysical lawlikeness and empirical lawlikeness. Empirical lawlikeness, which is of primary concern in this paper, is that kind of lawlikeness which appears to be directly in nature itself. Thus, when I see that the moon traverses the hemisphere daily, and see that the moons of other planets revolve around their own planets, I may hypothesize that our moon revolves around earth in the same way that distant moons revolve around their own planets. There is then, a lawlike connection between planets and moons since all moons revolve around planets. The observation of such lawlike regularities is the basis for science and knowledge in general, and Kant's investigation into the conditions which determine our knowledge of the natural world involves an investigation into the possibility of establishing empirical lawlikeness. As we shall see, the establishment of this latter possibility is closely connected to the establishment of transcendental and metaphysical lawlikeness. Transcendental lawlikenss refers to a kind of lawlikeness wherein the necessary perception of certain features of the physical world as objectively connected is explained by the fact that our experience is conditioned by a rule. This rule or 'category', is a 'transcendental' condition of experience; that is, although we cannot have empirical knowledge of the rule itself, we do know that the rule is a necessary condition for our experience to be as it is, and thus have transcendental knowledge that the rule applies. Metaphysical lawlikeness is only briefly explored in the present article by Buchdahl, who suggests that is tied to the 'metaphysical construction' of empirical concepts. The importance of this notion rests in its role in establishing the real possibility of empirical science. For this construction of empirical concepts is the source of the necessitarian character of metaphysical laws and of their scientific character. Buchdahl thinks that we should not expect to find that metaphysical lawlikeness of MFNS flows directly from the results of the Principles; for despite the fact that there is a conformity to the Principles in MFNS, this accordance is 'sought out' in undertaking the 'special metaphysics' of natural science as a guide and is not itself the justification of metaphysical lawlikeness. We will begin our discussion of the possibility of empirical lawlikeness for Kant by distinguishing it from transcendental lawlikeness. Some commentators on Kant have argued that Kant tried to establish empirical lawlikeness in the Second Analogy of the Critique. Buchdahl shows why this is not the case, and I will expain his view, which is, I think, a view that makes a great deal of sense of how the Second Analogy fits into Kant's metaphysics and philosophy of science. (ii) Transcendental Lawlikeness Buchdahl [1972] writes that in the Analytic of the Critique Kant attempts to show that because we experience nature as having certain 'objective' features we must invoke the categories as an explanation of this: ... the Analytic purports to establish no more than the experimental notion of an objective 'nature' in general, regarded as a series of singular contingent happenings and things, a notion of which according to Kant essentially involves certain categorial concepts, some of which - especially the categories of relation, including those of causality and interaction (mutual causation) - have a lawlike character [Buchdahl, 1972, p. 149]. The 'objectivity' in our experience of nature in general requires of us that we think of certain categories as lawlike. It is this sense of lawlikeness in which the category of causality is viewed as a transcendental condition of experience that Buchdahl refers to as transcendental lawlikeness. Buchdahl argues that certain philosophers, notably Strawson, have misconstrued Kant's arguments regarding causal lawlikeness in the Critique because they confuse empirical lawlikenss with transcendental lawlikeness. Buchdahl writes: Peter Strawson has accused Kant of engaging in an impermissible slide from causality as a transcendental condition ('transcendental lawlikeness') to causality as a principle justifying causal inferences ('empirical lawlikeness') [Buchdahl, 1972, p. 152]. This accusation by Strawson is prompted by Kant's proof in the Second Analogy of the Critique where Kant argues that we are forced to experience our representations of the succession of events in Time as causally ordered. Here Kant is notoriously ambiguous: If we try to discover what sort of new property the relation to an object gives to our subjective representations, and what new importance they thereby receive, we shall find that this relation has no other effect than that of rendering necessary the connection of our representations in a certain manner, and of subjecting them to a rule; and that conversely, it is only because a certain order is necessary in the relations of time of our representations, that objective significance is ascribed to them [Critique, M, A 197/B 242]. If we condense one of Kant's claims here we end up with this: when in experience we attribute a relation to an object, we never do so without a rule (category) requiring it of us. However, Kant also appears to argue in parts of the Second Analogy that we must think in certain successions of events as casually ordered, and that in such a case this relation is a necessary one. (See Critique of Judgement, A 192/B 237].) The ambiguity is that of whether the necessity of the relation is due to the objects themselves or due to the subject. In The Bounds of Sense Strawson seems to think that it is due to the former in this case: It is conceptually necessary, given that what is observed is in fact a change from A to B, and that there is no such difference in the causal conditions of the perception of these two states as to introduce a differential time-lag into the perception of A, that the observer's perceptions should have the order: perception of A, perception of B - and not the reverse order. But the necessity invoked in the conclusion of the argument is not a conceptual necessity at all; it is the causal necessity of the change occurring, given some antecedent state of affairs. It is a very curious contortion indeed whereby a conceptual necessity based on the fact of change is equated with the causal necessity of that very change [Strawson, 1966, p. 138]. It is thus that Strawson reasons that Kant invalidly establishes the claim that there are certain objectively necessary causal connections between objects in the physical world. Buchdahl disagrees with Strawson, arguing that Kant only intended to prove the possibility of a necessary order which is due to the subject [Buchdahl, 1972, pp. 153–154]. This latter interpretation seems to be in keeping with what Kant says at A 196/B 241, where Kant also distinguishes his endeavour from Hume's (see Kant's reference to 'the notions which people have hitherto entertained') regarding causality:2 No doubt it appears as if this were in thorough contradiction to all the notions which people have hitherto entertained in regard to the procedure of the human understanding. According to these opinions, it is by means of the perception and comparison of similar consequences following upon certain antecedent phenomena, and it is only by this process that we attain to the conception of cause. Upon such a basis, it is clear that this conception must be merely empirical, and the rule which it furnishes us with - 'Everything that happens must have a cause' - would be just as contingent as experience itself. The universality and necessity of the rule of law would be perfectly spurious attributes of it. Indeed, it could not possess universal validity, inasmuch as it would not in this case be a priori, but founded on induction. But the same is the case with this law as with other pure a priori representations (e.g. space and time), which we can draw in perfect clearness and completeness from experience, only because we had already placed them therein, and by that means, and by that alone, had rendered experience possible. [my emphasis] Indeed, the logical clearness of this representation of a rule, determining the series of events, is possible only when we have made use thereof in experience. Nevertheless, the recognition of this rule, as a condition of the synthetical unity of phenomena in time, was the ground of experience itself, and consequently preceded it a priori [Critique, M, A 196/B 241]. If we take this summary of Kant's to be a statement of the type of lawlikeness and necessity that he is truly attempting to establish, then Buchdahl's reading of Kant as merely trying to establish transcendental lawlikeness in the Second Analogy seems to be accurate. For on Buchdahl's view, the order of events which embodies a certain objectivity forces us to invoke the categories, which must be thereby thought of as lawlike. So for Buchdahl, empirical lawlikeness is not at issue in the Second Analogy. He argtues further that Kant would never have thought it to be at issue there, for Kant required that an 'independent foundation' link transcendental and empirical lawlikeness, and this foundation was not provided in the Second Analogy. Buchdahl writes: I have already alluded to Kant's oft-repeated reminder that the categories do not yield empirical laws without recourse to experience. What I am maintaining is that according to his less frequently noted view, they do not even yield lawlikeness, which requires an independent foundation to be shunted between the transcendental principle and the actual empirical law [Buchdahl, 1970, p. 157]. Having made the claim that Kant required an additional foundation in order to establish empirical lawlikeness, and that the latter must therefore be quite distinct from transcendental lawlikeness, Buchdahl proceeds to give four 'indications' which support this reading of Kant. These indicators are important because they reveal that the faculties of Reason and of the Understanding are involved in our knowledge in quite different ways. The faculty of the Understanding is shown to be a faculty which establishes possibility with regard to our experience of objects, while the faculty of Reason originates, legislates and regulates (systematizes) thought about our experience of objects. The four indicators are: 1. The distinction between causality as a regulative principle of the understanding, and as a regulative principle of Reason, with Reason invoked as a spontaneous source commanding the search for causes. 2. The second indicator has to do with a distinction similar to the first, with the added suggestion of some kind of 'analogy' existing between the two. 3. The third indicator concerns systemicity of scientific theory as a source of the lawlikeness of empirical laws. Here, Kant is quite explicit that we require the regulative and systematic activity of reason for an independent foundation of empirical lawlikeness in general. 4. The last indicator concerns the contention sometimes expressed quite explicity that the concept of causality, whilst 'founded' or legitimized in the transcendental argument, is, at the level of empirical lawlikeness, only applied. In other words, at this level causality provides us with conceptual form, not transcendental foundation [Buchdahl, 1972, p. 154]. All the above indicators develop the argument that an indpendent foundation is required to establish empirical lawlikeness by drawing a distinction between the respective roles of the faculty of the Understanding and the faculty of Reason as they relate to transcendental and empirical lawlikeness. I will try to emphasize this in my explanation of what these four indicators are. (iii) Reason and Empirical Lawlikeness In discussing his first indicator Buchdahl writes that Kant distinguishes between causality as a regulative principle of Reason and as a principle of the Understanding. As a principle of the Understanding, causality is a 'transcendental condition' of experience; that is, our experience of nature in general as having certain objective features is thought of as possible only in virtue of certain lawlike categories. By contrast, causality as a regulative principle of Reason does not ascribe causality as a condition of experience but rather prescribes casuality; that is, it forces us to seek out causality. Kant writes: In relation to the present problem (regarding the totality of the dependence of phenomenal existences), therefore, the regulative principle of reason is that everything in the sensuous world possesses an empirically conditioned existence - that no property of the sensuous world posses unconditioned necessity - that we are bound to expect, and, insofar as is possible, seek for the empirical condition of every member in the series of conditions - and that there is no sufficient reason to justify us in deducing any existence from a condition which lies out of and beyond the empirical series, or in regarding any existence as independent and self-subsistent [Critique, M, A 561/ B 589]. Kant's two general points from this quote are that 1. Reason seeks to find causality everywhere and 2. Reason's hypotheses regarding causality must be limited by the possibility of the object. Regarding the latter, I will only say here that it will later become an important ingredient of this chapter. The former point, that Reason seeks to find causality everywhere, is further subject to a law of Reason which requires that we seek to find an underlying unity to the causality that we are driven to find everywhere. Kant writes: For the law of reason which requires us to seek for this unity is a necessary law, inasmuch as without it we should not possess a faculty of reason, nor without reason a consistent and self-accordant mode of employing the understanding, nor, in the absence of this, any proper and sufficient criterion of empirical truth. In relation to this criterion, therefore, we must suppose the idea of the systematic unity of nature to possess objective validity and necessity [Critique, M, A 651/ B679]. Because of this unificatory procedure, Reason is also regarded as providing us with a basis for determining empirical truth. The criterion is systemicity itself, and it provides a reason for choosing one theory from amongst all candidate theories. Reason and the Understanding then have quite distinct roles with regard to causality. For while Reason merely requires that we seek out causality, the Understanding must assume that causality pervades nature, for only if such a unity is assumed to exist can experience of nature be possible. Yet, as Buchdahl goes on to argue, the two levels of Reason and the Understanding are also linked with respect to causality. For the Understanding in a sense mimics Reason in that it tries to see causality everywhere as a feature of nature. But this similarity is motivated differently in the two faculties. For Reason seeks to find causality everywhere because of its natural drive, whereas the Understanding only seeks it as a transcendental condition of experience in general. And so Reason, as the faculty which seeks out causality in its natural drive, seeks to unify causal connections, and gives a criterion for empirical truth, must be the justification for our seeking out empirical lawlikeness in nature. The Understanding, on the other hand merely fulfills other quite different needs regarding the possibility of experience. This is Buchdahl's first indicator that empirical lawlikeness, and it is based on an investigation into the very special role of Reason in justifying empirical lawlikeness as a faculty for drawing inferences. Buchdahl summarizes his position in his 1982 article entitled 'Reduction-Realization: a Key to the Structure of Kant's Thought': Take causality; As a category of the understanding, this 'determines' the sequence of perceptions, to yield an objective sequence in time; as a concept employed by (theoretical) reason, it yields an inference from ground to consequence, i.e., from instances of objective sequence to the existence of a causal uniformity or law. Hence Kant defines the understanding also as a capacity that involves concepts and principles, and reason as a capacity for drawing inferences [Buchdahl, 1982, p. 89]. Buchdahl's second indicator that there is no smooth connection between transcendental and empirical lawlikeness involves a description of the analogy between the levels of the Understanding and Reason. For the Understanding and Reason are both faculties which unify, but - and a big 'but' - the Understanding unifies appearances via rules, while Reason unifies rules of Understanding via principles which are creative of synthetic knowledge. Kant writes: The understanding may be a faculty for the production of unity of phenomena by virtue of rules; the reason is a faculty for the production of the unity of rules (of the understanding) under principles [Critique, M, A 302/ B 359]. The analogy between the Understanding and Reason then, as unifiers, is perhaps not as significant as the disanalogy between the two regarding their functions as unifiers. While the Understanding unifies appearance, Reason's object of unification is actually the Understanding itself; for Reason '...gives a unity a priori [to the manifold of cognition] by means of conceptions - a unity which may be called a rational unity, and which is of a nature very different from that of the unity produced by the understanding' [Critique, M, A 302 / B 359]. Thus with his second indicator Buchdahl continues to demonstrate that there is a gap between Reason and the Understanding, a gap which lends credibility to the claim that there is also a gap between empirical and transcendental lawlikeness - which would require that an independent foundation be 'shunted in' to link the two. Buchdahl then, has so far accumulated a good deal of credibility for his argument. He tries to augment this credibility even further with his third indicator; that Reason is responsible for generating the notion of empirical lawlikeness due to its projecting a 'synthetic unity objectively'. With his third indicator Buchdahl wants to demonstrate that Reason, in its hypothetical use, is the source of empirical lawlikeness. Here Buchdahl argues: The reason Kant gives [for thinking empirical laws as necessary] is that 'otherwise they would not constitute an order of nature'. Evidently this ties their necessitarian status to scientific systematization.... In so far as empirical generalizations are to be 'called laws they must be regarded as necessary'. [my emphasis] And why? 'In virtue of principles of the unity of the manifold' - which is here a reference not to the unity of the understanding but to reason or reflective judgement [Buchdahl, 1972, p. 157]. Accordingly, empirical laws must be thought as necessary because they are part of a systematic and unified theory of nature - that is, because they are part of the 'order of nature'. Kant further describes the nature of the relationship between particular empirical laws and the 'order of nature' at A 648/ B676: All that we can be certain of from the above considerations is, that this systematic unity is a logical principle, whose aim is to assist the understanding, where it cannot of itself attain to rules, by means of ideas, to bring all these various rules under one principle, and thus to ensure the most complete consistency and connection that can be attained. But the assertion that objects and the understanding by which they are cognized are so constituted as to be determined to systematic unity, that this may be postulated a priori, without any reference to the interest of reason, and that we are justified in declaring all possible cognitions - empirical and others - to possess systematic unity, and to be subject to general principles from which, notwithstanding their various character, they are all derivable - such an assertion can be founded only upon a transcendental principle of reason, which would render this systematic unity not subjectively and logically - in its character of a method, but objectively necessary [Critique, M, A 648/B 676]. According to Kant then, Reason demands that we regard our experience of nature as part of an empirical system such that particular laws are subsumed under more general ones. Thus, Kant views empirical lawlikeness as somehow being the result of an embedding in a system or theory which is characterized by having only a few general principles. This view is itself not foreign to one influential account of lawlikeness, due to Carl Hempel. Hempel says that there are two features which help us to distinguish empirically lawlike statements from accidental generalizations. These are 1) that lawlike statements are essentially generalizations, that is, the statement 'If X is released, X will fall' must pertain to any object X and not simply to some object X and 2) that the sentence must express a counterfactual relation. Goodman has illustrated Hempel's second point; the generalization 'Everything in my pocket on V-E day was Silver' does not sanction the counterfactual 'If p had been in my pocket on V-E day, p would have been Silver'. The generalization does not sanction this counterfactual because it does not express a real lawlike relationship between the antecedent and the consequent of the statement.3 That causality itself was perhaps explainable in terms of counterfactuals was a later suggestion due to Lewis.4 The most general feature of lawlikeness in scientific contexts, is expressed by Hempel in Aspects of Scientific Explanation as follows: Thus, the explanation of a general regularity consists in subsuming it under a more general law. Similarly, the validity of Galileo's law for the free fall of bodies near the earth's surface can be explained by deducing it from a more comprehensive set of laws, namely Newton's laws of motion and his law of gravitation, together with some statements abut particular facts, namely, about the mass and the radius of the earth [Hempel, 1965, p. 247]. Hempel also states that: The main function of general laws in the natural sciences is to connect events in patterns which are usually referred to as explanation and prediction [Hempel, 1965, p. 232]. According to Hempel then, empirical laws are valid insofar as they are subsumable under a general theory - a theory being a unified, small set of general laws. Moreover, empirical laws serve to reinforce the unity in natural science by 'connecting events in patters'. So like Kant, Hempel associates lawlikeness with subsumability under a unified, small set of general laws. This similarity between Hempel and Kant lends credibility to Kant's own views and provides a certain amount of clarification of what Kant meant. Buchdahl concludes his argument at this point with a reassertion of the connection between empirical lawlikeness and the subsumability of such laws under a unified system as made possible by Reason, a connection which reinforces his argument: Once more then, the necessitarianism of empirical laws, their lawlikeness , is a function of the unifying procedure of Reason or judgement and this procedure is one which Reason is driven to procure [Buchdahl, 1972, pp. 157, 158]. Finally, Buchdahl further distinguishes transcendental and empirical lawlikeness in Kant's thought by demonstrating that causality as a transcendental law differs from causality as it figures in an inductive context. For in contrast to the kind of certainty that we attach to causality as a transcendental condition of experience, causal connections , when they refer to inductively established regularities, cannot carry such certainty and carry only probability. Hence at A 770/B 798 Kant claims that the probability of an empirical hypothesis itself depends upon certainty regarding the possibility of the object: Imagination may be allowed, under the strict surveillance of reason, to invent suppositions; but, these must be based on something that is perfectly certain - and that is the possibility of the object. If we are well assured upon this point, it is allowable to have recourse to supposition in regard to the reality of the object; but this supposition must, unless it is utterly groundless, be connected, as its ground of explanation, with that which is really given and absolutely certain. Such a supposition is termed a hypothesis [Critique, M, A 770/B 798]. Thus we may infer that the probability of an empirical statement's being descriptive of nature is dependent upon the establishment of the real possibility of the 'object'. This leads us to associate the real possibility of empirical lawlikeness with two things; (1) with showing that the concepts can be brought into connection with what is given in intuition (i.e., through the procedure of construction), and (2) with the general conditions of experience, that is, with the possibility of experiencing nature as an ordered unity. That these are indeed the two essential aspects of real possibility is affirmed by Brittan who writes that Kant claims that ...real possibility can on occasion be demonstrated a priori, and this in two different ways. First, one can exhibit a priori an intuition corresponding to the concept. this is the way of mathematical construction . Second, one can argue on the basis of so called transcendental considerations that application of the concept is required by the possibility of experience. This is the way of Kant's metaphysical method [Brittan, 1986, p. 62]. In short then, there is a general condition for the possibility of empirical lawlikeness which is based on the possibility of experiencing an order of nature, and there is a more specific condition which relates to the constructability of concepts. In [Buchdahl, 1982], Buchdahl provides a generalized discussion of the nature of real possibility in connection with a method of validation which appears in Kant's thought and which Buchdahl calls the 'reduction-realization process' (RRP). Buchdahl characterizes Kant's main concern as that of establishing 'real possibility' - a term which he depicts as being equivalent to Kant's sense of ontology [Buchdahl, 1982, p. 43]. Real possibility, he thinks, exists at three levels in Kant's thought: Real possibility regarding nature in general (general ontology), which can be associated with the transcendental lawlikeness of the Critique; real possibility regarding physical nature which relates to the special ontology and metaphysical lawlikeness of MFNS; and real possibility regarding nature as an ordered system of objects and empirical laws, which he refers to as Kant's 'systems ontology'. On page 43 of the above mentioned article Buchdahl describes the nature of these ontologies: Correspondingly, we may thus distinguish among a 'general', a 'special', and a 'systems' ontology. The last named is concerned with the problem of the validation of the methodological maxims and ideas of natural science, supposedly yielding a "projected" system of empirical laws, constituting a description of the "unity" or 'order of nature'.... 'Special ontology' (Kant calls it "special metaphysics") investigates the possibility, and thus the intelligibility of the basic concepts and laws of Newtonian science. For instance, it seeks to show that gravitational action-at-a-distance is a real possibility and a legitimate hypothesis, the problem here arising from an explication of the concept of matter which belonged to a previous scheme of physics, and which thus seemed to make such action impossible...general ontology...deals with the problem of the real possibility of objective cognition, or experience in general [Buchdahl, 1982, p. 43]. While Buchdahl is primarily interested in emphasizing the importance and nature of general ontology in his article, our concern here is primarily with the 'systems ontology'. The 'special ontology' will figure in a later chapter. Buchdahl claims that in order to understand the notion of 'systems ontology', which involves the problem of theory construction in science, we must first clarify what criteria are required by Kant for acceptance of empirical hypotheses. We have already established that Kant thought that the inductive probability of a hypothesis depends on the possibility of the object itself being certain. The hypothesis, Buchdahl notes, must also be explanatory of the consequences and its probability is directed related to its explanatory power. In addition, the hypothesis must be a 'unity', that is, it must not require that ad hoc hypotheses be relied upon in providing an explanation. Finally, empirical laws must be able to be systematized into more general scientific theories. According to Buchdahl, what a systems ontology does is give additional criteria which are to be met in the accepting of empirical hypotheses. For instance, if a hypothesis is to be regarded as part of a systematic theory about nature it must not conflict with known facts about history and psychology. Most importantly, a hypothesis may be regarded as really possible only if there is a justification for the method by which it was derived. Only then does an empirical hypothesis possess a kind of objective validity - and therefore, real possibility. Therefore, Buchdahl wants to argue that part of the acceptance of an empirical hypothesis, part of its real possibility, is dependent upon the validity of the method by which it is obtained. This method, as we know, involves the claim that the methodological maxims of Reason create a unity of nature or project a system of empirical laws. Buchdahl argues that the demonstration of this is a transcendental one (although not a deduction), which he expresses in terms of his reduction-realization terminology. Kant himself writes regarding this that: The most remarkable circumstance connected with these principles is, that they seem to be transcendental, and, although only containing ideas for the guidance of the empirical exercise of reason, and although this empirical employment stands to these ideas in an asymptotic relation along (to use a mathematical term), that is, continually approximate, without ever being able to attain to them, they possess, notwithstanding, as a priori synthetical propositions, objective though undetermined validity, and are available as rules for possible experience. In the elaboration of our experience, they may also be employed with great advantage, as heuristic principles. A transcendental deduction of them cannot be made; such a deduction being always impossible in the case of ideas, as has been already shown [Critique, M, A 663/B 691]. The reduction-realization method is depicted by Buchdahl as being a general methodological feature in Kant. The process is as follows. First, nature is reduced or deprived of its systemicity and conceived of as being only a succession of objects. Then the maxims of reason are 'injected' into our conception of nature, thereby 'realizing' the concept of an ordered nature. This injection of the concept of an ordered nature is justified by our actual experience of nature as systematic (which is assumed). Buchdahl compares this realization with the schematization of the categories: Now Kant employs the same move in the present context: just as intuition supplies a schema for the category and thus "realizes" the latter, so we may imagine the notion of a maximum of systematization as the "analogon" of such a schema [Buchdahl, 1982, p. 90]. The reduction-realization process is then, a kind of transcendental proof of the possibility of the maxims which explain how it is that our experience of nature is an ordered, systematic unity. However, that there is an order of nature is not known a priori by us through maxims of Reason themselves, rather, this order of nature is known inductively, because of our (empirical) experience of nature. Therefore, the transcendental proof explaining how the methodological maxims necessarily relate a priori to objects gives real possibility to the maxims and to the concept of an ordered nature. So the systems ontology - or the purported connection between the maxims of Reason and an order of nature - has been shown to be justifiable using the reduction-realization process which Buchdahl thinks is typical in Kantian thought. Moreover, all of this shows how one of the criteria for acceptance of empirical hypotheses can be met. However Buchdahl warns that because we have 'realized' only the rule which projects systematic unity and not the a priori necessity of cognition of an object, that 'objective validity' is its usual sense has not been obtained. Having shown how the systems ontology can be validated, and how in one sense an empirical hypothesis can be really possible, Buchdahl goes on to detail the nature of the regulative principles of Reason and how they project a unity of nature. He writes: ...regulative principles are such as (1) lack constitutive force, (2) have a methodological function, and, finally (3) possess a transcendental status. All three characteristics, and not just one or the other, as wrongly implied in many accounts of Kant, define the notion of regulativeness [Buchdahl, 1982, p. 88]. Thus, because of our greater understanding of how a systems ontology is valid, we know that the maxims themselves do not yield knowledge of an order of nature and are therefore not constitutive. We also know that they have a transcendental status, which simply means that they have no corresponding object in experience but can be shown to be a necessary condition of experience. The unity of nature then, is represented to us not as an object itself, but as the result of the maxims of Reason, and as grounded transcendentally. We can summarize our discussion as follows: First of all, empirical lawlikeness could not have been established in the Principles of the Understanding of the Critique since the Understanding yields only the possibility of lawlikeness in nature in general and not the claim that empirical laws exist. Secondly, the faculty of Reason must be regarded as the faculty which justifies empirical lawlikeness because it is a faculty which seeks to unify into a system or 'order of nature' the abundance of causal connections it is driven to hypothesize. Since empircal lawlikeness itself also depends in part on the fitting of such laws into a unified order of nature given by Reason, that is, since lawlikeness requires a systematicity, empirical lawlikeness should be regarded as very closely tied to the activity of Reason. Third, we have also learnt that the empirical hypotheses of natural science must be directed toward 'really possible' objects. We noted that real possibility can be established for a theory in two ways; (1) by showing that the theory satisfies the general conditions of experience, this both at the level of the Understanding and at the level of Reason, and (2) by constructing the concepts of the theory in intuition. C onstruction in intuition itself operates at the level of the categories [as part of the general ontology] and at the level of the laws of Newtonian Physics [as part of special ontology]. We will take these themes up in order, beginning in Chapter II with the general ontology of constructability in the Schematism and concluding in Chapter III with the special ontology of construction in MFNS. Chapter II (i) Introduction The establishment of the real possibility of empirical concepts of objects is often thought to begin in the Schematism with the establishment of the real possibility of the categories. Kant provides evidence for this view at A 235/B 288: That the possibility of a thing cannot be determined from the category alone, and that in order to exhibit the objective reality of the pure concept of understanding we must always have an intuition, is a very noteworthy fact. Take, for instance, the categories of relation. We cannot determine from mere concepts how (1) something can exist as subject only, and not as mere determination of other things, that is, how a thing can be substance, or (2) how, because something is, something else must be, and how, therefore, a thing can be a cause, or (3) when several things exist, how because one of them is there, something follows in regard to the other categories; for example, how a thing can be equal to a number of things taken together, that is, can be a quantity. So long as intuition is lacking, we do not know whether through the categories we are thinking an object, and whether indeed there can anywhere be an object suited to them. In all these ways, then, we obtain confirmation that the categories are not in themselves knowledge, but are merely forms of thought for the making of knowledge from given intuitions [Critique, NKS, A 235/B 288]. There is however, some controversy over exactly what role the Schematism plays in the Critique. In this chapter, I will give an analysis of some of the different interpretations of the Schematism in order to elucidate its part in the establishment of the real possibility of pure concepts of objects, the latter being a general condition for the real possibility of empirical experience. Our analysis of the Schematism chapter will focus on the views of Pippin in Kant's Theory of Form [1982], Bennett in Kant's Analytic [1961], Allison in Kant's Transcendental Idealism [1983], and Butts in Kant and the Double Government Methodology [1984], and will attempt to establish the link between the Schematism and the establishment of knowledge in general. Before we look at the views of these philosophers, it will be helpful to clarify somewhat the link between the construction of concepts in intuition, the schematism of concepts and the real possibility of concepts of objects. The Schematism is located after the first book of the Transcendental Analytic, which deals with the canon of the Understanding. It is the first chapter of the second book of the Analytic which deals with the canon for the faculty of judgement, and the latter is that which tells how the analytic of principles involves the application of the concepts of the Understanding to appearance. According to Kant, the transcendental doctrine of judgement pertains to: (1) the schematism of pure Understanding which involves an explanation of the conditions by which judgment can subsume appearances under the rules or concepts of the Understanding, and (2) the principles of pure Understanding which describe how the judgments made in connection with the categories are the foundation of all other knowledge. Kant writes: Our transcendental doctrine of the faculty of judgement will contain two chapters. The first will treat of the sensuous condition under which alone pure conceptions of the understanding can be employed - that is, of the schematism of the pure understanding. The second will treat of those synthetical judgements which are derived a priori from pure conceptions of the understanding under those conditions, and which lie a priori at the foundation of all other cognitions, that is to say, it will treat of the principles of the pure understanding [Critique, M, A 136/B 175]. The Schema itself is described by Kant as a 'mediating representation' which ensures the homogeneity between categories and appearances. At (A 137/B 176), in the opening paragraph of the Schematism he says: In all subsumptions of an object under a concept of representation of the object must be homogeneous with the concept; in other words, the concept must contain something which is represented in the object that is to be subsumed under it [Critique, NKS, A 137/B 176]. In terms of pure concepts of the Understanding, the schema is a condition of sensibility due to a transcendental determination in time of the category, and through which the use of the category is restricted. As such, the schema is a kind of methodological condition which regulates the use of the category and is a 'transcendental product of the imagination'. In relation to empirical concepts the schema provides a means for the 'productive imagination' to construct an image according to the rule of the empirical concepts of objects. Finally, there is also a schematism of pure sensuous objects such as geometrical figures in space, and this involves the construction of the figure in the pure imagination a priori. Kant says that this latter form of construction is the transcendental condition for the construction of images. He writes of these three kinds of schema: The image is a product of the empirical faculty of the productive imagination - the schema of sensuous conceptions (of figures in space for example) is a product, and, as it were, a monogram of the pure imagination a priori, whereby and according to which images first become possible, which, however, can be connected with the conception only mediately by means of the schema which they indicate , and are in themselves never fully adequate to it. On the other hand, the schema of a pure conception of the understanding is something that cannot be reduced into any image - it is nothing else than the pure synthesis expressed by the category, conformably to a rule of unity expressed by conceptions. It is a transcendental product of the imagination, a product which concerns the determination of the internal sense, according to conditions of its form (time) in respect to all representations, in so far as these representations must be conjoined a priori in one conception, conformably to the unity of apperception [Critique, NKS, A 142/B 181]. There are then, three kinds of schema according to Kant. There is a transcendental schema of pure concepts, a schema of concepts of the pure imagination a priori and a schema of empirical concepts of objects. The Schematism chapter itself deals primarily with the schema of the concepts of the pure understanding, but this schema is important to establish because it the general condition for the possibility of knowledge, and as such is preliminary to the other two kinds of schematization in a sense. The schematization of a priori figures in space is not treated by Kant in depth, although Philip Kitcher [1975] has given an interpretation of what this kind of schematization entails. The schema of empirical concepts of objects is, of course, of great interest here as well, and we shall consider its nature, in the interests of demonstrating how the real possibility of constructing empirical concepts of objects is dependent upon the production of images via the schematization of the empirical concept. But preliminary to any discussion of the specific types of schema and of their respective roles regarding the possibility of empirical concepts, it is necessary to discuss the general nature of schematization and the character of the Schematism chapter itself, all of which will provide a suitable foundation for determining the exact nature of the link between schemata, construction of concepts in intuition, and the real possibility of concepts of objects. (ii) The Schematism of Pure Concepts of the Understanding In his chapter on the Schematism [Pippin, 1982, pp. 124-150], Pippin interprets the role of the Schematism as that of providing an account of how the pure and empirical concepts developed in the Analytic can be applied. This 'application' involves an account of how rules (pure concepts) are applied in forming judgements. Pippin summarizes what he takes Kant to have accomplished in earlier parts of the Analytic and describes Kant's results as leading up to the application of concepts which takes place in the Schematism: In other words, once we know how to prove the objective validity of pure concepts (by means of an appeal to the possibility of experience), know that such a proof shows that necessity for some pure concepts, and then introduce the specific characteristics of our experience (that is, its spatio-temporal character), we can proceed to use that proof, in terms of that (human) experience, and attempt a proof for a specific judgment about all objects of experience. Without the 'introduction' of these characteristics into the argument, concepts could not be "applied", could not yield judgements [Pippin, 1982, p. 126]. In the above quote, Pippin indicates that we need certain building blocks before an application of the concepts is possible. However, determining the exact nature of the application of the categories of the objects of experience is problematic because Kant does not give us enough clues for us to settle unambiguously the problem of what he had in mind by 'application'. Since there can be identifiable instances of a concept only when a rule is applied to intuition, and since knowledge is a result of this application, it is important to discern what Kant meant by the term application. One word that Kant often uses to characterize application is the word 'subsumption'. This word, unfortunately, has an ambiguous meaning. Subsumption under a rule can imply that many particular cases fall under a more generally described rule. Some have construed cases, but, Pippin warns, it is actually a (methodological) rule which prescribes how conceptual synthesis is to be carried out. The view that concepts should be regarded as rules for the subsumption of the manifold of intuition has been criticised by commentators such as G.J. Warnock. Warnock argues that if concepts are themselves viewed as rules for the subsumption of the manifold of intuition, then Kant's account appears to imply that a set of application rules must be made available for determining the application of the first set of rules. Warnock writes: In learning to use a word of this sort (to 'apply a pure concept'), a special, extra step is necessary; I must learn a rule for constructing in imagination some sort of model, which illustrates, or is an imagined case of, what the concept applies to. An image alone will not do, since no single thing can ever completely show the use of a pure concept (or of, e.g. the word 'cause'); I must learn a rule for constructing my illustrative model. "This representation of a universal procedure of imagination in providing an image for a concept, I entitle the schema of this concept [Warnock, 1948–1949, Analysis, p. 81]. Warnock goes on to argue that even construed as such Kant's characterization of concepts as providing a rule for constructing a model is problematic: And it is now clear that, if I can understand my rule, and so understand what my illustrative model is for, I have already applied the concept – namely to the model [i.e., so somehow another rule for application is needed]. But I must in this case have applied it without the rule and the model; if so, they are unnecessary; I may find a model helpful, i.g., as a simple specimen, or a reminder, but it cannot be used to explain how it is that I can apply the concept. I cannot understand how a model illustrates causality, unless I already know how 'cause' is used [Warnock, 1948–1949, Analysis, p. 82]. Pippin offers an alternative suggestion to this line of argument by claiming that the rules themselves must be regarded as having semantical import, he writes: Kant explains that these rules consist of several Merkmale, semantic "markers" or "characteristics", which, as an aggregate, or list, function as Erkenntnisgrund in the recognition of some other conception, or some intuition [Pippin, 1982, p. 108]. and he goes on to quote Kant from the Logic (1800) as saying: A marker [Merkmal] is that thing which makes up part of the knowledge of it or - which is the same - a partial representation insofar as it is considered as cognitive ground of the whole representation. All our concepts are therefore markers, and all thinking is nothing but a representing through markers [my emphasis] [Pippin, 1982, p. 108]. Application, we noted earlier, is important because it is part of the transcendental account of how rules are applied in forming judgements. Pippin, who offered a suggestion that the fact that the rules of the Schematism may have semantical import provides us with 'directives' for application which could be a solution to worries raised by Warnock. We shall have occasion to look further into the semantical rules interpretation in our discussion of Butts in section (iv) of this chapter. Naturally, in understanding how rules are applied in forming judgements, it is important to know what is meant by rules, and for this reason we have considered a couple of interpretations of the nature of the rules of the Schematism . Another important feature of the Schematism is that it establishes the general possibility of our forming judgements concerning when a concept of rule is applicable in the determination of an object, that is, it is part of the doctrine of 'transcendental judgment'. The demonstration that it is indeed possible to make judgements and the explanation of what are the conditions for such judgments, is considered by Pippin to be a central part of the Schematism. Pippin argues that the schematization of the pure concepts of the Understanding operates only to expound the meaning of the categories, which in turn helps us to determine what the conditions of their application to objects in judgement are. As such, it is the schema of pure concepts which establishes transcendental judgment, or the conditions for the possibility of judgment, thus setting the limits within which empirical judgments can be made. Therefore, the establishment of transcendental judgment plays an important role in the demonstration of the application of the categories to the objects of experience in judgment. Pippin writes: For pure concepts of the understanding, the Schematism could just be said to specify further the meaning of the concept itself ("for us"), and in that sense to help explain the conditions of its application. That is, the question of a schematism for pure concepts only asks about "the possibility of application", not for rules specifying actual application ... judgment is still always required in empirical investigation, but we must now explain how that judgement could be possible, in what way the categories set the limits within which an empirical judgment can be made. And specifying the categories in that way is transcendental judgment [Pippin, 1982, p. 135]. The establishment of the possibility of judgment in the transcendental schematism of pure concepts is regarded by both Pippin [1982] and Allison [1983] (albeit slightly differently) as really being the translation of categories into their temporal modes. As Pippin writes: The categories are thus said to determine appearances by virtue of the understanding's "affecting" inner sense, and since the form of inner sense is time, categories are to be understood as modes of time consciousness [Pippin, 1982, p. 136]. This view seems to be in agreement with what Kant writes at A 139/B 178: The conception of the understanding contains pure synthetical unity of the manifold in general. Time, as the formal condition of the manifold of the internal sense, consequently of the conjunction of all representations , contains a priori a manifold in the pure intuition. Now a transcendental determination of time is so far homogeneous with the category, which constitutes the unity thereof, that it is universal, and rests upon a rule a priori. On the other hand, it is so far homogeneous with the phenomenon inasmuch as time is contained in every empirical representation of the manifold. Thus an application of the category to phenomena becomes possible, by means of the transcendental determination of time, which, as the schema of the conceptions of the understanding, mediates the subsumption of the latter under the former [Critique, NKS, A 139/B 178]. Because the schematization of pure concepts is essentially the rule for the determination of the concept in the temporal order, the schema for pure concepts should not be regarded as an image, Pippin thinks, but rather as a method of representation: A schema is thus said to be a Methode, not, as any image must be, a particular representation. So far, such a claim is straight-forward enough. As Walsh points out, part of the understanding and meaning of a concept must involve more than understanding the strict semantical significance of its definition, more than being able to shuffle around synonyms in that definition. And it must involve more than being able to produce one or two examples of the concept. To be sure, if once could do all that, one would have thereby some understanding of the meaning of the concept, one would have to be able to produce a whole series of various examples, and it is this added ability which Kant seems to be trying to get at with the notion of a schema as a "method" [Pippin, 1982, p. 136]. Pippin is also critical of the suggestion by Gram that schemata can be understood in terms of pure intuitions. Pippin writes: He argues that concepts and intuitions are both considered representations in intuition by Kant (that intuitions, in short can function as semantic entities in Kant's theory); that we cannot represent intuitions by means of concepts, that all judgements of experience are judgements based on empirical intuitions, and therefore that any judgment of experience must contain an element which does not stand for a concept. So the problem of genuinely synthetic judgments a priori is not, Can we combine two concepts independent of experience? but, Can we discover independent of experience, and assert (in the judgment), that objects fall under concepts? Now this theory leads to the consequence that in a priori judgments, we are directly making a claim that all intuitions (function as a subject term in such judgments) fall under a concept. We thus need a pure intuition to do that, and providing that pure intuition is what we do in schematizing concepts [Pippin, 1982, pp. 139, 140]. Pippin argues that this view wanders too far from Kant's own views regarding intuitions, and that simply because the intuitions may be grounds for an assertion, this does not entail that what is asserted is about intuitions themselves. Pippin also complains that Gram's account of what pure intuitions are is too sketchy, which obviously leaves his view problematic given that there is ambiguity regarding the exact role of pure intuition in schematization. As we will see later, Allison is also critical of Gram's account and provides another way of making sense of the idea that schematization involves pure intuition. Thus, Pippin thinks, we must distinguish carefully between the notions of concept, schema and image in order to understand the Schematism properly: In sum, we now have three terms related to one another: (1) concept - a rule for synthetic unity; (2) schema - a method projected by the transcendental imagination specifying the conditions under which it can be used; and (3) image - some individual example of a concept, resulting from the use of the rule, as specified by the schema [Pippin, 1982, p. 137]. Pure concepts then, are not themselves images, nor do they produce images. As Warnock has pointed out it would be impossible to create a representation of the concept of causality in the form of an image, since no single image could ever show the full sense of causality which would be requisite of the image as a model of causality. What pure concepts do have is transcendental schemata. Furthermore, pure concepts are not transcendentally schematized in virtue of a transcendental judgment for the transcendental judgment is that which allows us to connect the pure concept with objects of experience in judgment. (ii)b The Temporal Dimension of Schematization Bennett, who agrees with Pippin regarding certain aspect of the schematization of pure concepts, thinks that the schematization involves the adding on of a temporal parameter. Bennett writes that: A schema is a kind of counterpart to a concept, and it involves imagination. Since imagination produces intuitions, which for humans are necessary temporal, schemas - even schemas of atemporal concepts - are all somehow temporal. The schema of the concept of substance, say, is a rule not for producing images of substances but for doing something - Kant does not make clear what - which involves imagination and therefore involves time. Each category, then, has an associated schema which carries temporality with it ... The schema of any category, then, is just the category itself with the condition of temporality added [Bennett, 1966, pp. 150, 151]. Allison follows after Paton in thinking that the schema is a product of the determination of our inner sense of time by the categories. He construes the relationship between temporal determination and the categories differently than does Bennett [Allison, 1983, p. 188]. For Allison, unlike Bennett, thinks that the categories act to produce an inner sense of time and so become schematized. And as such an added temporal parameter is not featured, but a pure temporal intuition is created. So it is by this method that the schematism of pure concepts tells us when a judgment is possible according to Allison, who describes real possibility as possibility in time. Allison writes: 'Real possibility' is defined in terms of the agreement of the thought of an object (the "synthesis") with the "conditions of the time in general". Simply put, to be really possible means to be possible in or over a period of time [Allison, 1983, p. 189]. and regarding the active component in this determination Allison writes: ...to "determine an intuition" ... clearly means to synthesize, conceptualize , or subsume the given intuition under a concept in such a way that the intuition is related to, or represents, an object [Allison, 1983, p. 182]. Allison's view however, does not stem from an unambiguous foundation. For Allison himself cites eight different characterizations of the transcendental schema by Kant, not all of which appear, on the surface, to be compatible with his view. The third and sixth formulations that he cites, for instance, may appear to hint at a different view of the transcendental schematism wherein the schemata are viewed as pure intuitions. Kant writes that the transcendental schemata can be regarded: 3. As the "formal and pure condition of sensibility to which the concept of the understanding is restricted". and 6. As "the true and sole conditions under which these concepts obtain relation to objects and so possess significance" [Allison, 1983, pp. 179, 180]. Given these formulations of the schemata and Kant's claim in the Critique of Judgment (which Allison cites) that: Intuitions are always required to verify [darzuthun] the reality of our concepts. If the concepts are empirical the intuitions are called examples , if they are pure concepts of the understanding the intuitions go by the name of schemata [Allison, 1983, pp. 180, 181]. Allison writes (following Gram's idea) that we must acknowledge that Kant did intend us to think of the schema as an intuition [Allison, 1983, p. 181]. What Allison further maintains is that this view of the schema is entirely compatible with the view of the schema as providing temporal determinations of pure concepts. Gram, who has argued that the schemata must be regarded as pure intuitions does not recognize this compatibility and argues that Kant's view is incoherent: In particular, he denies its compatibility [the compatibility of Kant's account of transcendental schema as pure intuitions] with the "thirdthing" account [of transcendental schema as representations for concepts which are a priori determinations in time]. The heart of the problem, according to Gram, lies in what he takes to be the incoherence of the notion of a "third-thing," which is both universal and particular, intellectual and sensible. Since these constitute two sets of contradictory properties, nothing can possess both members of either set. Moreover, even if something could, it would not be pure intuition, which is by definition entirely sensible and particular [Allison, 1983, p. 181]. So Gram does not see the two views, of the schemata as providing determinations in time and as pure intuitions, as compatible. Hence he argues that there is an incoherence to Kant's description because he views the former as being constitutive of sensible properties and the latter as being constitutive of a priori intellectual properties - which if true does render the description of what a transcendental schema is to be an incoherent one within Kant's philosophy. Allison is critical of Gram's treatment of this problem and he argues that it is flawed because Gram fails to distinguish between two senses of "pure intuition" in Kant. The two senses are these: for Kant there is a form of intuition of space and time which Allison takes to be equivalent to spatiality and temporality in general - and the sense to which Gram refers -, but there is also a formal intuition whereby space and time as objects with certain determinate properties are synthesized in accordance with the categories such that they can be brought into the unity of consciousness and lead to cognition. Allison thinks that concepts plus space and time as formal intuitions are necessary conditions for the possibility of knowledge namely, experience. Here space and time are considered as 'epistemic condtions'. Allison characterizes an 'epistemic condition' as follows: For our present purposes it must suffice to characterize an epistemic condition simply as one that is necessary for the representation of an object or an objective state of affairs. As such it could also be called an "objectivating condition"; for it is in virtue of such conditions that our representations relate to objects or, as Kant likes to put it, possess "objective reality" [Allison, 1983, p. 10]. The schemata then, because they pertain to formal intuitions of space and time serve as methodological or epistemic conditions for our representations of objects. This is the process, Allison thinks, which is required for our forming of representations, and it is the concept of determinate pure intuitions which is central to the transcendental synthesis of the imagination in the Schematism. It is these determinate intuitions to which we must appeal in order to construct concepts mathematically. Allison argues: Nor can this second (determinate) sense of pure intuition be taken as an afterthought to which Kant merely alludes in an obscure footnote in the Second Edition. On the contrary, it is a central thesis of the Transcendental Deduction, even in the First Edition, that it is only insofar as the "pure manifold" of the intuition (indeterminate pure intuition) is synthesized in accordance with the categories that it can be brought into the unity of consciousness and thus yield an actual content for cognition. As Kant clearly states, apart from such synthesis," not even the purest and most elementary representations of space and time, could arise. "Surely such representations count as pure intuitions in the Kantian sense, and so we are led inevitably to conclude that the conception of a determinate pure intuition is as central to Kant's thought as the doctrine of the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, from which it is in fact inseparable [my emphasis] [Allison, 1983, p. 181]. Allison goes on to provide additional textual support for his interpretation of the schemata as transcendentally determining the categories as pure temporal intuitions. In doing so he cites two passages in Kant: the first which is at A 26/B 42, is where Kant seems to sanction the idea that pure intuitions can be considered to be conditions of sensible intuition. Kant writes: ...the form of all phenomena [space] can be given in the mind previous to all actual perceptions, therefore a priori, and how it, as a pure intuition, in which all objects must be determined [space is what Kant is referring to here although this applies to time as well, on Allison's view], can contain principles of the relations of these objects prior to all experience...If we depart from the subjective condition, under which alone we can obtain external intuition, or, in other words, by means of which we are affected by objects, the representation of space has no meaning whatsoever [Critique, M, A 26/B 42]. Regarding Kant's passage here Allison argues that it is generally plausible to draw the connection between pure intuitions and forms of intuition: ...Kant asserts that space is "nothing but the form of all appearances of outer sense," precisely because he claims to have shown already that it is the "subjective condition of sensibility under which alone outer intuition is possible for us." Kant here assumes a correlation between 'condition of intuition', or sensibility, 'form of intuition', and 'pure intuition'. Given this correlation, it would seem plausible to maintain that transcendental schemata are pure intuitions if they can be shown to function as "forms" or "conditions" of sensible intuition [Allison, 1983, p. 185]. Allison reads Kant's claim at A 140/B 179 that 'pure a priori concepts, in addition to the function of understanding expressed in the category, must contain a priori certain formal conditions of sensibility, namely, those of inner sense to be evidence that the schemata must also be regarded as determining the categories in time according to Kant. Allison writes: Kant certainly seems to affirm such a function for transcendental schemata when he characterizes them as 'formal conditions of sensibility'. Indeed, this is strikingly reminiscent of the above mentioned characterization of space as a 'subjective condition of sensibility'. Even apart from this, however, it should by now be clear that this is precisely the function that is assigned to transcendental determinations of time. As conditions of empirical time determination, they are certainly conditions in a different sense than are space and time themselves. The latter are general forms or conditions of sensibility, that is, conditions under and with reference to which the data of empirical intuition are given to the mind, while transcendental determinations of time are specific temporal conditions of empirical intuition and, therefore, pure intuitions in the Kantian sense [Allison, 1983, p. 185]. Allison then, views the schemata as both pure intuitions and as transcendental determinations of the categories in time, that is, as determinate pure intuitions, and it is to these determinate intuitions that we must appeal he writes, if we are to construct concepts mathematically. For, in order for the construction of concepts of objects to be possible, the transcendental schema must allow for the possibility of formulating "schematic judgments", and the latter can only yield knowledge about objects of experience if the formal conditions of inner sense are in accord with objects of experience. On Allisons' view, this accordance is possible in virtue of the schematization's provision of the necessary epistemic conditions for knowledge, which it does in virtue of the temporal conditions which determine the categories. As temporally conditioned, then, the schematized categories have built into them an epistemic conditioning of possible experience of objects. Thus, the schema is also regarded as having a methodological function by Allison, which is in agreement with Pippin who said that the schematization involved a subsumption according to a methodological rule. We have then, considered several aspects of the schematization of pure concepts. We saw that the schema should not be regarded as an image but that they might be regardable as methodological rules which govern the subsumption of categories. This subsumption may involve a transcendental determination of the categories in time, as construed by Allison, in which case the schema may also be regarded as determinate pure intuitions. An important distinction in the Schematism that has yet to be discussed in detail is the distinction between the schematism of pure concepts of the understanding and the other two kinds of schematisms; that of sensuous concepts and that of empirical concepts. (iii) The Schematism of Pure Sensuous Concepts of the Imagination and Empirical Schematism In the following (rather long, but revealing) quote Kant distinguishes between the synthesis of the categories of the Understanding and the figurative synthesis of sensuous concepts: This synthesis of the manifold of sensible intuition, which is possible and necessary a priori, may be entitled figurative synthesis (synthesis specosia), to distinguish it from the synthesis which is thought in the mere category in respect of the manifold of an intuition in general, and which is entitled combination through the understanding (synthesis intellectualis). Both are transcendental, not merely as taking place a priori, but also as conditioning the possibility of other a priori knowledge. But the figurative synthesis, if it be directed merely at the original synthetic unity of apperception, that is, to the transcendental unity which is thought in the categories, must, in order to be distinguished from the merely intellectual combination, be called the transcendental synthesis of imagination. Imagination is the faculty of representing in intuition an object that is not itself present. Now since all of our intuition is sensible, the imagination, owing to the subjective condition to which aline it can give to the concepts of understanding a corresponding intuition, belongs to sensibility. But which is determinative and not, like sense, determinable merely, and which is therefore able to determine sense a priori in respect of its form in accordance with the unity of apperception, imagination is to that extent a faculty of intuitions, conforming as it does to the categories, must be the transcendental synthesis of imagination. This synthesis is an action of the understanding on the sensibility; and is its first application - and thereby the ground of all its other applications - to the objects of our possible intuition [Critique, NKS, B 151, 152]. The schematism of a priori sensuous concepts is discussed by Philip Kitcher [1975]. He focuses his discussion of the schematism of figures in space in pure imagination, arguing that their schematization does indeed involve the drawing of a picture in the mind which corresponds to the empirical intuition. Kitcher writes: Kant calls the set of rules which we follow to produce the object of a concept the schema of that concept, noting, apropos of a discussion of Berkeley's attack on Locke that "it is schemata, not images of objects, which underlie our pure sensible concepts. No image could ever be adequate to the concept of a triangle in general". Kant's solution to the problem is thus to claim that we can draw general conclusions using only those features of the image on which the rule has pronounced. In the above example, my production of a scalene triangle was brought about by a free decision of mine over and above my application of the rule. It is therefore illegitimate to use the scalene peculiarity to draw the conclusion that all triangles are scalene.... Now we can know that all triangles have the R-properties [properties drawn in accordance with rule] which they do have merely by analyzing our concepts. Again, since none of the A-properties [properties which are accidental to the figure and are a product of free choice] of the particular triangle we construct is shared by all triangles have an A-property just because we notice that our particular triangle has that property. Where pure intuition is supposed to help us is in leading us to the S-properties [properties derived from the application of the rule on the structure of the surface and which are thereby determined by both the schema and the structure of space] which are shared by all triangles. By this means we arrive at propositions which are synthetic a priori and are basic to geometry [Kitcher, 1975, pp. 43, 44]. Thus on Kticher's view schematization of a priori concepts is image making with a concept which leads us to conclude that it is possible to have synthetic a priori knowledge about space. As we have already indicated, there is also a key distinction to be made between the schema of pure concepts and the schema of empirical concepts. At A 141/B 180 Kant describes the relation between the schema and empirical concepts: Indeed it is schemata, not images of objects, which underlie our pure sensible concepts...an object of experience or its image is [not] ever adequate to the empirical concept; for this latter always stands in immediate relation to the schema of imagination, as a rule for the determination of our intuition, in accordance with some specific universal concept. The concept 'dog' signifies a rule according to which my imagination can delineate the figure of a four footed animal in a general manner, without limitation to any single determinate figure such as experience, or any possible image that I can represent in concreto, actually presents [Critique, M, A 141/B 180]. The claim that the schema provides rules which guide us in our empirical judgments about objects has been criticized by Bennett [1966] in a way not unlike Warnock's. Bennett argues that Kant's account may be circular because his claim that the application of the concept to an object is made by means of an image really involves two application rules: a rule which relates images to objects and a rule which enables us to apply the image to the dog. Bennett says: To insert an intermediate image between a concept and a putative instance of it is only to replace one concept application by two. For the single question 'Is that object a dog?' it substitutes the pair of questions 'Does this image correspond to that object?' and 'Is this image an image of a dog?' [Bennett, 1966, p. 144] However, splitting up the application problem as Kant has done does not provide a better explanation of how concepts can be applied to objects. So, according to Bennett, Kant's schematism does not solve the problem of application of concepts to objects. Whether or not Kant's account works, Kant apparently does think that the schemata provide rules whereby empirical judgments can be made, and that without such rules, we could not construct a concept of a dog or of any object in general. The schemata then, are depicted by Kant as being integral to the formation of empirical judgments. In the following section we will explore the nature of this connection as it is discussed by Butts. Butts gives an account of rules which may better explain how to make sense of the application Kant claims is made. (iv) Butts' Interpretation: The Schematism as a Semantical Rule According to Butts, the problem of constructing empirical concepts of objects according to a rule is the central problem of the Schematism. Butts characterizes Kant's whole project in the Analytic as that of showing how it is that we can move from the fact of our having immediate intuited knowledge of conceptual knowledge: The programme of Kant's "Analytic", as I read it, is to show just how we can move from immediate intuited knowledge in the form 'this X seems red', to conceptual (objective) knowledge in the form 'this X is red' [Butts, 1984, p. 154]. Thus, the problem of application of the categories to experience is not the twofold problem of showing that categories can apply generally to experience and then showing that sensible concepts can apply to experience, but it is just the problem of how it is possible to have conceptual systems that will be fitted to making truth claims about experience. For this, Butts claims, we need two things; (1) the formalism of laws (established in the Principles) and (2) rules for determining the formal content of obseration - the latter of which will enable the matehmatization of experience [Butts, 1984]. The categorical subsumption of the Schematism then, is viewed by Butts as involving the systematic demand for providing observations with a partial interpretation. The theory of the Schematization of concepts then is viewed by Butts as providing the semantical rules that partially specify the meaning of observations. The part of the meaning specified is the mathematically tractable part. The schema, in specifying the logical form of observation statements which are relevant in deciding the applicability of a category, give meaning to the category as well as orient our thinking regarding the construction of empirical concepts. Butts goes on to describe the nature of the construction of both empirical and nonempirical concepts. He writes that to construct a concept in a priori intuition means to produce individual examples according to rules that are given in our conceptual system. We construct concepts gradually, learning by example [I have here omitted the material in parentheses]: I learn the concept from constructed examples. By attending to "the act" of construction, I am able to generate the rule for generating triangles. Since the Kant concepts are rules, learning the concept is the same as listing the rules of construction. To find out how to construct a concept is to learn by examples [Butts, 1984, p. 183]. Thus, concepts of triangles and concepts of dogs are made explicit by analysis according to Butts. Mathematics then is not applied directly to sensuous apparitions but is applied to the idealized constructed concept. According to Butts then, at the root of the construction of concepts, and therefore at the root of the establishment of the possibility of natural science is the Schematism, for it is in the Schematism that the possibility of meaningful construction of concepts is first established. However, the Schematism, according to Butts, can only establish the general possibility of doing science. For each science, Butts, writes, requires an additional set of semantical rules: If we ask how the general semantical rules of the formalism (the schemata) apply, the answer is that they apply only to the world conceived of as in general a world of measurable physical objects and events in which these objects are ingredient. To become more specific, the formalism must be supplemented by semantical rules of another kind introduced by each special science. The subject matter of a particular science invites us to try various forms of explanation; the choice of things to be investigated, the choice of the domain of individuals over which the observational variables will range, is made freely and pragmatically. What guides the choice is a quest for individuals whose interposition will result in 'data' in accordance with the theoretical demands of the given science [Butts, 1984, pp. 198, 199]. So far then, we have briefly looked at some interpretations of the Schematism chapter in the Analytic. As we have noted, there is some ambiguity as to what Kant has meant by the applicability of the categories and as to the exact nature of the exposition of this application. Pippin made some useful comments about the nature of the application and pure schematization as well as about the differences between concepts, schemata and images. Allison agreed with Pippin that the schema itself should not be regarded as an image but as a method for determining the conditions under which a concept can be used. Allison's most important contribution however was in demonstrating that the schematization of pure concept can be regarded both as being a determination of the concept within time and as given in pure intuition; this helps us to make sense of Kant's endeavour in the Schematism. Finally, Butts stresses the role of the Schematism insofar as the Schematism is an important foundation for the possibility of empirical science. Butts' analysis of the link between construction of concepts and the semantical rules given in schematization is helpful and important within the context of this paper. For if the possibility of constructing empirical concepts of objects is indeed beginning to be established in the Schematism then several things become clarified regarding the intentions of Kant in writing MFNS. What Kant is doing in MFNS now appears to be a natural extension of an enterprise which begins in the Critique. For having shown that it is indeed possible for us to have empirical concepts of objects via the establishment in general of the possibility of constructing such concepts in the Schematism, he can now proceed to detail the specific possibility of a certain conception of matter, thus embarking on what Buchdahl would call his 'special ontology'. In the third chapter of this thesis I will turn to a discussion of nature of this construction, which I will discuss in connection with Brittan [Brittan, 1978 & 1986]. I will then examine some of the themes that were brought up in Chapter One regarding the possibility of natural science and empirical lawlikeness and the independent foundation which is required to establish the latter. Chapter III (i) Introduction In Chapter I we discussed the nature of and conditions for empirical lawlikeness according to Kant. Empirical lawlikeness, we saw, was not established in the Principles and is itself something that Reason, in giving unity to nature, both seeks out and makes possible. Moreover, in order for empirical lawlikeness to have real possibility, the concepts of objects in empirical hypotheses must be able to be shown to be both generally and specifically constructible. In Chapter II we discussed the general establishment of real possibility by the method of constructing categories, which Kant treats of in the Schematism. This demonstration involved the exhibition of the existence of pure schemata or rules. In this chapter, we will discuss Kant's view of the construction of physical concepts, the most important of which is matter. This he does in MFNS. In our discussion of this aspect of Kantian thought we will look at Brittan [Brittan 1978 and 1986] who has a clear and detailed account of the nature of the construction of the concept of matter in MFNS, as well as at Butts, who has a different view from Brittan. The second task of this chapter will be to defend the following claim: that in establishing the possibility of empirical lawlikeness and natural science, Kant thought that he would first have to establish an 'independent foundation'. Although Buchdahl's claim regarding the need for an independent foundation was discussed in the first chapter, the nature of this independent foundation was not discussed. I will argue that the independent foundation which bridges transcendental and empirical lawlikeness is metaphysical lawlikeness, and that establishing the possibility of the latter was an integral part of establishing the possibility of empirical lawlikeness. All of this will require an investigation into the nature of metaphysical lawlikeness, and a demonstration of how it figures in Kant's thought. But first we must discuss the possibility of constructing the concept of matter, which is itself, I will argue, linked to the establishment of metaphysical lawlikeness. (ii) General Aspects of Constructing the Concept of Matter According to Brittan [Brittan, 1978], Kant, in MFNS, tried to establish if it is to be possible. Specifically, Kant tried to show that matter must be understood as being composed of attractive and repulsive forces, and that these forces can be determined 'a priori' [MFNS, 523, 524].5 Brittan thinks that Kant encountered certain difficulties in his demonstration, and that Kant himself may have been aware of his own only moderate success in MFNS. For instance, Kant says in the introduction to MFNS that he was accomplished 'no very great work' in MFNS, although he seems to attribute his lack of success, in part, to the nature of the metaphysical doctrine of body. At 473 he writes: ... in metaphysics the object is considered merely as it must be represented in accordance with the universal laws of thought, while in other sciences, as it must be represented in accordance with data of intuition (pure as well as empirical). Hence the former, inasmuch as the object must always be compared with all the necessary laws of thought, must furnish a definite number of cognitions, which can be fully exhausted; but the latter, inasmuch as such sciences offer an infinite manifold of intuitions (pure or empirical), and therefore of objects of thought, can never attain absolute completeness but can be extended to infinity, as in pure mathematics and the empirical doctrine of nature. Moreover, I believe that I have completely exhausted this metaphysical doctrine of body, as far as such a doctrine ever extends; but I believe that I have accomplished thereby no very great work [MFNS, 473]. In his 1978 paper, Brittan writes of Kant's attempt in MFNS that at least two difficulties arise for his account. the first difficulty arises in relation to whether Kant has construed matter as a priori, a posteriori, or both, and the second arises in connection with the constructability of the forces which are constitutive of matter. Regarding the first difficulty, Brittan writes: If not always clear in detail, the main outlines of the program are comprehensible. But Kant's attempt to carry it out reveals two sorts of difficulties buried in the program. One of these difficulties originates in his claim that the concept of matter is an empirical concept because an element in the concept, motion, cannot be "cognized' a priori. Nevertheless, the concept of matter seems to play a rather curious role, somewhere between purely a priori and purely empirical concepts (Kant says, in fact, that it has a certain a priori elements in it). On the one hand, the concept is empirical insofar as the "possibility of experience, and ultimately the unity of consciousness, seem to require something like the concept of matter, first for the construction, i.e., empirical representation and determination, of space and time, on which not only the construction just mentioned, but also the "refutation of idealism" would seem to depend. Kant's narrow dichotomy - a priori or a posteriori - does not allow him to deal adequately with the concept of matter. At the same time, the fact that the concept of matter is called on to play different roles on different occasions accounts for the shifts in Kant's attitude toward the a priori/a posteriori status of Newton's theory [Brittan, 1978, pp. 136, 137]. The a priori element of the construction of the forces constitutive of matter resides in the extent to which the forces operate in space, and it is this which gives them a priori status. Kant writes: The only intuition that is given a priori is that of the mere form of appearances, space and time. A concept of space and time, as quanta, can be exhibited a priori in intuition, that is, constructed, either in respect (figure) of the quanta, or through number in their quantity only, (the mere synthesis of the homogeneous manifold). But the matter of appearances, by which things are given us in space and time, can only be represented in perception, and therefore a posteriori. The only concept which represents a priori this empirical content is the concept of a thing in general, and the a priori synthetic knowledge of this thing in general can give us nothing more than the mere rule of the synthesis of that which perception may give a posteriori ... it can never yield an a priori intuition of the real object, since this must necessarily be empirical [Critique, NKS, A 720/B 748]. Thus Brittan writes in connection with Kant's development of the a priori aspect of the construction of the law of universal gravitation, (the LUG) which is the law governing the attractive force: The point is that the proportionality of the force to the inverse square of the radius is a property of conic sections, and hence follows as a theorem from the postulates that lay down the conditions for the construction of conic sections ... (and whether or not its orbit is a conic section is a matter of empirical fact; it is in no way necessary), the objects must obey the inverse square law ... physics is possible only when experience, space and time in particular, has a determinate structure. In this same sense, the law of universal gravitation "stands under" the Principles [Brittan, 1978, p. 142]. According to Brittan then, the LUG is only partially constructible a priori - insofar as it is subject to the conditions of spatio-temporal experience - but since we experience forces a posteriori, evidence of the existence of forces is never certain and necessary and forces cannot be regarded as fully constructible a priori. Brittan outlines the second difficulty in Kant's endeavour in MFNS, which concerns the non-constructability of forces, and is described as follows: The other sort of difficulty in Kant's attempt to carry out his program concerns the construction of forces. Since the concept of matter, on Kant's analysis of it, essentially contains attractive and repulsive forces, the construction of the concept eventually involves the construction of these forces. But since according to Kant our knowledge of these forces is inevitably a posteriori, they cannot be constructed. Thus, the task kant sets himself in the MFNS, to construct the concept of matter, ends in half-admitted failure. I say "half-admitted" because there is a certain amount of hedging on his part. On the one hand, for reasons I have already indicated, attractive and repulsive forces "make possible the general concept of matter." On the other hand, owing to their a posteriori aspects, it is not possible to "construct this concept (in detail and thus) represent it as possible in intuition." Even more confusing is Kant's suggestion that although he has failed to construct (completely) the fundamental forces, and hence the concept of matter, there is still left open the possibility that they might be constructed by others [Brittan, 1978, p. 138]. At 517 Kant indicates the possibility that the constructive enterprise might fail: Because the original attractive force, namely, to act immediately at a distance, belongs to the essence of matter, it also belongs to every part of matter ... this original attractive force ... in combination with its counteracting one, namely, repulsive force ... must admit of being derived. And thus would the dynamic concept of matter as the movable filling its space (in determinate degree) be constructed. But for this construction one needs a law of the relation both of original attraction and of original repulsion at various distances of the matter and of its parts from one another. Since this relation rests solely on the difference of direction of both these forces ... and on the size of the space into which each of these forces diffuses itself at various distances, this law is a pure mathematical problem, with which metaphysics is no longer concerned ... For metaphysics answers merely for the correctness of the elements of the construction that are granted our rational cognition; it does not answer for the insufficiency and limits of our reason in the execution of the construction [MFNS, 517]. So far we have not yet discussed the constructibility of the concept of matter in detail, but have only set the background for such a discussion. As we have already seen, Brittan thinks that there are quite a few difficulties in Kant's account even at the most general structural level. Brittan notes that Kant does not quite have a clear position regarding whether matter is a priori or a posteriori and that the basic constituent of matter, force, and the LUG, which is necessary for the characterization of matter as composed of attractive and repulsive forces, cannot themselves be constructed a priori. Therefore, the establishment of their real possibility, and naturally, of the real possibility of matter, may not be regardable as successful if this is true, or at least, so Brittan thinks. I think that Brittan's construal is misleading, as is his presentation of aspects of Kantian thought as problematic. In the section (vi) of this chapter, I will try to show how the tensions that Brittan highlights can be resolved given that Kant is engaged in bridging transcendental and empirical lawlikeness with metaphysical lawlikeness. However, before this we must focus on the exact nature of the specific attempt to construct matter, in order to demonstrate how the second criterion of real possibility is fleshed out by Kant. (iii) The General Framework of MFNS Before turning to Brittan's discussion of the construction of the concept of matter in MFNS, it might be useful first to stop and outline the general framework of MFNS and what Kant tries to accomplish in each chapter.6 In the first chapter of MFNS, entitled the Phoronomy, matter is treated only insofar as it is thought of as 'the movable in space'. Here matter is treated as a movable point and considered in terms of the measurable quantity of its velocity and direction. At 480 Kant writes: Nothing but motion is to be discussed in the phoronomy; therefore no other property than movability is here attributed to the subject of motion, namely, matter. Matter thus endowed can itself be taken, then, as a point. In phoronomy one abstracts from every internal characteristic, hence also from the quantity, of the movable and concerns himself only with motion and what can be regarded as quantity therein (velocity and direction) [MFNS, 480]. In chapter two, which is entitled the Dynamics matter is regarded as 'the movable insofar as it fills space'. Matter can be regarded as filling space insofar as it is subject to attractive and repulsive forces. These forces are regarded as filling space in varying degrees. Kant writes: ... the dynamical explication of the concept of matter ... presupposes the phoronomic one but adds to it a property that is related as cause to effect, namely, the capacity of resisting a motion within a certain space. This property could not come into consideration in the foregoing science, even when we dealt with the motions of one and the same point in opposite directions. This filling of space keeps a certain space free from the intrusion of any other movable thing when its motion is directed to any place within this space [MFNS, 496]. The Mechanics, which is the third chapter, deals with the mechanical laws which govern the motion of matter insofar as matter is thought to possess repulsive and attractive forces which allows us to think of matter as acting on other matter. Kant writes: ... in the mechanics the force of a matter set in motion is regarded as present in order to impart this motion to another matter. But it is clear that the movable would have no moving force through its motion if it did not possess original moving forces, whereby it is active in every place where it exists before all proper motion. And it is clear that no uniform motion would be impressed on another matter by matter whose motion lay in the path of the straight line in front of this other matter unless both possessed original laws of repulsion; and that matter could not by its motion compel another matter to follow it in the straight line (could not drag another after it), unless both possessed attractive forces. Hence all mechanical laws presuppose dynamical ones; and a matter as moved can have no moving force except by means of its repulsion or attraction, upon which and with which it acts directly in its motion and thereby imparts its own motion to another matter [MFNS, 536, 537]. Finally, the fourth chapter, the Phenomenology, deals with the subject's experience of the motion of matter as objectified insofar as it is considerable in terms of a publicly experienceable motion of matter. Of the distinction between an appearance and a representation of an object Kant writes: But when the movable as such, namely, according to its motion, is to be thought as determined, i.e., for the sake of a possible experience, then it is necessary to indicate the conditions under which the object (matter) must be determined in one way or another by the predicate of motion. Here the question is not of the transformation of illusion into truth, but of appearance into experience. For as regards illusion, the understanding is always involved with its judgements determining an object, although it is always in danger of taking the subjective for the objective (think of the moon illusion in the Critique at A 297/B 354); but in appearance, no judgement at all of the understanding is to be found [MFNS, 555]. The four chapters then, discuss the doctrine of body and determine the concept of matter in relation to the transcendental predicates already familiar to us as the categories. Of this connection between metaphysics and natural science Kant writes: Natural science properly so called presupposes metaphysics of nature; for laws, i.e., principles of the necessity of what belongs to the existence of a thing, are occupied with a concept which does not admit of construction, because existence cannot be presented in any a priori intuition ... the latter must indeed always contain nothing but principles which are not empirical (for that reason it bears the name metaphysics) ... either it can treat of the laws which make possible the concept of nature in general even without reference to any determinate object of experience ... (see the transcendental argument below) or it occupies itself with the special nature of this o that kind of things, of which an empirical concept is given in such a way that besides what lies in this concept, no other empirical principle is construction below [MFNS, 469, 470]. (iv) Brittan on the Construction of the Concept of Matter in MFNS In 'Kant's Two Grand Hypotheses' [Brittan, 1986], Brittan writes that the argument in MFNS regarding the constructibility of the concept matter is partially accomplished, at a general level, in the Critique, and concluded at a more specific level in MFNS, this being related to the two ways of establishing the real possibility of certain concepts. Recall that the first way is to construct the concept in intuition; the second way is to establish its necessity for knowledge by means of a transcendental argument.7 Brittan describes the transcendental argument regarding the possibility of a concept of matter as follows: There are two levels of transcendental argument at stake here. The more general level of transcendental argument goes somewhat as follows . Kant's Refutation of Idealism in KRV turns on the claim that the unity of consciousness requires the existence of objects in some sense external to us. It cannot merely be the case that such objects have spatial location, for otherwise they are not to be distinguished from volumes of empty space. Spatial location does not by itself provide us with a suitable empirical criterion for the existence of objects external to us. In addition to spatial location, and more generally extension, we must also attribute something like impenetrability to such objects, the power to resist and exclude other objects among which are, most importantly, ourselves. Thus the necessity of the concept of matter has to do in the first place with a distinction between matter and space and with the empirical determination of the latter. In this respect, the argument completes Kant's enterprise in KRV [Brittan, 1986, pp. 62, 63]. Brittan characterizes the mathematical construction as follows: As for the construction of the concept of matter, Kant tries in the first two chapters of MAN to show under what conditions the concept of matter is mathematizable. In the first chapter, the Metaphysical Foundations of Phoronomy, where matter is understood as the movable in space, this involves establishing an appropriate additivity rule (given in the law of composition of velocities). In the second chapter, where matter is understood as impenetrable extension or that which "fills" a space, it involves showing determinate degree [Brittan, 1986, p. 64]. However, despite the fact that Kant begins his demonstration of the constructability of the concept of matter in the Critique, Brittan warns that the propositions that Kant tries to prove about matter in MFNS do not have the same synthetic a priori status as do the propositions of the Critique. Brittan explains why: The reason for this is that the concept of matter is an empirical concept . One of its components, motion, can only be given a posteriori, in experience. It follow, I think, that in our world the spatially extended permanent objects required by the unity of consciousness are in fact identical with matter. Matter happens to function as the perceptible representation of spatial and temporal relations, but we can conceive, perhaps barely, of other sorts of changes besides motion in terms of which these relations could be defined [Brittan, 1986, p. 63]. The more specific level of argument in MFNS concerns the demonstration that certain conditions must be met if matter is to be thought of as an impenetrable substance that is also movable. In chapters one and two of MFNS, where Kant deals with intuited quantity and quality with respect to matter, Kant demonstrates that matter, in order to be constructible, must be mathematizable. Regarding the constructibility of matter in intuition Kant writes in the preface to MFNS: Therefore, in order to cognize the possiblity of determinate natural things, and hence to cognize them a priori, there is further required that the intuition corresponding to the concept be given a priori, i.e., that the concept be constructed. Now, rational cognition through the construction of concepts is mathematical ... a pure doctrine of nature concerning determinate natural things (doctrine of body and doctrine of soul) is possible only by means of mathematics. And since in every doctrine of nature only so much science proper is to be found as there is a priori cognition in it, a doctrine of nature will contain only so much science proper as there is applied mathematics in it [MFNS, 470]. That an intuition corresponding to the concept of matter be given in order for matter to be constructible entails that we experience matter both as an extensive magnitude (as having quantity) and as an intensive magnitude (as having quality) according to Kant. According to Brittan, extensive magnitudes are arithmetically addable, that is, parts of objects can be added to form new wholes. That matter has extensive magnitude and thereby has addable parts is what enables the mathematical construction of matter to take place. According to Brittan, this mathematical construction is defined as an additive function: My suggestion is that the constructible is the addable. The reason why non-Euclidean figures, to continue the same example, cannot be constructed is not because we cannot visualize or imagine them, but because there is not an appropriate metric for them as there is, notably, in the case of Euclidean geometry whose distance function is embedded in the Pythagorean Theorem. And there is not an appropriate metric for them, Kant thought, because it is only on the presupposition that a Euclidean metric is supplied by us, a priori, that we can understand how it is that Euclidean geometry applies with perfect precision to the objects of our experience [Brittan, 1986, p. 65]. Brittan then, thinks that the constructible is equatable with the addable, and he demonstrates how this interpretation can be applied to MFNS. He argues that only quantities (and not qualities, i.e., intensive magnitudes) can be fully constructed according to Kant, and that Kant's mathematical construction of matter is therefore located in the Phoronomy.8 In MFNS Kant writes of the mathematical construction: Since in phoronomy I cognize matter by no other property than its movability and hence may consider matter itself only as a point, the motion can be considered only as the description of a space ... The determinate concept of a quantity is the concept of the production of the representation of an object through the composition of the homogeneous. Now since nothing is homogeneous with motion except motion, so phoronomy is a doctrine of the composition of the motions of the same point according to their direction and velocity... [MFNS, 489] Thus, we might interpret Kant here to be saying that what we can know regarding a thing is its motion, and that knowledge of the motion of a thing is related to the measurable units given insofar as an object is subject to the general conditions of space and time. This measurability is, according to Brittan, related to the notion of objectivity for Kant. Brittan writes: On the other reinforcing line of thought, Kant connects measurability with objectivity. Realizing that measurement is not of objects per se but of properties, we ask ourselves, under what conditions can numbers be assigned to them? A traditional answer, most of the elements of which can be found in Kant's text, goes as follows. To begin with, objects can be measured when they can be arranged in some order that is isomorphic to the structure of some numerical system. In particular, if objects can be ordered by a transitive and assymetric relation, then numbers can be assigned to them. Once objects can be ordered in this way, with respect to some property, they can be compared numberically. They can be measured ... A second set of "metrical" conditions must be satisfied before the question "how much?" can be answered. In particular, objects must be physically additive as well as orderable with respect to a given property before physical relations precisely correspond to numerical relations. Thus the precise application of mathematics to intuitions depends on their being extensive magnitudes [Brittan, 1986, pp. 68–69]. Knowledge of objects then, is connected to measurability in that measurability gives determination and determination is a precondition of knowledge. It is connected generally insofar as objects of experience must be subject to the conditions of possible experience, which means that they must be located in space and time. However, determinate spaces and times can be experienced only in terms of a metric defined on spatio-temporal objects, and this metric ensures measurability. Secondly, objects of experience must be extensive magnitudes in order that we apprehend them as the unity of consciousness requires - as successions of parts - this allowing us to detail precisely "how much" an object moved. The fact that we can supply the metric by which we can construct matter is equivalent to thinking of ourselves as supplying the 'form' of knowledge according to Brittan. The 'content' of experience, however, is that which corresponds to the 'real' for Kant. The 'real' has two sides; a subjective side which is embodied as sensation, and an objective side which is embodied as matter: It follows, according to Kant, that we can have a priori knowledge of the forms. Now the forms of our experience are space and time and the content, what fills these forms, is, subjectively considered, sensation, or, objectively considered, matter (that which causes sensations). If we can have a priori knowledge of these forms, then it would seem that our knowledge of the content is a posteriori [Brittan, 1986, p. 67]. According to Brittan then, Kant distinguishes between the concept of matter insofar as it is an extensive magnitude and an intensive magnitude. We shall see that Kant argues that intensive magnitudes such as fundamental forces are non-constructible. Despite this, Brittan thinks that there is an important sense in which the qualitative aspect of matter is objective, and that this is an important part of what Kant wants to establish. For in order that experience be 'about' objects, we must infer merely from our sensory experience of matter as an intensive magnitude with qualitative character that there is matter to which the concept of an intensive magnitude corresponds. The experience of matter as an intensive magnitude then, is an important part of the establishment of the objective validity of the concept of matter and this objective validity cannot be established from the purely quantitative (formal) characteristics of matter. This can be seen as follows: There must be a qualitative content in our perception of objects in order that it be possible for us epistemically to distinguish objects from the space in which they exist, and, in order for us metaphysically to distinguish between objects and empty space, there must be attributed to objects an objective qualitative content corresponding to the qualitative content of sensation. This is matter. Thus, there must be a qualitative (intensive) content in our perception of objects. For what makes something material is essentially its quality of impenetrability. Since qualities are not mathematically additive, and thus in Brittan's sense, are not constructible, while quantities are, there appears to be a certain tension between the two ways of knowing objects. Nevertheless, Brittan claims, Kant wants to establish both the necessity of matter being quantitatively and qualitatively knowable. Historically, there are 'two grand hypotheses' available to Kant about the way in which the material world could be fundamentally understood. The first hypothesis is essentially the Cartesian view of matter as the extended impenetrable, atomistic stuff which can be explained in terms of its mathematical properties; the second hypothesis is the Leibnizian one that matter must further be explained as essentially composed of the attractive and repulsive forces through which it can be thought of as 'filling' space. Brittan argues that the incompatability between the two characteristics is actually resolved in some way by Kant - a way that is important insofar is it reveals a further aim of Kant's metaphysics of natural science. (iv)a The 'Two Grand Hypothesis' One crucial difference between these two hypotheses centers on the way they treat the notion of impenetrability. On the mathematical-mechanical approach in natural science impenetrability is assumed to be an absolute and irreducible property. However, on the metaphysical-dynamical approach impenetrability is understood in terms of a repulsive force admitting of degrees. Hence, impenetrability is, in this latter case, relative impenetrability. According to Brittan, a key advantage that the metaphysical-dynamical approach has over the mechanical approach for Kant, is that the former finds an explanation for the conception of matter as impenetrable in terms of the repulsive forces' infinite compressibility. The difference between what we know of matter in terms of its quantitative and qualitative aspects is resolvable, although perhaps only with a paradoxical result, Brittan thinks, if we grasp the connection between the mathematical and metaphysical components to physical theories. Kant writes at 478 that the metaphysical approach is present in MFNS to a small, but important degree: I have in this treatise followed the mathematical method, if not with all strictness (for which more time would be required than I had to devote to it), at least imitatively. I have done this not in order to get a better reception of it through a display of profundity, but because I believe that such a system is quite capable of mathematical treatment, and that perfection may in time be attained through a cleverer hand when, stimulated by this sketch, mathematical investigators of nature may find it not unimportant to treat the metaphysical portion - which cannot be gotten rid of anyway - as a special fundamental part of general physics, and to bring it into unison with the mathematical doctrine of motion [MFNS, 478]. On the metaphysical-dynamical hypothesis matter is viewed as composed of attractive and repulsive forces. In order for us to understand matter in terms of our own experience of it then, the metaphysical-dynamical hypothesis requires that matter be ultimately explained in terms of the forces that constitute it, and this is why Kant rejects the mechanical-mathematical hypothesis that matter be understood as an absolutely impenetrable extensive magnitude. Brittan writes: ... on the dynamical hypothesis impenetrability is relational, not absolute. An object is impenetrable just to the degree that its repulsive force has been compressed; the more compressed, the more impenetrable is the object. No object is absolutely impenetrable and the degree to which an object is impenetrable can always be determined empirically. Thus the concept of impenetrability on the dynamical hypothesis is not "empty"; there are empirical conditions for its application [Brittan, 1986, p. 82]. There are other discrepancies between the two kinds of hypotheses insofar as they help us to form our concept of matter. Empty space, for instance, may be a hypothesis of the mechanical-mathematical approach, while according to the metaphysical-dynamical approach, it is not empty, but only relatively empty. On the dynamical hypothesis, space is relatively empty because its 'emptiness' is determined in experience in terms of the degree to which objects resist penetration. Since objects only have a relative degree of impenetrability, the determination of this being made empirically in accordance with the degree of compressibility of the repulsive force, space is only relatively empty on this hypothesis. By contrast, given that the mathematical-mechanical hypothesis follows the Cartesian view of matter as an extended, impenetrable substance, this latter hypothesis presumes as fundamental to it both absolute impenetrability and empty space. Furthermore, the metaphysical-dynamical approach hypothesizes that matter be infinitely divisible in order that forces be regarded as continuous, like space and matter, although this is not consistent with the mechanical-mathematical approach. Brittan's argument regarding this can be pieced together as follows: ... on the dynamical hypothesis matter is divisible to infinity since there is in principle no least part into which forces can be divided nor some point past which no object can be compressed. Forces, like space and matter are continuous (p. 83) ... Insofar as geometry is descriptive, in turn, of that which fills space, matter, then matter too must be infinitely divisible ... natural science depends on the infinite divisibility of matter. But the mechanical hypothesis denies the infinite divisibility of matter (p. 81) ... [because] ... no matter how often an object is divided, its parts will always have these properties [quantitative and qualitative] in a determinate magnitude (p. 78) [Brittan, 1986, pp. 83, 81, 78]. So the two types of explanatory approaches to understanding matter seem to force us to embrace conflicting notions about the nature of matter, but, if we understand their origins and role with respect to the establishment of objective validity, Brittan thinks, it is comprehensible why Kant thinks that we should depict matter in these two very different lights. For the dynamical hypothesis is based on what is empirically determinable about matter, while the mechanical-mathematical hypothesis is based on the required freedom of the imagination in making philosophical speculations. We shall see that the postulation of the existence of the fundamental forces cannot be demonstrated by construction, unlike the postulation that matter is an extensive magnitude. On the other hand, no content can be given to the concept of matter except insofar as it is based on experience, and this makes the metaphysical-dynamical approach necessary too. Brittan thinks that this difference between the two sorts of hypotheses explains the need for both explanatory approaches in natural science. (iv)b The Non-Constructibility of Fundamental Forces Following Hartz, Brittan argues that the reason that forces are not constructible is because they do not admit of any measurement as do extensive magnitudes, because they are non-relational. Brittan writes: We can think of all of the properties ascribed to matter by the mechanical hypothesis as relational properties. But, one might argue, relational properties alone do not give us an adequate concept of a physical object. An adequate concept requires the ascription of at least on non-relational property. But the fundamental forces are just such non-relational properties. Therefore, the concept of matter to which the fundamental forces belong is adequate. The difficulty is that for the very reason that they are non-relational they are not mathematizable; that is, not constructible. This larger picture is correct in outline: It supplies a plausible philosophical motive for Kant's embracing the dynamical hypothesis and it accurately locates the crux of Kant's problems [Brittan, 1986, pp. 87–88]. Brittan's view here presupposes that Kant subscribed to the belief that space is relative rather than absolute. The notion that space is absolute was made famous by Newton, and it is, roughly, the notion that there is some absolute frame of reference which allows for a unique determination of which object of a pair of objects in motion relative to one another is in absolute motion, and which (if either) is in absolute rest. The notion that space is relative stands in contrast to this, denying that there is any absolute standard for the determination of absolute motion, and claiming that the motion of an object can only be determined in terms of its relation to other objects in space. Brittan characterizes Kant's position regarding relativity as follows: What interests us here is not so much Kant's proof that the composition of motions can be represented only in a particular way as the remarks he makes concerning absolute space. Kant begins the Phoronomy with a defense of what he calls "relative space" and hence also of "relative motion" (since the motion of an object is defined as the change of its external relations to a given space). Insofar as space, or a space, is to be a possible object of experience, i.e., perceptible, it must be capable of being located with respect to some other space in which its movement may be perceived. All perceptible space is thus relative to some other space in which we assume it to be located. The ideal limit to the procedure of "embedding space". But the concept of absolute space refers only to this ideal limit. It is regulative idea, the principle of construction of ever larger spaces, and not an object of experience [Brittan, 1978, p. 104]. So, since all measurement of objects is made with reference to a relative space, properties must be relational in order to be measurable. The fact that the non-constructability of forces is problematic for Kant is explained by Brittan in terms of the difficulty in assigning a determinate direction to a force given that in each frame of reference the force receives a different value. Brittan writes: These forces [dynamical] are determined for any individual body as a function of its relation to other bodies. But we still face the problem of dividing up the accelerations; if we refer the motion to one frame of reference, we assign a particular value to the postulated forces; if we refer it to another frame, then the forces receive another value. In either case, the notion of a postulated dynamical force is fundamentally indeterminate. It is in this sense that the dynamical forces are not "constructible" [Brittan, 1986, p. 90]. Brittan sums up his appraisal of Kant's endeavour as follows, pointing out that the two hypotheses are a source of tension that Kant has difficulty trying to resolve: In one way, Kant comes to a rather paradoxical conclusion. The mechanical hypothesis is "constructible", but there are no empirical conditions for the application of several of its key concepts. It is not "really possible". The corresponding concepts of the dynamical hypothesis are in the same sense "really possible", but they are not "constructible". The paradox is already indicated in the titles: the mechanical hypothesis is mathematically, but not metaphysically, adequate; the dynamical hypothesis is metaphysically, but not mathematically, adequate. Yet it is one of Kant's central objectives to show that mathematical and metaphysical adequacy coincide, or at the very least are compatible [Brittan, 1986, pp. 90– 91]. Brittan then, thinks that Kant was not entirely successful in establishing the objective validity of the concept of matter because he must rely on a non-constructible concept of matter as force to establish the real possibility of matter as a determinate concept, but could successfully construct the concept mathematically only given a different conception of matter as the absolutely impenetrable. The conclusion that Brittan [1986] tried to draw from his view that certain tensions exist between the dynamical and mechanical hypothesis matter is constructible, but not really possible, while on the dynamical hypothesis, matter is really possible although not constructible. The tension is that alone neither hypothesis is adequate, and that as a consequence both hypotheses are necessary but construe matter in conflicting ways. Brittan explains the existence of such a tension in terms of a general concern of Kant's to distinguish between form and content in his Critical philosophy: The paradox results, I think, from a deeper tension at the heart of Kant's philosophical enterprise. On the one hand, he wants to distinguish sharply between form and content, to maintain that knowledge a priori is alone possible of the former, and to conclude that the limits of our experience and of the world. On the other hand, he wants to maintain that content has its own form, to maintain that we can have some a priori knowledge of it, and to conclude that our experience is in some sense directly and immediately of the real. One view emphasizes the measurable aspects of our experience, the other its purely qualitative aspects. Kant undoubtedly thought that he could combine both into a comprehensive view. I think he failed [Brittan, 1986, p. 91]. Brittan does concede however that it is possible to view Kant's enterprize in such a way that it does not have to face such a paradoxical tension. On this view, Kant is thought of as establishing only the internal (transcendental) reality of natural science, which, if true, dissolves the tension between the 'two grand hypotheses' somewhat. Brittan, while not committing himself to this view (he writes here with reference also to the views of himself and Butts) writes: This third view is that the reality of natural science is an internal reality. T he distinction between what is real and what is not is a scientific distinction, elaborated in a number of different ways as a contrast between motions, real forces, real causes and real objects are those which are merely hypothesized or are otherwise apparent. The reality of natural science does not depend either on identifying, as it did with Descartes, the real with the measurable, or on identifying, as did Leibniz, the real with the non-measurable. It is itself part of natural science, although to point this out, of course, is to give up the attempt to say what is, all cards on the table, really real. To opt for empirical realism as I think Kant, rightly construed, understood it, is at the same time to opt for a kind of transcendental idealism [Brittan, 1986, p. 91]. (v) Butts on the Construction of the Concept of Matter in MFNS We now turn to an alternative picture which is that of Butts [1984]. Butts stresses the epistemological importance of the dynamical and mechanical hypotheses in contrast to Brittan's ontological interpretation. What this means is that according to Butts, the hypotheses have certain functions in grounding the concept of matter insofar as we can have knowledge of it. His general thesis is that Kant was less concerned to show what the ontological conclusions are that can be reached regarding the concept of matter (as an extensive magnitude of force) and was more concerned with the methodological conclusions. For example, in connection with Kant's doctrine about absolute space, Butts writes: ... Kant's construction of point motion addition as well as his other constructions invoke a heuristic principle in the form of a demoted idea of reason. The concept of absolute space is not appealed to as an ascertainable ontological feature of the physical world, but only as the methodological rule that one can add additional frames of spatial reference whenever they are required to solve a problem not otherwise tractable. Thus the heir to the metaphysical idea of absolute space with which Kant struggled in his early works is a methodological principle and nothing more [Butts, 1984, p. 194]. Butts also applies this methodological perspective on Kant's account of construction: If I am right in stressing that Kant's categorical structure is a structure of rules (the most interesting ones of which are semantical rules, rules of constructing, projecting, doing, making), and if I am right thnking that Kant construed mathematical objects as idealizations, then the correctness of the application of the rules in the idealization is not predetermined, it is a way of seeing, looking for, understanding and expecting. In short, a Kantian idealization of sensation is a structure of searching for and hopefully finding ... Kant's entire categorial structure (his epistemic grammar and its required semantical rules) is one complex and exotic set of expectations that reality will be the sorts of things we can understand and comprehend under scientific laws [Butts, 1984, p. 197]. Butts then, can be summarized here as follows: mathematical constructions are idealizations and which are partly explainable in terms of our general set of expectations that nature will be scientific. The role of sensation is merely of epistemic import here: it serves as an empirical check on theory construction, but the construction itself has a will of its own insofar as it seeks to idealize experience: ... the nature of sensing, as I have been urging all along, provides a model of decisive observationality. In sensation a state is introduced that was not previously present; in this sense only sensation is decisive. It remains subjective, and science seeks objective knowledge depending on public methods of aquisition. Thus observations in science only need to imitate the model of decisiveness without becoming restricted to particular states of consciousness. Sensations yield undetermined appearances and are in this respect theory free. Observations made by an instrument remark idealized "presences" fully determined by theory: The instrument is designed to capture just those idealized features of data which the presence of sensation leaves mysterious [Butts, 1984, pp. 199-200]. The role of sensation then, is to guide the scientific aspect of the activity of making scientific theories, according to Butts, rather than that of helping to provide objective validity as Brittan argues. The general picture of scientific activity then, that Butts wants to depict as being Kant's is the following: ... that we cannot know beyond the bounds of possible experience does not commit us to accept that all knowledge is sensational, direct and sharp like pains in the hand. And that we cannot sense external objects except that they be represented in euclidean space does not prevent us from trying out sub-grammars that permit new construction, new definitions. What science, as Double Government Science, does it give us some assurance that in the absence of direct empiricism and an sich realism we can still get on with the job; the human resources for making and selecting worlds are, for humans, enough [Butts, 1984, p. 200]. Thus while Brittan emphasized the role of sensation in providing the subjective side of what is real in the concept of matter [Brittan, 1986], for Butts the role of sensation is that of a mere guide in the very initial stages of construction. For Butts then, the idealizations of construction make the establishment of a concept of matter appear to be quite speculative. This depiction of the nature of construction is in keeping with our original view of the importance of the faculty of Reason in establishing the possibility of empirical hypotheses. For Reason is the faculty which urges us to seek out lawlikeness and unity in experience, and tries to idealize experience. Furthermore, because Butts stresses the epistemological function of the two hypotheses, the tension that Brittan tried to establish loses import. In commenting on a later version of Butts' account [Butts, 1986], Brittan argues that Butts makes three good points [Brittan, 1986, p. 89]. The first is that the dynamical hypothesis is important methodologically because it explains how forces are related to scientific theories. The second is that the dynamical and mechanical hypotheses are not rival views of reality. The third is that Kant's position is made problematic by his inconsistent application of empirical and transcendental realism. Brittan however, is critical of Butts because Butts' account does not itself explain why Kant was particularly concerned to show that mattter has intensive magnitude and obeys the LUG. Brittan argues that a better explanation of the need for two approaches is that it is part of Kant's hope to show that fundamental forces provide the concept of matter with objective validity, despite their non-constructability. Brittan thinks that this endeavour of Kant's was not entirely successful, but that this should simply be regarded as a fundamental difficulty of Kant's task. By way of summing up we note that Brittan's own view is vulnerable to criticism. First of all, as Brittan himself demonstrates, if we view Kant as merely trying to establish transcendental idealism, then the apparent tension that Brittan sets regarding the two ways in which matter is depicted by the two different hypotheses dissolves. Secondly, if we want to count MFNS as part of Kant's critical philosophy (and I certainly do) it must be read as a work that is primarily concerned with establishing the epistemological conditions of natural science rather than as an attempt to regard matter as determined according to certain ontological features. Agreeing with Butts then, I argue that Kant is not primarily concerned to establish exactly what there is, but what the conditions for saying what there is are. Given the view that MFNS is part of Kant's critical philosophy and that this entails the establishment of the conditions for knowledge, then I must side with Butts in arguing that the dynamical and mechanical hypotheses are significant only insofar as they are methodological limitations of what natural science can say about the concept of matter, and that Kant is simply interested in exposing the epistemological features by which natural science must be constrained. (vi) The Establishment of Metaphysical Lawlikeness in MFNS Butt's methodological account can be compared to Buchdahl's notion that there is a certain 'looseness of fit' between the empirical, metaphysical and transcendental levels in Kantian thought. For Buchdahl [1972] claimed that there is a gap between the transcendental and empirical levels and that the establishment of transcendental lawlikeness could not lead directly to the establishment of empirical lawlikeness without an independent foundation being shunted between the two levels, as we say in Chapter I. This independent foundation is I think, what Buchdahl refers to as metaphysical lawlikeness, and I will try to show how Butts' characterization of the nature of the construction of the concept of matter can be viewed as Kant's attempt to establish metaphysical lawlikeness in MFNS. Although only vaguely characterized by Buchdahl, we can still determine enough about metaphysical lawlikeness from his article [Buchdahl, 1972] to determine that it is essentially linked to the construction of empirical concepts and the real possibility of empirical lawlikeness and natural science. Buchdahl says of metaphysical lawlikeness that: 1. It is tied to the metaphysical construction of empirical concepts. 2. The importance of metaphysical lawlikeness rests in its role in establishing the real possibility of empirical science. 3. The construction of empirical concepts is the source of the necessitarian and scientific character of metaphysical laws. 4. Metaphysical lawlikeness is responsible for 'seeking out' an accordance between the transcendental lawlikeness of the Principles and the possibility of empirical lawlikenss established in MFNS, or, is that kind of lawlikeness which is established in MFNS. Characterized as such, metaphysical lawlikeness still remains a fairly mysterious concept. As Buchdahl characterizes it, it is linked to the establishment of the possibility of empirical lawlikeness in MFNS and is in fact the kind of lawlikeness established in MFNS. This in itself seems plausible enough: for as we have seen possibility must be established both at a general level, which is the level at which transcendental lawlikeness is established, and at a specific level, which we might regard as the level at which metaphysical lawlikeness is established. Moreover, Buchdahl links metaphysical lawlikeness to the construction of concepts. We have already seen that the possibility of empirical lawlikeness depends upon the general and specific constructability of concepts. Given this and a demonstration of how that metaphysical lawlikeness plays a role in the construction of concepts (in that it carries half of the responsibility for their constructibility) and is established in MFNS we may be in a position to attempt to clarify further what the exact nature and role of metaphysical lawlikeness is in the establishment of the possibility of natural science. My suggestion is that we regard metaphysical lawlikeness as that lawlikeness which allows us to bridge the gap between our experience of matter, which leads us to conceptualize matter as composed of forces, and our idealized constructions of the specific concept of matter. This view presupposes the accuracy of Butts' interpretation of the nature of the specific construction of the concept of matter as well as Buchdahl's argument that certain gaps exist between the empirical, transcendental and metaphysical levels in Kant. Given this picture, metaphysical lawlikenss is that kind of lawlikeness which ensures the legitimacy of idealized constructions of empirical concepts. As such, metaphysical lawlikeness serves a function comparable to, but more specific than transcendental lawlikenss regarding empirical lawlikeness. For transcendental lawlikenss ensure that the general conditions of our experience of objects in space and time allows us to experience nature as lawlike, but this argument is at a very general level. Metaphysical lawlikeness is established in constructing empirical concepts and ensures that particular experiences of objects at the sensory level are consistent with the idealized mathematical construction required if empirical lawlikeness is to be possible. Thus, both the establishment of transcendental and metaphysical lawlikeness, and in doing a critical analysis of what the conditions for a natural sicence are, Kant had to establish the possibilities of both of the former kinds of lawlikeness. It is important at this point to clarify the distinction between Kant's references to the Principles of metaphysics, or metaphysical principles, and metaphysical lawlikeness. If my interpretation of what metaphysical lawlikeness is correct then it is clear why both of these features of Kantian thought should be entitled 'metaphysical'. For, traditionally, the metaphysical always concerns that which we can say about the ontology of the world. Kant, in his critical philosophy, is critical of metaphysics in this old sense and thinks that before we undertake any sort of metaphysics that we must determine what the conditions limiting that which we can say about our experience of the natural world are. The metaphysical principles then, provide general directions for understanding our experience of nature, while metaphysical lawlikeness would have to be that which ensures the connection between specific experiences of objects in nature and mathematical constructions of concepts. As such then, both may be termed metaphysical in that they relate to our experience of nature, but the two must be regarded as distinct. We may summarize our terminology and clarify the relations between concepts that we have used as follows then: Empirical lawlikeness is that kind of lawlike regularity which we notice in our experience of the nature world. When we always experience heavy objects as tending to fall towards the earth with a certain velocity, we postulate that there is an attractive force which explains the lawlikeness that we observe in our experience of objects in nature. Transcendental lawlikeness explains the general conditions of our experience that make such experiences possible, and it justifies the formulation of certain metaphysical principles which are general laws describing the relations between objects which we will experience. Thus, transcendental lawlikeness leads us to think of the relationship between heavy objects and their falling toward the earth, only that the concepts through which we must think these objects as related have imparted a certain lawlikeness into our experience of them as related. Metaphysical lawlikeness legitimates the more specific construction of empirical concepts of objects insofar as they are ideal, which is a required step between transcendental and empirical lawlikeness. For metaphysical lawlikeness allows us to proceed from the basis of our experience of matter as relatively impenetrable (insofar as it is subject to attractive force) to the idealization, made for this purpose of understanding observed empirical regularities, that matter can be regarded as possessing certain ideal proprerties, for instance, absolute impenetrability. Thus the lawlikeness here is simply the guarantee that this jump from experience to the ideal can or must be made if empirical lawlikeness is to be possible. If I have correctly depicted metaphysical lawlikeness as linking our particular experiences of objects with the idealized mathematical construction of concepts, then Buchdahl's claim that lawlikeness in general is the result of the legislative function of Reason is also supported. For it could only be Reason, as the faculty which seeks to unify and to idealize which could be responsible for the seeking out of a conformity between particular experiences of objects and idealized constructions, in order that it enable a system of empirical laws to be developed by humans in their attempt to depict nature as a coherent whole. That the faculty of Reason as a unifier of experience is relevant to this case is important. For in order that the 'special metaphysics' in MFNS be successfully established not only must metaphysical lawlikeness, the legitimator of the construction of empirical concepts be established, but so must the methodology involved in establishing the possibility of empirical lawlikeness be reflective of Reason's need to unify experience. We discussed the methodological jutification of empirical lawlikeness and its connection to the faculty of Reason in Chapter I, and that metaphysical lawlikeness is reflective of Reason's unificatory procedures fits together nicely with Buchdahl's view that Reason has an important role in establishing the possibility of natural science and empirical lawlikeness. That metaphysical lawlikeness is the result of Reason's unificatory procedures also explains how metaphysical lawlikeness is possible and is established in practice. Another important conclusion that should be drawn here is that given this picture of metaphysical lawlikeness and Kant's claim at A 720/B 748 that the a priori construction of appearances is only possible with respect to the general conditions of space and time, it follows that the more specific construction of the concept of matter does not involve establishing its a prioricity, but only involves establishing the link between particular experiences of objects and our ability to make idealized mathematical constructions which correspond to these experiences of objects. This then, tells us something more about the nature of the construction of empirical concepts insofar as it can be linked to a prioricity: we can know only generally that the concept of an empirical object is subject to the conditions of experience and is in this way linked to the a priori, while regarding the specific construction of empirical concepts in MFNS we can know only that it involves the possibility of metaphysical lawlikeness and depends upon the unificatory procedures of Reason in its establishment of the possibility of an empirical science. Finally, a word of criticism directed at Brittan's depiction of the tensions in Kant's thought regarding the construction of empirical concepts: The tensions that Brittan set up were the result of a focus on the ontological status of the concept of matter given the mechanical and dynamical hypotheses. I have tried to show that if we remember that Kant's concerns regarding metaphysics and a foundation for natural science were primarily epistemological rather than ontological, and, that if we grasp the nature of lawlikeness for Kant and its functions at different parts of Kant's critical thought, then we can see that Kant's endeavour was not so problematic and tension-filled as Brittan depicts it to be. The reason that Brittan finds this tension in Kantian thought is, I think, not only because of his emphasis on the ontological, but also because of his failure to grasp fully the need for and function of a third kind of lawlikeness in establishing the possibility of empirical lawlikeness. This lawlikeness is, I claim metaphysical lawlikeness. For several reasons, then, it may be useful and illuminating to regard metaphysical lawlikeness as that kind of lawlikeness which links our particular experiences of nature and our mathematical constructions of concepts, and as the lawlikeness necessary for the establishment of the possibility of empirical lawlikeness and natural science in general. Footnotes 1. I will be citing articles and books in the text of this paper by referring to the author, year of publication and page number after an initial introduction by title. The Critique of Pure Reason will be cited as the Critique and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science will be cited as MFNS. When quoting from the Critique I will cite the shortened version of the title, and either M or NKS - which stand for the Meiklejohn and Norman Kemp Smith translations respectively. 2. Many commentators on Kant's Second Analogy have interpreted his discussion ofa causality to be an attempt to refute Hume's skepticism regarding causality. Buchdahl, however, would find such an association misleading because it leads to a Strawsonian type of objection that that Kant did not successfully demonstrte that knowledge of the existence of an objective causal order in nature could be determined a priori. Hume's problem can be described as follows: The conjunction of causes and effects by humans must be the result of human experience and could never be determined as necessary a priori. Because we determine certain events to be causes and other effects of these causes based on past experiences of a constant conjunction of these events, the causality that we infer to exist is not due to a necessity of reason, but only custom. In An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding cited from Reason at Work, p. 317, Hume concludes that; `All belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived merely from some object present to the memory or senses and a customary conjunction between some other object ... if flame or snow be presented anew to the sense, the mind is carried by custom to expect heat or cold, and to believe that such a quality does exist and will discover itself upon a nearer approach. This belief is the necessary result of placing the mind in such circumstances. It is an operation of the soul, when we are so situated, as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love, when we receive benefits; or hatred, when we meet with injuries. All these operations are a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able either to produce or to prevent.' 3. Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. New York: The BobbsMerrill Company, Inc., 1955, pp. 18-20. 4. David Lewis. ` Causation'. i n Causation and Conditionals, edited by Ernest Sosa, London: Oxford University Press, 1975, pp. 181–182 5. See Brittan [1978, p. 136] for a discussion of this. 6. This outline is following Ellington's sketch of MFNS in the introduction to his translation of MFNS, pp. xvi–xviii. 7. See my quote from Brittan in section (iii) of chapter one. 8. See Brittan [1986, pp. 84–85] for a discussion of this. Bibliography Allison, Henry E. Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense. London; Yale University Press, 1983. Bennett, Jonathan. Kant's Analytic. New York; Cambridge University Press, 1966. Brittan, Gordon. Kant's Theory of Science. Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1978. Brittan, Gordon. `Kant's Two Grand Hypotheses' in Kant's Philosophy of Physical Science, edited by R.E. Butts. Boston; D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1986, pp. 61-94. Buchdahl, Gerd. Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science. Oxford; Basil Blackwell, 1969. Buchdahl, Gerd. ` Reduction-Realization: A Key to the structure of Kant's Thought' in Philosophical Topics, edited by Robert Shahan, Norman, Oklahoma; Philosophical Topics Inc., 1982, pages 39–95. Buchdahl, Gerd. The Concept ion of Lawlikeness in Kant's Philosophy of Science' in Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress, edited by L.W. Beck., Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1972, pages 149–171. Butts, Robert. Kant and the Double Government Methodology. Boston; D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1984. Goodman, Nelson. Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. New York ; The BobbsMerrill Company, Inc., 1955. Hempel, Carl. Aspects of Scientific Explanation. New York; CollierMacmillan, 1965. Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Norman Kemp Smith. Toronto; Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1929. Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgement. Translated by James Meredith. Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1952. Kant, Immanuel. Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Translated by James Ellington. New York; Bobbs-Merrill, 1970. Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by J.M.D. Meiklejohn. New York; Everyman's Library, 1979. Lewis, David. ` Causation' in Causation and Conditionals, edited by Ernest Sosa, London; Oxford University Press, 1975, pages 181–182. Pippin, Robert. Kant's Theory of Form: An Essay on the Critique of Pure Reason. Yale University Press, London, 1982. Warnock, G.J.. ` Concepetual Schematism' in Analysis 9 (1948-49), Oxford; Basil Blackwell, pages 77– 82.

Essay 3.4 Comments on 'Hume's Master Argument' Charles Pigden 1. Why Ockham? Do we really need the full panoply of Ockhamist Logic to reconstruct Hume's Master Argument? It seems to me that we can get by with a lot less: DEM) The thesis that if X is the conclusion of a demonstration (a valid deductive argument with necessary and self-evident premises K) then the negation of X entails a contradiction. This thesis is reiterated by Leibniz in the preamble to the Theodicy (Leibniz, 1985, 74-75) a book which we know Hume read because he refers to it in the Abstract (4/646). CONT) The thesis (widely believed in the early 18th Century) that in a demonstrative argument (that is a valid deductive argument from consistent premises) the premises cannot conceivably be true and the conclusion false because the matter of the conclusion is (somehow) contained in the premises. (See the Introduction and Essay 2.3 for details.) We can now reformulate the Master Argument as follows: To prove: A) That no conclusion Ψ about the future characteristics or activities of objects (and hence no a-temporal generalizations about such characteristics or activities) can be derived via deductive reason, either from self-evident premises Φ or from a premise set Θ consisting of the reports of past observations. 1) By DEM) no such thesis Ψ can be the conclusion of a demonstration (that is a deductive argument from self-evident and necessary premises, Φ). For if it were, its negation would entail a contradiction. But 'the contrary of every matter of fact [which Ψ would have to be] is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction'(EHU. 4.1.2/25). 110 2) By CONT) no thesis about the future characteristics or activities of objects Ψ can be the conclusion of a demonstrative argument from a premise set Θ consisting of the reports of past observations. For if it were, the matter of Ψ would have to be contained in Θ. But 'when a man says, I have found, in all past instances, such sensible qualities conjoined with such secret powers: And when he says, Similar sensible qualities will always be conjoined with similar secret powers; he is not guilty of a tautology, nor are these propositions in any respect the same' (EHU, 1.2.37/37). 'The [idea of] the effect is totally different from the [idea of] the cause, and consequently can never be discovered in it' (EHU, 4.1.9/29). Since there is new matter in the conclusion (matter concerning the future or the effect) which represents a 'new relation or affirmation', no conclusion about the future characteristics or activities of objects Ψ can be derived via deductive reason from a premise set Θ consisting of observation reports about the past. 3) Further, by CONT) given a premise set Θ of observation reports about the past, it is conceivable that the premises could be true and a conclusion Ψ about the future false. Given a true premise Θ about the cause ('a Billiard-Ball moving in a straight line towards another') and a conclusion Ψ about how the second Billiard ball will move when struck by the first, the negation of Ψ is conceivable ('may I not conceive that a hundred different events might as well follow from that cause?'). (EHU, 4.1.10/29.) Hence the argument from Θ to Ψ is not deductively valid which means that Ψ cannot be derived from Θ via deductive reason. 4) It might be objected that it is possible to bridge the gap between Θ and Ψ with the aid of some such premise Ω as 'the future will resemble the past' (EHU, 4.1.21/37) which might itself be deduced either from a set of necessary and selfevident premises Φ or a set of premises about past observations Θ. Setting aside the not inconsiderable problems of formulating such a principle precisely, from DEM) Ω is not deducible from necessary and self-evident premises Φ, since it's negation is conceivable and does not imply a contradiction. And from CONT) Ω cannot be validly derived from a set of observation reports about the past Θ, since its matter is not contained within such a set. 'Let the course of things be allowed 111 hitherto ever so regular; that alone, without some new argument or inference, proves not, that, for the future, it will continue so' (EHU, 4.2.21/38). 5) Therefore A) no conclusion Ψ about the future characteristics or activities of objects can be derived via formal deductive reason, either from self-evident premises Φ or from a premise set Θ consisting of the reports of past observations. QED. This is, I think the underlying argument of EHU, 4. The logical principles to which Hume was appealing were 'venerable, and of long-standing, not recent discoveries or innovations with which the reader might not have caught up'. Nor were they principles lost in the mists of medieval antiquity or consigned to oblivion as useless pedantries (which is unfortunately what had happened to Ockham's rules). They were the logical orthodoxies of Hume's day. Thus in developing the argument of EHU, 4, Hume was 'putting together various things which were well known separately, but which [would have had] a shocking conclusion when put together'. Negative principles of inference derived from the medieval tradition (3.1§2), were not necessary since positive principles of inference derived from the likes of Arnauld and Nicole had negative implications. If the conclusion of a valid argument must be contained within the premises, then if the conclusion of an argument is not contained in the premises, the argument is not valid. It is easy to adapt the Master Argument to prove B) That no conclusion Ψ' about external objects can be derived via deductive reason, either from self-evident premises Φ' or from a premise set Θ' consisting of the reports of past sensations. I leave this in the manner of logic texts as an exercise for the reader. But what about NoOught-From-Is? From Hume's point of view, this is simply a substitution instance of CONT). It plays its part in a variant of the Master Argument. To prove C.i) That (perhaps with certain important exceptions) no non-trivial moral proposition O can be demonstrated, that is, that no non-trivial moral proposition can be derived via deductive reasoning either from a set of self-evident moral 112 propositions O1 ...On, or from a set of self-evident non-moral propositions (propositions devoid of moral matter) Φ'', C.ii) That no moral proposition O can be demonstrated, in a looser sense, that is, that no such proposition O can be derived via formal deductive reasoning from a set of non-moral propositions (propositions devoid of moral matter) Θ'', consisting of claims about the being of a God, or 'observations concerning human affairs' which, though (supposedly) obvious or undeniable, are not self-evident in the strongest sense. (The 'demonstrations' of Hobbes and Cumberland, and the projected demonstrations of Locke would appear to involve premises of this kind see Essay 5.2.) 1) (With certain important exceptions) no non-trivial moral proposition (that is, no non-trivial proposition whose matter is distinctively moral) is self-evident. Hume does not make explicit use of DEM) to argue for this, perhaps from a motive of prudence. (It does not do, in righteously censorious times, to overemphasize your belief that [almost] any moral proposition can be negated without self-contradiction.) Instead, he hints at DEM) in his polemic against Wollaston and argues explicitly that moral propositions don't have the kind of characteristics that propositions have to have in order to be self-evident. They are not true in virtue of 'relations of ideas'. These arguments do not repay the considerable degree of effort required to understand them. Hume would have been better off if he had simply stuck with DEM). 1a) Triviality is close under deduction. That is, if a set of premises K is trivial and K ⊩ X, then X is trivial too. 2) By CONT) in the form of No-Ought-From-Is, no substantive moral thesis O, involving the distinctively moral matter can be the conclusion of a formal demonstrative argument from a premise set Φ'', consisting of self-evident but non-moral truths (self-evident truths not involving moral matter). For if it were, the matter of O would have to be contained in Φ''. But conclusions O about how things ought to be are not contained in premise sets Φ'' about how things are (and the same goes for conclusions involving the other distinctively moral terms, when the premises from which they are to be derived do not contain any corresponding 113 moral matter). Since there is new matter in the conclusion (often conveyed by the moral copula) which represents a 'new relation or affirmation', no moral conclusion O can be derived via formal deductive reason from premise sets Φ'' consisting of self-evident but non-moral propositions. 3a) Hence Ci) that - (perhaps with certain important exceptions) no non-trivial moral proposition O can be demonstrated (See Essay 5.2.§15) Of course, the proof of Cii) is so trivial for a logically educated philosopher of Hume's era as to be hardly worth stating. 3b) By CONT) in the form of No-Ought-From-Is, no substantive thesis O, involving distinctively moral matter can be the conclusion of a formally valid deductive argument from a premise set Θ'', not containing moral matter but consisting of claims about 'the being of a God' or 'observations concerning human affairs' For if it were, the matter of O would have to be contained in Θ''. which ex hypothesi it is not. Hence Cii). However in the moral case there is no equivalent of step 4). For on Hume's showing it is sometimes possible to bridge the gap between a set of observations concerning human affairs Θ'' and a moral proposition O with the aid of an analytic bridge principle Ω''. Hume 'defines' a virtue to be whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation, thus making it analytic that the mental actions or qualities which exercise this influence are in fact virtues. (EMP, App 1.10/289). Indeed, following Hutcheson he even suggests a definition of 'obligation', and hence presumably of 'ought': 'when the neglect or nonperformance of [an action] displeases us after a [certain] manner, we say that we lie under an obligation to perform it' (T, 3.2.5.4/517). Thus it is analytic (for Hume) that A ought to do B if and only if the omission of B by A would excite the sentiment of disapprobation in any suitably qualified observer. These propositions, which presumably hold true in virtue of 'relations of ideas', are the apparent exceptions to Hume's general view that no non-trivial moral proposition (no proposition involving moral matter) is demonstrable. With the aid of such truths we can derive moral conclusions from 'observations concerning human affairs' (namely observations about what we ideally disposed to approve or disapprove of). Indeed a sufficiently astute Martian anthropologist would in principle be able to do this even if she herself were a stranger to the sentiments of approbation and disapprobation. But - 114 and this is a very big 'but' that is not how human beings typically do it. Our opinions about moral distinctions are not in fact derived from reason (where reason includes conceptual truths and the results of empirical enquiry), except perhaps in sociologically based investigations such as Hume's in the EPM. Rather we arrive at the moral truth by approximating the ideal observer and consulting our sentiments. Thus morality is usually 'more properly felt than judg'd of' (T, 3.1.2.1/470). But it is not just that our opinions about moral distinctions are usually based on feelings rather than reason the distinctions themselves are derived from sentiment rather than reason, since if we did not share certain dispositions to approve and disapprove it would be impossible to form rational opinions about them. You cannot use reason to discover facts about feelings unless there are facts about feelings for reason to discover. But however that may be, there is no need for Ockham in any of this. 2. Transcending Reason Right or Wrong? 'We can bring out this problem [of how Hume knows that Custom is reliable] by imagining, parallel with Hume, that there is a faculty which produces superstitious beliefs: call it, the faculty of Superstition'. So says Heathcote at 3.1§4). But there is no need for imagination here, since Hume believed in at least two such faculties or propensities: 1) a 'universal propensity to believe in invisible, intelligent power[s that is, gods which] if not an original instinct, [is] at least a general attendant of human nature' (NHR, 15.5/184), depending, as it does, upon 'an universal tendency amongst mankind to conceive all beings like themselves, and to transfer to every object those qualities ... of which they are intimately conscious (NHR, 3.2/141); and 2) a tendency on the part of 'the mind' 'when any thing is affirmed utterly absurd and miraculous', to 'admit of such a fact, upon account of that very circumstance, which ought to destroy all its authority' [my italics] because of the agreeable 'passion of surprize and wonder' that such reports excite. (ECU. 10.16/117). Thus we have a propensity to believe in gods which is founded, in part, on a universal tendency to take the universe personally. We have an 'Inclination to find our own Figures in the Clouds our Face in the Moon, our Passions & Sentiments even in inanimate Matter [but] such an Inclination may, & ought to be controul'd [my italics], & can never be a legitimate Ground of Assent' (Letters, 1.72/151, Hume to Elliot, 10/2/1751). Call this propensity 115 Superstition 1. (This is not quite Hume's terminology, since he has a rather more sophisticated concept of Superstition, but it will do for present purposes.) And we have a tendency to believe in the miraculous though such beliefs are not warranted by reason (where reason has been augmented by a judicious dose of Custom) because it is fun to believe in the weird and wonderful. Call this tendency Superstition 2. And there is of course a fourth faculty, the Moral Sense, which enables us to formulate moral beliefs, though such beliefs are not usually derived from reason, even in an extended sense. Much of Hume's work is a set of variations on a single theme (the generalized Hume thesis or GHT): Beliefs of kind K are not usually derived via reason from experience (indeed, this may be impossible). Instead they are the products of a causal mechanism or set of mechanisms, a faculty or set of propensities Z. Beliefs about external objects and mundane beliefs about causal connections cannot be derived via reason from experience but are solely the products of Custom. As Hume argues in the Natural History, beliefs about the divine are not usually (and as he argues in the Dialogues cannot be) derived from experience by reason-augmented-by-Custom, but are primarily the products of Superstition 1. Beliefs in the miraculous cannot be derived from experience by reason-augmented-by-Custom but are often the products of Superstition 2. Moral beliefs, though 'in a great measure, infallible' (T, 3.2.8.8/546), are usually not derived from experience by reason-augmented-by-Custom (though this may be technically possible given certain conceptual truths) but are in fact almost always the offspring of the Moral Sense. Now the problem with the GHT is this. In the case of Custom and the Moral Sense, Hume seems to think that it allowable, perhaps even obligatory, to transcend reason and to go with the flow of the causal mechanisms Z. But in the case of Superstition 1 and 2 he does not. These are propensities that we ought not indulge. Has Hume got a principled basis for this preference? Let's start with the Moral Sense. The reason that Hume thinks that this is a reliable belief-generating mechanism is that the moral facts are defined in terms of its outputs. To say that an act is right is to say that, because of our shared Moral Sense, we have a tendency to approve of it under certain conditions. These include a clear view of the relevant facts. Hence, if our Moral Sense causes us to approve of an action under the relevant conditions, it follows automatically that it is right. In particular cases people can make mistakes in morals, since their reactions can be based upon factual errors and their Moral Sense perverted by 116 partial passions. But when it comes to generalities the conversational conventions compel us to adopt the general point of view. 'It is impossible we could ever converse together on any reasonable terms [without] continual contradictions, [unless we arrived] at a more stable judgment of things, [by fixing on] some steady and general points of view, and always, in our thoughts, plac[ing] ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation' (T, 3.3.1.17/581-2). And when discussing generalities mankind is less liable to error than when discussing particular persons or actions. This leads Hume to declare, in a moment of hyperbole, that in the case of morals 'the general opinion of mankind ... is perfectly infallible'! (T, 3.2.9.4/552.) But this is not, I think, his considered opinion. For human beings are prone to factual error, particularly under the influence of Superstition 1, which gives rise to the 'delusive glosses of superstition and false religion' (EPM, 9.1.3/ 270). And these in turn pervert the operations of the Moral Sense, leading people to mistake the monkish vices for virtues, in the erroneous belief that they are useful and agreeable, if not in this life then in the life to come. What about Custom? Here things are different. Causal facts are not defined as the outputs of Custom even if Custom is operating at optimum. To say that A causes B is not say that Custom causes us to believe (under certain circumstances) that A causes B. Thus Hume must have some other basis for his evident opinion that we ought to transcend reason and accept the deliverances of Custom. What is it? For Hume it is a fact, though an unknowable and unprovable fact, that we live in a law-governed world, characterized by regular causal process. Given such a world, Custom a propensity to formulate beliefs in accordance with some appropriately refined principle of induction is a reasonably reliable belief-forming mechanism. It is not perfect, of course, (though Hume does suggest measures for perfecting it) but if we adopted any other beliefforming strategy with respect to everyday causal connections we would 'perish and go to ruin' (T, 1.4.4.1/225). Imagine the mess we would be in if we formulated our beliefs about causal connections in accordance with some counter-inductive principle! There is thus 'a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas; [so that] our thoughts and conceptions [go] on in the same train with the other works of nature' (ECU, 5.2.21/54-55). Hume also seems to think though he is not as clear about this as he might be that if we indulge our inductive propensities, whilst enlarging our experience and taking care to proportion belief to the evidence, then we will tend, over time, to converge on the same results. Indeed, this is precisely what we would expect if a) we lived in a world of causal regularities and b) some refined version of induction were a reasonably reliable method of finding out about them. 'The INDIAN prince, who refused to believe the first 117 relations concerning the effects of frost' (ECU, 10.1.10/113), may have 'reasoned justly' in refusing to believe such reports, but, being a 'just' inductive reasoner, he would soon have changed his mind if we had enlarged his experience by transporting him to Scotland or even the Himalayas. Under favourable circumstances, Custom causes us to converge on the facts. 'How does Hume know that [Custom] is likely to be reliable in the future, granted that it was reliable in the past?' In one sense he doesn't know: he doesn't have knowledge in the sense of scientia. For he doesn't have a deductive argument from premises of which he has certain knowledge, that the future will resemble the past, and thus that Custom is largely reliable. Hence it is logically possible, given such premises, that the causal regularities which govern the world will suddenly give out. But in another sense he not only has knowledge but a 'proof', 'meaning [by 'proof'] such [an] argument from experience as leave[s] no room for doubt or opposition' (ECU. 10.1n/56). For all of our experience testifies to a world largely characterized by causal regularities (though Hume is clearly overstating the case when he seems to suggest that experience excludes the possibility of indeterministic causation). Thus the faculty of Custom begets a belief in the reliability of Custom. (We are inductively justified in believing in some form of induction.) This means, however, that Heathcote is wrong to suppose that all question-begging arguments are deductive and therefore that non-deductive (inductive-probabilistic) arguments do not beg the question (3.1§5). For there are more subtle ways of begging the question than simply assuming what you set out to prove. You can also beg the question by appealing to the propensity whose deliverances you are trying to vindicate. If reason cannot justify a faith in the deliverances of Custom (as in one sense it cannot), then reason cannot justify a faith in one of the deliverances of Custom, namely the belief that Custom itself is generally reliable. Nonetheless we can go some way to vindicating Hume's evident opinion that we ought to indulge our inductive propensities and formulate our beliefs in accordance with Custom. For Custom is in fact a reliable belief-forming mechanism (at least in Hume's opinion). Hence a suitably qualified spectator a sympathetic observer, driven by reliable belief-forming mechanisms suited to the circumstances of human life would tend to approve of Custom-based inferences and to disapprove of their 'neglect or nonperformance'. The inferences that we ought to draw are those that whose neglect would displease a sympathetic observer driven by a refined and reliable variant of Custom, just as those that we ought not to draw are those that would excite the same disgust. What about Superstition in both its variants? We cannot know for certain that Custom is reliable, but we can know for certain that Superstition is not. Take Superstition 1. There may be a 'universal propensity to believe in invisible, intelligent powers' but there is no one 118 set of powers that we have a universal propensity to believe in. The gods are the products of fear and fancy, but since our fears and especially our fancies are different, we postulate different and inconsistent deities. Superstition 1 has a powerful influence on the human mind, but it influences different people in different ways producing different and inconsistent theologies. Since at most one such theology can be correct, Superstition 1 is evidently unreliable. Even if we happen by chance to hit on the one true religion, most of the gods that Superstition causes us to postulate are known to be false, a point that is admitted even by the superstitious, since those who believe in one God (or set of gods) denounce the delusive glosses of everyone else. The same goes for Superstition 2. Most of the miracles it causes us to believe in are false, even if a tiny minority happen to be true. This is the burden of the 'Contrary Miracles Argument' of ECU, 10.2.25. Furthermore, although we would 'perish and go to ruin' collectively without the Moral Sense and as individuals without the faculty of Custom, we can get by quite comfortably without either of the two species of Superstition, at least we can get by in the one and only world that Custom licenses us to believe in. Indeed a great many people have perished and gone to ruin because of Superstition-induced beliefs, a point emphasized by Hume in his History of England and by his disciple Gibbon in The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. Persecution, self-mortification and the decline of civic virtue are all put down to the malign influence of religion and hence to the twin faculties of Superstition. And we have already seen how the delusive glosses of false religion pervert the operations of the Moral Sense, converting virtue into vice and vice into virtue. Thus it is an intellectual vice to indulge the two faculties of Superstition, since they result in unreliable inferences and a moral vice to indulge them because of their pernicious effects. On both counts they would be displeasing to a suitably qualified spectator, someone informed, impartial and dispassionate, with reliable belief-forming mechanisms and a refined Moral Sense. Thus it is sometimes right to transcend reason and sometimes wrong; right when it comes to Custom and the Moral Sense, but wrong when it comes to the two kinds of Superstition. 3. The Containment Principle and No-Ought-From-Is As I see it, No-Ought-From-Is is simply an instance of CONT) which is one of the two principles underlying Hume's Master Argument. Heathcote thinks that CONT) is subject to two obvious counterexamples (which perhaps explains why he thinks that it cannot be doing the heavy lifting in Hume's Master Argument): 119 (4) p & ¬ p ∴ A ought to believe q (5) p1...pn ⊩ q ∴ It is a necessary truth that if p1...pn then q . But although these inferences are formally valid (at least in logics rich enough to accommodate the concept of logical consequence) neither constitutes a counterexample to CONT). Inference (4) is not a counterexample, since in its more primitive versions CONT) only applies to inferences from consistent sets of premisses. But (5) not a counterexample to CONT) either. For CONT) only applies to expressions which constitute the matter of the conclusion, not to the expressions which are constitutive of its form. It is a thesis about categorematic rather than syncategorematic content, about schematic expressions rather than logical operators. Since 'necessarily' is both a syncategorematic expression and a logical operator, and since CONT) was never intended to apply to such expressions, Heathcote's inference is not a counterexample to CONT). As a 'Gentleman' makes clear (2.3) CONT) was widely accepted in the early modern era, but even in that logically benighted age, few philosophers were silly enough to reject ab esse ad posse, though the inference from A to A is possible clearly involves an operator in the conclusion that is absent from the premises. Hence CONT) does not apply to such expressions. Of course, CONT) as originally conceived is false, which is precisely the point behind Prior's famous counterexamples to No-Ought-From-Is. But it is possible to reformulate CONT) as a provable thesis of much greater precision and generality. The first step is to reformulate it as thesis about the (first-order) predicate calculus. We define inference relative vacuity as follows: An expression (a predicate or propositional variable) φ occurs vacuously in the conclusion of a valid inference K ⊩ X, iff under any interpretation of K ∪ {X} such that both K and X come out true, we can uniformly substitute for φ any expression of the same grammatical type, without prejudice to the truth of the resulting sentence X' or the validity of he resulting inference K ⊩ X' We can then characterize CONT*) as follows: 120 A (non-logical) predicate or propositional variable φ cannot occur non-vacuously in the conclusion of a formally valid inference unless it appears among the premises. This thesis is provable. What's more, a similar thesis call it CONT **) can be proved with respect to the operator logic of S.T. Kuhn in which sentential operators are treated as nonlogical schematic variables. But the really significant result is due to Lloyd Humberstone. Who generalizes CONT to a much wider class of logics. What we get is CONT***): In any logic subject to compositional semantics, no expression φ that is Sschematic for the semantics in question that is, no expression which is not a logical operator can appear non-vacuously in the conclusion of a formally valid inference unless it appears in the premises. (See Pigden, 1989, pp 144-5.) We don't need to make a special exception for inferences from inconsistent premises since every expression that appears in the conclusion of such an inference suffers from inferencerelative vacuity. And we don't need to make an exception for inferences with logically true conclusions, since in all such cases the schematic expressions occurring in the conclusions will likewise be vacuous. So far as I can see, CONT***) would enable us to vindicate Hume's Master Argument (at least as I construe it) since conclusions about the future would involve novel expressions not contained in premises about the past and conclusions about external objects would involve novel expressions not contained in premises about impressions. Step 2) becomes: 2) By CONT***) no thesis Ψ that is genuinely concerned with the future characteristics of objects can be the conclusion of a formally valid argument from a premise set Θ consisting of the reports of past observations. For such a conclusion Ψ would have to contain non-vacuous, non-logical expressions not contained in Θ, and by CONT***) no expression which is not a logical operator can appear non-vacuously in the conclusion of a logically valid inference unless it appears in the premises. Thus with Humberstone's help we can vindicate Hume. Logic does not allow you to derive conclusions about the future from premises about the past and this is basically because of the 121 principle that in a logically valid inference, you don't get out any non-vacuous matter that you haven't put in (where 'matter' is characterized in terms of non-logical expressions). But does CONT***) vindicate No-Ought-From-Is? Only on three conditions: 1) that No-Ought-From-Is is amended, to the more defensible but less succinct No-Non-Vacuous-Ought-From-Is; 2) that 'ought' is not to be construed as a logical constant, i.e that there are no principles peculiar to and pervasive of all moral and evaluative reasoning (a point that I argue at 5.2§10); and 3) that No-Ought-From-Is is to be read as a claim about logical consequence not a claim about analytic entailment. For CONT***) does not exclude the possibility of analytic bridge principles connecting 'ought' and 'is'. 4. Adrian Heathcote and the 'Methodological Flaw'. Heathcote displays a certain lofty disdain for those methodologically benighted philosophers who concern themselves with logical consequence rather than analytic entailment. Philosophers have been bewitched by [No-Ought-From-Is] partially [because of] a deeply ingrained methodological flaw [a tendency to switch] attention from actual arguments to symbolic forms for arguments. ... We should not mistake the question of what arguments are valid, with the question what argument forms are valid where the forms are part of some particular logical system. .... Valid arguments are our prime resource. Argument forms simply represent the few (the very few!) that we've managed to tame. One is tempted to reply that if formal logic is against a man a man will be against formal logic. But actually Heathcote's anti-formal polemics are rather beside the point. For so long as we have a logic with a sufficiently rich grammar (an important proviso that has not always been met in the past), if an argument Γ is materially valid such that given the content of the non-logical expressions, the premises cannot be true and the conclusion false we can construct a corresponding formally valid argument Γ' in which the necessary truths on which the argument turns are spelt out explicitly as extra premises (a point that has been noted since at least the fourteenth century see Broadie, 1993, pp. 92-95). Given the materially valid argument Fritz is a bachelor therefore Fritz is unmarried, we can construct the formally valid 122 argument Fritz is a bachelor, All bachelors are unmarried, therefore Fritz is unmarried, where the second premise, All bachelors are unmarried, is both necessary and analytic. (If the second premise were not necessary it would be possible for Fritz to be a bachelor without being unmarried, in which case, the original argument would not be valid.) Thus a devotee of symbolic forms can accept essentially the same arguments as a Heathcote-like enthusiast for analytic entailment it is just that she will formulate them differently, replacing unstated principles of inference with explicitly stated premises consisting of (putatively) necessary truths. Explicit extra premises have an advantage over implicit principles of inference. it is easier to subject them to critical scrutiny. So when the material validity of an argument is in dispute, it is a good idea to replace it with its formally valid counterpart since this forces us to be explicit about the alleged necessities on which the argument turns. Thus the 'deeply ingrained methodological flaw' that Heathcote complains of is due, in part, to a taste for 'transparency'. If we want to evaluate Heathcote's is/ought inferences it is illuminating to recast them as formally valid inferences in which the gap between the premises and the conclusion is bridged by an allegedly necessary truth. Note however that in Heathcote's case the extra premises must be not only necessary but analytic. His aim is to vindicate is/ought inferences (both epistemic and moral) in which the premises are substantively ought-free but the conclusion contains a (non-vacuous)'ought'. If the inference is to be formally valid there must be an epistemic 'ought' somewhere in the premises, presumably in the bridging principle, but if the bridging principle is analytic in something like the old-fashioned sense (that is true in virtue of the meanings of words1) we may still have an inference to a substantive epistemic 'ought' from substantively ought-free premises. Not so if the bridging principle is synthetic, for in that case the conclusion would depend on a substantive evaluative principle, which is exactly what Heathcote does not want. 5. Heathcote and the Epistemic 'Ought' When it comes to the epistemic 'ought' there is no need to invent a bridge principle on Heathcote's behalf. For in his view the 'fundamental normative tenet of correct reasoning ... 'that we used [in] deriving [epistemically] normative conclusions from non-normative premises' is the following: (p  q)  (OBp  OBq) Here the arrows represent material conditionals, or unspecified stronger conditionals. (I think 123 that Heathcote is mistaken here, and that the extra premise that he requires to underwrite inference (3) is slightly different, but since it is subject to the much the same counterexamples, I shall let the matter slide.) If this principle is to underwrite the kind of epistemic is/ought inferences that Heathcote favours, the 'fundamental normative tenet' had better be necessary which means we should replace the central connective with the fishhook of entailment, thus: (p  q) ⥽ (OBp  OBq) If we interpret the third arrow as the material conditional this gives us (p  q) ⥽ (OBq ∨ ¬OBp) which is clearly what Heathcote wants. Finally I am going to interpret the first arrow in the strongest possible sense. For if, as I shall argue, the principle fails where q is entailed by p, then it is unlikely hold where p implies q is some weaker sense. This gives us: (p ⥽ q) ⥽ (OBq ∨ ¬OBp) Suppose p represents a collection of contingent propositions relevant to our concerns for which we have excellent evidence. And suppose that q represents some trivial logical consequence of p [for example: (p ∨ m) & (p ∨ p) & (p ∨ r) & (p & p)]. Then it may well be the case that we are obliged to believe that p but not obliged to believe that q, since it would surely be silly to fill our heads with such useless junk. Hence the 'fundamental tenet' is false, and the inferences it underwrites invalid. 6. No-Ought-From-Is and the Conceivability of Nihilism Heathcote concludes with a moral argument. (9) A is confronted by a friend drowning A's faculties and abilities are in good working order A recognises that his friend has no desire to drown ∴ A ought to attempt to save his friend. He allows that those with those with refined moral intuitions may want to add extra conditions and caveats, but insists that in the end, most people will recognize that 'if the premises are true the conclusion must be true as well and that is all that is required for validity'. To give 124 Heathcote a helping hand I shall modify the conclusion, effectively incorporating the caveats and conditions: Absent a strong moral reason why he ought do otherwise, A ought to attempt to save his friend. [(¬(∃R)(R → OA & (A → ¬P))) → OP] Given this modification we don't have to worry about those cases where the drowning man is a torturer or a tyrant and it would be better to let him die, let alone bizarre scenarios in which a morally finkish magician would finish them both off the moment they got to the shore. For in all such cases there would be a strong moral reason why A ought to do otherwise than rescue his friend. Nonetheless, we still have a purported inference from non-moral premises to a substantively moral ought (neither inferentially vacuous nor ought-irrelevant). But the argument isn't valid. I don't just mean that isn't logically valid (though of course it isn't). I mean that it is not materially valid, that the premises could be true and the conclusion false. For the premises could be true in a world in which Mackie's error theory was true and nobody ought morally to do anything. In such a world the conclusion would be false. For the argument to be valid such that the premises could not be true and the conclusion false the error theory would have to be not only false but necessarily so. It would have to be inconceivable that any version of the error theory could be correct. And it is hard to believe that over the last thirty years, so much anxious ink could have been spilt arguing against the inconceivable. This is not to say that it is impossible to use analytic bridge principles to derive evaluative conclusions (whether epistemic or otherwise) from non-evaluative premises. It is just that we have no compelling example of any such principles. 125 NOTES 1. See Gillian Russell, 2008, for a sophisticated defence of old-fashioned analyticity.

God, Powers, and Possibility in Kant's Beweisgrund Abstract: This paper proposes a novel reading of Kant's account of the dependence of possibility on God in the pre-Critical Beweisgrund. I argue that Kant has a broadly Aristotelian conception of possibility, according to which grounds of possibility are potential grounds of actuality. Since Kant also thinks that the order of the world requires an intelligent being as its originator, he holds that God grounds possibility by his understanding and will. Furthermore, I explore the significance of the distinction between internal and external possibility, the influence of Crusius, and the afterlife of Kant's view in his Critical philosophy. Kant is most famous for rejecting all attempts at proving the existence of God in the Critique of Pure Reason. Notwithstanding this, the younger Kant proposed such a proof himself in The Only Possible Ground of Proof (or Beweisgrund, for short) of 1762. This so-called "possibility proof" has recently received meticulous scrutiny and is, I think, quite well-understood now. In brief, Kant argues that all possibility must be grounded in an absolutely necessary being and then identifies this being with God. 1 However, the way God grounds possibility is controversial to an astonishing degree. Some scholars hold that God is the ground by instantiating possibilities 2 , others that he is the ground by thinking them in his understanding (call this "intellectualism") 3 , and Stang, on his former approach, that God is the ground by his power (Macht), which he calls the "power view" 4 . 5 Newlands rejects all this and argues that Kant does not have any account of God's grounding of possibility. 6 But, recently, Stang has argued that this alleged indeterminacy is on purpose because Kant denies that we can ever comprehend how God grounds possibility, albeit Stang claims that Kant's account is best understood in terms of the power view. 7 I think the main reason for this wide disparity of views is that the conception of a ground of possibility is not well-understood yet. Some readers would like to attribute an account of grounding to Kant that connects contemporary theories of metaphysical explanation with the principle of sufficient reason. While I do not attempt to argue against this view directly (and my account may even be consistent with it), I shall argue that Kant has a different conception of grounding in mind concerning the grounds of possibility. For he accepts a broadly Aristotelian account of possibility, according to which grounds of possibility are potential grounds of actuality. Consequently, God is the ground of possibility because he is the potential ground of the actuality of the world. As a result, Kant explicitly says that God must have an understanding and a will because these faculties are needed in order to be the "sufficient real ground" of possibility (OPGP 2:88). Thus, these are the faculties by which God grounds possibility. 2 I will begin by examining a widely neglected argument in Kant's Beweisgrund that aims to establish that God needs understanding and will in order to ground the order and harmony of the world. In section 2, I show that God needs understanding and will to ground internal possibility (the possibility in accordance with essences), as opposed to external possibility (the possibility in accordance with contingent causal conditions). Section 3 presents the strongest case for this reading: Kant apparently follows Crusius, who has a broadly Aristotelian account of possibility. Crusius holds that grounds of possibility are potential grounds of actuality and also that God grounds possibility by his understanding and will. The task of section 4 is to explore the connection of potentiality and possibility in Kant and how this relates to the distinction between internal and external possibility. Section 5 briefly shows that Kant does not fundamentally change his views on God's grounding of possibility in the Critical period, even though the important discussion of what can be learned from my account as regards the Critical conception of "real possibility" must be deferred to another occasion. 1. God as the Ground of Possibility by His Understanding and Will The first section of Beweisgrund is dedicated to what is known as the "possibility proof", which consists of two main steps. 8 At first, Kant argues that something can be possible only if an absolutely necessary being is the ground of possibility. Then he shows that this being has all the properties that are contained in the concept of God, so this being is God. One of these properties that the absolutely necessary being must have in order to be God is that it is a "spirit" (OPGP 2:88) – that is, a being with understanding and will, rather than a "blindly necessary ground" (OPGP 2:89). Kant briefly sketches three arguments to establish this conclusion. The first argument contends that the divine understanding and will are perfect realities and, as such, must belong to God, the second that God must have understanding and will because the effect cannot be greater than the cause. 9 But my thesis – that God grounds possibility by his understanding and will – turns on the third of these arguments. 10 I will refer to it as the 'Third Argument' and present it in full now: Third, order, beauty, perfection in everything which is possible presuppose a being by whose properties either these relations are grounded, or at least through whom as from a principal ground the things are possible according to these relations. Now the necessary being is the sufficient real ground of all that which is possible external to him; for this reason, even the property must be encountered in him through which, according to these relations, everything outside him can become 3 actual. But it appears that the ground of external possibility, of order, beauty, and perfection, is not sufficient unless a will that conforms to the understanding is presupposed. Thus, it will be necessary to attribute these properties to the Supreme Being. Everybody realizes that, irrespective of all the grounds of the generation of plants and trees, nonetheless regular flowerbeds, boulevards, and such like, are only possible through an understanding which conceives the plan and a will which executes it. In the absence of an understanding, all power [Macht] or generative power [Hervorbringungskraft], likewise all other data of possibility, are insufficient for making the possibility of such order complete. (OPGP 2:88) 11 The Third Argument is, in all its details, extremely difficult and we will unpack it in the subsequent sections. But let us begin with a broad outline of the argument: 1) The absolutely necessary being is the sufficient real ground of possibility.12 2) The empirically observable properties of the world reveal that possibility is grounded by an understanding. 13 3) Thus, the absolutely necessary being is the sufficient real ground of possibility by his understanding. (from 1) and 2)) 4) An understanding is the sufficient real ground of possibility only in conjunction with a will by which that which is thought by the understanding can be caused. 5) For this reason, the absolutely necessary being is the sufficient real ground of possibility by his understanding and will. 14 (from 3) and 4)) This valid argument turns on the premises 1), 2), and 4). Kant takes himself to have already established at this point that there must be an absolutely necessary being as the sufficient real ground of possibility, which is premise 1). 2) is the premise that leads to the conclusion that God must have an understanding; and Kant appeals to the then-popular analogy by human design to defend it: a human designer, craftsman, or architect can only be the sufficient ground of the possibility of gardens and the like if she has not only powers, but also an understanding by which she conceives a plan of regular flowerbeds or avenues. Likewise, so the argument goes, God can only be the ground of the world (with its order, perfection, and beauty) if he has an understanding. 15 Premise 4) argues that God's understanding would not be sufficient to ground possibility without a will by which he can create a world that he conceives in his mind. 16 So his will is needed to make the grounds of possibility complete: without God's will that actualizes the harmony in essences that his understanding makes up, the harmony would be impossible. 17 This does not 4 mean that God decrees by his will that something be possible (which would make Kant a voluntarist about possibility, a view he rejects 18 ), but rather that God can use his will so as to create a world. The reason why his understanding alone is not sufficient for possibility is that this faculty does not explain how something can be actual. This calls for an even closer relation between possibility and actuality than is usually assumed by Kant scholars. But first, we need to see what kind of possibility the Third Argument is about. 2. Internal and External Possibility Following a Leibniz-Wolffian tradition, Kant distinguishes between "internal" and "external" possibility. As we shall see in a minute, internal possibility is the possibility of something considered in itself and can be cognized according to the principle of contradiction. External possibility, by contrast, depends on contingent grounds. One of the confusing aspects of the Third Argument is that Kant speaks of the "ground of external possibility". What makes this so puzzling is that the expression 'external possibility' does not occur elsewhere in Beweisgrund. By contrast, Kant frequently speaks of God as the ground of "internal possibility". 19 What is more, he explicitly says that "there will be talked of no other possibility or impossibility than the socalled internal or absolute one" in Beweisgrund (OPGP 2:78). This clearly means that Kant does not intend to talk about external possibility. 20 The reason for his decision is that he considers external possibility to be unsuitable for the proof of God's existence. 21 One may raise the following objection against my reading of the Third Argument. When Kant says that God grounds possibility by his understanding and will, he only speaks about external possibility, which he needs in order to prove that the absolutely necessary being is a spirit; but Kant does not think that God grounds internal possibility by his understanding and will. In this section, I will argue against this interpretation. As I read Kant, God is the direct ground of internal possibility, but (in most cases) the indirect ground of external possibility. Contrary to the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition, God needs his power not only to ground external, but also to ground internal possibility. Kant's source for the terminology of 'internal' and 'external possibility' appears to be the following passage in Wolff's Cosmology: Internally possible is what is possible regarded in itself, that is, which, considered in itself, does not include any contradiction [...]. Externally possible is what has a determinate cause in the visible world, that is, which is able to exist in it [...]. (Wolff, Cosm 111) 5 As Wolff understands it, external possibility is that which is consistent with the actual causal conditions. Internal possibility, on the contrary, is what is consistent with the essence of the thing. 22 According to Wolff, all intrinsic properties of a thing (as opposed to relations) are either essential properties (essentialia) which constitute the essence of a thing, necessary non-essential properties that are grounded by the essence (attributa), or contingent properties that are merely consistent with the essence (modi). 23 For this reason, the internal possibility of a thing contains all combinations of co-existing and succeeding modes that are consistent with the essence of a thing. 24 In contrast to external possibility, internal possibility can be cognized by the principle of contradiction alone. But cognizing external possibility requires knowledge of the causal conditions of the actual world. For external possibility is the agreement with contingent actual conditions, and Wolff holds that something can only exist if there can be a cause for it. This becomes clear by the notion of a "potential being", which he defines as that which "can have its sufficient ground of existence" in an existing being (Ont 175). Since a substance can only be a ground of actuality by virtue of its powers 25 , a substance is a potential ground of actuality and hence an actual ground of external possibility. However, since everything that is externally possible necessarily exists at one point of time (which is a consequence of Wolff's determinism) 26 , external possibility is co-extensional with actuality 27 . 28 Wolff's distinction harks back to Leibniz, who distinguishes between possibility "in itself" (per se) and possibility per accidens. The former is the possibility of something "in its own nature", the latter the possibility insofar as it depends on external conditions – for example, something may be possible per se but not per accidens because God does not choose to make it actual. 29 Clearly, Leibniz's conception of possibility per se is closely related to Wolff's notion of internal possibility. And although they disagree insofar as Wolff rejects Leibniz's doctrine of preestablished harmony with regard to causality within the physical world, they agree that God predetermines the course of events in the actual world. 30 Therefore, like Leibniz's possibility per accidens, Wolff's external possibility is dependent on what God chooses to happen. It is hard to tell what meaning exactly the expressions 'internal' and 'external possibility' have in Kant, as he does not bother to define them. However, he appears to use 'essence' and 'internal possibility' interchangeably in Beweisgrund 31 ; so I take it that Kant agrees with Wolff at least insofar as internal possibility is derivable from essences. He also, at least in principle, adopts Wolff's conception of external possibility. Kant argues that "conditioned possibility" – which is 6 plainly the same as external possibility – would not be suitable for a proof of God's existence because "conditioned possibility merely makes one see that something can only exist in certain connections; and the existence of the cause is proved here only insofar as the consequence exists" (OPGP 2:157). 32 This means, I take it, that external possibility depends on causal conditions which are themselves contingent and hence do not require the existence of an absolutely necessary being. Thus, "such a proof can only be done from internal possibility" (OPGP 2:157). Nonetheless, there is a notable difference to Leibniz and Wolff. According to Wolff, "therefore something is possible because it is represented by the divine understanding" (VG-Met 975), and Newlands argues convincingly that Leibniz has this view, too. 33 Kant denies that God's understanding alone grounds internal possibility, in part because he has a basically Crusian conception of grounds of possibility. Before we can turn to that, however, we have to address a potential objection that is based on Kant's use of the term 'external possibility' in the Third Argument. As I read it, he wants to prove that God needs understanding and will in order to ground internal possibility. However, in this argument, Kant refers to God as "the ground of external possibility, of order, beauty, and perfection", without explicitly mentioning internal possibility (OPGP 2:88, emphasis mine). This gives rise to the following objection: Internal possibility is required only for the first step of the possibility proof, that is, to show that there is an absolutely necessary being. The task of the Third Argument, however, is to prove that the absolutely necessary being is a spirit, without which it cannot be shown that this being is God. The argument accomplishes this by holding that God grounds external possibility by creating the world, which includes the contingent worldly grounds of external possibility. But to decide that the world has to be this way rather than another, God needs understanding and will. Consequently, the Third Argument does not show that internal possibility depends on God's understanding and will. 34 As sophisticated as this reading is, it would be a mistake to accept it. To begin with, we have just seen that Kant rejects that external possibility is suitable for a proof of God because external possibility is contingent. In fact, this argument would be a backlash into a kind of physicotheology that considers the order and harmony of the world exclusively dependent on God's choice. Such an account would only establish the "moral dependency" of the world. But Kant claims that the world exhibits also "non-moral [unmoralische] dependency" – that is, the harmony of the essences themselves, which is not the result of a choice, is dependent on God. 35 7 The traditional method of physico-theology, which Kant criticizes, proves God's existence by taking only moral dependency into regard. 36 According to Kant, this is wrong – among others, because this can only prove the existence of an "architect and not the creator of the world, who has ordered and formed the material, but not produced and created it" (OPGP 2:123). Even if one takes oneself to have proved the existence of an absolutely necessary being, one cannot infer from the fact that something is externally possible that the absolutely necessary being is the ground of the moral order of the world, since some more mediocre deities could have done the job of giving the world a moral order that depends on their choice as well. 37 Aside from these systematic considerations, the Third Argument itself contains textual evidence against the objection. Kant routinely associates "order, beauty, perfection" (and the like) with internal possibility for the reason that these properties of the world belong to its non-moral dependency. 38 When he speaks about God as "a being by whose properties either these relations are grounded, or at least through whom as from a principal ground the things are possible according to these relations" (OPGP 2:88), I take this to mean that God is not only the ground of the perfect harmony of essences, but also of all essences individually, as they are the relata of the harmony relation. So the Third Argument talks about God as the ground of internal possibility. The question remains, though, why Kant writes that God is "the ground of external possibility, of order, beauty, and perfection" (OPGP 2:88). Two viable explanations come to mind. First, the use of 'external possibility' may just be a mistake or misprint. This explanation would not be ad hoc. The term 'external possibility' appears out of a sudden, and the mistake/misprint may have been induced by the occurrence of the phrase "possible external to him" just one sentence earlier. The term 'internal possibility', however, would seem more appropriate in this sentence because the twofold use of 'of' indicates that "order, beauty, and perfection" is appositive to "external possibility". Another explanation would be that, if God grounds all possibility, he must also ground external possibility. Since the creation of the world includes causal relations 39 , on which external possibility depends, God is indirectly also the ground of external possibility. 40 Therefore, God grounds external possibility indirectly by creating a world. Either way, the texts do not support the interpretation that God does not ground internal possibility by his understanding and will. 8 The strongest case for this reading, however, can be made by taking the similarities to Crusius into account, who likewise thinks that God grounds possibility by his understanding and will. So let us have a look at Crusius. 3. Crusius on God, Powers, and Possibility In this section, I want to show that Kant has a largely Crusian approach of God's grounding of possibility. While this section is mainly textual, I will spell out Kant's account in more detail in the next section. It is a crucial feature of Crusius's account of possibility that all possibility has a "sufficient cause" in something that exists: We call possible that which is thought, but does not yet exist, or from the existence of which we as yet abstract. However, if something that does not yet exist is to begin to exist: then this must be produced through an efficient cause [...]. Therefore, that which is real in the possibilities of such things that do not yet exist – that is, which can have an influence in the coexisting and succeeding things – consists in the existence of a cause for a represented thing. And the possibility of such things that do not yet exist is, according to its higher concept, nothing else but the relation of a thing that we do not yet think as existing to an existing thing, by virtue of which the latter is a sufficient cause for the production of the former, which, as of yet, is only thought. (Crusius, E 56) If someone should find this passage difficult to parse, it would be hard to disagree. But the idea is a classical Aristotelian one: possibility is grounded in actuality. More precisely, existing things ground possibility through their powers. If something is possible, there is a "sufficient cause" for it. But this cause is not yet active. I take it that the meaning of "sufficient" is that the cause, once made active, produces the object that is grounded in the powers and, as it were, exists only in thought. 41 Therefore, according to Crusius, something is possible if there is a sufficient but not yet active cause for it. Using Scholastic terminology 42 , he distinguishes between powers that are present but not active and powers that are present and active: One says of that which is to be possible through a power in the first place, when it acts, that it is now present actu secundo, whereas it has formerly only been present actu primo. For this reason, to be present actu secundo means as much as to actually exist, insofar as one considers this existence as something to which one ascribes the actuality of a power. On the contrary, to be present actu primo means as much as to be possible through the already actually [wircklich] present power of a thing that merely does not act yet. (Crusius, E 64) 9 I take it that the only difference between powers that are present actu primo and those that are also present actu secundo is that the latter has been forced to act by a stimulus, whereas the former would act if being forced to act. Crusius holds that "real possibility" – the "possibility outside of thoughts", as opposed to "ideal possibility", or the "mere possibility in thoughts" (E 56) – obtains if something is grounded in powers that are present actu primo. For, in this case, "sufficient causes for the thing are really present [wirklich vorhanden], which only need to come into the state of action [in dem Stand der Action kommen dürfen]" (Crusius, E 56). 43 Crusius's account of possibility in general also applies to God as the ground of possibility. 44 Although Crusius primarily thinks of grounds and possibility in the world, he holds that God is the ground of the possibility of the world because he has the requisite powers to create the world: The ideal possibility of not existing things would not be useful for anything unless ideal possibility did not contain at least as much reality in itself that, for everything that contradicts neither itself nor other given truths, God at least is a sufficient cause if he were to make use of his omnipotence. (Crusius, E 56) This is what Crusius calls "absolutely possibility", which clearly resembles internal possibility. However, Crusius adds to the logical condition that there is no contradiction the condition that God must be the sufficient cause of possibility. 45 Furthermore, he holds that God needs his understanding to create the world: We encounter in the world an orderly and regular connection and sequence of things that obviously leads us to the fact that the world has been formed according to ideas and has an intelligent [verständige] cause. (Crusius, E 221, see also E 268) Since God creates the world by his will 46 , but "[e]very activity of the will already presupposes the understanding", which is "an indispensable ground of the possibility of any willing" (Crusius, E 445), God grounds the possibility of the world by his understanding and will. Seen in this light, the parallels to Kant are striking. Like Crusius, Kant holds that God grounds possibility by his understanding and will. The term Kant uses to indicate that God has the potentiality to act is "power" (Macht) – for example, Kant says that God has "a will accompanied by great wisdom and power" (OPGP 2:116). 47 Furthermore, Kant holds that God is a "sufficient real ground" because God must have the properties "through which [...] everything outside him can become actual" (OPGP 2:88). This suggests that "sufficient real ground" has the same 10 meaning as the Crusian term "sufficient cause", which means a potential ground of actuality. Hence, it is not an exaggeration to deem Kant a Crusian about God's grounding of possibility. 4. Potentiality and Possibility Newlands helpfully distinguishes between two questions that must be settled for any account of how God grounds possibility: Question 1 (Q1): On what in God do modal truths and modal truthmakers depend? Question 2 (Q2): What is the manner(s) of dependence by which modal truths and modal truth makers depend on God? (Newlands 2009: 158) As we have seen, Kant's answer for Q1 is: internal possibility depends on God's will and understanding. With regard to Q2, the answer is: God grounds internal possibility by being the potential ground of the actuality of everything that is internally possible. But we yet have to understand why Kant answers the questions the way he does. This shall be the task of the present section. With respect to Q1, it is clear that this question cannot be answered independently of Q2. If the answer to the latter were: 'God grounds possibilities by instantiating them', then he would ground them by the possibilities themselves. As Yong (2014: 36–8) has pointed out, this would be a circular explanation of the grounding of possibility. But it is also clear that the instantiation account is incompatible with Kant's claim that God does not instantiate worldly properties that would contradict his divine attributes. 48 Rather, God contains the "ultimate real ground of all other possibility" (OPGP 2:83) 49 , and my potentialist reading can explain how God can ground properties that he does not instantiate himself. As a result, God needs to possess capacities that allow him to be the cause of worldly things which instantiate possibilities. Now the question is: is God a "blindly necessary ground" (OPGP 2:89), or is he a "spirit" who, as such, possesses understanding and will (OPGP 2:87)? If God were the former, the "power view" would be true – God would still be the potential ground of actuality by his power, but not by his understanding and will. For Kant, this would not only be a defective account of God, but also render the great harmony of essences impossible. And as regards intellectualism, it is clear that God's understanding alone cannot be the sufficient potential ground of actuality – understanding just is 11 not a capacity that makes things actual. This shows why Kant answers Q1 by identifying the properties by which God grounds possibility with his understanding and will. As for Q2, we need to consider Kant's discussion of (internal) possibility within the possibility proof in some detail. To my mind, it does not get enough attention that Kant does not bother to argue that possibility, and internal possibility in particular, needs to be grounded. Rather, he uses the proposition that possibility needs grounds as an uncontested premise to argue that some being exists that grounds possibility. Kant introduces the concept of possibility by distinguishing between a formal and a material aspect of possibility. 50 The formal aspect concerns whether some predicates are consistent or contradict each other. But the relations of consistency and contradiction presuppose that there are relata that constitute the material aspect of possibility (Kant calls them the "real" or the "data" of possibility 51 ). Therefore, something is impossible either if there is a contradiction or if the data of possibility are not given. 52 Since Kant apparently thinks we can know a priori that something is possible 53 , he infers that something must exist that grounds possibility. 54 But why does Kant think that possibility must have grounds? Some interpretations vaguely understand the grounding relation in terms of contemporary "metaphysical explanation" and hold that possibility must be grounded in this manner in order to minimize "bruteness", that is, to leave only God (and maybe his properties) unexplained. On this reading, the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) demands that possibility be metaphysically explained. 55 However, at this general level it is unclear why we should ascribe such a view to Kant. Presumably, these interpreters base their reading on Kant's proof of the PSR in Nova Dilucidatio, a writing that appeared in print some years before Beweisgrund. Kant accepts two versions of the PSR in this writing, namely "Nothing is true without a determining 56 ground" (ND 1:393), and "No contingent thing can lack a ground that antecedently determines its existence" (ND 1:395). In Beweisgrund, however, he does not endorse the PSR in either form: in his refutation of what he shall later call the "cosmological proof", which attempts to prove God's existence from the fact that there must be an absolutely necessary ground for contingent existents, Kant objects that the proof rests on the PSR: Now the second step to the proposition that this independent thing is absolutely necessary is already much less reliable, as it must be made by means of the principle of sufficient reason, which is still challenged; however, I have no qualms about subscribing to everything so far. (OPGP 2:157) 12 Admittedly, it is not really clear whether Kant has doubts about the PSR himself or whether he just thinks that we should not appeal to the PSR because it would be a controversial premise. 57 But given that he criticizes the cosmological proof for its appeal to the PSR, it would be surprising if he assigned a role to the PSR in the possibility proof. This casts doubt on reading the grounds of possibility in terms of metaphysical explanation. 58 But if the PSR does not do the work, what then? The answer is that Kant has a potentialist account of possibility. On this view, grounds are an essential aspect of possibility – with the exception of God (who and whose properties are not in need of being grounded 59 ), being possible just is to have grounds of possibility. And since the potentialist view identifies grounds of possibility with potential grounds of actuality, being possible just is to have potential grounds of actuality. 60 This can not only explain the parallels to Crusius, but also why Kant gives no argument that possibility needs grounds. For it is just a conceptual truth that possibility has grounds. In the absence of competing explanations, these are strong reasons to ascribe a broadly Aristotelian potentialist analysis of possibility to Kant. With regard to God's grounding of possibility, the question then cannot be why possibility has grounds, but only why God is this ground. Answering this question is, of course, an important aspect of the possibility proof, and I do not further discuss the proof here. Yet, Kant's potentialist account of the grounds of internal possibility may seem to blur the distinction between internal and external possibility. Recall that, for Wolff and Leibniz, internal possibility consists in the consistency with a given essence, whereas external possibility also requires the agreement with actual causal conditions. According to this view, it is sufficient for internal possibility that God conceives the essences in his mind; only external possibility requires that there be a possible causal action that makes an object actual. But if we adhere to Kant's theory, the grounds of internal and external possibility are seemingly the same: they consist in powers that can make something actual. To be sure, this problem does not occur in the case of worldly substances, as their powers can only change the accidents (or modes) of substances, but not their essences and are hence not grounds of internal possibility. 61 But God is not only the direct ground of internal possibility, but in some cases – by the act of the creation of the world (as regards the immediate effect of God's action) or by miracles 62 – also the direct ground of external possibility. Therefore, an explanation is needed as to what distinguishes grounds of internal from those of external possibility. 13 I think this problem can be solved by considering that every actual thing, or state of things, is produced through an action that is itself dependent on contingent causal conditions. But potentiality is not sufficient to make an action possible. Consider first the example of a ball that is at rest, but has the power to roll. Despite of its power, it does not follow that it is externally possible that the ball rolls. For the ball might be located in a universe in which there is no motion at all, so there would not be another object that sets the ball into motion. By analogy, God's understanding and power are sufficient for internal, but not for external possibility because the mere possession of these faculties does not guarantee that an action is possible by which God can make something actual. Leibniz famously holds that God necessarily (qua his omnibenevolence) chooses the best possible world to exist 63 , and Kant defends him. 64 Thus, even though God has the power and understanding to create other worlds, the only world he can will to create is the actual world because this is the best possible world. Therefore, there can be no action that makes other worlds actual, which are hence not externally possible. Thus, the difference between grounds of internal and of external possibility is that the grounds of internal possibility only require potentiality, whereas the grounds of external possibility also need the possibility of an action. I am not suggesting that Kant in fact has this view (he says nothing about the problem), and some people may doubt that this is a particularly good solution. For example, one might object that Kant's model of grounding is inadequate, that it already presupposes the possibility of what God is supposed to ground, or that internal possibility is not in need of being grounded at all (which would undermine the "only possible ground of proof"). This would be criticism of Kant and not of my interpretation. Nonetheless, it is worth pointing out that his account does full justice to his central assumptions concerning possibility. First, it satisfies Kant's view that all possibility is grounded in causal powers (again with the exception of God). Second, the suggested account coheres with the assumption that internal possibility depends on God's essence and not on his choice. 65 It is crucial that internal possibility can be cognized according to the principle of contradiction because internal possibility is derivable from essences. Since internal possibility is the same in all possible worlds, there must be grounds of internal possibility in all these worlds, which is best achieved by an absolutely necessary being. And third, Kant can account for the fact that external possibility is not directly dependent on God's essence. For the grounds of external possibility are either contingent worldly grounds or God's decrees. 14 5. God's Grounding of Possibility in the Critical Period I have argued in this paper that Kant has a broadly Aristotelian account of possibility in Beweisgrund, according to which grounds of possibility are potential grounds of actuality. By way of concluding, I would like to have a brief look at the Critical period. Although Kant does not address the question of how God grounds possibility in his Critical writings, there are at least two passages in his lectures that, taken together, suggest that Kant still thinks that God grounds possibility by his understanding and will. Firstly, we read: For one can think the causality of God, or his capacity to make other things outside him actual, in no other way than in his understanding, or in other words: a being that is self-sufficient can only become the cause of other things outside him by his understanding; and this very causality of the understanding of making the objects of its representations actual is called will. (RT-Pölitz 28:1061) Kant is reported to be drawing a particularly close connection between God's understanding and his will: the understanding is not only a presupposition for his will; rather, the will is the causality of the understanding. This alone does not reveal that Kant holds that God grounds possibility by these capacities or that grounds of possibility are potential grounds of actuality, of course. But we read in another transcript: We represent the real possibility of things as derived from God because everything exists according to God's decree (as ens entium). (M-Dohna 28:698) This does not have to mean that Kant now accepts voluntarism about possibility. Rather, if we combine this passage with the passage from the Pölitz notes, we can adopt a reading that is compatible with the view from Beweisgrund. For God, who is the cause of the world by his decrees, must therefore also have the capacities of understanding and will, by which he is the potential cause of the world, and hence the ground of real possibility. However, I do not intend to make hasty conclusions from transcripts alone, but only want to point out the continuity that can be found here. And we must not overlook that there are also important differences to Kant's account in Beweisgrund. First, it goes without saying that the Critical Kant denies that we can prove God's existence. Second, Kant now thinks that God's understanding and will are, like all divine realities, properties of which we can have no determinate concept, but which we can only describe by analogy with human faculties. That is, we cannot attribute to God the faculties of understanding and will (which would be anthropomorphist), but only faculties 15 analogous to human understanding and will. 66 Third, the Critical Kant says that God is the ground not of internal (or external) possibility, but of "real possibility". But I must defer a reading of Kant's Critical conception of real possibility and what it means for the relation of God to the world to another occasion. This enterprise shall be as difficult as it is crucial. 67 References Abaci, Uygar (2017): "Kant, The Actualist Principle, and The Fate of the Only Possible Proof". Journal of the History of Philosophy 55/2, 261–291. Abaci, Uygar (2019): Kant's Revolutionary Theory of Modality. Oxford. Adams, Robert M. (1994): Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist. Oxford. Adams, Robert M. (2000): "God, Possibility, and Kant". Faith and Philosophy 17/4, 425–440. Aristotle. De Anima. Translated by Robert Hicks. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1907. Baumgarten, Alexander G. (M): Metaphysica. Reprinted in vol. 17 of the Akademie-Ausgabe. Boehm, Omri (2014): Kant's Critique of Spinoza. Oxford. Borghini, Andrea and Williams, Neil E. (2008): "A Dispositional Theory of Possibility". Dialectica 62, 21–41. Chignell, Andrew (2009): "Kant, Modality, and the Most Real Being". Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 91, 157–192. Chignell, Andrew (2012): "Kant, Real Possibility, and the Threat of Spinoza". Mind 121/483, 635–675. Chignell, Andrew (2014a): "Kant and the 'Monstrous' Ground of Possibility: a Reply to Abaci and Yong". Kantian Review 19/1, 53–69. Chignell, Andrew (2014b): "Can Kantian Laws be Broken?" Res Philosophica 91/1, 103–121. Crusius, Christian August (E): Entwurf der nothwendigen Vernunft-Wahrheiten, wiefern sie den zufälligen entgegen gesetzet werden. Reprint of the edition Leipzig 1745. Hildesheim: 1964. Dunlop, Katherine (2018): "The origins and 'possibility' of concepts in Wolff and Kant: Comments on Nicholas Stang, Kant's Modal Metaphysics". European Journal of Philosophy 26, 1134–1140. Fisher, Mark, and Eric Watkins (1998): "Kant on the Material Ground of Possibility: From "The Only Possible Argument" to the "Critique of Pure Reason"". The Review of Metaphysics 52/2, 369–395. Hoffer, Noam (2016): "The Relation between God and the World in the Pre-Critical Kant: Was Kant a Spinozist?" Kantian Review 21/2, 185–210. 16 Insole, Christopher (2011): "Intellectualism, Relational Properties, and the Divine Mind in Kant's Pre-Critical Philosophy". Kantian Review 16/3, 399–427. Jacobs, Jonathan D. (2010): "A Powers Theory of Modality: or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Reject Possible Worlds". Philosophical Studies 151, 227–248. Kanterian, Edward (2018): Kant, God and Metaphysics: The Secret Thorn. London. Leibniz, G.W. (Con): Confessio Philosophi: Papers Concerning the Problem of Evil 1671–1678. Transl. and ed. by R. Sleigh. New Haven, 2005. Leibniz, G.W. (Con): "Mondadology". In Leibniz: Monadology and Other Philosophical Essays. Transl. and ed. by P. Schrecker and A. Martin Schrecker. Indianapolis, 1965. Lin, Martin (2012): "Rationalism and Necessitarianism". NOÛS 46/3, 418–448. Nachtomy, Ohad (2012): "Leibniz and Kant on Possibility and Existence". British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20/5, 953–972. Newlands, Samuel (2010): "The Harmony of Spinoza and Leibniz". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81/1, 64–104. Newlands, Samuel (2013): "Leibniz and the Ground of Possibility". Philosophical Review 122/2, 155–187. Pasnau, Robert (2011): Metaphysical Themes: 1274–1671. Oxford. Stang, Nicholas F. (2010): "Kant's Possibility Proof". History of Philosophy Quarterly 27/3, 275–299. Stang, Nicholas F. (2016): Kant's Modal Metaphysics. Oxford. Theis, Robert (1994): Gott: Untersuchung der Entwicklung des theologischen Diskurses in Kants Schriften zur theoretischen Philosophie bis hin zum Erscheinen der Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Stuttgart. Vetter, Barbara (2015): Potentiality: From Dispositions to Modality. Oxford. Watkins, Eric (2005): Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality. New York. Wolff, Christian (GM): Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt ("German Metaphysics"). Reprint of the 11th edition, 1751. Ed. by C.A. Corr. Hildesheim: 1983. Wolff, Christian (Ont): Philosophia Prima sive Ontologia ("Ontology"). Reprint of the second edition, Frankfurt and Leipzig 1736. Ed. by Jean École. Hildesheim: Olms, 1962. Wolff, Christian (Cosm): Cosmologia Generalis. Reprint of the 2 nd edition, 1737. Ed. by J. École. Hildesheim: 1964. Wolff, Christian (TN): Theologia Naturalis ("Natural Theology"), Part 1.1. Reprint of the second edition, Frankfurt and Leipzig 1739. Ed. by Jean École. Hildesheim: Olms, 1978. 17 Wood, Allen (1978): Kant's Rational Theology. Ithaca. Yong, Peter (2014): "God, Totality and Possibility in Kant's Only Possible Argument". Kantian Review 19/1, 27–51. Yong, Peter (2017): "The Grounds of Determinate Thought: Kant's Possibility Proof and the Development of German Idealism". History of Philosophy Quarterly 23/4, 251–269. 1 See OPGP 2:79f., 2:83. – I quote Kant according to volume and page numbers of the Akademie edition. Translations are usually mine, although I considered standard translations. The following abbreviations for titles are used: CPJ = Critique of the Power of Judgment, M-x = Metaphysics x (lecture), OPGP = The Only Possible Ground of Proof, Opt = Essay on Some Considerations on Optimism, Rel = Religion within the Boundaries of Reason Alone, RT-x = Rational Theology x (lecture), VT = On a Recently Raised Tone of Superiority. Wolff and Crusius are quoted according to paragraphs. 2 See Chignell 2009, 2012, 2014a, Boehm 2014. Adams (2000) defends a modest form of Spinozism. 3 See Insole 2011 and Hoffer 2016, who also point out that this view conforms to the views of Leibniz, Wolff and Baumgarten (see Insole 2011: 419f. and Hoffer 2016: 193–5 in particular). 4 See Stang 2010: 280f. 5 For an overview of the grounding of possibility in Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, see Newlands 2013. 6 See Newlands 2013: 177. 7 See Stang 2016: 118, similarly Abaci 2019: 130f. According to Stang (2016: 117f.), we cannot know how God grounds possibility because Kant says that "this thought rises far higher than a created being can reach" (OPGP 2:152f.). However, as Yong points out, this does not mean that it is "strictly unthinkable for us" how God grounds possibility, but only that we have no "causal concept" of it (Yong 2017: 259). 8 For detailed discussion of the possibility proof, see Wood 1978: 64–71, Fisher and Watkins 1998: 369– 80, Chignell 2009, Stang 2010, 2016: ch. 4–5, Boehm 2014: 20–43, Abaci: 2017: 264–70, 2019: 104–31, Kanterian 2018: 207–41. 9 See OPGP 2:87f. 10 This argument is usually neglected. Stang, however, admits that, on a "very natural reading" of the argument, God grounds possibility by his power and understanding (2016: 112). Unfortunately, he rejects 18 this reading without explaining why he considers it mistaken or how the argument should be read instead. Hoffer (2016: 196) uses the argument as evidence that God has an understanding, but ignores the role of God's will. – The location of the argument within the context of the possibility proof, however, is initially puzzling. For the Third Argument seems to appeal to empirical considerations about the order of nature, as Kant does in the second part of Beweisgrund. But since the possibility proof is a priori, it would be problematic to invoke an argument that draws on empirical assumptions. One way to avoid this problem could be that the Third Argument only establishes that the absolutely necessary being must have the capacities to ground the order of nature, but not that this being exists (which already has been established by an a priori argument at this point). However, I am not interested in the role of the Third Argument within the possibility proof here, but only in what it tells us about grounds of possibility. 11 See also OPGP 2:123. 12 Crucially, the absolutely necessary being does not ground his own possibility or the possibility of his own properties. For "his own possibility is originally given", and the absolutely necessary being does not contain the real ground of "the possibility of the most real being himself" (OPGP 2:86). When Kant writes that some possibilities are given in the absolutely necessary being "as a determination" and not as a consequence through him (OPGP 2:79), Kant means that God's determinations are possible because God himself is the absolutely necessary being. Hence, I agree with Stang (2016: 104, 118) against Adams (2000: 438) and Chignell (2009: 181). 13 Because of the perfect harmony that all possibilities must exhibit, I take it that God can only ground them as a whole (see Yong 2014: 39–41). Therefore, it is not possible to single out possibilities that are not dependent on God's understanding. See also section 2. 14 One may wonder whether Kant thinks that there are other necessary conditions for God's will, in addition to his understanding, to cause something. Arguably, this question cannot be answered conclusively. But since all powers necessarily conform to God's will (or else he would not be 19 omnipotent), his will is always sufficient to cause something. Hence, nothing that is relevant for my account depends on this. 15 Metaphysics Herder, which is from about the same time as Beweisgrund, makes basically the same point when it reports Kant to have said that "possibility cannot be the consequence of a choice, but must precede in the representation of the understanding" (28:134). 16 Conversely, the will presupposes the understanding, without which the will could not have a thought of something that it wants to be actualized. This distinguishes a blindly necessary ground – which also could ground possibility – from a spirit. 17 Aside from the quote, this is made clear, e.g., in OPGP 2:91f. 18 See Stang 2016: 113. As Stang points out, Kant argues that "the will makes nothing possible, but only decrees what is already presupposed as possible" (OPGP 2:100, see also OPGP 2:91, M-Herder 28:134). Since Kant talks specifically about decrees, it is clear that he is not denying here that God's will is the ground of internal possibility by its capacity. – I will show later that the Third Argument only concerns "internal possibility"; "external possibility", by contrast, is dependent on God's decrees. 19 See OPGP 2:78, 2:84, and elsewhere. 20 See also Abaci 2019: 108f. 21 See OPGP 2:157, also Chignell 2009: 181, Kanterian 2018: 265. 22 In Theologia Naturalis, Wolff calls internal possibility "possibility considered absolutely", and external possibility is called possibility "considered as it is restricted by the context [in systemata redacta]" (TN 142, see also GM 574). See also Dunlop 2018: 1135, Abaci 2019: 71f. 23 See Wolff, Ont 143, 146, 148, also Abaci 2019: 67f. 24 See TN 144. So it is not true that, as Hoffer (2016: 194) suggests, for Wolff or the Wolffians internal possibility is the same as essence. Rather, internally possible is whatever is compatible with an essence. 25 See Wolff, Ont 881. 20 26 See Wolff, Cosm 112, 114. Determinism means that everything that happens is hypothetically necessary, which rules out free choice and uncaused events. Thus, everything that is externally possible is hypothetically necessary and actual. 27 See Cosm 112, also Abaci 2019: 73. 28 Also see Dunlop's and Abaci's discussion of Wolff's views on possibility (see Dunlop 2018: 1134f., Abaci 2019: 59–74), although I disagree with Dunlop on "possibility in potentia remota", which she reads in a way that seems close to Crusian real possibility. 29 See, e.g., Leibniz, Con 57, also Chignell 2009: 167 n. 20, Stang 2016: 15 n. 11, and the references mentioned there. My views on Leibniz's distinction of the different kinds of possibility have been informed by Adams 1994: ch. 2, Newlands 2010, Lin 2012, and Abaci 2019: 35–54. 30 That Wolff thinks that God predetermines what happens in the world follows from determinism together with the fact that God creates the world. 31 See OPGP 2:92, 2:100, 2:162. 32 I take it that Kant speaks of a "cause" (and not of a ground of external possibility) because he agrees with Wolff that external possibility is co-extensional with actuality. 33 See Newlands 2013: 164–6. 34 I would like to thank xxx for discussion on this kind of objection. 35 See OPGP 2:100. 36 See OPGP 2:117. 37 For helpful discussion of Kant's treatment of physico-theology and the difference between moral and non-moral dependency, see Theis 1994: 127–32, Kanterian 2018: 248–59. 38 See OPGP 2:92, 2:95f., 2:98, 2:99, 2:101, 2:124. 39 See Hoffer 2016: 199–202. 40 We will see in section 4 that God is also the direct ground of external possibility in the case of creation or miracles. 21 41 See Crusius, E 56, 64, 66, 69, 83(a), 83(b), 405. 42 See Robert Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes, 536. The distinction goes back to Aristotle's distinction of two senses of actuality. In De Anima, he argues that "soul is the first actuality of a natural body having in it the capacity of life", whereas the second actuality consists in the specific acts of the soul (De Anima ii 1, 412b5–6). 43 See also Crusius, E 63, 64, 69. 44 This has been pointed out by Stang (2016: 113), who nonetheless does not mention that, according to Crusius, God's understanding and will are needed for his omnipotence. Consequently, it is not true that Crusius is a voluntarist about God's grounding of possibility, as Chignell (2009: 181 n. 41) holds. 45 See Crusius, E 58. 46 See Crusius, E 278. 47 See also OPGP 2:117, 2:126, 2:132, 2:151, 2:159. 48 See OPGP 2:85f. 49 See also OPGP 2:79, 85, 87, and Stang 2016: 107–12. 50 See OPGP 2:77f. 51 See OPGP 2:77f. 52 See OPGP 2:78, 2:79. 53 See Chignell 2009: 164. 54 Some scholars believe that Kant identifies possibility with "thinkability" (see Wood 1978: 66, 68, Fisher and Watkins 1998: 371, Yong 2017: 253f.). But this is wrong. To be sure, Kant makes a strong connection between possibility and thinkability in Beweisgrund, arguing that "everything possible is something that can be thought" (OPGP 2:78). Notwithstanding this, he stops short of identifying possibility with thinkability and even claims that some concepts, which as such are thinkable, may be "deception" (OPGP 2:80) or "empty words" that do not signify possible things (OPGP 2:81). What Kant seems to mean instead is that possible is whatever is legitimately thinkable. And legitimately thinkable is 22 what is given, that is, what is grounded in something actual. For similar views to mine, see Chignell 2009: 168, Stang 2016: 118–20, Abaci 2017: 268f., 2019: 127–9. 55 See Fisher and Watkins 1998: 375 n. 15, Chignell 2009: 157f., Yong 2014: 28. 56 Following Crusius, Kant speaks of "determining" instead of "sufficient" grounds in this context (see ND 1:393). I stick by the usual terminology to avoid confusion. Furthermore, I use 'ground' and 'reason' interchangeably here. 57 When Kant says that he is willing to subscribe to the PSR, this is apparently not much more than a rhetorical move to put this worry aside and proceed to his main objection. Kanterian (2018: 267) argues that Kant in fact takes the PSR to be "unreliable" and already did so in Nova Dilucidatio. But the textual evidence is not straightforward as regards Beweisgrund; and as Kanterian himself notes earlier in his book, Kant accepts and proves the PSR in Nova Dilucidatio (see Kanterian 2018: 133). 58 Another problem about appealing to the PSR is that "the requirement that there be an explanation for real possibility does not dictate what counts as such an explanation" (Abaci 2019: 127). I agree with this. Potentialism about grounds of possibility may well be compatible with the PSR, but it would be only due to the fact that possibility is such that it requires grounds that we need to explain possibility. 59 See OPGP 2:79. Notably, Kant does not say whether his account is disjunctive or whether there is an overarching genus of possibility that applies both to God and the world. Nachtomy (2012: 957–62) argues that Leibniz has a disjunctivist account of existence that is quite analogous to the disjunctivist account of possibility Kant might accept (see Abaci 2019: 58 for a different reading). However, Nachtomy is unable to provide textual evidence that Leibniz consciously embraces disjunctivism, so we should be a bit cautious about this idea, in my view. The same problem applies to Kant – he might be a disjunctivist about possibility, or he might think that there is an overarching genus of possibility. Even so, Kant does not explicitly provide such an account. 60 Providing a compelling account of potentiality is tricky and beyond the scope of this paper; for recent systematic work, see Borghini and Williams 2008, Jacobs 2010, and Vetter 2015. Roughly, potentiality 23 means that, given the right circumstances, something has the intrinsic properties to be a ground of actuality. In the case of God, the right circumstances would be that he decrees to create a world, which would make his understanding and will grounds of the world's actuality; without God's decrees, his faculties are only potential grounds of the world's actuality. 61 Kant appears to endorse Baumgarten's (M 106) claim that essences are necessary and unchangeable (see M-Herder 28: 18). This view is very traditional and has also been championed by Wolff (GM 42, Ont 300). 62 Since the whole world owes its existence to God's creation, but substances cannot be created by worldly substances (maybe with the exception of living beings), worldly substances must be created directly by God. Miracles, on the contrary, "interrupt the order of nature" (OPGP 2:116); they are direct causal interventions by God and Kant clearly does not rule out their possibility. See Chignell 2014b for a helpful discussion of Kant's account of miracles. 63 See, for instance, Leibniz Mon 53–5. 64 See OPGP 2:153f., also his essay on optimism from 1758 (Opt 2:27–35). 65 This helps to refute an objection from Chignell (2009: 181), who argues that powers cannot ground internal possibility because they can only be grounds of external possibility. However, while it is true that worldly powers are only grounds of external possibility (because the existence of substances with these powers is contingent), God exists absolutely necessarily, so his powers can be grounds of internal possibility. 66 See CPJ 5:464n, Rel 6:65n, VT 8:400f.n, also A696f./B724f. Wood's discussion on this matter is most helpful (see Wood 1978: 86–93). 67 [acknowledgments]

Rolling Back the Luck Problem for Libertarianism Zac Cogley Northern Michigan University Biography Zac Cogley is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Northern Michigan University. His research interests include moral responsibility, emotion, and other related concepts. His publications include pieces on trust, the blaming emotions, the nature of angry virtue and vice, and the grounds for deserving resentment. Acknowledgments I am grateful to feedback from a friendly audience at the Free Will conference sponsored by the Center for Cognition and Neuroethics, a less-friendly PACT audience, and Andrea Scarpino. Publication Details Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics (ISSN: 2166-5087). March, 2015. Volume 3, Issue 1. Citation Cogley, Zac. 2015. "Rolling Back the Luck Problem for Libertarianism." Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3 (1): 121–137. Journal of Cognition andNeuroethics 122 Abstract I here sketch a reply to Peter van Inwagen's Rollback Argument, which suggests that libertarian accounts of free agency are beset by problems involving luck. Van Inwagen imagines an indeterministic agent whose universe is repeatedly 'rolled back' by God to the time of her choice. Since the agent's choice is indeterministic, her choices are sometimes different in the imaginary rollback scenarios. I show that although this is true, this need not impair her control over what she does. I develop an account of when and why the fact that an agent would choose differently impairs control, which provides a novel response to the Rollback Argument. Keywords Libertarianism, Luck, Peter van Inwagen, free will, Robert Kane 1. Introduction Libertarians believe that free-will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism. They hold that only causal indeterminism (of the relevant sort) ensures that when an agent acts she chooses between a plurality of options so that, whatever she chooses to do, she was free to choose something else. On the libertarian view, this is required in order for an agent to be morally responsible for her actions. One of the most pressing objections to contemporary libertarian accounts of free-will is luck. Peter van Inwagen's Rollback Argument (2000) has recently gained favor as a way of highlighting the luck problem for libertarians. In this paper, I sketch a response to the Rollback Argument on behalf of libertarians. I argue that the phenomenon of rollback need not be problematic for libertarians. Whether an agent's freedom and control is seen as impaired when we consider rollback scenarios depends on the underlying core agential features of a person. Bringing these agential features to the fore demonstrates that rather than presenting a threat to libertarianism, rollback may actually be a helpful tool for libertarians in further developing theories of morally responsible action. Rolling Back the Luck Problem for Libertarianism Zac Cogley Cogley 123 2. A Libertarian Sketch According to libertarianism, we are at least sometimes able to make choices that are free and for which we are morally responsible.1 Libertarians see this ability as grounded in the fact that at least some of our choices are not determined. I will assume an eventcausal libertarian view, which explains a person's making a choice by appealing to certain agent-involving mental events that cause that choice.2 Call the relevant mental events that cause a person's choices her mental set. A person's mental set is the collection of beliefs, desires, preferences, intentions, judgments, resolutions, and so on that plays a relevant role in making it the case that she makes a particular choice. If a choice were determined that would mean, given a person's mental set at the moment she was choosing, there would be only one choice she could make. So, for example, if my choice to work on this paper instead of go for a run were determined, it would only be possible for me to choose to work on the paper. Given my mental set at the time of my choice, I would not and could not choose to go for a run. An animating idea of libertarianism, as I understand it, is that if I could only choose to work on the paper, I would seem to lack sufficient control over my choice for it to be truly free. If it were not truly free, I would not be morally responsible for making it. For a libertarian, an agent has sufficient control to be free and morally responsible only when it is true that, given her mental set, she really could choose in more than one way. So in the case above, for me to be morally responsible for choosing to work on the paper it would also have to have been possible for me to choose to go for a run (or choose something else, instead). Thus, my choice must not be determined by my mental set in order for it to be free and for me to be morally responsible for it.3 Take an example: suppose Anne, a businesswoman in a hurry on the way to an important meeting, must decide whether to intervene in an assault (Kane 2007, 26). Anne's presence at the meeting could aid her career, but she is also sensitive to the help 1. Some philosophers allow for the separation of freedom and moral responsibility. I don't in this paper. I here treat free choice as the control condition on being morally responsible. 2. Libertarianism comes in many 'flavors'; important types include noncausal, event-causal, deliberative, and agent-causal accounts. While I focus on an event-causal picture, I don't imply that invoking other kinds of libertarianism can't help with the luck problem. Perhaps they can; I am merely concentrating on the event-causal picture here. For more on the distinctions between libertarian views and the plausibility of libertarian accounts, see (Clarke 2003). 3. While many define determinism as the claim that given the past and given the laws there is only one possible future, what matters most is that given the person's past mental set and the laws there is only one possible future choice. Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 124 needed by the assault victim. If Anne's choice is not casually determined by her mental set, then until she makes the decision there is at least some chance she will choose either to intervene or choose to continue on to the meeting. This means that there are possible worlds just like the actual one where everything-including her mental set-is the same right up until the point of the decision, but Anne chooses to go on to the meeting rather than help the assault victim. And there are possible worlds just like the actual one where everything is the same right up until her decision, but Anne chooses to intervene in the assault rather than go to the meeting. Robert Kane terms this ability to choose either option plural voluntary control. According to Kane, To have such control over a set of options at a given time is to be able to bring about any of the options (to go more-than-one-way) at will or voluntarily at the time. That is to say, it is to be able to do whatever you will (or most want) to do among a set of options, whenever you will to do it, for the reasons you will to do it, and in such manner that neither your doing it nor willing to do it was coerced or compelled. (Kane 1996, 111) When an agent has such control over her action it is free because she and she alone controls it in the sense that whatever choice she makes is one willed by her. Either way Anne chooses, her choice will be made for reasons (Kane 2007, 29). Let us suppose, then, that Anne in fact chooses to stop and intervene in the assault. She aids the victim in driving off the attacker. Her choice is grounded in her sympathy to the victim's plight and her desire to not let the attacker successfully harm an innocent person. Since her stopping to help is free, libertarians believe she is morally responsible for the choice. 3. Luck The luck problem results from the fact that Anne's choice to stop the assault- even if well-intentioned-may appear to be a matter of luck. Why? Well, consider that even though Anne stopped to help we know that she was not determined to do so. Importantly, her mental set did not determine that she would stop to aid the victim. It was possible that, given her mental set and the laws of nature, she would have chosen to continue on to her business meeting. It is possible Anne would have selfishly passed by the assault victim. Christopher Franklin presents a schematic account of the problem that luck presents for libertarianism (Franklin 2011, 201): Cogley 125 (i) If an action is undetermined, then it is a matter of luck. (ii) If an action is a matter of luck, then it is not free. If this argument is successful, it establishes that undetermined actions are not free and that agents cannot be morally responsible for performing them. Even worse, it suggests that libertarianism is incoherent. It implies that undetermined actions are free and that undetermined actions are also not free! But the argument can be challenged-it all depends on what we take luck to involve. For example, suppose we say that an outcome, action, or choice is 'lucky' just in case it is determined at least in part by something other than an agent. For example, my hitting a hole in one was lucky because after I hit the golf ball the wind blew in just the right way so that the ball went into the cup. If the wind hadn't blown in the way it did, I wouldn't have made the shot. However, if we examine Anne's choice using this account of luck, we can see that Anne's choice isn't lucky. Anne's choice to go to the meeting or help the assault victim is undetermined. But the fact that it is undetermined does not imply that it is determined by something other than Anne. Since only Anne's mental set bears on the choice she will make, no other factors play a causal role in bringing about what she will choose. On this account of luck, then, it is false to say that her choice is lucky. So how the putative links are developed between indeterminism, luck, and freedom (or its absence) matters for evaluating whether or not luck is a threat to libertarians. 4. The Rollback Argument 4.1 The Initial Argument Peter van Inwagen (2000) uses what has become known as the 'Rollback Argument' to develop the luck problem for libertarians.4 Van Inwagen asks us to imagine that Anne's universe is 'rewound' by God to right before she make her choice. Suppose God then 4. Van Inwagen presents the Rollback Argument as a way of developing what he terms the Mind argument. As van Inwagen explicates it, the Mind argument develops the idea that libertarian choices are not free because they are "mere matters of chance" and the Rollback Argument is a way of developing this intuitive idea (van Inwagen 2000). But as Franklin (2012) points out, van Inwagen earlier (1983) presented the Mind argument as having three separate instances; van Inwagen does not say which the Rollback Argument is supposed to develop or whether it is somehow supposed to develop the overall idea of all three. Franklin then wants to separate luck arguments and the Mind argument; treating the Rollback Argument as an instance of the first. I here do the same, reading van Inwagen's appeal to "mere matters of chance" as developing the concern regarding luck. Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 126 allows things to play out again. And then again, and again. Suppose that God rewinds the universe and causes it to replay 726 times. In about half of the replays, Anne chooses to intervene while in the other half she chooses punctual attendance at the meeting. After we observe the replays, van Inwagen comments: ...we shall be faced with the inescapable impression that what happens in the seven-hundred-and-twenty-seventh replay will be due simply to chance...[W]hat other conclusion can we accept about the sevenhundred-and-twenty-seventh replay (which is about to commence) than this : each of the two possible outcomes of this replay has an objective, 'ground-floor' probability of 0.5-and there's nothing more to be said? And this, surely, means that, in the strictest sense imaginable, the outcome of the replay will be a matter of chance. (2000, 15) He continues, If [Anne] was faced with [two options], and it was a mere matter of chance which of these things she did, how can we say that-and this is essential to the act's being free-she was able to [stop and help] and able to [go to the meeting]? How could anyone be able to determine the outcome of a process whose outcome is a matter of objective, ground-floor chance? (2000, 15–16 italics original) The implied answer is clear: no one is able to determine the outcomes of such a process. I thus interpret van Inwagen as here providing an argument schema similar to the 'luck' schema presented by Franklin above. This argument runs (i) If an action is undetermined, then it is a mere matter of chance. (ii) If an action is a mere matter of chance, then it is not free. Thus, I take van Inwagen to be offering an account of luck in terms of mere chance and then claiming that rollback scenarios show that rolled-back choices are matters of mere chance and thus not free. Importantly, while the claim that Anne's choice is a mere matter of chance gets significant intuitive support from consideration of the rollback scenarios, the key point is that her choice is a mere matter of chance even on the very first scenario. That is, van Inwagen presents the rollbacks as a way of intuitively showing that when Anne is faced with the choice in the actual world, it is a mere matter of chance that she chooses to stop and help the assault victim. Cogley 127 4.2 Franklin's responses Christopher Franklin has recently responded to the Rollback Argument on behalf of libertarians. One strand of reply invokes the following account of abilities: An agent S has the ability to Φ at t in W only if there is a set of possible worlds w, that is such that, all the worlds in this set have the same laws of nature as W, S's intrinsic properties are sufficiently similar to her intrinsic properties in W, and S Φ-s. (Franklin 2011, 218) This account of abilities is plausible and I additionally grant it to Franklin for the sake of argument. The idea is that if we understand what it is for an agent to have an ability, we will see that Anne has both the ability to stop and help and also the ability to go to the meeting. Thus, Franklin's account of abilities allows him to answer van Inwagen's first question in the second block quote above: "how can we say that-and this is essential to the act's being free-she was able to [stop and help] and able to [go to the meeting]?" We can say that she is able to stop and help because there are many worlds with the same laws of nature as the actual world, Anne's intrinsic properties in those worlds are sufficiently similar to her properties in the actual world, and Anne stops to help. And we can say that Anne has the ability to go to the meeting for the same reasons. With this strand of argument, then, Franklin presents an account of abilities that grounds the claim that Anne has both the ability to help and the ability to go to the meeting. He admits that it is still undetermined that Anne exercises her ability to stop and intervene in the assault (2011, 218). But he believes that "we are left with little to no reason for thinking that indeterminism introduces a kind of luck or chance that is incompatible with an agent...being free and morally responsible" (2011, 218–219). Franklin has met van Inwagen's initial challenge. Recall that part of van Inwagen's challenge was to answer the question "how can we say that-and this is essential to the act's being free-she was able to [stop and help] and able to [go to the meeting]?" We should agree that Franklin's account of abilities shows that Anne is able to do both. Adding further support for this claim, Franklin argues (2012) that rollback scenarios are just a way of demonstrating indeterminism, and thus don't present a significant challenge to libertarianism.5 His idea is that the rollback scenarios simply show what it would 5. Franklin also notes that van Inwagen's initial description of the rollback thought experiment is metaphysically impossible. That is because, as van Inwagen describes, God continually rolls back time in the same possible world, but we are asked to imagine that sometimes Anne makes different decisions in the future of that world. But Anne cannot make different decisions regarding the same choice at the same time period in the same world, as "a possible world has all its components essentially: a possible Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 128 mean for Anne's choice not to be determined and thus only "describe libertarianism in a rather colorful way. But one cannot raise the cost of libertarianism by simply describing it" (2012, 409). However, it is not clear that Franklin has fully vindicated libertarianism against the Rollback Argument. 4.3 Schlosser's reply While Franklin is able to demonstrate that Anne possesses the dual abilities in question, the success of his ultimate reply to the luck problem has been questioned by recent work. Let us grant that Anne has both the ability to help and the ability not to help. Does that show that Anne's choice-the choice she makes in the actual world-is truly free? The worry about freedom is a worry about control. If Anne stops and helps, is she in sufficient control of her choice? To answer this question in the affirmative it may not be enough to show that whichever way Anne chooses she will have chosen for reasons and that she was not coerced or compelled-as alluded by Kane when discussing plural voluntary control. Markus Schlosser has recently argued that answering 'yes' to the question requires that Anne have the power to choose one alternative rather than another. On Schlosser's view, the real challenge the Rollback Argument presents to libertarianism is to give an account of how Anne has control sufficient to exercise her dual ability in one way rather than another. While she can either stop and help or go to the meeting, she cannot "exercise either one of the two abilities such that she can select which alternative to pursue" (Schlosser 2014, 381 emphasis original). Seeing this might appear to show that, contra Franklin's assertions, the Rollback Argument does raise the cost of libertarianism. And it does that even though there is a sense in which the thought experiment simply shows a vivid demonstration of what indeterminacy between a person's mental set and her choice involves. If her choice is not determined then sometimes she could, and would, choose the other way rather than the way she actually does choose. That much is, and should not be, in dispute. The real threat of the Rollback thought experiment to libertarianism, however, concerns what it implies about Anne's original choice. It shows that while she has the ability to choose either way world could not have been different" (Franklin 2012, 407). However, this is not a serious barrier to consideration of the rollback idea, because as Franklin notes, we can imagine instead God rolling back time and letting Anne decide again. Any decision that is different will thus take place in a different possible world. Technically, then, rollback scenarios rollback time to a possible world that has more than one world as direct 'descendant.' As time rolls forward the world 'branches' into at least two sets of worlds, one set where Anne stops and helps and the other where she continues on to the meeting. Cogley 129 she does not have sufficient control over the original choice itself. If it is simply a matter of objective chance that she chooses to stop and help rather than continue on to the meeting, she appears as much in control of her decision as she would have been if the way she chose were simply determined by a coin flip. Since Anne would not be in control when the coin-flip selects the option of stopping and helping, why think that she is in control when her act is the result only of her own mental set? Franklin has not given us an answer to this question, which I think is the real question forced on libertarians by the Rollback Argument.6 5. A Way Forward 5.1 Suggestive Return to Kane and van Inwagen Kane develops the notion of plural voluntary control in conjunction with his account of self-forming actions (SFAs). I am worried that Kane's focus on the importance of selfforming actions (SFAs) may have led others astray in thinking about libertarian models of control. According to Kane, SFAs occur at those difficult times of life when we are torn between competing visions of what we should do or become. Perhaps we are torn between doing the moral thing or acting from ambition, or between powerful present desires and long-term goals, or we are faced with difficult tasks for which we have aversions. In all such cases, we are faced with competing motivations and have to make an effort to 6. John Fischer has recently responded to the Rollback Argument in a way that might appear to address this worry (2012; forthcoming). He suggests we imagine that someone is morally responsible for her choice to raise her hand. Hold fixed the supposition that she is morally responsible for doing so, then imagine that we add to the description of her case a machine that 50% of the time will do nothing, but 50% of the time will stimulate her brain to cause her to refrain from choosing to raise her hand. Because the operation of the machine is random, we can run the rollback scenarios and see that 50% of the time the person raises her hand, while 50% of the time she does not. But, Fischer urges, if we supposed the person was morally responsible for raising her hand in the first place, we should still consider her morally responsible once we add the machine even though the machine makes it indeterminate that she will raise her hand. I worry that Fischer's strategy does not fully address the argument because when the machine operates it preempts the person's choice: 50% of the time she chooses to raise her hand while 50% of the time the machine directly stimulates her brain to prevent her from choosing. So while the objective probabilities are the same as in Anne's case, there is a crucial difference from van Inwagen's rollback scenarios. In the rollback scenarios the worry about control emerges because it is clearly the agent, herself, who chooses differently. Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 130 overcome temptation to do something else we also strongly want. (2007, 26) Kane's idea is that libertarians do not need to require indeterminacy between a person's mental set and her choices at all times. They only need sufficient indeterminacy in the right place to ground an agent's ultimate responsibility for what she is like. Essentially, Kane's thought is that if an agent can be found ultimately responsible for her mental set then she will also be responsible for any choices that flow from that set. SFAs are what Kane uses to ground that ultimate responsibility. As he notes, "In SFAs, the agent's will is divided and the agent has strong reasons or motives for making either choice" (2007, 29). In these cases, when our motives and reasons are balanced, "we make one set of competing reasons or motives prevail over the others then and there by deciding" (2007, 26–27). By making one set of reasons prevail over the others, we make ourselves; we impact the makeup of our mental set. And then it is by virtue of our responsibility for our mental set that we are responsible for all other choices. But SFAs only concern cases where our motives are balanced. For Kane, then, it is key that in SFAs the indeterminacy of a person's actions is reflective of a balancing of motives. Consider, now, van Inwagen's initial presentation of the idea of rolling back, or replaying, an agent's choice. When presenting the Rollback Argument he notes that We may, for example, observe that, after a fairly large number of replays, Alice lies in thirty percent of the replays and tells the truth in seventy percent of them-and that the figures 'thirty percent' and 'seventy percent' become more and more accurate as the number of replays increases. (2000, 14) But he then goes on to imagine the "simplest case": the case where each choice occurs 50% of the time. Why? Well, one thought is that if the simplest case is sufficient to make the point there is no need to consider a more complex case. But another is that given the importance of Kane's SFAs in the literature, the simplest case is the most important one. Whatever the reasons, my concern is that a focus by libertarians and their critics on the simple case has made libertarians less able to respond to worries about luck. We don't yet have an account of how an agent can exhibit significant control if, in rollback scenarios, she acts differently 50% of the time. My strategy is to suggest that libertarians need to get further inside the heads of the relevant agents to respond to the worry about luck presented by the Rollback Argument. We need to say more about the mental sets of the Cogley 131 agents in question in order to more fully understand how they can be in control over their choices. 5.2 Anne and Jan Let's return to Anne; I want to now reply to Schlosser's concern that Anne lacks sufficient control. I admit that Anne, herself, is not able to select exactly which alternative to pursue in the actual world. (Acknowledging this is just what Franklin has referred to as 'describing libertarianism.') But I think there is room for libertarians to argue that Anne possesses as much freedom and control over what she does as is possible, so long as the evaluative elements of her mental set are equally inclining her toward either choice. This last fact is crucially important. Consider, by contrast, Jan instead of Anne. Jan is also a successful businesswoman on the way to an important meeting. Like Anne, Jan happens upon someone being assaulted. She must decide whether to intervene and help the victim of the assault or continue on to her meeting. And like Anne, Jan's choice is to stop and intervene. Finally, like Anne, the link between Jan's mental set and her choice is indeterministic. Given her mental set at the time of her choice, it is not ensured that she will choose to stop and help. Just like Anne, God 'rolls back' Jan's choice so we can see how she would choose in alternative scenarios. And again like Anne, we discover that Jan's choices are roughly split between the two alternatives as the scenarios unfold. The crucial difference, however, is that the evaluative elements of Jan's mental set vastly favor stopping and helping the assault victim over going to the meeting. But Jan is weak-willed, so her evaluation is not reflected in her pattern of choice, which obeys the simple case's 50%-50% split. What do I mean by the evaluative elements of Jan's mental set? Well, suppose that Jan judges that it is best for her to stop and help the assault victim. Perhaps it also turns out that she has resolved in the past to help people in need even if it means forgoing important benefits to herself.7 (Maybe Jan worries that she is too quick to favor her own interests over the needs of others when the temptation arises. Her resolution reflects her commitment to change.) But in spite of these facts, Jan's actions in the rollback scenarios often also reflect her desire for the potential promotion she could secure via attendance 7. In a recent paper (2012), Joshua May and Richard Holton argue that the ordinary concept of weakness of will is a prototype, or cluster, concept that involves both acting contrary to best judgment and also too quickly revising a previously-made resolution. I try here here to include both elements in Jan's mental set. For more on resolutions, see (Holton 1999). Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 132 at the meeting. But this desire for progress up the corporate ladder is one that she repudiates, has resolved not to act on, and works actively to extinguish-suppose Jan is not proud of her attraction to status and the increased salary isn't worth the extra responsibility. Regardless of the particular explanation(s), we find Jan's pattern of action displayed in the rollback scenarios to not be well predicted by the evaluative elements of her mental set.8 Jan, I submit, is thus significantly out of control compared to Anne. Anne's comparative control is explained by the fact that Anne is genuinely torn about what to do in the situation. She takes herself to have about equal reason to go to the meeting as to stop and help the victim of the assault. Perhaps she has also resolved to try to balance her career ambitions with her desire to help others from time to time. Thus, though Anne only helps the victim 50% of the time in the rollback scenarios, she does not display weakness of will in doing so. I take it that means Anne also does not display weakness of will in the actual scenario. When Anne decides to stop and help the victim, she does so for reasons she has and she endorses. They are not reasons she finds to be particularly overriding, of course. Anne would not be shocked at herself if in a similar future scenario she did not stop and help. Additionally, Anne is not coerced or compelled to stop and help. Anne has all the control over her act an agent can be expected to have. In contrast, Jan would be horrified to discover about herself that she only helps the assault victim 50% of the time in rollback scenarios. She wholeheartedly judges that her minor status ambitions should take a backseat to helping others in sufficient need. Further, she has resolved to never fail to help others even if there is an enticing career prospect in play. Given these facts, knowing that she only stopped to help 50% of the time would shock her. (Or, at least, it would shock her if she also thinks of herself as a mostly continent person.) And these facts about Jan should bother us, too. We see exhibited in Jan a defect of agency-of agential control-which is not present in Anne. Compare yet another agent, Stan, to both Anne and Jan. Stan is strongly committed to helping the assault victim in the actual scenario, just like Jan. He judges that it is clearly best for him to help and he has also resolved to always help in scenarios like this. When we rollback Stan's universe, however, we find that Stan chooses to help the assault victim 978 times, while he hurries on to the meeting only 22 times. Stan's choice is still not determined by the interaction of his prior mental set and the world. After all, he can 8. If Jan's resolution coupled with her judgments about what is best for her do not pick out the relevant elements of Jan's mental set that 'truly stand for her,' I invite the reader to substitute her own favored notions instead. That is, imagine whatever needs to be true for Jan to be strongly committed to acting one way, but at the same time, it is consistent that Jan often acts in the contrary manner. Cogley 133 and sometimes does choose to attend the meting over helping the assault victim. But since Stan chooses to help the assault victim 97% of the time, libertarians can hold- correctly-that Stan exercises significantly more control over his choice than Jan does. Suppose that the right thing to do is to stop and help the victim of the assault. If so, then not only does Stan exercise more control over his choice to stop and help, his decision to stop and help is more praiseworthy than Anne's. The fact that he chooses to stop and help 97% of the time demonstrates both the strength of his moral concern for people unjustly victimized by others and his continence in choosing in such contexts. In contrast, neither Anne's nor Jan's choice-pattern reflects particularly well upon her. The important thing, however, is that it is for very different reasons. Anne's choice pattern reflects that she is not particularly concerned for those in need (at least, when there are payoffs for her), while Jan's reflects that she has significant weakness of will (at least, in this context). Libertarians require an indeterministic link between an agent's mental set and her choices (at least, at certain key points in the life of an agent). What I am suggesting is that while the causal relation between an agent's mental set and her choices must be indeterministic, there is no reason that the indeterministic relation is always one where rollback scenarios show the agent choosing either option 50% of the time. What is more important, I urge, is the degree of fit between the outputs of the evaluative elements of an agent's mental set and her overall patterns of action. When the agent really is torn between two choices, her patterns of action in rollback scenarios should reflect that. If she is not on the fence, she should choose one option significantly more often when time is rolled back. My thought, then, is that libertarians might embrace rollback scenarios as potentially revealing important facts about an agent that impair agential control. Sometimes what rollback demonstrates weakens control, namely when the percentage of times the agent acts in a particular way does not reflect the degree to which she is committed to that option. However, sometimes it does not. To adequately respond to the Rollback Argument, then, libertarians need to talk more about agent's commitments to the various courses of action they consider. 5.3 Degrees of Control I have argued that rollback scenarios need not harm libertarians. If we are more specific about the mental sets of the agents we consider, libertarians can use rollback scenarios to help explicate an agent's degrees of control and the praise or blameworthiness of her choices. My idea here relates libertarians to a somewhat unlikely ally. John Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 134 Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza (1998) develop a similar account for compatibilists. On their model, an agent's control is explicated-roughly speaking-by appealing to counterfactuals about how the agential mechanism of a person's choice would perform in relevantly similar possible worlds. Thus, rollback scenarios are the libertarian counterpart to Fischer and Ravizza's compatibilist idea. Rollback scenarios are counterfactuals about how an agent would act in the same world, rather than relevantly-similar worlds.9 So rollback scenarios can do two helpful things for libertarians. First, they can show the degree of control an agent exercises over her action. To determine this, we ask in the rollback scenarios whether there is an appropriate mesh between the percentage of the time the agent chooses one option and the strength of her evaluative commitment to it. Thus, Anne and Stan exhibit more control than Jan, because their choices in the rollback scenarios comport with their evaluation of the desirability of the options. Jan's choices, by contrast, do not fully reflect where she stands on the issue confronting her. Second, rollback scenarios can help to show the degree of praise and blameworthiness an agent bears for her action. Consider, then, the relative degree of praiseworthiness each agent-Anne, Jan, and Stan-bears for the act of deciding to stop and intervene in the assault. (Remember, in the actual world, all three stop and help.) Sometimes Anne helps, sometimes Jan helps, and sometimes Stan helps. However, in the rollback scenarios Anne and Jan each helps about 50% of the time, while Stan helps 97% of the time. Thus, Stan's choice to help is more praiseworthy as it is more reflective of both a substantial resolution to aid when needed and his judgment that helping is the best thing for him to do in the situation. Assuming that stopping to help is the right thing to do, Anne's choice to help is not nearly as praiseworthy, because she is only moderately in favor of helping in such scenarios. Similarly, Jan's choice is not significantly praiseworthy, but for a different reason: her lack of control. We have reason to withhold praise either when a person is not strongly committed to what is morally right or when she lacks the ability to exhibit her commitment to what is right in action. Both are moral defects, though of very different kinds.10 9. Potentially, this could provide a small advantage for libertarian accounts of free agency, as libertarians do not then need to invoke or define which worlds are the relevant ones. 10. We might also have reasons to praise a weak-willed person: i.e. reasons to praise someone who is not praiseworthy. Perhaps, for example, praising the weak-willed person will encourage her to be more continent. Such considerations would take us far afield of the current topic, which is when people really deserve praise and blame for their choices such that they are morally responsible for them. For more, see (Cogley 2013). Cogley 135 At this point, an objector might urge that there is nothing inherently libertarian about my response to the Rollback Argument. After all, consider an agent who is totally in favor of one of the options she confronts. Suppose Anne happens on a person in need and at the same time has a very strange thought that she could instead go get ice cream. Puzzled, she rejects this thought: she's all in for helping in this scenario. Thus, perfect continence and control for Anne in this case would be exhibited if in rollback scenarios she always chooses just that option; 100% of the time she chooses to help the person in need. But this would just be for Anne's action to be determined by her mental set: anathema to a libertarian. Certainly, on the account I am developing, a libertarian must require an indeterministic link between a person's mental set and her choice. So the libertarian must balk at attributing full control when rollbacks show a person doing the same action 100% of the time. I do not have space to defend the claim that actually having leeway between options enhances a person's control over her choices. That is a fundamental libertarian commitment which I am simply assuming here. What I've tried to do is show that a failure to make the same choice 100% of the time in rollback scenarios is very much compatible with someone exhibiting significant control over what she does. I've thus provided a defense for libertarians against the rollback version of the luck problem, which is a problem about indeterministic agents having diminished control over their choices. Whether indeterministic agents have enhanced control over their choices compared to fully determined agents is another topic. 6. Conclusion I've here sketched an account of how libertarians can respond to worries about luck presented by rollback scenarios. My thought is that discovering that in rollback scenarios someone would act differently than she actually does 50% of the time need not make us think the agent lacks substantial control over what she does. Libertarians can, and should, insist that control is fundamentally about the core evaluative elements of a person's mental set being translated into choice. If we are clear about the nature of a person's mental set and that she really is torn between the options, then finding out that she chooses differently 50% of the time just is to see her continence demonstrated via a divine mechanism. Even if an agent's choice is undetermined, the choice may still be free and under her control if affected by the strength of the agent's commitment to the various courses of action. Counterfactual rollback scenarios that show how the agent could have acted if Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 136 the world were rewound to the exact state and time of her choice might then be a way of exhibiting the agents commitment and continence. The fact that an agent would have acted differently in such scenarios is thus consistent with her having control over her action sufficient for her to be free and morally responsible for it. Cogley 137 References Clarke, Randolph. 2003. Libertarian Accounts of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press. Cogley, Zac. 2013. "Basic Desert of Reactive Emotions." Philosophical Explorations 16 (2): 165–77. Fischer, John Martin. forthcoming. "Toward a Solution to the Luck Problem." In Libertarian Free Will : Contemporary Debates, edited by Robert Kane. New York: Oxford University Press. Fischer, John Martin. 2012. "Indeterminism and Control: An Approach to the Problem of Luck." In Deep Control. New York: Oxford University Press. Fischer, John Martin, and Mark Ravizza. 1998. Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Franklin, Christopher Evan. 2011. "Farewell to the Luck (and Mind) Argument." Philosophical Studies 156 (2): 199–230. doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9583-3. Franklin, Christopher Evan. 2012. "The Assimilation Argument and the Rollback Argument." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3): 395–416. doi:10.1111/j.14680114.2012.01432.x. Holton, Richard. 1999. "Intention and Weakness of Will." The Journal of Philosophy 96 (5): 241. doi:10.2307/2564667. Kane, Robert. 1996. The Significance of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press. Kane, Robert. 2007. "Libertarianism." In Four Views on Free Will. Oxford: Blackwell. May, Joshua, and Richard Holton. 2012. "What in the World Is Weakness of Will?" Philosophical Studies 157 (3): 341–60. doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9651-8. Schlosser, Markus E. 2014. "The Luck Argument against Event-Causal Libertarianism: It Is Here to Stay." Philosophical Studies 167 (2): 375–85. doi:10.1007/s11098-013-01021. Van Inwagen, Peter. 1983. An Essay on Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press. Van Inwagen, Peter. 2000. "The Eighth Philosophical Perspectives Lecture: Free Will Remains a Mystery." Noûs 34 (October): 1–19.

Lucky Achievement: Virtue Epistemology on the Value of Knowledge Tsung-Hsing Ho Department of Philosophy, National Chung Cheng University This is the pre-peer reviewed version, which will published in final form in RATIO (https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12188). This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving. ABSTRACT Virtue epistemology argues that knowledge is more valuable than Gettierized belief because knowledge is an achievement, but Gettierized belief is not. The key premise in the achievement argument is that achievement is apt (successful because competent) and Gettierized belief is inapt (successful because lucky). I first argue that the intuition behind the achievement argument is based wrongly on the fact that 'being successful because lucky' implicates 'being not competent enough'. I then offer an argument from moral luck to argue that virtue epistemologists should maintain that knowledge is no more valuable than Gettierized belief. KEYWORDS luck; achievement; virtue epistemology; value of knowledge; John Greco; Ernest Sosa ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This research was supported by the Ministry of Science and Technology, Taiwan (106-2410-H194-083). Thanks to Daniel Whiting, Conor McHugh, Anthony Booth, Lee Walters, Chienkuo Mi, Cheng-Hung Tsai, Wen-Fang Wang, Hua Wang, and Karen Yan for their feedback on the earlier versions of this paper. I also grateful to an anonymous reviewer for their helpful suggestions. 2 1. INTRODUCTION Virtue epistemologists, like John Greco (2010) and Ernest Sosa (2007, 2011), often advertise their account of knowledge for being able to solve the problems about the value of knowledge. More specifically, they argue that virtue epistemology can explain why knowledge is more valuable than justified true belief that falls short of knowledge (henceforth, Gettierized belief for short) (Jones, 1997; Kvanvig, 2003; Pritchard, 2010). Very roughly, their reasons are that knowledge is an achievement (apt) whereas Gettierized belief is not (inapt) and that achievement is constitutive of our flourishing. Hence, knowledge is more valuable than Gettierized belief. Virtue epistemology has a unique feature that distinguishes it from other theories of knowledge: that is, it considers knowledge as a kind of cognitive performance and thus epistemic evaluation as a species of performance evaluation. In Sosa's terms, there are three aspects of performance evaluation: success, competence, and aptness (success because of competence). Accordingly, a cognitive performance is successful when the belief that the performance produces is true, competent when the performance is done through exercising one's cognitive abilities or virtues, and apt when the performance is successful because competent. Knowledge is thus apt belief, whereas Gettierized belief is inapt. And apt performance is a better kind of performance than inapt performance. This account of the value of knowledge has been criticized on several grounds. Jonathan Kvanvig (2003) and Duncan Pritchard (2010) argue that it fails because its account of knowledge is also Gettierized, that is, some Gettierized beliefs are apt.1 Daniel Whiting (2012) argues that some achievements are not constitutive of our flourishing because they are easy. I will offer a novel argument to show that, even granted that virtue epistemology can meet the above objections, what virtue epistemologists should maintain is that Gettierized belief (inapt performance) can also be as valuable as knowledge (apt performance). I first argue that virtue epistemologists base their value intuition wrongly on the equation between being inapt and being successful because lucky. Since 'being successful because lucky' often implicates 'being not competent enough', it is not surprising that virtue epistemologists draw the wrong conclusion that inapt performances are inferior to apt ones (sec 3). To see why the equation should be avoided, I examine the concept of aptness in section 2. Finally, in section 4, I show that the achievement argument is also undermined by this equation and offer an argument from moral luck to show that virtue epistemologists should maintain that inapt performances can be as valuable as apt ones. 2. WHAT IS APTNESS? In this section, I examine the concept of aptness. Aptness is defined as 'success because of competence'. The phrase 'success because of competence' indicates that the point of aptness evaluation is to offer a causal explanation of the success. More specifically, aptness evaluation is not just seeking any cause of the success. It is to assess whether the performance's competence can explain why it is successful. When that is the case, the success is attributable to the performance, as Greco explains: In cases of knowledge, S believes the truth because S's belief is produced by ability. In Ernest Sosa's terminology, S's belief is 'true because competent'. But what are phrases of the form 'X because Y' getting at in this context? The answer is attribution: In cases of knowledge, S's success is attributable to S's ability, which is to say that it is attributable to S. (Greco, 2012, p.1) 1 However, Carter (2016), Greco (2010, 2011), and Sosa (2007, 2011) offer plausible counter-arguments. 3 But how should 'attributability' be understood? In Greco (2010) and Sosa (2007), attributability is explained in terms of explanatory salience: X is attributable to Y (or Y explains why X) if and only if Y is the most salient cause of X. Why the most salient cause, not the cause or a cause? The reason is that for every event, there are usually multiple causes contributing to it, and not all of them contribute equally. If lightning causes a forest fire, lightning is not the only possible cause. Other causes include the dry and hot weather, oxygen, combustible materials such as woods and grasses. Without any one of these factors, the forest fire might not occur. But usually we think that lightning is the most salient cause, so we attribute the cause of the forest fire to lightning. More accurately, the fact that the forest fire occurs is primarily attributable to lightning, since there are other less salient causes. Thus, when virtue epistemologists say that a performance is apt because its success is attributable to competence, they do not mean that competence is the only cause. Rather, they mean that competence is the most salient cause, among others, of why the performance is successful. There are, certainly, many factors contributing to the success of a performance. To the present purpose, however, we only need to focus on two factors: competence and luck. For they are what virtue epistemologists mostly focus on. Very often, virtue epistemologists describe inapt performances as ones that are 'successful because lucky' (which I will discuss in the next section). When virtue epistemologists decide whether a performance is apt, they decide whether competence or luck is the most salient cause of its success. Though the idea of being the most salient cause looks intuitive, things are more complicated than it looks. Greco (2012) distinguishes two versions of this idea: the quantitative account and the qualitative account. The quantitative account maintains that a success is attributable to its competence just in case it depends on its competence more (to a certain degree) than luck. The qualitative account holds that a success is attributable to its competence just in case its competence 'contributes to that success in the right way, where "in the right way" means "in a way that would regularly serve relevant purposes"' (Greco, 2012, p.14). Greco adopts the qualitative account, but J. Adam Carter (2016) argues, correctly in my opinion, that the quantitative account is preferable to the qualitative account. Furthermore, the qualitative account is not really helpful. Take the following case from Sosa for example: Apt Shot. Archie took aim and shot skillfully. His shot hit the bull's-eye. Inapt Shot. Archie took aim and shot skillfully. However, his arrow was blown away by a gust of wind. Fortunately, another gust of wind blew his arrow back to its original trajectory and hit the bull's-eye. The qualitative account would have to say that Archie's competence contributes to the success- for the purpose of archery-in the right way in Apt Shot but in the wrong way in Inapt Shot. But this is puzzling, since nothing changes on Archie's side. Certainly, in Inapt Shot, Archie's ability-aiming at the target, steadying his body, observing the environmental factors (such as wind)-does contribute in the way that that would regularly serve the purpose of archery. So, the qualitative account has difficulty in offering a clean-cut explanation for Inapt Shot.2 On the contrary, the quantitative account offers an intuitive explanation: the success depends more on luck than on competence in Inapt Shot. Henceforth, I will assume the quantitative account, though my arguments should not be affected if one prefers the qualitative account. In light of the quantitative account, I suspect that one may argue that, in Inapt Shot, the success depends on competence no less than luck so Archie's shot is apt in both scenarios. After 2 Greco may argue that Inapt-Shot is actually apt. However, it contradicts with most people's view. How to decide whether a performance is apt is a tricky task, which I will discuss. 4 all, Archie's shot might miss the target were he less competent. This does not affect the quantitative account, however. For the quantitative account implies that borderline cases can easily happen. This is an important feature of virtue epistemology that receives scant attention, and we will see how it affects the account of virtue epistemology about the value of knowledge. 3. INAPT = SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE LUCKY? In this section, I argue that we should resist a simple argument by virtue epistemologists: namely, knowledge (apt performance) is better than Gettierized belief (inapt performance) because a performance that is successful because competent is a better performance than one that is successful because lucky. Understanding why this simple argument should be resisted helps us uncover a fundamental mistake shared by virtue epistemologists. We can find this simple argument in the following passages from Sosa and Greco: Suppose that belief to be competently acquired but Gettiered, so that it is true only by epistemic luck [my italics]. ... Inapt performances fall short not only in that they might have been better on relevant dimensions. They fall short in the fuller sense that they fail to meet minimum standards for performances. Because they are inapt, they are therefore flawed: not just improvable but defective. (Sosa, 2011, p.46) The proposed solution answers even [the value problem of knowledge], respecting the supposition that knowledge is more valuable than all of its parts taken together. This is because success from ability is more valuable than an act that is both successful and from ability, but not successful because from ability. Suppose, for example, that an athlete runs a race in a way that is clearly an exercise of her athletic excellence. Suppose also that she wins, but only because the other runners, some of whom are equally excellent, get sick before the race. Or suppose that she wins, but only because the other runners were bribed. Clearly, neither sort of win is as valuable as it could be. What one really values as an athlete is to win as the result of ability. (Greco, 2010, p.99) Greco and Sosa both hold that a successful-because-competent performance is better than a successful-because-lucky performance. Why? The passage from Sosa is not helpful since he merely asserts that inapt performances are flawed. So, let me focus on Greco's athlete example. Intuitively, the win because of the athlete's own ability is a better performance than the win because of others' physical difficulties (luck) or even cheating. Since performance evaluation applies to belief and knowledge, virtue epistemology seems to offer a neat solution. The simple argument, however, is wrong-headed. True, when we say that a performance is successful because lucky, we tend to think that it is inferior to a performance that is successful because competent. But that is because the sentence 'He wins because of luck' often implicates 'he would not win without the luck'. And from 'he would not win without the luck', people tend to infer that he is not competent enough. It is not surprising, therefore, that the simple argument appears to work, since we tend to think that a successful-because-lucky performance is less or not competent and, as a result, inapt performances are worse performances than apt ones. This tendency is actually manifest in the above quotations from Greco and Sosa. Greco first correctly stipulates 'in-apt' as 'not "successful because adroit"', from which he then wrongly claim that the athlete's inapt performance is 'successful only because lucky'. Similarly, in Sosa's quotation, a Gettierized belief is 'true only by epistemic luck'. Obviously, this is invalid. 'A performance is successful only because lucky' would even more strongly implicate that the 5 performance is not competent enough.3 But inapt performances could be as successful and competent as apt ones. Clearly, the simple argument is fallacious because the issue is whether apt performances are more valuable than inapt performances that are equally successful and competent. To avoid unnecessary confusion, we need to cancel the implicature by explicitly stipulating the examples of Gettierized performance as being inapt but as successful and competent as their apt counterparts. Let us redescribe Greco's example and test our intuition again: Suppose, for example, that an athlete runs a race in a way that is clearly an exercise of her athletic excellence. Suppose also that she wins, because the other runners, some of whom are equally excellent, get sick before the race. Or suppose that she wins, because the other runners were bribed. But remember: she, in fact, is truly competent. That is, even if other athletes were in good conditions and competed in the race competently, she might still win the game. Once the case is redescribed as such, I doubt that we would still have the intuition that this athlete's performance is less good simply because of being inapt in such a way. In both cases, her performances are equally successful and competent. The only difference is that in the inapt case, it is just that other athletes happen to be ill or bribed (not even by her), which has nothing to do with her performance. Admittedly, people's intuitions differ. Virtue epistemologists may insist that the athlete's performance becomes a worse performance simply because of being inapt, even when it is equally successful and competent. The point of this section is modest: it is to clear up a potential confusion when testing our intuition. We need to bear in mind that inapt performances can be as successful and competent as their apt counterparts. It is true that inapt performances are successful because lucky, but it must be understood in the technical sense explained in section 2. To say the least, the athlete example is unable to elicit a strong intuition that apt performances are better than inapt ones. And we will see that this confusion affects the achievement argument-probably the most substantial argument virtue epistemologists have for the superior value of knowledge to Gettierized belief. 4. ACHIEVEMENT AND LUCK Greco (2010, ch.6) has a more substantial argument for the superior value of knowledge to Gettierized belief: the achievement argument. The achievement argument can be formulated as follows: (P1) A performance is an achievement if and only if it is apt; (P2) Knowledge is apt, and Gettierized belief is inapt; (C1) So, knowledge is an achievement, and Gettierized belief is not; (P3) Achievements have a sort of final value, which non-achievements lack; 3 In light of this, it is difficult to see how Greco can describe the athlete's performance as successful only because lucky, but meanwhile maintains that her performance is competent ('an exercise of her athletic excellence'). For if she does run competently, it is wrong to say that she wins only because other runners are sick or bribed. Saying that suggests that she would simply not be competent enough to win the race, if other runners were really competing. Hence, it would be wrong to describe it as a case in which the performance is competent. Competence does not just require the performer to do the best she can. Rather, it requires that the performer can reliably bring success (Greco, 2010, p.77; see also Sosa, 2015, ch.4). If the athlete can win the race only because other runners do not run competently, it is difficult to say that her running is competent. Therefore, Greco's athlete example is inadequate. 6 (C2) So, knowledge is more valuable than Gettierized belief.4 For the sake of argument, I assume that P2 is correct. I argue that either P1 or P3 (or both) is false. For either inapt performances can also be achievements, or they, if construed as nonachievements, are as valuable as apt performances. To begin with, let us look closer to Greco's reason why an apt performance (achievement) is finally valuable: In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle makes a distinction between (a) achieving some end by luck or accident, and (b) achieving the end through the exercise of one's abilities (or virtues). It is only the latter kind of action, Aristotle argues, that is both intrinsically valuable and constitutive of human flourishing. 'Human good,' he writes, 'turns out to be activity of soul exhibiting excellence.' (Greco, 2010, pp.97-98) We can accept Greco's claim that success through ability is constitutive of human flourishing. The readers should now see where the problem lies in: it seems wrong to say that inapt performances-when being equally successful and competent-are successful by luck rather than successful through ability. Certainly, in Greco's athlete example and Sosa's archery example, both protagonists exercise their abilities competently. While it is true that luck is prominent in the inapt version of both examples, their abilities are still salient causes of their successes. So, it seems correct to describe their performances as successes through abilities. Imagine a commentator who watch both games comments: 'Their successes are well deserved. Their performances are really competent!' The comment seems fair. Therefore, inapt performances can be achievements and finally valuable. To make my point more concrete, let us look at another example. To make a befitting example of inapt performance, it is crucial to construe it as being inapt just because luck is more prominent in itself than in the apt case (hence success and competence remain unchanged). This actually follows Linda Zagzebski's famous recipe for Gettierized case (Zagzebski, 1994): a performance, which might be otherwise apt, could become inapt just because of the intervention or presence of luck. Consider the following example of journal publication: Apt Publication. David submits his paper to Journal of Great Philosophy. The journal policy is to reject any paper that does not receive two unanimously positive reports from the reviewers. Both reviewers judge-correctly, let us assume-that David's paper is excellent. So David's paper gets accepted. Inapt Publication. In this scenario, one of the original reviewers is too ill to referee David's paper. The editors replace her with another one. Unfortunately for David, the new reviewer dislikes David's paper just because it argues against his own position regardless of the virtues of David's paper. Lucky for David, the new reviewer becomes seriously injured and unable to referee. The editors know that the original reviewer becomes well and ask her for help. She gives the same positive report. So, David paper gets accepted. To avoid confusion, let me stipulate that the success condition of David's performance- submitting a paper to Journal of Great Philosophy for review-is the acceptance of his paper and it is competent in the sense that the paper is truly excellent. In Apt Publication, David's performance is apt because his competence is the most salient cause of the acceptance of his paper. In Inapt Publication, however, David's performance is inapt because it is likely that David's paper would not be accepted-namely, his success is not safe-because of the intervention of luck. 4 This argument is modified from Pritchard's formulation (2010, p.67), which is only about whether knowledge is finally valuable. 7 It seems wrong to say that David's performance in Inapt Publication is not an achievement of David and not constitutive of his flourishing. Clearly, David exercises his philosophical abilities well and writes an excellent paper. True, there is some significant luck in explaining why David's paper gets accepted. But it remains true that David achieves his end through his abilities. To put it another way, it is hard to deny David is equally good as a philosopher in both scenarios, since nothing changes on his side of performance. This means that the publication of his paper in both scenarios contributes equally to his flourishing as a philosopher (which, let us assume, contributes to his flourishing as a human). It would be wrong to say that David's publication in Inapt Publication is less valuable because it means that David in Inapt Publication is not as good a philosopher as he in Apt Publication. So, both performances contribute equally to David's flourishing and are thus equally valuable. I suspect that some may still beg to differ. If so, I urge them to consider the possibility that luck is significant even in apt cases, to the extent that it is reasonable to conclude that all performances are inapt. Consider the following argument: (P4) A successful performance is apt if and only if its success depends more on competence than luck; (P5) For all performances, if they are successful, their success depends more on luck than competence; (C3) So, all successful performances are inapt. The crucial premise, of course, is P5. P5 looks ludicrous, but it may not be. For proponents of moral luck, it is well-known that luck significantly affects many dimensions of moral assessment. As proponents of moral luck (Nagel, 1979; Nelkin, 2013) often distinguishes, there are four types of moral luck: resultant, constitutive, circumstantial, and causal. Resultant luck affects whether a performance turns out to be successful. Constitutive luck usually affects competence when there is luck in who we are and what we can. Circumstantial luck can affect all three aspects of performance evaluation: what performances we may have and whether they are successful, competent, and apt depend greatly on what circumstances we happen to be in (I leave causal luck out because it is less relevant to the present purpose). Since luck significantly affects all dimensions of performance evaluation, it seems more ludicrous to say that our successes depend more on us than luck. Hence, all successes are inapt. Take the athlete for example. Even when it is 'apt', luck still plays a significant role in explaining why she is competent because she may be gifted in running, live in a society where she can receive the best training, and not be ill on the day of race. Luck is also significant in explaining why her performance is 'apt'. Let me slightly modify the example. Suppose there is one athlete who is her only contender (so we can ignore the performances of other competitors), who happened to be injured several weeks before the race. Now consider two possibilities: Apt Athlete. The contender is fully recovered and run competently (let us assume she breaks the record). Nevertheless, the athlete runs faster and wins the race; Inapt Athlete. The contender has not recovered yet so she quits. The athlete thus wins the race without strong contenders (though she runs equally fast). In both scenarios, the only changing factor is luck about whether the contender competes. Since it is just a matter of luck whether the athlete's competence is more salient than luck, we can say that her performance is 'apt' or 'inapt' by luck. In other words, if it is reasonable for virtue epistemologists to say that inapt performances are successful by luck, it is also reasonable, in light of the possibility of moral luck, to say that all performances are successful or unsuccessful by luck, competent or incompetent by luck, and apt or inapt by luck. Hence, we can conclude that all performances are inapt because their successes depend more on luck than competence. 8 When I say that a performance is 'apt by luck', it may sound an oxymoron because aptness means that a performance's success is not lucky. We see above that aptness is a matter of causal explanation of a performance's success, which can be context-sensitive. In light of the context sensitivity of aptness, we may distinguish between two levels or contexts of causal explanation of a performance's success and aptness. On the first or ordinary level, we often exclude moral luck as a cause of success. The reason may be that moral luck is omnipresent so that we tend to ignore, just like oxygen is usually not featured in an explanation of a fire accident. Or maybe it is offensive in ordinary life to include moral luck as part of the explanation, like saying that David's success and competence as a philosopher are partly due to his ethnicity, gender, or family background. Nevertheless, on the second or reflective level, we may include moral luck to examine the value of one's achievement. So, a performance is first-level apt when its success depends more on competence than first-level luck that excludes moral luck. But it is second-level inapt because moral luck is the most salient cause of its success, competence, and aptness. Accordingly, C3 should be modified as 'all successful performances are second-level inapt'.5 Virtue epistemologists cannot save the achievement argument by arguing that an achievement only needs to be first-level apt. For the idea behind the final value of achievement is that it is not something we earn by luck, which does not distinguish between different sorts of luck. Distinguishing two levels of aptness does not mean that factors on the second level are less real than those on the first level. So it would be wrong to exclude moral luck when reflecting upon whether we earn our success by luck. Since all of the above examples shows that we can achieve the same success by exercising the same competence and it is a matter of luck whether it is apt or inapt, it would be wrong to conclude that only first-level apt performances are achievements because only they are not successful by luck. Granted that my argument is correct, virtue epistemologists may, instead, maintain that all performances are not achievements and not constitutive of our flourishing, or that successful and competent performances-no matter whether it is apt or inapt-are achievements and constitutive of our flourishing. I prefer the second position, though I will not argue for it here.6 My aim of this paper is to show that virtue epistemologists are wrong to claim that knowledge is more valuable than Gettierized belief. Instead, what their account shows is that they are equally valuable. There might be some concerns. First, one may argue that moral assessment is different from performance evaluation, so moral luck is inapplicable to performance. I disagree. It is clear that 5 Sosa (2011, 2015) also famously claims that there can be higher levels of aptness; for instance, knowing full well is apt belief aptly guided by meta-competence (the agent's assessment of their chance of success). However, Sosa's higher levels of aptness remain on the first level of aptness according to my distinction since our concerns are different. Nevertheless, one may think that Sosa's account of knowing full well can explain how certain knowledge is more valuable than Gettierized belief. I have two points in response. First, even if that is true, it still does not show that mere knowledge (apt belief) is more valuable than Gettierized belief. Second, my argument here can apply to full aptness: similarly, whether a belief is fully apt (apt because of meta-competence) is a matter of luck (e.g. see Sosa's description of Diana's shot (2011, p.12)). What explains the extra value of knowing full well is simply the additional level of competence, i.e. meta-competence. 6 Several empirical studies (Colaço, Buckwalter, Stich, & Machery, 2014; Turri, 2016, 2017; Turri, Buckwalter, & Blouw, 2014) show that achievement and knowledge tolerate luck and unreliability, as Turri concludes: 'when the agent repeatedly misidentifies structures as barns, the presence of fakes is an obvious external explanation for her errors, so people do not conclude that she is unable to identify barns. This coheres with recent findings showing that when someone forms a true belief, people's default assumption is that she formed the true belief through a relevant cognitive ability and thus knows' (2017, p.112). 9 virtue epistemologists intend that their account of performance evaluation applies to all sorts of performances and moral action is certainly a kind of performance.7 So, a moral action may be assessed whether it achieves its end (successful), whether it is done reliably and out of the right kind of moral motivations or principles (competent), and whether it achieves its end through moral competence (apt). This also explains why Aristotle's account of final value about achievement is regarded as befitting to virtue epistemologists. Second, one may think that I confuse moral luck with epistemic luck. While it is widely held that knowledge cannot tolerate epistemic luck, knowledge is compatible with certain types of luck, such as circumstantial luck (Pritchard, 2005, Ch.5.2). For example, Darwin might not discover evolution if he was not born in a rich family or he did not get on board of the Beagle. So, virtue epistemologists may argue that moral luck ought to be excluded from performance evaluation. However, this actually reveals another problem for virtue epistemology. When it regards epistemic evaluation as a kind of performance evaluation, it is hard to see why moral luck should be excluded since, as we have seen, moral luck affects all aspects of performance evaluation. Furthermore, our concern here is about the value of knowledge rather than the nature of knowledge. The achievement argument trades on the intuition that an achievement should not be successful by luck, which does not distinguish between epistemic and moral luck. So, virtue epistemologists owe us an argument why a successful performance by moral luck can be an achievement whereas one by epistemic luck cannot. Third, one may respond that the existence of moral luck is controversial. I acknowledge that. For the present dialectical context, however, it is safe to assume the existence of moral luck because virtue epistemologists accept it. Sosa's archery example and Greco's athlete example are both affected by circumstantial luck. Furthermore, proponents of moral luck (Nussbaum, 1986; Williams, 1981) often argue that moral luck is an important element in Aristotle's moral thinking. For example, Aristotle says: 'some think that we are made good by nature, others by habituation, others by teaching. Nature's part evidently does not depend on us, but as a result of some divine causes is present in those who are truly fortunate' (1179b20-3). To be sure, I do not need to prove the truth of P5, but rather to show that virtue epistemologists would have to accept P5. Finally, one may think that Inapt Performance and Inapt Athlete (perhaps all the inapt cases under discussion) are not really inapt; after all, competence is still a significant cause of their success. However, this should not be regarded as a problem of mine. Since aptness is a matter of whether competence is more salient than luck, borderline cases can occur easily. What Zagzebski's recipe actually teaches us, in the terms of virtue epistemology, is how to produce borderline cases like the ones under discussion. All it needs is to make luck more salient without affecting success and competence. Since my cases, as well as the ones given by Greco and Sosa, are produced in accordance with this recipe, they should be regarded as Gettierized (inapt). Nevertheless, it may enlighten us about the true significance of the Gettier problem, for we may similarly consider some Gettier-style cases not as genuine counter-examples but as borderline cases. 7 For example, Greco says: 'knowledge is a kind of achievement, or a kind of success for which the knower deserves credit. ... This is a ubiquitous and perfectly familiar sort of normativity. Thus we credit people for their athletic achievements, for their artistic achievements, and for their moral achievements' (Greco, 2010, p.7). See also Sosa (2007, p.94) talks about a group of people that collectively save a stranger. 10 5. CONCLUSION Virtue epistemologists argue that knowledge is more valuable than Gettierized belief because apt performance is constitutive of flourishing but inapt performance is not. They usually support their arguments with examples of performance. However, intuitions about those examples often trade wrongly on the implicature that a luckily successful performance is not competent enough and is not one's achievement, which ignores the fact that it can be equally competent. Furthermore, the account of epistemic evaluation as performance evaluation invites us to reflect on the effect of moral luck. Since moral luck affects all aspects of performance evaluation, virtue epistemologists are wrong to describe apt performances as 'success through ability' and inapt performances as 'success by luck', which undermines their achievement argument. Given that a performance can be apt or inapt by luck, virtue epistemologists should maintain that knowledge (apt performance) is no more valuable than Gettierized belief (inapt performance). 11 References Carter, J. Adam. 2016. "Robust Virtue Epistemology As Anti-Luck Epistemology: A New Solution." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1):140-155. doi: 10.1111/papq.12040. Colaço, David, Wesley Buckwalter, Stephen Stich, & Edouard Machery. 2014. "Epistemic Intuitions in Fake-Barn Thought Experiments." Episteme 11 (02):199-212. doi: 10.1017/epi.2014.7. Greco, John. 2010. Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Greco, John. 2011. "The Value Problem." In The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard, 219-31. London: Routledge. Greco, John. 2012. "A (Different) Virtue Epistemology." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):116. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00567.x. Jones, Ward E. 1997. "Why Do We Value Knowledge?" American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (4):423-39. Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2003. The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nagel, Thomas. 1979. Mortal Questions: Cambridge University Press. Nelkin, Dana K. 2013. Moral Luck. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Nussbaum, Martha. 1986. The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pritchard, Duncan. 2005. Epistemic Luck. Vol. 29: Clarendon Press. Pritchard, Duncan. 2010. "Knowledge and Understanding." In The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations, edited by Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar and Adrian Haddock, 3-88. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sosa, Ernest. 2007. A Virtue Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sosa, Ernest. 2011. Knowing Full Well. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Sosa, Ernest. 2015. Judgment and Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Turri, John. 2016. "A New Paradigm for Epistemology From Reliabilism to Abilism." Ergo 3 (8):189-231. doi: 10.3998/ergo.12405314.0003.008. Turri, John. 2017. "Knowledge Attributions in Iterated Fake Barn Cases." Analysis 77 (1):104-115. doi: 10.1093/analys/anx036. Turri, John, Wesley Buckwalter, & Peter Blouw. 2014. "Knowledge and Luck." Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 22 (2):378-390. doi: 10.3758/s13423-014-0683-5. Whiting, Daniel. 2012. "Epistemic Value and Achievement." Ratio 25 (2):216-230. doi. Williams, Bernard. 1981. Moral Luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Zagzebski, Linda. 1994. "The Inescapability of Gettier problems." Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):65-73.

Are there communicative intentions? Marco Mazzone Department of Modern Philology, University of Catania [email protected] Emanuela Campisi PhD Course in Philosophy of Language and Mind, University of Palermo [email protected] Abstract: Grice in pragmatics and Levelt in psycholinguistics have proposed models of human communication where the starting point of communicative action is an individual intention. This assumption, though, has to face serious objections with regard to the alleged existence of explicit representations of the communicative goals to be pursued. Here evidence is surveyed which shows that in fact speaking may ordinarily be a quite automatic activity prompted by contextual cues and driven by behavioural schemata abstracted away from social regularities. On the one hand, this means that there could exist no intentions in the sense of explicit representations of communicative goals, following from deliberate reasoning and triggering the communicative action. On the other hand, however, there are reasons to allow for a weaker notion of intention than this, according to which communication is an intentional affair, after all. Communicative action is said to be intentional in this weaker sense to the extent that it is subject to a double mechanism of control, with respect both to present-directed and future-directed intentions. Keywords: intention, goal, automatic process, controlled process, social routine 0. Introduction The intuition that human communication has in essence an intentional character has led to theories having the notion of communicative intention at their core. The most famous examples are Paul Grice's theory in the domain of philosophical pragmatics, and Willem Levelt's psycholinguistic theory. While Grice was engaged in a philosophical project mainly focussing on the normative dimension of rationality underlying communication, Levelt's concern with the cognitive processes of language production commits him to a fully psychologically realistic attitude towards the notion of communicative intention. In other words, for his theory to work one has to assume that communicative intentions exist and have in fact a causal role in producing linguistic behaviour. However, such a realistic attitude towards individual communicative intentions is not accepted uncontroversially. On the contrary, it has been rejected by philosophers like Daniel Dennett and anthropologists such as Alessandro Duranti. Their critiques mainly concern the assumption that speakers represent their communicative goals in advance of producing utterances. These objections have often been intended as if they were directed against the whole epistemological enterprise of cognitive explanation of behaviour. Yet, recent studies on goaldirected action in the domains both of individual and social psychology suggest now a different key of interpretation: the point is not that individualistic explanations as such miss something substantial, but rather that goal-directed behaviour might not be in general conscious and controlled. Specifically, there might not always be explicit representations of goals at the beginning of the causal chain leading to communicative behaviour. In communication as well, a major role might be played by individual habits trained in the context of social routines. One should not draw the conclusion, though, that conscious and strategic processes play no role at all in communication. Quite on the contrary, we intend to claim that in a sense, despite its prevalent automaticity, human communication is nonetheless a quite intentional affair – though not in the standard sense according to which intentions play a direct causal role in each communicative act. Our proposal is rather that goal-directed behaviours are subject to a double control mechanism: firstly, the online control exercised by executive processes; and secondly, the control exercised in the long run by the subject herself through explicit propositional consideration of behaviour rationality. The combination of these two mechanisms ensures that the goals driving behaviour coincide normally with the intentions we would have – if only there were intentions to guide our behaviour. 1. Communicative intentions Grice (1989) has been the first to develop a global theory of communication as an intentional activity, but it is Levelt (1989) who changed Grice's insight into a fully psychological commitment, with his model of language production: in this model, communicative intention is conceived as a first step in the process leading to articulation. More precisely, at the beginning of this process Levelt puts a module he calls "the Conceptualizer", having a communicative intention as input and a preverbal message as output. Talking as an intentional activity involves conceiving of an intention, selecting the relevant information to be expressed for the realization of this purpose, ordering this information for expression, keeping track of what was said before, and so on. These activities require the speaker's constant attention. (Levelt 1989, 9) According to Levelt, an intentional activity "serves a purpose the speaker wants to realize" (idem, 20) and is "by definition", under some central control. Instead, when an activity is not under central control it has to be considered automatic, in that it is achieved "without intention or conscious awareness". As Levelt emphasizes, automatic processes are more efficient than controlled ones, in the sense that they are not limited by the span of working memory and can be performed in parallel with other processes, quickly and with few mistakes. On the other hand, a draw-back of automatic processes is their being inflexible. So Levelt proposes a modular model of language production, where some modules are under speaker's control while others are not. Specifically, the steps under speaker's control are the first and the last ones, that is, respectively, the preverbal message production and the final Monitoring. Evidence of this contribution of controlled processes, according to Levelt, is the fact that we do not entertain a fixed number of intentions that we have learned once and then use again and again, rather we can conceive of an infinite number of intentions and means apt to achieve them, while taking into account the infinite variability of contexts. However, since when producing an utterance we cannot plan everything, there must be some division of labour between automatic and controlled stages. Now, nobody wants to deny either that speaking is an intentional activity – in the limited sense that it accomplishes some subject's purpose other than just producing correct utterances – or that speaking is a kind of flexible behaviour. The point standing in need of further consideration, according to us, is rather: does this necessarily imply a conscious control? 2. Against communicative intentions Despite its intuitive plausibility, the assumption that human behaviour is guided by intentions has been questioned by philosophers like Daniel Dennett or anthropologists like Alessandro Duranti. Dennett is famous, amongst other things, for his thesis according to which intention attribution is part of an explanatory strategy which does not commit us in any way to the existence of such things as intentions. In fact intentions would exist – so to speak – only in the eyes of the observer when she adopts what Dennett (1989) calls the "intentional stance". One of his chief arguments to this effect concerns the alleged semantic indetermination of intentions: as it is well known by philosophers, it is far from easy to say exactly which beliefs and desires are involved in a single action. There are so many beliefs and desires potentially involved, and so many ways we could phrase them! These considerations concern linguistic behaviour in an obvious way: when we say that communication is a form of intentional behaviour, are we postulating the existence of a determinate intention as a causal trigger of the communicative action? Levelt appears to be confident that communicative intentions have (or, better, produce) a determinate pre-verbal content, given in a language of thought. Fodor's language of thought hypothesis, though, has been seriously undermined by empirical and theoretical considerations: it seems clear that words are correlated to modal representations, while there is no evidence for amodal representations of the kind Fodor had in mind (e.g. Barsalou et al., 2003). In any case, it is not clear that adopting Fodor's hypothesis can solve the problem of meaning indetermination in Levelt's framework: if we entertain conscious communicative intentions in a language of thought, why is it in general so difficult to say exactly what our intention is? Duranti (1998, 2007) proposes a quite radical answer to this question: either we do not entertain conscious communicative intentions at all, or, even in case we do, these intentions are not what does really matter. Linguistic behaviour is embedded in social routines which have a social normative "strength" of their own. Consequently, what a speaker does in a conversation is not simply what she consciously thinks she is doing: when we enter a routine it is this routine which essentially decides for us. We could speak here of sort of proxy-intentions: intentions we might not entertain consciously, or even represent at all, but that are socio-normatively embedded in the behaviours we are engaged in. One would be tempted to reject those objections in the face of the strong intuition that our behaviour is directed toward goals, is (in part) conscious, and is flexibly open to an indefinite variety of contexts. The point, however, is whether we have reason to think that these three features are combined in the expected way – that is, whether behaviours are triggered and guided by conscious representations of goals and whether this is the reason why they are so flexible. There is growing evidence that this picture is wrong for one aspect or the other. 3. Automatic goal-directed action In the last two decades, a large body of research in social and individual psychology has shown that in human behaviour goal pursuit can be non-conscious and automatic. To start with, Bargh and colleagues have conducted pioneering research on unconscious mimicry of others (Bargh 1989; Dijksterhuis et al. 2007). This work initially focussed on "inconsequential actions" where one does not expect any real goal to be involved: foot shaking, nose rubbing and the like. However, the road was open to the hypothesis that generally speaking our behaviour is unconsciously affected by others more than we are inclined to concede. In fact, subsequent work has shown the same pattern in goal-directed actions as in non purposive ones. For instance, the presence of significant others seems to unconsciously activate specific attitudes towards pursuing goals (Fitzsimons and Bargh 2003). Other studies have also shown phenomena of unconscious goal contagion by others (Dijksterhuis et al. 2007, 100). Moreover, it has been shown that priming goals "automatically activates behavior representation and resultant action according to an 'if-then' rule, enabling the goal-directed behavior to occur directly and independent of conscious intentions" (Dijksterhuis et al. 2007, 105). In those experiments goals are for the most part explicitly stated, so the results do not count as evidence that people act without explicit intentions. However, the experiments are revealing with regard to the pervasive role of habits in goal-directed actions. Habits are presumably stored as behavioural patterns in our long term memory by means of associations between goals, behaviours and contexts. In the experiments cited above, associations of that sort might explain the priming of actions which are frequently used to reach the primed goals. But, once we assume the existence of such associations, there is no reason why we should not expect that contextual cues – instead of goals – might directly trigger actions on occasion. This conclusion seems supported by the comparison between animal and human studies. de Wit and Dickinson (2009), in order to account for a number of results in animal studies, draw a complex model where two different routes interact in the selection of action. One route is based on an outcome-response mechanism, where the representation of the expected outcome trigger the response, while the other route lean on a response-outcome mechanism, where the expectation of the outcome follows the response rather than preceding it. The scholars suggest that this model could apply to human cognition as well, and that the response-outcome route might prevail when humans are involved in routinized activities. Continued reinforcement should strengthen the S → R [stimulus – response] association in the habit memory to such a degree that the presentation of the stimulus can reliably trigger the motor unit for the response before the longer feedback pathway through the associative memory can evaluate whether the outcome is currently a goal for the animal. (idem, 471) In other words, at the moment that behaviour is initiated the outcome might not be represented at all, or at least, the representation of the outcome might not be the reason why the behaviour is initiated – since the subject has not yet evaluated whether the expected outcome is one of her goals. In general terms, routinization of goal-directed actions can be described as "the effective delegation of (part of) action control to the external environment and its stimuli, so that its effective functioning resembles a stimulus-response reflex, which is much less demanding than attentional control" (Pezzulo and Castelfranchi 2009, 568). An impressive illustration of this phenomenon has been given through stimulation of cingulate motor area in epileptic patients. When stimulated, these patients produced a variety of coordinated manual, buccal and oculomotor actions. Most interestingly, as soon as they were given an object during stimulation, a complex pattern of objectrelated movements was evoked. For example, when one patient was given a cigarette, they lit and smoked it in a compulsive manner, stopping smoking when stimulation ceased, and restarting when stimulation restarted. (Pacherie and Haggard forthcoming) This sort of evidence seems to show the existence of a brain circuit for automatic selection of behaviour, based on the storage of routinary actions and the automatic triggering of these routines by means of environmental stimuli. In this line, Pezzulo and Castelfranchi (2009, 568) underline the importance of introducing in their own model of goal-directed systems a feature not included in "traditional control-theoretic models", that is, "the assumption that action schemas can be automatically activated by objects and events (including social ones)". The impact of such considerations on the issue of communication is enlightened by Garrod and Pickering (2007). In assessing Levelt's model, they ask themselves whether considering the actual dialogic format of linguistic performances would make any difference. Their answer puts emphasis on the fact that "[i]n dialogue, what one interlocutor says imposes constraints on what her partner can say next. For example, a question usually requires an answer." As a consequence, dialogue "may make production more automatic" (idem, 10). Here reference is made to the existence of verbal routines delivering automatic processing. Answering to a question is largely an automatic response, triggered by the question itself without any deliberate consideration of goals. It should be noticed, however, that these routines may not only concern linguistic behaviours such as question-and-answer pairs: social routines of any sort could constrain types of communicative moves. For instance, Levinson (1992) has proposed that we store in memory – on the basis of social regularities we are exposed to – a large variety of "activity types", conceived of as "goal-defined, socially constituted, bounded, events with constraints on participants, setting, and so on, but above all on the kinds of allowable contributions" (idem: 69). Activity types are supposed to have a sequential structure, as far as they prescribe which moves, be they communicative or not, one has to perform at any point of a given activity. The participation to such social regularities can therefore be expected to produce routinization of behaviour of the kind envisaged by Garrod and Pickering; as a consequence, as soon as the agent is engaged in social interactions, she is prompted to react quite automatically to preceding pieces of behaviour in accordance with the shared procedures. The conclusion to be drawn seems to be that Dennett's and Duranti's intuitions pointed toward some robust cognitive facts: human behaviour is not always caused by explicit, conscious representation of the goal to be subsequently pursued; this happens, amongst other things, because we are exposed to routinary social actions, which in the course of time become automatic and therefore gain some strength of their own; this is why, in turn, people can act without any determinate idea of their goals – in many cases there were no goals, in fact, and one has to infer them from behaviour, social regularities and previous personal propensities. 4. Doing without intentions? Should we then conclude that intentions simply do not exist, except from the side of the observer? Not exactly. Let us concede that we should better not speak of intentions unless there is, in advance (and as a cause) of acting, an explicit representation of the goal to be pursued. To be true, the most accurate philosophical definitions of "intention" are even more demanding than this: they make reference to a practical reasoning procedure whose result is the representation of an explicit goal – as Bratman (1987) puts it, intentions are terminators of practical reasoning about ends (see also Pacherie 2006). The psychological literature seems ready to embrace this definition, too: for instance, Aarts and Custers (2009, 319) distinguish between goals and intentions on the basis of the fact that the latter "are the product of conscious deliberation". In line with such definitions, we could justifiably say that in most cases human behaviour is not driven by intentions. However, here is where one feels the urge to accommodate two opposite but equally strong intuitions. On the one hand, it is hard to believe that human actions are ordinarily driven by intentions which are freshly produced as a result of deliberative processes; in fact, as we have shown, there is evidence that our goal-directed behaviours can be quite automatic instead. On the other hand, there is a strong intuition that what distinguishes human from non-human action (and communication) is its intentional, voluntary nature. How can these two intuitions be accommodated within a single picture? Our answer is that canonical intentions, despite their being very infrequent, occupy nonetheless a crucial position in human behaviour, while plain automatisms play a very modest role in our lives. Our "automatic" behaviours are always couched within a complex, multiple control system. We will now address the question at two different levels: the online control that executive system performs on current behaviour, and the way in which conscious decisions and deliberative processes may affect even our automatic drives. These two levels partially parallel the traditional distinction between intention-in-action and prior intention (Searle 1983), or between presentdirected and future-directed intention (Bratman 1987; see also Pacherie 2006). 4.1 Online control It would be misleading to think of automatic habitual actions as if they were wholly inflexible. If this were the case, only a little part of human behaviour – and certainly not linguistic behaviour – could be automatic. To be true, as de Wit and Dickinson (2009) observe, even the behaviour of other animals is far from being rigidly inflexible in any case. In fact, the model proposed by de Wit and Dickinson is also intended to explain how a significant amount of flexibility can be obtained (both in animals and in humans) thanks to a complex system of forward plus backward associations between stimuli, responses, outcomes and rewards. Does this system appeal in humans to the intervention of conscious and controlled executive processes? Maybe not – at least, not in many cases. Even the selection amongst existing behavioural schemata, their hierarchical organization, and the feedback control of the fit between intended and actual outcome, seem often to be performed without consciousness. Nonetheless, Hassin et al. (in press) concede that, in the face of novel and non(wholly)-routinized circumstances, a flexible behaviour seems to require the involvement of working memory and executive functions, though they claim that also these effortful controlled processes must not be conscious. However, Jeannerod and co-workers have shown that this depends on the difficulty of the task (Fourneret and Jeannerod 1998): there are cases in which the task obliges subjects to consciously attend to their own behaviour and its fit with the intended outcome. In such cases an explicit conscious representation of the goal is needed for behaviour control, even if this representation is not what has triggered the action at first. But conscious control seems to have a much wider range of applications than just situations where achieving goals is difficult or problematic (contrary to what Dijksterhuis et al. 2007 have suggested). Recall the compulsive behaviours obtained through stimulation of cingulate motor area in epileptic patients, referred to by Pacherie and Haggard (forthcoming). If, on the one hand, this sort of evidence shows clearly the existence of behavioural schemata apt to be automatically triggered by environmental cues in the appropriate conditions, on the other hand it is quite apparent that human behaviour is normally not as rigidly prompted by the mere presence of external stimuli as it was in those experiments. Rather, compulsive behaviours of that sort are typically attested when executive system is pathologically disrupted, as in the famous case of Phineas Gage: he could not help being distracted by objects which prompted stereotyped behaviours, so that he had become unable to coherently pursue the higher-level goals involved in his daily duties (Damasio et al. 1994). The maintenance of high-level goals and their "shielding" from environmental stimuli are essential for pursuing what Pezzulo and Castelfranchi (2009, 564) call "distal intentions": distal intentions require extra mechanisms to support self-regulation over long periods of time; these are the hallmark of executive functions, such as the ability to 'shield' these intentions from distracting opportunities, and dedicated memory mechanisms. The passage from proximal to distal action is therefore a major evolutionary step, requiring a sophisticated form of control. An integral part of what we call intentional behaviour is precisely this ability to maintain current courses of action while inhibiting alternative ones, especially stimulus-dependent responses. This feature of intentional behaviour apparently concerns more the pursuing of goals than their previous selection: an action is deemed intentional in this sense to the extent that the appropriate goal is consistently pursued, without any requirement that this goal, having been consciously selected, be the triggering cause of action. At the same time, the above-mentioned mechanism clearly involves much more than mere bottom-up activation of behavioural routines: it rather calls for a top-down process where consciously adopting a goal is a key prerequisite for its being pursued. It seems that a crucial role in this process is played by a brain circuit encompassing both lateral and orbital prefrontal cortex, and anterior cingulate cortex. These areas, as summarized by Fuster (2001, 324), are essential for the organization of goal-directed actions: The anterior cingulate seems involved in the motivation to perform them [i.e., goal-directed actions], the orbitofrontal cortex in the suppression of distractions that interfere with them, and the lateral cortex in the mediation of their crosstemporal contingencies. A well supported model of the role played by prefrontal areas in conscious control appeals to the formation of "reentrant loops" in the cortex. According to Dehaene and Naccache (2001), prefrontal cortex must cause top-down amplification of sensory and motor neuronal assemblies in order for sensory-motor representations to become conscious. More precisely, local assemblies need to be independently activated through bottom-up processes, and then merged in a larger circuit involving "higher association cortices interconnected by long-distance connections and forming a reverberating neuronal assembly with distant perceptual areas" (Dehaene et al. 2006, 205). The formation of such self-sustained long-distance loops is then believed to produce a "global workspace", which might account for both conscious integration of information and its maintenance in working memory until current goals have been accomplished. Interestingly, top-down processes mediated by prefrontal cortex not only may maintain goaldirected actions by amplifying the activation of current behavioural schemata and actively inhibiting alternative ones; besides, they can also probably affect automatic processing involved in pursuing goals. As Kiefer (2007, 293) puts it: "A given attentional (or intentional) state might be necessary for unconscious stimuli to trigger further processes". More specifically, Kiefer adopts Neumann's (1990) theory of "direct parameter specification", according to which [Subjects] search for information in order to specify free parameters within the currently active intention/action plan. Unconsciously registered information that resembles this searched-for information is selected and processed to specify the free processing parameters. Therefore, unconsciously perceived information will translate into behavioural effects that are absent if the same information is sufficiently dissimilar from the searched-for features. (Kiefer 2007, 300) In other words, attentional amplification due to top-down intentional processing allows stimuli to affect behaviour even when they are not consciously perceived. In sum, there is large evidence that intentions-in-action, or present-directed intentions, have an important role to play in human cognition – specifically, i) in the execution of new and difficult tasks, ii) in inhibition of alternative courses of action, iii) in the processing of unattended stimuli. This is not to say that human agents are driven by intentions with a precise propositional content. All we have seen so far is, rather, consistent with the hypothesis that present-directed intentions consist in the attentive amplification of sensory-motor assemblies globally representing actions in contexts. Furthermore, even assuming that those assemblies code for goal-oriented action schemata, it is far from clear that intentional control requires goals to be explicitly attended in any moment, and in particular that they have to be attended from the beginning. Quite on the contrary, an automatically activated response might as well support a present-directed intention, to the extent that it is part of a goal-directed behavioural schema. If we transfer our tentative conclusions to language processing, we might plausibly say that speaking is intentional in the sense of present-directed intentions: it is an attentional activity, relatively shielded from distracting stimuli, and clearly affected by top-down processes. This does not rule out the possibility that our communicative moves are largely specified by schemata automatically activated by environmental cues, in line with the previously considered suggestions of Garrod and Pickering (2007). 4.2 Future-directed intentions and practical reasoning While present-directed intentions, as we just claimed, are presumably an integral part of our communicative behaviours, planning those behaviours in advance seems to be something that only exceptionally occurs. To analyze the issue more precisely, we should better trace here a distinction between, on the one hand, the capacity to plan in advance to do something when certain circumstances obtain and, on the other hand, the ability to perform reasoning procedures in order to establish what would be preferable to do in certain circumstances. With regard to the first point, Pacherie and Haggard (forthcoming) recall the notion of "implementation intention" (Gollwitzer 1999) as a crucial component of prospective memory, that is, the capacity of remembering to perform an action in the future. Implementation intentions can be defined as "specific plans that identify both an appropriate goal-directed response and a suitable situation in which to initiate that response" (Webb and Sheeran 2007, 295). Specifically, the subject recall (or create anew) an if-then rule, where the then-component relates to the goal-directed response while the if-component relates to the situation offering a suitable opportunity to act. As a consequence, implementation intentions are expected to enhance the accessibility of the specified situational cues, and also "to forge an association between that cue and a response that is instrumental for obtaining one's goal" (idem, 296), thus facilitating action initiation in the appropriate circumstances. In a sense, implementation intentions are similar to routinization, in that both create associations between environmental cues and behaviour, with the difference that the former is a "one-shot" decisional process – that is, forming the association does not require repetition. In the same vein, Hommel (2000) speaks of "prepared reflexes", that is, cases where "intentional processes do not actually carry out S-R translation, but only configure the cognitive system to do so automatically, once the defined target stimulus arrives" (idem, 265). Just as presentdirected intentions seems to affect unconscious processing (let us recall the "direct parameter specification" theory), so prepared reflexes show the existence of complex patterns of interaction between automatic and future-directed intentional components: although intentional states may determine which rules are selected, formed, and implemented, once they are established, stimuli seem to have direct and uncontrolled access to these rules, leading to automatic translation via intentional routes. (idem, 261) Hommel also addresses a different kind of interaction between intentionality and automaticity: the case where they conflict each other. A well-established paradigm in psychology consists in studying the effect of will by contrasting it with overlearned habits that need to be overcome. Specifically, a particular S-R association is first acquired through extensive practice, then subjects are required to react to the same stimuli with different responses. Since at this point a controlled, effortful process is needed to counteract the now dysfunctional habit, two consequences are expected: (1) increased reaction time to stimuli previously associated with a different response; and (2) increased occurrence of [...] "intended errors", that is, production of the previously associated but now incorrect response. (idem, 252) On the one hand, this means that habits may gain a certain autonomy from intentions: de Wit and Dickinson (2009, 471) speak in this sense of "behavioural autonomy" with regard to the way in which "slips of action occur when well-practiced responses intrude to compromise our goal-directed behaviour". On the other hand, however, it is important to underline that, difficult as it can be, intentional actions sooner or later succeed in overcoming habits – to the point that after practice intended behaviours undergo a similar process of routinization and become habits. Prior intentions can therefore affect our present behaviour in at least two ways: through the effects of implementation intentions, and through routinization of intended actions. In both cases, automatic behaviour can follow as a consequence of associations formed under the control of intentional processes. Interestingly, intentional preparation of automatic behaviours also plays a key role in the insightful analysis of free will offered by Dennett (2003). Based on Kane's (1996) proposal, Dennett makes the claim that free will is not incompatible with automaticity; quite on the contrary, since our conscious decisional processes need time, we had better routinize a large part of processing in order for us to be ready for rapidly reacting to environmental stimuli in exactly the way we intended to do. Furthermore, as we showed previously, intentional action might require that we overcome some habits, and this might require in turn that intentional action is routinized, if any efficiency has to be gained. In other words, habits can be an essential instrument for preparing ourselves to make difficult choices, so as to be forced to do the right thing at the right moment. This intentional preparation of automatisms is what Kane calls "self-forming actions". Until now, we have considered how, given a goal, people may facilitate its accomplishment by creating new associations; nothing has been said about the way we settle the goals to be pursued. In a rather trivial case, "our" goals could be something we have simply been told to do. For example, the doctor prescribes us to assume a pill, and we find it useful to associate this goal with some daily routine which may help us not to forget it. Or, for another example, the ski instructor explains us how to correct a wrong position, and we keep trying until the old routine is substituted by the correct one. In both cases, there needs to be no direct and explicit assessment of the specific goals at play: rather, we defer to someone else to whom we accord the authority to tell us what is the best things for us to do – of course, we have a personal interest in our health, or in skiing, but we do not need to explicitly attend to the rational relationship between these overarching goals and the immediate goals we are adopting. A different case is when we do explicitly consider our behaviour's effects, and the reasons why we should, or should not, produce those effects. These are genuine cases of practical reasoning on ends, delivering genuine intentions – in accordance with Bratman's definition. Of course, it does not happen frequently that we stop acting in order to reflectively consider pro and con of our courses of action, and the worthiness of their respective goals. However, we should not underestimate the role of deliberative processes in our lives. Firstly, one single episode of deliberation may possibly affect many future behaviours in that they are all directed towards the same deliberated goal. Secondly, each deliberation may have a great number of consequences also because of the generality of its conclusions. Suppose, for instance, that you decide to learn skiing: you could be inclined to search for a ski instructor even without any explicit deliberation, just because you have in other circumstances reflected on the importance of being taught by experts. Thirdly, we should consider how often we engage in social practices involving the evaluation of behaviours and goals: starting from parental education and going on with school teachers, friends and then colleagues, we are continuously confronted by situations where reasons for behaviours are given and asked for. This social space of rational discussion allows us to repeatedly reconsider how appropriate and justified our and others' behaviours are. Finally, it should be taken into account the internalization of such social dialogic aptitude towards considering reasons for action, and comparing actions with norms and values. Even when we act automatically, social as well as idiosyncratic norms of action may be activated and affect our behaviour in many ways. For all these reasons, we can expect that in the long term most of our habitual goals have been assessed by some sort of rational deliberation. In sum, given the variety of ways in which intentional decisions may shape habits and automatisms, it does not seem inconsistent to claim that many automatic behaviours might have been caused by prior intentions. This conclusion applies to communicative behaviours as well. For instance, we could bring forth the communicative intention to give a certain information to a colleague the next time we meet her – a clear example of implementation intention. Or we could reflectively consider how appropriate is to give that information. But even in the ordinary case where the precise content of our communicative behaviour is not figured out in advance, that behaviour is constrained in various respects by the way in which prior deliberated intentions have shaped our habits. 5. Conclusions It might be true, and probably is, that we often do not need to be conscious from the beginning of the goals we are pursuing, but representations of such goals may nonetheless be activated at some point to some extent, and may be strategically attended when needed. Similarly, it is certainly true that in most cases our behaviour is not delivered through conscious deliberation, but nonetheless we ordinarily pursue goals that at some point in our experience have been consciously perceived as worthy of being pursued. In a prototypical sense, then, intentions are representations of outcomes, they follow from explicit deliberation, are causally responsible for subsequent action and involved in its conscious control. However, we would call an action "intentional" also when it is directed towards a goal we could have adopted consciously, if only we had considered it, and when this goal can be represented in the service of conscious control of behaviour when needed. It seems clear to us that communication is almost invariably intentional in the latter sense: we are immersed in a host of habits to the point that we hardly need to reflectively choose the kind of communicative move we are going to perform; nonetheless, the outcomes of our behaviour are soon represented as expectations, can be recruited for executive control of action, and can also be recognized by subjects as their own goals. Human communication is mostly an intentional activity without intentions – without any deliberate selection of goals as a causal determinant of current action. Bibliography Bargh, J.A. (1989). Conditional automaticity: Varieties of automatic influence in social perception and cognition. In J.S. Uleman & J.A. 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International Journal of Academic Management Science Research (IJAMSR) ISSN: 2000-001X Vol. 2 Issue 8, August – 2018, Pages: 19-29 www.ijeais.org/ijamsr 19 Application of Strategic Management in Strengthening the Tertiary Institutions Administration in Selected Higher Institutions in Ebonyi State Prof. Barr. Ezeodili, Walter O. 1 , Omebe, Matthew Amuche 2 1Department Of Public Administration, Enugu State University Of Science And Technology, Enugu Campus, 2A Phd Student Of Public Administration Department, Enugu State University Of Science And Technology, Enugu Campus, ([email protected]). Abstract: In Ebonyi State today, there are different Tertiary Institutions, with the managements left with the function of coordinating both the men and the materials in the institution for the purpose of training and producing the needed manpower that can fit in, in the society. Sequel to this, therefore, this research delved into advocating the need for the introduction of the administrative/managerial tactic known as 'Strategic Management.' The objectives of the study perhaps, are to: Find out the extent the application of strategic management in the tertiary institutions in Ebonyi State promotes effective and efficient service delivery in the institutions; Ascertain the extent regular formulation of vision and mission statements redirects the managements of the tertiary institutions in Ebonyi State towards tackling the administrative challenges facing the institutions; Find out the extent auditing is employed by the managements of the tertiary institutions in Ebonyi State to understand the strength and opportunities of the institutions; Determine the extent staff-performance evaluation helps the managements of the tertiary institutions in Ebonyi State to promote effective teaching and learning in the institutions. The theory adopted in the study is the Scientific Management Theory by Frederick Wilson Taylor (1856). The research design adopted is a descriptive survey design. The following are some of the findings made: Defining and re-defining the current business and mission make the school management change the ineffective policies and programmes for the effective ones; Carrying out proper internal and external auditing helps managers to know where they do well and where they need to improve in their services; Evaluation of job performance provides robust knowledge on the extent the projects and programmes of the tertiary institutions in Ebonyi State are implemented. The researchers finally recommended as follows: There should be the adoption of all the strategic management processes in running the affairs of the tertiary institutions in Ebonyi State. Keywords: Strategic Management, Tertiary Institutions, Administration, Higher Institutions. 1. INTRODUCTION In the world today and in Ebonyi State in particular, there exist different Tertiary Institutions owned and managed by both the private and the Government sectors respectively. Obviously, the managements of these institutions carry out different administrative functions, among which is regular and adequate coordination of both the men and the materials in the institutions for the purpose of producing a well-trained manpower needed in the society, (MacRae and Pitt, 1980) in Ezeani (2006, p.1). Notably, there exists, global competition among the institutions of the higher learning (University; Polytechnic and/or Colleges), centering on which would be the best institutions, nationally, regionally and worldwide. To this effect, therefore, the introduction of an administrative/managerial skill or tactic known as 'Strategic Management' becomes very imperative. According to Nnamani (2009, p.37), the managerial skill is the ingenuity, innovation and the administrative technique needed by the management of the tertiary institutions to exploit the various resources in the institutions for the good of the society. The strategy makes any higher institution stand above others, anytime, anywhere. It gives a general direction to an institution and its various components for the achievement of the desired state in the future. Such strategy results from the detailed strategic planning process. Meanwhile, according to Eze (2010, p.52), the world, 'strategy' originated from the Greek word, 'strategia' meaning, 'generalship' which loosely translates to the science and art of military warfare. 'ago' (meaning leading/moving). Through the Strategic Management processes, the managements of the tertiary institutions make the institution assume the state of a business, possessing all most all the features of business and as such, fit their capacities with their environmental possibilities. In this case, the managements of the institutions could be flexible, accommodating and accessible. They would also bring about periodic adjustments in the institution's strategies for the purpose of consolidating some positive changes in the institutions. Strategic Management moreover, allows the managements of the tertiary institutions to carry out their administrative functions of formulating and implementing the major goals and initiatives they already took on behalf of the establishers, based on consideration of resources and an International Journal of Academic Management Science Research (IJAMSR) ISSN: 2000-001X Vol. 2 Issue 8, August – 2018, Pages: 19-29 www.ijeais.org/ijamsr 20 assessment of the internal and external environments in which the institution competes. Strategic Management makes administration easy as it provides overall direction to the management of the tertiary institutions and helps them in specifying the institution's objectives, developing the policies and planning on how to achieve the objectives. It also helps the managements in allocating the resources for the implementation of the plans. Obviously, Strategic management is not static; the models often include a feedback loop to monitor execution and inform the next round of planning. To this end, Okpata (2006, p.14), opines that the management of every tertiary institution requires a very strong and steady communication link which must be utilized internally and externally. In the words of Dessler (2008, p.78), in Eze (2010, p.53), Strategic Management is the process of identifying and executing the strategic plan of an institution, by matching the institution's capabilities with the demands of its environment, which comprises the strategic planning and implementation. Of course, Strategic Management involves answering a key question from a portfolio perspective: 'What business are we in and what business are we supposed to be in?' Nevertheless, in academic business, the management is to answer the strategic question, 'How shall we compete in this environment?' Fayol (1949, p.19), in Ezeani (2006, p.111), enunciates the following as some of the managerial strategies which help the management in its administrations: Division of labour/work, authority, discipline, unity of direction, subordination of interests to the general interest, remuneration, centralization, scalar chain (line of authority), order, equity, stability of tenure of personnel, initiative and spirit de corps. Moreover, there are seven elements of Management or Public Administration which are as well referred to as Managerial Strategies applied in the administration of the tertiary institutions for the growth of the institutions. These elements according to Fayol (1916) in Ezeani (2006, p.116), include: Forecasting; Planning, Organizing, Commanding, Co-coordinating and Controlling. It therefore, encourages, fit. 2. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM Currently, the move to develop the tertiary institutions in Ebonyi State has taken a strategic dimension in the state. Such dimension/approach however, requires a number of things put in place, two among which include: the provision of both Material and Financial Resources for better development through the implementation of various projects and programmes of the institutions. Unfortunately, however, it seems that the reverse is the case in the higher institutions in Ebonyi State where the institutions seem to fall short of the necessary infrastructure and fund they need. This however, appears to be the case following the introduction of Single Treasury Account and the inadequate allocation of money to the public tertiary institutions in the state. As Alia and Alia (2013, p.131), puts it, since government does not allocate enough money to schools, the standard of education deteriorates. In the same vein, the minimal provision of infrastructure facilities such as water; light, health and sanitation facilities and all-season access roots which are essential to life in the tertiary institutions, seems to be a serious problem. However, according to Alia and Alia (2014, p.131), every school is highly expected as a matter of necessity, to have the basic physical facilities that give existence to the institute such as staff rooms and office block, laboratories/workshop/student hostel accommodation and staff house for effective teaching and learning. The education system in Nigeria and in Ebonyi State as well, seems to be falling because of what seems to be the inability to develop original thinkers/Scientists, creators, investors and innovators (Watson, 2000 in Chidi-Ehiem and Nweze, 2013, p.175). It therefore, becomes very worrisome to find out that there is little or no application of strategic management in most of the tertiary institutions in Nigeria. As such, the goals of the tertiary institutions appear to be unreliable and the graduates appear to not to perform in accordance with the declaration on their certificates, (Onah, 2010). In that effect, Olowolabi (1999), Chidi-Echem and Nweze (2013, p.176), lament that examination malpractice seems to become the order of the day and many people appear to be more interested in obtaining certificates rather than studying very hard. In another dimension, Okpata (2006, p.247), maintains that inadequate utilization of communication links among the managements, the workers and the students increases the problems facing the tertiary institutions in every part of the world. Indeed, due process (red tapism) which usually exists in every public establishments seems to prevent some subordinates from having free access to relate with the managements of the tertiary institutions on certain matters demanding urgent attention. Secondly, it appears that the breach in communication also emanate from managements of the tertiary institutions, who on several occasions, may not be willing to open up to both internal and external bodies on the way the programmes and projects of the institutions are being implemented, (Ezeani, 2006). This however, may be connected with fear of unknown and of course, for the avoidance of probe on the managements. In another dimension, certain files are left untreated and the contents unimplemented by the managements of the tertiary institutions. It therefore, becomes common to have many deadlines that are not met in the institutions since the supervisors/evaluators/accreditors of such institutions are confronted with so many data, (Okpata, 2006). Sometimes, the managements of the tertiary institutions become frustrated, confused, and either postpone processing, or fail to reflect on the implications of information in their domain, or utilize a suboptimal portion of the total information available. Again, the content of the data/files may be massive or so technical that the managements may just ignore or file them away. So, it appears that some of the members of the International Journal of Academic Management Science Research (IJAMSR) ISSN: 2000-001X Vol. 2 Issue 8, August – 2018, Pages: 19-29 www.ijeais.org/ijamsr 21 managements of the tertiary institutions lack the ability to adopt strategic management that could encourage the use of Information Communication Technology (ICT) needed to handle the numerous files in the institutions for effectiveness and efficiency (Udu, 2013, p.171). In all, Akpagu (2007, p.4), remarks that the major challenge bedeviling the tertiary institutions in Nigeria and Ebonyi State in particular, is how to retain the arms of government with strong institutions and authorities required to ensure good oversight/external evaluation on the managements of the tertiary institutions. Be that as it may, the quest to solve the above problems therefore, led the researcher to embark on this study. 3. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY The main objective of this study is to find out the extent the application of strategic management in the tertiary institutions in Ebonyi State promotes effective and efficient service delivery in the institutions. In specific terms, the objectives of the study are to: 1. Ascertain the extent regular formulation of vision and mission statements of the tertiary institutions in Ebonyi State redirects the managements towards tackling the administrative challenges facing the institutions. 2. Find out the extent auditing is employed by the managements of the tertiary institutions in Ebonyi State to understand the strength and opportunities of the institutions for future improvement. 3. Determine the extent job-performance evaluation of staff helps by the managements of the tertiary institutions in Ebonyi State promotes effective manpower development in the institutions. 4. REVIEW OF LITERATURE Conceptual Review Concept of Strategic Management Strategy is a well-defined roadmap which explains the overall mission, vision and direction of an institution. The objective of a strategy is to maximize an institution's strengths. Strategy bridges the gap between where an institution is and where it wants to be. Strategy can also be defined as knowledge of the goals, the uncertainty of events and the need to take into consideration the likely or actual behavior of others. Strategy is the blueprint of decisions in an organization that shows its objectives and goals, reduces the key policies, and plans for achieving these goals, and defines the business the organization is to carry on, the type of economic and human organization it wants to be, and the contribution it plans to make to its shareholders, customers and society at large. Meanwhile, Strategic Management is the continuous planning, monitoring, analyzing and assessment of all that is necessary for an organization to meet its goals and objectives, (Rouse, 2016). In other words, strategic management helps the management of an institution to really evaluate and control the business and the industries in which the institution is involved in. Through strategic management, the management of an institutions is able to evaluate the competitors of other institutions. They also set goals and strategies for their institutions to reevaluate strategies on a regular basis to determine how the goals are implemented. According to Porter (2016), strategic management is an administrative technique which involves creating a unique and valuable position for an institution, choosing what not to do, and creating fit by aligning institutional activities with one another to support the chosen strategy. It is therefore, a bundle of decisions and acts which a manager undertakes and which decides the result of the organization's performance. It is the identification and description of the strategies that managers can use so as to achieve better performance and a competitive advantage for their institutions. Strategic management involves making managers/administrators to have a thorough knowledge and analysis of the general and competitive organizational environment so as to take right decisions on the Human Resource Management in the institutions. As such, Human Resource Strategy becomes a very significant/important aspect of Strategic Management which its purpose is to articulate what an institution intends to do about the policies and practices effecting the manpower now and in the longer term. According to Armstrong (1999, p. 61), some specific human resource strategy areas the managers are involved in for better administration and to make their organization better include: human capital management, corporate social responsibility, organization development, engagement, knowledge management, employee resourcing, talent management, learning and development, reward, employee relations, and employee well-being. Strategic management is nothing but planning for both predictable as well as unfeasible contingencies. It is applicable to both small as well as large organizations as even the smallest organization face competition and, by formulating and implementing appropriate strategies, they can attain sustainable competitive advantage. Strategic management is a way in which strategists set the objectives and proceed about attaining them. It deals with making and implementing decisions about future direction of an organization. It helps the managements of the tertiary institutions to identify the direction in which their institutions are moving. Strategic Management is an administrative mechanism through which the managements of the tertiary institutions give a broader perspective to their employees so that they can better understand how their job fits into the entire organizational plan and how it is co-related to other members of the institutions. Strategic Management is actually a 'continually evolving of directional cues that helps the managements of the tertiary institutions fit their capacities with their environmental possibilities for the International Journal of Academic Management Science Research (IJAMSR) ISSN: 2000-001X Vol. 2 Issue 8, August – 2018, Pages: 19-29 www.ijeais.org/ijamsr 22 purpose of achieving their strategic goals,' (Albenese, 1988), in Eze (2010, p.52). The managements of the tertiary institutions use strategic management to manage their employees in a manner which maximizes the ability of achieving the objectives of the tertiary institutions. When the managements of the tertiary institutions apply strategic management in the administration of the employees, they become more trustworthy, more committed and more satisfied and they could co-relate themselves very well with each task of the institutions. Strategic management is a process with which the managements of tertiary institutions appreciate the reaction of environmental changes while undertaking their administrative functions and the probable response of the institutions. Processes of Strategic Management According to Dessler (2008, p.78), in Eze (2010, p.53), there are seven strategic management processes, which the first five of the tasks are concerned with strategic planning while the sixth is the strategic implementation stage and the last is the evaluation. The processes include: i. Defining the current vision and mission ii. Performing external and internal auditing iii. Formulating new business and mission statements iv. Translating the mission into goals v. Formulating strategies to achieve the strategic goals vi. Implementing the strategy and vii. Evaluating performance. For Rouse (2016), Strategic management typically involves: i. Analyzing internal and external strengths and weaknesses. ii. Formulating action plans. iii. Executing action plans. iv. Evaluating to what degree action plans have been successful and making changes when desired results are not being produced. Put together, strategic management processes make the tertiary institutions grow and develop: (A) Defining the Current vision and Mission of the Tertiary Institutions According to Eze (2010, p.54), the first and very important strategic management process which could be adopted by the management of the tertiary institutions for smooth administration is defining the current vision and mission of the institutions. Through defining the current vision and mission of the tertiary institutions, the managements really develop competence through evidence-based management (Armstrong, 2009:128). According to Eze (2010, p.55), As change is inevitable, management must be prepared to continually scan the operating environment with the following questions in mind: What business are we in? What is the current state of the business should we choose another business model altogether or simply diversify into other areas? Given the threats and opportunities within our environment and while considering our strengths and weakness, where do we want the business to be in the next three, four or five years' time? What means are available to us in order to get there? As Pfeffer and Sutton (2006), state it, the following practices of Human Resource Professionals are the means the managements of the different institutions could adopt in defining the current vision and mission of the institutions: i. Using data to identify where the greatest improvement opportunities are. ii. Running experiment and gathering information on how well, things are working, building up a spirit of inquiry and learning, and a commitment to gathering data and doing the necessary analysis to make decisions based on fact. Armstrong (2009, p.128), warns against acting on hunches, or '.....on belief, ideology, casual benchmarking, what they want or hope for, what they have done in the past, what they seem to be good or experienced in doing.' iii. Being committed to acting upon data in order to design and redesign more effective Human Resource system and processes and to ensure that the already existing do not harm those who use them or are effected by their use. The above implies that while defining and analyzing the vision and mission of the tertiary institutions, the managements must understand the routes that will enable the institutions get to the desired destination at the time under review. (B) Allowing External and Internal Auditing in the Tertiary Institutions In the course of their administration, the managements of the tertiary institutions could allow both internal and external auditing in the institutions for the purpose of understanding the true states of the institutions. According to Eze (2010, p.129), auditing is the process of gathering, analyzing and setting out detailed information about the requirements and contents of a job. Perhaps, job analysis provides useful data about a job by identifying the major job requirements (MJR) needed for the successful performance of the functions of that job. The internal and external audit centre on what is referred to as 'Strength, Weakness, Opportunity and Threat (SWOT). (C) Formulation of New Vision and Mission Statements and Translating the Mission into Goals by the Management of the Higher Institutions One of the administrative functions of the management of the tertiary institutions is to keep a continuous eye on the goals and objectives of the organization and make adjustments where and when necessary. According to Ezeani (2006, p.2), it could be understood that while formulating new vision and mission statements in an institution, certain International Journal of Academic Management Science Research (IJAMSR) ISSN: 2000-001X Vol. 2 Issue 8, August – 2018, Pages: 19-29 www.ijeais.org/ijamsr 23 question-statements could be very important. Such questionstatements according Eze (2010, p.59), include: which new institutional model can be explored? And which new distinctive or unique services can be made available to learners? Nevertheless, the essence of formulating new vision and mission statements in the tertiary institutions is to move the institutions forward in the emerging new dispensation. On the other hand, formulating new vision and mission statement by the managements of the tertiary institutions could be necessary but without translating the new vision and mission statement into goals, administration of the managements may be faulty and there may be no optimal services in the institutions. This follows the fact that the tertiary institutions like other organizations must have a set goals which must be appreciated and achieved/implemented from time to time. In the light of the above, Attmah (2014:87), notes that the managements of the tertiary institutions must use the manpower (academic and nonacademic staff) to adjust the difficult task in the institutions to accommodate the learners in a way of restructuring the task to supplement a prior knowledge. (D) Formulation of Strategies to Achieve/Implement the Goals of the Tertiary Institutions Following the role goal setting plays in the administration of different tertiary institution, it has become clear that the formulation of special strategies for the implementation of organizational goals could help the managements of the tertiary institutions a lot in optimizing productivity in Ebonyi State. The following therefore, are some administrative strategies the managements of the tertiary institutions could adopt in making their administration go smoothly and in return, develop their institutions rapidly: (i) Maintenance of adequate Communication Link in the Tertiary Institutions Maintenance of adequate communication link is an important strategy the managements of the tertiary institutions adopt to have smooth administration in the institutions. According to Okpata (2006, p.14), the directions of communication link necessary for perfect administration in any institution like the tertiary institutions include: (a) Downward CommunicationThis is the flow of information from the members of the management to the subordinates/staff. (b) Upward CommunicationThis is the flow of information from the staff members to the members of the managements. (c) Lateral CommunicationThe flow of information from one unit to the other in one tertiary institution. (d) Diagonal and Mixed CommunicationThe flow of information through different devices to the managements in the tertiary institutions. (e) Internal CommunicationThe flow of information among the management and the staff within the tertiary institution. (ii) Steady Use of Information Communication Technology in the Tertiary Institutions Another management strategy adopted by the managements of the tertiary institutions for smooth administration and better service delivery in the institutions is the use of Information Communication Technology. Of course, sharing of information on the current trend by the managements of the tertiary institutions is better done through the use of Information Communication Technology. In the word of Onwe (2014, p.140), Information Communication Technology is a super highway that links, hooks and focuses the entire world into a global village, where people of all races can easily get in touch, see, or speak to one another and exchange information from one point of the globe to another. As Armah (2009), puts it in Onwe (2014), the use of Information Communication Technology augments the information resources of the university libraries for improved satisfaction of users' needs. According to Ekruyota (2006), in Onwe (2014:140), with access to Information Communication Technology or internet facilities, the managements can retrieve information from the world's largest information database for easy administration. In other words, the use of Information Communication Technology by the managements of the tertiary institution makes the administration of the tertiary institutions very easily as the managements of the institutions can comfortably compete with each other anywhere, anytime, anywhere. Perhaps, according to Kochmer (1995), in Ezike (2014:1), the adoption of the Information Communication Technology by the management of the tertiary institutions in their administration involves the use of the use of E-mail for oneto-one correspondence. (iii) Reward Strategy According to Armstrong (1999, p. 746), reward strategy is a declaration of intent which defines what the management of an institution wants to do in the longer term to develop and implement policies, practices and processes which further the achievement of its goals and meet the needs of its stakeholders. Reward strategy is an administrative measure which based on an understanding of the needs, demands and satisfaction of the employees and the organization. Reward strategy is concerned with developing the values of the organization on how people should be incentives and formulating guiding principles which will ensure that their values are enacted. In the word of Brown (2001), Reward strategy is ultimately a way of thinking that the managements of institutions apply in any compensation issue arising in an institution, to create value in institutions. The following according to Armstrong (1999, p. 747), are therefore, the specific reward strategies the managements of (tertiary) institutions could adopt: i. The replacement of present methods of contingent pay with a pay for contribution scheme; International Journal of Academic Management Science Research (IJAMSR) ISSN: 2000-001X Vol. 2 Issue 8, August – 2018, Pages: 19-29 www.ijeais.org/ijamsr 24 ii. The introduction of a new grade and pay structure, eg a broad-graded. iii. The replacement of an existing decayed job evaluation scheme with a computerized scheme which more clearly reflects organizational values; iv. The improvement of performance management processes so that they provide better support for the development of a performance culture and move clearly identify development needs.' v. The introduction of a formal recognition scheme; vi. The development of flexible benefit system; vii. The conduct of equal pay reviews with the objective of ensuring that work of equal value is paid equally; viii. Communication programmes designed to inform every one of the reward policies and practices of the organization; ix. Training, coaching and guidance programmes designed to increase line management capacity. Evaluation of Job Performance Evaluation of job performance is a very essential and impact-making-strategy adopted by the managements of tertiary institutions based on available data, used to form conclusion, (Mbakwem and Ibe, 2014:18). It is a systematic process for defining the relative worth or size of jobs within an institution in order to establish internal relations. According to Attmah (2014, p.87), it is very important for the management of the tertiary institutions to provide alternative assessment since it provokes the lecturers to reflect on their performances. For Titanyi and Yuoh (2009), in Mbakwem and Ibe (2014:16), supervising the implementation of policies or goals of an instruction is an evaluation strategy which brings about changes or enhancement of the capacity of lecturers in the domains of knowledge, skills and attitudes. According to Onah (2010), another evaluation strategy which could be adopted by the managements of the tertiary institutions for quality service delivery in the institutions is project monitoring. Of course, project monitoring is a method adopted by the management of the tertiary institutions to get a detailed information on a project or programme either after it has been completed or at the appropriate points during the implementation process. According to Gasley and Lury (1981) in Onah (2010), project monitoring provides information to the managements of different organization to enable for the assessment of how much progress had according to schedule. The main purpose of project monitoring is for the management to check whether project inputs are being delivered as intended and whether they are having effects for which they were committed in the institutions. For Onah (2010), the essence of projects and programmes monitoring include to ascertain:  How the inputs (i.e resources) to the projects/porgrammes of the institutions are used.  How activities essential to the implementation of projects/porgrammes are processed.  Whether or not deadlines are being met.  Generally, whether or not things are working out as intended. Projects and programmes monitoring by the managements of the tertiary institutions fundamentally concerns with measuring quantities relating processors. The managements in the course of that, tactically correct deviations that may have accrued between what was intended to be done and what has actually been done. Furthermore, Onah (2010), states that technical economic and financial criteria are used in test/assessment. So, physical assessment of performance of projects and programmes involves comparing the actual use of labour and material inputs as against the estimates in the feasibility study made available. Moreover, the managements of the tertiary institutions carrying out evaluation of projects and programmes adopt the following:  Measurable objectives.  Critical Assumptions  Significant indicators  Data collection/recording system  Analytical technique  Effective organization structure. Job-performance appraisal is another evaluation technique done by the managements of the tertiary institutions. According to French (1979), in Onah (2007), describes job performance appraisal is the continuous evaluation of the contribution of managers and groups within an organization. It is designed to reveal the extent to which plan objectives of the organization have been achieved by the management and any unanticipated effects it may have so that lessons can be learned for future planning. Onah (2007), defined the appraisal the judgment of an employee's performance in his or her job, based on some issues order than productivity alone. Such judgment is otherwise called 'merit rating.' On the other hand, the appraisal of managers' performance could financially driven. Therefore, Okereke (1986), cited by Onah (2010), states that financial appraisal of the performance of managers of any institution takes the following forms:  Comparing the actual and planned capital and operational west and highlighting of cost differences by type and inputs, timing and direction;  Calculating the real production costs and comparing it with actual product price. Generally, the purpose of evaluation by the managements of organization like the tertiary institutions, according to Armstrong (1999, p.757), include: International Journal of Academic Management Science Research (IJAMSR) ISSN: 2000-001X Vol. 2 Issue 8, August – 2018, Pages: 19-29 www.ijeais.org/ijamsr 25  Establishing the relative value or size of jobs (internal relativities) based on fair, sound consistent judgment.  Production of the required information to design and maintain equitable and defensible grade and pay structures.  Provision of as much objectives as possible, a basis for grading jobs within a grade structure, thus enabling consistent decision to be made about job grading.  For the sake of having sound market comparisons with jobs or roles of equivalent complexity and size.  Being transparentthe basis upon which grades are defined and defined and jobs graded should be cleared.  Ensuring that the institution meets equal pay for work of equal value obligations. 5. METHODOLOGY Research Design The design used in this study is a descriptive survey design. It involves systematic collection and presentation of data given a clear picture of a particular action and correlation. Area of Study This study focused on Ebonyi State created in 1996 with particular reference to the five (5) Tertiary Institutions, namely: Federal University, Ndufu-Alike, Ikwo (FUNAI), Ebonyi State University (EBSU), Abakaliki, Federal Polytechnic, Uwana, Federal College of Agriculture, Ishiagu and Ebonyi State College of Education, Ikwo. Population of the Study The total population of this study is 288 derivable from the number of the management staff of the five (5) Tertiary Institutions in Ebonyi State. The detail is in the table below: Table 1 A Table Showing the Population of the Study S/N Institution Govt Appointees Deans Sub/ Deans Directors HODs Unit Heads Coordinators Other Appointees Total Federal University Udufu-Alike, Ikwo 4 7 0 11 25 3 7 1 58 Ebonyi State University, Abakaliki 4 13 3 18 57 0 0 6 101 Federal Polytechnic, Uwana 4 7 0 12 30 0 0 4 57 Federal College of Agriculture, Ishiagu 4 1 0 1 20 0 0 2 28 Ebonyi State College of Education, Ikwo 4 6 0 21 14 0 0 1 46 Total 20 34 3 63 146 3 7 14 290 Source: Authors' Field Survey 2017 Sampling Techniques The sampling technique used in this study is Simple Random Technique where the respondents were picked randomly. Sampling Size Determinations The sample size of population was determined using TARO Yemeni formular. 1 ( )2 n N N e Where: n= desired sample N= total population Therefore, a total number of one hundred and sixty eight (168) questionnaire items were distributed to the respondents as drawn from the population of 290. Research Instrument The instrumentation used in generating data in this study was questionnaire where questions were given to the respondents respectively following the research questions. Source of Data The source of data collection in this study is primary source using questionnaire. Data Presentation and Analysis International Journal of Academic Management Science Research (IJAMSR) ISSN: 2000-001X Vol. 2 Issue 8, August – 2018, Pages: 19-29 www.ijeais.org/ijamsr 26 Table 2: Questionnaire Distribution SN Description No of Questionnaire Items % No Returned % No Unreturned % 1 Govt. Appointees in the institutions 10 5.9 4 4.2 4 5.4 2 Deans and Sub-Deans 18 10.7 8 8.5 10 13.5 3 HODs and Unit Heads 98 58.3 44 46.8 54 72.9 4 Directors, Coordinators and Others 42 25 38 40.4 6 8.1 5 Total 168 100 94 100 74 100 Source: Authors' Field Survey 2017 From the table above, the researcher distributed 10 questionnaire items to the Govt. Appointees in the institutions. Among the 10 questionnaire items, the persons/respondents that returned their responses were 4 and while those who did not return any response were equally4. Also, 18 questionnaire items were given to the Deans and Sub-Deans in the institutions and 8 persons/respondents returned their responses and 10 respondents did not return any response. For the HODs and Unit Heads in the institutions, 98 questionnaire items were given to them and 8 of them returned responses while 44 respondents did not return any response. For the Directors, Coordinators and others in the institutions, 42 questionnaire items were given to them and 8 of them returned their responses while 6 of them did not return any response. In totality, 168 respondents returned their responses while 74 respondents did not return any response. Table3: A table showing the responses of the respondents. S/N Questionnaire Item SA % A % SD % D % U % X 1 Regular formulation of vision and mission statements of the tertiary institutions in Ebonyi State redirects the managements towards tackling the administrative challenges facing the institutions. 34 36 29 34 14 14 15 15 3 3.1 2 Auditing is employed by the managements of the tertiary institutions in Ebonyi State to understand the strength and opportunities of the institutions for future improvement. 35 37 28 30 15 16 16 17 1 1 n= 290 1+290 (0.05)2 = 290 1+290 (0.0025) International Journal of Academic Management Science Research (IJAMSR) ISSN: 2000-001X Vol. 2 Issue 8, August – 2018, Pages: 19-29 www.ijeais.org/ijamsr 27 3 Job-performance evaluation of staff helps the managements of the tertiary institutions in Ebonyi State to promote effective manpower development in the institutions. 37 37 26 28 16 17 14 15 2 2 Regular formulation of vision and mission statements of the tertiary institutions in Ebonyi State redirects the managements towards tackling the administrative challenges facing the institutions. In the table above, thirty four (34) respondents with 36% strongly agreed that regular formulation of vision and mission statements of the tertiary institutions in Ebonyi State redirects the managements towards tackling the administrative challenges facing the institutions while twenty nine (29) respondents with 31.0% agreed. Ten (10) respondents with 4% strongly disagreed while fifteen (15) respondents with 16% disagreed and three (3) respondents with 3.1% gave no response. Auditing is employed by the managements of the tertiary institutions in Ebonyi State to understand the strength and opportunities of the institutions for future improvement. Thirty five (35) respondents with 37% strongly agreed with the assertion that auditing is employed by the managements of the tertiary institutions in Ebonyi State to understand the strength and opportunities of the institutions for future improvement while twenty eight (28) respondents agreed. The respondents who strongly disagreed are fifteen (15) in number with 16% and sixteen (16) respondents with 17% just disagreed while one (1) respondents with 1% gave no answer. Job-performance evaluation of staff helps the managements of the tertiary institutions in Ebonyi State to promote effective manpower development in the institutions In the table three above, thirty seven (37) respondents with 39% strongly agreed that Job-performance evaluation of staff helps the managements of the tertiary institutions in Ebonyi State to promote effective manpower development in the institutions while twenty six (26) respondents with 28% disagreed with the assertion sixteen (16) respondents with 17% strongly disagreed while fourteen (14) respondents with 15% disagreed and two (2) respondents with 2% did not give any response. Major Findings The following are the major findings in this study: i. Regular formulation of vision and mission statements of the tertiary institutions in Ebonyi State truly redirects the managements towards tackling the administrative challenges facing the institutions. ii. Auditing is employed by the managements of the tertiary institutions in Ebonyi State to understand the strength and opportunities of the institutions for future improvement. iii. Job-performance evaluation of staff helps the managements of the tertiary institutions in Ebonyi State to promote effective manpower development in the institutions. 6. CONCLUSION In conclusion, it has become obvious that the application of strategic management like defining and redefining of the business and mission statement redirects the managements of the tertiary institutions in Ebonyi State towards tackling the administrative challenges facing the institutions. Some of the administrative challenges include: inadequate facilities like infrastructure; inadequate provision of fund to the schools, inadequate provision of resource materials. It is also true that evaluation of job performance promotes effective service delivery in the higher institutions in Ebonyi State because it helps to find out the best performing staff and the staff who are not doing well for onwards improvement of such staff and for the good of the higher institutions in general. 7. RECOMMENDATION Following the findings made in this study, the researcher recommends as follows:  The managements of the tertiary institutions in Ebonyi State should adopt all the strategic management processes in running the affairs of the tertiary institutions in Ebonyi State. Such processes include: defining and re-defining the current business and mission; turning the mission into goals, carrying out proper internal and external auditing, formulating strategies for implementing the goals and really implementing the strategic goals, as well as evaluation of job performance.  The managements of the tertiary institutions in Ebonyi State should calso make it a point of duty to always carry out proper internal and external auditing on the situation of the institution to enable them know where they do well and where they need International Journal of Academic Management Science Research (IJAMSR) ISSN: 2000-001X Vol. 2 Issue 8, August – 2018, Pages: 19-29 www.ijeais.org/ijamsr 28 to improve in the administration of the tertiary institutions in Ebonyi State.  Since the implementation of strategic goals in the higher institutions significantly improves the inputs and the outputs of management of the tertiary institutions in Ebonyi State, the principles of strategic management should always be adopted in the administration of the institutions.  Since evaluation of job performance provides robust knowledge on the extent the projects and programmes of the higher institutions in Ebonyi State are implemented, the management of the tertiary institutions in Ebonyi State should always carry out job performance evaluation in the institutions. 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Organon F 2020: 1–34 ISSN 2585-7150 (online) DOI (to be assigned) ISSN 1335-0668 (print) * National Research University – "Higher School of Economics"  International Laboratory of Logics and Linguistics, School of Philosophy, National Research University – "Higher School of Economics", Staraya Basmannaya st. 21/4, 105066 Moscow, Russian Federation  [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author. Journal compilation © The Editorial Board, Organon F. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International Public License (CC BY-NC 4.0). RESEARCH ARTICLE If Sounds Were Dispositions: a Framework Proposal for an Undeveloped Theory Jorge Luis Méndez-Martínez* Received: 17 May 2019 / Accepted: 5 June 2020 Abstract: In the realm of the philosophy of sounds and auditory experience there is an ongoing discussion concerned with the nature of sounds. One of the contestant views within this ontology of sound is that of the Property View, which holds that sounds are properties of the sounding objects. A way of developing this view is through the idea of dispositionalism, namely, by sustaining the theory according to which sounds are dispositional properties (Pasnau 1999; Kulvicki 2008; Roberts 2017). That portrayal, however, is not sufficient, as it has not inquired the metaphysical debates about dispositions beyond the conditional analysis. In this paper, I try to advance this view by including recent developments (for instance Bird 2007; Vetter 2015) in the field of dispositionalism and I analyse whether this new version can sort out known and new objections to Property View. Keywords: Audibility; dispositions; ontology of sound; potentiality; property view; sounds. 2 Jorge Luis Méndez-Martínez Organon F 2020: 1–34 0. Introduction Imagine that you are sitting next to a river, having a picnic with friends. It is a sunny but slightly chilly day, so you are wearing gloves. You take your beer bottles to make a toast and, as the bottles collide, you are surprised to realise that your bottle seems to be made of plastic instead of glass. The gloves had prevented you from realising that it was a plastic bottle and, because in shape and colour it imitates glass beer bottles, only the lack of the characteristic sound of clinking glasses gives away the material it is made of. When you finally take a sip, the feeling on your lips confirms what the sound had hinted: it is indeed a plastic bottle. This little scene relates to different issues regarding the philosophy of sounds: the relation of sounds and sources (Nudds 2010; Casati, Di Bona, Dokic 2013; O'Callaghan 2007b; Fowler 2013), the problem of perceptual justification (Handel 2006), the issues of sense multimodality (O'Callaghan 2011) and, last but not least, the problem of the nature of sounds (O'Callaghan 2007; O'Shaughnessy 1957; Pasnau 1999; Roberts 2017). The latter is the one I am concerned with in this paper. Is it possible to say that plastic has a different sound than that of glass? I think it is intuitive to answer 'yes.' In order to justify this intuition, I will appeal to a view in the ontology of sounds that should explain this in a satisfactory sense, that is the dispositional view or sound dispositionalism. Typically, by dispositions we mean things such as fragility, solubility, irascibility and the like. Dispositions are properties that, under certain circumstances, could manifest themselves. The suffix 'ity' is quite indicative of those cases. This paper is about those sorts of properties and it examines the possibility of claiming that "sound" is a sort of disposition. It can be said that an object has "the disposition to sound" or, seemingly, "sonority" if so and so occur. It will be a matter of dispute what the nature of this "so and so"-namely, the conditions-is about. The debate is circumscribed in the frame of Sound Ontology (SO), which, in this sense, has split into three views: the wave view (WV), where sounds are considered as acoustic waves (WV) as physics and, more precisely, acoustics tend to say; the property view (PV), where sounds are either properties of the perceiving mind (PV1), as psychology presumably If Sounds Were Dispositions 3 Organon F 2020: 1–34 argues, or properties of the object (PV2); and, finally, the event view (EV), where sounds are considered as events (O'Callaghan 2007a, 2009, among others, favours this stance). Seemingly, the dispositional view would belong to PV2, or so it has been interpreted by those who have taken this route. I must clarify that my purpose is not to decisively advocate for a dispositional view on sounds. I am not trying to convince you to accept the thesis that sounds are dispositional properties of objects. My commitment in this paper is related to the consequences and implications of such dispositional account. This is not the most popular view in SO. Actually, the so-called property view, mostly labelled as such when it is criticised, rarely unfolds in a way that takes the global philosophical discussion on properties into account: are they universals? Are they tropes? There is only a handful of allusions in this sense: P. F. Strawson (1959), on the one hand, and Edmund Husserl (1984), on the other, have made some type-token considerations of sound as universal (for instance the C note) and as a particular (the playing of the note C for instance), but that does not take sound as if it were a property of an individual.1 This, I argue, is due to a problem of under-specification, common to all the views that figure in the SO.2 The field is thus in need of further development. This applies for the dispositional account of sounds, which is a species within PV, and more precisely PV2. Three authors in particular, Pasnau (1999), Kulvicki (2008), and Roberts (2017), have advanced this view. Yet, sound's characterisation as a disposition has not been elaborated close to the spirit of the long metaphysical debate on dispositions. Only Roberts (2017, 347) mentions in passing the problems pertaining the conditional analysis, let alone newer considerations on the problems of modality and 1 As known, the fact that sounds do not coincide with the idea of basic particular in Strawson's metaphysics, namely that of the material body, is what motivates the examination of such problematic 'individuals.' The revival of sounds as a matter of philosophical discussion most likely comes from Strawson. 2 A notorious exception in that of Jonathan Cohen (2010, 205) who considers universal and/or trope form of abstract properties, while tackling linguistic objections against PV. 4 Jorge Luis Méndez-Martínez Organon F 2020: 1–34 potencies (Vetter 2011a, 2011b, 2013a, 2015). Thus, a first goal of the paper is to achieve a more complete picture of the dispositional view. The first section will provide a picture of Sound Ontology, hopefully short but compelling. The second section will present the current state of affairs of the dispositional view on sounds. A third section introduces the classical considerations from the dispositions' debate-its features under the conditional analysis and the newer potentiality argument-to the discussion on sound. In a fourth section, I want to learn if a new version of sound dispositionalism can withstand the criticisms that some authors (O'Callaghan 2011; Casati and Dokic 2014) have raised against the dispositional account and to evaluate its prospects for the future within the realm of SO. In this article my contention is to bring two debates together: that of the philosophy of sounds and auditory experience and that of dispositions. A brief literature review, especially in the first and third sections, is necessary to make intelligible the conceptual exchange between both discussions. This characterisation, however, is not free of difficulties and I do not take for granted that sounds are dispositions. Even more, since I am not sure sounds or sonority are dispositions, I have opted for the title "If sounds were dispositions..." and by doing so I also want to make more explicit the character of this inquiry as hypothetical. 1. The ontology of sound The expression "Ontology of sounds" refers to the effort to define what sounds are. There are, to my knowledge, two general proceedings in that quest: the purely ontological taxonomy of theories, which is elaborated by O'Callaghan (2007a, and with Nudds 2009), and the topological approach (the label is mine), which inquiries where sounds are (Casati and Dokic 1994, 2005). Both taxonomies overlap in some regards, but not in others. The first ontological choice to make is that of deciding whether sounds are properties or individuals. For some (Roberts 2017), this is what divides the ontologies of sound. There are, however, more diversified approaches. In O'Callaghan's taxonomy, for instance, this amounts to three possibilities: the wave view (WV), the property view (PV), and the event view (EV). If Sounds Were Dispositions 5 Organon F 2020: 1–34 The Wave View (WV) claims, from Aristotle3 to modern acoustics, that sounds are acoustic waves. Despite its popularity, there are a number of issues that WV cannot account for. The most important one is that it presupposes an Error Theory of perception:4 we, for one, do not perceive sounds to be at any acoustic wave as a vibration in an elastic medium. We perceive them as coming from a source (a sounding object, an event, etcetera). This gives rise to what we can consider as the phenomenological desideratum, which any prospect of SO should comply with. At least, O'Callaghan (2007a, 14) notices, it is better to choose a theory that explains the phenomenological aspect of sound, to one that does not. Authors differ on the degree of importance they assign to it, some take it as a necessary constrain, some as an inescapable requirement, and some consider it a discussion they could bypass.5 Another option is that of PV, which is twofold: it either describes sounds as properties of the perceiving mind (PV1) or it describes sounds as properties of the sounding objects (PV2). The most common one is that of PV2, ever since John Locke described them in his Essay as "secondary qualities."6 Typically, secondary qualities are thought of as being qualities of the objects somehow enabled, detected and identified by our perception. However, it is far from decisive that secondary qualities in general (let alone sounds) are 3 Aristotle is usually considered in such fashion in many historical accounts (Pasnau 1999, 310; Casati and Dokic 2014). 4 In neuroscience we can find a similar problem while dealing with vision and the so-called "inverse problem" in a Berkeleyan fashion. The information in the retina does not correspond directly to the real structure of the world, so how is it possible that we respond successfully on the basis of vision? (Purves 2010) 5 Such assessment is visible while pointing out to the 'Error Theory' as a major inconsistency to be resolved or that undermines the whole effort for searching a coherent view on the nature of sound, that is the case with Pasnau (1999), Casati and Dokic (2014). 6 In the seventh chapter of the second book ('On Ideas') from the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, while addressing the simple ideas, Locke formulates the notion of "primary and secondary qualities." Primary qualities are those that are inseparable of a body, for instance, solidity or extension; whereas, secondary qualities are "nothing in the objects themselves but power to produce various sensations in us" (Locke 1999, 117). Such is the case of sounds. 6 Jorge Luis Méndez-Martínez Organon F 2020: 1–34 exclusively objects' properties as there is an ongoing discussion on whether they could also, or instead, being regarded as properties of the perceiving mind (see, for instance, Egan 2006). In such scenario, we would face PV1. PV1 would be focused on sound as a purely an auditory phenomenon and, therewith, it would permit auditory hallucinations to be considered as sounds, since sounds' privacy would be plausible (this is an anathema for O'Callaghan 2007a). Not only that, but there would be as many sounds as hearers (Casati and Dokic 2014). Sound would lie, thus, in the ear of the beholder. No philosopher seems to be explicitly endorsing this stance, but there are interpretations that may implicitly argue in favour of it: O'Callaghan (2007), Casati and Dokic (2014) point to D. L. C. Robert Maclachlan's Philosophy of Perception (1989, New York, Prentice Hall); Casati and Dokic (2009, 103), additionally, mention O'Shaughnessy (1957). There is even mention of Edmund Husserl and Franz Brentano, usually overlooked in the analytical debates on sounds, as potentially approaching this view (MéndezMartínez 2020). In the same guise, O'Callaghan (2009, 34) appeals here to the argument from the vacuum, for which there are two ways of arguing this: either one says that a medium is a necessary condition for sound (a bell struck in the vacuum does not make any sound); or you say that the audible properties of sound (namely, timbre, pitch and loudness) cannot be afforded in the absence of a medium, and do not produce a veridical perception. PV2, as I elaborate below, is at odds with these arguments. Finally, we have the event view (EV), defended by O'Callaghan (2007a, 2009)7 and somehow by Casati and Dokic (2014). O'Callaghan defends what the latters label as "Located Event Theory," whereas the option defended by Casati and Dokic is that of the "Relational Event Theory." To say that "sounds = events" is to claim that they are spatiotemporal localisable occurrences that are to be identified neither with properties nor with waves. EV tries to deliver in the case of the phenomenological desideratum. Another key aspect that will mark a difference with any potential 7 Despite being considered as the most representative figure in EV, O'Callaghan has employed other labels for more current elaborations: the mereological position, for instance, which considers the causal sources of sound as a "part" of sound (O'Callaghan 2011). If Sounds Were Dispositions 7 Organon F 2020: 1–34 PV2, dispositional view included, is that EV relies in the manifestation of sound: whenever there is a sound, there is a sounding (O'Callaghan 2009, 36). EV pays a great deal of attention to the problem of relating to sources and, in that sense, it is probably the view that encompasses the most in its effort to explain sound. In reporting so, things complicate to the extent that some have preferred to cast aside causality, sources and just addressing "pure events" (Scruton 2009). A problem this theory has, among many that are beyond the scope of this paper, is that it must provide several explanations to specify the location of sounds; echoes and Doppler effect are recurring puzzling cases (Casati and Dokic 2014; O'Callaghan 2007b; Fowler 2013). In addition, as with the other views, EV is not free from the problem of under-specification. Although maybe not as properties, events represent another large topic in ontology and metaphysics to which EV relates to at a lesser extent. This is the purely ontological classification. Precisely because of the problem of location and spatiality, Casati and Dokic (1994, 2014) consider that deciding where sounds are warrants as much explaining as the matter of what they are. For them, there are three broad conceptions of sound: proximal, which locates sound at or in the hearer; medial, which locates sound between the hearer and the sounding event/object; and distal, which locates sound at the sounding object or event.8 In short, these are the views that compose SO, which, in my opinion, offer a general description of the discussion. There are other particular classifications depending on what is being inquired. Scruton (2009) thinks of physicalist and non-physicalist conceptions, where common rival views such as that of Pasnau and O'Callaghan fit, for him, in the physicalist row. Dokic (2007), who reviews the tensions between the "unique event" and the "repeatable object" ontologies, is another example. Let us now evaluate the proposal in question: the dispositional view. 8 There are some correspondences between both taxonomies. WV, for instance, is clearly distal; whereas EV is presumably distal, although it sometimes seems to make some concessions that put it close to WV (Casati and Dokic 2014). PV1 is proximal, whereas PV2 is distal. 8 Jorge Luis Méndez-Martínez Organon F 2020: 1–34 2. Sound dispositionalism, a state of art A preliminary outline is useful. On these views, sounds are properties and, curiously enough, most proponents of a PV point out to dispositional properties. However, in the large debate concerning properties there are other available options on how to draw on properties, yet philosophers of sound have chosen this one.9 I will analyse in the conclusions whether this compromises, or not, this view. This dispositional view is a sort of PV and, seemingly, it is PV2, because the argument points out the disposition-to-sound in the object, rather than in or at the hearer. If the dispositional locates what is going on at the object, it is certainly not medial nor proximal, but rather distal. If it locates sounds at the hearer, then it is proximal. These implications will be clearer further on. For now, let us elaborate on the state of affairs of the dispositional view that, though unpopular in the overall philosophical discussion on sound, is not without representatives (Pasnau 1999; Kulvicki 2008; Roberts 2017; and, at a certain extent, Cohen 2010). Pasnau's paper is probably one of the most influential sources in the field of the philosophy of sounds, which is probably due to its contribution to the revival of the debate. In it, Pasnau proposes: ...identifying sound with the vibrations of the object that has the sound. More cautiously, I would say that sounds either are the vibrations of such objects, or supervene on those vibrations. The former would imply a physicalist account of sound, whereas the latter would have room for a dispositional account. (Pasnau 1999, 317) However, the part concerning the supervenience on vibrations does not do the job in showing strong adherence to a dispositional model. An issue 9 A case of an adherent of this view who is not championing a dispositionalist alternative is Jonathan Cohen (2010). He elaborates on the idea that the characteristic temporal feature of sound is usually taken to be at odds with its characterisation as a property. Although his defence does not mention dispositions, his treatment could serve dispositional arguments. If Sounds Were Dispositions 9 Organon F 2020: 1–34 that here seems innocuous is that of sounds "supervening." Usually, the expression used is that of "being instantiated by" while describing exactly the same (for instance O'Callaghan 2007a, 66). It is yet to be inquired, though, on whether they are equivalent and exchangeable sentences,10 for the appeal to supervenience has been contested for some of those who are disposition realists, and a dispositional account of Anti-Humean inspiration would spare us of modelling through the idea of supervenience, as I will elaborate in the next section. Although Pasnau does not go deeper in this, he formulates one of the key ideas for the dispositional account while saying that objects have sound (Pasnau 1999, 316). This goes against the grain concerning the ordinary language use of sound as something that is "made" and not "had" (Pasnau 1999, 310). Not only in this having/making sound distinction has Pasnau paved the way down for sound dispositionalism but also regarding the appeal to colour. In so doing, he has a very different attitude towards colour analogy than that of O'Callaghan's (2007a), which goes against the 'tyranny' of the visual.11 Besides the distinction and the appeal to colour analogy, Pasnau does not add more on how this dispositional account could be. In the end, the 10 I fear they are not, because although at a certain point we can use them without reserves, while being specific 'supervenience' commits us to a metaphysical picture (the Lewis-Humean one) which could have, or not, unwarranted features on how the world is structured. 11 If considered as an endeavour within the philosophy of senses or the philosophy of perception, the philosophy of sounds and auditory experiences shares a relatively common ground with that of colour and vision: there are ontological discussions on the nature of both colour and sounds; there are several positions concerning the phenomenological content of our auditory and visual experiences, and so forth. However, when compared to the forays in the realm of colour and vision, the philosophy of sounds and auditory experience is considerably less developed. Not only that, but it has browsed, at large, many of the discussions that have taken place in the philosophy of colour and vision. Trying to explore, independently, new paths for the auditory phenomena is a task that O'Callaghan undertakes, rebelling against the 'tyranny of the visual.' Of course, not all the philosophers in this new field would agree with such assessment and particularly those defending dispositional views (Pasnau, Kulvicki, Roberts), for they appeal to an analogy with colour. 10 Jorge Luis Méndez-Martínez Organon F 2020: 1–34 goal of his paper is rather the criticism towards the "standard view." By using such label, Pasnau refers to both WV and PV-arguably PV1-, whose conflation is rather incoherent because it allows and even endows an 'Error Theory' of perception. John Kulvicki has a more detailed argument to offer. In his view, sounds are "stable properties" of the objects. Concerning the other philosophers' taxonomies and classifications, in O'Callaghan's taxonomy, this would clearly classify as PV. The same can be said of Casati's and Dokic's classification. When Kulvicki states that: "sounds are perceived to have locations, and those locations seem to correspond to the objects that make the sounds" (Kulvicki 2008, 1), he chooses a "distal" view. But, beyond these brandings, his account is also 'dispositional,' as he adds that: "Perhaps sounds are not vibrations per se but dispositions to vibrate in response to certain kinds of stimulation" (Kulvicki 2008, 4). The core of the argument, for Pasnau and Kulvicki, lies on colour analogy. Sounds are usually thought of as "transient" as opposed to colours that are "stable properties" of the objects that possess them (Dokic [2007] thinks precisely this while theorising on the opposition unique-repeatable). The key claim is the following: As objects still have their colours in the dark, they also "have" sounds even in the vacuum or without vibrating, those sounds cannot be heard. Kulvicki (2008, 5) considers that objects have "resonant modes," dependent on their material structure-remember the plastic beer bottles- that cause them to vibrate. Objects are disposed to vibrate when "thwacked." Here Kulvicki is getting closer to the standard conception of dispositions through the lens of conditional analysis. The 'thwack,' a way of imparting energy to the object (Kulvicki 2008, 9), is the stimulus condition; the sound made-seemingly-, its manifestation. But having a sound is not the same as making it. It is easy to think of objects that make sounds that they don't have: a speaker, for instance. Appealing to colour analogy, one might say that a projection in the movie theatre is showing ("making") coloured images, when the colour, indeed, isn't there. Notice how, by switching to colour analogy, we employ different verbs. If Sounds Were Dispositions 11 Organon F 2020: 1–34 This possession of sound, so to speak, represents, for Kulvicki, a stable property that licences the possibility of dispositional talk, although he does not draw beyond on the literature. All this would lead us to identify the expression "had sound" with dispositions, and that of "made sound" with the manifestation, which, formulated as such, is a rather circular argument. However, there are alternatives specifications. A more elaborated and/or explicit depiction on the dispositional account for sounds is that of Roberts's (2017), who relies at large in the property view for colour. Having divided the views between property and non-property, Roberts groups eleven possible views within PV, according to their potential compliance with three features: being dispositional or not dispositional (thus, categorical); being reductive or non-reductive; being relational or non-relational. Something not clearly explicit here is whether not having some of the features mentioned by Roberts means that they necessarily lack them. A first interesting aspect is that, unlike Pasnau and Kulvicki, he does consider a non-dispositional possibility for PV. Here 'non-dispositional' means categorical, for which one of the options is vibrationism (that is, appealing to vibrational structure), which is also a reductive view. As for the dispositional ones, they have revolved around the possibility of wave dispositionalism (that is, the overt disposition to produce an acoustic wave) and vibration dispositionalism (like Kulvicki's thwack). When we consider perceived sound (or sound appearance) things get, as usual, thornier: a conditional analysis like-spirit is still present, for here "sounds are dispositions to auditorily appear in certain ways if certain conditions are met" (Roberts 2017, 346). Here we have an internal sound dispositionalism and an external one. The difference is that the external one does distinguish between sound and apparent sound, thus enabling us to explain differences of change and constancy. However, apparent sounds seem difficult to conceive if not taken as experiences of sounds. Finally, on the possibility of connecting the dispositional and relational features, Roberts notices that they do not have to come necessarily together. This becomes an important issue to discuss the differences between sound, in a phenomenal sense, and the objectual sound.12 12 Talking about 'internal' and 'external' could lead us to hasty associations. For instance, we could say that the former matches, at a certain extent, with PV1, while 12 Jorge Luis Méndez-Martínez Organon F 2020: 1–34 So far, in Roberts' treatment the dispositional account is more complete. He concocts these varieties in a hypothetical fashion, as they are not being argued for currently. Kulvicki would happen to be a vibration dispositionalist, viewed from this lens.13 Another issue to bear in mind is that he depicts sound dispositionalism in the fashion of conditional analysis and, even more, he is aware that this way of dealing with dispositions might face theoretical obsolesce. Yet he does not appeal to alternative views on dispositions. In the following sections, I highlight the so far implicit elements of sound dispositionalism à la façon de Lewis and I also undertake its shaping into a more current discussion. 3. A dispositional view, from conditional analysis to potentiality A word at the broader level of the discussion on dispositions is required. Dispositions, as I have said, are a genre of properties. The other genre is that of categorical properties. The main difference lies in the fact that dispositional properties are instantiated under certain conditions, while the categorical ones are instantiated in all conditions. It is common to think, as well, that the latter are constant, while the formers are not; that the latter are observable, while the others are not (if not being manifested at the the latter with PV2. But that is not exactly the case, because the focus of the features sorted by Roberts is not aimed at bestowing the property either to objects or subjects, but on how they both relate to sound appearance. The same caveat goes for trying to associate this to the externalist/internalist discussion within the philosophy of mind and language. I do not mean that these aspects should remain separated from the features outlined here, it is just that so far the discussion is rather narrow. 13 The whole spectrum proposed by Roberts encompasses the following options: non-relational primitivism, vibrationism, disjunctive vibrationism, disjunctive wave/ vibration dispositionalism, primitive appearance relationism, reductive appearance relationism, vibration relationism, apprearance sound dispositionalism, wave dispositionalism, vibration dispositionalism, as well as an unavailable view which would happen to be dispositional, non-relational. If Sounds Were Dispositions 13 Organon F 2020: 1–34 moment).14 This division, as fundamental as it is, roughly mentioned by Roberts' taxonomy, is usually cast aside in the debate on sounds. This, as seen in the conclusions, could be of major importance for anyone who favours PV's varieties. In the big picture of metaphysics, Humeans and Anti-Humeans wage a battle concerning their understanding in the structure of the world. There are many arenas for this (for instance causality, modality, and observability/non-observability), being the nature of properties one of them. More concretely, the label "Anti-Humean" is employed while alluding to David Lewis's metaphysics, which strongly appeals to Humean supervenience, whose formulation goes as follows: "All there is in the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing over then another" and this has an impact in how laws are conceived: "The laws of the world supervene on the totality of local matters of particular fact" (Lewis 1986b: ix). If there is an accepted understanding on both sides it is that of Humean supervenience as the core of Humeanism and Lewis as its endorser. Typically, Humeans defend categorical properties and Anti-Humeans, dispositional ones. But this is an oversimplification as the matter is, indeed, which of the two are the most fundamental. In this sense, two monist positions are on sight: either every sparse property (namely, natural properties) is categorical or it is dispositional. A middle ground could recognize that there are properties on each side. One can also accept dispositions (or 'disposition talk' á la Ryle), without committing ultimately to this. The opposite view would be dispositionalist realism. This corresponds to a deeper review of our view on metaphysics and the philosophy of sounds and auditory experience could perhaps dispend with 14 We should not understand this in a visualist form. Observables entities are those that we can perceive with any of our senses, in normal conditions; unobservables don't. Yet some unobservables are detectable by using certain instruments (subatomic particles, for instance) and some are not detectable but have rather an explanatory role (Chakravaty 2007, 14–15). There is, of course, a critical aspect in this, as being "non-observable" used to be an anathema for the empiricist Weltanschauung, although being non-observable does not constitute a reason to rule out dispositions anymore. As, for the strictly scientific point of view, there are many entities, like quarks, whose status in this sense is non-observable. 14 Jorge Luis Méndez-Martínez Organon F 2020: 1–34 this. However, the difference could have some relevance while understanding the available dispositionalist projects and some falsifiability criteria. Back to business, both Kulvicki and Roberts have drawn on a profile of the long debate on dispositions that depends on the conditional analysis. However, the standard view on dispositions has been discussed (Armstrong 1996; Martin 1996), criticised (Bird 1998), reviewed (Lewis 1997) and dismissed by some authors (Bird 2007; Vetter 2015). This warrants a concise revisit to the guidelines of the conditional analysis. Let us take a quick view on it. Following no other than Lewis (1997b), the conditional analysis states that: CA: Something x is disposed at time t to give response r to stimulus s iff, if x were to undergo stimulus s at time t, x would give response r. In short, this is usually capsuled by the formula D (S, M), that is, the ordered pair of stimulus and manifestation (or response).15 We can see how it fits the problem of sound. Now, the disposition to sound would be given by the pair formed by a stimulus (eg. Kulvicki's 'thwack') and, on the other hand, a manifestation (either if it is the vibration or the wave, that is, vibration dispositionalism or wave dispositionalism in Roberts's terms). This looks simple and compelling. The conditional analysis picture can be, however, more specific. For instance, it can distinguish between covert dispositional property names or nouns (such as 'fragility', 'solubility', etcetera); covert dispositional predicates in adjective form (such as fragile, soluble); overt (canonical) dispositions descriptions 'the disposition to M when S'; and overt dispositional predicates 'x is disposed to M, when S' (Bird 2007, 18). Given that sound 15 Although this line of argument is immediately associated to Lewis, we had to go back a bit earlier to authors like Carnap and Ryle. Carnap (1936, 448), who introduces essentially the same definition but with a more elaborated formula, is concerned that disposition-terms don't enable semantic reduction-a 'dogma' later criticised by Quine (1961). Ryle (1949, 31), on the other hand, identifies dispositions' ascriptions as those that allude to a particular change when an object is under certain conditions. These semantics are known as the "simple conditional analysis" (Choi and Fara 2016). All this is to say that conditional analysis is not entirely Lewis's doing. His attention was dedicated to its reformation, rather than the simplistic formula. If Sounds Were Dispositions 15 Organon F 2020: 1–34 does not commonly figure as a disposition, it is perhaps artificial to say that we can easily appeal to "sonority" or "sounding,"16 whereas the former is, in the ordinary language, describing a conduction quality of an object (something you could say of a musical instrument or a performer of a musical instrument for example), the latter has been used to describe the manifestation. It seems that sound ought to be overtly formulated as "the disposition the sound" or "x is disposed to sound iff... certain conditions are met." The conditions could be, in a first moment, the object having resonant modes or a vibrational structure and a medium of propagation. A specification that is worth bearing in mind is that pertaining single and multi-track dispositions. A disposition D can have multiple manifestations: a fragile glass can break, but it also can just get cracked and so forth; or, as Ryle's (1949, 107) example goes, the disposition of knowing French can be manifested in being able to speak it, to listen to it, to write in French and the like.17 As it turns out, we have myriads of multi-track dispositions and one could say that thinking of dispositions otherwise would be mistaken.18 Let us portrait this feature for sound. Sounds' stimuli can be very diverse, which is already noticed by Kulvicki (2008, 9). In this sense, to give a dispositional analysis account for sounds while regarding them as dispositions had to be exhaustive. This can make us doubt on whether the definition of the stimuli of "when thwacked" is correct, for if you smash, make explode and so on, you will also have a sounding object. Manifestation can diversify as well. Let us think of a musical instrument like the violin. A violin player knows that she can obtain different 'colours' depending on how she pulls the bow. If she bows near the bridge then we 16 Audibility is also used in the debate, but I will stress the difference below. 17 While Ryle is the first one to brig up this idea, we owe its systematic treatment to Bird (2007, 23), who elaborated on all the combinations of stimuli-manifestation. His work on how such characterisations can, or not, account for fundamental and pure dispositions, leads him to proposes and a typology where we have simple stimulus, conjunctive manifestation; disjunctive stimulus, simple manifestation; simple stimulus, but conjunctive manifestations; conjunctive stimulus, and a simple manifestation. 18 For a comprehensive argument on how and why most if not all dispositions are multi-track, see (Vetter 2013b). 16 Jorge Luis Méndez-Martínez Organon F 2020: 1–34 obtain a very specific and a bit harsh effect, a technique known as sul ponticello; if she bows near the fingerboard, we have a rather sweet effect, known as sul tasto. If she plucks the strings instead of using the bow, we have pizzicato, and so on. Then the manifestations can be diverse and although in these cases it seems that they connect one-to-one with the diversity of stimuli, that is not necessarily the case. We can point to different examples. If you 'thwack' someone on the nose, maybe you would hear a sneeze, maybe not. Musical instruments are useful examples for all this, but they can be misleading in one particular aspect: unlike other objects, they are supposed to sound, sounding is what they are meant to do. When we turn to 'ecological sounds,' that disposition (taking for granted, for the sake of the argument, that they are such) can go along other with other dispositions, let alone multiple manifestations. As I will elaborate in the conclusions this leads to the problem of parasitical dispositions, which might represent a possible objection to sound dispositionalism. This is not where the story ends. As it is known, there are plenty of counterexamples for the conditional analysis. Such is the case of masks- i.e. entities that prevent the manifestation even if there is a disposition D and a stimulus S-and mimics-that is, when we have manifestations and stimulus but without the disposition D. The typical counterexamples for CA in the case of sound can come in two guises depending on how the manifestation is understood: in a vibrational sense or in the phenomenological sense, that is, as the possibility of having, or not, the experience of sound. A clear-cut case of a mask is that preventing the vibration in the medium of the disposition-to-sound when actually having the stimulus. A silencer or a pillow in the case of a firearm is a mask in a vibrational sense. Masks, as seen, may vary in their masking success. The other direction for masks is the phenomenological one. Maybe there is vibration, but there is some physical obstruction in one's ear tragus that prevents you from having the experience-of-sound. Or if this is still too objectual, we could refer to some reactive response within the auditory system. For PV1 this is the mask and not the former; whereas for PV2 the emphasis would be in the former. With mimics it happens in a similar way. The manifestation is produced either in spite of the absence of the disposition in the object to give away If Sounds Were Dispositions 17 Organon F 2020: 1–34 a characteristic sound; or in absence of the subject's disposition to have an experience of sound. This would happen via the intervention of a mimicker, like the famous case of 'The Hater of Styrofoam' (Lewis 1997): a Styrofoam dish would break when struck by intervention of the mimicker (i.e. The Hater of Styrofoam), even though the Styrofoam dish lacks that disposition. We may envision the example of a guitar, which is not supposed to sound like a cello with pizzicato when plucking a string, yet via the intervention of some mimicker, let us call it 'the Cello-pizzicato lover,' it would sound like a cello with pizzicato. Can we apply the difference between making and having sounds like in the case of the speakers? I think so. However, 'orphan manifestations' eventually raise some concerns (see §4). Some other counterexamples, like that of finks, are considerably more difficult to create for the case of sound than the already mentioned, and so far this is enough for contesting the conditional analysis. Conditional analysis, in order to respond to each of these cases, can reconfigure over and over with ceteris paribus clauses and with endless specifications that, in the long run, show that going through dispositions takes a lot to produce the correct statements, if any. This line of response is identified by Manley and Wasserman (2008, 63) as the strategy of 'getting specific.' Parsimony and simplicity are the desiderata that critics of conditional analysis have endorsed. A glass is still fragile even if nobody attempts to break it; an apple is edible even if no one is willing to eat it, and so on. In this fashion, Kulvicki already formulated that an object has a sound even if not sounding (or even if it is in a vacuum), and there is no need of going through a conditional analysis to state the disposition as it is. For some reason, however, sound dispositionalism has not gone beyond standard conditional analyses to other current views. In order to advance this view, I deem necessary to explore other options. One of those options is that of potentialities, which is extensively explored by Barbara Vetter (2015).19 19 There are other works by other authors (Bird 2007; Molnar 2003) and Vetter herself that go in this direction, yet it is the one mentioned which fully develops the project. 18 Jorge Luis Méndez-Martínez Organon F 2020: 1–34 Joining in the attack on conditional analysis seems to represent a first obliged step. Noting, however, that objects still have their dispositions regardless of the manifestation-i.e. a glass remains fragile even if no one breaks it-enables further considerations. The first one concerns us directly. In most cases we use the suffix 'ity' points to dispositions. And it concerns us for we still don't know which is the candidate for sound in such fashion. The second consideration is that some objects having a disposition seems context-sensitive. Since there can be cases of things breaking that are not or could hardly be considered as 'fragile,' as well as people who get angry without being irascible, Vetter appeals, in a first moment, to the notion of 'easy possibility' (Vetter 2015, 72). Yet it is unclear whether this commits us to possible worlds-for instance, that we have to consider worlds where something is likely to break and to distinguish it from those worlds where it is not-and what the relata are (for saying that something is easy is likely to say that it is easier than something else). In this spirit, Vetter switches from dispositions to potentialities: "I propose that we call those properties which form the metaphysical background for dispositions ascriptions potentialities" (Vetter 2015, 84). Let us go back to the case of a rock. Intuitively, we would not say that a rock is fragile. Making that ascription entails the definition of a context, in a world where maybe there is a different force of gravity and things of the sort. The ascription of fragility, a typical disposition, is, as said before, context-sensitive. Yet a rock can break. Both a glass and a rock-one of which you can ascribe fragility but not the other-can break. Therefore, we can appeal to a potentiality, which, if you like, can be expressed with the noun 'breakability' (which is not commonly used, if used at all). The difference with fragility is that fragility refers to a point of the spectrum where an object can break-you can fix the context using modal-talk, or by alluding to 'easy possibility'; whereas breakability covers the whole spectrum from a piece of diamond to a thin glass. What we commonly refer as the disposition is the maximal degree in the spectrum, which attaches the suffix 'ity' enabling linguistic intuitions. Having a high degree of potentialities also explains manifestations. And, likewise, the rough picture indicates that having a sufficient or high degree of potentialities goes against having counteracting potentialities-which halt or prevent manifestations (Vetter 2015, 99). If Sounds Were Dispositions 19 Organon F 2020: 1–34 Concerning modal aspects, a full discussion is beyond the scope of this article, but there is a token of relevance that is worth mentioning. Potentiality, as portrayed by Vetter, is still a sort of modality, but it is localised in the object in contrast with metaphysical possibility, which is non-localised (Vetter 2015, 203). Hence, rather than formulations such as "it is possible that x", we can appeal to "x can M."20 It is clear by now that Vetter offers an account of potentiality that tries to be independent of other explanans that come about when the manifestation of dispositions/potentialities is exerted. Many of the things we come to think of as definitional of potentiality are interacting factors of the exertion of the potentiality (its manifestation or production), and yet not essential. So there is no need to appeal to the whole conditional analysis conceptual package in order to interpret potentialities, as it happens with change and causation. Of course, change and causation may play a role in how the potentiality is exerted, but they are not definitional.21 If anything, we can explain causality via dispositions (Chakravarty 2007; Vetter 2015, 99). The 20 Vetter (2013a) claims that it is possible to express potentiality regardless of possible worlds. The reasons on why linking them was part of a canon is yet not as clear. And that happens as well with causality, Humeanism, conditional analysis and supervenience, which seem to be somehow entangled. This entanglement appears also when discussing modality. Lewis is well known for being, among other things, a modal realist (Lewis 1986a). In his quest for arraying his picture of possible worlds and to look for alternatives to modal operators, he first proposed a counterpart theory (Lewis 1968) and then found that supervenience is a convenient tool ('the right one') for his modelling throughout possible worlds (Lewis 1986a). In contrast, Vetter (2011b) identifies Kit Fine's efforts and hers on the side of 'new actualism,' which happens to be confronted with that of Lewis. Both sides could agree, however, on their search for new tools to reflect on modality (Lewis idem, Vetter 2013a). At a point, she uses modal talk identifying 'possible worlds' as heuristic (Vetter 2015). For her, new actualism and 'anti-Humean' metaphysics are on the same page (Vetter 2011b, 745). I am not entirely sure these associations apply at large concerning Humeanism/modal realism and actualism/anti-Humeanism, since the basic idea of supervenience doesn't need ab initio modalities (either with typical modal operators or with Lewis' counterpart theory). 21 For a detailed account on how and why we should avoid causal construal in dispositional explanations without going through modalities the way Vetter does and by taking into considerations epistemological aspects see Gurova (2017). 20 Jorge Luis Méndez-Martínez Organon F 2020: 1–34 first rebuke of a certain idea of foundational causality is that of rejecting conditional analysis whenever the stimulus is a cause, and the manifestation, an effect (Vetter 2015, 96). This does not mean that potentialities are dissociated from causal schemes. But not even in all cases manifestations have causes attached. Vetter mentions the possibility of spontaneous reactions.22 So it happens with change: a potentiality may remain as it is and, even if that is rare or uninteresting, they do exist. Going back to sound dispositionalism, we can think of sound as a potentiality. Typically, the acoustic spectrum covers human perception thresholds according to wavelength frequencies. Vibrations below of 20 Hz, like those of earthquakes, are considered infrasonic; whereas those above that threshold, like a dog whistle, are known as ultrasounds. It is interesting that the disposition to sound does not consider a maximal degree of frequency, but rather to be located at a specific range within the spectrum. This might lead us to reconsider the idea of associating a typical disposition with the 'maximal degree' in Vetter's account. Since this perspective also frees us from the chains of linguistic intuitions and it is context independent, we could cast aside for a minute the concern of not finding a suitable noun with the suffix 'ity'. We could brand it as acoustic potentiality. So far, I have said very little on how this relates to the perceiving subject or how and why we can consider or rule out other 'ity'-nouns for naming this acoustic potentiality. A last feasible element that can be addressed with the new conceptual device at hand is that of loudness and, presumably, loudability. That would be certainly a gradable potentiality. One could wonder however whether we should substitute acoustic potentiality for this. I think that should not be the case, since loudability refers to an audible quality of sound. This could give place to a known objection as the 'property of properties,' which I will address in the next paragraph. For now, it suffices to say I do not take this as a lethal objection against sound dispositionalism. Potentiality's basic elements have been introduced (i.e. gradability, context-independence, localised modality) and how we can think of sounds with 22 Vetter (2015, 98) mentions that for a dualist philosopher getting angry could be a spontaneous affair, rather than the outcome of a sufficient cause. If Sounds Were Dispositions 21 Organon F 2020: 1–34 them. Now some auxiliary elements may also help us to have a more complete picture. I would add only two: the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic and the idea of joint potentialities. An intrinsic property is contained in the object and it does not depend on any outer conditions. Presumably shape can be such a property; while properties such as being "taller than you" are relational and, therefore, extrinsic since they depend on external objects, conditions, and so on.23 As for joint potentiality, its formulation goes in hand with that of extrinsic and intrinsic potentialities. An orchestra, for instance, shows the plurality of potentialities of each musician for playing a particular instrument. Another example is that of a key, which has the potentiality of opening a door. This is a useful token, because it points to both joint potentialities-the potentiality of a key to open a door, and the potentiality of a door to be opened-and to the difference between intrinsic (the potentiality of opening a particular door) and extrinsic (the potentiality of opening a general type of door, regardless of that type actually existing) (Vetter 2015, 124). In order to implement some of the novel elements mentioned here, we have to go back to one of our initial hindrances: that we do not have an intuitive candidate attaching the suffix 'ity' for depicting sound as a disposition. In an objectual sense we could point out to 'sonority'. Although 'sonority,' in certain contexts, could allude to something else than the "disposition/potentiality to sound," when, for example, we say that: "The sonority of Tchaikovsky Hall is better than Carnegie Hall" Which is the same-imprecise and folk-usage we have for "acoustics." In this case we are actually referring to the disposition connected with reverberation of a space. Now, in spite of already having a more compelling idea of an acoustic potentiality, there is another candidate that comes around, which has, though, a slightly different character. Such is the case of 'audibility,' which is repeatedly used in the literature on the philosophy of sound's literature (for instance in O'Callaghan 2011, 400). 23 Dispositionalists discuss, however, whether extrinsic dispositions are adequate, for the canon used to be that they were all intrinsic (for instance Molnar 2003). Here I will just assume we can include them. For reviewing a comprehensive plea for extrinsic dispositions, see (McKitrick 2003). 22 Jorge Luis Méndez-Martínez Organon F 2020: 1–34 So far, the discussion has remained in a distal sense, that is, it portrays the property as objectual and that has the advantage of bracketing perception, which is a difficult issue in the philosophy of sounds. Albeit difficult, it is nonetheless decisive and that is probably the reason why sound has been traditionally considered a secondary quality. Framing audibility in this sense seems not only pertinent, but the very way to address dispositions and potentialities in the philosophy of sound. Audibility and sonority are extensionally the same, the difference lies in the fact that the former is addressed in a merely objectual sense, but that is a rather narrow picture that does not accurately describes sound's nature as a secondary quality. I can address this topic only now that I have elaborated on the adequate conceptual elements to depict its dynamics. One of the mentioned elements suits perfectly the occasion: joint potentiality (Vetter 2015, 2019b). In this case we have more than one actor in the circuit: the sounding object, the hearer, which is given also in a spectrum of frequency concerning the audibility/inaudibility of a vibration. Audibility jointly acts, thus, with at least other two potentialities: the one bestowed on the hearer, which is close to what audiologists describe as "hearing capacity" when, for example, describing the use of audiograms (Parker and Parker 2004, 76), and the vibrational potentiality of the object. Having a sound is, thus, just a fragment of the whole picture of a jointly dispositional acting scheme. From this new perspective we do not have to think of the medium as a condition in terms of the conditional analysis, but rather as an entity that provides for a joint potentiality. Besides, Vetter's approach offers yet another element to understand dispositions; a remaining problem in the philosophy of sound and auditory experience is that of sound individuation, a problem 'infamously difficult to resolve' (O'Callaghan 2007, 64). From the point of view of potentiality, a disposition is individuated by its manifestation, full stop (Vetter 2014, 752). As we have dispensed from dealing with change, causation and modality, being sound a disposition/potentiality, the problem of its individuation is no longer a great concern. This will prove even more relevant while reviewing the objections raised against PV and sound dispositionalism. Taking stock, even if this picture is, as I believe, more complete than the one offered by the authors who have pursued sound dispositionalism, it still faces challenges that I deem difficult to sort out, as I elaborate below. If Sounds Were Dispositions 23 Organon F 2020: 1–34 4. Objections against the dispositional wiew, known and new Objections to the dispositional view so far have been directed mainly against Pasnau and Kulvicki and, curiously enough, they do not consider the structure of the conditional analysis of dispositions nor do they focus their criticisms on the internal aspects of dispositions themselves. The goal of the critique is usually oriented towards showing that the ontological choice they make is more compelling, so they rather pick it on problematic aspects of the theory. Thus, although there are particular objections, we still lack a robust systematic critique. Casati and Dokic (2014) notice several objections of this nature. The first one is that our ordinary language does not recognize those uses of sounds (Pasnau [1999, 310] also stresses this). However, since the first lines of this paper I show how there is an ordinary and intuitive way of expressing that something "has a sound" and that, as a matter of fact, points out the main issue: their dispositional nature (iff, of course, sounds happen to be dispositions). A common philosophical strategy is to appeal to the intuitive nature of ordinary language. However, the reasons why philosophical concepts should accommodate to ordinary language, and to what extent, are a matter of debate. A reason on why this remains at issue may have to do with the problem of individuation and the assertion according to which "sounds are particulars". O'Callaghan (2011) has also raised some important objections. A coincidence he has with Casati and Dokic is that of pointing to the "many properties problem" (O'Callaghan 2011, 378). If sounds were properties, the audible properties we usually attach to sound (and mostly to musical sound), namely, timbre, pitch, and loudness or intensity would be dependent or second degree. In any case, O'Callaghan anticipates a complex property-like response.24 However, in this scenario and appealing to parsimony, he concludes that EV fares better. In fact, any view that holds that sounds are particulars would fare likewise, so it is not a virtue unique to EV. 24 Theorising about hierarchies while dealing with properties and their inter-array is not uncommon to metaphysics. An interesting view on this dealing directly with dispositions and powers is that of Molnar (2003). 24 Jorge Luis Méndez-Martínez Organon F 2020: 1–34 Another problematic issue is that of change. Typically, in metaphysics properties are not taken to be subject to change, the way individuals are. With O'Callaghan (2011, 379) it is unclear whether he concurs to this, since, after emphasising that sounds are concrete particulars-not object-like, but rather event-like-he claims that although both sounds and objects survive change, they differ in the fact that sounds need of time for unfolding and happening. Moreover, individuation of the formers does depend in the patterns of change in their audible features. Concerning change, Pasnau (1999, 319–20) does not grant that sounds are subject to change. Much of the evidence we have of change in sound, he says, depends on our perception. Something similar happens with the perception of size: we perceive things to be bigger or smaller in relation to our proximity to them, the same happens with our perception and 'measurement' of intensity, for which, in his opinion, "sound itself remains unchanged." Not all supporters of PV think accordingly, Roberts (2017, 341), for instance, gives an example on how a change of colour could be possible pointing out to the intensity of colours in a strange colour world.25 The same, presumably, could be exemplified for sound: the marker for intensity would be loudness. Actually, it is easier to imagine qualitative change in sound than in colour. While playing string instruments, a change in pitch 25 It goes as follows: "Imagine a world in which all objects were (mostly) transparent but when caused to vibrate suddenly became colored and would exemplify one color after another for some time before again becoming transparent. The exact colors objects would exemplify would depend on the type of object and how much it vibrated. For example, dense objects would exemplify different determinable colors on average than less dense objects, and objects would exemplify different determinate colors of the density-determined determinable color dependent on how much they were vibrating. If a very dense object were caused to slightly vibrate it would become light red, then a lighter red, then lighter, then white, and then the white would fade and the object would again be transparent, and if a less dense object were caused to vibrate lightly it would become a light blue, then a lighter blue, then lighter, and then white before fading back to being transparent, and if the object were caused to vibrate more heavily it would become a dark blue, and then a lighter blue, and lighter, then white, and again the whiteness would fade to transparency" (Roberts 2017, 341). If Sounds Were Dispositions 25 Organon F 2020: 1–34 can occur when using the technique known as glissando, or while simply tuning the instrument; a flute can produce in a note a considerable increase in intensity.26 By linking confronted views on how sounds survive, or not, change with compliance to ordinary language, Cohen (2010) notes that both views-that is, survivalist and non-survivalist-can be both acceptable, for which we should not use this as a definitive criterion. The last and main objection is that which actually could undermine any sort of PV: the claim according to which sounds are particulars. This comes in two fashions: the first one is appealing to countability; the second one is by invoking experiencing particulars. The bedrock of these arguments goes like this: particulars have features that arguably properties do not. So, if some of these traits can be encountered while addressing sounds, it is unlikely that they can be taken as properties. Now, there are two considerations here: either it is impossible for properties to have these features, because they are exclusives for particulars; or it is only that they are present in particulars, but not necessarily in an exclusive sense. Countability is also connected with this particular-like sort of objection: you can count particulars, and you can count sounds, therefore, sounds are particulars. Arguably, you cannot do the same with properties and, therefore, sounds are not properties. Here is a disanalogy with colour: you cannot count 'colours,' which is taken to be a property; but you can count sounds. Therefore, sounds are not like colours and they are not properties. Taking nonetheless the challenge, one could say that what is countable in that sense is the manifestation, which shows the way in which any disposition is individuated (Vetter 2015, 35, 108). On the other hand, sound could even be used as a mass-term as well (Cohen 2010; Méndez-Martínez 2019). Finally, in Roberts' 'strange colour world' the manifestation of a colour can be also the number of times you switch the light on and off. This gives an answer to the question raised by Casati and Dokic: "What are the particulars that you hear when you hear something?" So, the property theorist could simply answer: property manifestations. 26 Changes in timbre seem more difficult to use as an example, but theoretically we should not rule them out. 26 Jorge Luis Méndez-Martínez Organon F 2020: 1–34 So far so good, these known objections and the responses to them are all very well, even if some rely on desiderata (parsimony, concordance with ordinary language) whose relevance could be queried. A general and systematic objection that could counter PV and sound dispositionalism at large is still pendant. I would like to posit here what, in my view, should be its main guidelines. Despite philosophy's different standards and historical development patterns to those of science, a criterion that comes in handy while examining an argument is that of falsifiability. In a Popperian spirit we could ask how sound dispositionalism could be proved false. There are several goals that can be assessed and, thus, falsified. The broader one is that which states "sounds are properties" (T1). A way to falsify this out is to deny that claim: AT1: Sounds are not properties EV, WV and claiming that sounds are particulars seem to entail AT1. However, just stating that they are particulars does not constitute an argument in and of itself, it requires burden of proof. That is a difficulty we encounter with O'Callaghan's (2011) arguments against PV, for he heavily relies on the characterisation of sounds as particulars (not object-like, but eventlike), implying that those features could not belong to properties. However, as shown above, those features can be predicated of disposition's manifestations, as already said. Continuing with the-hypothetical-global systematic objection, if sounds were properties, then we would have to decide between PV1 and PV2. Asserting one discredits, seemingly, the other, and, thus, within PV, PV1 could be the antithesis of PV2 and vice versa. It is important to notice that this would be so only if we have overcome the challenge posit by AT1. So far, I have argued that, if they are properties, they are objectual properties, which, naturally, are enabled by our perceptive capacities. If the argument develops through the path of objectual properties (namely PV2), then there are also contesting views. A fundamental one is, as mentioned earlier, that of choosing between categorical and dispositional. In this sense, either one: – Chooses categoralist monism in order to advance this view or to discredit dispositions If Sounds Were Dispositions 27 Organon F 2020: 1–34 – Chooses dispositionalist monism in order to advance this view or to discredit categorical properties – Chooses a mild pluralist or dualist position that admits both; yet focus on one of the two. Naturally, if one were to choose a monist position it would have to be followed to its last consequences, which could undermine or even compromise the project. Categoricalism usually tries to undermine not only dispositionalist monism, but dispositions themselves and, thus, to challenge dispositional realism (that is, the stance for which dispositions do exist). Turning a blind eye to monism, a pluralist pax metaphysica, could engage with their preferred type of property without troubling dispositionalist talk or categoricalist talk, depending on one's focus. I believe that in the philosophy of sound and auditory experience we face such a situation and, hence the goal is far from asserting a dispositional view in detriment of a categoricalist one. And that is fine. While there is nothing intrinsically wrong with this, it would be better to keep in mind the falsifiability routes for dispositionalism. Finally, and narrowing the scale to those views that are not only PV, but dispositionalist themselves, the local theory choice seems to boil down to two options: conditional analysis or potentiality. Here the choice is not so simple, as conditional analysis is committed to more than it states in the analysis itself within the Humean project. However, there may be theoretical scenarios where both ways of framing dispositions are admissible. For instance, one could accept potentiality, and say that only dispositions (that is the maximal degree of a potentiality) can be framed with some reformed conditional analysis, but not the whole spectrum. To my knowledge, there are no claims in this direction, but maybe there is room for pluralism of this kind. The advanced picture I offer here is not bulletproof and we could conceive extra hindrances to its theoretical development. Let us consider new objections. Even though Kulvicki underestimates the case of sounds made and not had as a rara avis, there are more cases of 'orphan sounds.' Consider the case of a thunder. EV has no problem in cataloguing these both as sounding sources and as events-and not even Kulvicki denies that 28 Jorge Luis Méndez-Martínez Organon F 2020: 1–34 hearing informs us of the surrounding events. Many specifications are needed to frame clouds as objects. On the other hand, objectless or individualess properties seem to make no sense (Armstrong 1993, 433); although Galen Strawson (2011, 304) thinks differently. Now, it may be the case that thunders and all what is involved in the natural phenomenon of the water cycle is still a particular yet not an object-like one, but event-like, as O'Callaghan says. Granted. Still we could wonder what happens with manifestations, like orphan sounds, that are neither relatable to objects nor to dispositions. Therefore, orphan sounds just make a larger problem evident: that of lonely manifestations and mere happenings. This leads us to the point where we can find most of the objections to dispositionalist theories, including those of sound dispositionalism: the way they relate to stimulus and manifestations and, thus, to its multitrack nature. Although conditional analysis has generally been abandoned in the discussion on dispositions and potentialities, the other aspects in the circuit that are linked to dispositions can still raise concerns. Here I would like to propose the idea of 'parasitical dispositions.' Something already considered in the formulation of multi-track dispositions is the possibility for a disposition to have multiple manifestations, and multiple stimuli as well. That is not new. In this sense, we can use the typical case of a glass' fragility. When breaking, however, the glass also sounds. There is a characteristic sound of a breaking glass that is familiar to most of us. However, either both dispositions go in tandem, or one is dependent on the other. This is what I have in mind with parasitic dispositions: the possibility that the disposition to sound could be the disposition of something else. The notion of parasitical disposition is in need of a larger framework not only within philosophy of sounds, but also in the overall literature on powers and dispositions. Being a parasite is being a parasite of something. Thus, the idea implies a hierarchy that can be fixed bearing in mind an ecological array of how organisms perceive stimulus: sounds are relevant for animals that are either hunter or pray because they indicate something else than sounds per se. EV would refer right away to the causal relationship between sounds and its sources, but it is clear that from this side we have to look for an alternative. The combination of joint potentialities and Gibsonian If Sounds Were Dispositions 29 Organon F 2020: 1–34 affordances (Vetter 2018),27 for instance, may enable this approach. A parasitical disposition is one that has not affordances and yet it is instantiated with dispositions-potentialities that do have them. It is important to see that a parasitical disposition would not be a counteracting potentiality, which in the criticism of conditional analysis is presented as a 'mask.' We must conceive unperceived properties that do nothing. The fact that sounds don't happen to be in this category is an evolutionary making. There could be possible worlds, however, where sounds would not play such a role.28 Finally, an extra objection that follows the line of argument of 'things particulars have but properties don't' is that of parthood. Let's call this the mereological29 objection. Although we certainly would not say that: "Here is a sound. There you have half of that sound." You can appeal to lengths and durations in the following sense: "This sound lasted half the length of the previous sound." Perhaps, this is something a sound engineer or a composer could say. Clearly, sound is not the sort of discrete entity you can halve, like an apple or a table, and there are two non-equivalent solutions to this: either you say that this is something that happens with events in general, which are particulars in the end-as O'Callaghan would probably argue; or as the property theorists (dispositionalist included) would do, one could talk about the theoretical mereology of properties' manifestations (as in Robert's strange world of colour). The topic, however, remains unexplored. Up to this point, it is evident that the discussion on dispositions can contribute to the metaphysics and ontology of sound. It is in the best 27 In Gibson's ecological psychology, an affordance is a habitat feature that enables an organism to do something: "a surface that is knee-high and sufficiently steady affords sitting on." Barbara Vetter (2018) has worked on bringing together the philosophy of potentiality and this approach. 28 This resembles a Lewinsian idea: that of idlers, namely, properties that just manifest and 'do nothing' (Lewis 2008, 75). Perhaps our world is full of these things and it is just a matter of evolutionary serendipity that sounds happen to be relevant for so many species. 29 Unlike O'Callaghan (2011), I do refer here to mereology in its classical sense: as the study of the relationship between parts and wholes. 30 Jorge Luis Méndez-Martínez Organon F 2020: 1–34 interest of property theories to explore this possibility and face its consequences for, as I have shown, it has attractive theoretical features, albeit problematic. Not only it is worth reviewing for the property theorist but also for those accounting for EV or even WV. This is where my last advice goes. Although here I provide elements that can advance sound dispositionalism, there is maybe a good reason not to take this route in a reductionist way. By 'reductionist' I mean the ontological reduction of sound to the class of potentialities (and dispositions). This explanatory misplacement is a product of the aim of terminological reduction that looms in the views in SO. And this criticism is analogous to one of the main objections towards WV. For sure, acoustic waves have to do with the auditory phenomena but being part of the explanatory scheme does not imply the claim "sounds are waves." There is a sense in which much of the discussion can be arranged by means of specifying our usages of 'sound' in our explanatory schemes. Maybe there is room for everyone. Yet a difference here is that whereas acoustic waves' importance is undeniable in order to have the picture of sound, dispositions or potentialities require more justification. Avoiding a reduction of this kind would allow the necessary distance from the problem noticed by Casati and Dokic (2014) concerning the collapsing or conflation of views, which are supposedly antagonistic.30 In conclusion, dispositions or potentialities are potentially useful tools for the philosophical investigation of the realm of the auditory phenomena and they may be used in the discussion, but it is perhaps unwise to reduce and circumscribe the ontology of sound to the class of dispositional properties as it might be to do so with other classes (waves or events for instance). 30 In particular, Casati and Dokic are aiming a critique towards the Relational Event Theory, which intends appealing to both the surrounding medium and the source, that is, articulating distal and medial theories. However, for these authors this view (which is O'Callaghan's arguably) "collapses unto" a medial theory when considering puzzling cases where an informational barrier prevents us to access a sounding object. In such circumstances, this theory, they say, ends up being plainly medial. If Sounds Were Dispositions 31 Organon F 2020: 1–34 Acknowledgements I am grateful to Barbara Vetter, Brian McLoone, Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, Elena Grigorevna Dragalina-Chernaya and an anonymous reader for their generous comments to previous versions of this work. I would also like to thank the colleagues from the Nauchny Issledovatelsky Seminar and the meetings of the group of Formal Philosophy at the Higher School of Economics, Moscow, as well as the Kolloquium zur theoretischen Philosophie at the Institut für Philosophie of the Freie Universität Berlin for their comments and insights. Finally, I also want to thank Lucia Cirianni Salazar for her comments and support. 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Human Reproduction Vol.22, No.2 pp. 605–609, 2007 doi:10.1093/humrep/del409 Advance Access publication October 24, 2006. © The Author 2006. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology. All rights reserved. 605 For Permissions, please email: [email protected] Gender preferences and demand for preconception sex selection: a survey among pregnant women in Pakistan F.Zubair1, E.Dahl2, S.Sher Shah3, M.Ahmed4 and B.Brosig5,6 1Clinic for Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Marburg-Süd, 2Centre for Gynaecology and Obstetrics, University of Giessen, Giessen, Germany, 3Departments of Gynecology and Obstetrics, Civil Hospital, Karachi, Pakistan, 4Department of Clinical Genetics, St. James's University Hospital of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom and 5Clinic for Psychosomatic Medicine and Psychotherapy, University of Giessen, Giessen, Germany 6To whom correspondence should be addressed at: Clinic for Psychosomatic Medicine and Psychotherapy, University of Giessen, Ludwigstr. 76, 35392 Giessen, Germany. E-mail: [email protected] BACKGROUND: In its recent report 'Human Reproductive Technologies and the Law', the House of Commons' Select Committee on Science and Technology called for greater efforts to establish the potential demographic impact of sex selection across all sectors of UK society. Given the well-known preference for boys over girls among some communities, there is concern that a readily available service for social sex selection may upset the balance of the sexes. Of particular interest are the gender preferences and the demand for sex selection among Pakistanis. METHODS: We conducted a social survey on gender preferences and potential demand for preconception sex selection among 301 pregnant women in Karachi, Pakistan, using a self-report questionnaire consisting of 14 questions. RESULTS: About 41.5% wish to have a family with an equal number of boys and girls; 3.3% would like to have only boys, 1.0% only girls, 27.6% more boys than girls and 4.3% more girls than boys, and 22.3% stated that they do not care about the sex composition of their family. Whereas 6.3% could imagine employing cytometric sperm separation for social sex selection, 76.1% could not and 17.6% were undecided. About 27.2% felt that social sex selection ought to be legal, 48.8% thought it ought to be illegal and 23.9% were undecided. CONCLUSIONS: Although Pakistani women do show a statistically significant preference for boys over girls, the number of women willing to subject themselves to cytometric sperm separation appears to be too small to cause a severe imbalance of the sexes. However, further research among British citizens of Pakistani origin is needed to establish whether sex selection poses a serious threat to the sex ratio of UK communities. Key words: preconception sex selection/sex ratio/social survey/public policy Introduction The British Department of Health is currently reviewing the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. One of the issues to be addressed is whether PGD and cytometric sperm separation should be made available for the purpose of social sex selection. Although the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) advised to ban sex selection for any but the most serious of medical reasons, the House of Commons' Select Committee on Science and Technology concluded that there is no adequate justification for prohibiting the use of sex selection for family balancing (HFEA, 2003; House of Commons, 2005). In its report 'Human Reproductive Technologies and the Law', the Select Committee on Science and Technology urged the Department of Health to encourage further research into the moral, legal and social implications of sex selection for nonmedical reasons: 'The issue requires greater analysis than has been afforded by the HFEA and we urge greater efforts to establish the demographic impacts across all sectors of society' (House of Commons, 2005: 64). Although there is no evidence that allowing Britons to choose the sex of their children would result in a socially disruptive distortion of the natural sex ratio, there is concern that some communities within the UK, most notably British citizens of Indian and Pakistani origins, may have a decided preference for boys over girls. Permitting them to use sex selection could upset the balance of the sexes within these subpopulations and reinforce sexist attitudes. Thus, the report concluded that 'Further research is required to establish these impacts' (House of Commons, 2005: 62). The Select Committee on Science and Technology did not specify the nature of research to be conducted. However, it is quite obvious that research into the possible demographic implications of sex selection requires two quite different approaches. First, social scientists should survey gender preferences and attitudes towards sex selection of Indian and Pakistani populations. Ideally, these social surveys should be conducted F.Zubair et al. 606 among those who are living in their home country, those who have moved to Great Britain and those who have been born and raised in the UK. Second, demographic scientists should analyse actual reproductive behaviour by examining when couples stop having more children. By comparing the reproductive behaviour of couples with two boys, two girls and one boy and one girl, they can gain data on the most desired sex composition of their family and, consequently, either verify or falsify the gender preferences that have been stated. Again, if possible, research should focus on three different populations: on those who are living in their home country, those who have moved to Great Britain and those who have been born and raised in the UK. To contribute to the suggested research, we conducted a social survey on gender preferences and possible demand for sex selection among pregnant women in Pakistan. Providing data on a Pakistani population is important for three reasons. First, Pakistan accounts for ∼8% of the 100 million women who are 'missing' worldwide (Klasen and Wink, 2003; Allahbadia, 2002). The phrase 'missing women' has been coined by economist Amartya Sen to refer to the number of females whose lives have been cut short because of sex bias in relative care (Sen, 1992, 2003). Second, Pakistan's unusually high birth sex ratio of 108 points to a widespread use of ultrasound scans for the sole purpose of sex selective abortions (Miller, 2001). These selective abortions may have substantially contributed to the deficit of 6 million women that has been reported for Pakistan (Hudson and Den Boer, 2002, 2004a,b). Third, as already indicated, the Pakistani population constitutes the third largest ethnicity in the UK. Given that immigrants are very likely to uphold the cultural values of their native country, a decided preference for boys over girls could have a marked demographic impact on some communities within the UK. To our knowledge, this is the first study in the medical literature that examines the gender preferences and demand for sex selection among a population of Pakistan. For a Pakistani community to upset the balance of the sexes, at least two conditions must be met: first, there must be a marked preference for children of a particular sex, and, second, there must be a considerable demand for a reproductive service for preconception sex selection. Both conditions need to be met simultaneously. For example, if there was a marked preference for children of a particular sex, but Pakistani couples were unwilling to use sex selection technology (because it was thought to be too intrusive, too expensive, outright immoral or simply against their religion), then a readily available service for sex selection would not have any demographic effect whatsoever. Likewise, if there was considerable interest in employing sex selection technology, but couples did not have a marked preference for children of a particular sex (because they wish to have an equal number of boys and girls), then, again, a readily available service for preconception sex selection would not alter the sex ratio in any way. Moreover, for preconception sex selection to distort the natural sex ratio, couples need to control their sexual activity and to engage in a reliable form of family planning. If most of their pregnancies were unplanned, the demographic effects would be considerably reduced. Thus, our questionnaire focused on gender preferences, willingness to employ reproductive technology, moral attitudes towards sex selection and the degree of family planning. Methods and results Our survey in Karachi, Pakistan, was conducted between 1 and 20 December 2004. Of 370 pregnant women who were approached, 301 completed the questionnaire. To account for differences in education and income, we chose five medical centres serving patients from different ethnic backgrounds and socioeconomic status. The medical centres in question were the Sindh Government Qatar Hospital, the Sher Shah Health Centre, the Sobhraj Maternity Hospital, the Civil Hospital and the 7th Day Adventist Hospital. The Sindh Government Qatar Hospital in Karachi is an institution for lower class patients from different parts of Pakistan. The Sher Shah Health Centre, which is run by the government, is also visited by the underprivileged class, mainly from people of the northern area of Pakistan who have moved to Karachi in search of employment. The Sobhraj Maternity Hospital is one of the oldest medical institutions in Karachi and, again, is visited by a multi-ethnic, underprivileged population from different parts of Pakistan. The same applies to the Civil Hospital, one of the oldest training hospitals in Karachi. By contrast, the 7th Day Adventist Hospital is a private institution that is almost exclusively visited by patients from the upper and the middle classes with a higher education. Information on recruitment of the sample is given in Table I. Each woman received a self-report questionnaire consisting of 14 questions. Women who could not read the questionnaire by themselves were assisted by nurses. For statistical analysis, Software-System SPSS 11.0 was used. The first part of the survey collected information about the women's age, education and marital status (Table II). As the table summarizes, most of the pregnant women, generally married, were still young, between 18 and 25 years of age. A majority had only primary school or no formal education at all. Most women (170, 56.5%) did not have a planned pregnancy, whereas 131 (43.5%) women reported that their pregnancy was planned. Only 41 (13.6%) women already knew the sex of their fetus and 260 (86.4%) were unaware of the sex of the baby. Of these 260 women, 127 (48.8%) wanted to know the sex of their unborn. Of the 260 women, 102 (39.2%) were hoping for a baby boy and 36 (13.8) were hoping for a baby girl. The remaining 122 (47.0%) women, who already had given birth to a boy, reported that they had no preference for any particular sex. In contrast to these results, only 22 (25.9%) of 85 women having no experience as a mother wished for their first child being a boy, 17 women wished for a girl and all others (46) would leave this to their fate. A preference in having equal numbers of male and female children was also present: 125 women wanted an equal number of both genders. About 83 women wanted more boys than girls, and 13 women wished to have more girls than boys. It was interesting to see that 10 women wanted to have only male children and 3 to have only female (Tables III and IV, χ2 = 18.379, df = 8, P = 0.019, crosstable "gender preferences × medical centres"). Table I. Recruitment of sample from five health care centres in Karachi, Pakistan Health care institution Number of patients (%) Sher Shah Health Centre 46 (15.3) Qatar Hospital 68 (22.6) Sobhraj Maternity Hospital 62 (20.6) Civil Hospital 67 (22.2) 7th Day Adventist Hospital 58 (19.3) Total 301 (100.0) Interest in preconception sex selection in Pakistan 607 After being informed about the procedure and costs of sex selection (Table V), only a small group of 19 (6.3%) women reported that they could imagine using sex selection through sperm sorting, 229 (76.1%) could not and the remaining 53 (17.6%) were undecided. If sex selection was covered by their health insurance, 55 (18.3%) women said that they would be willing to use it, 174 (57.8%) were unwilling to use it and 72 (23.9%) were undecided. If it was possible to select the sex of their children through medication, 65 (21.6%) would do so, 163 (54.1%) would not and 73 (24.3%) were undecided. Asked whether social sex selection should be legal or illegal, 82 (27.2%) said it ought to be legal, 147 (48.8%) said it ought to be illegal and 72 (23.9%) were undecided. Discussion Our survey confirms that Pakistanis do indeed have a statistically significant preference for boys over girls. Although most pregnant women desired to have a family with an equal number of boys and girls, 27.6% preferred to have more boys than girls, whereas only 4.3% desired to have more girls than boys. Similarly, whereas 3.3% desired to have only boys, just 1.0% preferred to have only girls. The Pakistani gender bias becomes even more obvious when comparing pregnant Pakistani women with pregnant British women. In a 1993 survey conducted by the Centre for Family Research of the University Cambridge, 2359 British pregnant women have been asked 'Do you mind what sex your baby is?' Response options were 'prefer a boy', 'quite like a boy', 'quite like a girl', 'prefer a girl' and 'no preference'. About 6% preferred a boy, 6% preferred a girl, 12% quite liked a boy, 19% quite liked a girl and 58% said they had no preference for a child of a particular sex (Statham et al., 1993). Table II. Information on age, education and material status of the participants Characteristic Number of patients (%) Age (years) <18 6 (2.0) 18–25 125 (41.5) 26–30 98 (32.6) 31–35 58 (19.3) 36–40 11 (3.7) >40 3 (1.0) Total 301 (100.0) Education No schooling 99 (32.9) Primary school 64 (21.3) Secondary school 81 (26.9) High School 29 (9.6) University 28 (9.3) Total 301 (100.0) Marital status Single 6 (2.0) Married or stable partnership 295 (98.0) Total 301 (100.0) Table III. Planning the pregnancy, knowledge of fetal sex and interest in sex determination of the participants Characteristic Number of patients (%) Pregnancy Planned 131 (43.5) Unplanned 170 (56.5) Total 301 (100.0) Knowledge of fetal sex Yes 41 (13.6) No 260 (86.4) Total 301 (100.0) Interest in sex determination Yes 127 (48.8) No 133 (51.2) Total 260 (100.0) Table IV. Gender preference and ideal number of children Characteristic Number of patients (%) Gender preference for fetus Boy 102 (39.2) Girl 36 (13.8) No preference 122 (47.0) Total 260 (100.0) Preference for first-born child Boy 22 (25.9) Girl 17 (20.0) No preference 46 (54.1) Total 85 (100.0) Gender preferences Only boys 10 (3.3) Only girls 3 (1.0) More boys than girls 83 (27.6) More girls than boys 13 (4.3) An equal number of boys and girls 125 (41.5) Do not care 67 (22.3) Total 301 (100.0) Ideal number of children 1 0 (0.0) 2 78 (25.9) 3 32 (10.6) 4 151 (50.2) 5 16 (5.3) 6 22 (7.3) 7 1 (0.3) 8 1 (0.3) Total 301 (100.0) Table V. Demand for sex selection among pregnant women in Pakistan Characteristic Number of patients (%) Interest in sex selection (if paid by couple) Yes 19 (6.3) No 229 (76.1) Undecided 53 (17.6) Total 301 (100.0) Interest in sex selection (if paid by health insurance) Yes 55 (18.3) No 174 (57.8) Undecided 72 (23.9) Total 301 (100.0) Interest in sex selection (if feasible through medication) Yes 65 (21.6) No 163 (54.1) Undecided 73 (24.3) Total 301 (100.0) Moral attitude towards sex selection Legal 82 (27.2) Illegal 147 (48.8) Undecided 72 (23.9) Total 301 (100.0) F.Zubair et al. 608 Likewise, a representative UK survey on sex selection conducted in 2003 indicated similar differences in gender preferences between Pakistani and British respondents. Among the 1001 UK citizens surveyed, 899 were white and 13 were of Pakistani origin. Although the number of Pakistanis in the sample was clearly too small to be considered representative, the differences are worth mentioning. Among the white UK citizens, 69% wished to have a family with an equal number of boys and girls, 3% preferred only boys, 2% only girls, 6% more boys than girls and 4% more girls than boys, and 15% stated that they did not care about the sex of their children. Among the UK citizens of Pakistani origin, 78% wished to have a family with an equal number of boys and girls, 10% preferred only boys and 12% preferred more boys than girls. In other words, none of the Pakistani respondents desired to have more girls than boys, leave alone, only girls (Dahl et al., 2003b). The statistically significant preference for boys over girls among our sample of pregnant women in Pakistan may reflect the economic burden daughters impose on their parents. As in India, Pakistani parents are expected to pay a considerable dowry to marry off their daughter. In rural areas, the dowry consists of land, farm animals, jewellery and household goods. In urban areas, the dowry can consist of a new apartment, electronic goods, cars and money (Terzieff, 2004). According to a recent newspaper article 'a bridal dress can cost half a million rupees ($8,380) and the whole event sometimes runs to 20 million rupees ($335,200). [...] In some wedding functions, the dowry items are displayed and announced by the bride's family elders. [...] Companies offer special deals to purchase dowry goods, including washing machines, TV sets, gold sets-all on "easy installments" ' (Tohid, 2004). Obviously, having several girls, but no boys, can amount to a financial disaster for a Pakistani family. Although there is a statistically significant preference for boys over girls among Pakistani women, fears about a distortion of the natural sex ratio seem to be unjustified. Given that only a small minority of 6.3% appear to be interested in social sex selection, permitting Pakistani couples to choose the sex of their children would not have any adverse demographic effects. The representative UK survey mentioned above lends further support to the conclusion that Pakistanis are rather unwilling to use social sex selection. Although 21% of white UK citizens expressed interest in sperm sorting, 0% of Pakistani citizens expressed interest in this technology (Dahl et al., 2003b). As already indicated, for preconception sex selection to distort the natural sex ratio, couples need to control their sexual activity and engage in a reliable form of family planning. Given that 56.5% of Pakistani women stated that their pregnancy had not been planned, the potential demographic impact of social sex selection through sperm sorting is considerably reduced. In other words, even if 6% of Pakistanis were determined to take advantage of sex selection, only ∼3% would actually be able to do so because half of the women will continue to conceive an unplanned baby-thus leaving the sex of the child up to chance. There are several important limitations to our study. First, given that our sample included only 301 women, it may not be representative of the Pakistani population at large, even though our subjects were recruited at five quite different health care centres attending to women with quite different social backgrounds. Second, although UK citizens of Pakistani origin may share most of the values of Pakistanis living in their home country, we cannot infer that they are sharing the same gender preferences and the same attitude towards social sex selection. For example, the birth of a daughter may not be an economic burden for Pakistani couples in the UK. Third, our study surveyed only women and does not tell us anything about the men's gender preferences and their willingness to employ social sex selection. According to British, Australian and American fertility clinics offering a reproductive service for sex selection, it is usually the woman who initiates treatment and has the final word on the sex of the child (Khatamee et al., 1989; O'Reilly and Jones, 1999; Dow, 2002). However, among UK couples of Pakistani origin, it may very well be the husband who is more likely to encourage treatment and to decide about the sex of the child. Thus, further research should enquire not only about gender preferences, dowry payments and demand for sex selection but also about reproductive decision-making among UK couples of Pakistani origin. Fourth, our study used a questionnaire to obtain participants' views. This method is attractive because it is cost effective and less time consuming than other approaches. However, there could be limitations with such a method. Participants may not respond honestly. Particularly, in this study, women might have provided socially desirable answers, so they were not seen as going against the will of Allah. Therefore, it is important that future research uses both quantitative and qualitative research methods for studies on social sex selection. Nevertheless, despite some limitations, this study has addressed the vital research question and suggested some useful recommendations, which need to be taken into account in any future research that may be conducted with Pakistani populations in the UK. Our survey shows that Pakistani women do show a preference for boys over girls, but the number of women willing to undergo sperm separation appears to be too small to cause a severe imbalance of the sexes. References Allahbadia GN (2002) The 50 million missing women. J Assist Reprod Genet 19,411–416. Dahl E, Hinsch K-D, Beutel M and Brosig B (2003b) Preconception sex selection for non-medical reasons: a representative survey from the United Kingdom. Hum Reprod 18,2238–2349. Dow S (2002) Could you make it a girl, thanks. The Age, 18 December 2002 (http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/12/17/1039656389756.html). House of Commons (2005) Human Reproductive Technologies and the Law. The Stationary Office, London. Hudson VM and Den Boer AM (2002) A surplus of men, a deficit of peace: security and sex ratios in Asia's largest states. Int Secur 26,5–38. Hudson VM and Den Boer AM (2004a) The security threat of Asia's sex ratios. SAIS Rev 24,27–43. Hudson VM and Den Boer AM (2004b) Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia's Surplus Male Population. MIT Press, Cambridge. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) (2003) Sex Selection: Options for Regulation. HFEA, London. Khatamee MA, Leinberger-Sica A, Matos P and Wesley AC (1989) Sex preselection in New York City: who chooses which sex and why? Int J Fertil 34,353–354. Klasen S and Wink C (2003) Missing women: revisiting the debate. Fem Econ 9,263–300. Miller BD (2001) Female selective abortion in Asia: patterns, policies, and debates. Am Anthropol 103,1083–1095. O'Reilly J and Jones L (1999) Girl power. The Times, 25 July 1999 (http:// www.fact.on.ca/newpaper/ti99072a.htm). Interest in preconception sex selection in Pakistan 609 Sen A (1992) Missing women. BMJ 304,586–587. Sen A (2003) Missing women – revisited. BMJ 327,1297–1298. Statham H, Green J, Snowdon C and France-Dawson M (1993) Choice of baby's sex. Lancet 341,564–565. Terzieff J (2004) Dowry practice challenged in Pakistan's northwest. Women's E-News, 28 March 2004 (http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/ aid/1765/context/cover/). Tohid O (2004) Pakistan's novel attack on poverty: ban wedding feasts. Christian Science Monitor, 22 December 2004 (http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/ 1222/p01s03-wosc.html). Submitted on August 3, 2005; resubmitted on February 10, 2006, July 25, 2006; accepted on August 11,

Gli ominoidi o gli androidi distruggeranno la Terra? Una recensione di Come Creare una Mente (How to Create a Mind) di Ray Kurzweil (2012) (recensione rivista nel 2019) Michael Starks Astratto Alcuni anni fa, ho raggiunto il punto in cui di solito posso dire dal titolo di un libro, o almeno dai titoli dei capitoli, quali tipi di errori filosofici saranno fatti e con quale frequenza. Nel caso di opere nominalmente scientifiche queste possono essere in gran parte limitate a determinati capitoli che sono filosofici o cercanodi trarre conclusioni generali sul significato o sul significato a lungoterminedell'opera. Normalmente però le questioni scientifiche di fatto sono generosamente intrecciate con incomprodellami filosofici su ciò che questi fatti significano. Le chiare distinzioni che Wittgenstein ha descritto circa 80 anni fa tra le questioni scientifiche e le loro descrizioni da parte di vari giochi linguistici sono raramente prese in considerazione, e quindi si è alternativamente stupiti dalla scienza e costerghi per la sua analisi incoerente. Così è con questo volume. Se si vuole creare una mente più o meno come la nostra, è necessario avere una struttura logica per la razionalità e la comprensione dei due sistemi di pensiero (teoria del doppio processo). Se si vuole filosofare su questo, bisogna capire la distinzione tra le questioni scientifiche di fatto e la questione filosofica di come funziona il linguaggio nel contesto in questione, e di come evitare le insidie del riduzionismo e dello scientismo, ma Kurzweil, come la maggior parte degli studenti di comportamento, è in gran parte all'oscuro. Egli è incantato da modelli, teorie e concetti, e dalla voglia di spiegare, mentre Wittgenstein ci ha mostrato che dobbiamo solo descrivere, e che le teorie, i concetti, ecc., sono solo modi di usare il linguaggio (giochi linguistici) che hanno valore solo nella misura in cui hanno un test chiaro (clear truthmakers, o come John Searle (il critico più famoso di AI) ama dire, chiare condizioni di soddisfazione (COS)). Ho cercato di dare un inizio su questo nei miei scritti recenti. Coloro che desiderano un quadro aggiornato completo per il comportamento umano dalla moderna vista a due systems possono consultare il mio libro 'La struttura logica della filosofia, psicologia, mente e il linguaggio in Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Coloro che sono interessati a più dei miei scritti possono vedere 'Talking Monkeys--Filosofia, Psicologia, Scienza, Religione e Politica su un Pianeta Condannato--Articoli e Recensioni 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) e Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019) Inoltre, come di consueto nei resoconti "feffettivi" dell'IA/robotica, non dà tempo alle minacce molto reali alla nostra privacy, sicurezza e persino sopravvivenza dalla crescente "androidizzazione" della società che è prominente in altri autori (Bostrum,Hawking, ecc.) e frequente in scifi e film, quindi faccio qualche commento sulle illusioni piuttosto probabilmente suicide di androidi 'belli', umanoidi, intelligenza artificiale (AI), democrazia, diversità e ingegneria genetica. Dare per scontato che si verificheranno progressi tecnici nell'elettronica, nella robotica e nell'IA, con conseguenti profondi cambiamenti nella società. Tuttavia, ritengo che i cambiamenti che derivano dall'ingegneria genetica siano almeno altrettanto grandi e potenzialmente molto più grandi, in quanto ci consentiranno di cambiare completamente chi siamo. E sarà possibile fare servitori superintelligenti/super forti modificando i nostri geni o quelli di altre scimmie. Come con altre tecnologie, qualsiasi paese che resiste sarà lasciato indietro. Ma sarà socialmente ed economicamente fattibile implementare biobot o superumani su vasta scala? E anche se così, non sembra probabile,economicamente o socialmente,, prevenire la distruzione della civiltà industriale da parte della sovrappopolazione, dell'esaurimento delle risorse, del cambiamento climatico e probabilmente anche della regola tirannica dei Sette Sociopatici che governano la Cina. Quindi, ignorando gli errori filosofici in questo volume come irrilevanti, e dirigendo la nostra attenzione solo alla scienza, quello che abbiamo qui è un'altra illusione utopica suicida radicata nella mancata comprensione della biologia di base, della psicologia e dell'ecologia umana, le stesse illusioni che stanno distruggendo l'America e il mondo. Vedo una remota possibilità che il mondo possa essere salvato, ma non dall'IA/robotica, dal CRISPR, né dal Neomarxismo,dalladiversità e dall'uguaglianza. Alcuni anni fa, ho raggiunto il punto in cui di solito posso dire dal titolo di un libro, o almeno dai titoli dei capitoli, quali tipi di errori filosofici saranno fatti e con quale frequenza. Nel caso di opere nominalmente scientifiche queste possono essere in gran parte limitate a determinati capitoli che sono filosofici o cercanodi trarre conclusioni generali sul significato o sul significato a lungoterminedell'opera. Normalmente però le questioni scientifiche di fatto sono generosamente intrecciate con incomprodellami filosofici su ciò che questi fatti significano. Le chiare distinzioni che Wittgenstein ha descritto circa 80 anni fa tra le questioni scientifiche e le loro descrizioni da parte di vari giochi linguistici sono raramente prese in considerazione, e quindi si è alternativamente stupiti dalla scienza e costerghi per la sua analisi incoerente. Quindi,, è con questo volume. Se si vuole creare una mente più o meno come la nostra, è necessario avere una struttura logica per la razionalità e la comprensione dei due sistemi di pensiero (teoria del doppio processo). Se si vuole filosofare su questo, bisogna capire la distinzione tra le questioni scientifiche di fatto e la questione filosofica di come funziona il linguaggio nel contesto in questione, e di come evitare le insidie del riduzionismo e dello scientismo, ma Kurzweil, come la maggior parte degli studenti di comportamento, è in gran parte all'oscuro. Egli, è incantato da modelli, teorie e concetti, e dalla voglia di spiegare, mentre Wittgenstein ci ha mostrato che dobbiamo solo descrivere, e che le teorie, i concetti, ecc., sono solo modi di usare il linguaggio (giochi linguistici) che hanno valore solo nella misura in cui hanno un test chiaro (chiaro dei veristiri, o come John Searle (il critico più famoso di AI) ama dire, chiare condizioni di (Soddisfazione) ). Coloro che desiderano un quadro aggiornato completo per il comportamento umano dalla moderna vista a due systems possono consultare il mio libro 'La struttura logica dellafilosofia, psicologia, Mind e il linguaggio in Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Coloro che sono interessati a più dei miei scritti possono vedere 'TalkingMonkeys--Filosofia, Psicologia, Scienza, Religione e Politica su un Pianeta Condannato--Articoli e Recensioni 2006-2019nd ed (2019) e Suicidal Utopian Delusions nel 21st Century 4th ed (2019) In realtà, 'riduzione' è un gioco di lingua complesso o un gruppo di giochi (usi di parole con vari significati o COS) quindi il suo uso varia notevolmente a seconda del contesto e spesso non è chiaro cosa significhi. Allo stessomodo, con 'modellazione' o ' simulandosimulating' o 'equivalente a' o 'lo stesso di' ecc. Allo stesso modo, con le affermazioni qui e ovunque che 'calcolo' di processi biologici o mentali non è fatto, come ci vorrebbe troppo tempo, ma non 'computabl'eo 'calcolabile' significa molte cose, o niente a seconda del contesto, e questo è di solito semplicemente totalmente ignorato. Il capitolo 9 è il tipico incubo che ci si aspetta. La prima citazione di Minsky "Minds sono semplicemente quello che fanno i cervelli" è un truismo in quanto in alcuni giochi si può ad esempio, dire 'il mio cervello è stanco' ecc. ma come la maggior parte non ha alcuna comprensione di tutte le domande scientifiche e quelli su come i giochi linguistici devono essere giocati (come possiamo usare il linguaggio in modo intelligibile). Le descrizioni del comportamento non sono le stesse delle descrizioni dei processi cerebrali. Questo 'riduzionismo' è una visione irrimediabilmente fallita della vita, semplicemente non funziona, cioè, non è coerente, e questo è stato spiegato a lungo, prima da Wittgenstein e successivamente da Searle, Hacker e molti altri. Per prima cosa, ci sono vari livelli di descrizione (fisica, chimica, biochimica, genetica, neurofisiologia, cervello, pensiero/comportamento) e i concetti (giochi di linguaggio) utili e intelligibili (con un significato chiaro o COS) a un livello diverso funzionano in modo diverso in un altro. Inoltre,, uno "stato mentale", "disposizione" o "azione" o "azione", può essere descritto in prima o terza persona da molte dichiarazioni e viceversa, e una dichiarazione può descrivere molti diversi "stati mentali", "disposizioni", "pensieri" o "azioni" a seconda del contesto, quindi la corrispondenza tra comportamento e linguaggio è enormemente sottodeterminata anche per "semplici" atti o reazioni. Hacker e altri hanno spiegato questo molte volte. Non c'è un chiaro significato per descrivere il mio desiderio di vedere il sole al suolo ai livelli inferiori, e il loro non lo sarà mai. Sono diversi livelli di descrizione, concetti diversi (giochi linguistici diversi) e uno non può nemmeno dare un senso di ridurre l'uno all'altro, del comportamento in neurofisiologia in biochimica in genetica in chimica in fisica in matematica o calcolo e come la maggior parte degli scienziati Kurzweil handwaving e sostiene che non è fatto perché il suo scomodo o impraticabile non riesce totalmente a vedere che la 'riduzione' non ha un significato chiaro (COS), o meglio molti significati acuti a caso sul contesto, e in nessun caso possiamo dare un conto coerente che elimina qualsiasi livello. Tuttavia, il cadavere in decomposizione del riduzionismo fluttua frequentemente in superficie (ad es. p37 e la citazione di Minsky su p199) e ci viene detto che la chimica "riduce" alla fisica e che la termodinamica è una scienza separata perché le equazioni diventano "ingombranti", ma un altro modo per dire che questo è che la riduzione è incoerente, i giochi linguistici (concetti) di un livello non si applicano (senso) a livelli sempre più alti e inferiori di descrizione , e non è che la nostra scienza o la nostra lingua sia inadeguata. Ne ho discusso nei miei altri articoli ed è ben noto nella filosofia della scienza, ma è probabile che non penetrerà mai nella "scienza dura". La psicologia del pensiero di ordine superiore non è descrivibile per cause, ma per ragioni, e non si può far scomparire la psicologia in fisiologia né fisiologia in biochimica né nella fisica ecc. Sono solo diversi e indispensabili livelli di descrizione. Wittgenstein lo descrisse 80 anni fa nel Blue Book. "Il nostro desiderio di generalità ha [come] fonte ... la nostra preoccupazione con il metodo della scienza. Intendo il metodo per ridurre la spiegazione dei fenomeni naturali al minor numero possibile di leggi naturali primitive; e, in matematica, di unificare il trattamento di diversi argomenti utilizzando una generalizzazione. I filosofi vedono costantemente il metodo della scienza davanti ai loro occhi, e sono irresistibilmente tentati di chiedere e rispondere nel modo in cui la scienza fa. Questa tendenza è la vera fonte della metafisica e conduce il filosofo in completa oscurità. Voglio dire qui che non può mai essere il nostro lavoro per ridurre nulla a nulla, o per spiegare nulla. La filosofia è davvero "puramente descrittiva". Come quasi tutti gli scienziati "duri" e anche quelli purtroppo 'morbidi', non ha affatto la comprensione di come funziona il linguaggio, ad esempio, di come funzionano "pensare" e altri verbi psicologici, così li fraintende costantemente in tutti i suoi scritti (ad esempio, vedi i suoi commenti su Searle su p170). Non entrerò in una spiegazione qui come ho scritto ampiamente su questo (Suicidal Utopian Delusions nel 21st Century 5th ed (2019)). Così, come la maggior parte degli scienziati, e anche la maggior parte dei filosofi, gioca un gioco di lingua (usa le parole con un significato o Condizione di soddisfazione) ma lo mescola con altri significati molto diversi, insistendo per tutto il tempo insistendo sul fatto che il suo gioco è l'unico che può essere giocato (ha un senso 'reale'). Come la maggior parte, inoltre, non è chiaro sulla distinzione tra questioni scientifiche di fatto e le questioni di come il linguaggio può essere utilizzato in modo intelligibile. Inoltre,, non ha una chiara comprensione della distinzione tra i due sistemi di pensiero, l'automaticità del sistema non linguistico S1 e le deliberazioni coscienti del sistema linguistico S2, ma ho descritto questo ampiamente nei miei scritti e non lo farà qui. Un'altra cosa che Kurzweil non menziona mai è l'ovvio fatto che ci saranno conflitti gravi e probabilmente spesso fatali con i nostrirobot, cioècon l'intelligenza artificale. Basti pensare ai continui problemi quotidiani che abbiamo convivere con gli altri esseri umani, al numero di aggressioni, abusi e omicidi ogni giorno. Perché questi dovrebbero essere meno con gli androidi, e poi chi si prende la colpa? Non sembrerebbe esserci alcun motivo per cui gli androidi/AI dovrebbero essere meno in conflitto tra loro, e con noi, rispetto ad altri esseri umani sono già. E tutti i dispositivi/funzioni/armi vengono consegnati all'IA a un ritmo rapido. Presto tutti i sistemi di armi, comunicazioni, reti elettriche, attività finanziarie, sistemi medici, veicoli, dispositivi elettronici saranno controllati AI. Centinaia di miliardi di dispositivi "intelligenti" connessi all'Internet delle cose e solo una manciata di programmatori anche forse in grado di capirli o controllarli. Milioni di missle intelligenti,navi, sub, carri armati, pistole, satelliti, droni in tutto il mondo, programmati per eliminare automaticamente i "nemici" e sempre più dominati da un enorme esercito cinese internazionale gestito dai Sette Sociopatici. Un hacker (o io canaglia) potrebbe paralizzare o attivare uno di loro in qualsiasi momento, e una volta che i fuochi d'artificio iniziano, chi potrebbe fermarlo? Naturalmente, sono gli ottimisti che si aspettano che i sociopatici cinesi governino il mondo mentre i pessimisti (che si considerano realisti) si aspettano che la sociopatia dell'IA (o AS come la chiamo io – cioè la stupidità artificiale o la sociesia artificiale) prenda il sopravvento. È opinione di molte persone premurose Muschio, Gates, Hawking ecc., compresi i migliori ricercatori di IA (vedi i molti discorsi TED su YouTube) che l'IA raggiungerà l'auto-crescita esplosiva (aumentando la sua potenza migliaia o milioni di volte in pochi giorni, minuti o microsecondi) a un certo punto nei prossimi decenni – 2030 è talvolta menzionato, sfuggendo attraverso la rete e infettando tutti i computer sufficientemente potenti. AS sarà inarrestabile, soprattutto perché sembra che sarà in esecuzione su computer quantistici che aumenterà la sua velocità più migliaia o milioni di volte, e come un bel effetto collaterale, sarà in gradodi rompere facilmente tutti gli schemi di crittografia). Se sei ottimista, manterrà gli esseri umani e gli altri animali in giro come animali domestici e il mondo diventerà uno zoo con un programma di allevamento in cattività eugenetico, se un pessimista, eliminerà gli esseri umani o anche tutta la vita organica come una fastidiosa competizione per le risorse. La fantascienza di oggi sarà probabilmente la realtà di domani. La legge della robotica di Asimov – non danneggia gli esseri umani, è una fantasia che è irraggiungibile in pratica per gli androidi/AI proprio come lo è per noi. Ammetto (come Searle ha molte volte) che siamo 'androidi' troppo, anche se progettato dalla selezione naturale, non avendo 'intelligenza' da un punto di vista, ma avendo quasi illimitato 'intelligenza' da un altro. Che cosa impedisce all'IA di avere tutti i disturbi mentali che abbiamo: nevrosi, psicosi, sociopatie, egomania, avidità, desiderio egoistico di produrre copie infinite del proprio "genome" (elettrome, digitoma, siirica?), razzismo (programma?), qualcosa di equivalente alla tossicodipendenza, alle tendenze omemicide e suicide o dovremmo solo usare tutti i "bug biocili"? Naturalmente, gli esseri umani cercheranno di escludere il cattivo comportamento dai programmi, ma questo dovrà essere dopo il fatto, cioè, quando è già disperso tramite la rete a milioni o miliardi di dispositivi, e come sarannoautoprogrammazione e aggiornamento, qualsiasi male che conferisce un vantaggio di sopravvivenza dovrebbe diffondersi quasi istantaneamente. Questo è ovviamente solo l'equivalente AI dell'evoluzione umana per selezione naturale (idoneità inclusiva). John Searle uccise l'idea di una forte IA con la stanza cinese e altre descrizioni dell'incoerenza di vari giochi linguistici (come Wittgenstein aveva fatto superbamente molto tempo prima che ci fossero computer, anche se pochi hanno notato). Egli è considerato da alcuni come la nemesi dell'IA, ma in realtà l'ha appena descritto con precisione, e non ha alcuna antipatia. Searle ha detto più volte che naturalmente le macchine possono pensare e sentire, perché siamo tali macchine! Fatte di proteine, ecc., e non di metallo, ma macchine in un senso molto fondamentale tuttavia. E macchine che hanno impiegato circa 4 miliardi di anni di sperimentazione in un laboratorio delle dimensioni della terra con trilioni of milionari di macchine create e solo un piccolo numero dei sopravvissuti di maggior successo. Gli sforzi dell'IA sembrano o almeno la robotica, finora sembrano banali in confronto. E come egli osserva è possibile che gran parte o tutta la nostra psicologia può essere unica per gli esseri carnosi, proprio come gran parte dell'IA può essere quello di silicon. Quanto potrebbe essere 'vero' sovrapposizione e quanta simulazione vaga è impossibile da dire. La selezione darwiniana o la sopravvivenza del più forte applicato all'IA è un problema importante che non viene mai affrontato da Kurzweil, né dalla maggior parte degli altri, ma è oggetto di un intero libro del filosofo-scienziato Nik Bostrum e dei ripetuti avvertimenti del fisico del buco nero e il più longevo della SLA sopravvissuto al mondo Stephen Hawking. La selezione naturale è per lo più equivalente alla forma fisica inclusiva o favoritismi verso i parenti stretti (selezione dei parenti). E contrastare la "selezione di gruppo" per la "niceness" è illusorio (vedi la mia recensione de The Social of Conquest of Earth di Wilson (2012)). Sì,, non abbiamo DNA e geni nei robot (ancora), ma in quello che è forse il contributo più (solo)sostanziale di Daniel Dennett alla filosofia, è utile considerare la forma fisica inclusiva come l'"acido universale" che mangia attraverso tutte le fantasie sull'evoluzione, la natura e la società. Così, qualsiasi androide auto-replicante o programma che ha anche il minimo vantaggio rispetto ad altri può eliminare automaticamente loro e gli esseri umani e tutte le altre forme di vita, proteine o metallo, che sono concorrenti per le risorse, o solo per 'divertimento',, come umano fare con altri animali. Esattamente cosa impedirà ai programmi di evolvere l'egoismo e di sostituire tutte le altre macchine/programmi concorrenti o forme di vita biologiche? Se si prende sul serio la "singolarità", allora perché non prendere questo sul serio? L'ho già fatto e, naturalmente, è un punto fermo della fantascienza. Così, AI è solo la prossima fase di selezione naturale con gli esseri umani accelerando in certe direzioni fino a quando non vengono sostituiti dalle loro creazioni, proprio come i vantaggi nel nostro 'programma' hanno portato all'estinzione di tutte le altre sottospecie ominoidi e sta rapidamente sterminando tutte le altre grandi forme di vita (tranne naturalmente quelli che mangiamo e alcuni animali domestici degenerati, la maggior parte dei quali saranno mangiati come diffusione della fame). Come di consueto nei resoconti "fattuali" dell'IA/robotica, Kurzweil non dà tempo alle minacce molto reali alla nostra privacy, sicurezza e persino sopravvivenza dalla crescente "androidizzazione" dellasocietà, che sono prominenti in altri autori di saggistica (Bostrum, Hawking ecc.) e frequenti in scifi e film. Richiede poca immaginazione per vedere questo libro come un'altra illusione utopica suicida che si concentra sugli aspetti "belli" di androidi, umanoidi, democrazia, computer, tecnologia, diversità etnica e ingegneria genetica. È però grazie a questi che le ultime vestigia della nostra stabilità/privacy/sicurezza/prosperità/tranquillità/sanità stanno rapidamente scomparendo. Inoltre, droni e veicoli autonomi stanno rapidamente aumentando di capacità e aumentando i costi, quindi non ci vorrà molto prima che le versioni di IA avanzate vengono utilizzate per il crimine, la sorveglianza e lo spionaggio da tutti i livelli di governo, terroristi, ladri, stalker, rapitori e assassini. Dato la tua foto, le impronte digitali, il nome, il posto di lavoro, l'indirizzo, il telefono cellulare, le e-mail e le chat, tutto sempre più facile da ottenere, droni alimentati a energia solare o auto-carica, microbots e veicoli saranno in grado di svolgere quasi ogni tipo di crimine. Virus intelligenti continueranno a invadere il telefono, pc, tablet, frigorifero, auto, TV, lettore musicale, monitor di salute, androidi e sistemi di sicurezza per rubare i dati, monitorare le vostre attività, seguirvi, e se lo si desidera, estorcere, rapire o uccidervi. È chiaro che se gli aspetti positivi accadrà allora anche gli aspetti negativi. Si tratta di un svitato che farà il più male-i jihadisti, i Sette Sociopatici, gli hacker o i nostri programmi, o forse tutti in concerto. Questo lato oscuro di AI/Robotics/The Internet di cerniere Tnonviene menzionato in questo libro, e questa è la norma. Anche se l'idea che i robot prendessero il sopravvento è stata in scifi per molti anni, ho iniziato a pensarci seriamente quando ho letto di nanobot in Drexler's Engines of Creation nel 1993. E molti si sono preoccupati del problema del "grey goo", cioè dei nanobot che si replicano fino a soffocare tutto il resto. Un'altra singolarità che Kurzweil e la maggior parte nell'IA non menzionano è la possibilità che l'ingegneria genetica porti presto alla sostituzione del DNA come mezzo per l'intelligenza avanzata. CRISPR e altre tecniche ci permetteranno di cambiare i geni a volontà, aggiungendo nuovi geni/cromosomi in mesi o addirittura ore, con uno sviluppo superveloce di organismi o cervelli nelle vasche senza corpi fastidiosi per infastidirli. Anche ora, senza ingegneria genetica, ci sono geni precoci che padroneggiano la meccanica quantistica nei loro primi anni dell'adolescenza o prendono il cubo di un numero di 10 cifre nella loro testa. E la programmazione dei geni potrebbe essere fatta dagli stessi computer e programmi utilizzati per l'IA. Chiunque prenda sul serio l'IA potrebbe anche trovare di interesse il mio articolo sul lavoro di David Wolpert sulla legge definitiva nella Teoria delle Macchine di Turing, che suggerisce alcuni aspetti e limiti notevoli di calcolo e 'intelligenza'. L'ho scritto perché il suo lavoro è in qualche modo sfuggito all'attenzione dell'intera comunità scientifica. È prontamente disponibile in rete e nel mio articolo "Wolpert, Godel, Chaitin e Wittgenstein sull'impossibilità, l'incompletezza, il paradosso bugiardo, il teismo, i limiti del calcolo, un principio di incertezza meccanica non quantistica e l'universo come computer, il teorema finale nella Teoria della Macchinadi Turing (2015). ' Al suo attivo, Kurzweil fa uno sforzo per capire Wittgenstein (p220 ecc.), ma (come 50 milioni di altri accademici) ha solo una comprensione superficiale di ciò che ha fatto. Prima dell'esistenza deicomputer, Wittgenstein ha discusso in profondità i problemi di base di ciò che il calcolo era e ciò che rende gli esseri umani distinti dalle macchine, ma i suoi scritti su questo sono sconosciuti ai più. Gefwert è uno dei pochi ad analizzarli in dettaglio, ma il suo lavoro è stato in gran parte ignorato. Su p222 Kurzweil commenta che è 'sciocco' negare il "mondo fisico" (un intricato gioco linguistico), ma è piuttosto che non si può dare alcun senso a tale negazione, in quanto presuppone l'intelligibilità (realtà) di ciò che nega. Questo è il problema sempre presente di come diamo un senso (siamo certi) a nulla, che ci riporta al famoso lavoro di Wittgenstein 'On Certainty' (vedi la mia recensione) e alla nozione della proposta "solo vera". Come tutte le discussioni sul comportamento, Kurzweil ha bisogno di una struttura logica per la razionalità (intenzionalità) e (ciò che è più o meno equivalente) una comprensione approfondita di come funziona il linguaggio, ma è quasi totalmente assente (certamente la norma per gli accademici). Poiché gran parte del mio lavoro si occupa di questi problemi non entrerò in essi qui, tranne per fornire la tabella riepilogativa di intenzionalità. Dopo mezzo secolo di oblio, la natura della coscienza è ora l'argomento più caldo nelle scienze comportamentali e nella filosofia. A partire dal lavoro pionieristico di Ludwig Wittgenstein negli anni '30 (i libri blu e marroni) fino al 1951, e dagli anni '50 ad oggi dei suoi successori Searle, MoyalSharrock, Read, Hacker, Stern, Horwich, Winch, Finkelstein ecc., ho creato la seguente tabella come euristica per promuovere questo studio. Le righe mostrano vari aspetti o modi di studio e le colonne mostrano i processi involontari e i comportamenti volontari che comprendono i due sistemi (processi duali) della struttura logica della coscienza (LSC), che possono anche essere considerati come la struttura logica Razionalità (LSR-Searle), del comportamento (LSB), della personalità (LSP), della Mente (LSM), del linguaggio (LSL), della realtà (LSOR), dell'intenzionalità (LSI) -il termine filosofico classico , la Psicologia Descrittiva della Coscienza (DPC), la Psicologia Descrittiva del Pensiero (DPT) –o meglio, il Linguaggio della Psicologia Descrittiva del Pensiero (LDPT), termini introdotti qui e nei miei altri scritti molto recenti. Le idee per questo tavolo hanno avuto origine nel lavoro di Wittgenstein, un tavolo molto più semplice di Searle, e correla con ampie tabelle e grafici nei tre recenti books sulla natura umana di P.M.S Hacker. Le ultime 9 righe provengono principalmente dalla ricerca decisionale di Johnathan St. B.T. Evans e colleghi, come rivisto da me. Il sistema 1 è involontario, riflessivo o automatizzato "Regole" R1 mentre Pensiero(Cognizione) non ha lacune ed è volontario o deliberativo "Regole" R2 e Disposto(Volontà) ha 3 lacune (vedi Searle). Suggerisco di descrivere più chiaramente il comportamento cambiando "imporre condizioni di soddisfazione a condizioni di soddisfazione" di "mettere in relazione gli stati mentali con il mondo muovendo i muscoli", cioè parlare, scrivere e fare, e la sua "mente alla direzione del mondo di adattarsi"e "mondo alla direzione di vestibilità" per "causa ha origine nella mente" e "causa ha origine nel mondo" S1 è solo verso l'alto causale (da mondo a mente) e privo di contenuto (mancanza di rappresentazioni o informazioni) mentre S2 ha contenuto ed è verso il basso causale (mente al mondo). Ho adottato la mia terminologia in questa tabella. A PARTIRE DAL L'ANALISI DEI GIOCHI DI LINGUA Disposizione* Emozione Memoria Percezione Desiderio PI** IA*** Azione/ Parola La causa proviene da ******** Mondo Mondo Mondo Mondo Mente Mente Mente Mente Provoca cambiamenti in ***** Nessuna Mente Mente Mente Nessuna Mondo Mondo Mondo Causalmente autoriflessivo ****** No Sì Sì Sì No Sì Sì Sì Vero o Falso (verificabile) Sì Solo vero Solo vero Solo vero Sì Sì Sì Sì Condizioni pubbliche di soddisfazione Sì Sì/No Sì/No No Sì/No Sì No Sì Descrivere Uno stato mentale No Sì Sì Sì No No Sì/No Sì Priorità evolutiva 5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 Contenuti volontari Sì No No No No Sì Sì Sì Inizio volontario Sì/No No Sì No Sì/No Sì Sì Sì Sistema cognitivo ******* 2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 Cambia intensità No Sì Sì Sì Sì No No No Durata precisa No Sì Sì Sì No No Sì Sì Ora, Luogo (Qui e ora/Lì e poi) ******** Lì e Poi Qui e Ora Qui e Ora Qui e Ora Lì e Poi Lì e Poi Qui e Ora Qui e Ora Qualità speciale No Sì No Sì No No No No Localizzato nel corpo No No No Sì No No No Sì Espressioni corporee Sì Sì No No Sì Sì Sì Sì Auto contraddizioni No Sì No No Sì No No No Ha bisogno di un Sé Sì Sì/No No No Sì No No No Ha bisogno di linguaggio Sì No No No No No No Sì/No DALLA RICERCA DECISIONALE Disposizione* Emozione Memoria Percezione Desiderio PI** IA*** Azione/ Parola Effetti subliminali No Sì/No Sì Sì No No No Sì/No Associativo/ Basato su Regole BR A/BR A A A/BR BR BR BR Dipendente dal Contesto/ Astratto A DC/A DC DC DC/A A DC/A DC/A Seriale/Parallelo S S/P P P S/P S S S Euristica/ Analitica A E/A E E E/A A A A Esigenze Lavorando Memoria Sì No No No No Sì Sì Sì Dipendente dall'intelligence generale Sì No No No Sì/No Sì Sì Sì Caricamento cognitivo Inibisce Sì Sì/No No No Sì Sì Sì Sì L'eccitazione facilita o inibisce I F/I F F I I I I Le Condizioni Pubbliche di Soddisfazione di S2 sono spesso indicate da Searle e altri come COS, Rappresentazioni, produttori di verità o significati (o COS2 da me), mentre i risultati automatici di S1 sono designati come presentazioni da altri (o COS1 da me). * Inclinazioni, capacità, preferenze, rappresentazioni, azioni possibili ecc. ** Le precedenti intenzioni di Searle *** L'intenzione di Searle in azione **** Searle's direzione di adattamento ***** La direzione della causazione di Searle ****** (Lo stato mentale istanzia Cause o soddisfa se stesso). Searle in precedenza lo chiamava causalmente autoreferenziale. ******* Tversky / Kahneman / Frederick / Evans / Stanovich hanno definito i sistemi cognitivi. ******** Qui e ora/Lì e poi Bisogna sempre tenere a mente la scoperta di Wittgenstein che dopo aver descritto i possibili usi (significati, produttori di verità, Condizioni di soddisfazione) del linguaggio in un particolare contesto, abbiamo esaurito il suo interesse, e i tentativi di spiegazione (cioè la filosofia) ci allontanano dalla verità. Ci ha mostrato che c'è solo un problema filosofico, l'uso di frasi (giochi linguistici) in un contesto inappropriato, e quindi una sola soluzione, che mostra il contesto corretto. Il p 278 commenta il nostro miglioramento della vita e fa riferimento a "Abundance" dal suo collega Diaminidis – un'altra fantasia utopica, e cita il recente lavoro di Pinker "The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined", ma non riesce a notare che questi miglioramenti sono solo temporanei e vengono acquistati a costo di distruggere il futuro del nostro discendente. Come ho recensito il libro di Pinker e commentato in dettaglio il prossimo crollo dell'America e del mondo nel mio libro 'Suicide by Democracy' 4th ed (2019) Non lo ripeterò qui. Ogni giorno perdiamoun t meno di 100 milioni di tonnellate di suolo in mare (ca. 6kg/persona/giorno) e circa 20.000 ettari di terreno agricolo diventassiae e inutile. L'acqua dolce sta scomparendo in molte aree e il riscaldamento globale ridurrà drasticamente la produzione alimentare, soprattutto in moltipaesi del mondo 3o più.. Eproprio giorno le madri del terzo mondo (il primo mondo ora in diminuzione ogni giorno) ci 'benedicono' con altri 300.000 o giù di lì bambini, portando ad un aumento netto di circa 200.000 un altro Las Vegas ogni 10 giorni, un'altra Los Angeles ogni mese. Circa 4 miliardi in più entro il 2100, la maggior parte in Africa, la maggior parte del resto in Asia. I famosi musulmani tolleranti probabilmente saliranno da circa 1/5 a circa 1/3 della terra e controlleranno numerose bombe H e droni controllati dall'IA. Grazie alle illusioni sociali dei poche centinaia di politici che la controllano, la storia d'amore dell'America con la 'diversità' e la 'democrazia' garantirà la sua trasformazione in un inferno del terzo mondo e i famosi Sociopatici Sette benevoli che gestiscono la Cina sono ora al centro della scena (cercano The Belt and Road Initiative, Debt Trap Diplomacy e Crouching Tiger in rete o Youtube)). Si prevede che il livello del mare salirà da uno a tre metri entro il 2100 e alcune proiezioni sono dieci volte superiori. Non c'è dubbio che alla fine salirà molto più in alto e coprirà gran parte dei terreni agricoli principali del mondo e delle aree più densamente popolate. E 'anche chiaro che il petrolio e il gas naturale e di buona qualità facile da ottenere carbone sarà andato, gran parte della terra spogliata di suolo, tutte le foreste sparite, e la pesca drasticamente ridotto. Vorrei vedere un resoconto plausibile di come AI risolverà questo problema. Anche se teoricamente possibile, a quale costo in denaro e inquinamento e disagio sociale crearli e mantenerli? La seconda legge della termodinamica e il resto della fisica, chimica ed economia funziona per gli androidi e gli ominoidi. E chi costringerà il mondo a cooperare quando la sua vita ovvia sarà un gioco a somma zeroin cui il tuo guadagno è lamia perdita? Certamente non i jihadisti o i Sette Sociopatici. Non c'è il pranzo gratuito. Anche se i robot potessero fare presto tutti i compiti umani, soon non salverebbe il mondo da costanti conflitti internazionali, fame, malattie, crimini, violenza e guerra. Quandoey non si può cooperare in questo periodo limitato di abbondanza (comprato violentando la terra) è irrimediabilmente ingenuo supporre che lo faranno quando l'anarchia sta spazzando il pianeta. Dare per scontato che si verificheranno progressi tecnici nell'elettronica, nella robotica e nell'IA, con conseguenti profondi cambiamenti nella società. Tuttavia, ritengo che i cambiamenti che derivano dall'ingegneria genetica siano almeno altrettanto grandi e potenzialmente molto più grandi, in quanto ci consentiranno di cambiare completamente chi siamo. E sarà possibile fare servitori superintelligenti/super forti modificando i nostri geni o quelli di altre scimmie. Come con altre tecnologie, qualsiasi paese che resiste sarà lasciato indietro. Ma sarà socialmente ed economicamente fattibile implementare biobot o superumani su vasta scala? E anche se così, non sembra lontanamente possibile, economicamente o socialmente per prevenire il collasso della civiltà industriale. Quindi, ignorando gli errori filosofici in questo volume come irrilevanti, e dirigendo la nostra attenzione solo alla scienza, quello che abbiamo qui è un'altra illusione utopica suicida radicata nella mancata comprensione della biologia di base, della psicologia e dell'ecologia umana, le stesse illusioni che stanno distruggendo l'America e il mondo. Vedo una remota possibilità che il mondo possa essere salvato, ma non dall'IA/robotica, dal CRISPR, né dallademocrazia, dalla diversità e dall'uguaglianza e penso che sottovaluti enormemente il pericolo rappresentato dall'IA.

Forthcoming in Phronesis. Accepted for publication 25 Nov 2019 Demonstration and the Indemonstrability of the Stoic Indemonstrables Susanne Bobzien All Souls College, Oxford University [email protected] Abstract: Since Mates' seminal Stoic Logic there has been uncertainty and debate about how to treat the term anapodeiktos when used of Stoic syllogisms. This paper argues that the customary translation of anapodeiktos by 'indemonstrable' is accurate, and it explains why this is so. At the heart of the explanation is an argument that, contrary to what is commonly assumed, indemonstrability is rooted in the generic account of the Stoic epistemic notion of demonstration (apodeixis). Some minor insights into Stoic logic ensue. Keywords: Stoic logic, demonstration, indemonstrables, Stoic syllogistic, Stoic epistemology Chrysippus' five kinds of basic syllogisms. Arguably the most well-known elements of Stoic logic are Chrysippus' five kinds of anapodeiktoi, or indemonstrables, as the Greek expression is commonly rendered. 1 Stoic standard examples, one of each kind, are 1. If it is day, it is light. But it is day. Hence it is light. 2. If it is day, it is light. But it is not light. Hence it is not day. 3. Not: both it is day and it is night. But it is day. Hence not: it is night. 4. Either it is day or it is night. But it is day. Hence it is not night. 5. Either it is day or it is night. But it is not night. Hence it is day. 1 Some alternative translations are: 'non-demonstrables' (Bury 1933, 1935), 'undemonstrated' (Mates 1961, p.63 'unproveds' (Barnes 1980, 1985 p.431 in the 2012 reprint ('indemonstrables' in the original, 1985, p.576), 2003, p.14; 2007, e.g. p.371, p.507), 'unprovables' (Annas & Barnes 2000), 'undemonstrateds' (Hitchcock 2006). 2 These indemonstrables are Stoic syllogisms; that is, arguments valid due to their form. 2 The incongruence problem and a solution. As has been repeatedly remarked, the Greek verbal adjective anapodeiktos, as is the case in general with adjectives formed with an alpha privative and ending in '-tos', has two possible main translations: one factive, e.g. 'undemonstrated' or 'unproved' and one expressing (absence of) potentiality or possibility: e.g. 'indemonstrable' or 'unprovable' (cf. e.g. Frede 1974, 127-9, Barnes 2007, 369). Philosophically, the difference between those two options is significant. Something that has not been proved may be provable. For example, if an axiom in a system has not been proved but is provable, it is redundant. If it is unprovable, it is not. It is reasonable to assume that the Stoics had at least unreflective knowledge of this systematic lexical ambiguity in anapodeiktos, and that they intended the word to be taken in one of these two core meanings (so also Barnes 2007, 369). Consistent with this assumption, some ancient works on logic distinguish more than one usage of anapodeiktos (SE M 8.223, Apul. Int. 205.21-206.5, both quoted below). One may think that the main question is which of the two meanings the Stoics intended; and derivatively and accordingly, what the right translation of anapodeiktos is in the context of Stoic logic. Things are more complicated, however. Jonathan Barnes, in his 2007 tour de force through ancient logic, Truth, etc., notes that several ancient texts distinguish two meanings of anapodeiktos, but that surprisingly, the one attributed to the Stoics appears not to be a meaning anapodeiktos actually has (Barnes 2007, 370). Rather, the texts suggest that the Stoics used anapodeiktos for arguments that need no proof; a meaning the word does not carry (Barnes 2007, 370-71). So we have an expression with two grammatically attested meanings neither of which seems to be the Stoic one; and we have an attribution to the Stoics of a meaning that is not grammatically attested. How can we make sense of this incongruence? We can assume that the Stoics themselves believed and stated that their anapodeiktoi were not in need of proof. This is well-documented in ancient texts and is not in doubt (SE M 8.223, SE PH 2.156, DL 7.79). 3 2 For details see DL 7.80-81, SE PH 2.157-9, SE M 8.224-7, Gal. Inst.Log.VI.6, [Galen] Hist.Phil.15 and Frede 1974, 137-52; Bobzien 1996, 134-41; 2019, 243-46. 3 (A) And there are some [arguments] that are indemonstrable(s) (anapodeiktoi) since they do not need a demonstration (apodeixeōs). 4 (DL 7.79) (B) For they say [the anapodeiktoi] are the arguments which are not in need of demonstration (apodeixeōs) for the establishment of their own conclusiveness. 5 (SE PH 2.156) It is also plausible that, when calling the anapodeiktoi anapodeiktoi, the Stoics did not intend the term to mean that they need no proof. Accepting these assumptions, Barnes tentatively offers the following suggestion. With the choice of meanings of anapodeiktos for the Stoics being between 'unproved' or 'indemonstrable/unprovable', it has to be 'unproved': with this intended meaning, the Stoic claim that the anapodeiktoi are not in need of proof provides a reason for their so naming them (Barnes 2007, 370-371). 6 Hitchcock 2006, p.239, fn.29, echoes Barnes' argument. Additionally, he spells out explicitly the common assumption that the Stoic terms apodeixis (proof, demonstration) and anapodeiktos signify a Stoic deduction, or result of a Stoic analysis, and its absence, respectively, and thus (it is implied) differ in meaning from the Stoic epistemic notion of apodeixis for which we find definitions elsewhere in our sources. Call this the Two-senses Assumption. The first proponent both of a translation 'undemonstrated/unproved' and of the Two-senses Assumption appears to be Benson Mates (Mates 1961, 63, see below). I have reservations both about the 'undemonstrated/unproved' translation and about the Two-senses Assumption. In what follows I offer an alternative resolution of the above-stated incongruence. It is grounded in a rejection of the Two-senses Assumption. My starting point is textual. Barnes' and Hitchcock's explanations face a difficulty in connection with the evidence for the Stoic use reported by Sextus, who writes 3 Besides these two texts, also SE M 8.223, quoted below as (C); all in Barnes 2007. There seems to be indirect support in Gal. Int.Log. 8.1 and Apul. Int.205.21-206.5, quoted below as (G). 4 εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἀναπόδεικτοί τινες, τῷ μὴ χρῄζειν ἀποδείξεως. (DL 7.79) 5 οὗτοι γάρ εἰσιν οὕς φασιν ἀποδείξεως μὲν μὴ δεῖσθαι πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν σύστασιν. (SE PH 2.156) 6 Barnes concludes that 'the standard translation' (of anapodeiktos by 'indemonstrable') 'is demonstrably inaccurate' (Barnes 2007, 371). 4 (C) 'Anapodeiktoi' is used of syllogisms 7 in two senses, as arguments that have not been demonstrated and as arguments that have no need of demonstration because for them it is immediately evident that they conclude (i.e. are syntactically valid). 8 And we have frequently indicated that [Chrysippus' anapodeiktoi] as they are set out at the beginning of the first book of his Introduction to Syllogisms are so called by the second sense. 9 (SE M 8.223) Sextus does not just state generically that anapodeiktos has two senses. He is more specific: It is arguments or syllogisms of which anapodeiktos 'is used ... in two senses', as is implied by the nominative masculine plural. This suggests that we get a historically based report on an element of ancient logic. It is likely that the report is of two philosophical uses, each calling some valid arguments anapodeiktoi but in a different sense, where the second includes the Stoic position held by Chrysippus. In the first use, anapodeiktoi are so named, since the arguments have not been demonstrated. This is straightforward ancient Greek. I am not concerned here with whose view this may have been. 10 Sextus' description of the second view is more complex in that it includes a reason why anapodeiktoi are said not to need demonstration ('because ...'). Barnes' suggested rendering 'unproved' makes this part of (C) more perplexing than a translation as 'indemonstrable' or 'unprovable' would. Sextus' distinction appears to be 7 The nominative plural masculine requires some masculine noun. The context provides logos ('argument') in SE M 8.224-5. Alternatively, the book title by Chrysippus mentioned at the end of SE M 8.223, Introduction to Syllogisms, makes sullogismos ('syllogism') another option, which is preferred by Barnes 2007, 372. Either way the arguments at issue are valid arguments, and we know that the Stoic anapodeiktoi were syllogisms. 8 Conclude the conclusion from the premises, that is. Cf. SE M 8.228. 9 ἀναπόδεικτοι λέγονται διχῶς, οἵ τε μὴ ἀποδεδειγμένοι καὶ οἱ μὴ χρείαν ἔχοντες ἀποδείξεως τῷ αὐτόθεν εἶναι περιφανὲς ἐπ αὐτῶν τὸ ὅτι συνάγουσιν. ἐπεδείξαμεν δὲ πολλάκις ὡς κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον σημαινόμενον ταύτης ἠξίωνται τῆς προσηγορίας οἱ κατ ἀρχὴν τῆς πρώτης περὶ συλλογισμῶν εἰσαγωγῆς παρὰ τῷ Χρυσίππῳ τεταγμένοι. (SE M 8.223) 10 Aristotle uses anapodeiktos in his syllogistic at An.Pr. 53 a 32 and b 2, where it appears to have the sense 'undemonstrated' (so also Barnes 1994, 95). Elsewhere Aristotle uses it with the sense 'indemonstrable'. In the Eudemian Ethics, he takes explicit note of the two senses of expressions with an alpha privative ending in '-tos' (Arist. EE III 1, 1230 b 1-3). Later Peripatetics and Peripateticinspired authors link the perfection of a syllogism with its indemonstrability (cf. Barnes et al 1991, 48 fn.45) and with no need for a demonstration (so Galen and Alexander of Aphrodisias, see Barnes 2007, 371-2). 5 between two different intended meanings for valid arguments or syllogisms. Barnes' reading makes both uses of anapodeiktos have the same intended meaning, namely 'unproved' or 'undemonstrated'. They are distinct insofar as in the second use, but not the first, the arguments are said to be unproved for the reason that they are not in need of proof. This sits uncomfortably with Sextus' 'legontai dichōs', which is commonly found for expressions that are employed with two different meanings – not for expressions used with the same intended meaning but used in that meaning for different reasons. (The point applies mutatis mutandis to Hitchcock 2006.) So this textual point suggests that it may be worth looking for an alternative explanation of the apparent incongruence of the Stoic use or understanding of anapodeiktos with which I started the paper. My aim is to show that there are philosophical reasons that endow the rendering 'indemonstrable' of the Stoic anapodeiktos with perfect sense. Here it helps to recall that the Greek anapodeiktos is cognate with apodeixis. In Stoic logic, apodeixis ('demonstration') is an epistemic term, i.e. a term that concerns cognition, and not a purely logical term. The generally very reliable summary of Stoic logic in Diogenes has (D) A demonstration is an argument (logos) that [validly] concludes (perainonta) from what is more easily grasped (katalambanomenōn) that which is less easily grasped. 11 (DL 7.45) The verb 'to grasp' (katalambanein) is the Stoic term for factive cognition that falls short of knowledge, the latter being reserved for the sages. Sextus reports an almost certainly Stoic definition of apodeixis (this is supported by terminology and context) that is both less generic and adds more detail: 12 11 τὴν δ ἀπόδειξιν λόγον διὰ τῶν μᾶλλον καταλαμβανομένων τὸ ἧττον καταλαμβανόμενον περαίνοντα (DL 7.45). The definition of argumenti conclusio in Cicero Luc.26 is similar to (D) and likely to be Stoic. 12 Cf. Barnes 1980, Allen 2008, part III.5, and Hankinson 2009, 209, 212, for discussion of apodeixis in Hellenistic philosophy. 6 (E) A demonstration is, they say, an argument (logos) which reveals by concluding (kata sunagōgēn) a non-evident (adēlon) conclusion on the basis of agreed premises. 13 (SE PH 2.135, cf. SE PH 2.143) Definition (E) is a variant of (D). It is less generic, since the definition in (D) allows for degrees of ease of grasping, whereas in (E) the underlying distinction is simply between what is evident and what is non-evident and can be revealed. Both definitions agree that demonstrations (apodeixeis) are valid arguments: they conclude (perainein) or afford a concluding (sunagōgē). 14 Text (E) is followed by a step-by-step explanation of the definition that culminates in the semi-schematically presented example of a demonstration, or demonstrative argument (apodeiktikos logos). (F) If sweat flows through the surface, there are imperceptible pores. But the first. Therefore the second. 15 (SE PH 2.142, tr. Annas & Barnes) Both definitions characterize demonstration (apodeixis) in epistemic terms: ease of grasping and the non-evidence or unclarity of the conclusion together with its being revealed (ekkaluptomenon, SE PH 2.143, cf. 142); this is contrasted with the conclusion being evident or clear (prodēlon, ibid. 140). Now, Stoic terminology is rarely random, and uses of groups of cognates for the explanation or reference to the same philosophical notion abound. It is most plausible then that the Stoic term anapodeiktos was by the Stoics related to, and more specifically based on, the Stoic notion of apodeixis. (Mates 1961, 63, rejects this, but without convincing reasons, see below.) This relation would naturally be as follows. We are told in (C) (i) that the Stoic anapodeiktoi are syllogisms (and thus valid arguments) which need no apodeixis (see above with fn.9) and (ii) that this is so because "it is immediately evident that they are conclusive". Substitution in (C) of the definiens for the definiendum of the more generic definition of apodeixis (D) 13 Ἔστιν οὖν, ὡς φασίν, ἡ ἀπόδειξις λόγος δι ὁμολογουμένων λημμάτων κατὰ συναγωγὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἐκκαλύπτων ἄδηλον. (SE PH 2.135) In Stoic logic, sunagein, translated 'to conclude', and sunagōgē, translated 'concluding', are semantic; epiphora, translated 'conclusion', is syntactic. 14 Perainein and sunagein appear to be used synonymously in Stoic logic, and express that something is (validly) concluded. Validity is expressly mentioned in SE PH 2.137. 15 εἰ ῥέουσι διὰ τῆς ἐπιφανείας ἱδρῶτες, εἰσὶ νοητοὶ πόροι· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ δεύτερον ἄρα (SE PH 2.142). 7 yields: (i) an anapodeiktos needs nothing that makes it more easily grasped/graspable than it already is, and (ii) this is so because it is immediately evident that it is conclusive. Now 'being evident' is a Stoic epistemic term, and if something is 'immediately evident' this would imply that it is as easily grasped as things can be. From this it would follow that there is nothing more easily grasped that can be used on it to make it more easily graspable. 16 This substantiates the suggestion that the demonstrations (apodeixeis) in (C) of which the indemonstrables (anapodeiktoi) have no need are those defined in (D): The most plausible and decisive explanatory answer to the question why something needs nothing that makes it more easily grasped or graspable than it already is would be: because it is already easily graspable to an extent that nothing can make it more easily graspable. 17 By definition (D), in terms of Stoic apodeixis this yields: because it cannot be demonstrated; and that is, because it is indemonstrable. So the anapodeiktoi are not in need of a demonstration since they are indemonstrable. I propose that this is the link in Stoic logic between the Greek term anapodeiktos with the intended meaning 'indemonstrable' and the phrase 'no need of a demonstration', which provides an explication of a particular use of the term in that meaning. For, note that here we have a case of indemonstrability that is unusual in the following sense: it is combined not with the impossibility to realize the usual end of demonstration (say, cognitive access to the demonstrandum), but instead with the fact that the usual end of demonstration is already realized without demonstration. 18 16 I take it that for the Stoics 'being immediately evident' (εἶναι περιφανὲς) does not admit of degrees. I also assume that those for whom things are immediately graspable are people with the relevant rational skills and information. For example, someone without mastery of the notions of argument, premises, conclusion and formal validity may not find the indemonstrables immediately graspable. (Moreover, indemonstrables can be of great complexity; the immediate evidence concerns their form, and an indemonstrable will only be immediately evident once its form has been recognized.) I bypass any further questions regarding the descriptive or normative nature of this evidence, since this is not relevant to my main points. 17 Just as 'it is light' is only evident to a person who understands the sentence 'it is light' and grasps the Stoic proposition 'it is light', so the indemonstrables are evident only to those who have completed their development into fully rational beings. (See also previous note.) By emphasising that the syllogismhood of the indemonstrables needs no demonstration, where 'demonstration' is understood as the Stoic epistemic term, I take no stance on the question whether the Stoics were logical psychologists or logical anti-psychologists. Rather, the evidence of the indemonstrables is entirely compatible with the assumption that for the Stoics what makes the validity of their indemonstrables evident is a logical as opposed to psychological feature. 18 For the Stoics, there are truths that are non-evident, so satisfying one necessary condition for being demonstrable –demonstrations are by definition of the non-evident– while failing to satisfy the other, say that there is a valid argument from evident premises for them. 'The number of stars is odd' or 'The number of stars is even' (whichever is true) is an example. Then there are truths that may satisfy the second necessary condition, but do not satisfy the first, because they are evident. Cf. Sextus' discussions of demonstration, SE PH 2.135-143, M 8.299-314. 8 Further support for the solution. Of interest is in this context a passage in Apuleius' De Interpretatione (Peri Hermeneias) which offers a threefold distinction for the Latin term indemonstrabilis (translating, no doubt, anapodeiktos, see Kneale & Kneale 1962, 164 and below) and states which of these is used for the first four Peripatetic syllogistic moods – the correlates in Aristotle's syllogistic to the Stoic five kinds of indemonstrables. (G) Now ... the first four are called indemonstrabilis – not because they cannot be demonstrated, like the measurement of the whole of the ocean, nor because they are not yet demonstrated, like the squaring of the circle, but because they are so simple and so evident that they do not need a demonstration. (Apul. Int.205.21-206.5, tr. Barnes modified) 19 As Barnes 2007, 272-3 points out, the passage does not say that this threefold distinction is one of linguistic meanings and we have no reason to assume that it is meant to. In line with the explanation of the incongruence regarding anapodeiktos I just offered, passage (G) lends itself to the following interpretation. First, the ancients did not, for what we know, have a grammar book that explained to them the two meanings of alpha-privativeprefixed verbal adjectives ending in '-tos' (which is paralleled by the Latin '-ibilis' and 'abilis') that I mentioned earlier. Rather, we can assume that they had as part of their ordinary linguistic aptitude (and possibly without reflection) the knowledge that any meaning of anapodeiktos / indemonstrabilis would have to fit one of the two options: indemonstrable or undemonstrated (or in alternative translation, unprovable or unproved). Thus retrospectively we may be able to discern in any of Apuleius' explications which of the two meanings it involves. Apuleius' distinction is threefold, since from his, or rather his source's, perspective, there were three distinct pertinent applications of indemonstrabilis, each related to a distinct kind of situation. He offers an example of each: (i) Situations in which it is humanly impossible to obtain a demonstration of something, with the result that the envisioned 19 ... igitur ... primi quattuor indemonstrabiles nominentur, non quod demonstrari nequeant, ut universi maris aestimatio, aut quod non demonstrentur, sicut circuli quadratura, sed quod tam simplices tamque manifesti sint ut demonstratione non egeant (Apul.Int.205.21-206.5). The text is slightly corrupt. I adopt Barnes' reading, and with Barnes 2007, Ramsey 2017 among others, I assume that Apuleius provides a three-fold distinction. With Ramsey 2017, 26-7 and the majority of manuscripts, I read nondum (not yet). Apuleius' first two examples seem a tad out of date. 9 outcome of the demonstration is not obtained: the measure of the entire ocean; (ii) situations in which, although it may be humanly possible, a demonstration of something has not (yet) been obtained: the squaring of the circle; (iii) situations in which something one usually expects a demonstration to provide, i.e. simplicity and evidence, is already present before any demonstration has been attempted, and for that reason cannot be (and is not) provided by demonstration: (the syllogismhood or validity of) certain basic syllogisms. Here is an analogy to illustrate the main point of the distinction between (i) and (iii). The goal is to fill a glass with water. The expected outcome is to have a glass full of water. Take case (ii) first. It would compare with the situation in which a functional glass is empty, and hence has not (yet) been filled and is unfilled. Case (iii) would compare to a situation with a full glass of water. You cannot fill a full glass of water with water. A full glass is unfillable, because it is already full. At the same time, there is no need for it to be filled, since the intended outcome of filling a glass with water, a glass full of water, is already achieved. Case (i) might compare to a situation with a glass that has a sieve as bottom. Again you cannot fill the glass with water. It is unfillable. Still, the last two situations are fundamentally different: once the intended outcome cannot be achieved, once the intended outcome is already realized. Although in either of (i) and (iii) the situation is such that the syllogism is indemonstrable, and linguistically both (i) and (iii) would permit the translation 'indemonstrable', metaphysically the difference between them is as significant as that between (i) and (ii), and (ii) and (iii), respectively. A natural way to express succinctly what is significant about (iii), in contrast to (i) and (ii), is to say that no demonstration is needed. The meaning of the term is not thereby given. What distinguishes (i) from (iii) is not a matter of meaning of the expression anapodeiktos. It is a way of explaining two fundamentally different situations in which the same expression is used with the same meaning. Whether this meaning is being indemonstrable or being undemonstrated is not completely conclusive in (G). What is conclusive is that ultimately the syllogisms at issue need no demonstration because they are indemonstrable: If for some reason the intended meaning was undemonstrated, then the reason for the syllogism's being undemonstrated would be its indemonstrability. Interim result. Both Sextus in passage (C) and Apuleius in passage (G) report the application of the term anapodeiktos (indemonstrabilis) in the context of syllogistic. (So do 10 (A) and (B)) This makes it likely that they both report the same later ancient tradition of explaining anapodeiktos as used of syllogisms. If we additionally combine the results from passages (C) and (D) with those from (G), the balance tips toward the meaning 'indemonstrable', and I will assume that this was the intended meaning. 20 Either way, looking back, Apuleius' demarcation of (iii) from (i) and (ii) can be used to better understand Sextus' and Diogenes' reports that the Stoic anapodeiktoi were syllogisms that are not in need of demonstration. Residual question. It may still seem puzzling why in some sources the Stoics in their syllogistic explained the term 'indemonstrables' by 'need no demonstration' ((B) and (A)) rather than 'need no demonstration because they are self-evident' or 'need no demonstration because they are self-evident and as such permit no demonstration'. Texts (C) and (G) suggest that the accounts are abbreviated. And it can be readily explained why the abbreviation would retain the characterization 'need no demonstration'. In Stoic logic, what needs to be shown of certain syllogisms is that they are endpoints in an analysis, or backwards-worked deduction; and that is, that they themselves are not in need of justification by means of other syllogisms. Without such endpoints, syllogistic would be susceptible to infinite regress arguments, a kind of argumentation the Stoics were aware of (e.g. Chrysippus' Logical Investigations, PHerc 307, frg II). Assuming that in a syllogistic the guarantee of such an endpoint is the essential and primary concern, and the epistemic justification by immediate evidence is secondary, and the indemonstrability comes third, one can see how within Stoic syllogistic the account of the name anapodeiktoi was abbreviated to 'need no demonstration', and also how at a later time this explication may possibly have morphed into a definition. The incongruence between the expression anapodeiktos and the apparent Stoic definition of anapodeiktoi as being not in need of demonstration thus finds an 20 Thus I do not share Barnes' conclusion that 'In any event, one thing is plain: Apuleius does not think that first figure predicative syllogisms are called 'indemonstrabilis' in the sense of 'unprovable'.' (Barnes 2007, 373). My view differs from Barnes's in two respects. First, I argue that at least for the Stoics and in later ancient texts, when used of basic syllogisms, anapodeiktos is used with the intended meaning that expresses the absence of a potentiality or possibility. Second, and more fundamentally, I argue that the Stoic term anapodeiktos, used of syllogisms, is by the Stoics understood as having its meaning derivative from the Stoic epistemic term apodeixis, rather than a special logical meaning (for which see below). 11 easy explanation. 21 Note also that in other texts, e.g. SE M 8.228, text (H) below, the abbreviation appears to have gone the other way. Apodeixis and syllogisms. This connection between the Stoic epistemological term apodeixis and their core logical term anapodeiktos can be exploited further. As noted above, for the Stoics, if something is 'immediately evident' this implies that it is as easily grasped as things can be, and so that there is nothing more easily grasped that can be applied to it. Now the things at issue are syllogisms (or formally valid arguments) and their syllogismhood (or formal validity). So we can say more specifically, it is as easily grasped as it can be that these anapodeiktoi are formally valid, and so there is nothing whose validity is more easily grasped that can be applied to them. Compare (H) the [simple] indemonstrables are those [syllogisms] for which it is immediately clear (autothen saphes) that they conclude, that is that in them the conclusion follows from (suneisagetai) the premisses. 22 (SE M 8.228) This suggests that the Stoics also had cases of valid arguments that are in need of demonstration and, that is, for which there is something that is more easily grasped than them that is used in their demonstration. Consider the following two passages that report Stoic theory. (They are extensions of (A) and (B)): 23 (B+) For they say [the anapodeiktoi] are the arguments which are not in need of demonstration (apodeixeōs) for the establishment of their own conclusiveness but are 21 The identification within syllogistic of indemonstrability and lack of need for demonstration is not unique to the Stoics. In the commentary to his translation of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, Barnes identifies Aristotelian uses of anapodeiktos in which 'being indemonstrable' and 'not being in need of demonstration' appear to be used interchangeably (Barnes 1994, 95). 22 ὧν ἁπλοῖ μέν εἰσιν οἱ αὐτόθεν σαφὲς ἔχοντες τὸ ὅτι συνάγουσιν, τουτέστι τὸ ὅτι συνεισάγεται αὐτῶν τοῖς λήμμασιν ἡ ἐπιφορά. (SE M 8.228) 23 The expression 'they say' marks (B+) out as reliable, despite the fact that it is part of a Sceptic refutation of Stoic doctrine. This is common in Sextus. I assume that Sextus is here drawing on the same – intermediate – source on which he draws at SE M 8.223, as is frequently the case in the two works. 12 demonstrative (apodeiktikous) of the fact that the other syllogisms, too, conclude. 24 (SE PH 2.156) (A+) And there are some [arguments] that are indemonstrable(s) (anapodeiktoi) since they do not need a demonstration (apodeixeōs), a different number according to different [Stoics], five according to Chrysippus. 25 Through these every argument is composed (pleketai). 26 (DL 7.79) Both texts use the noun apodeixis saying that the anapodeiktoi do not need an apodeixis, and both relate the anapodeiktoi to other valid arguments or syllogisms. (This further confirms that for the Stoics the phrase 'needs no apodeixis' is not intended as a definition of anapodeiktos. It is in the context of comparison with other syllogisms that it becomes the crucial characteristic of the anapodeiktoi: 'since' in A+, 'but' in B+.) (B+) spells out this relation. The indemonstrables are 'demonstrative of the fact that the other syllogisms, too, conclude'. Indirectly, then, by using again the definition of apodeixis in (D), here we obtain information about something that Stoic analysis does: it makes things, more precisely the validity of non-indemonstrable syllogisms, easier to grasp. We know that the relation between the indemonstrables and the other syllogisms is that the latter can be reduced by analysis via one or more of the Stoic themata, or some other Stoic inference rule, into the former (DL 7.78, Bobzien 1999, 2019). So this relation too can be expressed in epistemic terms. We can assume (we do not know) that a demonstration (apodeixis) of a syllogism S would involve an analysis that reduces or analyses S by way of one or more themata into one or more syllogisms that are more obviously conclusive than S itself. For a syllogism not to be in need of a demonstration is thus a complex property that combines epistemic and logical elements. First, it is its validity that is evident or as easy to 24 οὗτοι γάρ εἰσιν οὕς φασιν ἀποδείξεως μὲν μὴ δεῖσθαι πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν σύστασιν, ἀποδεικτικοὺς δὲ ὑπάρχειν τοῦ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους συνάγειν λόγους. (SE PH 2.156) 25 It would be useful to know more about this alleged disagreement about the number of (kinds of) indemonstrables and what criteria were used to justify the different Stoic choices. However there is no surviving evidence. From later ancient logic texts we may conjecture that later Stoics may have added multi-conjunct or multi-disjunct syllogisms, or simply counted Chrysippus' multi-disjunct fifth syllogism as a sixth syllogism, or possibly added the later so-called wholly hypothetical syllogisms. But all this is uncertain. (No text suggests that the second indemonstrables were ditched, see below.) 26 εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἀναπόδεικτοί τινες, τῷ μὴ χρῄζειν ἀποδείξεως, ἄλλοι μὲν παρ ἄλλοις, παρὰ δὲ τῷ Χρυσίππῳ πέντε, δι ὧν πᾶς λόγος πλέκεται. (DL 7.79) 13 grasp as can be. This implies second, that even if it could be analysed by use of any thema(ta), the validity of the resulting syllogism would be no more easily graspable than the original syllogism itself. Apodeixis and analysis. En passant, this provides insight in the difficult issue how the Stoics thought about the meta-logical elements of logical analysis. Remember that demonstrations are arguments. Thus the demonstration of an argument A is itself done in the form of an argument, call it a meta-argument. It appears that such a meta-argument would have A occurring in its conclusion, with validity or syllogismhood predicated of it; that it would have occurring in one premise a thema application; and in one or more separate premises an argument each. And the arguments (and presumably the thema) in the premises would have to be more easily grasped than A. Ideally, such meta-arguments should be indemonstrables, too. Not only are all our examples of Stoic demonstrations indemonstrables (e.g. (F) above); more importantly, this would also avoid a hierarchy of meta-arguments (see below). Here is an example which uses the first thema and analyses a two-premise syllogism A into another two-premise syllogism. Take as the syllogism whose syllogismhood is to be demonstrated, the following argument: 'it is day; but not: it is light; so not: if it is day, it is light'. Call it syllogism A. Note that syllogism A is not a Stoic indemonstrable. Call the syllogism 'if it is day, it is light; but: it is day; so it is light' syllogism B. Note that syllogism B is a first indemonstrable. Recall that the Stoic first thema is (I) When from two <propositions> a third is deduced, then from either of them together with the/a contradictory of the conclusion the/a contradictory of the other is deduced. 27 (Apul. Int.209.12-16) The meta-argument then is 27 ... appellaturque a Stoicis prima constitutio vel primum expositu. quod sic definiunt: Si ex duobus tertium quid colligitur, alterum eorum cum contrario illationis colligit contrarium reliquo (Apul.Int.209.11-14). Apuleius' choice of 'expositu' ('bare', 'exposed') as one possible translation of 'thema' indicates that the themata were considered as evident. 14 Premise 1 If 'if it is day, it is light; but: it is day; so it is light' is a syllogism, then 'it is day; but not: it is light; so not: if it is day, it is light' is a syllogism. Premise 2 But 'if it is day, it is light; but: it is day; so it is light' is a syllogism. Conclusion Hence 'it is day; but not: it is light; so not: if it is day, it is light' is a syllogism. Premise 1 is an application of the first thema to syllogism A. Premise 2 is the antecedent of Premise 1. The conclusion is the consequent of Premise 1. It states the syllogismhood of syllogism A, i.e. of the argument whose validity is to be demonstrated. Thus the metaargument is a demonstration of syllogism A that includes an application of the first thema in its first premise. By way of this demonstration, syllogism A has been made more easily graspable, since it has been reduced by a more easily graspable thing (the meta-argument) to a more easily graspable thing. First, the demonstration or meta-argument is itself a first indemonstrable, and as such cannot be made more easily graspable. (Of course my articulation may be lousy: the representation of the argument might be improved on and the meta-argument made more easily graspable in that way.) Second, syllogism B, to which it has been reduced, is also a first indemonstrable, and as such cannot be made more easily graspable. Third, the first thema is also evident (cf. fn.27) and cannot be made more easily graspable (with the possibility of improved formulation again discounted). These demonstrations would be a species or subclass of the demonstrations covered by the Stoic definitions of demonstration (above texts (D) and (E).) How do such demonstrations avoid a hierarchy of meta-arguments? If the meta-argument had, say, the form the non-indemonstrable syllogism A has, one could require that it be made more easily graspable by a (meta-)analysis. If this (meta-)analysis also had the form of a nonindemonstrable syllogism, one could require that it be made more easily graspable by a (meta-meta-)analysis, and so on. By removing the epistemic requirement that the arguments or arguments in the premises are to be more easily graspable than the argument in the conclusion, we can construct examples of Stoic meta-logical formulations of a step in an analysis in general. Still, while a demonstration (apodeixis) is an argument, analysis is a method of deduction or an instance of the application of that method. At most, one-step instances of that method would be 15 arguments. However, our examples of analysis (SE M 8.230-38) do not suggest that a onestep analysis needs to have the form of an argument. Apodeixis and the role of the indemonstrables. If all this is correct, we can also answer a question about the Stoic indemonstrables that has puzzled some logicians and historians of logic. 28 The Stoic first thema (above text (I)) seems to allow as a special case of application the analysis of a second indemonstrable into a first, and of a first indemonstrable into a second. Thus from the point of view of modern axiomatic systems, with the indemonstrables (or alternatively indemonstrable schemata) as axioms and themata as deduction rules, either the first or the second indemonstrables (or their indemonstrable schemata) are redundant. Now, it is not unheard of that logicians have proposed systems with redundant axioms. 29 However, this is usually either an oversight that is adjusted at some later point, or there are some other reasons (e.g. retaining cut elimination) that make a redundant axiom useful or required. Neither case appears to capture what we know about Stoic syllogistic. We can assume that the Stoics were aware of the mutual reducibility of a first and a corresponding second indemonstrable, since this involves one of the two most basic applications of the first thema. So far no logical property has been identified that would require both first and second indemonstrables as axioms. However, as was already hinted by Michael Frede, it is plausible that with regard to the immediate evidence of their conclusiveness, the Stoics considered the two kinds of indemonstrables as on a par (Frede 1974, 131). Reducing a case of modus tollens to a case of modus ponens does not make the first clearer, since it is already immediately and evidently clear that it is valid. The Stoic criterion for the choice of their kinds of indemonstrables (or indemonstrable schemata) is then not motivated by minimizing their number qua number of axioms, or preserving a logical (as opposed to epistemic) property. Rather, it is motivated by retaining those kinds that cannot be made clearer to us with the help of analysis by logical inference rules such as the themata. Thus, demonstrability rather than axiomhood would be the criterion for the Stoic choice of basic syllogisms. If so, it 28 See e.g. Ierodiakonou, 2006, 1.1 ; Bobzien 2019, p.244 fn.21. Mueller, 1979, p.205 and Hitchcock 2006, p.227 mention that a second indemonstrable is derivable from a first (but not the other way about). Mueller does not consider the question why the anapodeiktoi are anapodeiktoi. 29 E.g. Axiom PM.4 in Principia Mathematica, shown to be redundant by Paul Bernay in 1926; Bernays, Paul, 1926, "Axiomatische Untersuchungen des Aussagen-Kalküls der Principia Mathematica", Mathematische Zeitschrift, 25: 305–320. doi:10.1007/BF01283841; Łukasiewicz showed that the axiom systems of the calculus of propositions proposed by Frege, Russell, and Hilbert each contained a different redundant axiom, e.g. Axiom P1 (p➝p) in Hilbert's propositional calculus; some schemata in Gentzen's systems LK and LJ are redundant, cf. Gentzen 1934, 193. 16 is not strictly correct when Frede (1974, 128) and Łukasiewicz (1935, 117) assert that the indemonstrables were called indemonstrables because their role is that of axioms. The fact that the rejection of the Two-senses Assumption allows us to make sense of the redundancy of one of the five kinds of Stoic indemonstrables should speak in favour of this rejection. Of course the Stoics, like Medieval and contemporary logicians, may have allowed for redundant axioms for ease of application. Even in this case, the ease gained by having both the first and second indemonstrables is not great. More significantly, even in this case it would be hard to find a reason for the choice of those two other than their immediate evidence. Apodeixis and deduction. It is a common, if incorrect, assumption that the demonstrations which the alpha privative in an-apodeiktos counters are Stoic deductions. Scholars generally assume that the apodeixis that corresponds to the anapodeiktoi is Stoic deduction and that the claim that the anapodeiktoi need no apodeixis is another way of saying that they need no analysis. For example, this assumption is made by Mates 1961, 63, Mueller 1978, 11 and Frede 1974, 132, and appears to be presupposed in Barnes' and Hitchcock's reasoning. It is also commonly invoked or presupposed in the argument that anapodeiktos should be translated as unproved or undemonstrated rather than unprovable or indemonstrable: for example that it is false that anapodeiktoi cannot be analysed, since matching first and second anapodeiktoi appear to be mutually analysable. There is however (i) no evidence for the assumption that apodeixis in texts (A+), (B+), (C), and in Stoic logic generally, means something like deduction or analysis. No reliable Stoic source uses apodeixis or its cognates to refer to or describe a Stoic analysis or its result. Instead, Stoic terms commonly used are logos, analusis, analuein, sullogismos, sunagōgē, sunagein, perainein, kata synagōgēn, etc. (Passages (B+), (H) and (I) are examples.) In particular, no definition of apodeixis in this sense is ever supplied. By analysing a non-indemonstrable one does not per se make it more easily graspable. One just applies some logical apparatus. 30 There is also (ii) no need for the 30 It has been suggested that strictly speaking in Stoic sequent logic, the anapodeiktoi are not analysable either. Bobzien argues that Stoic analysis is such that once an axiom has been reached no further rule can be applied (Bobzien 1996, 2019). Matching first and second indemonstrables are then not analysable into each other. Barnes, too, seems to think this (2007, 371, '[t]he five Chrysippean unproveds are the five syllogistic forms which the Chrysippean system does not prove.') though he does not say why. If this is correct, then for every non-indemonstrable syllogism (or formally valid argument) there would exist a demonstration (apodeixis) or a concatenation of demonstrations that corresponds to some analysis of it. The demonstrations would be meta-arguments of the type given above. Still, the analysis of an argument would not be its demonstration, as the examples of analysis in Sextus (SE M 8.235-7) illustrate. Also, the redundancy of the first and second indemonstrables is retained even if indemonstrables, once reached, cannot be analysed further. The difference between 17 assumption, since as we have seen there is a historically documented alternative notion of apodeixis that provides an explanation of the occurrence in Stoic logic of apodeixis and anapodeiktos that explains the epistemic language in those passages, makes do with one – documented – Stoic notion of apodeixis and removes the apparent incongruence in the explication 'no need for apodeixis' in (A+), (B+), (C). So, since there is an alternative, epistemic, notion for which the expression apodeixis is used, and (A+), (B+), (C) invoke epistemic elements, the identification in Stoic syllogistic of apodeixis with deduction is unsubstantiated and unnecessary. 31 Historically, we can see how such an identification arose possibly already in late antiquity. Peripatetics like Alexander use apodeixis and apodeiknunai ('to demonstrate') in order to express the proof of the validity of an Aristotelian syllogism (cf. Barnes et al 1991, 20-21). Such a proof would be the Peripatetic analogue to a Stoic analysis. This use of apodeixis and cognate terms is likely to have eclipsed the Stoic distinction between the analysis of an argument and what would be its apodeixis. This historical development does of course have no impact on the fact that, for the reasons just given, any argument against the translation of 'indemonstrable' based on the assumed identification in Stoic logic of apodeixis and deduction or analysis fails. There is thus a web of reasons why the standard translation 'indemonstrable' can be retained and why the translations 'indemonstrable' or 'unprovable' are preferable to 'undemonstrated' and 'unproved'. Historically, 'indemonstrable' may be preferable. Either way, it seems not advisable to mingle Stoic epistemic and Stoic logical terminology in translations (as we find it e.g. in Mueller 1978, Hitchcock 2006). Whichever modern-language word family one uses for apodeixis, apodeiknumi, apodeiktikos, anapodeiktos is best reserved for those epistemic terms and avoided for translations of the aforementioned logical terms. Failure to do so just adds to the muddle. Apodeixis and dialectic. There are three mentions that relate demonstration with Stoic dialectic in Diogenes Laertius. One is the anecdote that Chrysippus told Cleanthes that all he demonstrability and analysability is thus retained in the choice of indemonstrables. If it was just analysability, we would expect the first or the second indemonstrables to be eliminated. 31 So, even though it may be correct that indemonstrables need no analysis in Stoic sequent logic, this is not what texts (A), (B), (C) were intended to express where they say that Stoic indemonstrables need no demonstration. At the very most, analysis would be a species of apodeixis, but even for this there is no indication in our sources, and it does not sit well with our texts. 18 needed were the views (dogmata) of Stoic philosophy, he would find the proofs or demonstrations (apodeixeis) for them himself (DL 7.179). Here a demonstration is clearly an argument in support of a philosophical statement, not an argument about the validity of a complex syllogism. The other two are in my view related to the same topic. A Chrysippean book title 'On the fact that the ancients admit dialectic along with demonstrations' (DL 7.201) and a summary statement that the Stoics say 'that the consideration (or theory) of syllogisms is most useful; for it makes manifest that which can be demonstrated (to apodeiktikon)' (DL 7.45). Both sentences are found in an epistemological context. The second is followed by definitions of argument, syllogism and then of demonstration (above (D)). In both cases the point appears to be that dialectic, and in particular syllogistic, is at the service of demonstrating philosophical tenets. 32 The epistemological context in both cases would seem to rule it out that that which is or can be demonstrated by demonstrations is the validity of non-indemonstrable syllogisms. Refutation of Mates' argument against a single Stoic notion of apodeixis. My main contention has been that the notion of demonstration that gives rise to the Stoic term 'indemonstrable' is the Stoic epistemic notion of demonstration for which we have extant definitions. Why, one may ask, is this assumption virtually absent in the literature on Stoicism, particularly, since there is no evidence of any other Stoic notion of demonstration, let alone another definition? Perhaps in contemporary scholarship this absence has gained support via Benson Mates' highly influential monograph Stoic Logic (Mates 1961), which I mentioned at the outset of this paper. Mates writes that in the classification of fundamental valid arguments (1) 'the term "demonstrated" (apodeiktikos) has a far different meaning from that which it has in the contexts of' Sextus' report of the Stoic demonstrative arguments and definition of demonstration; and that hence (2) 'it is clear that' 'the sense of "demonstrate" ... involved in the Stoic term "undemonstrated" as applied to the basic arguments' 'is not the same sense involved in the word "demonstrative" [i.e. apodeiktikos]' (Mates 1961, 63). 32 The book title at DL 7.201 has been given a more complex interpretation by Brunschwig 1995, picked up in Bronowski 2019, 26-7.This seems to me to be too speculative, although it is consistent with what I suggest. 19 Mates offers the following two points in support for his claim. (a) 'an invalid argument would be non-demonstrative [i.e. ouk apodeiktikos], but it would not be undemonstrated [i.e. anapodeiktos].' (ibid.) and (b) '[c]onversely, the "milk" and "pores" arguments, which were examples of demonstrative arguments, are also examples of the type I undemonstrated argument' [i.e. examples of first indemonstrables] (ibid. fn.27; for the "pores" argument see text (F) above). However, Mates makes a number of questionable assumptions, and once these have been sorted, his argument crumbles. First, he assumes without comment that the correct translation of anapodeiktos is 'undemonstrated'. We have seen that this assumption is not warranted. Second, Mates' claim (1) has a false presupposition, namely that a synonym of the Stoic term anapodeiktos occurs in the context of Sextus' reports of Stoic demonstrative arguments (i.e. SE PH 2.135-143, M 8.299-314). It does not occur in that context. What occurs in that context is the expression 'not demonstrative' (ouk apodeiktikos). Mates wrongly assumes that the Stoic terms 'not demonstrative' and 'indemonstrable' (anapodeiktos) are synonymous, or at least that the first entails the second. This is however not so. In Stoic logic only the use of 'not' (ouk / ou / ouch / ouchi) in front of an expression provides contradictory opposites. The alpha privative, though a kind of negation, does not guarantee contradictoriness (DL 7.70 with Apul. Int.191.6-11, SE M 8.103). There is then nothing problematic in there being things that are both not demonstrative (ouk apodeiktikos) and not an indemonstrable (anapodeiktos). Mates' justification (a) of his claim (1) hence also loses its force. 33 Third and related, Mates' claim (1) appears to wrongly presuppose that the Stoic expressions 'anapodeiktos' and 'ouk apodeiktikos' are used as part of a discussion of the same distinction, namely a distinction of arguments (logoi). Mates disregards (although he mentions it earlier in the same chapter) that the Stoic distinction between apodeiktikoi and ouk apodeiktikoi is a distinction of arguments (logoi). The Stoic expressions are short for 'apodeiktikoi logoi' and 'ouk apodeiktikoi logoi' respectively. By contrast, 'anapodeiktoi' is short for 'anapodeiktoi sullogismoi', and the anapodeiktoi are part of a two-fold distinction of syllogisms or formally 33 The expression anapodeiktos appears to have been used as opposite both to apodeiktikos (active form) and to apodeiktos (passive form). There is no ancient Greek word anapodeiktikos. The Stoic use the active form, so the question whether in their view something could have been both apodeiktos and anapodeiktos does not occur. 20 valid arguments. In this respect, too, there is nothing problematic to find one expression that negates an aspect of demonstration in the definition by division of one kind of objects and another expression that negates a different aspect of demonstration in the context of a different kind of objects. Fourth and related, Mates' claim (1) appears to wrongly presuppose that the negating element in the Stoic expressions anapodeiktos and ouk apodeiktikos have the same function. They do not have the same function. Invalid arguments are not demonstrative (ouk apodeiktikos), since they are not demonstrations. A demonstration is the same as a demonstrative argument, and it presupposes validity (SE PH 2.135-143, SE M 8.301-314, Mates 1961, 60-3, Barnes 1980, Allen 2008, Study III.5). By contrast, indemonstrable syllogisms (anapodeiktoi) are indemonstrable, since no demonstration can be given of their validity or syllogismhood, because their syllogismhood is already fully evident and hence maximally graspable. This difference does not impact the fact that in both cases the very same notion of demonstration (apodeixis) is at issue. The dissimilarity that the demonstrandum in one case is a simple conclusion (e.g. 'there exist imperceptible pores', above (F)), in the other a sentence that contains reference to an entire argument, presumably in the subject expression, and its formal validity or syllogismhood, presumably in the predicate expression, does not affect the truths that the underlying notion of demonstration is the same and that it is the Stoic epistemic one for which we have definitions. Hence, Mates inference (2) is faulty, since it does not follow that if the two expressions 'not demonstrative' and 'indemonstrable' have different meanings, so do the corresponding positive expressions (apodeixis and apodeiktikos). Likewise, fifth, there is no problem with Mates' second allegedly problematic case (b). A demonstration like (F) reveals its conclusion and makes it more easily graspable than its premises are. At the same time, syllogisms like (F) are indemonstrables, since the fact that they are formally valid or a syllogism is fully evident and as such does not permit a demonstration, because the function of a demonstration is to reveal something that is not evident or at least to make it more graspable. Moreover, the word apodeiktikos, which Mates assumes to be related solely to the passages that explain the definition of apodeixis and its synonym apodeiktikos logos (implied, SE M 8.311, 314, SE PH 2.140, 143), actually occurs also in the context of the indemonstrables (SE PH 2.156, quoted above as text (B+)). 21 So, pace Mates (Mates 1961, 63), we have every reason to assume that 'the sense of "demonstrate" ... involved in the Stoic term "undemonstrated" [i.e. anapodeiktos] as applied to the basic arguments' is 'the same sense involved in the word "demonstrative" [i.e. apodeiktikos]'. 34 Results. It is the principal point of this paper that in their syllogistic (sequent logic, theory of deduction ...), where the Stoics use the word apodeixis and its cognates they use their epistemic notion of apodeixis of which definitions and explications have survived. On this basis, we can conclude that there is an array of jointly compelling reasons for assuming that the translation 'indemonstrable', understood as meaning 'cannot be demonstrated' is accurate: It makes sense of the Stoic explication 'no need of demonstration'. It avoids the difficulties with passage (C) which translations like 'unproved' introduce. It makes do with just one Stoic notion of demonstration, the one of which we have two Stoic definitions. It can explain the relation between Stoic analysis and Stoic demonstration. It can explain why one Stoic kind of indemonstrables, although it appears redundant, is retained by the Stoics. It can make sense of the – apparent – difficulties on the basis of which Mates infers that the indemonstrables have nothing to do with Stoic demonstration. 34 A passage in Sextus suggests that some Stoics called all their syllogisms indemonstrables, both simple and non-simple ones, where non-simple ones are those analysable into simple ones. This has generated much discussion, but no convincing solution. Frede 1974, 130, compellingly shows that the first meaning of anapodeiktos in (C) cannot refer to all Stoic syllogisms, simple and non-simple, and also refutes Mates' self-declared 'entirely conjectural' suggestion regarding the meaning of "undemonstrated" as applied by the Stoics to the five types of basic arguments (Mates 1961, 64 with fn.30). Frede's own suggestion is however similarly forced. I offer two alternative explanations. Sextus is generally a most reliable source for Stoic logic where he reports Stoic theory. However, in this case I believe that it is plausible that the occurrence of anapodeiktoi is an – inadvertent – error, whether introduced by Sextus or his non-Stoic source. The distinction of these two types of Stoic indemonstrables occurs nowhere else. It is not picked up by Sextus later in the text. There is not even a hint in the following long report of Stoic analysis that would explain why the non-simple syllogisms are indemonstrables. Usually at the end of a sceptical argument Sextus repeats his initial thesis. In this case, the sceptical argument is in SE M 8.239-243, where no mention of non-simple indemonstrables is found. If on the other hand the text must be left as it is, here is my best offer. The Stoics often use the same philosophical expression in a wider and in a narrower sense. Assuming a wider sense for all syllogisms, non-simple syllogisms are then indemonstrable in this wider derivative sense. An analysis uses indemonstrables and themata, and we can assume that the themata were considered evident. (Apuleius offers expositum, English 'bare' or 'exposed', as one of two translation of the Stoic term thema, Apul.Int.209.10-12.) So derivatively, as the result of the use of evident rules to reduce in evident steps the non-simple syllogisms to evident syllogisms, the non-simple syllogisms inherit the evidence of this procedure. This is of course entirely conjectural. 22 Coda. Let me end with a historical note. In Latin texts from antiquity the only occurrences of indemonstrabilis are thirteen in Apuleius' De Interpretatione (listed in Belli 2014, 76) and sixteen in Boethius' logical writings (Belli 2014, 53), including two used of Peripatetic syllogistic modes (Boeth.Syll.Cat.823A = 75.14-15 Thomsen Th rnqvist) and importantly one of the Stoic indemonstrables (Boeth.Com.Arist.Int.II 351.8 Meiser 35 ). We can assume that both authors translate from a Greek source the expression anapodeiktos (cf. Kneale & Kneale 1962, 164 fn.3, Barnes 2007, 372; Belli 2014, 65 and assumed passim; Ramsey 2017, 235) and it is likely that they arrived at this translation independently of each other (Belli 2014, 59-60). The term then makes its way into medieval philosophical and theological texts (Belli 2014, 68-74) and into the earliest Latin translations of Sextus and early translations of Diogenes Laertius, 36 and from there into English and other modern languages, languages in which the ambiguity is no longer present, and nolens volens a choice is made. 37 So, this development provides a historical explanation of the predominance of the translation of anapodeiktos as 'indemonstrable'. It comes to us via an Anglicisation (etc.) of the Latin indemonstrabilis, with presumably unnoticed disambiguation. So, not only is 'indemonstrables' a philosophically correct rendering of the Stoic anapodeiktoi, it is also the historically grown translation. 35 'And he makes this syllogism in the second hypothetical mode, which he calls indemonstrable, in this way: if the first is, the second is; but the second is not, hence the first is not.' (Fecit autem hunc syllogismum in secondo modo hypothetico quem indemonstrabilem vocat hoc modo: si primum est, secundum est; sed secundum non est, primum igitur non est. Boeth.Com.Arist.Int.II 351.7-10, Meiser.) 36 Sextus, first Latin translation of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Henricus Stephanus (1562), p.93, indemonstrabiles; Sextus, first Latin translation of Adversos Mathematicos, Hervet (1569), p.425, SE M 8.223: 'indemonstrabilis', 'indemonstrabiles', 'quae non opus habent demonstratione'. Diogenes Laertius: The first translation of Diogenes into Latin, by Henricus Aristippus, is lost. The 2 nd Latin translation, Traversari (1455, MS), was originally completed between 1427 and 1433. Traversari obviously had difficulties rendering anapodeiktos. On the relevant page (carta 102 verso, which includes DL 7.79-81) he leaves a gap for the translation of anapodeiktoi before dicuntur, as if to fill in later perhaps after some research on the Greek term. He avoids the Latin noun for anapodeiktos in the accounts for the first, second, fourth and fifth indemonstrables; for the third he decides on tertia demostrativa. 37 Sextus, first English translation of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Thomas Stanley (1655-60), part XII, p.502, 'Indemonstrable'; Diogenes Laertius, first English translation (Fetherstone et al 1696), 'Anopodeicti'; Diogenes Laertius, second English translation, Yonge (1853), 'demonstration', indemonstrable' (DL 7.78), 'demonstration', 'not demonstrated' (DL 7.79). Sextus, French tr., Huart (1725), indémonstrables', Sextus, German tr., Buhle (1801), 'indemonstrabeln'. 23 Acknowledgements: I thank James Allen and Wim Vanrie for most helpful comments, Chiara Martini for pointing out an ambiguity in the initial formulation of my example, and the audience at the Oxford Workshop in Ancient Philosophy for stimulating discussion. Bibliography: Allen, James. 2008. Inference from Signs: Ancient Debates about the Nature of Evidence. Oxford: OUP. Annas, Julia & Barnes, Jonathan. 2000. Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Scepticism. Cambridge: CUP. Barnes, Jonathan. 1980. 'Proof destroyed', in Schofield, Malcolm, Burnyeat, Myles & Barnes, Jonathan, Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology (Oxford), 16181. Barnes, Jonathan. 1985. 'Theophrastus and hypothetical syllogistic' in Wiesner, Jürgen. Aristoteles Werk Und Wirkung, Bd I, Aristoteles Und Seine Schule (Berlin), 557-576. Reprinted in Barnes, Jonathan. 2012 (Oxford), 413-32, Logical Matters, as 'Theophrastus and Stoic logic'. Barnes, Jonathan et al., 1991. Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle Prior Analytics 1.1-7. London: Duckworth. Barnes, Jonathan. 1994. Aristotle: Posterior Analytics. Translated with a Commentary. 2 nd edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Barnes, Jonathan. 2003. 'Proofs and syllogisms in Galen', in Galien Et la Philosophie: Huit Exposés Suivis de Discussions. (Geneva),1-24. Barnes, Jonathan. 2007. Truth, etc. Oxford: OUP. Belli, Margherita. 2014. 'Boethius, disciple of Aristotle and master of theological method' in Böhm, Thomas, Jürgasch, Thomas & Kirchner, Andreas. Boethius as a Paradigm of Late Ancient Thought (Berlin), 53-82. Bobzien, Susanne. 1996. 'Stoic Syllogistic.' Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 14: 133– 192. Bobzien, Susanne. 2019. 'Stoic Sequent Logic and Proof Theory.' History and Philosophy of Logic 40 (3): 234-265. Bronowski, Ada. 2019. The Stoics on Lekta. Oxford: OUP. Brunschwig, Jacques. 1995. 'Sur un titre d'ouvrage de Chrysippe: 'que les anciens ont admis la dialectique aux cotés de la démonstration', in Brunschwig, J. Études sur les philosophies hellénistiques (Paris), 233-50. Buhle, Johann Gottlieb. 1801. Sextus Empirikus oder der Skepticismus der Griechen. Lemgo: Meyer. 24 Bury, Robert Gregg. 1990. Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Buffalo, N.Y: Prometheus Books. Chrysippus, Logical Investigations (λογικὰ ζητήματα), PHerc 307, ed. L. Marrone, 'Le Questioni Logiche di Crisippo (PHerc 307)' in 1997. Cronache Ercolanesi 27: 83-100. [Log. Inv.] Fetherstone et al.1696. Laërtius, Diogenes. The lives, opinions, and remarkable sayings of the most famous ancient philosophers.Volume 2. London: Edward Brewster. Frede, Michael. 1974. Die stoische Logik. Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Gentzen, Gerhard. 1934. 'Untersuchungen über das logische Schliessen. I.' Mathematische Zeitschrift 39 (2): 176-210. [English translation by M. E. Szabo: Investigations into Logical Deduction I'. American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (1964), 288-306. Also in M. E. Szabo,. The Collected Works of Gerhard Gentzen, Amsterdam 1969.] Hankinson, Robert J. 2009. 'Galen on the limitations of knowledge' in Gill, Christopher, Whitmarsh, Tim & Wilkins, John (ed.). Galen and the World of Knowledge (Cambridge), 206-242. Hervet, Gentian. tr. 1569. Sexti Empirici viri longe doctissimi adversus mathematicos, Hoc est, adversus eos quo profitentur disciplinas, Opus eruditissimum Paris: Le Jeune. Hitchcock, David. 2005. 'The peculiarities of Stoic Propositional Logic'. In John Woods, Kent A. Peacock & A. D. Irvine (eds.), Mistakes of Reason: Essays in Honour of John Woods. (Toronto), 224-242. Huart, Claude. tr. 1725. Sextus Empiricus. Les Hipotiposes ou Institutions Pirroniennes en trois livres. Presumably printed in Amsterdam. Ierodiakonou, Katerina. 2006. 'Stoic logic.' in Blackwell Companions to Philosophy: A Companion to Ancient Philosophy (eds. M. L. Gill and P. Pellegrin) (Oxford), 505‐29. Kneale, W. and M. Kneale. 1962. The Development of Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Łukasiewicz, J. 1935. 'Zur Geschichte der Aussagenlogik.' Erkenntnis 5: 111-131. [Translated by the author from his 'Z historii logiki zdań', Przegląd Filozoficzny 27 (1934), 417-37. English translation as 'On the History of the Logic of Propositions ' by S. McCall in Polish Logic 1920-1939 (Oxford, 1967), 66-87.] Mates, B. 1961. Stoic Logic. 2 nd edn. Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press. (First edition 1953). Meiser, Karl. 1880. Anicii Manlii Severini Boetii Commentarii In Librum Aristotelis Peri Hermenias. Leipzig: Teubner. Mueller, Ian. 1978, 'An Introduction to Stoic Logic.' in Rist, John M. (ed.). The Stoics. (Berkeley / Los Angeles), 1–26. 25 Mueller, Ian. 1979. 'The Completeness of Stoic Propositional Logic.' Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 20 (1): 201-215. Ramsey, Emma. 2017. A Commentary on the Peri Hermeneias ascribed to Apuleius of Madaura. Doctoral Thesis, Royal Holloway, University of London. Stanley, Thomas. 1701. History of Philosophy: Containing the Lives, Opinions, Actions and Discourses of of Every Sectionthe Philosophers of every Sect. 3 rd edn. Part XII, London: W. Battersby. Stephanus, Henricus [Henri Estienne]. tr. 1562. Sexti Empirici Pyrrhoniarum Hypotyposeon libri III. Geneva, 1562. Thomsen Th rnqvist, Christina. 2008. Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii de Syllogismo Categorico: Critical Edition with Introduction, Translation, Notes, and Indexes. Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg, Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia 68. Traversari, Ambrogio. 1455. MS. Laertii Diogenis vitae atque sententiae eorum qui in philosophia claruerunt liber decimus et ultimus faeliciter explicit. Florence. Manuscript S.Marco 323 in the Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, (electronic copy CNMD\0000114834). http://mss.bmlonline.it/s.aspx?Id=AWOS4v9JI1A4r7GxMdi4&c=LAERTII%20VITAE%20PHIPOSOPHORUM#/book Yonge, C.D. 1853. Diogenes Laertius: The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers. London: H. G. Bohn.

Otto Neumaier (Hrsg.) Satz und Sachverhalt Sonderdruck im Buchhhandel nicht crhaltlich Academia Verlag ..... Sankt Augustin 1. Die Kombinationstheorie des Urteilens Urn 1870 vertraten viele Philosophen eine Urteilstheorie, der wir den Namen "Kombinationstheorie" geben kannen. Genauer gesagt handelt es sich dabei urn eine Theorie der Tiitigkeit des Urteilens , in der diese als Vorgang des Verkni.ipfens oder Trennens bestimmter als " Begriffe", "VorstellW1gen" oder "Ideen" bezeichneter geistiger Einheiten aufgefaBt wurde. Positives Urteilen ist eine Tatigkeit, durch die ein Komplex von Begriffen zusammengefi.igt wird; negatives Urteilen ist die Tiitigkeit des Trennens von Begriffen, tiblicherweise eines Paares, bestehend aus einem Subjekt und einem Priidikat, die mittels einer Kopula miteinander verbunden sind. Zur erwiihnten Zeit wurde die Kombinationstheorie von nahezu allen Philosophen vertreten, wobei die Skizze, die wir gerade priisentiert haben, nattirlich eine Vielzahl von Unterschieden abdeckt, die insbesondere mit verschiedenen Ansichten tiber die Natur des Gehalts oder Gegenstandes von Urteilsakten zu tun haben. Die Kombinationstheorie geht mit der Annahme einher, daB die Logik des Urteilens durch die traditionelle Syllogistik (man denke an Kant) angemessen erfaBt werde. Auch in anderer Hinsicht wurzelt die Theorie in Aristotelischem Gedankengut. Sie beruht auf der von Aristoteles in den Kategorien ( 14 b) und der Metaphysik (1 051 b) dargelegten Intuition, wonach ein begrifflicher Komplex eine ihm entsprechende Verkniipfung von Gegenstiinden in del" Welt widerspiegJe. Die Nachfolger des Aristoteles hielten lange Zeit daran fest , daB das Phanomen "Urteil" nur innerhalb eines Rahmens angemessen verstanden werden kanne, in dem dieser weitere ontologische HintergrW1d beriicksichtigt wird. Dementsprechend waren die friihesten Kombinationstheorien eine Art von "transzendenten" Theorien, niimlich wegen der ihnen zugrunde liegenden Annahme, daB dem 9 U rteilsakt transzendente Korrelate auf seiten der Gegenstiinde in der Welt entsprechen. Solche Ansichten wurden etwa von Scholastikern wie Petrus Abaelardus (z.B. in seiner Logica Jngredientibus) oder Thomas von Aquin (in De Veritate 1, 2) entwickelt , und sie ist selbst noch im 17. lahrhundert erkennbar, bei Locke (Essay IV, v) ebenso wie in Leibnizens Suche nach einer kombinatorischen Logik (z.B. in den Nouveaux Essais , IV5). Um 1870 finden sich jedoch kaum mehr (wenn iiberhaupt noch) Anhanger transzendenter Theorien nach Art von Aristoteles oder Leibniz. Spatestens dann hatte sich niimlich im Sog des Deutschen IdeaJismus eine immanentistische Ansicht durchgesetzt, der zufolge der Vorgang des Urteilens ausschliel3lich mit Blick darauf, was sich im Geist oder Bewuf3tsein des urteilenden Subjekts abspielt, zu verstehen ist. Die in der zweiten Halfte des 19. lahrhunderts am weitesten verbreitete Spiel art des Deutschen Idealismus fal3t die Gegenstiinde der Erkenntnis als etwas auf, was dem Geist des erkennenden Subjekts "immanent", d .h. darin wortw6rtlich lokalisiert ist. In diesem Sinne kann z .B . Windelband den Idealismus als "Aufl6sung des Seins in Bewul3tseinsvorgange" definieren . Derart vom Idealismus befruchtete Kombinationstheorien wurden in Deutschland von Gustav Biedermann, Franz Biese, Eduard Erdmann, Kuno Fischer, Ernst Friedrich, Carl Prantl, Hermann Schwarz u. v.a .m. entwickelt. 1.1. Bernard Bolzanos Sdtze an sich Vor dem erwahnten Hintergrund stellt die 1837 verOffentlichte Wissenschaftslehre von Bernard Bolzano eine grol3e Ausnahme dar. Bolzanos Werk erschien zwar bereits rund 40 Jahre vor dem Zeitraum , mit dem wir uns hier beschiiftigen, doch ist wegen seiner Bedeutung fUr die Urteilstheorie unumgiinglich, hier kurz darauf einzugehen. Auch Bolzano vertrat eine Kombinationstheorie des Urteils, allerdings eine der platonistischen Art. Laut Bolzano (1837, § 127) bestehen Satze generell aus drei Teilen: "In allen Siitzen befindet sich der Begriff des Habens, oder bestimmter noch der Begriff, den das Worl Hat bezeichnet. Nebst diesem einen Bestandtheile kom10 men in allen Siitzen 110ch zwei andere vor, die jenes Hat miteinander auf eine Wiese verbindet, wie in dem Ausdrucke: A hat b, angezeigt wird. Der eine dieser Bestandtheile, niimlich der durch A angedeutete, stehet so, als ob er den Gegenstand, von welchem der Satz handelt, und der andere b so, als ob er die Beschaffenheit, die der Satz diesem Gegenstande beilegt, vorstellen sollte. Daher erlaube ich mir, den einen dieser Theile A, worin er auch immer bestehe, die Unter/age oder Subjectvorstellung; den anderen b aber den Allssagetheil oder die Prddicatvorstellung zu nennen." Grob gesagt unterscheidet Bolzano in seiner Urteilstheorie zwischen (1) dem Satz an sich (d .h. dem, was heute gew6hnlich als Proposition bezeichnet wird) und (2) dem gedachten, ausgedriickten oder geaul3erten Satz. Das erste ist eine ideale oder abstrakte Entitiit, die einem bestimmten Bereich der Logik angeh6rt; das zweite geh6rt zum konkreten Bereich der Denktiitigkeit bzw. zum Bereich der Sprache oder des Sprechens . Ein Urteil ist dieser Theorie zufolge das Denken einer idealen Proposition. Der Gegenstand eines empirischen Urteilsaktes ist also ein Satz an sich, eine Entitiit auf3erhalb des Reiches von Raum und Zeit: "Unter einem Satze an sich verstehe ich nur irgend eine Aussage, dal3 etwas ist oder nicht ist; gleichviel, ob diese Aussage wahr oder falsch ist; ob sie von irgend Jemand in Worte gefal3t oder nicht gefal3t, ja auch im Geiste nur gedacht oder nicht gedacht worden ist (Bolzano 1837: § 19). Diese platonistische Urteilstheorie spielt eine einflul3reiche Rolle in der folgenden Geschichte, wobei zu beach ten ist, dal3 im spiiteren 19. Jahrhundert Leute wie Hermann Lotze oder Gottlob Frege in Deutschland ebenso wie auch George Frederick Stout in England ahnliche Theorien wie jene von Bolzano vertreten haben. Laut Bolzano sind Wahrheit und Falschheit zeitlose Eigenschaften von idealen Propositionen. Jede Proposition ist entweder wahr oder falsch, auch wenn die Eigenschaft, einen Wahrheitswert zu haben, in Bolzanos Augen nicht zur Definition des Begriffs " Proposition" geMrt (vgl. Bolzano 1837, §§ 23, 125). Da die Proposition den Inhalt des geistigen Urteilsaktes darstellt, kann dieser in einem 1 I t. weiteren Sinne ebenfal1s wahr oder falsch genannt werden; ebenso kann auch von den Sprechakten, in denen etwas behauptet wird , gesagt werden, sie seien wahr oder falsch, denn diese sind in Worte gefa13te Propositionen. Bolzanos Theorie soli die Objektivitiit der Wahrheit in platonistischem Sinne garantieren. Erstens ist Wahrheit unabhiingig vom Bewu13tsein; sie gilt unabhiingig davon, ob sie gedacht oder erkannt wird. Zweitens ist Wahrheit absolut; sie hiingt nicht von Zeit (oder von bestimmten Zeiten) ab o Drittens aber hiingt die Wahrheit oder Falschheit eines Urteils nicht vom Kontext ab, in dem es gefallt wird (vgl. Bolzano 1837, § 25) . Diese von Bolzano propagierte Auffassung der Objektivitiit von Wahrheit und Erkenntnis wird heute von nahezu allen Philosophen vertreten, die nicht einem Relativismus der einen oder anderen Art anhiingen. 1.2. Mit der Kombinationstheorie des Urteilens einhergehende Probleme Als der philosophische Idealismus urn die Mitte des 19.1ahrhunderts allmahlich in Frage gestellt wurde, wurde in Verbindung damit auch die Kombinationstheorie zunehmend als problematisch erkannt. Ein erstes Problem der Kombinationstheorie hat mit dem zweifelhaften Charakter von existentiellen oder unpersonlichen Urteilen wie "Geparden existieren" bzw. "Es regnet" zu tun. Solche Urteile scheinen nur ein Element einzubeziehen, weshalb fUr sie jeder Gedanke an "Verkniipfung" oder "Vereinigung" ausgeschlossen zu sein scheint. Ein wei teres Problem bezieht sich auf die Tatsache, da13 selbst in jenen Fiillen, in denen anzunehmen ist, daB das Urteilen eine Verkniipfung von Begriffen oder Vorstellungen einschlieBt, der Bedarf an zusiitzlicher Bestiitigung oder Dberzeugung verspiirt wurde, an einem "Bewul3tsein von Giiltigkeit" in idealistischer Terminologie bzw. einer "behauptenden Kraft" in Freges Sprache. Andernfalls wiire die Theorie namlich nicht in der Lage, mit hypothetischen oder anderen logisch zusammengesetzten Urteilen zurechtzukom12 rnen, in denen anscheinend komplexe Begriffe odeI' Vorstellungen als echte Teile der Urteile enthalten sind, ohne selbst beurteilt zu werden. Andere Probleme kreisten urn den Begriff der Wahrheit. Eine wichtige Art der Bewertung eines Urteils ist niimlich sein Wahrheitswert. Einer Reihe von Philosophen wurde urn 1900 klar, da13 sie der Wahrheit von Urteilen nul' dann gerecht werden konnten, wenn sie einen das Urteil transzendierenden objektiven Standard anerkannten, an dem die Wahrheit gemessen werden konnte. Dies wurde zu einer zentralen Herausforderung fUr die Annahme, da13 die Begriffsverkniipfung allein alles ausmacht, was fUr die Erklarung von Urteilen norwendig ist. Auch wenn das Urteilen eine Verkniipfung von Begriffen einschlief3t, mu13 die Wahrheit eines Urteils jedoch auch mit etwas auf seiten des Gegenstandes zu tun haben, dem die Begriffsverkniipfung entsprechen solI. Jedes Urteil, sei es nun wahr oder falsch, mu13 zudem aber auch ein Moment des Uberzeugtseins enthalten. d.h . des Glaubens daran, da13 tatsiichlich eine soIche Entsprechung besteht. Deshalb wurden Versuche unternommen, solchen "gegenstiindlichen Korrelaten" Rechnung zu tragen, also herauszufinden, was jenes "gegenstiindJiche Etwas" ist , dem unsere Urteilsakte entsprechen. 2. Franz Brentano Fiir den ersten grol3eren Bruch mit der Kombinationstheorie des Urteils ist Franz Brentano verantwortlich, und zwar durch die in seiner Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte vorgeschlagene Lehre von der Intentionalitiit (vgl. Brentano 1874, S. 109-140, bes . S.124 ff.). Erkenntnis ist fUr Brentano die Angelegenheit bestimmter Urteilstypen . Die psychologische Beschreibung und Klassifikation von Urteilen in all ihren Erscheinungsformen ist in seinen Augen also eine notwendige Vorbedingung fur die Erkenntnistheorie als philosophische Disziplin . Zuniichst mu13 jedoch eine sichere GrundJage fiir die Wissenschaft der Psychologie selbst gefunden werden, und 13 I~ dies erfordert eine nachvollziehbare Bestimmung des eigentlichen Gegenstandes psychologischer Forschung. DafUr benotigen wir eine einzigartige Eigenschaft, durch die sich geistige von anderen Arten von Phanomenen unterscheiden. Daher also Brentanos vieldiskutiertes Prinzip der Intentionalitat des Geistigen, das besagt, dal3 jeglicher geistige Vorgang von bzw. iiber etwas ist. 2.1. Der Begriff der 1ntentionalital Brentano unterscheidet drei grundlegende Arten von geistigen oder intentionalen Phanomenen: Vorstellen und Urteilen sowie die Phanomene des Liebens LInd Hassens . Jede dieser drei Arten geistiger Phanomene ist durch ihre spezifische intentionale Beziehung bzw. intentionale Gerichtetheit bestimmt. Eine Vorstellung ist jeglicher Akt, in dem das Subjekt sich eines Inhaltes oder Gegenstandes bewuf3t ist, ohne daf3 es irgendeine Stellung dazu bezieht. Ein sotcher Akt kann entweder intuitiv oder begrifflich sein. Das heif3t, ein Gegenstand kann unserem Geist durch Sinneserfahrung (sowie in Abwandlungen davon in unserer inneren Anschauung) gegenwartig sein, oder aber durch Begriffe, z. B., wenn wir an die Begriffe von Farbe oder Schmerz im allgemeinen denken. Vorstellungen konnen entweder (relativ) einfach oder (relativ) komplex sein eine Unterscheidung, die durch die von den englischen Empiristen vertretene Lehre von einfachen und komplexen Ideen angeregt ist. Eine einfache Vorstellung ist z. B. die von etwas Rotem; eine komplexe Vorstellung ist hingegen d ie von einer Reihe verschiedenfarbiger Quadrate (vgI. Brentano 1874, S. III f., 124 ff.). 2.2. Die Existenztheorie des Urteils Auf der Grundlage des or tellens konnen nun neue Arten oder Formen von Intentionalitat kon truiert werden. Der einfachen Moglichkeit, auf einen Gegenstand in cler Vorstellung bezogen zu sein, kann etwa diejenige von zwei einandeT diametral entgegengesetzten Formen der Beziehung zu diesem Gegenstand hinzugefUgt werden ; die14 se Beziehungen werden als " Anerkennen" (bei positiven Urteilen) bzw. "Verwerfen" (bei negativen) bezeichnet. Brentano halt beide fur spezifische Bewul3tseinsprozesse. Brentanos Begriff der Anerkennung kommt dem nahe, was durch den englischen Ausdruck ' belief' ausgedriickt wird. Brentano unterschied freilich nicht klar zwischen dem Urteilen und Glauben wie er ja auch keine klare Unterscheidung zwischen geistigen Akten und geistigen Zustanden traf. Anerkennung und Ablehnung mussen aber von dem unterschieden werden, was analytische Philosophen "propositionale Einstellung" genannt haben. Deren Gegenstand ist eine Proposition bzw. ein abstrakter propositionaler Inhalt, wahrend in Brentanos Ontologie kein Platz fUr derlei entia ration is ist. Ein Uneil besteht fUr Brentano entweder im Glauben oder im Unglauben an die Existenz eines Gegenstandes . Aile Urteile haben also eine der beiden folgenden Standardformen: "A existiert" oder "A existiert nicht". Dies ist Brentanos beriihmte Existenztheorie des Urteils . Deren Bedeutung besteht nicht zuletzt in der Tatsache , daJ3 es sich um die erste einfluf3reiche Alternative zur Kombinationstheorie handelt, einer Theorie, die so lange unwidersprochen geblieben war. Das Urteil, das im Satz "Franz sieht ein schones, nasses Herbstblatt von leuchtend-roter Farbe" formuliert ist, sollte der Existenztheorie zufolge wie folgt ausgedriickt werden: "Das von-Franz-gesehene-Ieuchtend-rote-nasse-schone-Herbstb latt ist" . Das im Satz "Philosophie ist keine Wissenschaft" ausgedriickte Urreil sollte in "Philosophie-alsWissenschaft ist nicht" umgeformt werden. Das im Satz "Aile Menschen sind sterblich" ausgedriickte universelle Urteil sollte durch "Es gibt keine unsterblichen Menschen" oder "Unsterbliche-Menschen sind nicht" dargestellt werden. 2 Urteile konnen weiter in wahrscheinliche /gewisse, evidentel nicht -evidente, apriorischel aposteriorische, affi rma ti vel nega ti ve usw. gegJiedert werden. Wie Brentano behauptet, spiegelt jede dieser Unterscheidungen einen tatsachlichen psychischen Unterschied in den Urteilen selbst wieder. Wie wir sehen werden, kann dasselbe jedoch nicht uber die Klassifikation von Urteilen in wahre und falsche gesagt werden. 15 In linguistischen Begriffen laJ3t sich Brentanos Theorie folgenderrnaBen formulieren: Vorstellungsakte (die Pendants der Begriffe im Rahmen der Kombinationstheorie) werden durch Namen ausgedruckt, die in unserer Sprache vorkommen. Urteilsakte werden dann durch komplexere linguistische Ausdrucke geauBert, deren Bedeutungen von den Bedeutungen der Namen abhangt, aus denen sie bestehen. Brentanos Bruch mit der Kombinationstheorie besteht hauptsachlich darin, daB er der Kopula eine spezifische Rolle zuweist, indem er sie in das Duo von Anerkennung und Ablehnung umwandell. Eben diese duale Kopula bestimmt das Wesen des Urteils. Wie fast alle Philosophen des 19.1ahrhunderts geht Brentano in den FuBstapfen des Aristoteles, indem er behauptet, daB das GeauBert-Werden eines Urteils lediglich eine sekundare Angelegenheit ist primar ist vielmehr der Akt des Urteilens selbst. Entscheidend ist letztlich nicht, was man sagt, sondern vielmehr, was man denkt. Und doch ist die zentrale Rolle der Sprachanalyse im Werk von Brentano und seinen Nachfolgern bemerkenswert. Brentano bemuht sich urn eine linguistische Rechtfertigung fUr seine Existenztheorie des Urteils. Er diskutiert z. B. das Phanomen subjektloser Satze, insbesondere die sogenannten Meteorologica CEs regnet" oder "Es schneit") und anderer Beispielsfamilien, die Linguisten wie Miklosich studiert hatten (vgl. Brentano 1889, S.16ff., 57f.). Fur Brentanos Analyse sprachlicher Ausdriicke ist vor aHem die Unterscheidung zwischen kategorematischen und synkategorematisch en Ausdrucken zentral: Synkategorematika sind Worter, die nur in Verbindung mit anderen Wortern in einem bestimmten Kontext eine Bedeutung haben; beispielsweise ist "wahr" synkategorematisch. Dies bedeutet u.a., daB es in Wirklichkeit nichts gibt, wodurch sich ein wahres Urteil von einem bloBen Urteil unterschiede (so wie es in Wirklichkeit nichts gibt, wodurch sich ein existierender Dollar von einem Dollar unterschiede). Es gibt keine Eigenschaft von Urteilsakten, auf die sich das Pradikat "wahr" bezieht. Brentanos Nachfolger wendeten dieselbe Art von Analyse auch auf andere Falle an, z. B. auf die deflationare Analyse von W ortern wie "Sein" oder "Nichts". 16 2.3. Der Gegenstand des Urteilsaktes Wenn Urteilen im Anerkennen oder Verwerfen von etwas besteht, so mussen wir immer noch bestimmen, was dieses Etwas ist, das anerkannt oder verworfen wird. Dies nennt Brentano die Urteils-A1aterie. Die Art, auf die es beurteilt (d.h. anerkannt oder verworfen) wird, nennt der die Qualitat des Urteils. Um diese Termini zu verstehen, muss en wir nochmals Brentanos Begriff der Intentionalitat betrachten. Dummerweise laBt der beriihmte Abschnitt aus seiner Psychologie eine Fulle von Jnterpretationsmoglichkeiten offen (vgl. Brentano 1874, S.124ff.). Ein Zankapfel ist etwa die Beziehung zwischen den Gegenstanden der drei verschiedenen Arten von geistigen Akten. Sol1ten wir annehmen, daB alle Akte mit gleichem, ihnen eigenem Recht auf Gegenstiinde gerichtet sind? Oder liegt es in jedem Fall an den Vorstellungsakten, die Aufgabe der Gerichtetheit zu erfUlIen? Der zweiten Annahme zufolge waren Urteile, GefUhle und Willensakte bloB durch die Ihnen zugrunde liegende Intentionalitat der Vorstellungen, auf denen sie beruhen, intentional. 3 Ein zweiter Streitpunkt betrifft relationale und nicht-relationale Interpretationen des Ausdrucks "auf einen Gegenstand gerichtet sein" als Deutung der Phrase "intentional sein". Der relationalen Interpretation zufolge sind aile geistigen Akte derart auf Gegenstande gerichtet, daB diese ihre transzendenten Ziele sind. DaB diese Auffassung etwas problema tisch ist, laBt sich erkennen, wenn wir an die Akte denken, die zum Lesen von Dichtung gehoren, oder an Akte, die auf falschen Existenzannahmen beruhen. Die These, daB aile geistigen Akte auf Gegenstande im relational en Sinne gerichtet sind, d. h. auf Gegenstande auBerhalb des Geistes, erscheint vollig falsch, es sei denn, daB wir wie Meinong neben der Existenz oder Realitat von Gegenstanden auch andere Arten des Seins zulassen. Tatsachlich verlangt eine aufmerksame Lekture von Brentanos Werk jedoch eine nicht-relationale (heute manchmal auch "adverbial" genannte) Interpretation der Intentionalitiit, der zufolge diese eine einfache, durch ein einstelliges Pradikat darzustellende Eigenschaft von geistigen Akten ist, namlich ihre Eigenschaft des auf 17 ~-:.: ,. ~> :~~\ . . ;. l diese oder jene spezifisehe Weise Geriehtet-Seins. Wenn Brentano vom Geriehtetsein auf einen Gegenstand sprieht, bezieht er sich also nieht auf mutmaf3liche transzendente Ziele von geistigen Akten, auf Gegenstande, die ohne den Geist existieren .4 Vielmehr bezieht er sieh auf Gegenstande, die dem Geist immanent sind, bzw. auf "geistige Inhalte", wie wir vallig im Geiste von Brentanos Darlegung in der Psychologie sagen kannen. Der Denkakt ist etwas Wirkliches (ein tatsaehliehes Ereignis oder ein tatsaehlieher Vorgang); dem Gegenstand des Gedankens kommt jedoeh nur in dem Maf3e Sein zu, in dem der Akt, in dem er gedacht wird, Sein hat. Der Gegenstand des Gedankens ist seiner Natur gemaf3 etwas Nicht-Wirkliehes, das dem geistigen Akt einer realen Substanz (eines Denkenden) innewahnt (vgl. Brentano 1930, S. 87 f.) . In einer Fuf3note zu seiner urspIiinglichen Behauptung der Intentionalitatsthese bestatigt Brentano, daf3 Intentionalitat stets zwischen einem Akt und einem dem Geist immanenten Gegenstand besteht (vgl. Brentano 1874, S.12S) . Wie er betont, hat schon Aristoteles "von dieser geistigen Einwohnung gesproehen", und er geht in der Folge naher auf die Aristotelische Annahme ein, "das Gedachte sei in dem denkenden Verstande." Dieselbe These ist auch in Brentanos ausfiihrlicherer Darlegung seiner Gedanken in der Deskriptiven P~ychologie zu finden, wo "immanente Gegenstande" ausdrucklieh den von Brentano so genannten "Teilen der Seele im strengen oder wartliehen Sinne" zugereehnet werden (vgl. Brentano 1982 , bes. S.10-27) .5 Selbst bei einem immanentistischen Verstandnis bleibt jedoch Brentanos Intentionalitatsprinzip nieht ohne seine Probleme. Insbesondere treten Schwierigkeiten beim Versueh auf, negative Existenzurteile wie etwa "Gott existiert nicht" zu behandeln , die unter Voraussetzung jenes Prinzips sowohl ein Objekt zu haben seheinen als auch nieht. Wie wir sehen werden, versuehten Brentano und seine unmittelbaren Naehfolger genau diese Probleme zu lasen, indem sie die ursprungliche These uberdachten, wonaeh Urteilsakte ihre Objekte (lnhalte, Materialien) aus zugrunde liegenden Vorstellungsakten gewinnen. 18 2.4. Die TheOl'ie des evidenten Urteils Brentanos Urteilstheorie ist in zweierlei Sinn sUbjektiv: Erstens ist sie immanentistisch insoweit, als Urteilsobjekte betroffen sind. Zweitens aber sind Urteile wirkliehe Ereignisse, und zwar geistige Zustande oder Episoden ein Standpunkt, der keinen Raum flir eine Auffassung von Wahrheit und Falsehheit als zeitlosen Eigenschaften nach Art von Bolzano laf3t. Dieser Schluf3 veranlaf3t Brentano sogar zur weiteren Folgerung, daf3 Gott, sofem er allwissend ist, in der Zeit existieren muf3, denn das Wissen davon, welehe Urteile wahr und welche falseh sind, muf3 sieh von Augenbliek zu Augenblick andem (vgl. Brentano 1976, S. 104ff.) Wie haben wir dann den sUbjektiven Bereich von geistigen Urteilsakten mit dem objektiven Bereich der Wahrheit zu verbinden? Wir k6nnten versuchen, das Problem mit Berufung auf den traditionellen Begriff der Wahrheit als Korrespondenz zu lasen. Brentano freilich gelangte dazu, diese Idee abzulehnen, und zwar u.a. deshalb, weil die Korrespondenztheorie kein Wahrheits-Kriterium bietet; Brentano jedoch glaubte, selbst ein solches Kriterium mit Bezug auf eine Klasse von Urteilsakten gefunden zu haben, die er als ebenso umfassend wie wiehtig erachtete, niimlieh Akte, die mit der Sphare des sen zusammenhangen, was er "innere Wahrnehmung" nannte (vgl. Brentano 1930). Also wandte sieh Brentano einer sogenannten erkenntnistheoretischen Auffassung von Wahrheit zu, die aueh durch seine Ansieht gestutzt wurde, wonach "wahr" und "falsch" synkategorematische AusdIiicke sind, sich also nieht auf Eigenschaften von Urtei1sakten beziehen. Die entscheidende Rolle in Brentanos Wahrheitstheorie wird yom Begriff der Evidenz gespielt. Hier begegnen wir einem wiehtigen cartesianisehen Zug in Brentanos Denken. Er unterteilt aile Urteile in Tatsachenurteile einerseits und Axiome oder Notwen.digkeitsurteile andererseits. leGe sind wiederum von zweierlei Art: Urteile der inneren Wahrnehmung (etwa wenn ieh urteile, daf3 ieh gerade denke bzw., in anderen Worten, daf3 mein. gegenwiirtiges Denken existiert) und Urteile der auf3eren Wahrnehmung (z. B. wenn ich urteile, daf3 et19 was rot ist, also daG ehvas Rates existiert). Unseren Urteilen kommt laut Brentano Evidenz zu, wenn etwas eintritt, was er als Identitat von Urteilendem und Beurteiltem bezeichnet. Die Erfahrung einer so\chen Identitat i t derart grundlegend, daG sie sozusagen nur "ostensiv" in unseren j eweiligen besonderen Urteilsakten aufgezeigt werden kann (vgl. Brentano 1928, § 2, S.3). Eine solche Identitat (und mithin auch unsere Erfahrung davon) bleibt fur Urteile der aufieren Wahrnehmung ausgeschlossen, doch ist sie fUr Urteile def inneren Wahrnehmung garantiert: "Unmittelbar sicher, d. h. evident, i t dagegen die innere Wahrnehmung. Was uns im inneren Bewu(3tsein erseheint, ist wirklich so, wie es erscheint" (Brentano 1956, S. 154). Axiome lassen sich laut Brentano durcb Urteile wie "Ein rundes Quadrat existiert nicht" veranschaulichen. Solche Urteile haben begriffiiche Beziehungen zum Gegenstand und sind ebenfalls immer evident. Axiomen ist eigen, daG sieh ihre Wahrheit a priori aus den entsprechenden Begriffen ergibt (vgl. Brentano 1956, S.141 ff., 162-16 , 173; Brentano 1933, S.88, 187) . Sie sind in dem Sinne "a priori" daB sie nicht auf Wahrnehmung (oder auf irgendeinem Tatsachenurteil) beruhen. Neben dem runden Quadrat sind ein griines RoJ und ein Urteilender, der etwas mit Recht zugieich anerkennt und verwirjt, Brentanos Lieblingsbeispiele fur Objekte von Axiomen. Brentano beharrt nun darauf, daB aile Axiome negativ sind, d.h . von der Form " Ein A, das B ist , existiert nicht", , Bin A, das B und C ist, existiert nicht" usw. Die Urteile , die fUr Weseo wie uns evident sind, umfassen ledighch innere Wahrnehmungen und Axiome. Brentano gesteht zwar zu daf3 wir auch tiber die auf3ere Wel t wahr urteilen kbnnen, doch be~teht er darallf, daB unsere diesbezuglichen Urteile zwangslaufig "blind" (d .h. eine Angeiegenheit von bloBenAhnungen oder Vermutungen) bleiben und darum nicht zu unserer Erkenntnis im strengen Sinne gehbren. lbst wahre Urteile, die uns nicht evident sind, mussen jedoch fur ein Wesen (wie Gott) evident sein, das fahig ist, uber diesel ben Gegenstande auf gleiche Weise zu urteilen, jedoch derart, daB seine Urteile von der Erfahrung der Evidenz begleitet werden. 20 3. Akt, Inhalt und Gegenstand des Urteils GemaB Brentanos Erkenntnistheorie ist Wahrheit insofern subjektiv, als sie von einer subjektiven Erfahrung der Evidenz abhiingt. Bei einem tieferen Verstandnis ist sie jedoch in dem Sinne objektiv, da/3 die Erfahrung der Evidenz zu jeglichem Zeitpunkt nur mit Bezug auf die Elemente einer begrenzten Menge von Urteilen gewonnen werden kann, die unabhangig von dem urteilenden SUbjekt festgelegt ist. lodes gilt Wahrheit fUr Brentano nieht absolut: Ein Urteil, das zu einem Zeitpunkt wahr ist, muB dies zu einem anderen nicht sein . Wer wahr urteilt, tut dies in der Tat nur zu einer gewissen Zeit. Das bedeutet freilich nicht , daB sich die Wahrheit von einer Zeit zur anderen und von einem Subjekt zum anderen wandelt; vielmehr liegt es an den urteilenden Subjekten, daB sie manchmal mit Evidenz urteilen und manchmal nicht (vgl. Brentano 1956, S.193 ff.). Wie verhalt es sich nun mit der Logik? GenieJ3en logische Gesetze eine zeitlose Giiltigkeit? Diese Frage betrifft jene Problematik, die unter dem Schlagwort Psychologismus bekannt geworden ist. Brentanos Lbsungsvorschlag lautet, daB die Objektivitiit der Logik durch Evidenz garantiert sein sollte, und zwar auf dieselbe Weise, auf welche die Evidenz die Objektivitat der Wahrheit garantiert. Vom Begriff der Wahrheit ist jedoch vernunftigerweise anzunehmen, daB er stets auf einzelne kognitive Akte und mithin auf einzelne urteilende Subjekte bezogen ist. Wie sollen wir auf dieser Basis die Tatsache erklaren, daf3 die Logik darauf zielt, ein gemeinsames normatives Regelsystem hervorzubringen, das fUr jeden DenkprozeJ3 einen Standard darstellt, dem er zu entsprechen hat?6 Brentano selbst bot letztlich keine befriedigende Antwort auf diese Frage. Seine Nachfolger begegneten dem Problem auf zweierlei Weise: einerseits durch detaillierte Untersuchungen der geistigen Seite von Urteilsakten, andererseits aber durch den Schritt von der Psychologie zur Ontologie: ein Schritt, der zur Behauptung spezifischer Objekte von Urteilsakten fUhrte, wie sie bereits einerseits in der Scholastik7 vorweggenommen worden war, andererseits aber in Bolzanos Lehre yom Satz an sich. 21 3. J. Hermann Lotze und julius Bergmann: de,. Begriff des Sachverhalts Insbesondere in Zusammenhang mit dem Terminus 'Sachverhalt' begannen die Urteilstheoretiker gegen Ende des 19. lahrhunderts wieder einmal Elemente der iilteren, transzendenten (realistischen) Theorie der Scholastiker wiederzuentdecken. Del' Terminus selbst ist von Phrasen der Art 'wie die Sachen sich zueinander verhalten' aus dem gewohnlichen deutschen Sprachgebrauch abgeleitet. 8 Del' Ausdruck taucht, wenn auch nur en passant, 1874 in Hermann Lotzes Logik auf. Lotze verteidigt dort die Ansicht, dal3 es spezifische Urteilsgegenstande gibt, eine Ansicht, die einen weiteren Keirn des sich abzeichnenden Bruches mit den immanentistischen Kombinationstheorien in sich birgt. In seiner Behandlung der Urtei Ie selbst hiilt sich Lotze jedoch brav innerhalb des kombinationstheoretischen Rahmens. Er fuhrt seine Auffassung von Urteilen ein, indem er Relationen zwischen Vorstellungen einerseits und Relationen zwischen Dingen (sachlichen Verhiiltnissen) andererseits einander gegeniiberstellt (vgl. Lotze 1880: § 36). Nur "deshalb, wei! man dieses sachliche Verhiiltnil3 .. . als bestehend schon voraussetzt" , schreibt Lotze, "kann man es in einem Satze abbilden." Eben dann, wenn Lotze von Relationen zwischen Dingen als dem transzendenten Ziel des Urteilens spricht, verwendet er den Ausdruck 'Sachverhalt', den dann Julius Bergmann, ein Lotze nahestehender Philosoph, 1879 in seiner Allgemeinen Logik auf systematische Weise gebraucht. Fur Bergmann ist Erkenntnis ein Denken, "des sen Gedachtes mit dem Sachverhalt ubereinstimmt, d. i., welches wahr ist" (vgl. Bergmann 1879, S.2-5, 19, 38) . Fur Lotze und Bergmann fungiert der Sachverhalt also als jene objektive Komponente, der das Urteil entsprechen mul3, urn wahr zu sein.9 Lotzes Ideen iiber Urteilsobjekte wurden auch in England aufgeariffen und zwar durch den Einflul3 von lames Ward, der bei Lotze b ' nach dessen Berufung (1844) nach Gottingen studierte. Auf diese Weise ge!angte Lotze in Cambridge zur Kenntnis von George Frederick Stout 10, der in die angelsachsische Welt die Theorie der spateI' 22 als "Propositionen" bekannt gewordenen spezifischen Urteilsobjekte einfiihrt. Lotzes Vorlesungen wurden auch von zwei Lieblingsschulern von Brentano besucht, namlich Carl Stumpf und Anton Marty. Beide spiel en in der folgenden Geschichte eine Rolle. 3.2. Carl Stump!, Akt und lnhalt von Urteilen Urn Stumpfs Errungenschaften zu verstehen, muss en wir uns Brentanos Urteilstheorie in Erinnerung rufen. Die prototypischen ontologischen Korrelate von Urteilen sind nach Brentanos Ansicht einfach die immanenten geistigen Objekte von Vorstellungen, z.B. die Sinnesdaten, die in positiven oder negativen Urteilen anerkannt bzw. verworfen werden. Brentanos unmittelbare Nachfolger wurden jedoch zumindest bis zu einem gewissen Grad von Bolzano wie von Lotze angeregt, ontologische Korrelative von Urteilsakten zu suchen, die sich kategoria1 von jenen der Vorstellungsakte unterscheiden. Aber Stumpf, Marty u.a . konzipierten diese ontologischen Korrelative weiterhin auf eine Weise, die mit Brentanos Existenztheorie hannonierte. Fur das ontologische Korrelat des positiven Urteils "A existiert" verwendeten sie Ausdriicke wie "die Existenz von A"; fUr das Korrelat des entsprechenden negativen Urteils Termini wie "die Nicht-Existenz von A". Auch erkannten sie andere Typen von Urteilskorrelaten: die Subsistenz von A (als Korrelat von Urteilen tiber ideale Gegenstande und Fiktionen), die Moglichkeit von A, die Notwendigkeit von A (als Korrelaten von Modalurteilen) usw. 1m Jahr 1888 fiihrte Stumpf den Terminus 'Sachverhalt' ein, urn sich auf derartige Urteilskorrelate zu beziehen, und begrundete damit eine Praxis, die sich a!s einflu13reicher erwies als jene von Lotze und Bergmann. Der betreffende Passus findet sich in Stumpfs Logikvorlesung von 1888, deren schriftliche Unterlage im Husserl-Archiv in Louvain aufbewahrt wird und wo wir lesen konnen: "Von der Materie des Urteils unterscheiden wir seinen Inhalt oder den im Urteil ausgedriickten Sachverhalt. Z.B. 'Gott ist' hat zur Materie Gott, zum Inhalt das Sein Gottes. 'Es gibt keinen Gott' hat dieselbe Materie, aber den Inhalt: 'Nichtsein Gottes'" (MS Q 13, S.4). Der Sachver23 halt ist demzufolge jener spez~fische Inhalt eines Urtei/s, " der yom Vorstellungsinhalte (der Materie) zu scheiden sei und sprachlich in ' DaB-Satzen' oder in substantivierten Infinitiven ausgedrlickt wird" (Stumpf 1906a, S.29f.). Stumpf ordnet die Sachyerhalte einer speziellen Kategorie zu, den von ihm so genannten Gebilden Entitaten, die er mit Sternbildern am Himmel Yergleicht, die wir dort aufzufinden vorgeben, obwoh! sie in Wirklichkeit Schopfungen der geistigen Welt sind . Gebilde sind also nicht an sich Entitaten, die irgendwo in der Welt existieren, sondern vielmehr Inhalte von geistigen Akten (oder yon "Funktionen" in Stumpfs eigener Tenninologie). Gebilde sind immanent; sie existieren bloB "im Verbande des lebendigen seelischen Daseins" (Stumpf 1906b, S.34; vgl. auch Stumpf 1906a, S.ll, 32) . Das Besondere dieser Position laf3t sich am klarsten an der Tatsache erkennen, daB Stumpf nicht nur 8egriffe und Sachverhalte zur Kategorie der immanenten Gebilde rechnet, sondern auch Gestaltqualitaten, Werte und Mengen oder Klassen im mathematischen Sinne. Diese Idee ist eher verstandlich, wenn wir bedenken, daf3 Stumpfs Vorstellung einer Wissenschaft von Gebilden (vgl. Stumpf 1906b, S. 32) so gut wie sieher durch die von Georg Cantor, einem KoJlegen von Stumpfund Husser! an der Universitat Halle, entwickelte Theorie der Mannigfaltigkeiten beeinfluf3t war. Erinnern wir uns nur an Cantors Definition einer Menge als "jegJicher Ansammlung von bestimmten und wohlunterschiedenen Gegenstanden unserer Anschauung oder unseres Denkens zu einem Ganzen ."11 So wie Cantors Werk in der Ontologie von Mengen oder Kollektiven einen neuen Standard etablierte, genauso stellt Stumpfs Werk liber Sachverhalte einen Meilenstein auf dem Weg zu einer ontologisch anspruchsyolleren Urteilstheorie dar, die wie wir sellen werden fUr die Zwecke der modernen Logik fruchtbar ist. 3.3. Kazimierz Twardowski: Inhalt und Gegenstand Den entscheidenden Bruch mit der immanentistischen Position, die sich so verheerend auf die Urteilstheorien wiihrend des 19. 1ahrhun24 derts auswirkte, vollzog schlie.f3lich Kazimierz Twardowski, und zwar in seinem Buch Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen: Eine psychologische Untersuchung von 1894. Twardowski pdisentiert dort eine Reihe von Argumenten zugunsten der Unterscheidung zwischen dem Inhalt von Vorstellungsakten einerseits und ihren Objekten andererseits. Twardowski (1894), S.3f. , beginnt seine Untersuchung mit einer Analyse des Unterschiedes zwischen Vorstellung und Vorgestelltem im Sinne der friiheren Brentanisten. Beide Ausdriicke sind mehrdeutig: Der erste bezieht sich manchmal auf einen Akt oder die Aktivitat des Vorstellens, manchmal aber auf den lnhalt bzw. das immanente Objekt dieses Aktes. Der zweite Ausdruck bezieht sich mitunter ebenfalls auf dieses immanente Objekt (grob gesagt, auf ein Bild des tatsachlichen Dinges), manchmal aber auch auf das tatsachIiche, unabhangig yom Bewuf3tsein existierende Ding. Um diese Ver~ wirrung zu vermeiden, miissen wir wie Twardowski zu zeigen versucht die Unterscheidung einer genaueren Analyse unterziehen. Erstens gibt es Eigenschaften, die wir dem Gegenstand zuschreiben, aber ohne daf3 sie Eigenschaften des Inhalts sind: Mein geistiges Bild einer roten Rose ist nicht selbst rot. Zweitens unterscheiden sich Gegenstande und Inhalte durch die Tatsache, daf3 der Gegenstand wirklich sein kann oder nicht, wahrend dem Inhalt in jedem Fall keine Wirklichkeit zukommt. 12 Drittens kann ein und derselbe Gegenstand durch verschiedene Vorstellungsinhalte vorgestellt werden: So kann etwa dasselbe Gebaude von vorne oder von hinten gesehen werden. Viertens ist es moglich, eine Vielzahl von Gegenstanden durch einen einzigen Inhalt vorzustellen, z. B. durch einen Allgemeinbegriffwie Mensch. Schlief3lich aber konnen wir selbst tiber nicht-existierende Gegenstande wahre Urteile Hillen, z.B. wenn wir urteilen, daf3 Pegasus Fliigel hat. 13 Wenn es keinen tatsachlichen Unterschied zwischen lnhalt und Gegenstand gabe, dann ware es unmoglich, daB der Inhalt eines solchen Urteils existiert , das Objekt jedoch nicht. Twardowski definiert den Inhalt einer Vorstellung als "jenes Bindeglied zwischen dem Vorstellungsact und dem Vorstellungsgegenstand, kraft dessen sich ein Act eben auf diesen bestimm25 ~. ten und keinen andern Gegenstand bezieht" (Twardowski 1894, S. 31). Den Gegenstand charakterisiert Twardowski folgendermaBen: Alles, was durch eine Vorstellung vorgestellt, durch ein Urteil anerkannt oder verworfen, durch eine Gemiitstatigkeit begehrt oder verabscheut wird, nennen wir Gegenstand. Die Gegenstande sind entweder real oder nicht real, sie sind entweder mogliche oder unmogliche, sie existieren oder existieren nicht. Allen ist gemeinsam, dass sie Object ... psychischer Acte sein konnen oder sind, dass ihre sprachliche Bezeichnung der Name ist '" Alles, was im weitesten Sinne "etwas" ist , heisst zunachst mit Beziehung auf ein vorgestelltes Subject, dann aber auch abgesehen von dieser Beziehung "Gegenstand". (Twardowski J 894, S.40) Twardowski bemuht sich auch um eine linguistische Erklarung der von ihm auf dem Gebiet der Psychologie erzielten Ergebnisse. In dieser Hinsicht folgt er seinem Lehrer Brentano (von dem er auch die Ansicht ubernimmt, daB es zwar keinen strikten Parallelismus von Denken und Sprache gibt, daB die linguistische Analyse aber dennoch helfen kann, die Beziehungen zu analysieren, die in unserem geistigen Leben bestehen). Twardowski stutzt sich dabei wesentlich auf Brentanos Unterscheidung zweier Arlen von Adjektiven, der determinierenden und der modifizierenden (vgl. Brentano 191 J, S. 60 ff., Anm.): "Attributiv oder determinierend nennt man eine Bestimmung, wenn sie die Bedeutung des Ausdrucks, zu we\chem sie gehort, sei es in positiver oder negativer Richlung erganzt, erweitert. Modificierend ist eine Bestimmung dano, wenn sie die ursprungliche Bedeutung des Namens, bei welchem sie steht, vollstiindig andert" (Twardowski 1894, S. 12 f.). Das ' fest' in 'fester Hiindedruck' wird determinierend gebraucht, 'verweigert' in 'verweigerter Hiindedruck' hingegen modifizierend. Wie Twardowski bemerkt, kann das Adjektiv 'vorgestellt' abhangig davon , wie die Phrase 'das Vorgestellte' verstanden wird (namlich so, daB es den tatsachlichen Gegenstand der Vorstellung oder ihren Inhalt bezeichnet), auf beiderlei Weise fungieren, d. h. als determinierendes oder modifizierendes 26 Adjektiv. Es tritt etwa determinierend auf, wenn der Ausdruck 'Vorgestell tes' sich auf eine Landschaft bezieht, die Gegenstand eines geistigen Aktes ist. Andererseits aber fungiert 'vorgestellt' (so wie 'gedacht', 'vermutet' oder 'eingebildet') aufmodifizierende Weise: Es verandert die Bedeutung des Wortes 'Landschaft' . Diese Betonung des Zusammenspiels von sprachlichen und psychologischen Merkmalen von Urteilen bleibt auch fUr Twardowskis spatere Werke eben so wie fUr die seiner SchUler charakteristisch. Ein anderes wichtiges Beispiel fUr diesen Gegensatz zwischen detenninierenden und modifizierenden Adjektiven stell en die Worter 'wahr ' und 'falsch' dar. In Wendungen wie 'falscher Freund' o?er 'falsches Gold ' fungiert das Adjektiv 'falsch' gewi13 auf modlfizlerende Weise. Wenn 'falsch' von Uberzeugungen oder Urteilen ausgesagt wird, wird es jedoch determinierend gebraucht. Als Trager von Wahrheit und Falschheit betrachtet Twardowski (1894) d~shalb Urt~tle (dIe er zu jener Zeit als psychische Vorgange und mHhm als emzelne episodische Vorkommnisse auffa13te). In seiner Schrift Zur Lehre vom lnhalt und Gegenstand del' Vorstellungen schreibt Twardowski dem Urteilsakt einen spezifischen, Ihm elgenen lnhalt zu, wahrend er meint, daB das Urteil seinen Gegenstand von den ihm zugrunde liegenden Vorstellungen "erbe". Fur Tward~wski ist deshalb (ebenso wie fUr Brentano oder Stumpf) der UrteIismhalt die Existenz des betreffenden Gegenstandes . Drei Jahre spater schlagt Twardowski jedoch in einem Brief an Meinong vor, daB zusatzlich zum Urteilsinhalt auch ein spezifischer Urteilsgegenstand anerkannt werden sollte (vgl. Meinong 1965, S.143f.). Dadurch bewirkte er eine Verallgemeinerung der Unterscheidung von Inhalt und Gegenstand auf den Bereich der Urteilsakte, und zwar derart, wi~ dies im Schema auf der folgenden Seite dargestellt ist. Durch dIe Anerkennung der Unterscheidung dieser drei Elemente im Bereich der Urteile wurde ein weites Feld verschiedener Arlen von Untersuchungen Uber Urteile moglich. 1m Werk von Meinong, Ehrenfels, Husser! und anderen Nachfolgern Brentanos entwickeln sich Ontologien von Sachverhalten und verwandteo Gebilden wie Werteo oder Gestaltqualitaten. Twardowski selbst interessierte sich 27 Vorstellungsakt Vorstelilingsinhal t Vorstellungsgegenstand (Denken eines CBiid cines Apfels) (Apfel) Apfels) Urteilsakf Urfeilsinhalt Sachverha/{ (positive Beurtei- (die Existenz (ein Apfel existiert) lung [Anerkennung] eines Apfels) eines Apfels) vor all em fiir Akt und Inhalt des Urteilens mit Bezug auf sprachliehe Ausdriicke und begrundete dadurch in Polen eine Tradition, die im 20. Jahrhundert auf natiirliche Weise zum Werk von Tarski und anderen auf den Gebieten von Logik und Semantik fiihrte. 14 Zur gleichen Zeit lebte unter seinen polnischen Nachfolgern des Interesse an der klassischen korrespondenztheoretischen Idee wieder auf eine Wiedergeburt, die dadurch moglich geworden war, daf3 Twardowski zusatzlich zu Akt und Inhalt des Urteils auch des sen wahl'machendes transzendentes Ziel anerkannt hatte . 4. Edmund Husserl: Ontologie des Urteils Unter allen in Brentanos Kielwasser entstandenen Werken, die del' Psychologie und Ontologie des Urteils gewidmet sind, ragen Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen von 1900/01 (2. AuO . 1913-1921) als auf3erordentliches Meistel'werk hervor. Wie sein Vorganger Twardowski unterscheidet Husser! den immanenten Inhalt eines Urteilsaktes von dessen Gegenstand (Husser! 1894; 1913b, VI §§ 28, 33, 39). Er anerkennt auch Brentanos Begriff der Aktqualitat, meint aber, daf3 dieser nicht nur den positiven odeI' negativen Faktor der Anerkennung bzw. Ablehnung in einem Urteilsakt einschlief3t , sondem ebenso einen anderen Faktor, der bestimmt, ob ein gegebener Akt ein Akt des Ul'teilens, des Annehmens, Zweifelns usw. ist. Zugleich legt er grof3en Wert auf die Tatsache, daf3 dieses Moment des Aktes val'iabel ist, selbst wenn sein Inhalt festgelegt ist (vgl. Husserl 28 1913 b, V § 20) . 1ch kann also etwa urteilen. dafJ Hans schwimmt, uberlegen. ob er schwimmt usw. Dieser Inhalt ist mithin jenes Moment des Aktes, das den betreffenden Gegenstand bestimmt, zudem aber aueh, als was der Gegenstand im Akt erfaf3t wird die Merkmale, Beziehungen und kategorialen Formen, die ihm durch den Akt zugewiesen werden (vgl. Husserl 1913 b, V § 20). All das ist uns schon aus Brentanos und Twardowskis Schriften vertraut. Husserls Theorie findet aber auch Entspreehungen in Freges Schriften, in denen die dreiHiitige Theorie von Akt, Inhalt und Gegenstand auf die sprachliehe Ebene iibersetzt ist und so die dreifache Unterscheidung zwischen Ausdruck, Sinn und Bedeutung erglbt; Husserls "Qualitat" entspricht dem, was in Freges Urteilstheorie "Zweck" heif3t (vgl. Frege 1879, §§ 2 ff.).15 Hatten sich die orthodoxeren Brentanisten auf Psychologie konzentriert, auf aktbasierte Ansatze der Urteilstheorie, so hatte Frege notorisch Probleme, diese psychologische Dimension in sein sprachlich ausgerichtetes Modell einzubauen. 16 Husserl gelang als erstem die Konstruktion eines integrativen Rahmens, in dem die Theorie sprachlicher Bedeutungen zum Element einer Theorie von Akten und ihren Strukturen wird. Husserls Behandlung der Beziehungen zwi schen Sprache, Handlung und Bedeutung beweist in der Tat eine Differenziertheit, wie sie bis dahin in der philosophisehen Literatur noch nicht zu finden war. Dies erklart u.a. den gewaltigen Eintlu13 der Logischen Untersuchungen, der sich nicht auf die rasante, gut dokumentierte Wirkung der "Prolegomena zur rein en Logik" (des ersten Bandes der Logischen Untersuchungen) beschrankte, durch welche die in loaischen Zirkeln bis dahin vorherrschenden psychologistischen Theorien hinweggefegt wurden.17 Vielmehr fiihrten Hussel'ls Logische Untersuchungen auch zu einer Neubelebung des Intel'esses an Bolzanos Wel'k, und sie beeinfluf3ten insbesondere auch logische Entwicklungen in Polen, indem sie die Entwicklung der nunmehl' so genannten kategorialen Grammatik dUrch Lesniewski und andere anregten. J 8 Husserls Gedanken zu Sprache und Bedeutung fiihrten zudem zur Entwicklung der Sprechakttheorie durch seine fruhen Anhanger in 29 ~, Munchenl9, zu neuen Ansatzen in der theoretischen Linguistik durch Roman Jakobson und andere Mitglieder des Cercle Linguistique de Prague sowie in der Denkpsychologie durch die Arbeiten von Karl Buhler und anderen Vertretern der Wurzburger Schule. 20 4. J. Sachverhalt und Proposition Urn die Originalitat von Husserls Ansichten zu verstehe.n , muss en wir bedenken, daB die fruheren Brentanisten der DimenSIOn der l~- gischen Syntax nicht angemessen berucksichtigten - ,::oran zum Te~1 ihre Ablehnung der kombinatorischen Aspekte der fruheren K~mbl- nationstheorie von Wahrheit und Urteil schuld war. Also fehlte Ihnen jegliches Verstandnis fUr die Tatsache, daB sich Urteils.akte von Vorstellungsakten nicht nur durch ein Moment der Zustlmmung .oder Uberzeugung (Brentanos Anerkennungl Ablehnung) unterschelde~, sondern auch durch durch eine spezifische propositionale Form. Mit anderen Worten muB ein Urteil eine bestimmte Art von Komplexitat aufweisen, d.h. eine Komplexitat, die nicht bloB kombinatorischer Natur is!. Diese Komplexitat druckt sich seJbst sprachlich in der spezifischen Form des Satzes aus; ontologisch spiegelt sie sich in Form von Sachverhalten wider. Urn diese Komplexitiit und die Art, wie verschiedene Urteilsdimensionen zu einer einzigen Ganzheit vereinigt werden, zu erklaren, bedient sich Husser! ei~er õto!ogis~hen TheOl'ie von Teil, Ganzem und Verschmelzung, die er 111 der dnttcn seiner Logischen Untersuchungen darlegt. 21 . Wenn wir einen sprachlichen Ausdruck verwenden, so hat dleser Ausdruck laut Husser! Bedcutung, wei! ihm durch eine Handlung, in der ein entsprechender Gegenstand dem die Sprache gebrauchenden Subjekt intentional gegeben ist, eine Bedeutung verliehen wird: "Einen Ausdruck mit Sinn gebrauchen und sich ausdruckend auf den Gegenstand beziehen (den Gegenstand vorstellen), ist einerlei", wie Husser! (1913b), S.59, betont. EinAkt des Bedeutens.l~t laut Husserl (1913b), S.54f., "die bestimmte Weise des den Je:-,elhgen Gegenstand Meinens"22 Die gegenstandsbezogene und dIC b~- deutungsverleihende Komponente des Aktes werden dadurch zu el30 nem einzigen Ganzen verschmolzen: Sie konnen nur in abstracto voneinander unterschieden, aber nicht als zwei getrennte Teile des Aktes erfahren werden. Das Verleihen einer Bedeutung z.B. besteht also nicht in der bewuBten geistigen Verbindung eines Sprachgebrauchs mit einer idealen Bedeutung platonistischer Pragung: 1m Gegensatz zu Bolzano oder Frege betrachtet Husserl Bedeutungen nicht als ideale oder abstrakte Gegenstande, die derart im Leeren hangen, daB sie getrennt von konkreten Akten der Sprachverwendung existieren konnten. Wie Bolzano und Frege benotigt jedoch auch Husser! eine ideale oder abstrakte Komponente als Grundlage fUr seine nicht-psychologische Erklarung der Notwendigkeit logischer Gesetze. Ebenso bedarf er einer Moglichkeit, der Tatsache Rechnung zu tragen, daB die einem gegebenen Ausdruck ver!iehene Bedeutung bei einer bestimmten Gelegenheit dadurch, daB sie kommuniziert wird, uber die besonderen Akte hinausgehen kann, die bei jener GeJegenheit ins Spiel kommen. Wie kann diesel be Bedeutung von unterschiedlichen Subjekten an verschiedenen Orten und Zeiten erkannt werden? Husserls Antwort auf diese Frage ist eben so elegant wie kuhn: Er entwickelt einen aristotelischen Begriff der Bedeutungen von sprachlichen Ausdrucken, indem er sie als Arlen oder Spezies der damit verknupften Sprechakte auffaBt. Urn zu verstehen, worauf es dabei ankommt, mussen wir zunachst einmal festhalten, daB Husser! Bedeutungsakte in zwei Typen gliedert: solche, die mit dem Gebrauch von Namen verknupft sind und von ihm als Vorstellungsakte bezeichnet werden, und solche, die mit dem Gebrauch von Siitzen zu tun haben, d. h. die Urteilsakte. Wahrend jene auf Gegenstande gerichtet sind, beziehen sich diese auf Sachverhalte. Ein Bedeutungsakt der ersten Art kann entweder fUr sich vorkommen oder aber im Rahmen eines Bedeutungsaktes del' zweiten Art wobei er in diesem Fall einem AnpassungsprozeB unterzogen wird (vgl. Husserl 1921, S. 546 f.). Die von Husserl als Begriffe bezeichneten Bedeutungen von Namen sind Spezies von Vorstellungsakten, die Bedeutungen von Satzen (die Husserl "Propositionen" nennt) sind Spezies von Urteilsakten. Die Beziehung zwischen einer Bedeutung und einem damit verknupften Akt der 31 Sprachverwendung ist aber in jedem Fall eine Beziehung zwischen Spezies und Instanz, und zwar genau so wie zwischen der Spezies Rot und einem roten Gegenstand. Zu sagen, daf3 meine Verwendung von 'rot' dassel be bedeutet wie deine Verwendung von ' rot', heif3t nichts anderes, als daf3 unsere jeweiligen Akte charakteristische Ahnlichkeiten aufweisen, aufgrund welcher sie als gleichartig angesehen werden konnen . Etwas genauer sollten wir sagen , daf3 die Spezies Rot nur durch einen bestimmten Teil oder ein Moment des roten Gegenstandes instantiiert wird, namlich seine individuelle Beschaffenheit des Rotseins; also wird jegliche Bedeutungs-Spezies nur von einem Teil oder Moment des Bedeutungsaktes instantiiert, und zwar von jenem Teil oder Moment, der fUr die lntentionalitat des Aktes verantwortlich ist, d.h. dafiir, daB er auf ganz bestimmte Weise auf einen Gegenstand gerichtet ist (vgl. Husserl 1913a. S.111 f.; 1913 b, S.111 f.).23 Die Bedeutung ist dieses Moment des Geriehtetseins, in specie betrachtet. Die Identitat def Bedeutung von Akt zu Akt und von Subjekt zu Subjekt ist dann die identital der Spezies, wobei dieser Begriff vor dem Hintergrund jener immanent realistisehen Theorie der Spezies und ihrer lnstanzen zu sehen ist , die Aristoteles in den Kategorien entwiekelt. Es ist wichtig zu betonen, daB so verstandene Bedeutungen nieht selbst die Gegenstande von gewohnliehen Spreehakten sind. Unter normal en Umstanden geistiger Erfahrung bezeichnen wir nicht die Bedeutung eines Ausdrucks , indem wir diese Bedeutung als Ziel eines jeglichen damit verknupften intentionalen Aktes auffassen. Vielmehr bringen wir unsererseits muhelos zustande, daf3 die Bedeutung instantiiert wird, indem wir den Ausdruck als Bestandteil eines Aktes verwenden, durch den jener auf einen geeigneten Gegenstand oder Sachverhalt gerichtet ist. Bedeutungen konnen zu Gegenstanden oder Zielen bestimmter Arten von reflexiven Akten werden; eben solche Akte machen jedoch (unter anderem) die Wissenschaft der Logik aus. Die Logik kommt ins Spiel , wenn wir jene Spezies, die Bedeutungen sind, als besondere Art von stellvertretcndcn Gegenstanden (als 'ideale Einzelgegenstande ' ) ansehen und die Eigenschaften dieser Gegenstande auf ziemlich gleiche Weise untersu32 chen, wie Mathematiker die Eigenschaften von Zahlen oder geometrischen Figuren untersuchen. Geometrische Figuren erhalten wir ja, ,,":enn konkrete Gestalten in specie behandelt werden, losgel6st von Jeder zuf<illigen Verknupfung mit besonderem Erfahrungsmaterial und Kontext; genauso konstituiert sich der Gegenstand def Logik daraus, was sieh ergibt, wenn konkrete Episoden des Sprachgebrauchs in Abstraktion vom Material und Kontext ihrer Verwendung behandelt werden . Ebenso besteht ein Zusammenhang zwischen der Mehrdeutigkeit von Termini wie 'Lin ie' , 'Dreieck' oder 'Halbkreis', die sowoh! Klassen von tatsachlich existierenden Instantiierungen a!s auch ideale Einzelgegenstande im Bereich der Geometrie bedeuten, und der Mehrdeutigkeit von Termini wie 'Begriff' , 'Proposition ', ' Foigerung' oder 'Beweis', die sowohl Klassen geisti?er Akte bezeichnen, die Gegenstand der Psychologie sind, als auch ldeale Einzelgegenstande im Bereich der Bedeutungen. 4.2. Formate Ontologic und Kategoriale Grammatik Husser! geht auch in seiner Behandlung der Ontologie liber seine Brentanistischen Vorganger hinaus. Twardowskis (1894) und Meinongs (1899) Idee einer Gegenstandstheorie aufgreifend, begriindet Husserl dIe neue Disziplin derformalen Ontologie , innerhalb welcher der formale Begriff des Sachverhalts - "formal" in dem Sinne dal3 er ohne Einschrankung auf aile Angelegenheiten angewende; werden kann Seite an Seite mit dem formal en Begriff des Gegenstandes als ontologischer Begriff h6herer Ordnung eingestuft wird. Dlese Husserlsche Disziplin der formalen Ontologie wird dano von Husserls Schulern in Munchen weiterentwickelt, was zur Vorstellung der Logik als Wissenschaft von Sachverhalten fUhrt, wie s ie Adolf Reinach in seinem Aufsatz "Zur Theorie des negativen Urtells" vo.n 1911 entwickelt. Darin werden die beiden Begriffe der Proposltlon und des Sachverhalts letztlich v61lig auseinanderdivi diert. Propositionen sind die Bedeutungen von Urteilen, Sachverhalte sind gegenstandliche Wahrmacher; sie sind das, kraft dessen ei n Urteil wahr ist. Reinach unterscheidet foJglich zwei Arten von Ne33 gation: die Negation auf der Ebene des Saehverhalts (wie in 'Di~se Rose ist nieht rot') und die Negation auf der Ebene der ProposltlOn (wie in 'Was du gerade gesagt hast, ist nicht wahr'). Als weiterer, nicht minder einflu13reieher Teil von Husserls Werk erwuchs aus seiner Urteilstheorie die in der vierten Logisehen Untersuehung prasentierte Theorie der grammatischen Kategorien. Sieher ist Frege fUr manehe der bedeutendsten Fortschritte in unserem Verstandnis der logisch-grammatischen Form verantwortlich; was seine Behandlung der logiseh-grammatischen Besonderheiten von Urteilen und Satzen betrifft, gelangte Frege seltsamerweise jedoeh nicht tiber Brentano hinaus, und zwar deshalb, weil er aile Satze als besondere Art von Namen auffa13te. Die vertrauten Unterscheidungen zwischen kategorischen, hypothetischen und disjunktiven Urteilen bestehen fUr Frege nur an der Oberflache; Sie haben " nur grammatische Bedeutung" (Frege 1879, S.4) . In Freges idealer Sprache hat jedes Urteil ein und dieselbe Form: " Das Subject enthalt den ganzen Inhalt", wahrend "eine solche Sprache" andererseits "nur ein einziges Pradicat fur aile Urtheile" hat. "namlich 'ist eine Thatsache'" (Frege 1879, S. 3f.).24 In der vierten seiner Logischen Untersuchungen skizziert Husser! die Idee einer Wissenschaft der "logischen Grammatik", einer formalen Theorie der Kategorien sprachlicher Einheiten (bzw., genauer gesagt , ihrer Entsprechungen im Bereich der Bedeutungen) und def kategorialen Gesetze, welche die Kombination solcher Einheiten bestimmen. Er griindet seine Theorie auf die Vorstellung, da13 es einen strukturellen Parallelismus zwischen immanenten Inhalten auf der Ebene unserer empirisch vollzogenen Akte einerseits und Bedeutungsuniversalien auf der Ebene der Logik andererseits gibt. Dies erlaubt ihm, auf sehr natlirliche Weise die Tatsache zu erklaren, dal3 die Gesetze der Logik auf das tatsachliche Denken, Sprechen und Folgern anwendbar sind, zugleich aber der Notwendigkeit gerecht zu werden, die solchen Gesetzen aufgrund der Tatsache zukommt, dal3 sie sich in erster Linie auf universale , als aristotelische Arten aufgefal3te Bedeutungen beziehen, aber erst in zweiter Linie auf die immanenten Inhalte, durch die diese Arten instantiiert werden. 34 1m Gegensatz dazu lie13en Frege und seine Nachfolger in der analytischen Tradition aufgrund einer Oberreaktion auf die von ihnen bemerkten Gefahren des Psychologismus Fragen der Psychologie ganzlich links liegen. Dadurch manovrierten sie sich selbst in eine Lage, die Ihnen nicht erlaubte, den Beziehungen zwischen der Logik einerseits und den geistigen Aktivitaten andererseits , durch die und in denen 10gische Gesetze realisiert bzw. instantiiert werden, Rechnung zu tragen. Die Anwendbarkeit der Logik auf das empirische Denken und Schlie13en bleibt in ihrem Werk also restlos unerklarlich ein Ergebnis, das ironischerweise auf seiten der Philosophen analytischer Pragung die urspriingJiche Abneigung gegen die Psychologie noch verstarkte . Brentano und die strengglaubigen Brentanisten neigten andererseits zum Gegenteil, also zu einem extremen Psychologismus: Da sie vor dem "Platonismus" idealer Inhalte zuriickscheuten, war ihre Behandlung der Logik und ihrer Gesetze alles andere als erfolgreich . Husserl bewirkte also einen uberzeugenden Kompromi13 zwischen Psychologie und Logik, wie er von zeitgenossischen Denkem, die an der Grenze von Philosophie und Cognitive Science arbeiten, erst allmahlich wiederentdeckt wird. 5. Objektiv, Urteilsinhalt und Proposition 5.1. Alexius Meinong: Glaube und Annahme Neben Husserlleistete auch Meinong an der Wende zum 20 .Jahrhundert wichtige Beitrage zur Urteilstheorie, insbesondere in seinem Werk aber Annahmen, in dem er sich mit dem Problem hypothetischer Urteile beschiiftigt.25 Wie wir gesehen haben, sind Urteile fUr Brentano rein psychologische Phanomene. Der Urteilsakt ist ein Akt des Bewu13tseins, in dem ein Vorstellungsgegenstand anerkannt oder verworfen wjrd. Fur Brentano sind die Ausdrticke ' Urteil' und 'Glaube' synonym. Infolgedessen hat er jedoch Probleme, jene komplexen hypothetisehen Phanomene zu erklaren , die z .B. beim Abwagen moglicher, 35 bei einer Entscheidung zur Wahl stehender Ergebnisse oder bei anderen "Was-wiire-wenn"-Szenarien auftreten . Meinong gelang es , diese Lucke zu fUllen. Betrachten wir z.B. den Fall , da/3 wir in einem indirekten Beweis annehmen, das und das sei der Fall. Dabei liegt keine Uberzeugung vor; in Meinongs (1902) , S.3 8, Augen unterscheidet sich jedoch das Urleil von der Annahme eben durch das Moment der Uberzeugtheit. Das Annehmen unterscheidet sich aber auch yom Vorstel1en, da es wie das Urteilen entweder positiv oder negativ ist (Meinong 1902, S. 8-20). Verglichen mit dem Annehmen und Urteilen ist die Vorsteliung irgendwie passiv. Also bilden die Annahmen, die Meinong oft auch als "Urteilssurrogate" bezeichnet, eine Klasse psychischer Phiinomene, die zwischen Vorstellung und Uneil liegt (vgl. Meinong 1902, S. 359, 368). Meinongs Werk Uber Annahmen bietet nicht nur eine neue Sicht auf die Urteilstiitigkeit, sondern auch einen neuen Beitrag zur Ontologie des Urteils, und zwar mit seiner Theorie der Objektive (Meinongs Entsprechung zu Stumpfs Sachverhalten). Objektive sind laut Meinong die Gegenstiinde, auf die wir bei wahren und bei falschen Urteilen sowie bei Annahmen intentional gerichtet sind . Oas Denken ist jene geistige Aktivitiit, die sich auf Objektive bezieht. Objektive sind Gegenstiinde hoherer Ordnung, d.h ., sie beruhen in gleicher Weise auf Gegenstiinden niedrigerer Ordnung, wie sich eine Melodie aus einzelnen Tonen aufbaut. Manche Objektive sind ihrerseits auf Grundlage anderer Objektive gebildet, wie z. B. im Faile eines Urteils der Art "Wenn das Treffen stattfindet, dann mussen wir nach Prag fahren." Das Objektiv, auf das ich in einem bestimmten Urteilsakt gerichtet bin, ist demnach verschieden yom Objekt, uber das ich urteile. Der Gegenstand, uber den ich im Urteil "Die Rose ist rot" urteile, ist also die Rose, wiihrend das Objektiv des Urteils das Rotsein der Rose ist . Oer Gegenstand, uber den ich im Urteil "Pegasus existiert nicht" urteile, ist Pegasus; das Objektiv dieses Urteils ist jedoch die Nicht-Existenz von Pegasus. Pegasus selbst ist der Auffassung von Meinong zufolge ein reines Objekt , das ein Reich "jenseits von Sein und Nicht-Sein" bewohnt. 36 Meinong unterscheidet nicht nur zwischen positiven und negaliven Objektiven des Seins (daj3 A iSI, daj3 A nicht ist) , sondem auch zwischen positiven und negativen Objektiven des Soseins (daj3 A B iSI , daj3 A nicht B ist). Wahrheit , Mbglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkei t sind laut Meinong nicht Eigenschaften von Objekten, sondern von Objektiven. Letztlich bilden aber die Objektive den Gegenstand fLir die Wissenschaft der Logik (vgl.Meinong 1902).26 Wie Reinach (1911), S. 114/ Fn., bemerkte, muB alJerdings gegen Meinong ein grundlegender Einwand erhoben werden, niimlich "da/3 sein Objektivbegriff die durchaus verschiedenen Begriffe von Satz (im logischen Sinne) und Sachverhalt ungeschieden enthiilr." In seinen Schriften betrachtet Meinong Objektive einerseits als Objekte (Ziele) von geistigen Aktivitiiten wie Urteilen oder Annahmen andererseits aber auch als Bedeutungen der betreffenden Ausdru'cke. Manchmal behandelt er das Objektiv der Phrase, daj3 Joseph del' Mann von Maria ist , als Entitiit, die Stumpt's Sachverhalten gleicht, d.h ., die Phrase steht fiir den spezifischen {nhalt eines Urteils . In anderen Fallen behandelt er das Objektiv, daj3 Joseph der Mann von Maria ist, jedoch als Gegenstand hbherer Ordnung. In vielen Kontexten bleibt unklar, welche Deutung Meinong vorschwebt, und hochstwahrscheinlich war ihm der Unterschied zwischen den beiden Oeutungen nicht wirklich klar. Fur ihn gehoren Bedeutungen und Gegenstande ("jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein") ein und derselben Kategorie an. 5.2. Anton Marty iiber Wahrheit lind Urteilsinhalt 1m Jahre 1908 verOffentlichte Anton Marty, ein anderer SchUler von Brentano, den ersten und einzigen Band seiner Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie. Dieses Werk war als Darlegung von Brentanos Ideen in Anwendung auf den Bereich der Sprache gedacht. Martys Buch war nicht nur insofern bedeutsam, als es sich auf Brentanos eigene Ansichten i.iber Sprache auswirkte, sondern auch wegen seines Eint1u ses auf Denker wie Lesniewski, Karl Buhler und Roman Jakobson . Indem s 37 in sprachlichen Details weiter geht als Husserls Logische Untersuchungen, stellt es den ersten Versuch einer vollstandigen und systematischen Erklarung der Beziehungen zwischen geistigen Tatigkeiten einerseits und unseren Verwendungsweisen der Sprache andererseits dar, bei dem zugleich auch die ontologischen Korrelate beider beriicksichtigt werden. Auch Marty gliedert die psychischen Phanomene iri die drei Brentanoschen Grundklassen der Vorstellungen und Urteile sowie der Phanomene von Liebe und HaB. Wie Brentano glaubt auch Marty (1908), S. 239, nicht, daB diese grundlegende Unterscheidung in der Sprache zu finden ist . Vielmehr geht er davon aus, dal3 die Grundkategorien sprachlicher Formen ihrerseits von den Grundklassen psychischer Phanomene abhangen (Marty 1908, S. 226). Die Beziehung zwischen Zeichen und Erfahrung erklart Marty mit Bezug auf die kommunikativen Funktionen der Spraehe, die er grob gesagt so eharakterisiert: Namen erfi.illen im Sprachgebrauch drei Funktionen: Sie werden gebraucht, um eine Vorstellung auf seiten des Spreehers auszudrueken (bzw. zu zeigen); sie werden gebraucht, urn im Horer eine analoge Vorstellung (d.h . eine Vorstellung von einem gleiehen Gegenstand derselben Art) zu bewirken (bzw. hervorzurufen); und sie beziehen sich auf etwas. Auch das Aul3ern von Siitzen erfiillt drei Funktionen: Eine derartige Auf3erung driickt das Vorkommen eines Urteils auf seiten des Spreehers aus; sie solI aber auch ein entspreehendes Urteil auf seiten des Adressaten hervorrufen; und sie bezieht sich auf einen Sachverhalt oder "Urteilsinhalt". Martys Theorie soJcher "Urteilsinhalte" ahnelt in vielerlei Hinsicht der Theorie der Objektive, wie sie Meinong in Uber Annahmen darlegt. Urteilsinhalte sind ebenso wie Objektive in gewissem Sinne Entitiiten, die zwischen Urteilen und Gegenstiinden stehen. Marty entwickelt seine Theorie der Urteilsinhalte in Riickgriff auf Bolzano: Martys Urteilsinhalte sind insofern mit Bolzanos "Wahrheiten an sich" vergleichbar, als sie als Mal3stab oder Kriterium dienen, dem ein talsaehliches Urteil entsprechen mul3, um wahr zu sein. Martys Urteilsinhalt dient jedoch als Wahrmach er im strengen Sinne, d .h., es ist das, kraft dessen ein Urteil wahr ist, wahrend wir es im Faile 38 von Bolzanos Satzen an sich mit etwas zu tun haben, das auch als Wahrheitstriiger in Frage kommt. 27 Marty'sehe Urteilsinhalte unterscheiden sich jedoeh auch insofem von Bolzano'schen Wahrheiten an sieh, als sie nicht ideal oder auBerzeitlich sind; ein Urteilsinhalt existiert filr Marty (wie alles andere aueh) in der Zeit (d.h., er existiert jetzt oder gar niehl). Urteilsinhalte sind jedoeh nieht wirklich: Weder ubt ein Urteilsinhalt Wirkungen aus, noeh erfahrt er weJche; er gehort nieht zum Reich der Kausalitat. Aus Martys Sicht ist ein Urteil walu, wenn eine adaequatio cogitantis et cogitati im Sinn einer tatsachliehen Entsprechung zwischen Urteil und Wirklichkeit besteht. Eine solche Korrespondenz kann jedoch nur dann bestehen, wenn die spezifisehen Relata dieser Relation selbst gleichzeitig existieren. Die Elemente, zwischen denen die Entsprechung in einem wahren Urteil bestehen sollte, sind einerseits das , was in einem konkreten Urteilsakt kommuniziert wird , andererseits aber sind es besondere Urteilsinhalte. Das erste konnen wir uns als ausgedriickte Bedeutungen vorstellen, das zweite hingegen als Tatsaehen oder Sachverhalte. Wenn ich sage "Hans liebt Maria", so kommuniziere ich eine bestimmte Bedeutung. Die Kommunikation mag dabei gelingen, selbst wenn mein Urteil falsch ist. Selbst wenn Hans Maria in Wirklichkeit nicht liebt, sind wir dennoch in der Lage zu verstehen, was mit der Aul3erung gemeint ist. Nur wahre Urteile haben jedoch Inhalt im Sinne von wahrmachenden Sachverhalten. Mit Bezug auf falsche Urteile besteht selbstverstiindlich kein Sachverhalt, mit dem ein solches Urteil iibereinstimmen konnte. Gemal3 Martys Theorie entspricht ein falsches Urteil nicht einem speziellen nicht-bestehenden Sachverhalt der von Mei nong zugestandenen Art. Fur Marty bestehen aile Saehverhalte (bzw. Urteilsinhalte). Zudem meint Marty (wieder auf einer Linie mit Brentano), daB es moglich sein sollte, die Korrespondenz zu erfahren; wir sollten in der Lage sein, die Wahrheit eines Urteils zu erfassen indem v i r seine Ubereinstimmung mit dem entsprechenden Sach;erhalt erfassen. Wenn diese Entsprechung erfal3t wird, so wird die Wahrheit elbst erfahren (bzw. "erlebt"). Die Korrespondenz zwischen dem Urteils39 , .t 1 akt und dem Sachverhalt verursaeht die Erfahrung, die notwendig ist, damit wir in die Lage kommen, ein Urteil "wahr" zu nennen. Wir kbnnen diese Ubereinstimmung erfahren, weil beide Faktoren der erfahrenen Korrespondenzrelation von unseren Urteilsakten abhangen . Sowohl die ausgedruckte Bedeutung als auch der Urteilsinhall sind subjektabhangig: Sie existieren nur zu dem Zeitpunkt, da sieh ein Urteilsakt ereignet. Wie Husserl zeigt, ist es durchaus verni.inftig anzunehmen, daB die ausgedriickte Bedeutung eines Urteils yom Urteilsakt abhangt. Es erscheint jedoch schwierig, eine solche Ansicht mit Bezug auf wahrmachende Sachverhalte zu vertreten. Wie sollte es namlich mbglich sein, mithilfe dieses Modells eine Yerteidigung der klassischen Korrespondenztheorie der Wahrheit auf die Beine zu stell en? Marty beantwortet diese Frage mit der These, daB ein Sachverhalt kein Gegenstand ist, der im Urteilsakt vollstandig bestimmt wird. Yielmehr beruhe er auch auf dem betreffenden Gegenstand der Yorstellung bzw. werde er dadurch bestimmt. Die ausgedruckte Bedeutung sei ebenso wie der Urteilsinhalt ein Yennittler zwischen Urteilen und den Gegenstanden, die in den ihnen zugrunde liegenden Vorstellungen vorgestell t werden.28 Oer wichtigste Aspekt von Martys Wahrheitstheorie ist der Begriff der Wahrheit selbst. Wie Husser! zu zeigen versuchte, ist Wahrheit eine Spezies . Fur Marty (1908), S. 328 f., existiert diese Spezies jedoeh nieht fortwahrend; vielmehr existiert sie nur in jenen Augenblicken der Korrespondenz, die durch Urteilsakte auftreten, und mithin zur zu bestimmten Zeitpunkten. Die notwendige und hinreichende Bedingung fUr die Existenz solcher AugenbJicke ist die Ko-Existenz eines Urteilsvorgangs und eines entsprechenden Saehverhalts. Eine Welt ohne Urteilsakte ist in Marlys Augen eine Welt ohne Wahrheit. Wahrheit ist ein Artefakt urteilender Subjekte, aber sie ist niehtsdestotrotz objektiv. Eine Urteilstheorie, die von einer tatsiiehlichen Korrespondenz mit Saehverhalten ausgeht, steht vor einer Reihe zusammenhangender Schwierigkeiten. Insbesondere treten fUr die Theorie Probleme mit Bezug auf Urteile uber Yergangenes und uber Aligemeines auf. 40 Urteile tiber Yergangenes werfen Probleme auf, weil Wahrheit laut Marty eine vergangliehe Beziehung ist, welche die gleiehzeitige Existenz von Urteil und Urteilsinhalt voraussetzt. Wenn ieh sage, daB Napoleon die Sehlacht von Austerlitz gewonnen hat, so kann jedoeh mein Urteil nieht gleiehzeitig mit dem betreffenden Ereignis existieren und darum aIIem Ansehein naeh nieht wahr sein. Marty versucht dieses Problem zu Ibsen, indem er sieh auf die bereits erwiihnte Diehotomie zwischen "wirklieh sein" und "existieren" beruft. Die zweite Kategorie ist weiter, weshalb sowohl Realia als auch Non -Realia existieren kbnnen. 29 Der Urteilsinhalt Napoleons Sieg bei der Schlacht vOn Austerlitz ist (aJs Teil der kausalen Ordnung) nur zu jenem besonderen Zeitpunkt wirklich; er existiert jedoch zu jeder Zeit, da der entspreehende Urteilsakt vorkommt. Das Problem mit Bezug auf Urteile tiber AJigemeines hangt damit zusammen , daB fUr Marty (der aueh in dieser Hinsicht treu zu seinem Mentor Brentano steht) alle Gegenstande individuell sind. Selbst ein allgemeiner Sachverhalt wie Katzen existieren ist eine spezifische individuelle Entitat, die zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt (mit der ersten Katze) zu existieren begann und die ebensogut zu irgendeinem Zeitpunkt in der Zukunft wieder zu existieren aufhbren mag. Zudem ist selbst ein alIgemeiner Sachverhalt wie die NichtExistenz runder Quadrate, der zu jedem Zeitpunkt besteht, eine spezifische individuelle Entitiit. 5.3. Moore, Stout und Russell Auch in England setzten sieh Philosophen Ende des 19.1ahrhunderts mit lokalen, englischen Spielarten der Probleme des Deutschen Idealismus auseinander. Folglieh vertrat G. E. Moore in seinem ufsatz tiber "The Nature of Judgment" (1899) in Reaktion auf den Hegelianismus eines F. H. Bradley eine Art von Kombinationstheorie des Urteils . Fur Moore sind Begriffe weder geistige Gegebenheiten noeh spraehliehe Zeiehen, sondern ideale Entitiiten. Moores Auffassung von Urteilen kam zu jener Zeit also derjenigen von Bolzano nahe: Ein Urteil ist eine Proposition, die ihrerseits als Kombination 41 idealer Begriffe verstanden wird. Propositionen sind wahr oder falsch, unabhangig wovon auch immer, einschlieBlich Ereignissen oder Sachverhalten in der Welt dessen, was passiert oder der Fall ist. Moores Urteilstheorie ist demnach in gewissem Sinne platonistisch: "Aus unserer Beschreibung eines Urteils muB jeglicher Bezug auf unseren Geist oder auf die Welt [ ... J verschwinden. Keines von beiden kann einen 'Grund' fUr irgendetwas liefern, hochstens insofern, als es sich urn komplexe Urteile handelt" (Moore 1899, S. 80). Andere in Cambridge achteten nicht auf den Idealismus, sondern auf die neuen philosophischen Botschaften, die vom Kontinent , insbesondere aber von bsterreich ausgingen. In den 80er und 90er Jahren des 19. lahrhunderts befaBte sich George Frederick Stout (1888, 1889,1892,1894) in einer Reihe von Aufsiitzen mit der Philosophie von Herbart und Twardowski. In seinem Buch Analytical Psychology erklart sich Stout (1896) offen als Anhanger Brentanoscher Lehren wie etwa der These von der Intentionalitat des Mentalen, der Auffassung von Urteilen als einer spezifischen Art des Bezogenseins auf einen Gegenstand, aber auch der Unterscheidung von Akt, Objekt und Inhalt. Stout hieIt jedoch daran fest , daB es im Urteilsakt 'nur eine Art des Bezogenseins auf den Gegenstand gibt , namlich den Glauben. Wie Frege erlaubte also aueh Stout in seiner Theorie nur einen grundlegenden Typus von Urteilsakten. Andere Arten von Akten wie etwa negative Urteile, Annahmen, Zweifel usw. sind lediglieh Modifikationen dieses einen grundlegenden Typs von Urteilen. Die Negation ist Bestandteil des Objekts eines Urteils, das Stout auch "Proposition" nennt. Oer Urteilsakt ist fur Stout eine zustimmende Einstellung zu einer Proposition eine Idee, die von Bertrand Russell weiter verfolgt wurde und die bis heute im Begriff der "propositionalen Einste1Jung" weiterlebt. Niemand anderer als Stout weckte Russells Interesse fUr die Urteilstheorie, indem er diesen einlud, eine Besprechung von Meinongs Schriften zu verfassen . Russells Nachdenken uber die spezifischen Gegenstande von Urtcilen begann mit seiner kritischen Besprechung von Meinongs Gegenstandstheorie (Russell 1904).30 Seine Kritik an der Ontologie nicht-existierende Gegenstande veranlaBte Russell 42 (1905a) auch zu einem seiner beriihmtesten Aufsatze, niimlich "On Denoting". Oer fruhe Russell halt immer noch an Brentanos Unterscheidung zwischen dem Inhalt und dem Gegenstand geistiger Phanomene fest. In seiner Argumentation gegen Meinongs anscheinend allzu groBzugige Ontologie entwickelt Russell (1912) in den Problemen der Philosophie eine Urteilstheorie, in der er Urleile als Relationen zwischen dem Geist und bestimmten komplexen auJ3ergeistigen Gegenstanden in der Welt auffa13t. Genauer gesagt ist ein Urteil eine Relation des Glaubens zwischen einem urteilenden Subjekt und einer Vielzahl von Objekten in der Welt (vgl. Russell 1912, S.IIOf.). Diese bilden zusammen das , was Russell eine "Proposition" nennt, d.h. eine relationale Struktur oder einen Rahmen, worin Objekte miteinander verbunden und geordnet sind. Leider unterschied Russell jedoch (wie vor ihm bereits Meinong) nicht klar zwischen Propositionen und Sachverhalten. Nehmen wir z.B. das Urteil, das durch den Satz 'Hans liebt Maria' ausgedriiekt wird. Laut Russell druckt es eine Relation <S, <Hans, Maria, L» zwischen einem urteilenden Subjekt S und der Proposition < Hans, Maria, L> aus, wobei die Ordnung der Elemente als Abbild der Ordnung der Gegenstande zu sehen ist, uber die geurteilt wird. Hans, Maria und die Beziehung des Liebens sind laut Russell Gegenstande in der konkreten auf3eren Welt; der Status der Proposition, die sich daraus ergibt, ist jedoeh in dieser Hinsicht hochst unklar. 31 6. Uber Objektive Erkenntnis 6.1 . Kazimierz Twardowski gegen die Relativitiit der Wahrheit Aufgrund von Twardowskis EinfluB erfreuten sich in Polen bis in die erste Halfte des 20 .1ahrhunderts Urteilstheorien in def BolzanoBrentano-Tradition groBer Beliebtheit. Dabei wurde Twardowskis Interesse an der Objektivitat von Erkenntnis und Wahrheit mit Untersuchungen uber die Beziehung zwischen Urteilsakten und ihr n sprachlichen Entsprechungen kombiniert. 43 Fur Brentano ist Wahrheit (so wie spater fur Marty) etwas episodisch oder gelegentlich Vorkommendes. Dasselbe Urteil, z.B. "Es regnet", kann bei der einen Gelegenheit wahr sein, bei einer anderen aber falsch. So gesehen ist Wahrheit eine relative Angelegenheit; und zwar ist sie relativ zum Kontext bzw. zur Gelegenheit. rm Gegensatz dazu argumentiert Twardowski (\900), bis zu einem gewissen Grad beeinflul3t von Bolzano, fUr einen Begriff von Wahrheit als objektiver Angelegenheit, d.h. flir eine Auffassung, welche die Mbglichkeit ausschliel3t, dal3 sich die Wahrheit eines Urteils von einer GeJegenheit zur anderen oder von einem Subjekt zum anderen andert. 1m Unterschied zu Bolzano zeigt Twardowski jedoch, wie wir an del' Objektivitat der Wahrheit festhalten kbnnen, ohne irgendwelche platonistische entia rationis annehmen zu mussen . Wie Twardowski zu zeigen versucht, beruht die relativistische Ansicht. wonach sich die Wahrheit ein und desselben Urteils andern kann, auf einer Verwechslung von Urteifen einerseits und ihrer Behauptung bzw. ihrem Ausdruck andererseits. Damit das Sprechen seine kommunikative Funktion erfUllen kann, beschranken wir uns in unseren Aul3erungen auf eben jene unabdingbaren sprachlichen Komponenten, die im Kontext, in dem sie geau13el't werden, zu einem hinreichenden Verstandnis unseres Urteils flihren. Die elliptische Sprechweise, die sich daraus ergibt, ist ein charakteristisches Merkmal unserer Alltagssprache. Wenn ich sage "Es regnet", dann drucke ich z.B . das Urteil aus "Am 29. April 2000 regnet es urn 19.15 Uhr MESZ in der Stadt Salzburg (bsterreich) zwischen Getreidegasse und Universitatsplatz nahe bei Mozarts Geburtshaus." Fur Twardowski schlie13t deshalb das Urteil oder die propositionale Bedeutung, das bzw. die bei einer bestimmten Gelegenheit geau13ert wird, alle relevant en Verweise ein. In Twardowskis Augen ist immer noch das episodische Urteil der Wahrheitstrager. Dieses Urteil ist jedoch im Satz, durch den es ausgedrilckt wird , nur zum Tei! reprasentiert. Twardowskis Uberlegung ist in der einen oder anderen Form auch im Werk von Frege und Russell zu finden. Ebenso kbnnen wir es in Wittgensteins Tractatus finden, z. B. in der Bemerkung: "Die Sprache verkleidet den Gedanken. Und zwar so, dal3 man nach der au13e44 ren Form des Kleides, nicht auf die Form des bekleideten Gedankens schlie13en kann" (Wittgenstein 1921, §4.002) . In Twardowskis Fonnulierung spielt dieses Argument eine Rolle beim Versuch, die beim Urteil ins Spiel kommenden geistigen Akte und deren ontologische Korrelate zu vel'stehen. Anders als Fl'ege, Russell oder Wittgenstein ist Twardowski demnach nicht am anspruchsvolleren Projekt einer idealen oder kunstlichen Sprache interessiert, in welcher del' Gedanke und sein sprachlicher Ausdruck einander genau entsprechen. Getreu seiner brentanistischen Erbschaft richtet er seine Bemuhungen auf die Dinge und Vorgange, die beim tatsachlichen Urteilen ins Spiel kommen, jedoch nicht auf die Konstruktion von abstrakten Modellen oder etwas dergleichen. Eben dadurch ruhrte Twardowskis Einsatz fur einen BegTiff der objektiven Wahrheit seine Schuler jedoch erwiesenennal3en in die Richtung einer wahrheitsfunktionalen Auffassung der Logik im modemen Sinne. Die Objektivitat der Wahrheit wurde in Polen ebenso wie die Korrespondenztheorie der Wahrheit als eine Art "Axiom" aufgefal3t . Es waren jedoch noch weitere Schritte nbtig, ehe Twardowskis polnische Schuler eine allsgereifte propositionale Logik der Art entwickeln konnten, die heute als selbstverstandlich ist. 32 6. 2. Kazimierz Twardowski iiber Funktionen und Gebilde Ein Schritt auf dem Weg zu einer solchen Logik ist die Theorie der Funklionen lind Gebilde, die Twardowski (1912) in seinem Aufsatz gleichen Tit-els vorschlug. 33 Diese Unterscheidung geht auf tumpf (\906a) zuruck, der ebenfalls schon von Funktionen und Gebilden spricht 34 Zu den Funktionen zahlt er geistige Vorgange (passive Empfindungen) und geistige Tiitigkeiten (z. B. Urteile) . Was als Ergebnis einer Funktion entsteht, nennt Stumpf ein Produkt oder Gebilde. So wie der Akt des Sprechens zu Sprache fUhrt, so fUhrt der Akt des Denkens zum Gedanken . Gebilde kbnnen in drei Klassen gegJiedert werden, namlich geistige, physische und psychophysische Gebilde. Beispiele dafiir sind ein Gedanke, ein geschriebener Satz bzw. eine behauptende Au/3e45 rung. Weiter konnen vergangliche Gebilde von dauerhaften unterschieden werden : Das Vorstellungsbild eines Hauses ist ein vergangliches geistiges Gebilde, das freilich in ein dauerhaftes physisches Gebilde iiberfUhrt werden kann, z. B. durch das Zeichnen eines Plans oder das Bauen des Hauses. Eben diese Moglichkeit, vergiingliche geistige Gebilde in physische oder psychophysische Gebilde wie z. B. geschriebene Siitze umzuformen, erlaubt uns, beim Erforschen von Gedanken und Urteilen den geistigen Bereich zu ubersteigen. Twardowskis Bedeutungstheorie baut auf seiner Theorie der Funktionen und Gebilde auf. Die Rede davon , daB ein psychophysisches Gebilde etwas Geistiges manifestiert , bedeutet laut Twardowski zweierlei : (i) Das Entstehen des fraglichen psychophysischen Gebildes wurde durch das geistige Gebilde (und die damit verkniipfte Funktion) verursacht (so wie Sprache durch Denken verursacht wird). (ii) Das psychophysische Gebilde ist uns durch Sinneserfahrung zuganglich. Wenn das psychophysische Gebilde, das flir uns das zugrunde liegende geistige Gebilde manifestiert, in mehreren Subjekten ahnliche geistige Gebilde verursacht, dann druckt es dieses geistige Gebilde aus . Sofern ein psychophysisches Gebilde ein geistiges Gebilde ausdriickt, konnen wir es als Zeichen dafur ansehen und das ausgedriickte Gebilde als dessen Bedeutung bezeichnen. Auch der Ausdruck 'Urteil' bezeichnet fUr Twardowski dann zweierlei: (i) das Urteil im psychischen Sinne, d.h. die Funktion oder Tiitigkeit des UrteiJens , sowie (ii) das Uneil im logischen Sinne, d.h. ein Gebilde . Das zweite hangt yom ersten ab o Es existiert nur dann, wenn jemand urteilt. Das vergangliche geistige Phanomen des Urteilens kann jedoch wiederum durch ein dauerhaftes psychophysisches Produkt fixiert werden, z. B. durch einen geschriebenen Satz. Der Vor46 gang des Festhaltens von geistigen Gebilden im Schreiben kann jedoch noch komplexer sein, etwa so, daJ3 eine Funktion (das Denken) ein geistiges Gebilde (einen Gedanken) hervorbringt , das ein vergangliches psychophysisches Gebilde (Sprache) erzeugt, das zu einem dauerhaften psychophysischen Gebilde (Schrift) fiihrt. In jedem Fall besteht eine enge Beziehung zwischen Sprache einerseits und Denken andererseits .35 Auf eben diese Weise driickt der aufgeschriebene oder ausgesprochene Satz das Urteil aus: Er bewirkt (bzw. verursacht) dasselbe Urteil in anderen Personen. Urteile, die in Form von Satzen fixiert sind, erscheinen uns nieht bloJ3 als dauerhaft, sondem auch als unabhiingig von Funktionen . Wir sprechen miteinander; ein Satz verursacht "denselben" Gedanken in mehreren Personen. Genaugenommen verursacht der Satz ebenso viele verschiedene Gedanken, wie es verschiedene Person en gibt; wenn wir von Satzbedeutungen sprechen, abstrahieren wir j edoch von derlei Unterschieden. 1m Falle der Logik erfreuen sich die dauerhaften Gebilde sogar einer noch groJ3eren Unabhiingigkeit von tatsachlichen geistigen Funktionen, und zwar dadurch, daB kilnstl iche logische Gebilde nicht Urteile ausdriicken, sondern bl oJ3e Vorstellungen von. Urteilen, die vollig unabhangig yom psychischen Moment des Uberzeugtseins sind . Nach Ansicht von Twardowski machen solche Vorstellungen von Urteilen eben das aus, was Bolzano als Siitze an sich bezeichnete. Wir konnen die Satze auf dieser Seite auf zweierlei Weise lesen: erstens als psychophysische Gebilde als Ergebnis des Festhaltens geistiger Gebilde und mithin als bedeutungsvolle Satze - , zwei tens aber als physische Gebilde, die wir "lesen" konnen, ohoe s ie zu interpretieren: Indem Twardowski solche Uberlegungen anstellt , vollzleht er elDen Wandel in der Urteilstheorie, und zwar von der Beschiiftigung mit geistigen Tiitigkeiten zur Untersuchung von Sprache und von sprachlich ausgedriickten Urteilen . Mit anderen Worten bedeuten diese Uberlegungen eine Hinwendung zur Logik im modemen Sinne. Folglich ist es kein Zufall, daB gerade in Polen einige der friihesten und nachhaltigsten Beitrage zur propositional en bzw. Aussagenlogik geleistet wurden. 47 6. 3. Jan Lukasiewicz Twardowskis Ubergang von der Psychologie des Urteilens zur Logik der Propositionen war ein wesentlicher Beitrag zu der durch Husserls Logische Untersuchungen ausgelbsten Auseinandersetzung mit dem Problem des Psychologismus. In Polen wurde dieses Thema erstmals durch Jan Lukasiewicz in seinem Aufsatz tiber Logik und Psychologie ("Logika a psychologia", 1907) aufgegriffen, der Tw~r- dowski in seiner Entwicklung der Theorie von Funktion und Gebdde beeinfluBte. Lukasiewicz versucht in jenem Aufsatz zu zeigen, daB die Frage, weJche geistigen Vorgange an logischen Schliissen beteiJigt sind, zum Bereich der Psychologie gehbrt, wahrend es Aufcrabe der Logik sei , die objektiven Gesetze aufzuzeigen, welche die Beziehungen zwischen der Wahrheit und Falschheit von Urteilen bestimmen. Die Verwechslung von Psychologie und Logik beruht auf der Doppeldeutigkeit der grundlegenden Begriffe beider Disziplinen von Begriffen wie Urteil, SchluB, Argumentation usw. Ein Urteil im logischen Sinne ist fiir Lukasiewicz das objektive Konelat eines geistigen Urteilsaktes und insofem mit Meinongs Objektiv vergleichbar. 36 Zugleich beharrt Lukasiewicz jedoch auf der Annahme, daB es ohne Sprache, in der Urteile ausgedriickt werden kbnnen, auch keine Urteile im logischen Sinne gibt. Nur ein Urteil, das als Foige von gesprochenen oder geschriebenen Wbrtem verstanden wird, denen zufolge das und das der Fall ist bzw. ein Gegenstand eine bestimmte Eigenschaft hat oder nicht hat, ist laut Lukasiewicz ein Urteil im iogischen Sinne. Logisch betrachtet ist ein Urteil also weder ein geistiger Urteilsakt noch eine ideale Bedeutung platonistischer Pragung, sondern vielmehr eine Foige von Wbrtern (d. h. von psychophysischen Zeichen) , die mit einem Sachverhalt konelieren. Jedes Urteil im logischen Sinne bezieht sich also auf Gegenstande in der Welt, steht mit diesen in einer Relation, die Lukasiewicz als Konkordanz oder Nicht-Konkordanz bezeichnet. Gleichzeitig ist die Relation zwischen einer Uberzeugung worunter Lukasiewicz (1910), S.12, einen Urteilsakt versteht, dem nicht notwendigerweise eine Foige von Wortern entspricht -und dem damit 48 verkniipften Sachverhalt eine intentionale Beziehung im Sinne von Brentano. 6. 4. Stanislaw LeSniewski und radeusz Kotarbiriski iiber die EWigkeit und das Schaffen von Wahrheit Urn 1912 drehte sich in Polen eine Reihe von Diskussionen urn die Objektivitat von Wahrheit und Urteil; diese Diskussionen wurden durch Lukasiewicz's (1910) Buch tiber das Prinzip des Widerspruchs bei Aristoteles ausgelbst, insbesondere durch seine Erorterung des Problems von Wahrheitswerten fUr Satze liber Zuktinftiges. Tadeusz Kotatbinski verwies auf eine scheinbare Unvertraglichkeit zwischen der Lehre von der objektiven (und deshalb zeitlosen) Wahrheit von Urteilen im Sinne von Bolzano und der Idee der Freiheit. Kotarbinski und Lesniewski diskutierten dieses Problem in dem von den brentanistischen Philosophen zuvor skizzierten Rahmen. lhre Diskussion konzentrierte sich vor allem auf das Problem der tatsiichlichen Existenz gegensHindlicher Konelate von Urteilen, also auf dasselbe Problem, das auch schon in Zusammenhang mit Martys Wahrheitstheorie aufgetreten war. Infolge der von Husserl angeregten antipsychoJogistischen Wende stlitzten sie sich in ihrer Argumentation jedoch weniger auf die Beschreibung un seres Seelenlebens als auf die Prinzipien der klassischen Logik. Wenn Wahrheit von Zeit unabhangig ist, dann impliziert dies, wie Kotarbinski (1913) zu zeigen versucht, eine Art von Detenninismus. Betrachten wir etwa das Urteil, dal3 meine Nase morgen rot sein wird (etwa wegen des Schnapses, den ich heute Abend trinken werde). Wenn Wahrheit keinen Anfang hat, dann war dieses Urteil auch schon vor hundert Jahren wahr. Wie aber konnte ein Urreil lib r einen nicht existierenden Gegenstand wahr sein (da meine Nase vor hundert Jahren noch nicht existiert hat)? Der klassischen Wahrheitstheorie zufolge ist ein Urteil ja genau dann wahr, wenn es mit einer entsprechenden Tatsache in der Welt korrespondiert . Das e rwahnte Urteil kann jedoch auch nicht falsch sein. Wegen der Ewigkeit der Wahrheit ware es sonst namlich fUr aile Zeit fal ch. Ande49 rerseits kann ieh jedoch anscheinend jetzt entscheiden, ob ich den Schnaps trinke oder nieht ; demzufolge bestimme ieh selbst mit , ob das Urteil wahr oder falsch sein wird. lch bin in der Lage, den Gegenstand zu sehaffen, mit dem das Urteil ubereinstimmen sollte (d.h. das Rotsein meiner Nase). Wenn Urteile einmal wahr sind, so sind sie, wie Kotarbinski zu zeigen versucht, folglich fUr immer wahr; zugleich aber beginnen sie zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt wahr zu sein. In seiner Erwiderung auf Kotarbinskis Argument verteidigt Lesniewski (1913) die absolute Wahrheitsauffassung, wie sie von Bolzano und Twardowski vertreten worden war. Wahrend Kotarbinski die Gegenstande von Urteilen als vergangene, gegenwartige oder zukunftige Gegenstande auffaBte, bezieht sich LeSniewski auf die vergangene, gegenwartige oder zukunftige Existenz eines Gegenstandes. Auf diese Weise kann Lesniewski die Ansicht vertreten, daB ein bejahendes Urteil, das sich auf einen Gegenstand bezieht, wahr sein kann, auch wenn dieser Gegenstand nicht gleichzeitig mit dem Urteil existiert . lch kann morgen das wahre Urteil fallen, daB ich heute diese Zeilen geschrieben habe. LeSniewski betrachtet Urteile in einem absoluten Sinne als Wahrheitstrager, wiewohl ihr Ausdruck mil der von Twardowski bemerklen Mehrdeutigkeit behaftet isl, d.h. mit der Mehrdeutigkeit von Funktion und Gebilde . Als Funktionen gel ten Urteile bloB episodisch; in diesem Sinne kann keine Wahrheit fUr sich beanspruchen, ewig zu sein. Dies ist einer der fruhesten Belege fUr Lesniewskis Nominalismus, und es ist bemerkenswert, daB ein und dasselbe Problem des Urteilsgegenstandes zu zwei vollig verschiedenen Losungen fiihrte, namlieh einerseits zur groBziigigen Ontologie eines Meinong in bsterreich, andererseits aber zu den von polnischen Philosophen vertretenen nominalistischen Positionen )? LeSniewskis Nominalismus zeigt sieh auch in seiner Auffassung von Sprache. Jeder Ausdruck einer Spraehe bestehl seiner Ansieht nach aus einer bloB endlichen Zahl konkreter Elemente (Inschriften, AuBerungen). Zwei Foigen solcher konkreter Elemente sind zwei verschiedene Ausdriicke: "Wenn wir einen Gegenstand des50 halb, weil er nie aufhort zu existieren, ' ewig' nennen", so gilt dieser Auffassung von LeSniewski (1913), S.96, zufolge, "daB in diesem Sinne kein Urteil ewig ist: Es hort in dem Augenblick auf, weirer zu existieren, wenn es zum letzten Mal geauBert wird. "38 Lesniewski (1913), S. 95, behauptet dennoch die Absolutheit der Wahrheit, und zwar in dem Sinne, daB ein Urteil, sofern es zu irgendeinem Zeitpunkt wahr ist, zu jedem Zeitpunkt wahr ist, da es zum Ausdruck gebracht, niedergeschrieben, erfahren oder erlebt wird. 7. Adolf Reinach: Logik als Theorie der Sachverhalte Bei den Urteilstheorien, die an der Wende zum 19. Jahrhundert entwickelt wurden, k6nnen wir eine Vielfalt von Ansichten uber Sachverhalte finden, d .h. daruber, was in der Welt einem wahren Urteil entspricht. Die Mehrzahl davon trifft keine klare Unterscheidung zwischen der Proposition (in Bolzanos Sinn) und dem Sachverhalt (z.B. im Sinne von Wittgensteins Tractalus) . Eine klare derartige Unterscheidung findel sich jedoch in den Schriften von Husserls fruhen Anhangern, den sogenannten realistischen Phanomenologen der Milnehner Schule. So entwickelte z.B . Johannes Daubert eine Auffassung von Saehverhalten als Gebilden einer naturalistischen Ontologie: Ein Saehverhalt ist ein wahrmachender Ausschnitt der Wirklichkeit, der durch einen Urteilsakt "offenbar" gemacht wird. 39 Ein Daubertscher Sachverhalt ist deshalb fUr seine Abgrenzllng bewu13tseinsabhangig; dennoch ist er ein objektiver Teil der Natur in dem Sinne, daB das, was abgegrenzt wird was wir den Stoff des Sachverhalts nennen konnen -, unabhangig vom Akt ex istiert , der seine Abgrenzung bewirkt. Nur in den seltensten Fallen wenn dieser Stoff zufalligerweise rein psychischcr Natur ist, is! der Sachverhalt ein Gebilde, das dem Geist im Sinne von Stumpf immanent ist. Noch interessanter (im Lichte def darauf folgenden Entwicklungen) is! die Ontologie von Sachverhalten, Uberzeugungen, Urteilen und Behauptungen, die Adolf Reinach in einer Reihe von Werken vorgeschlagen hat, deren Hohepunkt sein Buch tiber Die apriori51 . ;~ schen Grundlagen des burgerlichen Rechts ist. Darin arbeitete Reinach die erste systematische Darstellung dessen aus, was spater als "Sprechakte" bekannt wurde. . Reinach betrachtet die Gesamtheit von Sachverhalten als eWlges platonisches Reich, das die Korrelate aller mogJichen Urteile umfaBt, ob diese nun positiv oder negativ, wahr oder falsch, notwendlg oder kontingent, atomar oder komplex sind. Ein Sachverhalt ist durch die Gegenstande, die daran teilhaben, in der Wirklichkeit verankert; der Sachverhalt "handelt" von diesen Gegenstanden. Gegenstande mogen kommen und gehen, doch Sachverhalte bleiben (in einem noch zu erliiuternden Sinne) unveranderlich. Diese Ansicht ist naturlich beinahe das genaue Gegenteil dessen, was Wittgenstein im Tractatus vertritt. Auf diese Weise gelangt Reinach aber in die Lage, Sachverhalte als "Orte" der Existenz des Vergangenen und des Zukiinftigen zu bestimmen, d.h . als Wahrmacher fUr unsere gegenwiirtigen Urteile iiber Gegenstande, die aufgehort haben zu existieren oder die erst zu existieren anfangen miissen. Mit seinen Mitteln kann er fUr die Zeitlosigkeit der Wahrheit einstehen, zugleich aber jenes Zusammenfallen von Wahrheitstriiger und Wahrmacher vermeiden, das flir die Theorien von Bolzano und Meinong charakteristisch ist. Reinachs Sachverhaltsontologie stellt ein wei teres Zeichen fUr die Tatsache dar, daB urn 1911 der Gegenstand der Logik ein fur allemal yom Psychischen abgesondert worden war. Infolgedessen standen die Logiker jedoch vor der Notwendigkeit, eine alternative Erkliirung zu bieten, was dieser Gegenstand sein sollte. Frege selbst hatte ideale Bedeutungen ins Auge gefaBt, ebenso wie Bolzano sowie (manchen Interpreten zufolge) auch Husser!' Ideale Bedeutungen haben jedoch etwas Mystisches an sich und werfen das Problem auf, wie sie von sterblichen denkenden Subjekten "erfaBt" bzw. "gedacht" werden sollen. Wie wir wissen, beriefen sich viele in der analytischen Tradition stehende Philosophen in diesem Zusammenhang auf Satze sowie auf die "Institution einer gemeinsamen Sprache", die sie als Alternative zum Platonismus idealer Bedeutungen auffaBten. 4o Dieser 52 Ansatz wirft jedoch das Problem auf, daB angesichts der Verschiedenheit, Wandelbarkeit und ZuHilligkeit menschlicher Sprachen vollig unklar ist , warum die Berufung darauf nicht denselben Einwanden ausgesetzt sein soli , die zuvor schon gegen den Psychologi mus erhoben worden waren. Twardowski versuchte das Problem zu 16sen, indem er Bedeutungen als Produkte geistiger Tatigkeit auffaBte. 1m Gegensatz dazu stiitzte sich Reinach weder auf ideale Bedeutungen noch auf den Ausdruck einer Bedeutung in der Sprache; vielmehr betrachtete er spezifische Wahrmacher, namlich die gegenstiindlichen Korrelate von Urteilsakten, als dasjenige, das als Gegenstand der Logik fungiert. Ein derart konzipiertes Modell taugt nur dann als Alternative zum Psychologismus, wenn es auf irgendeine Weise die Objektivitat und Notwendigkeit logischer Gesetze garantieren kann. Dies erreichte Reinach, indem er Sachverhalte platonistisch auffaf3te: Er gestand ihnen einen besonderen Status jener Art zu, wie Bolzano und Frege ihn den Propositionen zugesprochen hatten. Reinachs Platonismus mit Bezug auf Sachverhalte ist so zu verstehen, daB diese zuniichst einmal den Geist transzendieren ; ie sind v6IIig ullabhiingig von jegJicher geistigen Tiitigkeit. Sie stehen aber auch auf3erhalb des Bereiches von Raum und Zeit; also spielen sie keine Rolle in Kausalbeziehungen . In dieser Hjnsicht ahneln Reinachs Sachverha!te Mengen im gebrauchlichen mathematischen Sinne. Wie Mengen bestehen Sachverhalte (im Gegensatz zu mereo- !ogischen Ganz.heiten) u.a. aus gewohnlichen Gegenstiinden; irgendwie wird dadurch aber deren Wande!barkeit aufgehoben. Reinach zufolge ist der Bereich der Sachverhalte insofern vollstandig, a!s jedem moglichen Urtei! genau ein Sachverhalt entspricht. Ein Grund fUr die Anllahme einer derartigen Vollstandigkeit besteht fUr Reinach darin , daB sie ihm erlaubt, die Korrespondenztheorie der Wahrheit in ihrer gesamten Allgemeinheit aufrecht zu erhalten. Insbesondere stimmen negative Urteile mit spezifischen negativen Sachverhalten liberein. Wahrend es mogli h sein mag, sich einen positiven Sachverhalt wie Diese Rose ist rot aIs eine Art von wirklichem Komplex (bestehend aus der Rose und ihrem Rot53 sein) vorzustellen, 1st ein ana loges Vorgehen fur negative Sachverhalte wie Diese Rose ist nicht gelb oder Einhorner existieren nicht unmbglich, da diese nicht als Leugnung der Realitat in welch em Sinne auch immer aufgefaJ3t angesehen werden kbnnen. So stutzt denn die Vollstandigkeitsthese die ubrigen platonistischen Elemente von Reinachs Ontologie (und wird ihrerseits durch diese gestutzt). Die in Wittgensteins Tractatus enthaltene Korrespondenztheorie der Wahrheit beruht naturlich auf einer nicht-platonistischen Sachverhaltstheorie. Wittgenstein bietet eine sehr klare Erklarung der Relation zwischen Sachverhalten und Gegenstanden, d.h., es ist die Relation zwischen einem komplexen Ganzen und den einfachen Teilen, aus denen dieses besteht. Hingegen kann Wittgenstein nicht erklaren, wie solche Sachverhalte mit unserem alltaglichen Denken und an deren geistigen Tiitigkeiten zusammenhangen (z.B. mit den Akten des Sehen als, mit denen unsere Urteile verifiziert werden) . 1m Gegensatz dazu bietet Reinach eine weniger gute Erklarung der Relation zwischen einem Sachverhalt und den daran "beteiligten" Objekten. Da diese Objekte gew6hnliche Erfahrungsgegenstande sind, kann er jedoch zeigen, wie geistige Akte des Urteilens sowie Zustande des Glaubens oder Uberzeugtseins auf unterschiedliche Weisen mit den logischen Relationen in Beziehungen stehen, die (laut Reinach) jenen entsprechen, die zwischen den Sachverhalten selbst bestehen. Zu Reinachs originellsten Beitragen zahlt in der Tat seine Darstellung der verschiedenen Arten von Tatigkeiten, durch die Sachverhalte erfaJ3t werden, der verschiedenartigen Einstellungen, die Sachverhalte zum Gegenstand haben, sowie der Frage, wie solche Akte und Einstellungen zum einen miteinander in Beziehung stehen, zum anderen aber mit den Akten und Einstellungen, die Urteile und Propositionen zum Gegenstand haben (Reinach 1911) .41 7. 1. Sprechakte Wie wir gesehen haben, beruht Husserls Theorie sprachlicher Bedeutung auf seiner Theorie der Objektgerichtetheit von Akten . Fur Husser! laufen alle Verwendungsweisen von Sprache auf einen re54 ',.; , . 1: ;. :;. ": . ferentieIJen Gebrauch hinaus. Genauer gesagt sind aile Ausdrucke entweder mit nominalen Akten oder mit Urteilsakten verknupft. Wenn andere Verwendungsweisen der Sprache, z.B. jene, die mit dem Stell en von Fragen, dem Geben von Befehlen, dem AuJ3ero von Bitten usw. zu tun haben, sinnvoll sind, so liegt dies Husserls Erklarung zufolge daran, daJ3 die betreffenden AuJ3erungen verkappte Behauptungen tiber damit verbundene Erfahrungen auf seiten der zeichenverwendenden Subjekte sind. So sei z . B. der Befehl "Setz dich auf den Stuhl!" eine verkappte Behauptung, der zufolge "dein Auf-dem-Stuhl-Sitzen" mein derzeitiger Wunsch ist. Gegen diese urteilsbasierte Theorie sprachlicher Bedeutung argumentierten Husserls Schuler in Munchen in einem sich aufschaukelnden ProzeJ3, der von Johannes Daubert angestiftet wurde und in Reinachs (1913) Theorie der Sprechakte seinen Hbhepunkt fand. Reinachs Arbeiten uber Urteile, zumal sein Aufsatz uber negative Urteile (1911) hatten einen neuen Standard ontologischer Differenziertheit etabliert, bei der Behandlung von geistigen Akten ebenso wie von Sachverhalten, die mit Urteilsphanomenen im weitesten Sinne sowie mit den verschiedenen Arten der gegenstandlichen Korrelate soIcher Gegebenheiten zu tun haben. 1m nachsten Schritt wandte Reinach diese ontologische Behandlung dann auch auf andere Arten des Spracbgebrauchs an, die nichts mit Urteilen zu tun haben, beginnend mit dem Phanomen des Versprechens. 7. 2. Uber Ver!iprechen Nach herkbmmlicher Auffassung galt der Akt des Versprechens a ls Ausdruck eines Willensaktes oder als Erklarung der Absicht, im Interesse dessen zu handeln, dem etwas versprochen \.vird. Diese Erk,larung wirft indes keinerlei Licht auf die Frage, wie eine derartige AuJ3erung allein dadurch, daJ3 sie getatigt wird, zu einer wechselseitigen Verpflichtung bzw. einem damit verkntipften Anspruch fiihren kann . Die bJoJ3e Absicht, etwas zu tun, bat schlieJ3lich und endlich keine quasi-rechtlichen Konsequenzen dieser Art, und es ist kaum einzusehen, warum sich die Dinge anders verhalten sollen, 55 wenn wir den Umstand bedenken, daB eine solehe Absieht spraeh1ieh zum Ausdruek gebraeht wird. Sowohl das Verspreehen als aueh das Mitteilen der Absieht, etwas zu tun, gehbrt naeh Ansieht von Reinaeh zur Kategorie dessen , was er "spontane" Akte nennt. Spontane Akte sind Handlungen, dureh die ein Subjekt in seiner eigenen psyehisehen Sphiire etwas herbeifUhrt im Untersehied zu passiven Erfahrungen wie etwa dem Filhlen von Sehmerzen oder dem Horen einer Explosion (vgl. Reinaeh 1913, S.158) . Ganz bestimmte Arten von spontanen Akten erfordern nun notwendigerweise eine spraehliche AuBerung oder eine andere offenkundige Handlung nieht-naturlieher (d .h. regelgeleiteter) Art. Dies gilt z.B. zwar nicht fUr das Urteilen oder Entseheiden, noeh nieht einmal fUr das Vergeben, wohl aber fUr das Entsehuldigen, Besehuldigen oder Befehlen. Dementspreehend gJiedern sieh die spontanen Akte in zwei Klassen, die wir als externe und als interne Akte bezeiehnen kbnnen, je naehdem, ob der offenkundige Ausdruck ein unabdingbares Moment des betreffenden komplex en Ganzen oder davon abtrennbar ist. Reinaeh gliedert Akte ferner in solche, die auf sieh selbst geriehtet sein konnen, und solche, fUr die das nieht gilt. Bei Akten, die auf sieh selbst geriehtet sein konnen, kann das Subjekt, auf das der Akt geriehtet ist, mit dem SUbjekt, das den Akt vollzieht, identisch sein (wie im Falle von Selbstmitleid, SelbsthaB usw.). 1m anderen Fall kbnnen die beiden Subjekte hingegen nieht identiseh sein, so z. B. beim Vergeben und beim Beten. Manche externe Akte, die nieht auf sieh selbst geriehtet sein kbnnen, weisen nun die Besonderheit auf, daB die betreffende AuBerung nieht nur notwendigerweise auf ein bestimmtes Subjekt gerichtet ist, sondern daB sie von diesem aueh in einem weiteren Akt zur Kenntnis genommen bzw. erfaBt werden mu13: Ein Befehl muB z. B. von der Person, an die er geriehtet ist, wahrgenommen und verstanden werden (was andererseits z. B . fUr die Akte des Segnens oder Verfluehens nieht gilt). Filr die Struktur eines Befehls ist wesentlieh, daB es sieh urn einen spontanen, absiehtliehen, nieht auf sieh selbst gerichteten Akt einer Person handelt, der von dem SUbjekt, an das er geriehtet ist, erfaBt werden 56 muB. Dies gilt aber nieht nur fUr Befehle, sondern etwa alleh fur Bitten und Ermahnungen, fUr das Fragen, Informieren, Beantworten und viele andere Arlen von Akten (Reinaeh 1913, § 3, S. 158169). Jeder dieser sozialen Akte stellt eine innere Einheit aus absichtliehem AusfUhren und absiehtliehem AuBern dar. In Abwesenheit der AuBerung ist es unmogJieh , sie zu erfahren. Die AuBerung kommt zur Handlung also nicht als etwas ZuHiJliges hinzu; vielmehr steht sie im Dienst des sozialen Aktes und ist sie notwendig, damit dieser seine anzeigende Funktion erfiilIen kann. Sieher werden aueh Dinge geiiu13ert, die einem sozialen Akt unwesentlieh zukommen, z. B . "Ieh habejetzt einen Befehl erteilt", doeh beziehen sieh derlei Feststellungen dann auf den gesamten sozialen Akt (einsehlie131ieh seines iiuBeren Aspekts) als davon unabhiingige Einheit (vgl. Reinaeh 1913, S.160). Die Niihe dieser Oberlegungen zu Austin und spiiteren Spreehakttheoretikern ist unverkennbar. Ein Verspreehen kann nieht der Ausdruek oder die Mitteilung eines Willensaktes oder einer Absicht sein, denn die dem Verspreehen zugrunde liegenden Handlungen konnen unmoglieh auBerhalb des Rahmens eines Ganzen von eben dieser Art (des Versprechens) existieren. Niehtsdestotrotz ist riehtig, da13 die Handlungen des Verspreehens und Befehlens nieht bloB eine externe Dimension des AuBerns und AusfUhrens besitzen, sondern aueh eine interne Dimension. Und zwar sind sie an den Bereich geistiger Akte gebunden. Reinaehs Behandlung sozialer Akte sehliel3t aueh eine Darstellung von uneehten, unvollstiindigen oder sonstwie defekten Akten ein, von Akten, die gemeinsam oder einzeln, bedingt oder unbedingt ausgefiihrt werden, sowie von jener Impersonalitiit sozialer Akte, die wir etwa im Faile von reehtlieh erlassenen Normen odeI' in offiziellen Erkliirungen finden , wie sie bei der Hoehzeit oder bei Taufzeremonien verwendet werden . Sein Werk stellt dabei aber sogar nur einen, wenn auch zentralen Ausschnitt aus einem umfassenderen Korpus phanomenologiseher Literatur dar, die von Munchen ausging und etwa aueh Beitriige von Daubert und Pfander ilber UrteiJe und damit verwandte Phiinomene einsehlief3t. 57 :~ .. : 8. Schl43 Es wurde zu einem Gemeinplatz, da13 Bolzano, Frege und Husserl dadurch, daB sie Bedeutungen aus dem Geist verbannten, die Voraussetzungen fur die Objektivierung der Erkenntnis und fUr die Entwicklung der Logik im modern en Sinne schufen. Mit ihrer Auffassung von Gedanken oder Propositionen als idealen oder abstrakten Entitaten ermoglichten sie die VorsteHung, daB Propositionen etwas sind, was auf unterschiedliche Weisen in fonnalen Theorien behandelt werden kann. So wie Cantor den Mathematikern einer friiheren Generation gezeigt hat, wie mit Mengen oder Klassen umzugehen ist, die in Abstraktion von ihren Elementen und von der Art ihrer Bildung verstanden werden, so gerieten die neuen Logiker Schritt fUr Schritt in die Lage, mit propositional en Gegenstanden in Abstraktion von ihren Inhalten und von ihren psychischen Wurzeln in Urteilsakten umzugehen . Allerdings ist wichtig zu bemerken, daB die Errungenschaften von Bolzano, Frege und Husser! Teil eines umfassenderen his torischen Prozesses sind, in dem nicht nur Lotze und Bergmann, sondem auch Brentano, Stumpf, Marty, Meinong und Twardowski sowie dessen Schtiler in Polen eine entscheidende Rolle spiel en . Auch zeigt sich etwas, was bereits dem Verfasser des Tractatus klar war, namlich daB die strikte Trennung der Begriffe "Proposition" und "Sachverhalt" fUr die Oberwindung des Psychologismus mindestens ebenso wichtig war wie die Trennung des UrteiIs von komplexen Begriffen einerseits und von idealen propositionalen Gegenstanden andererseits. Selbst die Sympathien fUr den NominaIismus, die den polnischen Philosophen gemeinsam sind, lassen sich als Ergebnis der Diskussion tiber ideale Gegenstande und Sachverhalte in der von Brentano gestifteten Tradition sehen. 1m Zeitraum zwischen 1870 und 1914 machten die Logik und die Erkenntnistheorie einen Wandel mit Bezug auf ihren Gegenstand eben so wie auf ihre Methode durch. Die Urteilstheorie wandelte sich von einer Theorie tiber Denkvorgange (und mithin von einem Zweig der Psychologie) zu einer Theone der Bedeutungen bzw. lnhalte gei58 stiger Akte, d.h. zu einer Theorie, die sich nicht mit den geistigen Akten als solchen befaBt, sondern damit, worauf sich diese beziehen. Zu Beginn des 20 .1ahrhunderts wurde die Erkenntnispsychologie allmahlich durch die logische Sprachanalyse und durch das Studium des sprachlichen Handelns ersetzt, spater aber durch die semantische Analyse der Sprache. 1m Lichte dessen ist bemerkenswert, daB Tarskis (\933) Aufsatz tiber den Wahrheitsbegriff (das bedeutendste Werk, das aus der von Twardowski und seinen Schtilern begriindeten Lemberg-Warschauer Schule stammt) sich eben auf die Entdeckung sttitzt, wie es moglich ist, formal nicht nUT Satze oder Propositionen zu behandeln, sondem auch bestimmte Arten von Objektstrukturen in der Welt, mit denen diese Satze oder Propositionen korrespondieren. Der Satz wird von Tarski (1933) als endliche Inschrift und mithin als bestimmte Art von physischem Gebilde aufgefa13t, das aber zugleich in seiner Komposition von der Syntax der zugehorigen Sprache bestimmt ist und deshalb von Sprachbenutzem verstanden werden kann, die sich einer geeigneten "semantischen Einstellung" beflei13igen. Tarski versucht, so lieBe sich sagen, den gro13ten gemeinsamen Nenner, der sich in der Familie der klassischen korrespondenztheoretischen Wahrheitsauffassungen findet, mathematisch zu erfassen. Die seit 1933 entwickelten modelltheoretischen Systeme der Semantik weichen betrachtlich von jenen Aspekten in Tarskis Werk ab, die sein urspriingliches Interesse widerspiegeln, namlich formale Mittel zu gewinnen, die ihm erlauben, mit den Dingen in der Welt auf gleiche Weise umzugehen wie mit Satzen oder Propositionen. Die Mo** delltheoretiker trachten stattdessen danach, die mathematischen Mittel auszuschopfen, die ihnen Tarski und andere zur Verfiigung gestellt haben ; dies bedeutet jedoch, da13 ihre Arbeit auf die Konstruktion und Manipulation abstrakter mengentheoretischer Strukturen beschrankt bleibt, die wenig oder gar nichts mit der tatsachlichen Welt dessen zu tun haben, was sich ereignet oder der Fall ist. Dadurch hat sich die Logik selbst in einem bedauemswerten Ausma13 selbst von ihrer Beziehung zur Wahrheit im klassischen Sinne gel os!. Dagegen weisen neuere Arbeiten (nicht zuletzt im Bereich 59 der Wahnnaehertheorie und Situationssemantik) anseheinend wieder mehr in die Riehtung einer Semantik, die mit einer realistisehen Saehverhaltsontologie vertraglieh ist; soweit dies der Fall ist, mag jedoeh sogar noeh Leben in einer Logikkonze~tion.Reinaeh's~her Pragung steeken. Sowohl Reinaeh als aueh dIe SltuatlOnssem~ntJker weisen darauf hin, daB wir uns vom einseitigen Bild der LOglk, das man in den gangigen Lehrbuehern findet, befreien mussen. Diesem Bild zufolge ist die Logik eine Wissensehaft von Propositionen, die in Abstraktion von ihrer Verwirkliehung in den Kapfen denkender Subjekte und von ihren gegenstandliehen Korrelat~n in d~ ~elt verstanden werden. Gemaf3 ihrer Auffassung so\l dIe LOgIk vlelmehr nieht bloB als Wissensehaft weltferner Wahrheitstrager gesehen werden, sondern als Disziplin, die sieh mit aHem besehiiftigt, was in irgendwe\Chen Wahrheitsbeziehungen stehen kann. 60 .,. i :\ ,. Anmerkungen 1. Dieser Aufsatz beruht aufunserer Stu die liber UrteilstheOlien in der Cambridge HistOlY of Philosophy 1870*-1945 . Wir danken der Cambridge University Press fLir die Erlaubnis, dieses Material zu verwenden. Besonderer Dank geblihrt Thomas Baldwin, dem Herausgeber jenes Bandes, ebellso abel' Johannes Brandl, Karl Schuhmann und Jan Wolenski rur ihre Kommentare zu frliheren Fassungen des vorliegenden Textes. Wahrend der Arbei t daran war Artur Rojszczak Stipendiat der Foundation for Poli h cience in Buffalo. Der Text wurde von Otto Neumaier ins Deutsche liber e tzt. 2. Diese neue, existentielle Lesart dessen , was spater als logische Form eines Urteils bezeichnet wurde, ftihrte zu einem der ersten Versuche, die traditionelle Logik zu reformieren; vgl. dazu Hillebrand (1891) sowie neuerdings Simons (1982) . 3. Die Theorie solcher Abhangigkeitsoder Fundierungsbeziehungen wird in Brentano (1982) skizziert (einer Sammlung von Notizen zu Vorle ungen, die Brentano um 1890 in Wien gegeben hat, also vor seiner spateren Hinwendung zum "Reismus"). Brentanos Theorie der versch iedenen Arten von Teil, Ganzem und Abhangigkeit gewann vor allem durch die Arbeiten von Stumpf sowie durch Husserls Generalisierung in der in den Logischen Untersuchungen entwickelten Theorie Einflu13; vgl. dazu Smi th (19 6). 4. Nichtsdestotrotz wu rde Brentano immer wieder eine in diese Richtung zielende Annahme zugeschrieben, so z.B. von Dummett (1 99 ), in besondere in Kap. 5 liber "Brentanos Erbe". 5. Zur Frage, inwieweit Brentanos immanentistische Lehre del' Intentional itat in Aristoteles wurzelt , vgl. Kap.2 von Smith (I 994). 6. Zu Brentanos Wahrheitstheorie vgl. Brentano (1930), Baumgartner (19 7) und Rojszczak (J 994). 7. Vg\. dazu Nuchelmans (1973) und Smith (1992). 8. Vgl. Mulligan (1985) und Smith (1992). 9. Lotze spielte die Rolle einer "grauen Eminenz" im philosophischen Leben Deutschlands gegen Ende des 19 . lahrhunderts . Die Idee, daB besondere Alten von Objekten den Urteilsakten als deren Ziele gegenuber stehen, wurde u.a. von Frege entwickelt, der Lotzes Vorlesuogen in G6tti ngen besuchte und dort sein Doktorat erwarb. Man k6nnte sagen, dafi Frege aus dem begrifflichen Komplex der Idealisten eineo platonischen Gegenstand machte. Freges Entwicklung platonistischer Ansichten in seiner Theorie des Gedanken,I' ist tatsachlich aber noch enger mit einer anderen 61 Idee von Lotze verknlipft, namlich mit seiner Idee der Geltullg. Insbesondere scheint Frege von Lotzes Begriff der "behauptenden Kraft" beeinfluBt zu sein; vgl. dazu Sluga (1980). 10. Vgl. van der Schaar (1991). 11. Vgl. Cantor (1895/ 97), S. 282. Ubrigens besteht eine markante Ahnlichkeit zwischen den von Cantor (1887/88) in seinen "Mitteilungen zur Lehre vom Transfiniten" diskutierten Beispielen fUr " Mengen" und den von Stumpf (1907) erorterten Beispielen immanenter Kollektive. Vgl. auch Cantor (1895 /97), S .282, und Cantor (1887/ 88), S.421 f. 12. Diese These fuBt auf Twardowskis Unterscheidung zwischen "wirklich sein" und "existieren", eine Unterscheidung, die er mit Meinong, Mart y und Brentano teilt. Das erste gilt nur fUr raum-zeitliche Entitiiten, die miteinander in Kausalbeziehungen stehen, wiihrend das zweite auch fUr vermutliche Irrea/ia gilt , z.B. fUr Zahlen und andere abstrakte Entitiiten . 13. Nach Auffassung von Twardowski lauft Brentanos Intentionalitiitsthese darauf hinaus, daB fLir geistige Phiinomene die Beziehung zu einem Gegenstand wesentlich ist. Daraus folgt, daf3 es keine gegenstandslosen Vorstellungen gibt, auch wenn der Gegenstand einer bestimmten Vorstellung nicht notwendigerweise tatsiichlich existiert. 14. Vgl. dazu Rojszczak (1997, 1998, 1999), Wolenski (1989, 1998, 1999) sowie Wolenski /S imons (1989). 15. Vgl. auch Bell (1979), S.83-106. 16. Vgl. Dummett (1981), S.681 , sowie Dummett (1988), insbes.Kap.IO ("Das Fassen e ines Gedankens") und Kap. II ("Husserl liber Wahrnehmung"); vgl. dazu auch Smith (1989a). 17 . Vgl. Kusch (1995) . 18. Vgl. dazu insbesondere den Aufsatz liber "Die syntaktische Konnexitat" von Ajdukiewicz (1935), der in der Tat die erste Formalisierung der Jdeen liber Bedeutungskategorien enthalt, die Husser! in der vierten der Logischen Untersuchungen darlegt. 19. Reinach (1913). Vgl. dazu auch Smith (1990) . 20. Vgl. Holenstein (1975) . 21. Vgl. dazu die Beitrage in Smith, Hg. (1982). 22. Zu den weitere gehenden Implikationen von Husserls kognitiver Bedeutungstheorie vgl. Schuhmann/Smith (1987 a) sowie Smith (1990). 23. Vgl. dazu auch Willard (1984), S.183 f., und Smith (l989c) sowie die dort gegebenen Li terat u rh i n weise. 24. Vgl. dazu Bell (1979). 62 , , I ;- .f f 25 . Ein interessantes Problem flir die Geschichte der Urteilstheorien stellt die Frage dar, inwieweit Meinong, Husser! und Twardowski EinfluB aufeinander ausgelibt haben . So war es z.B. Twardowski , der mit seiner Arbeit Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand del' Vorstellungen den Anstol3 zur Untersuchung der Ontologie von Urteilen gab. Dieses Werk beeinfluBte Meinong ebenso wie Husser! und trug dazu bei, daB sich die Brentanisten fUr Bolzanos Lehren zu interessieren begannen. Dies ist deshalb wichtig, weil die Verbindung von Bolzano und Brentano quer durch Husserls Logische Untersuchungen sichtbar wird ein Werk, das zudem von Meinongs (1899) Aufsatz "Uber Gegenstande hoherer Ordnung" beeinfluBt war. Zu jener Zeit schickte Meinong Husserl regelmiil3ig seine Schriften . 26. Diese Auffassung findet sich auch in den fruhen Schriften von Lukasiewicz, der eine Zeit lang bei Meinong in Graz studierte. Vgl. z.B. Lukasiewicz (I 913), insbes . S. 37, sowie Lukasiewicz (1987). 27. Mit Wahrheiten an sich verwandte Entitiiten konnen in Bolzanos Theorie auch als "Falschheitstriiger" fungieren; vgl. dazu Morscher (1986) und (1990) . Zum Begriff des Wahrmachers vgl. auch Armstrong (1997), Mulligan /Simons/Smith (1984) und Smith (1999). 28. Vgl. fUr weitere Einzelheiten Kap .4 von Smith (1994) . Diese " Vermittlungstheorie" des Urteils wurde von Johannes Daubel1 weiterentwickelt; vgl. dazu Schuhmann (J 998) . 29. Vgl. Smith (1994), S.113f. 30. Vgl. dazu auch Russe ll (J905b, 1907) sowie Simons ( 19 6). 31. In seiner Analyse des Geistes vertritt Russell (1921), S. 297 f., eine immanentistische Konzeption des Inhalts von Uberzeugungen , die derjenigen von Stumpf nahe kommt. Tatsiichlich wird Russells Po ition in einer Besprechung seines Buches durch Brentanos Schliler Oskar Kraus (1930) als "Stumpf-RusseJl-Auffassung" charakterisiert. Andererseits unterscheidet Russell (J 921), S. 295, jedoch nicht nur zwischen Uberzeugungen, die fUr ihn bestimmte geistige Vorgiinge sind, und den immanenten Inhalten solcher Oberzeugungen, sondern zusatzlich davon auch noch das Faktum. "das einen gegebenen Glauben zu einem wahren oder falsch en macht." . 32. Zum Einfluf3, den Twardowskis Ansichten in dieser Hinsicht ausgelibt haben, vgl. Rojszczak (J 998; 1999) und Wolenski (J 989; 1998). 33. Der Aufsatz wurde 1912 in polnischer Sprache tinter dem Titel"O czvnnosciach i wytworach" veroffentlicht. Eine urn 191 0 entstandene deuts;he Fassung ist 1996 unter dem Titel "Funktionen lind Gebilde" erschienen. 63 34. Zu seinen Vorgangern beim Treffen dieser Unterscheidung zahlt Twardowski u.a. Bolzano (1837), Bergmann (1879) und Witasek (1908). 35. Diese Auffassung hat u.a. zur Konsequenz, daB sich die Klarheit beim Urteilen in entsprechenden klaren Satzen zeigt; Klarheit in philosophischen Schriften spiegel! also eine Klarheit beim Denken wider. Vgl. dazu z. B. Twardowski (1920). 36 . In den Jahren 1908 und 1909 studierte Lukasiewicz bei Meinong in Graz. Nichtsdestotrotz behauptete Lukasiewicz aber, daB er auf seinen Begriff des Urteilskorrelats unabhangig von Meinongs Begriff des Objektivs gekommen sei; vgl. dazu Lukasiewicz (1907), S.490. 37 . Die weite Verbreitung des Nominalismus in Polen rtihrt von den Diskussionen tiber allgemeine Gegenstande her, die mit Lesniewskis (1913) Aufsatz tiber das logische Gesetz des ausgeschlossenen Dritten einsetzten. Lesniewski (1927), S. 198, schreibt dazu: "Zu jener Zeit [urn 1913] glaubte ich, daB in der Welt sogenannte Merkmale und sogenannte Relationen existieren, und ich empfand keinerlei Skrupel, Ausdrticke wie 'Merkmal' oder 'Relation' zu verwenden. Seit der Zeit, daB ich an die Existenz von Gegenstanden glaubte, die Merkmale sind, oder an die Existenz von Gegenstanden, die Relationen sind, sind aber viele Jahre vergangen. Heute kann mich nichts mehr verleiten, an die Existenz solcher Gegenstande zu glauben." 38. Vgl. dazu auch Simons (1993) und Wolenski (1989). 39. Die Relation zwischen Urteil und Wahrmacher ist demnach nicht eineindeutig, wie von korrespondenztheoretischen Ansatzen gew6hnJich vorausgesetzt wird; vielmehr handelt es sich urn eine einmehrdeutige Relation . Vgl. Schuhmann/Smith (l987a), Schuhmann (1998) und Smith (1999). 40 . Vgl. z.B. Dummett (1988), S.79f. 4l. Vgl. auch Smith (1978; 1987; 1989b). Zu Reinachs Werdegang vgl. Schuhmann/ Smith (I 987b). 64 Literatur Ajdukiewicz, K. (1935): Die syntaktische Konnexitat, m: Studia Philosophica 1, S.I-27. Armstrong, David M. (1997): A World of States of Affairs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Baumgartner, W. (1987): Die Begriindung von Wahrheit durch Evidenz. Der Beitrag Brentano's, in: W.Baumgartner, Hg. (1987): GewifJheit lind Gewissen. Festschr~ft fiir Franz Wiedmann zum 60. Geburstag, Wlirzburg: Konigshausen und Neumann, S.93116. Bell, D. (1979): Frege's Theory of Judgement, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Bergman, J. (1879): Allgemeine Logik, Bd. I: Reine Logik, Berlin: Mittler. Bolzano, B. (1837) : Wissenschafislehre, 4 Bde., Sulzbach: Seidel (zit. nach der Bernard Bolzano-Gesamtausgabe, Reihe I, Bd. 1111 und 12/ 1, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1985 und 1987). Brentano, F. (1874) : Psychologic vom empirischen Standpunkt, Bd. 1. 2. Aufl ., hg. von O. Kraus [1924], Hamburg: Meiner, 1973. Brentano, F. (1889): Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis, hg. von O. Kraus, 4. Autl., Hamburg: Meiner, 1955 . Brentano, F. (1911): Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, Bd. II: Von der Klassifikation del' psychischen Phiinomene, 2.Aufl., hg. von O. Kraus [1925], Hamburg: Meiner, 1971. Brentano, F. 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Arming the Outlaws: On The Moral Limits of the Arms Trade James Christensen, Department of Government, University of Essex (This paper is forthcoming in Political Studies. An early access version is available here: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0032321718754516) If, not unreasonably, we were to follow Albert Camus in assessing the relative urgency of philosophical questions by reference to the actions that they entail, it is likely that those surrounding the international arms trade would rank highly. "I have never seen anyone die for the ontological argument", Camus observed, dismissing its significance (Camus, 2000 [1942], p. 11). But countless people have died as a result of states approving or promoting the sale of weapons abroad. It is somewhat surprising, then, that the women and men whose job it is to think carefully about ethical issues have largely bypassed the subject. Political philosophers have devoted varying degrees of attention to related and adjacent questions about the justice of war (Fabre, 2014; McMahan, 2009), the morality of markets (Sandel, 2012; Satz, 2010), the private ownership of firearms (DeGrazia, 2016; Lafollette, 2000), and the normative dimensions of international commerce more generally (Christensen, 2017; James, 2012; Risse, 2007), but the arms trade itself has been almost entirely ignored.1 There is, of course, no paucity of social-scientific literature exploring empirical issues relating to the changing dynamics of 2 international arms markets (Stohl and Grillot, 2009; Tan, 2010), but the moral concerns that draw so much attention to the arms trade in the first place have been neglected. This paper contributes to resetting the balance. In doing so, it joins a growing body of literature that seeks to answer a range of overlooked questions at the margins of just war theory.2 From a normative perspective, the most politically salient question about the international arms trade concerns its scope, or moral limits. There are three sets of scope-restrictions that might be placed on the arms trade: restrictions on what can be sold; restrictions on who can participate; and restrictions on what can be sold to certain participants. (The third category is relevant because we might think that certain products should not be sold to certain parties, even if the latter should not be excluded from the market altogether.) In this article, I consider the second set of scope-restrictions: restrictions on who can participate.3 It is the putative failure of politicians to appropriately limit the scope of the arms trade in this dimension that elicits the most vociferous opposition to international arms transfers. States regularly authorize the sale of weapons to outlaw states that, critics maintain, should be excluded from the market.4 (By an "outlaw state", I mean an oppressive regime that violates the basic rights of its own citizens, or an aggressive regime that wrongfully threatens the security of outsiders.) When I began writing this paper, the British government was under fire for its continued provision of weapons to Saudi Arabia, a country that had recently been condemned by the UN for its indiscriminate aerial 3 attacks on schools, hospitals, and other forms of civilian infrastructure in Yemen (MacAskill, 2016). And the government has also recently been rebuked for selling arms to regimes guilty of abusing their own citizens. At the outset of the Arab Spring, the British authorities revoked export licenses covering sales to several Arab countries engaged in the violent repression of civilian protesters (Quinn and Booth, 2011), but they have been criticized for continuing to supply weapons to a range of countries about which the Home Office has the "most serious [and] wide-ranging human rights concerns" (Townsend and Boffey, 2014). Weapons transfers to outlaw states typically contribute to the infliction of wrongful harms in a number of ways. They provide the tools with which domestic security forces coerce, maim, and kill, and with which national armies aggress against outsiders; they increase the power of the state relative to internal dissidents; and they increase the power of the state relative to members of the international community (Christensen, 2015, p. 34). Consequently, there is a general presumption against arming such states; the provision of arms to oppressive and aggressive regimes is prima facie wrongful. When a state provides weapons to such regimes, its status as a society in good standing in the international community is called into question. If it is to preserve that status, it must prove that its actions can be justified. This is something that Britain – along with other major arms exporters, such as the United States – has repeatedly failed to do. 4 But can the presumption against arming oppressive and aggressive regimes sometimes be overturned? And, if so, under what conditions could the justificatory burden be met? According to the argument that I want to consider here, outlaw states can have legitimate security interests, and transferring weapons to these states can be an appropriate way of promoting those interests. Weapons enable governments to engage in wrongful oppression and aggression, but they also enable them to fend off predators in a manner that can be beneficial to their citizens. It clearly does not follow from the fact that a state is oppressive or aggressive that it will never be a victim of wrongful aggression, and while an outlaw state's primary aim in repelling such aggression will often be the preservation of its own power, its defensive manoeuvres will sometimes also serve its citizens' interests. In short, supplying weapons to outlaw states may sometimes contribute to the protection of innocents. We should note immediately that while supporting an outlaw state by supplying weapons may contribute to the protection of its innocent citizens, supplying weapons is one mode of support among several, and, under many circumstances, it will be a suboptimal approach. Any evaluation of a proposed arms transfer to an outlaw state must take a comparative form. Whether such a transfer can be justified will depend, inter alia, on how it fares relative to other actions that could be taken instead. If an arms transfer is expected to produce worse outcomes than alternative available options, then it will not be permissible.5 5 Comparative evaluation of available modes of intervention must proceed on a case by case basis, but certain considerations can be expected to consistently tell against the provision of arms (which is not to say that arms transfers will not be the best option, all-things-considered). Most obviously, arms transfers provide outlaw states with tools that can be used for oppressive and aggressive ends; other types of support lack this feature. Another distinctive shortcoming is the problem of "leakage". Outlaw states may pass on weapons to third parties, or be unable to ensure the security of stockpiles. The risk of stockpiles being looted is especially high in times of crisis (Stohl and Grillot, 2009, p. 100; and, relatedly, Pattison, 2015, pp. 460-61). But there is one consideration that can be expected to tell in favour of providing arms (which is not to say that arms transfers will be the best option, allthings-considered), namely, providing arms may be less costly to the intervener than other modes of support, such as sending troops. Sending troops exposes interveners to an immediate risk of severe physical harm, while sending weapons does not. Sending weapons rather than troops may increase the risk of harm to others (either to the intended beneficiaries of the intervention or to third parties), but this may sometimes be permissible. It may be fairer for the largest costs of an intervention to be borne by those whose interests it is intended to serve (McMahan, 2010). In the next two sections of this paper, I show how, and under what conditions, arming an outlaw state can be justified. I begin by considering arms 6 transfers to oppressive regimes, and then move on to consider arms transfers to aggressive regimes. I am motivated not by a desire to vindicate the arms transfers to outlaw states in which our governments regularly engage, nor by mere philosophical curiosity, but rather by the importance of demonstrating just how difficult it is to justify such transfers – just how special the circumstances have to be – and, therefore, how rarely these transfers will in fact be permissible. While any activists reading this article may be troubled by my willingness to concede that there are conditions under which arms sales to outlaw states can be justified, they can perhaps take solace in the fact that state officials and arms company executives involved in those sales will struggle to draw any comfort or reassurance from anything that I have to say. Oppressive Regimes Let us start by considering a case in which an oppressive regime is a victim of wrongful aggression. Oppressors: an oppressive regime (the Incumbent) is vulnerable to being overthrown by vicious insurgents or the invading army of a rival state (the Challenger) whose rule promises to be even more despotic than the status quo.6 If we withhold weapons from the Incumbent, we will undermine its ability to wage a just defensive war that would serve the security interests of its citizens. Those interests cannot be served (as effectively, or without imposing far greater costs on us, the intervener) by other means. 7 In such a scenario, it seems, intuitively, that the general presumption against arming oppressive regimes is suspended. When the conditions I have described are satisfied, it will likely be said that we are permitted to transfer arms (the permission to arm claim), or even that we have a duty to transfer arms (the duty to arm claim). Each of these claims has two variants, which are distinguished by the type of arms transfer to which they refer. Notice that we can distinguish between two types of arms transfer: Foreign Military Sales (which are sales made by a government) and Direct Commercial Sales (which are sales made by a private firm) (Stohl and Grillot, 2009, p. 52). Thus, the permission to arm claim could mean either that (i) the state is permitted to engage in Foreign Military Sales (i.e. it is permitted to sell weapons to the Incumbent), or that (ii) the state is permitted to sanction Direct Commercial Sales (i.e. it is permitted to grant an export license allowing private firms within its jurisdiction to sell weapons to the Incumbent). Similarly, the duty to arm claim could mean either that (iii) the state has a duty to sell weapons to the Incumbent, or that (iv) the state has a duty to issue an export license (if one is sought). While they have intuitive force, these claims might be resisted in a number of ways. One possible objection appeals to the distinction between doing and allowing harm (Pattison, 2015, pp. 458, 460, 464). It might be said that if a state transfers weapons to the Incumbent (in any of the ways described in claims (i)-(iv)), it does harm by contributing to the preservation of an oppressive status quo, whereas if a state withholds weapons, it merely allows harm to occur. It might then be argued 8 that, at least if the relevant harms do not differ too greatly in size, doing harm is worse than allowing harm, and that if we are forced to choose between the two, we must choose the latter. This strategy raises two questions, which correspond to two of its key claims. First, is it really true that a state that exports weapons to the Incumbent thereby inflicts harm? And, second, is it really true that a state that withholds weapons from the Incumbent merely allows harm? Consider the first question. One might suggest that an exporting state does not do harm when it transfers weapons to the Incumbent, for harm is a comparative concept – it involves making someone worse off than they were previously, or could otherwise have been – and, by transferring weapons, the exporting state does not make anyone worse off in either of these ways; rather, it contributes to the maintenance of the status quo, and to making the oppressed better off than they would be if the Challenger secured power. But this line of argument is defeated by a number of independent considerations. First, we do not have to conceive of harm in comparative terms. There are plausible non-comparative accounts that understand harms as absolute states, "a list of evils like broken limbs, disabilities, episodes of pain, significant losses, [and] death" (Shiffrin, 1999, p. 123). Second, it should not be assumed that the set of individuals that would be oppressed by the Challenger and the set of individuals that are oppressed by the Incumbent are coterminous: there may be some people who are oppressed by the Incumbent who would not be oppressed by the Challenger, even though the Challenger would be more oppressive 9 overall. A related problem is that there might be some people who are oppressed by the Incumbent, and who would be oppressed by the Challenger, but who would be oppressed to a lesser degree by the Challenger. These people are made worse-off if we arm the Incumbent and thereby enable it to fend off the Challenger. So, the first key claim in the argumentative strategy under scrutiny – a state inflicts harm by transferring weapons to the Incumbent – remains intact (at least when certain conditions are satisfied). But now consider our second question. Does a state that withholds weapons merely allow harm? The answer to this question depends on what we mean by "withholds", and this in turn depends on the kind of arms transfer the state in question is eschewing. If a state withholds weapons from the Incumbent in the sense that it refrains from engaging in Foreign Military Sales, and a consequence of this is that the Incumbent is unable to fend off the Challenger, it is plausible to hold that the state is, indeed, merely allowing harm to occur. This form of withholding is an omission, rather than an act; a mere denial of benefits. By withholding weapons in this way, a state behaves in an entirely passive manner. But things look different when a state withholds weapons by declining to issue an export license to a private firm that wishes to supply the Incumbent with arms. When a state refuses to issue an export license for a particular sale, this amounts to the state informing the relevant arms company that if it attempts to make the sale, it will be coercively prevented from doing so, and subjected to legal penalties. Thus, when a state refuses to issue an 10 export license, it does not merely deny benefits; rather, it commits to actively preventing a transaction that could otherwise have gone ahead.7 And when a state prevents an arms sale, with the result that the would-be recipients of the sale are unable to defend themselves against wrongful aggression, this cannot be interpreted as a case of merely allowing (rather than doing) harm. The upshot of these reflections is that the distinction between doing and allowing harm can at best ground an objection to (i) and (iii); it cannot ground an objection to (ii) and (iv). How else might (ii) and (iv) be challenged? One might claim that the Incumbent, by virtue of being oppressive, lacks legitimacy, and that the war it wages could therefore not be just. The Incumbent, one might claim, has forfeited its right to rule, and it has thereby forfeited the right to wage defensive wars (Luban, 1980, pp. 164-166). We can distinguish between two versions of this argument. The first, which we can call the No Claim Objection, targets (iv). According to this version of the argument, while legitimate states can have a claim-right to wage defensive wars, illegitimate states have no such right. Put differently, the suggestion is that while legitimate states have a right that can, at the very least, impose upon others a negative duty to refrain from interfering with their prosecution of a defensive war, illegitimate states lack that right. The objection continues: as oppressive states are illegitimate, they lack a right that could impose upon others a duty to refrain from interfering with their prosecution of a defensive war (e.g. by preventing them from acquiring the requisite weapons). So, while by refusing to license commercial sales to 11 the Incumbent we thereby prevent it from waging an effective defensive war against wrongful aggression, the Incumbent has no right that could impose upon us a duty to act differently. Even if its conclusion is sound, this argument does not succeed as an objection to (iv). This is because the duty whose existence is posited by (iv) may be grounded in something other than the rights of the Incumbent. We may be duty-bound to issue an export license not because refraining from doing so would wrong the Incumbent's state officials, but because refraining from doing so would wrong its citizens. In fact, given that, on the most plausible account, a state's right to wage war is a right that is ultimately held by its citizens, and that its citizens have transferred to it (Fabre, 2014), it is natural to suppose that an illegitimate state retains a right to wage a defensive war that serves its citizens interests. For, why would its citizens revoke that right? Now consider the second version of the argument currently under scrutiny, which we can call the No Liberty Objection, and which targets (ii). The first step in this objection maintains that oppressive states, by virtue of their illegitimacy, lack a liberty-right to wage defensive wars; that is, they have a duty not to wage defensive wars. The second step in the objection claims that it is impermissible to allow an agent to perform an action that that agent has a duty not to perform, at least when certain conditions hold – e.g. when the agent lacks a claim-right to perform the action in question (a "right to do wrong"); the action is especially egregious; and the 12 costs to a third party of preventing the action are not unduly onerous. (As I believe this argument can be defeated irrespective of how it is formulated, I shall not dwell on specifying its optimal formulation.) It might then be said that the relevant conditions hold in Oppressors, and that it is therefore impermissible to license commercial sales to the Incumbent. This would mean that (ii) is false. What should we say about this version of the objection? While it is true that a threat to its sovereignty does not automatically give an oppressive state a libertyright to defend itself, it is less plausible to claim that such a state lacks a liberty-right to defend itself against aggression that, if left unchecked, would produce injustice greater than that which characterizes the status quo (Caney, 2005, p. 204). To be sure, when a state performs acts that render it illegitimate, it thereby forfeits the right to exercise power in many of the ways in which power is typically exercised. But it is hard to see how one could defend the claim that, by virtue of mistreating its citizens, an illegitimate state is duty-bound to continue to neglect their interests by refusing to wage a defensive war against unjust aggression, a war that, perhaps for selfinterested reasons, it might be motivated to wage. Yet this is a claim that advocates of the No Liberty Objection are committed to endorsing. At this point, it might be said that talk of states defending themselves or their citizens is misleadingly elliptical. When an illegitimate state wages a defensive war, it sends its subjects – the individual women and men it rules and oppresses – to fight and die. Illegitimate states (like their legitimate counterparts) do not defend their 13 citizens, but rather command their citizens to defend themselves. And illegitimate states, it might be said, lack the authority to do that. But this objection is unpersuasive. While illegitimate states may lack the authority to order their citizens into battle in the sense that their citizens may have no obligation to comply with such orders, it is hard to deny that those citizens are nevertheless permitted to follow those orders in cases where they are the targets of unjust aggression. The citizens of illegitimate states have a right to defend themselves, their families, and their compatriots against unjust aggressors, and they may reasonably believe that participating in their country's armed forces is the best way to do so. Refusing to issue an export license to the Incumbent would deny its citizens the opportunity to participate in an effective defensive war against wrongful aggression, and we are yet to uncover an argument that could justify that denial. So, in cases where withholding weapons from an oppressive regime would undermine its ability to repel an even more oppressive aggressor, we cannot justify a decision to withhold weapons (when this means refusing to issue an export license) by appealing to the distinction between doing and allowing harm, or to the fact that oppressive regimes lack legitimacy. Of course, this does not mean that, in such cases, arming oppressive regimes is always permissible. Notice that real-world cases that are otherwise similar to Oppressors often differ in one of three important respects. First, in civil wars, there is often a multiplicity of groups competing for power, and while one or more of those groups may threaten to impose a regime that is even 14 worse than the one currently in place, others may be considerably more benign. (This appears to be the situation in the ongoing Syrian Civil War, in which the Assad regime is opposed both by genocidal fundamentalists like ISIL, and by ostensibly progressive groups such as the Syrian Democratic Forces.) When this is the case, we can intervene by supporting one of the more favourable groups. In such scenarios, it will often be impermissible to support the regime rather than one of its more benign rivals. ("Often" rather than "always" because the more benign rivals may sometimes lack the capacity to achieve a just victory. Their war may lack a reasonable chance of success, for example.) As I mentioned earlier, our assessment of a proposed arms transfer to an outlaw state must have a comparative element; we must ask how the proposal fares against other available options. Second, an essential feature of Oppressors is that withholding weapons will undermine the ability of the Incumbent to wage a successful defensive war; the provision of weapons is crucial to tipping the balance in its favour. It should go without saying that this feature will not always characterize conflicts that are otherwise like the one I have been considering. There is a subclass of cases in which the incumbent regime requires our assistance in order to prevail, and a further subclass in which the assistance needed must come in the form of weapons. Sometimes it will be possible to tip the balance in favour of the incumbent regime without providing it with tools that can be used for oppressive ends, e.g. by providing it with intelligence that will enable it to locate insurgent bases. This point, 15 like the previous one, drives home the fact that, in situations that are otherwise similar to Oppressors, there will often be a wider range of interventionist strategies from which to choose. Third, I said that transferring weapons to the Incumbent, and thereby enabling it to fend off the Challenger, would simply preserve the status quo; I suggested that after the Challenger had been defeated, things would carry on in much the same way as they had before. But, sometimes, providing weapons to an oppressive regime will enable it to become more oppressive. In some cases like the one I have described, the Incumbent's rule may be less oppressive than the Challenger's promises to be not because the former has less oppressive ambitions, but simply because it is not sufficiently powerful to realize its ends. But providing the Incumbent with arms may bolster its power, and thereby enable it to tighten its stranglehold on the populace. If supplying weapons to the Incumbent can be expected to make it as oppressive as the Challenger, then the case for arms transfers collapses. The considerations adduced in the last three paragraphs narrow the space in which the presumption against arming outlaw states can be overturned, and it is important to recognize that fact. But we have not succeeded in identifying an argument that demonstrates that (ii) and (iv) are never defensible claims. I will return to the case for (ii) and (iv) presently, but first there is a subsidiary matter that must be addressed. 16 We should recall the point made earlier that the precise nature of the kind of case I have been considering will vary depending on how certain details are filled in. There are cases where the outcome of the conflict will affect not just the degree, but also the distribution, of oppression among the population, and there are cases where it will not. The most problematical scenario is one in which some individuals would be better-off under the Challenger's rule than they are under the Incumbent's rule, even though the Challenger's rule would be all-things-considered more oppressive than the status quo. Such a scenario would obtain if there were individuals who are oppressed by the Incumbent but who would not be oppressed by the Challenger. It could also obtain if the Challenger would oppress everyone (equally), while the Incumbent oppresses only a small minority. Under such conditions, the Challenger could be more oppressive by virtue of the fact that it seeks to oppress a larger number of people, even if it will oppress everyone less severely than the Incumbent oppresses a minority. While a lesser-evil justification for transfers can remain in this kind of scenario (because the Challenger is still more oppressive, all-thingsconsidered), the lesser-evil involved is greater than in cases where everyone is better-off under the Incumbent's rule. In cases where there are individuals who would be better-off under the Challenger's rule, it is tempting to think that a state that transfers weapons, and thereby preserves the power of the Incumbent, acquires special responsibilities to those who are worse-off under the Incumbent's rule. We might believe that by 17 preserving the subordinate position of the oppressed without making them betteroff than they would otherwise have been, the exporting state acquires a special duty to work to end their oppression. But is this really plausible? Consider an analogous case. Flood I: Heavy rain fall regularly causes a river to burst its banks and flood Town A. A sympathetic third party, Anita, draws up plans to redirect the water so that it instead floods Town B, which has a higher population and weaker flood defences. Reasonably believing that this would be unjust, I block the proposal, and thereby become implicated in the continued plight of Town A. By blocking the proposal, do I thereby acquire special duties to Town A, duties that go beyond those I owe, say, to Town C, which also suffers from regular flooding? If I have to choose between assisting Town A and assisting Town C, should my decision hinge on the fact that I am "complicit" in Town A's plight, rather than on other considerations, regarding, for example, who has the greater need, or whom I can assist more effectively? It seems to me that it should not. Harm was inevitably going to befall someone, no one was liable to bear – or deserving of – the harm in question, and all I have done is act to prevent an agent from substituting a greater harm (to be imposed on one set of individuals) for a lesser harm (imposed on a different set). Given that there is no justification for this substitution – whereas there is a (lesserevil) justification for preserving the status quo – it is hard to see how claims for 18 compensatory assistance could arise. The same is true in the case of a state that transfers weapons to the Incumbent under the conditions I have described. While it is plausible to hold that there are (general) duties to assist victims of oppression, it is less plausible to hold that the allocation of those duties should track facts about the kind of "complicity" involved in the case under scrutiny. The oppressed can make claims against us (and others) qua victims of oppression, but not qua victims of the particular kind of intervention described. The issues considered in the previous three paragraphs are orthogonal to the central thrust of our discussion, but addressing them has provided resources with which to settle a matter that I have so far left open, namely, whether (ii) should be supplemented with (iv). Consider a variation on the thought-experiment introduced a moment ago. Flood II: The same as Flood I, except that Bernard forbids me from intervening. I seek Bernard's permission to act, and permission is withheld. Given that no alternative action is taken, the water is redirected, and Town B is flooded instead of Town A. Should we say that Bernard was merely permitted to grant me permission to act, or that he was also duty-bound to do so? In the absence of any alternative plan to block Anita's water-redirection proposal, it seems that Bernard was duty-bound. By withholding permission, Bernard acts in a way that facilitates Anita's substitution of 19 a greater harm for a lesser harm, a substitution for which there is no justification; he stops me from preventing that substitution. If Flood II is analogous to Oppressors in relevant respects, and if we are confident that, in the former case, Bernard is duty-bound to grant me permission to act, then we should also hold that, in the latter case, the state is duty-bound to issue an export license. The Challenger seeks to substitute a greater harm for a lesser harm, a substitution for which there is no justification. An arms firm then proposes to prevent (or contribute to the prevention of) that substitution. If the state refuses to issue an export license, it stops the firm in question from preventing the substitution. It enables the substitution to go ahead; it facilitates the Challenger's implementation of a greater harm. Notice that the duty posited in (iv) is easier to defend than the duty posited in (iii). This is because the former, unlike the latter, is a negative duty. While (iii) holds that the state is duty-bound to provide benefits, (iv) holds that the state is dutybound only to refrain from preventing third parties from providing benefits. This follows from my analysis of the sense in which refusing to issue an export license counts as "withholding" arms. Notice, too, that, in many cases, one will not be able to contest (iv) by appealing to the onerousness of the posited duty. This is because the costs involved in discharging that duty will often be minimal. It might be said that, because issuing an export license implicates them in wrongdoing, the duty posited in (iv) requires state officials to act in a manner that compromises their moral 20 integrity (Cf. Williams, 1973, pp. 98-99). But two responses are available here. First, authorizing one agent to sell the tools that a second agent may use to inflict wrongful harms, and doing so purely in order to ensure that a third agent does not substitute those wrongful harms for greater ones, is far removed from the kind of complicity in wrongdoing that we usually expect to pose large threats to one's integrity. Second, as should be clear from what was argued earlier, state officials would also become implicated in wrongdoing if they withheld arms. If they refuse to issue an export license, they become implicated in the harms that will be inflicted by the Challenger, harms that could have been averted had an export license been granted. One significant cost that may sometimes be borne by a state that issues an export license is a risk of terroristic reprisals. Individuals who are oppressed by the Incumbent (or who belong to the same ethnic, religious, or national community as those who are oppressed), may be aggrieved by the provision of support to the Incumbent, and may seek violent revenge. This seems unlikely in cases where all of the Incumbent's citizens stand to be made worse-off by the Challenger, and it might be less likely than in cases where state officials negotiate the sale themselves, rather than merely permitting private firms to make the sale. Nevertheless, when there is a sizeable risk of "blowback", this could justify (or at least excuse) declining to grant an export license. 21 Let me conclude this section by suggesting that when attempting to determine whether a particular arms transfer is permissible, the first question we should ask is not "Is the recipient oppressive?", but rather "What effect will the sale have on the incidence and degree of oppression?" The consideration that motivates this suggestion is the one that we have examined, namely, that arms transfers to an oppressive regime may sometimes reduce the overall incidence or degree of oppression by enabling the regime in question to repel an even more oppressive rival. This can be true even if the sale contributes to oppression in one sense by sustaining an oppressive status quo. But there is also a second consideration that one might adduce in support of my suggestion, namely, that arms sales to oppressive regimes sometimes do not contribute to oppression at all. This thought can be illustrated with an example. The US subjects certain prisoners to sustained periods of solitary confinement, a practice which critics argue is a form of torture, and we might think that this fact justifies regarding the US as an oppressive regime (Gawande, 2009). But it is natural to doubt whether arms sales contribute to the maintenance of this practice; the suspension of arms transfers, it seems reasonable to suppose, would not precipitate the abolition of solitary confinement. However, it is important to observe that arms sales can contribute to oppression in a variety of different ways, some of which are subtler than others. The most obvious way in which arms transfers can contribute to oppression is by making available the tools used by oppressive regimes against their people. We are inclined 22 to say that arms transfers to the US do not contribute to the maintenance of oppressive practices because those transfers do not contribute in this way. It is not as though, in the absence of arms transfers, the US would lack the means of oppression. But arms transfers can also contribute to oppression in another way. The maintenance of trade relations can express certain attitudes; it can communicate to a trading partner that it is regarded as a respected member of the international community, that its status is not undermined by any of its internal practices. In this way, the maintenance of trade relations can be interpreted as a tacit endorsement of a trading partner's internal practices. Put differently, the maintenance of trade relations can be regarded as contributing to oppressive practices when the suspension of those relations (or the threat of suspension) could be used to incentivize reform of such practices. Of course, these considerations do not differentiate the arms trade from other, more conventional, forms of trade, and we may sometimes have all-things-considered reasons to maintain certain forms of trade with oppressive regimes. The point I am currently making, and with which I shall close this section, is simply that we must adopt a broad understanding of what it means for a sale to contribute to oppression. Aggressive Regimes So far I have considered the morality of selling weapons to oppressive regimes. I turn now to the morality of selling weapons to aggressive regimes. When one regime poses a wrongful threat to another, we have a pro tanto duty to refrain from 23 providing it with weapons. If we were to provide weapons, we would facilitate, and become complicit in, any wrongful harms that the regime inflicts. This duty is undoubtedly violated frequently. But are there any conditions under which it could be overridden? The strongest case for arming an aggressive regime mirrors the strongest case for arming an oppressive regime: it arises in situations where the regime's own legitimate security interests are threatened. As I mentioned above, it does not follow from the fact that a regime wrongfully aggresses against others that it will never be a victim of wrongful aggression itself. We saw in the previous section that we cannot oppose transfers to outlaw states by claiming that, when a government withholds an export license, it merely allows harm to occur, or on the grounds that outlaw states lack legitimacy. I also stressed that when an arms transfer is proposed, its merits and demerits must be compared to other available modes of intervention. But let us now consider in more detail the conditions that would have to be satisfied in order for arms transfers to an aggressive regime to be justifiable. Consider the following scenario. Aggressors: A regime (the Claimant) is the target of wrongful aggression, and the following further conditions also hold: (i) the Claimant has acted aggressively in the past, but is not currently engaged in aggression; (ii) it is liable to act aggressively again in the future; (iii) providing the Claimant with weapons is the only viable way of enabling it to defend itself and its citizens; (iv) providing weapons can be expected to enhance the threat that the 24 Claimant wrongfully poses to others (the Third Parties); (v) the Claimant's citizens are in no way culpable for its leaders' actions; and (vi) the defensive war that the Claimant intends to wage can be expected to satisfy the requirements of justice (at least if arms transfers are made).8 It is under these conditions that the question of whether arms transfers are permissible is most difficult to answer. When any one of conditions (i)-(vi) is altered, the question becomes easier, because the case for transfers is either weakened or strengthened. However, as I explain below, altering the conditions in a way that would strengthen the case for transfers cannot be done without either departing from reality, or jettisoning the scenario's key characteristic (namely, the fact that the regime in question is aggressive). Therefore, the conditions that I have described actually characterize the circumstances under which the strongest case for arming an aggressive regime can be made. Consider the first condition, according to which, while the Claimant has acted aggressively in the past, it is not presently engaged in wrongful aggression. If the Claimant were presently engaged in wrongful aggression, the case for permitting the sale of weapons would be weakened by two considerations. First, the continued exercise of wrongful aggression would pose a challenge to the suggestion that the Claimant requires additional weapons in order to satisfy its citizens' legitimate security interests. In the absence of additional weapons, it could simply redeploy the weapons that it is currently using for wrongful purposes. Second, by continuing to 25 engage in wrongful aggression, the Claimant is declining an available opportunity to demonstrate to potential trading partners that it will not use their weapons in a wrongful manner. Now consider the second condition. If the Claimant had acted aggressively in the past but were not liable to act aggressively again in the future – if it had, say, reached a peace agreement with its past adversaries – the concern about arms transfers facilitating aggression would be less acute, and the case for permitting weapons transfers would be strengthened. With regards to the third condition, if providing weapons were not the only viable way of enabling the Claimant to defend itself and its citizens, then we could justify a refusal to supply weapons by committing to other forms of assistance, forms which may lack the downside of bolstering the threat that the recipient poses to Third Parties. Even if the available alternatives were less effective than the provision of arms, their adoption could sometimes be justified on the grounds that it is a happy medium between (a) arming the Claimant (and thereby endangering Third Parties) and (b) doing nothing (and thereby neglecting the interests of the Claimant's citizens).9 So, when the third condition is not satisfied, the case for transfers is weakened. The absence of the fourth condition would strengthen the case for transfers. If providing weapons would not be likely to enhance the threat that the Claimant poses to Third Parties – if, say, weapons could be magically teleported back to their distributors, or remotely disabled – the case for withholding weapons would be 26 substantially diminished. Let us now consider the fifth condition, according to which the Claimant's citizens are not culpable for their leaders' actions. This condition will often be satisfied – especially when the regime in question is not only aggressive but also authoritarian – and, when it is, the case for transfers will be stronger than it would be otherwise. When the fifth condition is satisfied, a decision to withhold weapons will appeal to facts about activity that the Claimant has engaged in that are independent of, and perhaps contrary to, its citizens' wishes and interests; the decision to reject arms-requests grounded in the legitimate security-interests of the people will be motivated not by considerations about what the people have done, but rather by considerations about what their government has done. By contrast, when citizens have actively supported or encouraged a wrongfully aggressive foreign policy, we can justify our decision to decline weapons-requests by telling the people: "not only do we mistrust your government; we mistrust you. Through your past actions, you have revealed yourself to be an untrustworthy and irresponsible polity." I do not claim that this consideration is decisive, only that it weakens the case for arms transfers. Finally, let us consider the sixth condition. Even if the Claimant has a just cause for war (self-defence), the war it proposes to wage may nevertheless fail to be just overall. This would be the case if, say, it failed to discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate targets, or if the harms it proposed to inflict were expected to be excessive in relation to those it intended to prevent. If the sixth 27 condition is not satisfied, the case for arms transfers will be weakened. One especially egregious feature of recent British and American arms sales to Saudi Arabia is that they continued in the face of the desert kingdom's systematic violation of the rules of war. Deviating from one (or both) of conditions (ii) and (iv) would strengthen the case for arms transfers, while deviating from any one of the remaining four conditions would weaken the case. But notice what deviation from (ii) and (iv) involves. Deviating from (ii) – the Claimant is liable to act aggressively in the future – amounts to saying that the Claimant is not actually aggressive. And it is hard to see how deviation from (iv) – providing weapons can be expected to enhance the threat that the Claimant wrongfully poses to others – could currently be possible. Weapons cannot be magically teleported back to their distributors if and when they are misused; nor can they be remotely disabled: so the scenario I have described is the one in which the strongest case for arming an aggressive regime could actually arise. Let us now return to this case. In the scenario I described, it is especially difficult to establish whether arms transfers should be permitted. More specifically, it is especially difficult to adjudicate between the interests of two sets of individuals: the legitimate security-based interests of the Claimant's citizens, and the legitimate security-based interests of Third Parties who are threatened by the Claimant. If we were to withhold weapons, by refusing to issue an export license, how could we try to justify this to the 28 Claimant's citizens? We might say that the Claimant's citizens should direct their complaints at their government: if their government had not engaged in unacceptable behaviour in the past, it would not have lost our trust, and we would be able to provide weapons without worrying that, by doing so, we would be jeopardizing the interests of Third Parties. One problem here is that, as we have already noted, we are penalizing the people for the behaviour of their government. Another problem is that there may be nothing that the government can do in the short-term (in the time-frame in which it requires weapons) to win back our trust. (Remember that, in the case we are imagining, the Claimant is not currently actively engaged in aggressive behaviour.) By saying that we would provide weapons if only the regime could demonstrate its trustworthiness, we may be asking for the impossible. If we were to go ahead and transfer weapons, how could we try to justify this to the Third Parties who are wrongfully threatened by the Claimant? We might be able to say that there is only a risk that the Claimant will use our weapons to harm them, whereas it is certain that the Claimant's citizens will be harmed unless we permit the transfers (see, relatedly, Pattison, 2015, p. 462). But if the risk is high enough, or if the risk actually materializes, this is hardly sufficient to vindicate our decision. We might commit to protecting the threatened Third Parties from any future aggression that our weapons make possible, but then it seems that we have simply transferred (some of) the harm that we have helped to create to the women 29 and men who comprise our armed forces, and that, in turn, will have to be justified to them. But perhaps there are ways to insulate the Third Parties from harm without relying on our armed forces. If we currently engage in cooperative enterprises with the Claimant, we can threaten to terminate this cooperation if it engages in future aggression. If we are not currently engaged in such enterprises, we can issue conditional offers of cooperation. We could also threaten to terminate any cooperation we engage in with the Claimant's allies if aggressive policies are pursued. If these allies are sufficiently powerful or valuable, they may be able to influence the Claimant's behaviour, and the threat of withdrawn cooperation may provide them with adequate incentive to do so. When the other relevant conditions obtain, this kind of strategy offers the best chance of vindicating arms sales to aggressive regimes, and, in principle at least, this strategy can succeed. The issue can be framed in terms of proportionality, as that term is understood in just war theory. According to the sixth condition that characterizes Aggressors, the war that the Claimant proposes to wage will, amongst other things, be proportionate. But we also need to know whether our act of arming the Claimant will itself be proportionate – that is, whether or not the harms associated with providing arms will be excessive in relation to the good we can reasonably hope to achieve – and that question cannot be answered simply by considering whether the Claimant's war will be proportionate; we also need to consider the harms that will or might be imposed upon the Third Parties. It is 30 tempting to think that the (dis)proportionality of a particular act, P, is determined independently of our subsequent actions. But the actions that we perform subsequent to P can help to determine whether P is itself proportionate. Providing arms to the Claimant is permissible if, among other things, doing so satisfies the proportionality criterion, but whether that criterion is satisfied will depend upon how we act subsequent to providing arms. This is because our subsequent actions will affect the degree of harm associated with our initial act, the harm that will be weighed against the good outcomes associated with our initial act in the calculation that will determine that act's proportionality. The provision of arms may be proportionate if we subsequently engage in the kinds of activities described above (e.g. threatening to terminate cooperation if the Claimant pursues aggressive policies), which can mitigate the harms associated with arms provision, but disproportionate if we do not engage in those activities. If this is the case, an exporting state will have to engage in those activities in order to justify its decision to provide weapons. One final issue that needs to be addressed is whether arming the Claimant is merely permitted, or also required. One feature that distinguishes Aggressors from Oppressors is a larger element of uncertainty. In the latter case, the Incumbent is currently imposing upon its citizens an observable degree of oppression, and I stipulated that we are able to compare that degree of oppression to that which is threatened by the Challenger. In the former case, by contrast, the Claimant is not 31 currently engaged in aggressive behaviour, and we are forced to speculate about the harms that it may subsequently inflict on Third Parties. As we saw, if the provision of weapons enables the Claimant to inflict harms that turn out to be disproportionate, the exporting state will acquire remedial duties, and discharging those duties may be costly, e.g. if doing so requires deploying the armed forces, or abandoning cooperative practices with other states. Moreover, it seems plausible to hold that sometimes these costs (and the risk of having to bear them) will be large enough to rule out the existence of a duty to arm. In such cases, the provision of arms will be permissible (provided that the exporting state is committed to discharging any remedial duties that this act engenders), but not required. Conclusion I want to conclude with some qualificatory addenda. I have suggested that the presumption against arming outlaw states can sometimes be overturned. But I should stress that my argument does not have the effect of exonerating Britain, the US, and other western states that regularly provide weapons to oppressive and aggressive regimes. I suggested that arms transfers to such regimes can be permissible, and sometimes required, but only under certain conditions. The conditions I identified are too special for my account to ground anything like a general permission to arm outlaw states, but not so special as to render permissible transfers to such states a practical impossibility. During WWII, the US Lend-Lease policy sanctioned arms transfers to the Soviet Union, and these could potentially be 32 justified by the arguments I have supplied. The Soviet Union was an oppressive and aggressive regime, but (i) arms transfers were necessary to enable the Red Army to resist the greater oppression that would otherwise have been imposed by the Nazis, and (ii) after the end of WWII, and throughout the Cold War, the US acted to bolster the strength of those states that were vulnerable to Soviet aggression. (The case is complicated by the fact that weapons transfers were approved at a time when the Soviets were engaged in ongoing aggression, illegally occupying territory in a number of neighbouring states. This fact (along with more ideological considerations) made many US politicians reluctant to extend arms transfers to the Soviet Union.) The conclusion that it can sometimes be permissible to arm outlaw states is not a comfortable one to embrace. When we witness states providing weapons to oppressive and aggressive regimes, we tend to assume that, by doing so, they are forfeiting their status as members in good standing in the international community – and, typically, they are. But recognizing that arms transfers to outlaw states can sometimes be justified coheres with widely shared views about just war. A commonly held view among those who write about the ethics of war is that military action in a just war can be permissible even if it foreseeably kills individuals who have not made themselves liable to be killed. Provided that the deaths are not intended, and that they are proportionate, their infliction can be justifiable. But, then, it would be strange to conclude that while killing innocents by dropping bombs on them can be 33 justified in this way, contributing to their deaths (or to the infliction of other burdens) by exporting weapons cannot. Still, it is incumbent upon me to finish with a cautionary remark: while there are conditions under which it can be permissible, even obligatory, to arm outlaw states, those conditions are exceptional, and rarely obtain. This means that the regular arming of oppressive and aggressive regimes by Britain, the US, and others is simply one further example of the myriad ways in which the governments of these countries casually and callously disregard the most stringent requirements of morality. References Buchanan, A. (2013) "The Ethics of Revolution and Its Implications for the Ethics of Intervention", Philosophy &Public Affairs 41 (4) (2013): 291-323. Camus, A. (2000 [1942]) The Myth of Sisyphus. London: Penguin Books. Caney, S. (2005) Justice Beyond Borders. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Christensen, J. (2015) "Weapons, Security, and Oppression: A Normative Study of International Arms Transfers", Journal of Political Philosophy, 23 (1), 23-39. Christensen, J. (2017) Trade Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cohen, G. A (2011) "Freedom and Money" in Michael Otsuka (ed.) On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, and Other Essays in Political Philosophy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. DeGrazia, D. (2016) "Handguns, Moral Rights, and Physical Security", Journal of Moral Philosophy, 13 (1), 56-76. Fabre, C. (2010) "In Defence of Mercenarism", British Journal of Political Science, 40 (3): 539-59 Fabre, C. (2014) Cosmopolitan War. Oxford: Oxford University press. Finlay, C. J. (2015) Terrorism and the Right to Resist: A Theory of Just Revolutionary War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gawande, A. (2009) "Hellhole", The New Yorker, available at: http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/03/30/hellhole. James, A. (2012) Fairness in Practice: A Social Contract for a Global Economy. New York: Oxford University Press. Lafollette, H. (2000) "Gun Control", Ethics, 110 (2), 263-281. Luban, D. (1980) "Just War and Human Rights", Philosophy and Public Affairs, 9 (2), 160–81. MacAskill, E. (2016) "UN report into Saudi-led strikes in Yemen raises questions over UK role", The Guardian, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/27/un-report-into-saudi-ledstrikes-in-yemen-raises-questions-over-uk-role. McMahan, J. (2009) Killing in War. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 34 McMahan, J. (2010) "Humanitarian Intervention, Consent, and Proportionality" in N. A. Davis, R. Keshen, and J. McMahan (eds.), Ethics and Humanity: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Glover. New York: Oxford University Press. Pattison, J. (2014) The Morality of Private War: The Challenge of Private Military and Security Companies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pattison, J. (2015) "The Ethics of Arming Rebels", Ethics & International Affairs, 29 (4), 455-471. Quinn, B and Booth, R. (2011) "Britain cancels Bahrain and Libya arms export licences", The Guardian, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/feb/18/military-bahrain?INTCMP=SRCH. Risse, M. (2007) "Fairness in Trade I: obligations from trading and the Pauper-Labor Argument", Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 6 (3), 355-377. Sandel, M. (2012). What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets. London: Penguin Books. Satz, D. (2010) Why Some Things Should Not be for Sale: The Moral Limits of Markets. New York: Oxford University Press. Shiffrin, S. V. (1999) "Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm", Legal Theory, 5 (2), 117-148. Stohl, R and Grillot, S. (2009) The International Arms Trade. Cambridge: Polity Press. Tan, A. T. H. (ed.) (2010) The Global Arms Trade: A Handbook. New York: Routledge. Townsend, M and Boffey, D. (2014) "UK condemned over arms sales to repressive states", The Guardian, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/08/uk-condemned-arms-salesrepressive-states. Williams, B. (1973) "A Critique of Utilitarianism", in J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a workshop on trade justice hosted by Harvard University. I am grateful to participants at this event for their valuable feedback, and especially to Helena de Bres and Mathias Risse, who provided excellent comments in their capacity as discussants. A very early draft was presented at a workshop hosted by Pompeu Fabra University. I received helpful feedback from my discussant, David Axelsen, and also from the other participants. Paul BouHabib and Tom Parr have each provided helpful written comments. In addition, I have benefitted from helpful discussions with Paul and Tom, and also with Chris Armstrong, Catriona Macinnon, Zosia Stemplowska, and Patrick Tomlin. Finally, I am grateful for the feedback provided by two anonymous reviewers for Political Studies. 1 The only article-length treatment of the issue is Christensen (2015). A revised and extended version of this discussion appears in Christensen (2017, 11-31). The related matter of arming rebel groups is addressed in Pattison (2015). 2 This body of literature includes Fabre (2010), Buchanan (2013), Pattison (2014); and Finlay (2015). 3 For a discussion of the first set of scope-restrictions, see Christensen (2015, 27-28). 4 The term "outlaw state" is borrowed from Rawls (1999). 5 In this paper, I do not distinguish between permission and justification. Rather, I use the two concepts interchangeably. 35 6 The Challenger may be more oppressive either in the sense that it will oppress a larger number of people, or in the sense that the oppression it inflicts will be more severe. That we can anticipate how oppressive the Challenger's rule will be is not an unrealistic stipulation. Suppose the Challenger is ISIL. We know enough about ISIL – about what it believes in, and about how it has governed in the territories that it has managed to conquer – to be able to predict with reasonable accuracy what future ISIL rule would look like. 7 Cf. the account of how a lack of money undermines negative liberty in Cohen (2011). 8 The parenthetical qualification is included in acknowledgement of the fact that arms sales could transform an unjust war into a just one. This would be the case if the war was unjust simply by virtue of lacking a reasonable chance of success, and if arms transfers could bolster the recipient's prospects of victory. 9 We have to tread carefully here. If available alternatives are "less effective", this might mean that the war lasts longer than it otherwise would have, and that more innocent lives are lost. But the point of adopting alternative strategies is to reduce the threat that the Claimant poses to innocent Third Parties. If the harms engendered by pursuing a strategy other than arms provision are expected to be greater than the harms that the Claimant could inflict on Third Parties, if armed, then the justification for pursuing that strategy is undermined.

Self, Philosophical Considerations Şerife Tekin Daemen College, U.S.A. From Socrates' admonition to know oneself and his claim that the unexamined life is not worth living, the self has occupied a central place in philosophical and scientific inquiry. Debates about the self include metaphysical questions on the nature and reality of selfhood, empirical questions about the developmental and historical trajectory of the human selves, and ethical questions about agency, responsibility, and autonomy. The answers to these metaphysical, empirical, and ethical questions are intertwined, as the nature of selfhood both constrains and enables the range of moral and political actions the individual engages with in a social world. This entry focuses on the realist and antirealist positions on the metaphysical question of the reality of the self and its scientific investigation. Realism has two fundamental commitments about the world posited by scientific theories: existence and evaluation-independence. According to the existence claim, both the everyday world of objects and their properties-the subject of scientific theorizing-do exist. According to the evaluation-independence claim, the objects and properties posited by a scientific theory exist independent from what human beings think about them or how they are linguistically articulated. As a corollary, realists about the self argue that the self exists; its features are evaluation independent; and these features can be scientifically investigated. Antirealists on the other hand suggest that there is no such thing as the self, that it is merely a construct and what is identified as its features are contingent upon cultural and linguistic practices. The Encyclopedia of Clinical Psychology, First Edition. Edited by Robin L. Cautin and Scott O. Lilienfeld. © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2015 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. DOI: 10.1002/9781118625392.wbecp519 The Cartesian notion of the self sets the stage for both the realist and the antirealist approaches. In Meditations, Descartes seeks to investigate the grounds for his beliefs about the world. He explores whether any of his ordinary beliefs could survive methodical doubt. He goes so far as to doubt the existence of the external world itself by positing that an evil demon could make humans perceive the external world even if one did not exist. In this process, the only thing that Descartes cannot doubt is the fact that he is thinking. Thus, the very activity of thinking (i.e., doubting) is evidence of his own existence: "I must finally conclude that the proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind" (Descartes, 1641/1968). Descartes concludes that he knows one thing with certainty, the existence of a thinking substance, his "self." According to Descartes reality is made up of two fundamental kinds of substance: mental and material. Human beings, as parts of reality, are constituted by the mental, which has no extension in space, and the material, which is extended but is void of thoughts. Descartes' dualism about substances has given rise to the famous mind–body problem, one of the most important topics in philosophy of mind. Descartes constrains selfhood to immaterial substance only. The self is a thinking "thing," or metaphysically simple, unified, bounded, determinate, permanent, independent, and self-transparent substance (Descartes, 1641/1968). The Cartesian view of mind then allows us to specify what makes a person the same person over time: it is not the body; it is the possession of the immutable thing that constitutes the self. This mental substance makes the self the same unchanging entity from birth to death and possibly beyond. To summarize, for Descartes the self exists as a nonphysical and evaluation-independent entity; that is, it is there even if no one knows 2 SELF, PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS about it. Because it is compatible with most theologies that postulate souls existing in an independent "realm" of existence distinct from that of the physical world, and also because it resonates with common sense, Descartes's view has dominated modern European philosophy. Most of the realist and the antirealist views on the self have been developed in reference to the Cartesian self. Antirealists deny the existence of the self by arguing that there is no such thing as the self. Rather the self is an illusion, a fiction of the mind. There would not be such a thing that we call the self if there was no one to perceive it. They further deny the evaluation-independence claim, arguing that the concept of the self is invented by cultural, social, and linguistic conventions, and it is nothing but a useful conceptual tool for organizing human experience. Unlike what a Cartesian claims, there is no substance such as the self, the self is not a determinate, timeless, unified, and bounded thing. In fact, for the antirealists, this malleable nature of the self is evidence that the self cannot be a evaluation-independent and real thing in the way that chemical elements such as gold are (e.g., Dennett, 1991; Foucault, 1979; Rorty, 1989). Contemporary realists argue that there is such a thing as the self (the self exists) and it is evaluation-independent. Selves would exist even if even if our social, cultural, and linguistic conventions did not, but that they would be more impoverished than they currently are. However, most realists also deny the Cartesian view of the self as an immutable and unchanging thing from birth to death. Realism about the self comes in different varieties. While some realists defend the existence of the self by committing themselves to the existence of a substance-whether material or immaterial-others take issue with Cartesian commitment to substance. Instead they observe the phenomenological experience of the self and pay attention to the empirical evidence drawn from cognitive sciences and neuroscience. They relax the Cartesian limitations on the self as permanent, stable, and nonchanging, but still construe it as real (e.g., Flanagan, 1991; Jopling, 1997; Neisser, 1988). There are also some realists who claim that the self is real but remain agnostic about its nature (Graham, 2000; Kennedy & Graham, 2006). Further, some construe antirealism as a reaction to the Cartesian account of the self; once we abandon the Cartesian definition of the self, antirealism will no longer be a viable view (Graham, 2000; Jopling, 1997; Kennedy & Graham, 2006). Antirealists are represented by a number of continental philosophers with postmodern leanings, for example Richard Rorty and Michel Foucault, and a number of contemporary analytic philosophers, for example Daniel Dennett. Realists include psychologists and empirically informed philosophers of mind including William James, Owen Flanagan, Ulric Neisser, and George Graham. Varieties of Antirealism about the Self Postmodern philosophers are opposed to the Cartesian account of the self as a unified, permanent, evaluation-independent substance that is impervious to perturbations and changes. In their view, the self is construct that can be shaped in as many diverse ways as is socially, culturally, and linguistically possible. Unlike the Cartesian assumption, there are no a priori limits on the ways in which selves can be created and recreated, because there is no singular determinate self to begin with. When it comes to the self, there are no facts. This view is summarized in such propositions as "there is no such thing as the self," "the self is an illusion," and "there is no thinking, experiencing subject" (Kennedy & Graham, 2006). The phenomenal experience of having a self-that is, feelings of agency and intentionality, acting according to beliefs and desires, and being embedded in and interacting with a physical and social environment-provide apparent evidence of the existence of the self. However, for antirealists, such phenomenal information is not objectively grounded; rather, SELF, PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 3 it shows variation across subjects. Because it is impoverished, such information is usually enriched or crafted by metaphors, narratives, and symbols. Michel Foucault argues that the self is not a hidden metaphysical substance that can be unearthed, but has developed historically as a correlate of cultural and social institutions (Foucault, 1979). This means, for instance, that the concept of the self had different connotations in Ancient Greek society from its connotations in contemporary society. Thus, what people consider as the self is not a fixed, unchanging thing, as Descartes postulated it, but an evolving concept dependent on cultural and social practices and relationships. Similar to Foucault, Richard Rorty argues that there is no unchanging metaphysical substance such as the self. While Foucault emphasized the idea that the self is a product of society and culture, Rorty also considers it to be a product of linguistic practices (Rorty, 1989). Just as an author or a poet creates a novel or poem from scratch, a person creates and transforms herself through the stories (or narratives) she tells to herself about herself at particular times in particular situations. Thus, just like a novel or a poem, the self is a contingent phenomenon; it is dependent on the subject's perceptions and evaluations of herself. For Rorty, this makes the realist claim that the self is a timeless, fixed unity, wrong. A contemporary philosopher of mind and cognitive science, Daniel Dennett also defends the antirealist view of the self also by appealing to the stories or narratives we tell about ourselves. Unlike Rorty, however, Dennett is interested in psychology and cognitive sciences, rather than the activity of novelists or poets. Dennett vocalizes the two antirealist commitments and argues that the self does not exist as a concrete thing, nor as a metaphysical substance, and that what is considered as the self is not evaluation-independent (Dennett, 1991). Each "normal" individual of the species Homo sapiens, for Dennett, creates a self by spinning stories about herself in the process of presenting herself to others through language. The tendency to create selves by way of creating stories, for humans, is akin to how spiders weave webs to protect themselves; it is both intrinsic and unconscious (Dennett, 1991). Because it is constructed and abstracted out of narratives, the self is permeable and flexible. Dennett uses multiple personality disorder to illustrate his ideas (Dennett & Humphrey, 1989; see also Graham, 2000 for a detailed discussion). For Dennett the multiple personalities claimed to be possessed by the same body are difficult to individuate, both by the individual and others, because the self is not a real thing that is easily identifiable. Varieties of Realism about the Self Realists object to the antirealist claim that the self is not a real thing but fiction, a product of the social, cultural, and linguistic conventions, for three reasons. First, they assert that phenomenal experience of selfhood (conscious experience) manifests a physically embodied and socially embedded configuration; as a result, empirical research in the sciences of the mind provides robust reasons to deny antirealism. Second, they argue that those antirealists who argue that the self is a fiction because the evidence for the reality of the self is subjectively variant are confusing self-concepts (how the self represents itself to itself) with the self. While the linguistic representations of the self, i.e., self-concepts, are manifest in the social, cultural, and linguistic world, they are also grounded on the physical body. The embodiment and the developmental trajectory of the self provide objective and universal facts about human selves. Third, they declare that the antirealist position is based on overly stringent expectations of what the self must be in order to exist. William James has made major contributions to a realist picture of the self that is responsive to the experience of ordinary human beings. For James, the self is constituted by four different-but complementary-selves: (a) the material self, (b) the social self, (c) the 4 SELF, PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS spiritual self, and (d) the pure ego. The material self includes the body; there is a certain kind of intimacy that each person feels toward their own body. For example, we feel our own hunger more intimately than we do the hunger of others, even though we may empathize with them. The material self also includes clothes, wealth, and immediate family. For instance, referring to the family, James writes, "when they die a part of ourselves is gone" (James, 1890/1983). The social self is constituted by the recognition that one gets from interpersonal relationships. Humans are "gregarious animals" who have an innate tendency to be noticed favorably and to seek the respect of others. The spiritual self involves moral sensibility, conscience, and the will. Finally, the pure ego is the self of selves, which mediates between the ideas of the self and its actions in the world. The self of selves can be viewed as self-consciousness because it is active whenever the individual is conscious of something; for example, when uttering a word. William James is a realist, committed to the claim that the self is a real phenomenon, a complex language-independent entity with several constituents. His investigation of the self follows both the phenomenological method, where he uses his own experience of himself as a framework to understand the self, and the scientific method, where he uses psychopathological cases, such as multiple personality, to theorize his account. Unlike Dennett who used multiple personality to argue for an antirealist approach to the self, James uses psychopathology as evidence for the claim that there are selves. In addition to being an important figure in the development of cognitive psychology, Ulric Neisser also helped found the ecological psychology movement. This movement was triggered by worries about the exclusive focus of the field of cognitive psychology on computer modeling and information processing. Ecological psychologists challenge cognitive psychology not to confine itself to the laboratory but to also study how actual people interact in the world outside the laboratory. Neisser argues that the forms of information that individuate the self are so different from one another that it is plausible to suggest that each form of information establishes a different "self" (Neisser, 1988). Neisser's different selves are (a) the ecological self, or the self that perceives and who is situated in the physical world; (b) the interpersonal self, or the self embedded in the social world who develops through intersubjectivity; (c) the extended self, or the self in time that is grounded on memory of the past and anticipation about the future; (d) the private self, or the self of private experiences that are not available to others; and (e) the conceptual self, or the self that represents the self to itself by drawing on the properties of the self and the social, cultural, and linguistic context to which it belongs. Even though these selves specified by five different kinds of information are not experienced as distinct and independent, they differ in their developmental histories; for instance, the ecological and intersubjective selves start at birth, whereas the conceptual self develops with the development of language. An empirically informed philosopher of mind and moral psychologist, Owen Flanagan is also a proponent of realism about the self. He carves the self into what he calls the "actual full identity" and "self-represented identity," hoping to account for the self from both an objective point of view (via a complete science of mind, behavior, and personality) and a subjective point of view (via subject's self-reports at a given time and place). Actual full identity is a dynamic integrated system of individual's past and present identifications, desires, commitments, aspirations, beliefs, dispositions, temperaments, roles, acts, and actional patterns, as well as her self-understandings (even the incorrect ones) (Flanagan, 1991). Self-represented identity is a collection of various representations of actual full identity. Self-representations, in this sense, never have direct access to actual full identity; they can only approximate it with varying degrees of success. SELF, PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 5 Committed to realist intuitions, Flanagan argues there is a self and it is multiplex; that is, the various self-representations are collected into a single autobiographical narrative by the subject, who performs "active authorial work" to integrate her memories about the past, plans about the future, various projects, and so on (Flanagan, 1991). Such a narrative warrants the psychological connectedness possible in a first-person perspective, thereby reiterating the person over time. Self-representations, through such autobiographical narratives, shape actual full identity in two senses. First, when considered as a cognitive activity, representing one's self involves activating certain mental representations and cognitive structures. This activity realigns, recasts, and modifies the representations already in place. For instance, a subject representing herself as a vegan activist fighting for animal rights realigns her other self-representations, such as her participation in demonstrations, the articles she publishes in the local newspaper about the unethical treatment of animals, and so on. Second, the self as represented has motivational bearings and behavioral effects. In this case, the subject's placement of her self-conception in motivational circuits fine tunes her actions. For instance, having represented herself as a vegan activist fighting for animal rights, she might feel motivated to change people's attitudes and campaign to get more people to read her articles. Such activities are constitutive of the subject's actual full identity (Flanagan, 1991). Note that, just like Rorty and Dennett, Flanagan draws attention to the importance of narratives and the social and cultural factors in the formation of the self; however, unlike the former two, he uses these arguments to argue for the reality of the self. In this respect, Flanagan's realism accommodates both the realist claim that there is such a thing as the self, and the antirealist attempts to explain how social, cultural, and linguistic factors are influential in shaping the self. A contemporary philosopher of mind and cognitive science, George Graham is committed to the claim that the self is real, but is agnostic about what the self is. His realism is grounded on what he calls the manifestation thesis, whereby a subject's conscious experiences manifest themselves as modifications of her own experience. For example, when we become conscious of an experience such as seeing a flower, we perceive that experience as ours, not as someone else's seeing of a flower. Such selfconsciousness reveals to us that there is a self, but it does not reveal whether the self is a material or immaterial phenomenon. In Graham's view, antirealists who question the existence of the self overestimate what we know about the self; they mistakenly believe that being a realist commits someone to a Cartesian substance called the self, forcing them to abandon realism altogether. However, if we relax the stringent Cartesian demands on selfhood and remain agnostic about its ontology, we will find realism plausible. In addition, antirealists argue for antirealism by claiming selves are indeterminate. However, for Graham, the indeterminacy of the self does not require conceding that it is unreal. According to Graham, the theoretical temptation to use determinacy to distinguish real from unreal selves should be resisted. He suggests that describing the ontology of self requires knowing a complete set of metaphysical truths about the self, including truths about self/brain (body) relations, the nature of consciousness and intentionality, and personal identity across time. He is skeptical that we can ever know such truths; therefore, the best strategy is to commit to the existence of selves, but remain agnostic about what they may be (Graham, 2000). SEE ALSO: Descartes' Model of the Mind; Psychometric Validity; Social Constructionism Acknowledgments Thanks to Owen Flanagan, George Graham, Peter Zachar, and Kathyrn Tabb for their helpful feedback on this entry. 6 SELF, PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS References Dennett, D. (1991). Consciousness explained. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company. Dennett, D., & Humphrey, N. (1989). Speaking for ourselves: An assessment of multiple personality disorder. Raritan, 9, 68–69. Descartes, R. (1641/1968). Meditations on first philosophy. In E. Haldane & G. Ross (Eds.), The philosophical works of Descartes (pp. 131–200). Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. Flanagan, O. (1991). Varieties of moral personality: Ethics and psychological realism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Foucault, M. (1979). Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison (A. Sheridan, Trans.) New York: Vintage. Graham, G. (2000). Self-consciousness, psychopathology and realism about self, SWIF. Philosophy of mind. Retrieved from http://www. swif.uniba.it/lei/mind/texts/allen.htm James, W. (1890/1983). The principles of psychology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Jopling, D. A. (1997). A "self of selves". In U. Neisser & D. A. Jopling (Eds.), The conceptual self in context (pp. 249–267). New York: Cambridge University Press. Kennedy, R. C., & Graham, G. (2006). Extreme self-denial. In M. Marraffa, D. De Caro, & F. Ferretti (Eds.), Cartographies of the mind: Philosophy and psychology in intersection (pp. 227–242). Dordrecht: Kluwer. Neisser, U. (1988). Five kinds of self-knowledge. Philosophical Psychology, 1(1), 35–59. Rorty, R. (1989). Contingency, irony, and solidarity. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. Further Reading Graham, G. (2000). Self-consciousness, psychopathology and realism about self, SWIF. Philosophy of mind. Retrieved from http://www. swif.uniba.it/lei/mind/texts/allen.htm Kennedy, R. C., & Graham, G. (2006). Extreme self-denial. In M. Marraffa, D. De Caro, & F. Ferretti (Eds.), Cartographies of the mind: Philosophy and psychology in intersection (pp. 227–242). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Counterfactuals, Accessibility, and Comparative Similarity abstract Berit Brogaard and Joe Salerno (2008) have defended the validity of counterfactual hypothetical syllogism (CHS) within the Stalnaker-Lewis account. Whenever the premisses of an instance of CHS are non-vacuosly true, a shift in context has occurred. Hence the standard counterexamples to CHS suffer from context failure. Charles Cross (2011) rejects this argument as irreconcilable with the Stalnaker-Lewis account. I argue against Cross that the basic Stalnaker-Lewis truth condition may be supplemented in a way that makes (CHS) valid. Yet pace Brogaard and Salerno, there are alternative ways of spelling out the basic truth condition which are standard in most debates; and given these ways, the counterexamples to CHS are successful. Charles Cross (2011) has taken issue with Berit Brogaard and Joe Salerno's argument for the validity of counterfactual hypothetical syllogism (CHS).1 The classical example: (Hoover) [H1] If J. Edgar Hoover had been a communist, he would have been a traitor. [H2] If he had been born a Russian, he would have been a communist. [H3] Therefore, if he had been born a Russian, he would have been a traitor.(Brogaard and Salerno 2008: 39) Brogaard and Salerno argue for the following claim: 1 I am very grateful to Professor Cross for intense discussion. 2 The ability of the possible worlds account to explain the failure of these inferences is thought to be one of its great strengths. However, as we will argue, the results yielded rest on a contextual fallacy. (Brogaard and Salerno 2008: 40) Cross, in contrast, has the following aim: I will argue that no contextual fallacy is committed in the standard Stalnaker/Lewis counterexamples to the rules in question.(Cross 2011: 91) What is the Stalnaker-Lewis semantics as presupposed by Brogaard and Salerno? Cross notes that it is neither textbook Stalnaker nor textbook Lewis (Cross 2011: 92 ann. 1). Nor can it be identified with the maximal consensus of both positions. In Brogaard and Salerno's view, the Stalnaker-Lewis semantics boils down to the following truth condition: (SL) p>q is true at possible world w iff q is true at all of the closest possible worlds to w at which p is true.(Cross 2011: 92) Of course, in order to understand SL, we have to add some implications like a similarity ordering that discerns the set of closest possible worlds. Brogaard and Salerno add: ...a consequence of the standard account is that counterfactuals with impossible antecedents (i.e. counterpossibles) are vacuously true; if there are no closest A-worlds, then vacuously all the closest A-worlds are B-worlds.(Brogaard and Salerno 2008: 40) So we should keep in mind that the Stalnaker-Lewis semantics Brogaard and Salerno commit themselves to just consists in SL and its implications plus the condition for vacuous truth. 3 As we will see, Cross argues to the stronger conclusion that Brogaard and Salerno's account is irreconcilable with the Stalnaker-Lewis semantics. I will argue, however, that neither Brogaard and Salerno nor Cross are completely right. Pace Cross, Brogaard and Salerno are right as far as there is a neat way of spelling out SL according to which the Stalnaker-Lewis counterexamples do rest on a contextual fallacy. In contrast, Cross is right in claiming that the standard Lewisian way of spelling out SL does not lead to the contextual fallacy. Here is Brogaard and Salerno's defence of CHS. An inference must be valid only provided context is held fixed throughout this inference. Regarding CHS, there are two possibilities. Either context is held fixed; then CHS comes out valid. Or it is not; then the failure of CHS does not impair the claim that CHS is valid in principle. The two alternatives arise as follows. Closest antecedent worlds are determined by holding fixed a context of background facts. In order for H1 to be non-vacuously true, the closest worlds where Hoover is a communist must be worlds where Hoover is a traitor. To achieve this, we hold fixed the contextual background fact that Hoover is the American director of the FBI. Holding this fixed, the antecedent of H2 and H3 is inaccessible. H2 and H3 are vacuously true. The inference is valid. In contrast, in order for H2 to be non-vacuously true, we must give up the background fact that Hoover is the American director of the FBI. If we hold the resulting context fixed, the premiss H1 turns out false and (Hoover) fails for this reason. What remains is that the context of background facts changes such as to make first H1 and then H2 true. Then the inference fails due to context failure. All counterexamples to CHS must be treated in the same way. Cross denies that for both premisses H1 and H2 to be non-vacuously true, a change in context must occur. To be sure, whenever both premisses are true, a change in what would be true if the antecedent were true occurs. But this change does not have to amount to a shift in context: The issue for Brogaard and Salerno is not whether, in real-world examples, what would be true if p were true varies with p; the issue is whether this variation entails a change of 4 context. Brogaard and Salerno's argument assumes that a change of context must occur in that case, but this assumption is simply wrong as claim about the semantics of the Stalnaker-Lewis conditional.(Cross 2011: 94) Why is the assumption that a change of context must occur wrong? The variation in background facts that occurs whenever H1 and H2 are true may be owed to the variation in the antecedent given a fixed similarity ordering and not to a shift in context. Brogaard and Salerno have not shown otherwise. I want to argue, however, that the most charitable interpretation of Brogaard and Salerno's way of spelling out SL indeed substantiates their key assumption. Their view is anticipated by Wright's discussion of CHS: ...when a number of counterfactuals are at play in a single context, some single range of relevant worlds –perhaps that, determined à la Lewis, for the most remote of themgoverns them all.(Wright 1983: 138) I introduce a specific notion of background facts held fixed, factsB, which is subject to the following conditions: Context fixes the similarity ordering by holding fixed factsB. Different factsB, different context. A world is accessible in a context iff factsB obtain at that world. Any difference in accessible worlds must be a difference in factsB. Hence any difference in accessible worlds must amount to a difference in context. Cross rejects this notion of a background fact: Where exactly did Brogaard and Salerno go wrong? The problem is their claim that 'if context must remain fixed when evaluating an argument for validity, the set of contextually determined background facts must remain fixed when evaluating an argument involving 5 subjunctives for validity.' On a Stalnaker/Lewis account of counterfactuals, context alone does not determine a set of background facts. What context determines is a measure of comparative world similarity, and it takes both a comparative world similarity measure and a counterfactual antecedent to determine a set of background facts. In short, the set of contextually determined background facts is always antecedent-relative... (Cross 2011: 94, emphasis on 'background facts' mine) But I do not see any reason within SL to eschew background factsB. The distinction between worlds being accessible and being inaccessible looms large in the Stalnaker-Lewis semantics. For instance, we may want to constrain accessible worlds by their being nomically possible. This is done by holding fixed the natural laws as background factsB. And it is plausible to say that these background facts are not antecedent-relative. What is special about Brogaard and Salerno's use of factsB is that accessibility is both very flexible (it may vary with context from H1 to H2) and very restrictive (mundane possibilities like Hoover being Russian may become inaccessible due to a context shift). Cross introduces a very different notion of background facts, let us call them factsC, which are partly determined by the contextually shaped similarity ordering together with the antecedent of a counterfactual. On Cross's epistemic account of factsC, the background facts held fixed by p are the propositions q such that a given agent would use p > q to settle her beliefs about the truth values of other counterfactuals. This is perfectly legitimate, but so far it is perfectly reconcilable with the conception of Brogaard and Salerno. Just add the subscripts 'B' to the first occurrence of 'background facts' and 'C' to the other three occurrences in the passage quoted from Cross. Then it becomes obvious that Brogaard and Salerno can happily agree with what Cross says about the Stalnaker-Lewis account. FactsB must remain fixed when evaluating counterfactual syllogisms, factsC vary with the antecedent. Both kinds of background facts serve very different tasks. FactsB are the 6 contextual features that shape the similarity ordering, factsC are determined by the similarity ordering together with the antecedent in order to settle the truth value of other counterfactuals. Now in my charitable reading of Brogaard and Salerno, a crucial further premiss of the semantics Brogaard and Salerno build around SL enters the stage: (Accessibility )Antecedent worlds are either closest or inaccessible. This follows in no way from SL; but it is reconcilable with SL. SL does not have to be given up if supplemented by this additional premiss. For H1 to be (non-vacuously) true, the set of accessible worlds from which precisely the antecedent worlds are selected must be confined to worlds where Hoover is the American director of the FBI. This is the decisive background factB held fixed by the context. Yet for H2 to be (non-vacuously) true, some accessible world must be a world where Hoover is not American. In order to reconcile both, a change in context is required. Why can Brogaard and Salerno be confident that the same must go for all other examples where CHS fails? The general scheme of CHS is: p > q, q > r; p > r If we consider a fixed set of worlds from which precisely the antecedent worlds are selected, we can be confident that this scheme is valid: All p-worlds in the set are q-worlds. All qworlds in the set are r-worlds. Thus all p-worlds in the set are r-worlds. As a consequence, the set of worlds considered must vary throughout the inference for the scheme to fail. In Brogaard and Salerno's account as I have presented it, there is such a fixed set: the set of accessible worlds. If context varies whenever the set of accessible worlds varies, CHS can only fail due to a change in context. 7 In sum, I doubt that Cross successfully defeats Brogaard and Salerno. Their account is a legitimate way of spelling out SL. What justifies (accessibility)? It provides an explanation why CHS fails that rivals with the standard explanation. Its advantage is that it preserves the principled validity of a syllogistic pattern we feel familiar with. Thus it allows to explain the pull (Hoover) unfolds as an inference. Consider (Hoover) rearranged (H2) If J. Edgar Hoover had been born a Russian, he would have been a communist. (H1) If he had been a communist, he would have been a traitor. (H3) Therefore, if he had been born a Russian, he would have been a traitor. Here it seems to me that we feel compelled by the inference but do not as readily accept the second premiss (H1) as in other situations. In my view, this is explained by the inferential pattern (p > q, q > r; p > r) becoming manifest upon rearranging (Hoover). On behalf of Brogaard and Salerno, I offer the following additional explanation: We settle for the first premiss we encounter (H2) to be non-vacuously true. Yet since CHS is valid in principle, we also feel compelled to expect a commitment to its validity whenever the pattern is manifest. Thus we hold the context fixed.2 Fortunately, this is irreconcilable with the truth of H1. So we do not have to accept the untenable conclusion. If this view is correct, it shows our commitment to the principled validity of CHS, contrary to the standard explanation. Yet since Brogaard and Salerno do not provide sufficient evidence of the sort just outlined, I join Cross in denying that they have convicted the usual counterexamples to CHS of a 2 Wright's proposal that we tend to hold context fixed when counterfactuals are uttered 'in one breath' does not explain why (Hoover) and (Hoover) rearranged behave differently (Wright 1983: 138; cf. Lowe 1984, 1990, 1995; Wright 1984). 8 contextual fallacy. My reasons are different from Cross's. There is an alternative way of spelling out SL in which no contextual fallacy is committed. In that reading, CHS comes out invalid. And this alternative is standard in most philosophical debates. The contestable premiss is (accessibility): Antecedent worlds are either closest or inaccessible. I focus on Lewis' (1973) treatment. In Lewis' picture, a similarity ordering does not simply distinguish between worlds being closest and worlds being inaccessible. Some worlds are not as close as others but still accessible.3 This changes our picture of (Hoover). Remember: In order for H1 to be non-vacuously true, the closest worlds where Hoover is a communist must be worlds where he is a traitor. To achieve this, the closest worlds where Hoover is a communist must be worlds where Hoover is still the American director of the FBI. Yet in accepting a similarity ordering that makes these worlds the closest worlds where Hoover is a communist, one does not commit oneself to the antecedent of H2 and H3 being inaccessible. To be sure, the worlds where Hoover is Russian and a communist cannot be as close as the closest worlds where he is a communist; but they may still be accessible. Nor does the truth of H1 preclude H2 from being true. For contrary to Brogaard and Salerno's view, holding fixed background facts is not inevitably an all-or-nothing matter ('either worlds are such as to preserve that Hoover is American, or they are inaccessible'). For reasons of clarity, I introduce a further notion of background facts, factsL, that replace factsB in determining the similarity ordering. Nothing seems to preclude a more flexible unified similarity ordering that has the following features: As long as this is reconcilable with the antecedent to be assessed, it holds onto the contextually salient features of the actual world, both the factL that Hoover is American and the factL that Russians are (used to be) communists. This ordering interacts with the antecedent of a counterfactual as follows: If one of the factsL proves irreconcilable with the 3 Or, if we follow Lewis in dropping the limit assumption, there tend to be only such worlds but none that are closest tout court. 9 antecedent, it is given up. The result is not that the antecedent worlds are inaccessible; rather they are, other things being equal, less close than an antecedent world that allows to hold onto the factL in question. The factL that Hoover is the American director of the FBI must be given up in order to maintain the antecedent that he is Russian. As a consequence, the closest worlds where he is Russian are less close than the closest worlds where he is a communist. But they are not ipso facto inaccessible. If they are not, no prerequisite of H1 being non-vacuously true precludes H2 from being non-vacuously true as well. This is not to give up the idea that certain other background facts, factsB, play a role in determining the range of accessible worlds. But the accessibility relation is not relevant to assessing (Hoover). We have seen that, if there is only one set of worlds from which all antecedent worlds are selected to evaluate the scheme (p > q, q > r; p > r), Brogaard and Salerno's results seem compelling. But now there are several sets of antecedent worlds for consideration as selected from the set of accessible worlds. Firstly, there is the set of accessible antecedent worlds. And then there is the set of closest antecedent worlds. Both will usually come apart. Then CHS may well fail without a shift in context: The closest antecedent worlds form a subset of the accessible antecedent worlds. As a consequence, not all accessible p-worlds must be q-worlds for the first premiss to come true. And not all accessible q-worlds must be r-worlds for the second premiss to come true. Thus the closest p-worlds may well be q-worlds without being r-worlds provided the closest q-worlds are both r-worlds and not-p-worlds. As a consequence, Brogaard and Salerno are right in that there is a legitimate way of spelling out SL according to which the usual counterexamples to CHS involve a contextual fallacy. Yet Cross is right that they do not attain their more ambitious aim: they fail to establish that within the Stalnaker-Lewis approach, CHS comes out valid. For the standard way of cashing out SL has CHS come out invalid. In order to further substantiate their claim, Brogaard and 10 Salerno would have to show that it is superior in dealing with the data, for instance (Hoover) rearranged.4 References Brogaard, B., Salerno, H. 2008. Counterfactuals and context. Analysis 68: 39-46. Cross, C. 2011. Comparative world similarity and what is held fixed in counterfactuals. Analysis 71: 91-96. Lewis, D. 1973. Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell. Lowe, E.J., 1984. Wright versus Lewis on the Transitivity of Counterfactuals. Analysis 44: 180-183. Lowe, E. J. 1990. Conditionals, Context and Transitivity. Analysis 50: 80–87. Lowe, E. J. 1995. The Truth about Counterfactuals. The Philosophical Quarterly 45: 41–59. Wright, C. 1983. Keeping Track of Nozick. Analysis 43: 134-140. Wright, C. 1984. Comment on Lowe. Analysis 44: 183-185. 4 Cf. Lowe's counterexample to the Lewisian account (Lowe 1984: 182-183). Yet Lowe argues against context-relativity as espoused by Wright and later by Brogaard and Salerno (Wright 1984: 184; Lowe 1984: 181).

UMĚNÍ ART 1 LXII 2014 RECENZE REVIEWS 87 Dvořákovo dílo jednou shromážděno v souborné výstavě, bude možno zhodnotit Dvořáka umělce. Uvidíme potom, jak vědomě, nesmlouvavě a průbojně šel za ryzí plastikou formy až k oněm nefi gurativním plastronům..."8 Teprve díky první monografi i Zdeňka Dvořáka doprovázené soubornou výstavou se Svobodova předpověď naplnila. Přesto, že se dochovalo jen omezené množství plastik, Hana Rousová přesvědčivě analyzuje cestu „abstrakcionisty" Dvořáka k abstraktním reliéfům jako vrcholnému výkonu, ale sleduje také její odbočky a souběžnou realistickou linii, rekonstruuje jeho osobní historii a podává katalog díla, v němž jsou téměř všechny práce reprodukované. Kromě zhodnocení uměleckého vývoje dosud vcelku nenápadného sochaře, se nám tak od autorky znovu dostává inspirativního připomenutí, že výzkum nefavorizovaných směrů, tendencí a osobností může nečekaně obohatit obraz dějin výtvarné kultury. notes 1 Marie Klimešová, František Pacík, Řevnice 2008. Výstava se konala v Západočeské galerii v Plzni (29. 1.–19. 4. 2009). 2 Výtvarná práce IV, 1926, č. 2, s. 48 a 61 („Interieur Uměl. prům. školy v Praze na výstavě v Paříži 1925. Řezby ze školy prof. B. Kafk y"). 3 Veraikon XV, 1929, č. 2–3, s. 47 (v popisku označena „Kupte balonky"). 4 Kromě výstav, které připravila Hana Rousová, se Dvořákovy abstraktní reliéfy ze sbírek Národní galerie v Praze objevily na výstavách Sochařství východních Čech 1700–1945, Orlická galerie v Rychnově nad Kněžnou a Městské muzeum v Jaroměři 1988 (připravil Jiří Zemánek); Tschechische Kunst der 20er und 30er Jahre: Avantgarde und Tradition, Mathildenhöhe Darmstadt 1988 (připravil Jiří Kotalík a kol.); Přírůstky českého umění 20. století z let 1989–1992, Národní galerie v Praze 1992; El Arte de la Vanguardia en Checoslovaquia 1918–1938: Th e Art of the Avant-Garde in Czechoslovakia 1918–1938, IVAM Centre Julio Gonzáles, Valencia 1993; Umění pro všechny smysly: Meziválečná avantgarda v Československu, Národní galerie v Praze 1993 (připravil Jaroslav Anděl a kol.). 5 Hana Rousová, Vliv na českou abstrakci třicátých let 1919–1935, in: eadem (ed.), František Foltýn 1891–1976: Košice - Paříž - Brno, Brno - Řevnice 2007, s. 125–151. 6 Hana Rousová (ed.), Konec avantgardy?: od mnichovské dohody ke komunistickému převratu, Řevnice 2011. 7 Dle autorky v Pestrém týdnu z dubna 1935. Reprodukovaný článek Galerie politiků v karikatuře se však nepodařilo dohledat. 8 Stanislav F. Svoboda, Zdeněk Dvořák, Kvart IV, 1945–1946, č. 1, s. 18. TOMÁŠ HŘÍBEK - FILOSOFICkÝ ÚSTAV AV ČR, V. V. I., pRAHA Piotr Piotrowski Art and Democracy in Post-Communist Europe London, Reaktion Books 2012, 312 s. Dějiny moderního umění byly dlouho vyprávěny za tichého předpokladu platnosti jistých binárních rozdílů. Tak se nepochybovalo o tom, že modernismus má své centrum a svou periférii; že má svou podstatu, od níž lze poměrně snadno oddělit jisté nahodilosti; že je internacionální, nikoli nacionalistický; a že se odehrává na Západě, nikoli na Východě. Centrum bývala Paříž (o něco později New York), a kdo chtěl být moderní, musel opustit periférii a odejít do centra. Moderní umělec měl kultivovat formu, nikoli konkrétní obsah - zvláště ne obsah, odkazující ke specifi cké národní kultuře, k nějakým místním tradicím. A už vůbec se nepovažovalo za plodné hledat moderní umění na Východě, řekněme na východ od Berlína, neboť ti umělci, kteří byli schopni k vývoji modernismu přispět, se přece sebrali a odešli do centra, takže doma zůstali pouze průměrné talenty a epigoni. Historici moderního umění z „periferních oblastí" toto dominantní vyprávění obvykle převzali a potvrzovali jeho správnost hledáním lokálních impresionistů, expresionistů či kubistů. Jenže taková snaha nemohla nikdy uspokojit nároky, kladené na umění v centru jeho dění, protože lokální Moneti a Picassové potvrdili původní dojem autorů dominantního 88 RECENZE REVIEWS UMĚNÍ ART 1 LXII 2014 vyprávění, že umělci z periférie, odkudsi z Východu, buď impresionismus a kubismus nepochopili - to v případě, že se jejich výtvory odlišovaly od produkce z centra –, nebo byli pouhými epigony - v případě, že jejich díla věrně připomínala západní vzory. Je kuriózní, že i historici modernismu, kteří si zakládají na tom, že poučeni poststrukturalismem nahlédli nahodilost tradičních binárních rozdílů, reprodukují tytéž rozdíly, pokud se setkají s východoevropským uměním. Tak Rosalind Kraussová ve známé recenzi jedné z prvních výstav kubismu, která měla vskutku internacionální charakter, píše o českém segmentu následovně: „... je zde sedmnáct děl českých adeptů, Filly, Kubišty, Procházky, Beneše, Gutfreunda a Čapka, jež jsou svědectvím orgií akademismu, které nový styl rozpoutal v evropském umění."1 Jinými slovy, Kraussová vidí, že české umění do jisté míry připomíná pařížský kubismus, ale zároveň se od něj v lecčem liší, a učiní závěr, že první je tedy derivátem druhého; navíc derivátem neumělým, neboť odlišnost může znamenat jen provinciální nepochopení záměrů avantgardy z centra. Ještě hůř na tom bylo východoevropské umění z období studené války. Umělci vesměs ztratili kontakt s vývojem na Západě i v jiných zemích regionu, a stejně tak se východoevropské umění stalo nedostupné Západu. Západní kritika a historie umění definitivně ztratila o region zájem, protože v něm viděla vesměs jen uniformní produkci socialistického realismu. Pád železné opony mnohé změnil. Nejen umění předválečných avantgard, ale i nezávislé umění z doby studené války, a hlavně nová tvorba po roce 1989 se staly obecně viditelnými a soupeří o pozornost na globálním uměleckém trhu. Někteří západní historici přepisují dějiny klasických avantgard, protože začínají objevovat, že nejen Paříž, Mnichov či Berlín, ale i Praha, Budapešť, Krakov, Lodž či Moskva jsou neredukovatelnou součástí této historie. Ale zdá se, že úkol napsat nové dějiny východoevropského umění z období studené války čeká především na historiky z jednotlivých zemí regionu. Zvláště je potřebná srovnávací historie, která ukáže, jak se produkce z různých zemí navzájem lišila, přestože všechny byly oficiálně satelity Sovětského svazu a zdánlivě uplatňovaly tutéž kulturní politiku. Nedávno sepsal právě takové srovnávací dějiny umění několika východoevropských zemí polský historik Piotr Piotrowski. Anglickým překladem knihy In the Shadow of Yalta: Art and the Avant-garde in Eastern Europe,2 která vznikla rozšířením práce, v níž původně sledoval pouze vývoj poválečného polského modernismu, se Piotrowski etabloval jako přední znalec moderního umění regionu. Kromě polské scény popsal vývoj nezávislého umění i v socialistickém Československu, Východním Německu, Maďarsku a Jugoslávii. Autor zpracovává svůj materiál více méně chronologicky, ale rozhodně se nejedná o pouhý popis vybraných osobností a jejich díla. Piotrowski sleduje specifické teoretické cíle, zvláště pak má ambici prokázat, jak se díla z jednotlivých východoevropských zemí mohou podobat sobě navzájem nebo produkci ze západní Evropy či USA, avšak podobná forma je vyplněna odlišným, lokálním obsahem. Zvláště fascinující jsou v tomto ohledu Piotrowského analýzy některých velice minimalistických uměleckých projevů, třeba konceptuálního umění z bývalé Jugoslávie (záhřebská skupina Gorgona, Goran Trbuljak) či akčního umění z počátku sedmdesátých let v normalizačním Československu (Jan Mlčoch, Petr Štembera). In the Shadow of Yalta končí osmdesátými lety minulého století. Avšak Piotrowski se rozhodl ve svém projektu srovnávacích dějin východoevropského umění pokračovat a výsledkem je nový svazek, Art and Democracy in PostCommunist Europe.3 Tato kniha se od své předchůdkyně v některých ohledech liší. Zatímco In the Shadow of Yalta pojednává o materiálu, který je bezpochyby historický - ačkoli jde o nedávnou historii –, Art and Democracy je kniha o umění přítomnosti, umění posledních dvou dekád. Proto není komponována chronologicky, nýbrž spíše jako sbírka devíti relativně vzájemně nezávislých, tematicky odlišených esejí-kapitol, rozdělených do tří oddílů knihy. První kapitola slouží jako teoretické prolegomenon a je rozhodně nejambicióznější částí knihy. Autor v ní totiž nežádá nic menšího, než přehodnocení či rovnou odmítnutí předpokladů západních dějin umění, a zvláště dějin umění 20. století, z nichž některé jsem stručně popsal v úvodním odstavci. Piotrowski totiž upozorňuje, že navzdory všem metodologickým posunům a změnám chápání vztahu mezi Východem a Západem po r. 1989 jsou dějiny moderního a současného umění pojímány jako nezadržitelný sled avantgard v metropolích jako Paříž a Manhattan, k nimž jen výjimečně přispělo dění v odlehlých místech jako Krakov, Vitebsk, Moskva či Mexico City. Typickým příkladem takového vyprávění je nedávno publikovaná standardní učebnice Art since 1900, kolektivní dílo crème de la crème současných amerických historiků a kritiků umění, mimo jiné též zmíněné Rosalind Kraussové.4 Vycházeje ze současných diskusí o „globálních dějinách umění", které by měly nahradit dosud dominantní, vertikální, esencialistický model, upřednostňující západní úhel pohledu, rozvíjí Piotrowski v Art and Democracy ústřední metodologický princip své předchozí knihy, tj. požadavek interpretovat umění ve vztahu k místu jeho původu. Zatímco v In the Shadow of Yalta sloužila aplikace tohoto principu pouze k prokázání skutečnosti, že východoevropské umění z doby studené války je nepochopitelné, pokud se chápe jako pouhý derivát západních stylů bez ohledu na lokální kontext, v nové knize autor žádá, aby globální dějiny umění, „berouce v úvahu specifické významy umění produkovaného v okrajových oblastech", fungovaly „jako kritika hierarchického vyprávění, produkovaného v kontextu vertikálních dějiny umění". (s. 31) Horizontální dějiny umění tedy nejen rehabilitují produkci z regionů, nýbrž způsobí regionalizaci dosud dominantního západního umění. Zbývající kapitoly Piotrowského knihy zkoumají takové specifické rysy východoevropského umění, jako modifikace památníků komunismu současnými umělci; odlišné osudy konceptu autonomie umění v různých sovětských satelitech a politizace umění UMĚNÍ ART 1 LXII 2014 RECENZE REVIEWS 89 v postkomunistické situaci; rehabilitaci anarchismu v umění současnosti; dialektiku paměti a historie a jejich odlišný výraz v nových muzeích současného umění, budovaných v posledních letech v městech jako Bukurešť, Talinn či Varšava; dědictví biopolitiky komunistického státu v díle některých současných umělců; lokální formy genderového umění; a konečně nové konflikty mezi uměním a mocí v některých postkomunistických zemích. V těchto kapitolách se povšimneme druhé odlišnosti Piotrowského nové knihy ve srovnání s jeho předchozími dějinami modernismu v sovětských satelitech: rozšíření záběru. Art and Democracy analyzuje uměleckou produkci nejen z Polska, Maďarska, České a Slovenské republiky, ale i z nových národních států, vzešlých z trosek bývalé Jugoslávie, Rumunska, pobaltských republik a Ruska. Přinejmenším autor této recenze, nejsa historikem či kritikem současného umění, měl šanci poprvé se dozvědět o zjevně fascinujících tvůrcích, jako jsou Zbigniew Libera, Grzegorz Klaman či Katarzyna Kozyra z Polska, Milica Tomić ze Srbska, ukrajinská skupina R. E. P, maďarský kolektiv Little Warsaw, a mnozí další. Extenzivní je též zastoupení českého a slovenského umění. Piotrowski analyzuje mimo jiné intervence do veřejného prostoru Davida Černého a skupin Rafani, Podle Bal, Kamera Skura a Guma Guar, stejně jako Romana Ondáka a Richarda Senešiho, a genderové umění Veroniky Bromové či Lenky Klodové. Ale z českého umění posledního zhruba čtvrtstoletí zatím nevzešla osobnost, která by na mezinárodní scéně dosáhla podobného věhlasu jako Krzystof Wodiczko původně z Polska, Marina Abramović z Jugoslávie či Ilja Kabakov z Ruska, jimž Piotrowski věnuje značnou pozornost. Právě osudy tří posledně jmenovaných umělců nám ale připomínají, že binární protiklady, které si Piotrowski přeje překonat, hrají i v současném umění zásadní strukturující roli. Umělec má šanci být viděn a slyšen na globální scéně jen tehdy, opustí-li „Východ" a usadí se na „Západě". Piotrowského nemůžeme obvinit, že by Wodiczka, Abramovićovou či Kabakova nějak protežoval na úkor umělců, kteří zůstali „ve staré vlasti", ale zdá se, že si lze zatím stěží představit, jak by se umění mohlo regionalizovat, protože tón nadále určuje „centrum", nikoli „periférie". V té souvislosti mě napadá, zda se dominance Západu či centra neprojevuje v Piotrowského knize ještě jiným, snad méně nápadným způsobem. Autor mimo jiné budí respekt jistotou, s níž ovládá kritickou teorii, jejímž prostřednictvím dává smysl rozmanitému materiálu z tolika odlišných zemí. Jenže pak si povšimneme, že polský historik zkoumá východoevropské umění výhradně pomocí nástrojů západní teorie. Na různých místech knihy se odvolává na Althussera a jeho pojetí ideologických státních aparátů, Lévinasovu etiku, teorii agonistické demokracie Chantal Mouffe, Halbwachsův kontrast mezi pamětí a historií, kritiku moci u Giorgio Agambena... Můžeme to interpretovat dvojím způsobem. Buď Piotrowski nedotáhl svůj vlastní projekt odpoutání východoevropského umění od západní perspektivy do konce, ačkoli něco takového je možné; anebo to možné není, protože existuje jen západní teoretický diskurs, vůči němuž není žádná východní alternativa. Jinými slovy, i kdyby výtvarní kritici, kurátoři a v neposlední řadě i dealeři z centra přistoupili na představu, že umělec nemusí opustit svůj lokální kontext, aby byl brán vážně, východoevropské umění bude přece jen nadále závislé na Západě, neboť je popisováno a nahlíženo prostřednictvím západních kategorií a pojmů. poznámky 1 Rosalind Kraus, The Cubist Epoch (1971), přetištěno in: eadem, Perpetual Inventory, Cambridge (Mass.) 2010, s. 138. 2 Piotr Piotrowski, In the Shadow of Yalta: Art and the Avant-garde in Eastern Europe, London 2010. 3 Piotr Piotrowski, Art and Democracy in Post-Communist Europe, London 2012. 4 Hal Foster - Rosalind Krauss - Yves-Alain Bois - Benjamin H. D. Buchloh, Art since 1900: Modernism, Antimodernism, Postmodernism, New York 2004, 2. rozšířené vydání 2012. Český překlad 1. vydání: Umění po roce 1900. Modernismus, antimodernismus, postmodernismus, Praha 2007.

PERCEIVED POLITICS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CAPITAL 1 Combined Effects of Perceived Politics and Psychological Capital on Job Satisfaction, Turnover Intentions, and Performance Muhammad Abbas Faculty of Management Sciences Riphah International University, Sector I-14, Hajj Complex, Islamabad PAKISTAN Email: [email protected] Usman Raja* Faculty of Business Brock University 500 Glenridge Ave. St. Catharines, ON L2S 3A1, CANADA Email: [email protected]; [email protected] Wendy A. Darr Defense Scientist Directorate of Military Personnel Research and Analysis National Defense Headquarters Ottawa, ON, Canada K1A 0K2 Email: [email protected] Dave Bouckenooghe Faculty of Business Brock University, 500 Glenridge Ave. St. Catharines, ON L2S 3A1 CANADA Email: [email protected] * Corresponding author Acknowledgements: This research was partially supported by Brock University research grant 112-348066. The authors would like to thank Gary Johns, Gary Greguras (Action Editor), and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable suggestions that helped us in improving this paper. We also thank Aliya Moeen Zafar for her help in proofreading and editing this paper. Citation: Abbas, M. Raja, U., Darr, W., & Bouckenooghe, D. (August 2012). Combined Effects of Perceived Politics and Psychological Capital on Job Satisfaction, Turnover Intentions, and Performance. Journal of Management DOI: 10.1177/0149206312455243. This is final accepted version of the article (without proofread). The final publication is available at http://jom.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/08/08/0149206312455243.abstract PERCEIVED POLITICS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CAPITAL 2 Abstract With a diverse sample (n = 231 paired responses) of employees from various organizations in Pakistan, we tested for the main effects of perceived organizational politics and psychological capital on turnover intentions, job satisfaction, and supervisor rated job performance. We also examined the moderating influence of psychological capital in the politics – outcomes relationships. Results provided good support for the proposed hypotheses. While perceived organizational politics was associated with all outcomes, psychological capital had a significant relationship with job satisfaction and supervisor rated performance only. As hypothesized, the negative relationship of perceived organizational politics with job satisfaction and supervisor rated performance was weaker when psychological capital was high. However, the result for turnover intentions was counter to expectations where politics – turnover intention relationship was stronger when psychological capital was high. Keywords: Perceived Politics; Psychological Capital; Job Performance; Job Satisfaction; Turnover Intentions PERCEIVED POLITICS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CAPITAL 3 COMBINED EFFECTS OF PERCEIVED POLITICS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CAPITAL ON JOB SATISFACTION, TURNOVER INTENTIONS, AND PERFORMANCE Over the past couple of decades, perceived organizational politics (POP) has remained an important subject of inquiry in the field of organizational behavior and is commonly viewed as a source of detrimental consequences for organizational members (e.g., Chang, Rosen, & Levy, 2009; Ferris, Russ, & Fandt, 1989). However, despite two recent meta-analytic studies, the effects of POP on outcomes are still inconclusive. For example, Miller, Rutherford, and Kolodinsky's (2008) meta-analysis examining perceived politics and various employee outcomes such as job stress, job satisfaction, turnover, and organizational commitment suggests that POP is generally detrimental to personal and organizational effectiveness; yet their findings also reveal variation in effects across outcomes and certain settings. Specifically, the effects for job performance were much smaller than for other outcomes, and public sector employees were more likely to leave the organization in the face of organizational politics compared to private sector employees. In addition, the effects for organizational commitment were much lower in international samples than in domestic samples, suggesting the need for further exploration of POP theory in different cultures to determine its boundary conditions. Pointing to the lack of a theoretical understanding of how perceptions of politics influence employee outcomes, Chang et al. (2009) called for future researchers to examine the contextual and individual difference factors as moderators in such relationships. Although few studies have attempted to explore the moderating role of individual difference variables in the relationship between perceived politics and various outcomes, there remains a lack of understanding of the influence of an individual's composite psychological resources, particularly PERCEIVED POLITICS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CAPITAL 4 hope and self-efficacy, on the relationship between perceived politics and outcomes such as turnover intentions, job satisfaction, and job performance. For example, Kacmar, Collins, Harris, and Judge (2009) found that Core Self Evaluations (which includes generalized self-efficacy) exacerbated the relationship between POP and job performance. Bozeman, Perrewe, Hochwarter, and Brymer (2001) found some mixed evidence whereby self-efficacy intensified the negative effects of perceived politics on job satisfaction; however, it did not moderate between POP-turnover intentions and POP-job stress relationships. On the contrary, we draw upon Conservation of Resource Theory (Hobfoll, 2011) to argue that psychological capital (PsyCap) comprising hope and self-efficacy will act as 'a solid resource reservoir' (Hobfoll, 2002: 318) and reduce the negative effects of politics on work outcomes. Thus, the study of psychological capital as a holistic core construct would better explain the moderating role of such constructs in the POP – outcomes relationships and would advance further knowledge in this domain. In addition, it is important to note that the majority of studies in this domain of research have been conducted in developed countries of North America and Europe. Tsui, Nifadkar, and Ou (2007) suggested that unless we test the theories largely developed in the US in non-Western settings, researchers and practitioners would have little confidence about their generalizability in other regions. We believe that our study will address this gap as it provides a rare opportunity to examine the applicability and validity of concepts largely developed in Western cultures. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES POP, PsyCap, and Workplace Outcomes Politics is an inevitable component of an organization's social fabric, which different people may perceive differently. Despite some discussion that some individuals thrive on PERCEIVED POLITICS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CAPITAL 5 politics, using it to their advantage through the development of political skill (Ferris, Perrewe, Anthony, & Gilmore, 2000), this treatment of POP has typically been made in reference to the upper organizational echelon of executives (see Perrewe, Ferris, Frink, & Anthony, 2000). In the current study, we define perceived organizational politics as an individual's perceptions of others' self-interested acts or behaviors, frequently associated with manipulation of organizational policies, often using coercive tactics even at the expense of others for short-term gains (Kacmar & Ferris, 1991). These behaviors are perceived as subversive and contradict with the interests of other individuals and the organization (Vigoda, 2000). As an antecedent to workplace outcomes, POP has generally been regarded as a stressor. For example, while examining stressors, Cavanaugh, Boswell, Roehling, and Boudreau (2000) found that POP loaded on a factor called hindrance stressors. The 'organizational development literature' also conceives perceived politics as a stressor that has detrimental impact on a person's resources. More specifically, Crawford, Lepine, and Rich (2010) suggest that POP activates an energy depletion process whereby an employee's sustained increases in effort to meet the perceived demands is met with an increase in compensatory actions and psychological processes that drain a person's individual resources. In addition, Chang et al. (2009) metaanalytically examined perceptions of politics as a hindrance stressor to find a stress-related connection to performance. In the light of these findings, POP is regarded as a hindrance stressor in the present examination. Despite recent meta-analytic evidence for variation in the effects of POP on outcomes (e.g., Miller et al., 2008), perceived politics can be summarized as having a generally positive relationship with turnover intentions (Chang et al., 2009), and a negative relationship with job satisfaction (Chang et al., 2009; Ferris & Kacmar, 1992) and job performance (Vigoda, 2000). PERCEIVED POLITICS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CAPITAL 6 There is also some evidence available for the harmful effects of perceived organizational politics across cultures. For example, Vigoda (2001) found that British and Israeli employees reported similar levels of organizational politics at the workplace, however British employees responded to perceived politics with higher turnover intentions than Israeli employees. Vigoda (2001) attributed these findings to the difference in power distance (PD) between both cultures. Britain ranks higher on the national cultural dimension of power distance as compared to Israel (Hofstede, 1983). In high power distance cultures, individuals usually accept a hierarchical order in which everybody has a place. In these cultures, interpersonal conflict is considered a disruption of ordinary life (Hofstede, 1991). Similar to Britain, Pakistan also ranks high on power distance (Hofstede, 1983). In addition, Pakistan scores high uncertainty avoidance (UA), reacting adversely to uncertainty or a lack of control. Hofstede (2001) suggests that the combination of these two dimensions results in situations where leaders have ultimate power and authority, and that rules, laws, and regulations are developed to reinforce such leadership. In such a context, formal rules and regulations exist to further managerial interests at the expense of subordinates (Kacmar & Ferris, 1991), prompting turnover and lowered job satisfaction as employees' reactions to perceived politics in the workplace. Hence, we expect to replicate the findings that perceived politics would have harmful effects on outcomes in Pakistan. Hypothesis 1: Perceived organizational politics will be positively related to turnover intentions and negatively related to job satisfaction and job performance. Lately, researchers in domains of positive organizational behavior have stressed the need to focus on positive strengths and well-being of individuals in the workplace (Luthans & Youssef, 2007). The positive psychological approaches have emerged with a focus on what is right with people, rather than the traditional approaches of what is wrong with people (Luthans, PERCEIVED POLITICS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CAPITAL 7 2002). This line of thinking has resulted in the coining of a term known as psychological capital (Avey, Luthans, & Youssef, 2010). Although psychological capital (PsyCap) comprises of four components named hope, optimism, self-efficacy, and resilience (Luthans, Youssef, & Avolio, 2007), research considers hope and efficacy to be the most significant in predicting various work-related outcomes (e.g., Luthans, Avolio, Avey, & Norman, 2007; Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998a; Youssef & Luthans, 2007). Efficacy is "the employee's conviction or confidence about his or her abilities to mobilize the motivation, cognitive resources, or courses of action needed to successfully execute a specific task within a given context" (Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998b: 66). Similarly, hope is "a positive motivational state that is based on an interactively derived sense of successful (a) agency (goal-directed energy) and (b) pathways (planning to meet goals)" (Snyder, Irving, & Anderson, 1991: 287). Conceptually, self-efficacy and hope are assumed to be more significant factors than optimism and resiliency in predicting attitudes and organizational behavior (Bandura, 2012). Self-efficacy is considered to best meet the inclusion criteria for PsyCap in positive organizational behavior (Luthans, 2002). Similarly, of the three remaining facets of PsyCap 'hope' is the strongest predictor of work related outcomes and shares the strongest underlying common denominator with self-efficacy and (Luthans, 2002; Magaletta & Oliver, 1999; Youssef & Luthans, 2007). Efficacy and hope share the components of internalized motivation and energy, or the positive expectation of success for the reason of belief in one's individual abilities. Highly efficacious and hopeful employees would set challenging goals for themselves and selfselect into challenging assignments with motivation and tenacious effort toward success. Therefore, we focus on the efficacy and hope dimensions of psychological capital in this study. PERCEIVED POLITICS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CAPITAL 8 Previous research has found PsyCap to be positively associated to job performance and satisfaction (Luthans, Avolio, et al., 2007), and negatively associated to organizational cynicism and turnover intentions (Avey et al., 2010). Based on its definition, individuals with high PsyCap are believed to possess the cognitive capacity of self-regulation (Bandura, 1997) that offers initiative, energy, and self-discipline necessary to reach one's goals (Luthans & Youssef, 2007). Thus we believe that being personal and psychological in nature, psychological capital will have similar effects on outcomes as those observed in US settings. Psychological capital, especially hope and self-efficacy, will give individuals more confidence and stimulate positive thinking, which would result in better performance, higher satisfaction, and lower possibility of leaving the job. Therefore, we suggest that: Hypothesis 2: PsyCap will be negatively related to turnover intentions and positively related to job satisfaction and job performance. The Moderating Role of Psychological Capital Recent studies have shown the relevance of COR theory to serve as a conceptual foundation for the role of individuals' psychological resources to cope with harmful effects of organizational politics (Kapoutsis, Papalexandris, Nikolopoulos, Hochwarter, & Ferris, 2011). Hindrance stressors tend to dampen motivation, which thwarts performance and personal goal attainment and growth (LePine, Podsakoff, & LePine, 2005). This theory helps in delineating the processes by which resources such as psychological capital assist individuals to cope with stressors. Individuals who possess key resources such as hope and self-efficacy 'might be more capable of selecting, altering, and implementing their other resources to meet stressful demands' (Hobfoll, 2002: 308). When faced with an environmental stressor (e.g., organizational politics), individuals PERCEIVED POLITICS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CAPITAL 9 exert efforts to successfully cope with it in order to maintain a balance (Hobfoll, 2011). The success of these efforts depends on the psychological resources these individuals possess (Treadway et al., 2005).Therefore, individual differences in internal psychological resources are likely to play an influential role in the attribution of resource loss as salient. Here, resource loss could refer to perceived loss of tangible goals due to politics in the workplace or to a perceived loss of cognitive or emotional coping resources dedicated to addressing politics as a stressor. We argue that high PsyCap individuals, because of their level of confidence in pursuing challenging tasks (Bandura, 1997), their capacity to derive multiple pathways to be successful (Snyder, 1994), and their ability to persevere in the face of obstacles (Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998a), are less likely to perceive organizational politics as threatening or harmful. These individuals possess the cognitive capacity of self-regulation (Bandura, 1997) that offers initiative, pro-activeness, and self-discipline necessary to reach the desired goals, even when there is a lack of extrinsic motivators (Luthans & Youssef, 2007) and absence of feedback (Judge, Jackson, Shaw, Scott, & Rich, 2007). Therefore, they are less likely to experience the typical negative outcomes (e.g., lowered job satisfaction and performance) associated with organizational politics. Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) posit that hope plays the role of a buffering agent against psychological distress, addiction, and dysfunctional behavior. Studies have demonstrated a strong relationship between hope and academic and athletic performance, mental and physical health, and the ability to cope with adversity (Snyder, 1994; Snyder et al., 1991). Similarly, Caprara, Barbaranelli, Pastorelli, and Cervone (2004) investigated the ability of efficacy beliefs to predict psychosocial outcomes among high school students. These authors found that selfefficacy beliefs predicted lower problem-behaviors (depression and aggression) and attainment PERCEIVED POLITICS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CAPITAL 10 of greater grades. Moreover, high efficacious individuals are less likely to expect failures or loss of confidence when faced with negative feedback, setbacks, uncertainties, and difficulties (Bandura & Locke, 2003). When combined, these psychological resource capacities form the cognitive, emotional, and motivational bases (Bandura & Locke, 2003; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000) through which individuals mitigate the detrimental effects of negativity (Youssef & Luthans, 2007). Based on these arguments, we believe that when individuals perceive the organizational activities and procedures to be politically driven, their psychological capital may help them to minimize the salience of resource loss associated with these activities, allowing them to cope better with these stressors, thereby reducing the influence of POP on outcomes. Consequently, we suggest: Hypothesis 3: PsyCap will moderate the relationship between POP and outcomes (turnover intentions, job satisfaction, and job performance) such that the relationship will be weaker when PsyCap is high. METHODS Sample and Data Collection Procedures Perceptions of politics can vary considerably across organizations. In order to capture maximum variance in politics, we decided to collect data from a variety of organizations. Through personal and professional contacts of the first author, we were able to gain access to employees in six branches of private banks, local offices of two textile-manufacturing firms, three offices of a government ministry, and customer service offices of a telecommunication company in Faisalabad, which is the third largest city of Pakistan. We decided to target all whitecollar employees in each location for two reasons. First, we believe that organizational politics is PERCEIVED POLITICS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CAPITAL 11 more likely to play a role among managers and professional workers because they have to manage people and resources. Second, due to low education levels, we believed that lower level blue collar workers would not be able to respond to a questionnaire in English effectively. We collected data through onsite administration of a questionnaire with self and supervisory-report versions. A cover letter explained the purpose of the study to the respondents, assured them of strictest confidentiality of responses, and mentioned that participation was voluntary. Respondents completed the self-report version that contained items related to POP, PsyCap, turnover intentions, and job satisfaction. In addition, they reported their name, age, gender, occupational level, education, and work experience in the demographics part of the survey. The supervisor of each respondent completed the supervisor-report version that contained questions on job performance. Both the respondents and their supervisors returned the completed questionnaires to one of the authors without having access to each other's responses. Each supervisor knew his / her subordinates for more than six months and had done at least one performance appraisal for him / her. Of the 300 distributed questionnaires, we received 237 completed self-report responses. We were able to get supervisor reports from 79 supervisors for 231 of the respondents. Therefore, our final response rate for the 231 usable paired (231 employee and 231 supervisor responses) responses was 77%. We distributed 48 surveys among the government workers, 154 in bank branches, 33 in the telecom company, and 65 in the textile firms. The response rates for government offices, banks, telecom, and textile firms were 75%, 78%, 76%, and 75% respectively. The majority of respondents (80.1%) were male with an average age of 31 years (SD = 8.1). The sample included several occupational levels comprising 16% entry level (clerical and IT staff) workers, 80% supervisory and middle managers, and 4% upper middle and topPERCEIVED POLITICS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CAPITAL 12 level managers. The average tenure was 4.80 (SD = 6.48) years. About 31% of the respondents had an undergraduate university degree while 69% held graduate degrees. A total of 79 supervisors reported for the 231 respondents, which could result in nesting of data. With supervisor as a grouping variable, we ran the null model in HLM to calculate between and within group variance for job performance in our dataset. This procedure estimated whether it was feasible to run a more complex model controlling for nesting of data based on supervisor as the higher-order level in our dataset. The results revealed that within group variance (R2 = .27) was substantially higher than between group variance (R2 = .08) and the F statistic for the ratio of the two variances was not significant (F (78, 152) = .22, n.s). Put differently, the data suggest that supervisors as a grouping variable do not explain sufficient variance to justify the use of HLM analysis controlling for nesting of data (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). Measures All constructs were measured using self-reported instruments except for job performance, which was measured using supervisory ratings to avoid method bias issues. Responses for all variables, with exception of PsyCap, were assessed using a 5-point Likert type scale with anchors of 1 = 'strongly disagree', 2 = 'disagree', 3 = 'neither disagree/nor agree', 4 = 'agree', and 5 = 'strongly agree'. The responses for psychological capital were measured using a 6-point Likert-scale with anchors ranging from 1 = 'strongly disagree', 2 = 'disagree', 3 = 'somewhat disagree' 4 = 'somewhat agree', 5 = 'agree', to 6 = 'strongly agree'. For all measures, higher score corresponded to higher levels of the construct. Perceptions of Organizational Politics (POP). We used the 12-item Perceptions of Organizational Politics Scale (POPS) by Kacmar and Ferris (1991) to assess this construct. This PERCEIVED POLITICS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CAPITAL 13 scale contains three sub-dimensions of perceived politics: general political behavior (six items), go along to get ahead (four items), and pay and promotion policies (two items). Examples of items include "people build themselves up by tearing others down", for the first dimension, "employees are encouraged to speak out (reverse-coded)" for the second, and "Pay and promotion policies are not politically applied (reverse-coded)" for the third dimension. As we were interested in examining the effects of overall perceived politics on outcomes, we conducted a second order confirmatory factor analysis to see if the three-dimensional construct did load on to a single latent factor. The results of CFA revealed a good fit for a latent single factor model (2 = 84.76, df = 53, CFI = .94, GFI = .94, IFI = .95, RMSEA = .05). Therefore, we used an additive measure by taking average of all items to create overall POP such that high scores reflected high perceived politics1. This treatment of POP measure has been used in past research (e.g., Randall, Cropanzano, Bormann, & Birjulin, 1999; Rosen, Levy, & Hall, 2006). Cronbach's alpha reliability of the POP measure was .73. Psychological Capital (PsyCap). We measured efficacy and hope using 12-items (six items for each measure) from Psychological Capital Questionnaire (Luthans, Youssef, et al., 2007). Examples of items include "if I should find myself in a jam at work, I could think of many ways to get out of it" for hope; "I feel confident analyzing a long-term problem to find its solution" for efficacy. We conducted a second order CFA to see if both hope and efficacy loaded on to a single latent factor. Results yielded a good fit for a latent single factor model (2 = 102.91, df = 52, CFI = .95, GFI =.94, IFI = .95, RMSEA = .06). Therefore, to create overall psychological capital, we averaged scores on all 12 items such that a high score reflected high psychological capital. The internal consistency reliability of PsyCap was .89. 1 We ran our analyses using a measure based on mean of the means of dimensions. The results did not differ compared to the additive measure. PERCEIVED POLITICS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CAPITAL 14 Outcomes. A 3-item scale by Vigoda (2000) was used to measure turnover intentions. This measure included items such as "I often think about quitting this job". The reliability of this measure was .76. We measured overall job satisfaction using a 6-item scale developed by Agho, Price, and Mueller (1992), which contained questions such as "I feel fairly well satisfied with my present job" and "I find real enjoyment in my work." The reliability of this measure was .67. Supervisor responses to a 7-item scale developed by Williams and Anderson (1991) were used to measure job performance. Sample items include, "This person adequately completes assigned duties" and "This person performs tasks that are expected of him/her." The alpha reliability was .77. Control Variables. We used age and tenure as control variables because of their possible effects on job outcomes. A one-way ANOVA comparing job satisfaction, job performance, and turnover intentions across gender, education, and organizations revealed that there were significant differences in turnover intentions (F = 34.02, p < .000) and job satisfaction (F = 14.60, p < .000) across organizations. Post-hoc analyses showed that the differences were only between the two groups of organizations in the public and private sectors. Hence, we used a dummy variable (0 = "Private," 1 = "Public") to control for the effects of organization type. RESULTS POP, PsyCap, and Outcomes Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics, bivariate correlations, and estimates of reliability (coefficient alpha) for all measures. All the zero-order bivariate correlations were in the expected direction. -----------------------------Insert Table 1 about here PERCEIVED POLITICS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CAPITAL 15 ------------------------------ We used multiple linear regression analyses to test all main effect hypotheses (H1 and H2). We entered age, tenure, and organizational type in the first step followed by the independent variables. Table 2 (step 3) presents the results for the main effects of POP and PsyCap on the outcomes. POP was positively related to turnover intention (β = .26, p < .001) and negatively to job satisfaction (β = -.29, p < .001) and job performance (β = -.21, p < .05). These results support hypothesis 1. Similarly, Table 2 shows that psychological capital was positively related to job satisfaction (β = .56, p < .001) and job performance (β = .54, p < .001), but its relationship with turnover intentions (β = -.01, n.s) was not significant. These results render support to hypothesis 2 for satisfaction and performance only. -----------------------------Insert Table 2 about here ------------------------------ Moderating Influence of PsyCap We used moderated multiple regression (MMR) analyses (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003) to test hypotheses 3. We entered the control variables in the first step followed by independent and the moderator variables in the next step. In the third step, we entered a product term of independent and moderator variable, which if significant, confirmed moderation. We centered the variables by subtracting the overall mean from the individual values for the moderated regression analyses. In addition, we also obtained the variance inflation factor (VIF) scores (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998) and the tolerance statistics (Tabachnick & PERCEIVED POLITICS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CAPITAL 16 Fidell, 2001), which measure the extent to which collinearity among predictors affects the precision of a regression model. VIF scores of less than 5 (Chatterjee & Price, 1991) and tolerance scores above .10 (Hair et al., 1998) are typically considered acceptable. The VIF scores were below 3 (Tolerance > .3) in all analyses indicating that multicollinearity was not a problem. Results presented in Table 2 (step 3) show that controlling for the effects of POP and PsyCap, the interaction term of POP x PsyCap was significant for turnover intentions (β = .14, p < .05; ΔR2 = .02, p < .05), job performance (β = .33, p < .001; ΔR2 = .09, p < .001), and job satisfaction (β = .17, p < .01; ΔR2 = .02, p < .01). The additional variance explained by the interaction term falls within or exceeds the typical range for moderator effects in nonexperimental field studies (e.g., Chaplin, 1991). We plotted the significant interactions for high and low (Mean ± SD) values of the moderator. The plots of the significant interactions are displayed in figures 1 through 3. Figure 1 shows that, contrary to our hypothesis, the positive POP–turnover intentions relationship was stronger when PsyCap was high. Simple slope tests using the procedure recommended by Aiken and West (1991) revealed that the slope for high levels of PsyCap was significant (β = 0.79, p < .001), however the slope for low levels of PsyCap was not significant (β = -.23, ns). Figure 2 shows the plot of significant interaction for job satisfaction. The slope for high psychological capital was not significant (β = -.04, ns), but the slope line for low psychological capital was significant (β = -.74, p < .01). Figure 3 shows the plot of simple slopes for job performance. The relationship between perceived politics and job performance was significantly negative for low levels of PsyCap (β = -1.26, p < .001) and significantly positive for high levels of PsyCap (β = .32, p < .01). Hence, the results supported hypothesis 3 for job performance and job satisfaction only. PERCEIVED POLITICS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CAPITAL 17 ----------------------------------------------Insert Figures 1 through 3 about here ------------------------------------------------ Figures 2 and 3 indicate that there was one outlier cell, where psychological capital was low and perceived organizational politics was high, tended to have greater effects. Therefore, we conducted the Bobko procedure (Bobko, 1986) as a robustness check for ordinal interaction effects. The results for the first contrast (comparing means for low politics and high PsyCap; low politics and low PsyCap; high politics and high PsyCap) using a one-way analysis of variance showed that there were no significant differences between the three means (Fperformance = 1.59, n.s.; F satisfaction = 1.64, n.s.). The second contrast revealed that these three conditions were significantly different from the condition in which respondents were scoring high on politics and low on PsyCap (t performance = 5.19, p < 0.001; t satisfaction = 4.49, p < 0.001). DISCUSSION Despite general agreement amongst researchers, empirical evidence has revealed variations in the influence of POP on outcomes. In this research, we not only tested for the moderating role of psychological capital in accounting for some of the observed variation in effects, but also incorporated the COR theoretical framework to better understand how psychological capital of hope and efficacy can play a role in employee efforts to address POP as a hindrance stressor. Our findings clearly support the assertion that when employees perceive politics in the workplace, it reduces their satisfaction and performance and increases the likelihood that they would leave the organization. These findings provide support for the idea of perceived politics PERCEIVED POLITICS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CAPITAL 18 being detrimental to desired outcomes at workplace. The results of our study also support the idea that psychological capital has a positive effect on desired outcomes such as job satisfaction and job performance, but not intentions to quit. In addition, we found good support for the moderating influence of PsyCap in the POP-outcomes relationship. Interestingly, and contrary to our expectations, the negative relationship between perceived politics and intentions to quit was stronger when PsyCap was high. In retrospect, it is possible that individuals with high psychological capital, being more skillful and confident, think of leaving their jobs if they perceive high politics. They might want to seek better working environment and start looking for options in the wake of high-perceived politics. For example, it has been suggested that high performers would be more likely to quit when salaries and promotion policies are not aligned (Allen & Griffeth, 1999), as they have greater tangible resources such as a proven performance track record or other employment opportunities to draw upon (Jackofsky, 1984). Moreover, research on employability suggests that an organizational environment that does not foster its members' development and employability, increases employees' turnover intentions (Nauta, van Vianen, van der Heijden, van Dam, & Willemsen, 2009). Our findings suggest that psychological resources function the same way, equipping individuals with the cognitive and emotional resources necessary to push them away from a threatening political workplace. The results for moderating effects of PsyCap in the relationship between POP and job satisfaction and performance were in the expected direction. In both cases, the observed negative relationship was stronger when psychological capital was low. The results indicate that perceived organizational politics is going to be a bigger concern for those with low psychological capital. Perceived politics does not seem to have negative impact on the satisfaction and performance of PERCEIVED POLITICS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CAPITAL 19 individuals with high psychological resources (i.e., hope and efficacy). Our finding that psychological capital comprising hope and efficacy acts as a threatneutralizer by reducing the negative effects of politics on performance deserves further attention as it apparently contradicts with the findings of Kacmar et al. (2009). Drawing upon trait activation theory, Kacmar et al. (2009) found that core self-evaluations (which include generalized self-efficacy) intensified the deleterious effects of perceived politics on job performance. We believe that efficacy in conjunction with hope creates a positive resource for individuals that help them to take up the challenge of perceived politics instead of reacting negatively to it. Social psychologists argue that these psychological resources should be studied collectively, as they do not act in isolation (Fredrickson, 2001; Youssef & Luthans, 2007). Instead, such resources together provide support to each other through a shared underlying mechanism (Luthans, Avolio et al., 2007) that binds them and helps individuals to use them effectively when faced with stressful situations (Hobfoll, 2002). More specifically, a person with no hope and high efficacy is less likely to effectively deal with hurdles as compared to an individual who not only has the required confidence but also has hope that his / her efforts would lead to positive outcomes. We believe that our findings support this line of thought and confirm the idea that efficacy and hope together act to minimize the harmful effects of POP on job outcomes. A comparison of the zero-order correlations reported in Table 1 against the meta-analytic uncorrected associations reported in Miller et al. (2008) provides an opportunity to compare results for main effects in Western cultures to those examined in this study. With respect to turnover intentions and job performance, it appears that our obtained associations (r =.30 for turnover intentions and r = -.08 for job performance) are almost identical to those found for PERCEIVED POLITICS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CAPITAL 20 Miller et al's (r =.33 for turnover intentions and r = -.09 for job performance) domestic samples (i.e., North American, generally thought to be low on the cultural values of power distance and uncertainty). Although the perceived politics – satisfaction association was almost half the size (r = -.21) compared to that observed in Miller et al's meta-analysis for domestic samples (r = -.40), the confidence interval (-.73 to -.17) included the correlation observed in our study. Taken together, these findings suggest that results from the past research in Western context generalize well to Pakistani context. Perceived organizational politics, perhaps, is much more personal in nature and less susceptible to contextual influences. This examination is consistent with the call to examine theories, mostly developed and tested in Western settings, in a non-Western context. Our deliberate exploratory examination of cultural context is consistent with Johns' (2006) directions for future researchers in the field of organizational behavior. While this study provides some evidence for external validity or generalizability of the examined relationships, it also points to the need for more direct examinations of context by incorporating discrete contextual features (e.g., cultural values) in future examinations of POP. Implications for Practice Our study provides some valuable managerial implications. For example, managers should be wary of the harmful implications of workplace politics. They should address potential contributors to perceived organizational politics, such as ambiguous policies and procedures, poor communication, and lack of proper feedback and guidance to minimize the adverse effects on employees. Managers of organizations that are going through mergers, downsizing, or restructuring should be even more vigilant, as these processes also tend to increase uncertainty and politics in the work environment. It would be prudent for organizations to re-examine their selection criteria in hiring individuals, to include characteristics such as hope and efficacy, as PERCEIVED POLITICS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CAPITAL 21 these can buffer new hires from the influence of politics. The design and implementation of training interventions can benefit by incorporating methods that help in enhancing the psychological resources, especially hope and efficacy of employees so that they are better equipped to cope with demanding and stressful work environment. Strengths and Limitations The current study has several strengths. First, responding to the call of Fineman (2006), this study integrates the positivityand negativity-oriented research. In particular, we enhance our understanding of the organizational politics and psychological capital theories in a new cultural setting significantly different from North America and Europe. Exploring the main and moderating effects in such setting extends our understanding and provides evidence for external validity of research domains dominated by Western samples. Second, we collected our filed data from multiple sources, which reduced the possibility of method bias. Detection of significant interactions for self-reported perceived politics and supervisory-reported performance, where the interaction accounted for 9% additional variance, is rare. Third, this study provides strong evidence for main effects of overall psychological capital on job satisfaction, and supervisorrated job performance. Finally, our findings provide support for the role of psychological capital (i.e., hope and self-efficacy combined) as a threat-neutralizer as compared to previous findings of efficacy as a threat-amplifier. This study has several limitations that need to be noted. One of the limitations has to do with common method bias. Although we attempted to circumvent this possibility by assessing job performance using supervisory ratings, this was not the case with the other examined variables. However, the obtained results for the main effects of POP are generally consistent when compared to those reported in past research. Moreover, significant interactions suggest that PERCEIVED POLITICS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CAPITAL 22 method variance was not an issue as it works against detection of such interaction effects. A second limitation is the slightly lower reliability of job satisfaction (α = .67). Nevertheless, the obtained associations between POP and outcomes are consistent with the meta analytic findings of Miller and colleagues (2008). A third limitation is that we included only two of the four dimensions of psychological capital. Although we do not expect our findings to change if the remaining two dimensions are included because efficacy and hope are the dominant dimensions and have stronger effects, some differences in effect size cannot be ruled out. Future Research Directions Future research in this area should examine the role of other plausible individual and contextual moderators in the relationship between perceived politics and outcomes. For example, exploring the effects of the Big Five traits on the POP-outcomes relationship might provide insight into our understanding of the interplay of person and situation factors in determining various attitudinal and behavioral outcomes. Acknowledging possible differences in the domain of POP across nations, future research needs a direct comparison of non-Western and Western samples to explore the moderating influence of discrete cultural contextual factors (e.g., cultural values). Future studies should also focus on providing a more detailed analysis of the dimensionality of POP and their relative influence on job outcomes. Similarly, research may continue to explore the viability and vitality of PsyCap as a construct that can help improve our understanding of organizational behavior. Being a state-like characteristic that is amenable to development, psychological capital may hold better promise for organizational effectiveness against the dominant trait theories. PsyCap, being a composite of positive psychological resources, has inherent proactive coping mechanism and goal-orientation that may buffer against challenge and hindrance related stressors such as role stressors, heavy PERCEIVED POLITICS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CAPITAL 23 workload, time pressure, and job scope. Testing models that directly examine such role of PsyCap would provide more insight into the buffering capacities of these resources. Conclusion Asia has an important role in the global economy as multinationals are increasingly moving to Asian regions. Unless we test the theories largely developed in the US in non-Western settings, researchers and practitioners would have little confidence about their generalizability in those regions (Tsui et al., 2007). Our study provides some insights into the generalizability of concepts such as perceived organizational politics and psychological capital in Pakistan. 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Journal of Management, 33, 774–800. PERCEIVED POLITICS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CAPITAL 30 Table 1 Means, Standard Deviations, Correlations, and Reliabilities Note. N = 231; Alpha reliabilities presented in parenthesis. POP = Perceived Organizational Politics; PsyCap = Psychological Capital. a. Organizational type: 0 = Private; 1 = Public. * p < .05 ** p < .01 Mean S.D 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1. Age 30.82 8.10 -- 2. Tenure 4.89 6.49 .76** -- 3. Organization a 0.17 0.37 .36** .43** -- 4. PsyCap 4.52 0.82 .01 .08 .12 (.89) 5. POP 3.06 0.54 -.03 -.01 -.05 .11 (.73) 6. Turnover Intentions 2.92 0.93 -.30** -.29** -.35** -.05 .30** (.76) 7. Job Satisfaction 3.62 0.52 .14* .15* .24** .49** -.21** -.29** (.67) 8. Job Performance 3.80 0.59 -.01 .03 .05 .43** -.08 -.09 .53** (.77) 31 Table 2 Results for Main Effects and Moderated Regression Analyses Note. N = 231; POP = Perceived Organizational Politics; PsyCap = Psychological Capital. a. Organizational type: 0 = Private; 1 = Public. * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 Turnover Intentions Job Satisfaction Job Performance β ∆R2 β ∆R2 β ∆R2 Step 1 Age -.16* .04 -.07 Tenure -.06 .03 .06 Organization a -.27*** .16*** .21** .06** .06 .00 Step2 Age -.16* .09 -.03 Tenure -.06 .01 .01 Organization a -.25*** .14** .00 POP .29*** -.24*** -.11* PsyCap -.05 .08*** .51*** .28*** .44*** .19*** Step 3 Age -.15* .09 -.01 Tenure -.06 .01 .00 Organization a -.26*** .14** .00 POP .26*** -.29*** -.21* PsyCap -.01 .56*** .54*** POP x PsyCap .14* .02* .17** .02** .33*** .09*** 32 Figure 1 Interactive Effects of PsyCap and POP on Turnover Intentions 33 Figure 2 Interactive Effects of PsyCap and POP on Job Satisfaction 34 Figure 3 Interactive Effects of PsyCap and POP on Supervisory-Rated Job Performance

Forthcoming in Foundations of Science Identifying Difference, Engaging Dissent: What is at Stake in Democratizing Knowledge? Loren King , Brandon Morgan-Olsen , and James Wong1 2 3 Abstract Several prominent voices have called for a democratization of science through deliberative processes that include a diverse range of perspectives and values. We bring these scholars into conversation with extant research on democratic deliberation in political theory and the social sciences. In doing so, we identify systematic barriers to the effectiveness of inclusive deliberation in both scientific and political settings. We are particularly interested in what we call misidentified dissent, where deliberations are starkly framed at the outset in terms of dissenting positions without properly distinguishing the kinds of difference and disagreement motivating dissent. The creation of cognitive democracy, of democratic science, is as much a matter of conflict and hope as is the creation of political democracy. Helen Longino, "Subjects, Power and Knowledge" 1. Introduction Several recent voices in epistemology and the philosophy of science have called for a democratic turn in understanding how we seek and gain knowledge. Philip Kitcher calls for inclusion of all relevant parties in an "enlightened democracy" of knowledge production, where participants are carefully tutored to avoid "the danger of holding inquiry hostage to capricious and irrational desires" (Kitcher 2003, 124), but are nonetheless motivated by respect for other views 1 Department of Political Science, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada 2 Department of Philosophy, Loyola University Chicago, Illinois, USA 3 Department of Philosophy, Wilfrid Laurier University, Ontario, Canada 1 (118-119). In this way, Kitcher hopes parties will transform their beliefs and preferences in light of compelling evidence and persuasive argument, while taking seriously a diversity of perspectives and interests. In a similar vein, Helen Longino calls for "critical discursive interactions," which allow the parties involved to determine what can be counted as knowledge (Longino 2002, 129ff). Both these accounts of democratizing knowledge lean heavily on two intuitions, which Longino codifies into criteria for epistemically favourable exchanges. First, in spite of myriad differences and inequalities, we can reliably treat one another as competent reasoners and valid sources of knowledge claims. Longino calls this tempered equality. Second, mere voice is insufficient: we must treat other viewpoints and arguments with sufficient openness, allowing that our own beliefs and practices may ultimately be revised in light of our deliberative engagements. This is Longino's condition of uptake. There is an important theme in contemporary political theory that parallels these arguments. For a certain sort of political philosopher and democratic theorist, deliberation is vital to democratic legitimacy. Philosophers and theorists have offered several distinct kinds of justification for enhanced publicity and greater deliberative inclusion. Some have hoped that inclusive deliberation will transform preferences and understandings in ways that ameliorate conflicts. Others cite desirable epistemic properties of inclusive deliberation. Still others link inclusive deliberation with a standard of legitimacy that is morally attractive independent of epistemic properties and transformative hopes.4 These philosophical efforts have been tempered, however, by a growing body of empirical work suggesting that the transformative and epistemic virtues of deliberation are at best difficult 4 For an elaboration of these rationales see King (2003). On epistemic features of deliberation and deliberative democracy, see, e.g., Peter (2009, ch. 3), and Estlund (2009, esp. 18ff). 2 to achieve. There are lessons here for any efforts to democratize science in the ways Kitcher and Longino suggest: treating other persons and viewpoints as potentially authoritative turns out to be difficult in the moral and political sphere, so we may reasonably worry that the same will sometimes be true of claims to scientific knowledge, especially when those claims are cited in contentious policy debates. In this paper, our aim is to bring the burgeoning work on democratizing science into fruitful dialogue with the now well-established philosophical and social-scientific branches of deliberative democratic theory. We engage in this synthetic analysis with an eye towards identifying systematic barriers to uptake that are of common interest to all in favor of inclusive deliberation, whether such deliberations are explicitly scientific in nature or otherwise. We begin with the democratic turn in philosophy of science, focusing on Longino's account. We then draw elements of that account into conversation with some of the extant work on deliberative democracy, taking special note of how several empirical findings may suggest cautionary lessons for those who would be inclined to endorse something like Kitcher's or Longino's views. In doing so, we join others who have sought to connect these literatures in democratic theory and philosophy of science; we distinguish our efforts from related work inspired by Chantal Mouffe (Van Bouwel 2009), and discuss what we take to be the merits of our approach. Finally, we consider a type of uptake failure relevant for efforts to democratize science: misidentified dissent. This species of uptake failure occurs when deliberations are starkly framed at the outset in terms of dissenting views, without properly disambiguating between the kinds of difference and disagreement motivating dissent in the case at hand. Disagreement can sometimes seem so deep and complex as to appear utterly intractable. Nonetheless, constructive argument can sometimes be sustained across even profound differences in interests and worldviews, and disagreement can sometimes be successfully 3 framed against a background of evidence and argument that all parties accept as valid, even as they disagree deeply on matters of both policy and principle. Our intention is to clarify the features of dissent of this kind, resting as it does-sometimes unnoticed, other times misidentified-in the conceptual and rhetorical spaces between principled agreement and an agonistic modus vivendi between conflicting interests and incommensurable worldviews. We hope that such clarification is helpful for both democratic theory and recent directions in social epistemology and the philosophy of science. 2. Democratizing Science Recent work in philosophy of science has embarked on what Philip Kitcher calls the "road to democracy" (Kitcher 2002: 554). The path to democratization in knowledge is motivated by the rejection of the idea that the significance of truths can be determined objectively, independent of contexts, which Kitcher describes (rather idiosyncratically) as monism (555). While there are obvious and even profound differences in their approaches, both Kitcher and Helen Longino adopt a methodological pluralism in which what is significant is "relative to our cognitive capacities and our (changing) interests" (ibid). "Democraticism" follows from methodological5 pluralism; it represents a commitment to the inclusion of all relevant perspectives in the community of researchers-Longino's concern-or all parties in the community that are affected by what research projects are pursued-the focus of Kitcher's analysis (557). Longino's project shows how the justification of knowledge can proceed in a social way, while Kitcher's shows how the goals of science can respond to a variety of interests and perspectives. 5 The 'pluralism' we take from Kitcher and Longino is methodological, rather than substantive: for our purposes here we are agnostic on the further question of whether vigorous inclusion as a methodological commitment in science will result in a thoroughgoing pluralism of irreducible theoretical frameworks. Longino is certainly friendlier to that possibility than Kitcher, but even here we find support for our methodological emphasis and agnostic stance: see, e.g., Longino (2002, 140-142) and Kellert, Longino, and Waters (2006). 4 The question that must be addressed for pluralists like Longino is how to arrive at knowledge from diverse contributions. Underlying Longino's answer to this question is her concept of critical discursive interactions which transform the subjective into the objective by ensuring that what is endorsed as knowledge has "survived criticisms from multiple points of view" (Longino 2002, 129). She proposes four conditions which would facilitate epistemically effective critical interactions. 1. Venues: There must be publicly recognized forums for the criticism of evidence, of methods, of assumptions and reasoning (ibid). 2. Uptake: There must be uptake of criticism. The community must not merely tolerate dissent, but its beliefs, theories and procedures must change over time in response to the critical discourse taking place (ibid). 3. Public Standards: There must be publicly recognized standards by reference to which theories, hypotheses and observational practices are evaluated and by appeal to which criticism is made relevant to the goal of the inquiring community. These standards are not a static set but may themselves be criticized and transformed in reference to other standards, goals, or values held temporarily constant (Longino 2002,130). 4. Tempered Equality: Communities must be characterized by equality of intellectual authority. ... This requirement implies both that the persuasive effect of reasoning and argument be secured by unforced assent to the substantive and logical principles used in them, rather than by properties, such as social or economic power, of those who are propounding them; and that every member of the community be regarded as capable of contributing to its constructive and critical dialogue (Longino 2002, 131-132). These conditions specify how critical interactions between relevant points of view can facilitate effective epistemological critique and proceed to endorse particular claims put forward by the parties involved. Longino acknowledges that these conditions are ideal (Longino 1993, 113; Longino 2002, 134). Nonetheless they capture the intended 'spirit' of what is needed to make actual engagements with different points of view productive. For example, the point of the public standards condition is to preclude the possibility that 5 determining the results of one's or the group's inquiry can be achieved privately (ibid.). The point of the condition of tempered equality is to "ensure the exposure of hypotheses to the broadest range of criticism" from relevant perspectives (Longino 2002, 132). Longino points out that "as an epistemological criterion, [tempered equality] differs from equality as a moral or political criterion. The latter would require only that different perspectives have an equal chance of being included, whereas epistemic effectiveness requires that all (relevant) perspectives be included" (Longino 2002, n.15, 131). So while the condition calls for inclusion, it does not follow that6 inclusiveness means that "every alternative view is equally deserving of attention" (Longino 1993, 118). Exactly what the criteria are for determining relevance is determined by the aims or goals of the inquiry, and cannot be detached from that context. Other complex issues prompted by the condition of tempered equality include questions about membership in the community of inquiry (Longino 2002, 133). It makes us ask "who constitutes the 'we' for any given group and what the criteria are for providing an answer" (ibid.). For Longino, then, the production of knowledge is both a rational pursuit and a political event. She tells us that in a power-stratified society, the inclusion of the less powerful is necessary because their views could serve as models for criticism of the received wisdom in the community. For her, "no segment of the community, whether powerful or powerless, can claim epistemic privilege" (ibid.). Central to what makes criticism effective is the idea of uptake: that dissenting views are not merely tolerated, but rather all sides are committed to take seriously each other's positions 6 We accept Longino's characterization here for the sake of argument, but we doubt that the epistemic standard of equality is so easily disentangled from moral and political dimensions of equality. Such disentanglement is certainly difficult in practice, since failures of mutual respect grounded in legacies of socioeconomic inequality and unequal political standing can have epistemic consequences that Longino and others readily acknowledge. There is a comparable difficulty separating these dimensions in theory also: moral and political philosophers have, after all, spilt much ink on the question: 'equality of what?' Their varied answers-welfare, resources, capabilities, life chances, respect, standing as citizens-go far beyond the intuition that moral and political equality is exhausted by the condition that all have an equal chance at inclusion. 6 (Longino 2002, 130). 'Uptake' also plays a key role in Kitcher's treatment of the discussion of values. Such discussions ought ideally to satisfy the conditions of mutual engagement, which is based on the recognition that "the perceived desires of those with whom one deliberates are given equal weight with one's own" (Kitcher 2011: 51). For Kitcher, participants in such conversations must be motivated by respect and the principle that others' claims are taken seriously. How then does the kind of critical dialogue proposed by Longino and Kitcher deal with heterogeneity? Longino notes that in order to make constructive and potentially transformative7 dialogue epistemically effective, contributors must share some commonalities, such as referring terms, principles of inference, experimental practice, and the like (see also Kitcher 2011, 49-58). Contributors from within the same community of inquiry pose little problem because they presumably already share the same or much of the same frame of reference. Longino cites an example in ecology in which different experimental methods are employed. Ecosystems can be modeled on laboratory circumstances in which some variables are kept constant. For example, in an Oregon study of the result of the impact of ultraviolet (UV) radiation on amphibian populations, one laboratory examined the results of exposing frog eggs to UV radiation. They exposed one set of eggs to UV radiation, while another set was protected as control. However, another approach would be to study whether or not UV radiation has increased over time. These are two different methodologies: one focuses on the replicability and control of variables; the other on evaluating and predicting the effects of the change in UV radiation (Longino 2002, 177-78). In this example, the two approaches are driven by different questions which establish 7 By singling out constructive dialogue, we have in mind the following distinction: the kinds of encounters both Longino and Kitcher have in mind may have desirable consequences even if they fail to move parties from their favoured positions-if, for instance, deliberation clarifies the sources of disagreement, or introduces new sources of evidence and directions of inquiry. So even if dialogue doesn't change peoples' beliefs or attitudes, it may still be constructive. 7 different standards of evaluation, but both approaches are following shared rules. Since the research answers different sets of questions, it would be inappropriate to foreclose on one or the other approach. Critical interaction between the two might yet lead to an understanding of the limits of such methodologies and may yet moderate the results from such research (Longino 2002, 197). However, efforts to identify shared features are made more difficult for contributions from different communities of inquiry owing to the vagaries of "cross-cultural communication and translation" as in, for example, cases between western and non-western medicine (Longino 2002, n.20, 130). Assuming such translation succeeds in identifying commonalities for the sake of argument, contributors are able to evaluate each other's results by shared standards. In addition, there may be cases in which translation isn't the difficulty, but that there are obstacles barring successful engagement between participants in the dialogue. Longino cites two such examples: wrongheaded content (Longino 2002, 157-158) and wrongheaded rules (Longino 2002, 159-162). To illustrate, let's consider the wrongheaded content example. The8 example deals with the creationist's claim that her belief is as warranted epistemically as any other scientific claim (157). Longino argues that the creationist's account does not meet the norms of effective criticism which require openness to criticism from perspectives that can connect to "some standards of the creationist community to count as knowledge"-in this case, the origins of the physical universe. The commitment of the creationist community to salvation as the principle underlying their inquiry only insulate their cognitive goals from those of other communities of inquirers. The claims of the creationist scientists, then, would not count as scientific knowledge because of their commitment not to participate in open effective criticism.9 8 An example of wrongheaded rule would be one in which observational practices in an inquiry are restricted to reading tea leaves. 9 In our judgement, the creationist community typically forfeits on the status of their claims, owing to their failure to take up the views of other approaches in the ongoing critical discourse. Sometimes this failure of 8 In this example, there is little possibility of uptake for the other parties to learn from another point of view. Pluralists like Longino and Kitcher do not regard the content of knowledge as fixed. Questions are open within the proposed structure of a critical transformative dialogue: results are always only provisionally endorsed, however stable and enduring the endorsement may be. It is10 always possible that future results or future interactions with other perspectives may prompt reassessment about claims and also about which communities are to be included. Knowledge is dynamic, not static (Longino 2002, 135). Matters are quite different outside the structure for critical interaction proposed by Longino, such as when there is no uptake of alternative points of view and issues are black-boxed. As illustrated in the debate between science and creationist science, such black-boxing results in closed structures between which debate is not possible. 3. Deliberation and Systematic Uptake Failure As we've seen, Longino and Kitcher both emphasize the importance of uptake for legitimate, democratic knowledge-productive practices. And it should be clear that characterizing uptake will involve careful attention paid to both the proposals forwarded into deliberation and the social uptake is subtle, in the form of selective uptake for rhetorical purposes, while still grounding alleged scientific efforts in unchallengeable core beliefs that are immune from evidentiary or theoretical challenge. We cannot argue the point here, but our sense is that recent efforts to engage this community (by, for example, Steven Fuller 2008 and Thomas Nagel 2008) fail to take seriously this deeply problematic feature of allegedly scientific challenges to evolutionary theory by intelligent design advocates. Neither Fuller nor Nagel ask the obvious question: why don't intelligent design researchers actually try to study conjectured intelligent design, using the methods available and widely used in the social and historical sciences? (Economists and historians routinely ask, for example, whether or not some consequence of a given legislated policy or military engagement was the result of design, or merely accidental). 10 In an earlier work, Longino notes that her proposed pluralist account faces a dilemma: "If objectivity requires pluralism in the community, then scientific knowledge becomes elusive, but if consensus is pursued, it will be at the cost of silencing critical oppositional positions" (Longino 1993, 114). The strategy she adopts to avoid the dilemma is to "detach scientific knowledge from consensus, if consensus means agreement of the entire scientific community regarding the truth or acceptability of a given theory" (ibid., italics added). 9 relations between the relevant deliberators. Indeed, in her campaign to jettison the traditional rational-social dichotomy, Longino implies that these two objects of study must be regarded together. To view deliberative contributions as if they could be analyzed in an abstract space of propositional content would be to ignore the irreducibly social nature of human justificatory practices. To concentrate exclusively on social phenomena like power relations and identity formation would be to myopically discount mechanisms of evidence, logic, and inference. One must instead treat "agents or subjects of knowledge as located in particular and complex interrelationships . . . [which] can be understood as a rich pool of varied resources, constraints, and incentives to help close the gap left by logic" (Longino 2002, 128). The literatures on democratic deliberation and deliberative democracy are helpful in two ways here: they provide a complementary philosophical account of the conditions under which morally attractive deliberation proceeds, but they also provide empirical findings that help to concretize the difficulties involved in following up on Longino's right-headed but ultimately abstract prescription.11 First, then, in political-philosophical treatments of deliberation, the roughly equivalent conditions to Longino's tempered equality and uptake are (i) civility and mutual respect, and (ii) 11 We note here the difference, well-explained by Simone Chambers (2009), between democratic deliberation and deliberative democracy. We do not sustain the distinction in our discussion, however, since the underlying theoretical work we draw on is common to both strands of theory. That said, some of the empirical findings on deliberation that we cite are precisely what motivates the move from deliberative democracy to democratic deliberation that concerns Chambers: she draws the distinction to emphasize, analyse, and redress a move away from concerns about the mass public character of democracy in deliberative theory. In recognition of the difficulties of reconciling deliberative aspirations with well-known problems of spatial and organizational scale in democratic politics, advocates of deliberation have begun to focus far more attention on the question of how to democratize various tractable forms of group deliberation, and worried correspondingly less about how a democracy en toto might be made more deliberative. In general we think it fair to say that the democratic turn in philosophy of science is concerned with democratic deliberation-rendering deliberative processes democratic-and not deliberative democracy. (For instance, one might wonder about the status of scientific knowledge production within a theory of deliberative democracy, but that is not our concern here, nor of the philosophers we are engaging. However, it is certainly a question worth asking.) 10 sincerity and seriousness with respect to deliberative engagement. While rules of civility needn't be stringent, at the very least we must let others present their testimony, offer facts, make observations; and in doing so we treat them as, to adopt and extend John Rawls's elegant characterization, "self-authenticating sources of valid claims" (Rawls 2005, 72). Further, we listen to them, and make our own cases, with an openness that allows we might be persuaded to change our own views after our engagements. In this sense, then, our engagements are sincere, and our openness to other views evinces a seriousness of resolve: we commit ourselves to the possibility of transformed expectations and understandings. We do not merely listen and talk strategically, seeking our own pursuits and feigning respectful engagement only insofar as this better serves our aims.12 Second, in its empirical mode, deliberative theory calls attention to the social dynamics and institutional influences, jointly epistemic and political in nature, which can affect our collective judgements about effective uptake. Let us refer to these varied intervening factors-formal institutions, cognitive heuristics and biases, cultural norms-as mediating structures, working between pre-deliberative inputs and post-deliberative judgements. Implementing the democratization of knowledge necessitates taking stock of the mediating structures already in place-especially those with pernicious tendencies-alongside sober analysis of the viability of moving forward with measures designed to manipulate, dismantle, or replace these structures. 12 Invoking Rousseau, we allow that our deliberations together may lead us to discover and freely affirm a general will that is not simply the will of all, or of some. In the literature on deliberative democracy the openness condition is most often discussed in the same breath as toleration, although the condition of openness is typically framed as civility and mutual respect: "In deliberative settings, citizens manifest their equality with each other not only by refraining from interference with their acts of expression; they also do so by sustaining the conditions for communication. How do they do this? They do so reflexively, in their communication with each other in public deliberation and in their attitudes towards others as participants in a public process ... Toleration in this sense is at minimum discursive openness" (Bohman 2003, 763). Scanlon (1996) sees that toleration commits us to the perhaps uncomfortable possibility of a changed social environment. 11 Debating Science, Debating Politics There are, to be sure, important distinctions between the scientific and political cases, specifically with respect to the kinds of mediating structures that are especially relevant and problematic. Indeed, in the moral and political case it is arguable that Longino's two other conditions-of authoritative venues, on the one hand, and widely accepted standards of relevant evidence and rules of inference, on the other-simply do not obtain. First, in the cacophonous public spheres of contemporary democracies, there are some historically prominent venues (venerable media outlets; courts and legislatures) that are widely viewed as authoritative information providers and interpreters. These claims to authority are, however, often challenged by both scholarly and partisan voices, and a great many other venues (particularly in cyberspace) vie for comparable respect. Second, on the matter of shared rules of evidence and inference, there are clear incentives for powerful actors to distort information and promulgate dubious claims, in ways that are perhaps harder to challenge than in the case of scientific knowledge claims. The incentives for citizens to remain rationally ignorant on a range of public matters is often noted, and may in part reflect awareness, by citizens, of the difficulties in finding consensus in the moral and political realm regarding what even counts as reasonable evidence and convincing argument on deeply divisive matters of policy and principle.13 Motivating Dissent: Varieties of Disagreement With these caveats in mind, we know turn to the kinds of differences and disagreements that motivate dissent. Our aim here is to elaborate further on how insights from the political and 13 These distortions and perverse incentives are central, for instance, to Pincione and Teson (2006) on the persistence of what they call "discourse failure" and their associated critique of deliberative democratic proposals. 12 moral spheres may be useful for efforts to democratize science. One particularly relevant complementarity between political and scientific contexts is the fact that these contexts, when democratized, have in common certain kinds of conflict, and being clear on these is, we contend, crucial to keeping track of uptake. In this light, consider the following kinds of disagreement that can arise in democracies. In some cases, there may be a genuine fact of the matter concerning a public question: for example, whether a policy will reduce crime or increase employment. Here, disagreements might be at least in part rooted in simple errors of fact or reasoning or, of course, deliberate distortions of facts and arguments. Call these factual disputes. Disagreements in factual disputes are rooted either in error or dishonesty. In other cases, disagreements may simply reflect conflicting tastes, sentiments, needs-in a word, interests. Fair division problems with scarce resources often have this character, for instance: there may only be sufficient materials available to satisfy some, but not all desires, or even brute needs, if scarcity is stark. Evidence and argument may well clarify the nature and extent of such conflicts, and even reveal their causes, but is unlikely to resolve them. Call this interest agonism. Interests are not immutable, of course, but they often are settled features of who we are, and so the best we might hope for when settled interests conflict is that, by understanding the nature and extent of those differences, we might also debate what values are to guide us in negotiating compromises and finding strategies of mutual accommodation. In still other cases, disputes do not stem simply from conflicting interests, nor errors in fact or reasoning, but are the result of profound differences in worldviews and resultant disagreements over what counts as relevant and reliable evidence, what constitute persuasive arguments, and what values ought to inform and restrain law and policy. Call this worldview agonism. Suppose, for example, that your policy proposal to limit stem cell research-based 13 solely on religious convictions about God's plan for every potential human life-carries the day, and my only response is "well that's just unscientific!" Here we have an instance of worldview agonism: I offer only my assertion of scientific standards of inference and argument against your assertion of religious convictions, but I find myself facing a majority who share your worldview. The two species of agonism are distinct, but are likely to be related: deep differences in worldviews are likely to result, over time, in distinct communities of tastes and interests. They are both, however, distinct from factual disputes, where we agree on the terms of debate, and where some fact of the matter is relatively uncontentious, but as yet undetermined. In factual disputes, we simply need good evidence and argument to forge a legitimate consensus around the truth of the matter. In disputes grounded in brute differences in needs, tastes, and desires, there is the possibility of bargaining and compromise, even morally principled accommodation, but these disputes are defined by either objective needs or settled preferences that are not part of the calculus of deliberative engagement. Rather, they are taken as given. So too with some kinds of settled commitments to particular worldviews, and the standards of evidence and argument that go along with those comprehensive spiritual and philosophical doctrines. If I, and my fellow believers, simply refuse to accept your favoured standards of what14 count as persuasive arguments and reliable evidence (because, perhaps, you refuse to accept the existence of god, or the inerrancy of our favoured interpretation of sacred texts), then we can easily find ourselves in disputes of much the same character as that associated with interest 14 Our meaning is consonant with Rawls, who gives us the idea of a comprehensive doctrine as including "conceptions of what is of value in human life, as well as ideals of personal virtue and character that are to inform much of our nonpolitical conduct" (2005, 175). As is clear from this passage, however, Rawls is primarily concerned with distinguishing political conceptions of justice and legitimacy from those derived from more comprehensive religious-spiritual and moral-philosophical systems of thought. Our usage is more capacious, including especially core ontological and epistemic commitments that condition knowledge claims and define valid inferences. An example: some religious-spiritual worldviews commit adherents to accepting private subjective mental states as convincing evidence, that in turn justifies faith in the existing of supernatural realms and beings. These are the kinds of deep and settled commitments that are of particular interest to us here. 14 agonism: in both cases, the sources of disagreement are not in dispute, but are also largely immune to agreement. In the case of interest agonism, dissent is rooted in brute conflict. In the case of worldview agonism, dissent arises insofar as meaningful argument about particular scientific hypotheses or political proposals cannot even get off the ground: the parties do not accept compatible rules of inference and evidence.15 We can, however, imagine disputes that are not brute conflicts of tastes and interests, on the one hand, but also are not transparently the result of deep disagreements about ontological and epistemic fundamentals, on the other. The kinds of disagreement we have in mind proceed from a space of underlying agreement-or at least, sufficient convergence-on relevant evidence and acceptable rules of inference. These disputes may involve, for example, thorny interpretive debates, disagreements about the weighing and/or prioritization of values, adjudication of apparent value conflicts, or questions about the contexts of application for shared principles. Here, critically, the motivating disagreement seems to parties to be, at least in principle, rationally resolvable, insofar as parties roughly agree on what an acceptable claim would look like. Still, these disagreements, while in principle resolvable, do not simply dissolve under straightforward corrections of fact and reasoning; neither are they mere precipitates of more fundamental incommensurability with respect to either tastes and interests, or foundational assumptions and commitments. To put the point roughly, but simply: parties in these cases more or less accept the (logical and evidentiary) terms of debate, they are sufficiently informed, and they argue sincerely and plausibly, but they nonetheless disagree over what conclusions follow. When dissent reflects disagreements of this sort, parties cannot be dismissed as simply having different needs and tastes; nor is their disagreement an instance of a deeper clash of 15 Recall here the importance, for Longino, of widely shared and reasonably settled public standards in the generation of valid knowledge through inclusive critical interactions. 15 antagonistic worldviews. What is tantalizing about such dissent is the prospect for rational resolution in spite of profound disagreement. Parties to such disputes sincerely want to find an answer that would satisfy all or most parties; but they cannot agree with the prevailing interpretations and arguments that seem ready to carry the day. To be clear, the varieties of conflict we distinguish are idealized types; disagreements are not always easily characterized as one of these ideal types in practice. Still, clarifying the kinds of disputes that motivate dissent invites us to consider the spaces between these conceptual poles, and how what seems to be one kind of disagreement might in fact resolve itself into something else entirely. In actual political and scientific controversy, what seems at first to be unresolvable dissent may turn out to be mere strategic posturing, with some party adopting the language of deep religious convictions or scientific scepticism to further more mundane material or ideological interests. Or, perhaps, a persistent dissenting voice, apparently baying against the winds of reason and evidence, will ultimately reveal that the prevailing consensus, seemingly so certain, in fact relies on a subtle evidentiary mistake, or an unsustainable interpretation of some core concept. Think here, for example, of how the concept of a "calorie" transformed from an assumed entity, an ontological status, to a unit of measurement in a very different model of heat (Hacking 1983, 86-7; Psillos 1996).16 For many moral and political issues, the evidence is complex and uncertain; and our interpretations of that evidence, as well as the weight we grant to particular facts, are inevitably shaped by our values, interests, and experiences. What seems obviously true to us and many others may admit of reasonable challenge, and persistent dissent may eventually expose subtle biases and errors in our views. While the problems wrestled with in most fields of science seem 16 We simply note this as a plausible example of how dissent can eventually challenge status quo understandings in science; for our purposes here we take no sides in the dispute over convergent realism where this example is often invoked, e.g. Laudan (1981) and Lewis (2001). 16 to admit of far more (and more stable) intersubjective certainty than moral and political disputes, it still shouldn't surprise us of these same "burdens of judgement," which motivate respect for17 reasonable dissent in the moral-political realm, may have some relevance in the realm of science, especially when considering the kinds of dissent we see, for instance, against complex model-dependent knowledge claims in evolutionary theory or climate sciences. Agonism, Transformation, Consensus We have suggested that some kinds of disagreement allow for dissent that cannot be easily dismissed as either fruitless or disingenuous, relying as it does on sincere and informed parties agreeing upon rules of inference and evidence, yet nonetheless leading to unsettled conclusions. Still, we might think that this kind of disagreement-leading to what we will here call unsettled dissent-is unlikely to remain unsettled for long. After all, if we can find some measure of agreement on basic rules of inference and admission of evidence relevant to a given dispute, then how likely is it that substantive disagreement could persist? Wouldn't such disputes eventually be shown to originate in either brute differences in tastes and interests, subtle mistakes of fact and reasoning, or in deeper foundational disagreements on the very terms of debate? In short, this critic argues that unsettled dissent is simply an unstable, perhaps illusory point between interest and worldview agonism, on the one hand, and relatively uncontentious 17 We draw here on what John Rawls (2001, 33-37) calls the burdens of judgement: on the most profound and important questions of morality and politics, evidence is complex and uncertain, and even when we can provisionally agree on what evidence is relevant, reliable, and how we ought to reason about those facts, factual questions almost never settle the matter of how to weigh competing considerations, and how best to interpret available evidence. Thus, while we may be firmly convinced of the truth of our views, we allow that other intelligent, informed, sincere interlocutors may reasonably disagree on these kinds of questions. These burdens are central to Rawls's idea of reasonable disagreement, (see esp. 2005, 36ff and 134ff), but we do not claim that such disagreement is synonymous with the kind of potentially fruitful dissent that especially interests us here. We simply cite acceptance of these burdens of judgement as an obvious way that sincere and informed disagreement could persist on complex and contentious issues. 17 knowledge and truth claims (factual disputes), on the other. This kind of critic points to a real worry in moral and political philosophy: what if, ultimately, democratic politics is most often rooted in interest and worldview agonism, rather than the kinds of questions that admit of a legitimate consensus on facts and values? Different cultural, religious, and philosophical traditions-the critic contends-simply approach the big questions in life with incommensurable beliefs about how the world works, what values should guide our lives together, what counts as persuasive argument, what evidence is relevant to those assumptions and arguments, and how we should interpret and weigh the significance of alleged facts. These traditions result in ways of life with distinctive tastes and interests, and these will inevitably conflict with those of other traditions, other worldviews. The best we might hope for here, as Chantal Mouffe (1993; 1999) suggests, is that disputing parties come to see themselves as adversaries rather than enemies: an adversary is a legitimate enemy, an enemy with whom we have in common a shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of democracy. But our disagreement concerning their meaning and implementation is not one that could be resolved through deliberation and rational discussion, hence the antagonistic element in the relation (1999, 755). We agree with Mouffe that such transformations are surely desirable in the face of disputes rooted in interest and worldview agonism. We also agree with Jeroen Van Bouwel (2009) that Longino's approach can be allied with Mouffe's insofar as both evince clear scepticism that deliberation ought to aim at authoritative consensus. Longino, as Van Bouwel rightly notes, is far more concerned with inclusive procedures than with privileging consensus as the desired outcome of deliberation. This, he suggests, leads Longino to a model of "agonistic engagement" (Van Bouwel 2009, 129) that is quite friendly to Mouffe's view. Still, the critic we are considering here seems to assume that there is no stable point between interest and worldview agonism, on the one hand, and uncontentious facts and 18 inferences that should motivate consensus, on the other. On the critic's view, either disputes are amenable to evidence and argument (in which case dissent reflects ignorance, ineptitude, or dishonesty) or they are not; if not, then inclusive deliberation solves nothing substantive, at least not without first convincing everyone to hold compatible tastes, cultivate common interests, and share a common worldview. However tempting, we resist this assumption, for two reasons: First, we contend that unsettled dissent, as we have defined it, can be durable and is worth taking seriously. To be clear, we applaud philosophical and theoretical efforts to scrutinize consensus as a moral or epistemic ideal, and as a practical aim, especially as it relates to scientific knowledge-claims and their public consequences (e.g., Miller 2013). We do not dispute that Mouffe and other agonists do indeed have plausible targets for their criticisms. Some advocates of deliberation are overly sanguine about the possibility and desirability of consensus: Jürgen Habermas comes to mind, and Van Bouwel (2009, 127) makes a good case for putting Kitcher in this category. We contend, however, that deliberation in the moral and political realm is not so tightly bound to consensus as might at first seem to be the case. This last point seems to us to deserve particular emphasis: inclusive deliberation need not issue in consensus to be useful or otherwise morally attractive. Deliberation may instead serve to clarify the various dimensions of complex disputes, showing us where and how, precisely, we disagree (e.g. Miller 1992), and again, even suggesting novel lines of inquiry that may have been obscured by pre-deliberative disagreement. The rich literature on democratic deliberation and deliberative democracy suggest, then, that deliberation need not be motivated by substantive consensus, but may instead have other epistemic and legitimating functions, including but not limited to the kind of modest transformation in mutual appraisals that Mouffe suggests. Second, while Mouffe's agonism certainly allows for the possibility of productive interactions 19 under a "conflictual consensus," that possibility comes at a cost. Not only does she deny the18 possibility of "rational procedures" ever "overcoming" dissenting interpretations of core political values (2005, 228), she holds that productive interactions through agonistic channels require 'conversion' rather than 'persuasion'. For Mouffe, "to come to accept the position of the adversary is to undergo a radical change in political identity, it has more of a quality of a conversion than of rational persuasion (in the same way as Thomas Kuhn has argued that Hey adherence to a new scientific paradigm is a type of conversion)" (1999, 755). She is, then, sceptical of the possibility of intersubjective convergence on truth or likelihood as motivating personal transformations. We, however, want to allow such convergence as a possible (although certainly not necessary) consequence of inclusive deliberation. Like Longino, we19 maintain an agnostic position that does not prejudge the results of deliberation, although with Mouffe and other hopeful agonists, we suspect that a certain kind of transformation in our attitudes towards others will be a desirable outcome of appropriately structured deliberative encounters with others. In addition to those modest transformative aims of inclusive deliberation, our focus is on the deliberative frameworks that can further encourage favourable epistemic results, such as clarifying the dimensions of disputes and even issuing in provisional consensus. We contend that Longino's rejection of the rational/social dichotomy and her articulation of the social norms for "effective critical interactions" highlights the rational elements of persuasion in a way that is friendlier to our view than to Mouffe's (Longino 2002, 128-135). We hasten to add, 18 For Mouffe, this is a consensus on "the 'ethico-political' principles of the liberal democratic regime, that is, liberty and equality for all," but where "there should always exist the possibility of serious dissent about their interpretation" (2005, 228). We thank an anonymous reviewer for pushing us to clarify this contrast with Mouffe's position. 19 More pointedly, we suspect that personal conversions-however difficult and unlikely-will sometimes have rational or at least reasonable grounds. Or, if these transformations really are as mysterious as Mouffe seems to suggest, we suspect that those conversions are at least occasionally the result of exposure to different (but rational) assumptions, evidence, interpretations, and arguments. 20 though, that we do not presume that all things epistemic are strictly rational. Not at all, for that would mean upholding the problematic rational/social dichotomy against which Longino rightly argued. Cautionary Lessons Having suggested that deliberative approaches gleaned from political theory may be more promising than some critics have intimated, we turn to more pessimistic lessons for approaches such as Kitcher's and Longino's-lessons drawn from empirical work on political deliberation. To this end, consider a troubling set of mediating structures that recent empirical work on deliberation has highlighted. A longstanding body of work in social psychology finds that groups are easily polarized by deliberation, with like-minded participants conforming to more extreme positions than they might otherwise have endorsed (see Sunstein 2002; and 2007, ch. 3). More recently, in a careful study of experimental and survey data, Dianne Mutz (2006) has found a clear tradeoff between participation and deliberation in the face of disagreement: the kinds of people who participate actively in politics do not tend to engage in much deliberation with others, certainly not outside their favoured beliefs and opinions. Worse, when citizens are exposed to a diversity of beliefs, viewpoints, and arguments, they tend to participate less in politics (Mutz 2006). Similarly, Simon Jackman and Paul Sniderman (2006) have found modest but suggestive evidence that, in everyday political argument, deliberation-understood as engagement with opposing evidence and argument-does not seem to have much effect on subsequent beliefs. There are ways around these pernicious psychological tendencies, and most prominent in democratic theory has been the pioneering work of James Fishkin, whose statistically 21 representative deliberative polls bring together a wide range of citizens to discuss specific public issues under careful moderation, copious information, and relevant expert testimony. Several researchers, working between normative political theory and empirical social sciences (e.g. Fung 2006; Goodin and Dryzek 2006; Tansey & Burgess 2006; Guston 2007; MacKenzie and Doherty 2011; Niemeyer 2011; see also Chambers 2003; and Thompson 2008), continue to explore the precise institutional architectures favorable to successful group deliberations in a variety of settings. Yet there are obvious moral concerns that these sorts of solutions (emphasizing as they do the importance of moderation, and controlling information and access to expertise) may complicate the very hopes-for more broadly inclusive democratization of knowledge access, evaluation, and production-that motivate the turn to democratic deliberation in the first place. A prevalent and particularly pernicious mediating structure-the effects of which careful moderation seeks to ameliorate-consists of ingrained stereotypes and associated biases inherent in public political culture, which leave particular groups at a deliberative disadvantage. Think here of the systematic barriers to comprehension that Miranda Fricker describes as forms of "epistemic injustice" (2007). Fricker introduces the notion of "testimonial injustice" to describe the disvaluing of a speaker's credibility that can occur when the speaker is the victim of prejudice or the object of malicious stereotyping (2007, chp. 1). Fricker also speaks of "hermeneutical injustice", where widespread cultural misinterpretation causes subaltern groups difficulty in conceptualizing certain of their social experiences and contributing to the collective understanding of these experiences (2007, ch. 7). As a result, these marginalized individuals face difficulties in making political claims that stem from these experiences (Morgan-Olsen 2010). An important critical theme in the debates over deliberative democracy drives home much the same point, showing how apparently benign norms of civility in discourse can in fact exclude 22 particular gestures and speaking styles historically linked to oppressed and socioeconomically marginalized ethnic, racial, and cultural groups (e.g., Saunders 1997; Young 2001; Bohman 2003). These injustices are particularly significant because they present barriers to uptake that are integrated into the epistemic norms by which we all operate, meaning that those affected "are confronted with a double bind: not only are their voices not heard, but the structures through which this happens are hidden from view" (Martineau 2012, 172). The general lesson here is that to maximize uptake, it is not sufficient to track bare facts like inclusion of individuals or minority voices in critical discursive interaction. One must also analyze the set-up conditions of the deliberative process in order to make sense of whether such inclusion is effective, and to increase the chances of excavating mediating structures that are serving to hinder unfairly the uptake of particular deliberative contributions. To consider a specific instantiation of this general phenomenon, let us turn towards an analysis of how deliberations can be framed so as to systematically misidentify dissent by conflating unsettled dissent with worldview agonism. 4. Misidentified and Manufactured Dissent It should be clear at this point that those in favor of democratizing science and deliberative theorists alike tend to worry about deep failures of understanding and insular value judgements that will lead to the recalcitrant disagreement of black-boxed deliberation. In short, they worry about the possibility of worldview agonism. These worries generally arise in reaction to20 prominent, contentious public disputes, as in Longino's reaction to the claims of creationist science. In such cases, as we've also seen with Longino, often a call is made for "translation" of 20 There is, of course, considerable debate among theorists about whether such worries are warranted or ill-advised. Charles Taylor, for example, has an optimistic take on this question, insisting that the driving problem in democratic communication is not incommensurability, but the fact that we face "'the jackals and vultures of partial and (we hope) surmountable noncommunication' (2002, 291). 23 concepts or evaluative frameworks in order to identify commonalities and resolve dissent. But such disputes do not spring into being fully-formed. There is a pre-deliberative stage where views are canvassed, relevant evidence is identified, and positions are identified as dissenting or assenting with respect to the question at hand. Uptake failure can occur at this stage, as mediating structures interfere with the criteria invoked to classify disagreements as conflictual or recalcitrant. We are especially interested in these antecedent hindrances to the uptake that Longino and Kitcher seek. In this respect, Longino's and Kitcher's proposals can benefit, we suggest, from attention paid to the sources of dissent, especially the degree to which worldview agonism really is at work in some particular disputes. Here, then, we move from our earlier discussion of broader questions-about how perspectives and worldviews can generate the disagreements that motivate and frame dissent-to specific disputes over, for instance, particular policies in the political realm, or specific hypotheses or research proposals in the scientific realm (and, of course, cases where these intersect, when specific research findings have moral and political valence). To begin to get at the question of how unsettled dissent can get quickly classified as unresolvable agonism, we can point towards exemplary cases in contemporary debates about multiculturalism and religious accommodation. Consider, for example, Carolin Emcke's line of questioning about "the so-called 'headscarves affair' in France (and its analogues elsewhere)", in which she argues: To say that this controversy exemplifies the tendency for the simple fact of pluralism to generate "normative or practical contradictions" seems question-begging: how, exactly, does what a Muslim girl wears on her head in school come to represent a threat to the survival of French secularism? Does this signification somehow inhere in the practice as such, prior to and independently of its encounter and interaction with its "external" context? (2000, 500) Emcke here calls attention to the process by which a pre-theoretically benign cultural difference became strongly representative of a divisive political conflict. To be sure, the choice of the 24 headscarf as a locus of conflict makes sense in that it serves as a symbol of identification for certain Muslims (and as a symbol of gender oppression to other participants in the debate). But the fact that this in itself trivial cultural difference was so quickly ratcheted up to an instance of deep conflict raises questions about the initial framing of the debate and the characterization of the opposing parties. Consider also the Quebec National Assembly's motion to ban the wearing of the kirpan, a symbolic dagger worn by members of the Sikh religion, in the provincial legislature. The motion21 was carried ostensibly on grounds of security, as the provincial legislature, reasonably, has a policy against the wearing of weapons. Since the kirpan is a dagger, and thus a weapon, the National Assembly concluded that it should not be allowed. However, Sikhs argue that the kirpan is a religious symbol akin to the wearing of a cross or a kippah, and that it is not a weapon. What is important here, though, is that no Sikh came forward to disagree with the professed motivation for the policy. No one argued that the importance of a religious symbol trumps concerns of security; no one argued that a loaded rifle should get through the door, whether it has religious significance to its owner or not. Yet Quebec championed this case to demonstrate the importance of maintaining its staunch secularism, and of resisting the tolerance of religious constituencies that is embraced by the other provinces of Canada. Again, we have an issue of a particular, trivial religious and cultural difference being quickly regarded as an instance of deep conflict. It is easy to see the possibility of malicious political spin taking place in these examples. And, 21 The National Assembly unanimously passed the motion in early 2011, inciting a national debate (see, e.g., "Kirpan Banned at Quebec National Assembly" http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/story/2011/02/09/pq-kirpan-measure.html (accessed 10.1.2011), and "Kirpan Ban Puts Canada on Brink of Multiculturalism Debate No One Wants" http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ottawa-notebook/kirpan-ban-puts-canada-on-brink-of-multicult uralism-debate-no-one-wants/article1903372/ (accessed 10.1.2011). 25 indeed, similar phenomena of manufactured controversy take place in disputes surrounding the public understanding of science, such as the debate over teaching Intelligent Design in American schools. We will revisit this point below, but overt manipulation is not all that is going on when22 dissent is misidentified or mis-characterized. At least some of what went awry in the framing of the affair du foulard, for example, can be traced to public misunderstandings (and outright ambiguities) about the cultural meaning of the headscarf. This is just to reiterate that, oftentimes, mediating structures can complicate the collective epistemic task of setting up a democratic debate, to the detriment of some deliberators' attempts to get uptake. Such worries lead to the question of what criteria are used to characterize the degree to which dissent is likely to be constructive. More specifically, one ought to wonder on what grounds we distinguish deep value conflicts from, for example, more immediate conflicts of interest. While such criteria can certainly be maliciously manipulated, they can also be problematized without specifically malicious intention. Discourse about dissent can be misleading because it often occurs on a level that does not illuminate the substance of a debate between two parties in disagreement; the discourse generally focuses on a particular political policy or proposition, meaning that the political camps involved will be neatly separated into pro- or against- camps with little regard for the reasons individuals consider decisive in joining one of these camps. But the discourse can also be misled by policy proposals that are not transparent about their underlying motivations; sometimes it is far from clear why a particular deliberative proposal is being enacted, and thus those who dissent from the proposal because they disagree with one possible motivation for it might seem to be in sharper conflict with others than they really are. With this in mind, and against the backdrop of our earlier discussion of the varieties of 22 For insight into how controversy can be manufactured in scientific debates, see, e.g., Ceccarelli (2011). 26 disagreement that can motivate dissent, we offer a taxonomy that establishes a more fine-grained conceptualization of forms of dissent, aimed at the level of policies and proposals, thus offering a potential tool for minimizing mis-categorization and maximizing effective uptake. For these purposes, let us assume that every proposed political policy has a single overriding motivation that underlies it. This limits our taxonomy to four options: 1. Full Assent: when one assents to a policy and agrees with its underlying motivation. 2. Attenuated Assent: when one assents to a policy, but does not agree with its underlying motivation. (In other words, one has a distinct motivation for assenting to the policy that overrides the presented motivation, which leads to something of an overlapping consensus.) 3. Full Dissent: when one disapproves of both the policy and its underlying motivation. 4. Attenuated Dissent: when one does not necessarily disagree with the underlying motivation of the policy, but disapproves of the policy on some other grounds. We want to call particular attention to the case of attenuated dissent, where groups express dissatisfaction with a deliberative proposal but their motivations for dissatisfaction are often poorly understood or mis-categorized. This is what is happening most often, we contend, when consequential mistakes are made in misidentifying dissent. One might characterize the headscarf and kirpan cases as instances of attenuated dissent, but there are more striking illustrative examples, such as the ongoing negotiations between indigenous groups and the Canadian government over land claims. As Paul Nadasdy argues-referencing, in particular, Kluane First Nation (KFN) land claims in the Canadian Subarctic-the deliberations about aboriginal title that have taken place in Canadian courts are framed around a notion of property that alienates many First Nations groups from the outset (Nadasdy 2002). The Western notion of property qua individualistic private property does not23 map well onto traditional KFN concepts of land use and management. Thus, "... the land claim 23 Thanks to Burke Hendrix for pointing us towards this specific example. 27 process-because it forces aboriginal people to think and speak in the language of property-tends to undermine the very beliefs and practices that a land claim agreement is meant to preserve" (ibid., 247). This case is striking not simply because it involves the translation of concepts for the purposes of deliberation, as Longino cautions might be necessary at times, nor because we24 can speculate about the existence of malicious intervention in the debate's history. It is striking25 because, despite appearances, the difference between Aboriginal and Western conceptualizations of land use is not what is ultimately at issue. What is at issue is who gets to govern what tracts of land-an issue fully intelligible within each framework of conceptualization and potentially resolvable without anything resembling a full resolution of the conceptual disconnect between frameworks. However, as it stands, the deliberation has been framed so that it is very difficult to express clearly the First Nations perspective-even leaving aside the massive power imbalances at play. Thus, the differences between the parties seem more relevant than they might be in another light (one, for example, that highlights common interests in sustainable resource use, environmental protections, and uncontaminated air, water, soil, etc.). To illustrate, imagine a court proposing to grant a KFN leader ownership of a huge swath of the Yukon, with the understanding that the KFN group will engage in collaborative stewardship of the territory. As a whole, the Kluane Nation would likely not disagree with the spirit of the proposal, but they are still placed in an awkward position of attenuated dissent due to the fact that they do not endorse the notions of ownership built into the foundations of the court's operating principles. 24 "... to even engage in the process of negotiating a land claim agreement, First Nation people must translate their complex reciprocal relationship with the land into the equally complex but very different language of 'property'" (Nadasdy 2002, 248). 25 Nancy Williams argues that, historically, the legal notion of "property rights" were defined explicitly in contradistinction to aboriginal conceptualizations, in order to stack the debate in favor of the courts (1986, ch. 8). 28 These cases call attention to ways in which the line between unsettled dissent and worldview agonism can be obscured in the public political debate of modern democracies. The enterprise of science has by no means been historically free of political maneuvering, explicitly manufactured controversy, or the sway of public opinion. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the democratization of scientific knowledge production will more directly expose science to pathologies of public political discourse, like this tendency to conflate dissent and difference. So the question to ask of proponents of democratization is whether they have built sufficient safeguards into their accounts to militate against such destructive tendencies. For instance, to revisit an example cited earlier in passing, consider how challenges to a morally and politically charged consensus in climate science, surrounding the reality and likely impacts of anthropogenic warming, are often framed. Here, dissenting voices are often assumed (and often revealed) to be partisan interests masquerading as reasonable challenges to interpretations of complex models and associated evidence. Yet the models so central to climate science are indeed extraordinarily complex, sensitive, and admit of reasonable debates over model specification and testing. Here, as in the moral and political case (and perhaps in some measure because this too is importantly an instance of interpreting and weighing moral values, and setting priorities, e.g. Broome 2012), we must distinguish carefully where dissent is based on the unsettled character of evidence and argument, and where it instead reflects dishonesty in the service of particular interests. Here too, however, we should also see the space for attenuated dissent: accepting the scientific claims (about human involvement in climate change) that motivate particular policy recommendations (rapid cuts to emissions) and future research projects (for instance, in pollution abatement and alternative fuels), but disputing those policies and research priorities. Bjorn Lomborg's critical interventions into the climate debate (e.g. Lomborg 2004) are an obvious 29 illustration of this: his constructive point, whatever one thinks of it, was not to dispute the26 relevant climate science, but to highlight the human development priorities that seemed likely to be undercut by aggressive policy interventions and applied research aimed at dramatic emission reductions. Longino and Kitcher are obviously both aware of the overt mechanisms of power that can skew deliberative processes, which can manifest themselves in, for example, strategies of privatization, disenfranchisement, and political "spin". Our aim here is simply to clarify how some of these real-world deliberative complexities play out in the moral and political spheres, and especially in those areas of scientific research with clear moral and political valence, all with an eye to aiding those who would draw on deliberative practices and procedures for democratizing science. We have drawn here on the moral and political spheres to elaborate a taxonomy of public dissent. Our hope is that this exercise may be of use in thinking through the practical implementation of more democratic ways of doing science. 5. Concluding Remarks Debates surrounding deliberative democracy continue to reveal subtle and pernicious mediating structures which must be guarded against in order for deliberation to be successful, epistemologically speaking. In putting the literature on democratizing science into conversation with political theory and social science concerned with public deliberation, we hope to have raised awareness of sources of uptake failure that may be critical to the success of efforts to democratize scientific knowledge and practice. We are especially concerned that scientific debates not be left vulnerable to framing effects such as those we have canvassed in the preceding discussions. 26 For an example of harsh criticism, see Friel (2010). 30 The phenomena of misidentified and manufactured dissent should be of special interest to Philip Kitcher and Helen Longino, because these phenomena themselves can influence the empirical landscape used to judge the long-term plausibility of democratizing knowledge. An unrepresentative illusion of preponderant dissent can lead us to characterize our polity solely in terms of persistent disagreement and an unmanageable gridlock of conflicting values. This characterization, in turn, can be used as evidence to justify more insular scientific practices and policy considerations, and to reject principles that encourage collaboration and deliberation across lines of difference, like those championed by proponents of democratization. Moreover, there are forces of political expediency that will seek to encourage such characterizations. We take it that this point is relatively uncontroversial, but let us briefly adduce two considerations in its favor. First of all, presenting one's view as if it is in sharp conflict with another's is a useful strategy for getting one's voice heard. With limited time and patience for arbitrating subtle disputes, public political discourse tends to operate on a point/counter-point model of debate between two conflicting sides of an issue. The more easily distinguished these different sides are, the more effectively the debate can be framed. Hence, it often behooves one to push a political agenda that is in stark contrast to an existing view rather than offering a conciliatory yet revisionary view. Moreover, if there is a received view on a particular issue, one is almost guaranteed to gain a political presence by disagreeing with it strongly. Secondly, an extended period of unproductive engagement favors those who have entrenched power. As long as there is hope for mutual advantage and concordance, there is a prima facie reason for deliberation to continue. In contrast, as gridlock continues and tension mounts, the point of decision approaches more quickly; if we are convinced that "never the twain shall meet," we will be motivated to take a vote and move on. As this process moves more 31 quickly, the opportunities for the marginalized to represent themselves dwindle, and the likelihood that they will be stonewalled increases. Thus, claims of gridlock provide an air of legitimacy to attempts made by those in power to push their agendas through complaint without making any substantial compromises. 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A Companion to Experimental Philosophy, First Edition. Edited by Justin Sytsma and Wesley Buckwalter. © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2016 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 35.1 Introduction The concept of innateness has led a busy life. Within the sciences, it has historically exerted an influence in many regions of biology; and though its explicit role in the life sciences has waned in recent decades, it continues to play a significant role in cognitive science – especially, developmental psychology and linguistics. Yet, the concept of innateness is quite unlike many that figure in science. Whereas the concepts of a Higgs boson or lateral geniculate nucleus, for example, are products of science and make little sense independently of this context, the c oncept of innateness has led a life outside the lab. Discussions of innateness appear in works of both Western philosophy (Cowie 1999) and Chinese philosophy (Fung 1953; Wong 2012) that long predate modern science. Moreover, the concept appears to have a place in our ordinary folk understanding as well. Even if many people rarely come across the actual English word "innate," they can easily understand the claim that certain capacities are "just built into us," a product of nature, or "in our genes." The role of the concept of innateness – especially in the sciences – has also been contentious. According to the standard criticism, widely endorsed by philosophers and theoretically oriented biologists, the concept of innateness is unfit for scientific purposes because it encodes a prescientific conception of development that conflates several distinct biological issues and thereby leads researchers to commit fallacies of ambiguity (Bateson 1991; Griffiths 2002). Furthermore, the most vociferous recent advocates of this standard criticism maintain that it is bolstered by empirical research on innateness judgments (Griffiths, Machery, and Linquist 2009). This chapter has a pair of aims. The first is to provide an overview of some recent efforts to empirically study the innateness concept, both as deployed in folk contexts and among scientists. The second aim is to consider whether this research really bolsters the standard criticism. In Section 35.2, I describe research by Paul Griffiths and his collaborators, which seeks to assess The Concept of Innateness as an Object of Empirical Enquiry RICHARD SAMuELS 35 THE COnCEPT OF InnATEnESS AS An OBjECT OF EMPIRICAL EnquIRY 505 whether the folk concept of innateness is a manifestation of our folk biology. In Section 35.3, I consider whether, as Griffiths et al. maintain, this research bolsters the standard criticism. In Section 35.4, I review further research, largely due to josh Knobe and Richard Samuels, on folk innateness judgments; and in Section 35.5 I describe how this research was extended in order to explore the issue of whether scientists' innateness judgments rely on a distinctly scientific i nnateness concept, or whether they merely redeploy the folk concept. Finally, in Section 35.6, I conclude with some very brief comments on the implications of this research. 35.2 Folk Innateness judgments: The Innateness Concept as a Manifestation of Our Folk Biology Philosophers have long sought to analyze the concept of innateness (Stich 1975); and over the past few decades a number of explicit definitions have been proposed. (For surveys see Samuels 2004; and Mameli and Bateson 2011). Experimental studies of the innateness concept are quite different in emphasis. Rather than seeking to define "innate," the goal has been to describe the sort of mental processes and representations that underlie our thought about innateness. In this section, I set out one intriguing proposal, initially suggested by Paul Griffiths (2002), and later explored by Griffiths in collaboration with Edouard Machery, Stephan Linquist, and Karola Stotz. According to this proposal, which they call the three‐feature hypothesis, the concept of innateness is a manifestation of certain core aspects of our folk biology (Griffiths 2002; Griffiths, Machery, and Linquist 2009; Linquist et al. 2011). 35.2.1 Background: Folk Essentialism Let me start by laying some background in place. Over the past four decades, naïve thought about the biological world has been a focus of intensive study among cognitive psychologists, anthropologists, and developmentalists. Although much controversy remains (see, e.g., Sloutsky, Kloos, and Fisher 2007), there is fairly widespread consensus concerning certain core aspects of our folk biology – aspects that Griffiths and his collaborators rely on in developing their hypothesis. Crucially, there is considerable agreement that quotidian thought about the biological realm is a manifestation of folk essentialism. When ordinary people draw inferences or make judgments about biological phenomena, they tend to suppose that organisms possess a hidden causal essence or inner nature - a property or set of properties that is possessed by the organism throughout its life, and which both defines its kind membership and causes it to possess kind‐ typical properties (Medin and Ortony 1989; Atran 1990; Gelman 2003). On this view, for example, people tacitly suppose that what makes an organism a tiger with typical tigerish characteristics is that throughout its life it possesses a hidden species essence that causes the organism to exhibit such species typical properties as being four‐legged, fury, and striped. Furthermore, this bias appears not to be an artifact of local cultural mores. Rather, what evidence there is s uggests that folk essentialism is pan‐cultural, and that it emerges reliably, and quite early in development (Atran 1998). Although folk essentialism has been invoked to explain a broad array of psychological phenomena, for present purposes the most relevant is a tendency, shared by adults and children alike, to suppose that species typical traits are insensitive to environmental variation. For example, when asked to imagine a cow that has been raised by pigs, adults routinely assume that the cow will display normal bovine traits, such as mooing instead of oinking (Atran et al. 2001). Folk essentialism readily explains this fact because if people assume that an organism will possess the same species essence RichaRd SamuelS 506 throughout its life, then an organism's species typical traits – which are a product of this essence – should be expected to develop across an exceedingly broad range of environments. 35.2.2 The Three‐Feature Hypothesis We are now in a position to set out the three‐feature hypothesis. It can be divided into two main parts. The first is that folk judgments about innateness reflect our ordinary tendency to think in essentialist terms about biological kinds (Griffiths 2002; Griffiths, Machery, and Linquist 2009). Specifically, Griffiths and his collaborators propose the following: Essentialist Thesis: naïve subjects judge a trait as innate when it is categorized as a product of the organism's species essence. But on what basis do people work out whether a trait is an expression of a species essence and, hence, innate? Here's where the second part of the hypothesis comes in. According to Griffiths and his collaborators: Categorization Thesis: naïve subjects categorize a trait as a product of the organism's species essence largely on the basis of the extent to which it exhibits three features: fixity, species typicality, and teleology (or functionality). Roughly, a trait is fixed to the extent that its possession is unaffected by environmental variation; a trait is species typical to the extent that it possessed by all members of the species that are not abnormal; and a trait is teleological to the extent that it contributes to the well‐being of the organism which possesses it. Other factors may, Griffiths et al. suppose, exert an influence; but these three are central. Furthermore, and more stringently, they hypothesize that evidence of fixity, typicality and teleology are independent of each other, and consequently, they predict that these three features will contribute additively to judgments about whether some trait is innate. The above earlier proposal requires a bit more unpacking. In particular, it is important to appreciate how the Essentialist and Categorization theses are connected – why the Essentialist Thesis should lead Griffiths et al. to suppose that innateness judgments are largely determined by fixity, typicality, and teleology. In light of our earlier discussion of folk essentialism, it should be pretty obvious why typicality and fixity are relevant. Evidence that a trait is species typical should increase the probability that it is judged to be an expression of a species essence, hence innate, because, by assumption, species typical traits are products of a species essence. Similarly, e vidence that a trait is fixed should raise the probability that it is judged innate because, by hypothesis, essences are invariant over the lifespan of the organism, and the traits they produce are insensitive to environmental influence. It is rather less obvious, however, why evidence of functionality should raise the probability that a trait is judged innate. As Griffiths et al. clearly recognize, this assumption does not flow directly from the hypothesis that we are folk essentialists. As a consequence, they cite various auxiliary considerations in order to bolster the claim that teleology is relevant. For example, they note the cross‐cultural tendency for people to invoke teleology in explaining why animals and plants possess traits (Atran 1995); and (quite unrelatedly) they note that some scientists and philosophers have suggested that "innate" should be analyzed to mean "designed by natural selection." These considerations are, however, clearly auxiliary to the core idea that innate traits are an expression of an organism's species essence; and as such, the status of teleology seems quite unlike that of fixity and typicality. I return to this point later on, but first we need to consider the empirical support for the three‐feature hypothesis. THE COnCEPT OF InnATEnESS AS An OBjECT OF EMPIRICAL EnquIRY 507 35.2.3 Experimental Study Suppose the three‐feature hypothesis is correct. Then we should expect the following: Prediction 1: When a trait is associated with any of the three features – fixity, typicality and teleology – participants will be more likely to judge the trait innate. Prediction 2: All three features will contribute independently to participants' judgments about the trait's innateness. To test these predictions, Griffiths and his collaborators ran a series of studies in which they p resented vignettes describing the song of different bird species (Griffiths, Machery, and Linquist 2009; Linquist et al. 2011). The vignettes systematically varied whether a trait was species t ypical, whether its development was dependent on the environment and whether it was functional. More specifically, each probe was organized in the following manner: • First, there is an initial paragraph about research on birdsong, designed to convince participants that there is a wealth of well‐established scientific knowledge about birdsong. • The next paragraph begins with one or two sentences, designed to convince participants that the animal is real, naming a specific bird and providing some neutral information about it. • The remainder of the second paragraph states whether the song of the male of this species is fixed, typical, teleological, or their opposites, using one of each of these pairs of statements: Fixed/Plastic 0. Studies on ___________ show that the song an adult male produces depends on which songs they hear when they are young. 1. Studies on ___________ show that the song an adult male produces does not depend on which songs they hear when they are young. Typical/Typical 0. Studies also show that different males in this species sing different songs. 1. Studies also show that all males of this species sing the same song. Teleology/Teleology 0. Close observations of these birds reveal that the males' song is not used to attract mates or to defend territories. Scientists therefore agree that this feature of the bird has no real function, like the appendix in humans. 1. Close observations of these birds reveal that the males' song attracts mates and helps to defend their territory. Scientists therefore agree that this feature of the bird has a real function, like the heart in humans. • Finally, the probe concludes with a question of the following form: On a 7‐point scale, 1 meaning strongly disagree and 7 meaning strongly agree, how would you respond to the following statement? "The song of the male _______ is innate." To illustrate, here is the probe describing a species of bird in which birdsong is not‐typical but is fixed and has a function: Birdsong is one of the most intensively studied aspects of animal behaviour. Since the 1950s s cientists have used recordings and sound spectograms to uncover the structure and function of birdsong. neuroscientists have investigated in great detail the areas of the brain that allow birds to develop and RichaRd SamuelS 508 produce their songs. Other scientists have done ecological fieldwork to study what role song plays in the lives of different birds. The Alder Flycatcher (Empidonax alnorum) is a migratory neo‐tropical bird which breeds in southern Canada and the northern uSA. Studies on the Alder Flycatcher show that the song an adult male produces does not depend on which songs they hear when they are young. Studies also show that different males in this species sing different songs. Furthermore, close observations of these birds reveal that the males' song attracts mates and helps to defend their territory. Scientists therefore agree that the bird's song has a real function, like the heart in humans. On a 7‐point scale, 1 meaning strongly disagree and 7 meaning strongly agree, how would you respond to the following statement? "The song of the male Alder Flycatcher is innate." Griffiths and his collaborators used vignettes of this sort in three different studies, two of which have a between‐subjects design, another within‐subjects. What they consistently found is that (1) typicality and fixity are both significant predictors of folk judgments about innateness; (2) fixity explains more of the variance than typicality; and (3) the influence of these two factors is additive. These results comport well with the three‐feature hypothesis. In contrast, the data on teleology is far less clear, and fit far less well. At best, teleology appears to be a marginally significant predictor of innateness judgments – explaining only a very small part of the variance. But in two of their experiments – both of which had between‐subject designs – teleology had no significant effect at all on judgments of innateness. 35.2.4 Follow‐up Study The three‐feature hypothesis predicts that teleology should exert a significant influence on folk innateness judgments. Why then did it exert so little influence, and what implications does this have for the three‐feature hypothesis? Clearly, the data provide little reason to reject the Essentialist Thesis. But it may appear to undermine the Categorization Thesis since only two of the three proposed features make a significant contribution to folk innateness judgments. But why is it that teleology exerted so little influence? This is a question that Griffiths and collaborators sought to address in a follow‐up study (Linquist et al. 2011). Perhaps the most obvious explanation for why teleology exerts so little influence is that, contrary to what Griffith et al. assume, the Categorization Thesis is false: Our folk biology does not construe essence‐produced traits as teleological. And, as a matter of fact, there is little direct e vidence that subjects do view essence‐produced traits in this way. This is why, as noted earlier, when Griffiths et al. argue for the inclusion of teleology, they resort to considerations that are more‐or‐less independent of the Essentialist Thesis. But if this is true – if there is little reason to suppose that subjects think of essence‐linked traits as functional – then Griffiths et al.'s data a ctually fit better with the Essentialist Thesis than would have been the case had teleology turned out to be an important factor. In short: on the present view, the evidence against the Categorization Thesis actually supports the Essentialist Thesis. There is a second intriguing possibility, however, which Linquist et al. (2011) explore. Rather than rejecting the Categorization Thesis, they suggest that our folk biology does treat essence‐ p roduced traits as teleological, but that teleology fails to influence verbal assertions involving the English word "innate" because – for whatever reason – "innate" is not especially effective at "tapping into" our underlying folk biological theory. If this were true, they suggest, one might expect other English expressions to do a better job at satisfying the Categorization Thesis; and as matter of fact, this appears to be the case – at least among Anglophone undergraduates. Specifically, in their 2011 study, Linquist et al. posed tasks very similar to those outlined earlier, except that they used the expression "in its DnA" instead of "innate." This manipulation was THE COnCEPT OF InnATEnESS AS An OBjECT OF EMPIRICAL EnquIRY 509 guided by the hunch that the relatively colloquial expression "in its DnA" would – at least for naïve undergraduate participants – do a better job of tapping into our folk biology than the somewhat antiquated word "innate." What they found was that for judgments concerning whether an organism's trait is "in its DnA," the three‐features – fixity, typicality, and teleology – explain far more of the variance than they do for innateness judgments: 46% as opposed to 16%. Moreover, they found that teleology alone is a good predictor of judgments about whether a trait is in the DnA, and indeed a better predictor than typicality is. Although the findings outlined in the previous paragraph are consistent with the three‐ feature hypothesis, they also raise a range of issues that require further clarification and exploration. One such issue concerns why we should accept the assumption that "in its DnA" is eliciting judgments that depend on the very same cognitive structures as those elicited by "innate." Minimally, in its present form, the three‐feature hypothesis leaves it a mystery why an inversion in the significance of teleological considerations should occur, if "innate" and "in its DnA" both rely on the same essentialist folk biology. Furthermore, there is an obvious alternative hypothesis that merits consideration. Given the recent and purely scientific provenance of talk about DnA, it may be that "in its DnA" elicits judgments that rely on a distinct but related set of semi‐scientific concepts. Among other things, such a proposal would explain the heavier weighting of teleological considerations, if (as I suspect) many people associate DnA with the process of evolution by natural selection – a commonly made connection is popular scientific works, such as Dawkins' The Selfish Gene. 35.3 Does Empirical Research on the Three‐Feature Hypothesis Bolster the Standard Criticism? Although one major goal of Griffiths et al.'s research is simply to understand the psychological basis of innateness judgments, they also maintain that it has implications for longstanding debates over the scientific legitimacy of the innateness concept. Specifically, they maintain that: The data from our ... empirical studies bolsters the standard scientific criticism of the concept, which is that it conflates a number of different ideas and leads to fallacies of ambiguity (Griffiths, Machery, and Linquist 2009, 624). In what follows, I set out this criticism in more detail, and argue that the extant research fails to support this contention. 35.3.1 Innateness as a "Tonkish" Concept In a well‐known paper on logical connectives, Arthur Prior discussed a connective, TOnK, which everyone would consider defective because it permits, via repeated applications of its introduction and elimination rules, the inferring of anything from anything else (Prior 1967). Griffiths and his collaborators, of course, never suggest that innateness is nearly so permissive. But they do suggest that it is "tonkish" in that it licenses illicit patterns of inference from one claim that we have reason to endorse, to others that are entirely unwarranted (Machery, 2014). Specifically, they contend that the innateness concept permits one to illegitimately infer from the trait's possession of one of the three features, to its possession of the others. Suppose, for example, that one has evidence that an organism's fur color is species‐typical. Then since the influence of typicality on innateness judgments is independent, one might make the following "introduction" inference: RichaRd SamuelS 510 Trait x is typical Trait x is innate More generally, because the three features exert an independent influence ... people need not know whether a trait is fixed or has a function to decide whether it is innate on the basis of evidence about typicality (and vice versa). Thus, if they are told that a trait is species‐typical, people may well infer that it is innate. But presumably we also make "elimination" inferences, from a trait's being innate to its possession of other properties – for example, Trait x is innate Trait x has a function But if this is so, then the concept of innateness would appear to license inferences from justifiable claims –in our example, the trait's species‐typicality – to quite different, and entirely unsupported conclusions (e.g., that the trait is functional). As Griffiths et al. put it: Having judged that [a trait] is innate, people are likely to infer that it is fixed-that its development does not depend on its environment. Or if they are told that a trait has a function, people may infer on that basis alone that it is innate. Having judged that it is innate, they are likely to conclude that it is species‐typical (and so on). In which case, it might seem that the innateness concept is tonkish and, hence, defective. Furthermore, if innate is defective in this fashion, then it may seem reasonable to conclude that it ought not to be deployed in the sciences, where the avoidance of equivocation and intellectual confusion are presumably quite desirable. 35.3.2 Why the Extant Empirical Research Fails to Bolster the Standard Criticism The research outlined earlier fails to bolster the Standard Criticism. First, in order to sustain the claim that the innateness concept is tonkish, one needs evidence concerning both introduction inferences (e.g., from fixity to innateness) and elimination inferences (e.g., from innateness to t ypicality). It is only if both exhibit the right inferential profile that the concept will behave in a tonkish manner. But as a matter of fact, the Griffiths et al. studies say nothing whatsoever about elimination inferences. Rather, they wholly concern introduction inferences. And what the e vidence at most suggests is that innateness judgments are made on the basis of multiple dissociable factors. The same is true, however, of many concepts – including many that figure in scientific contexts. For example, scientists judge a substance to be a mineral on the basis of m ultiple dissociable factors – for example, whether it is naturally occurring, stable at room t emperature, and abiogenic. But it would surely be implausible to conclude from this alone that the mineral concept should be expunged from science. Second, it's unclear how Griffiths et al.'s studies could provide very much support for the s tandard criticism, since it's far from clear that they tell us much about innateness judgments in science. The point is an obvious one. The research conducted by Griffiths and his collaborators focuses on folk applications of the term "innate." But such research will not do much to bolster the standard criticism, unless we have reason to suppose that innateness judgments in science deploy the very same conceptual resources. Yet, the studies outlined earlier are silent on this matter. Moreover, we ought not to assume that the same concept is operative merely because the THE COnCEPT OF InnATEnESS AS An OBjECT OF EMPIRICAL EnquIRY 511 same word, "innate," is being used in both contexts. After all, there are a great many examples of words that express quite different concepts in folk and scientific contexts. "Heat," "weight" and "velocity" come readily to mind (Carey 1992). In which case, even if the earlier studies established the tonkishness of the folk innateness concept – which they do not – this alone would do little to support the contention that scientific usage is similarly problematic. One obvious question, then, is whether scientists deploy the same concept of innateness as the folk? In Section 35.5, I focus on this issue. But first I need to describe another strand of research on folk innateness judgments – this time from work by josh Knobe and Richard Samuels (Knobe and Samuels 2013). 35.4 More on Folk Innateness judgments In their work on folk innateness judgments Knobe and Samuels focused primarily on two questions: • To what extent do learning theoretic considerations influence folk innateness judgments? • Are folk innateness judgments influenced by value judgments? Both questions were motivated, in large measure, by what they saw as central aspects of the way in which cognitive scientists use the concept of innateness. Specifically, on the basis of an assessment of published research on innateness hypotheses, they argued that learning theoretic considerations appear very important to whether cognitive scientists count a trait as innate, but that considerations of value appear, on the face of it, to exert little or no influence. As such, Knobe and Samuels' work on folk judgments was a preliminary to considering whether scientists in the relevant fields deploy a folk concept of innateness or some distinctly scientific one. 35.4.1 Learning and Folk Innateness Judgments It is widely supposed in cognitive science and allied disciplines that there is an important connection between innateness and learning. Indeed some very influential cognitive scientists go so far as to maintain that the two concepts are inter‐defined – that innate traits just are those that are not the output of learning processes (Carey 2010). But even if this claim about the definition of innateness is untrue, it is still the case that in published research it is invariably assumed that a trait will not count as innate, if an organism acquires it by perceiving its environment and engaging in straightforward learning. Within cognitive science, then, it appears to be no more than a banal truism that learned traits are not innate. Should we expect folk innateness judgments to conform to this banal truism? If the three‐ f eature hypothesis is correct, then we should not. More precisely, the hypothesis predicts that when all three features are held constant, folk innateness judgments should not be sensitive to the distinction between learned and non‐learned capacities. In order to test this prediction, Knobe and Samuels presented vignettes to 60 Yale students that were based on the "bird" vignettes used by Griffiths and his collaborators. But rather than varying the fixity, typicality or functionality of the trait, participants were instead randomly assigned to a "learning condition" in which the trait was said to have been learned or to a "n euroscience condition" in which the trait was described as the product of a "brute casual" process. Participants in the learning condition received the following vignette: Bird navigation is one of the most intensively studied aspects of animal behavior. Since the 1950s scientists have investigated in great detail the processes by which birds develop the ability to navigate. RichaRd SamuelS 512 The Alder Flycatcher (Empidonax alnorum) is a migratory neo‐tropical bird that breeds in southern Canada and the northern uSA. Studies of the Alder Flycatcher show that, like many birds, they have the ability to use the sun as a "celestial compass." That is, they are able to combine information about the sun's position and the time of day, in order to determine direction of flight. Though this ability to navigate by the sun develops rapidly in fledgling Flycatcher, studies have shown that acquiring the ability requires approximately four hours visual experience in direct sunlight. This is required in order to learn the relationship between sun position and time of day, which is crucial to the operation of the bird's navigation system. As a matter of fact, virtually all Alder Flycatcher experience at least four hours of direct sunlight, and so virtually all members of the species develop the ability to navigate by the sun. Participants in the neuroscience condition received a vignette that was exactly the same except that this phrase "learn the relationship between sun position and time of day" in the third paragraph was replaced with "activate a photosensitive region of the brain, called the suprachiasmic nucleus." All participants were then asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement: "navigation in the Alder Flycatcher is innate." Answers were recorded on a scale from 1 ("d isagree") to 7 ("agree"). The results were exactly what one would predict if the three‐feature theory were correct. In other words, there was no significant difference between participants' responses in the learning condition (M = 4.7, SD = 1.9), and the neuroscience condition (M = 5.1, SD = 2.0). But if this is so – if people exhibit insensitivity to learning‐theoretic considerations – why does scientific research that deploys the concept of innateness invariably conform to the truism that learned traits are not innate? We return to this issue in Section 35.5. 35.4.2 Value and Folk Innateness Judgments As mentioned earlier, considerations of value appear to exert little or no influence in which traits are claimed by cognitive scientists to be innate. Yet over the past decade or so, there has been a steady accumulation of research suggesting that value judgments exert a surprisingly large influence on ordinary folk thought about apparently straightforwardly factual matters. To take one example, consider the way that people ordinarily decide whether an agent has performed a behavior "intentionally." It might initially appear that people's answers should be determined entirely by their beliefs about the agent's mental states (what she believes, what she wants, etc.). But a series of studies appear to indicate that something more is actually involved. People's intuitions about whether a behavior was performed intentionally can actually be influenced by their value judgments (Ditto, Pizarro, and Tannenbaum 2009; Knobe 2003; nichols and ulatowski 2007, Cova this volume; but see Machery 2006). Related effects have been observed for people's use of numerous other concepts, including the concepts of causation (Alicke 2000; Hitchcock and Knobe 2009; Livengood and Rose this volume), knowledge (Beebe and Buckwalter 2010; Beebe this volume), freedom (Phillips and Knobe 2009; Young and Phillips 2011; Chan et al. this volume) and the distinction between doing and allowing (Cushman, Knobe, and Sinnott‐ Armstrong 2008). These various effects appear to be deeply similar, and it seems plausible that they all have the same underlying cause (Knobe 2010). Against this background, Knobe and Samuels sought to determine whether value judgments exert a similar influence on folk innateness judgments. In one experiment, participants were assigned either to an "abilities condition" or to a "disabilities condition." Each participant then read one or the other version of the following vignette: A baby was born with a rare genetic condition. The doctors told the baby's parents: "If this baby drinks its mother's milk during its first two weeks of life, it will grow up to have extraordinary mental abilities that make it able to solve very complicated math problems [serious psychological disabilities THE COnCEPT OF InnATEnESS AS An OBjECT OF EMPIRICAL EnquIRY 513 that make it unable to solve even very simple math problems]. However, if you instead give it this expensive formula we sometimes use, it won't develop the extraordinary abilities and will just be normal." The parents said: "We have decided not to give the baby the expensive formula. We will just be feeding it with its mother's milk." As expected, the baby grew up to have extraordinary mental abilities that made it able to solve very complicated math problems [serious psychological disabilities that make it unable to solve even very simple math problems]. After reading this vignette, participants were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the sentence: "The baby's extraordinary mental abilities [psychological disabilities] were innate." Participants marked their answer on a scale from 1 ("disagree") to 7 ("agree"). Participants gave higher innateness ratings when the parents' action led to special abilities (M = 4.7, SD = 1.9) than when it led to disabilities (M = 3.3, SD = 1.7). Although these results are suggestive of the claim that innateness judgments are influenced by value judgments, taken in isolation, this result in clearly consistent with alternative interpretations. For example, people might simply believe that abilities (or functional traits) are more likely to be innate than disabilities are. To rule out this kind of alternative interpretation, Knobe and Samuels conducted a second study, in which participants were given no information about the nature of the trait itself. Instead they were told only about the genetic and environmental factors that caused the trait to arise. The prediction then was that people would be more inclined to regard the trait as innate when the environmental factors were morally good than when they were morally bad. Twenty students volunteered to fill out a questionnaire in the Yale university dining hall in exchange for $1. Participants were assigned either to the decent treatment condition or to the bad treatment condition. Each participant then read one or the other version of the following vignette: Imagine that scientists are trying to understand how people develop a particular trait, which they have come to call Trait X. The scientists have discovered a surprising fact about people's genes. They have discovered that people's genes work in such a way that almost everyone will end up developing Trait X. In fact, it turns out that children develop Trait X as long as their parents sometimes offer them at least a decent level of treatment [treat them badly]. now, just about everyone's parents offer them at least a decent level of treatment [treat them badly] at least sometimes. So, given the way people's genes work, just about everyone actually does develop Trait X. After reading this vignette, participants were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the s entence: "Trait X is innate." Participants marked their answer on a scale from 1 ("disagree") to 7 ("agree"). As predicted by Knobe and Samuels, participants were more inclined to rate the trait as innate when it was the product of being treated decently (M = 4.6, SD = 1.9) than when it was the product of being treated badly (M = 2.7, SD = 1.9). This result lends further support to the view that people's value judgments are impacting their intuitions about innateness. 35.5 Innateness judgments among Scientists So far we have considered the issue of how naïve subjects deploy the concept of innateness. An obvious next question to ask is whether scientific disciplines that invoke a concept of innateness deploy a distinctively scientific concept or merely redeploy the folk one. RichaRd SamuelS 514 35.5.1 Hypotheses notice that the pattern of intuitions outlined in Section 35.4 – that moral considerations influence folk innateness judgments but that learning‐theoretic considerations do not – is quite antithetical to what one should expect to find in systematic scientific inquiry. The lack of influence exerted by learning‐theoretic considerations is surprising because, as already noted, it is no more than a banal truism in the relevant sciences that learned traits are not innate. Indeed, to our knowledge, no hypothesis in psychology – or any related science, for that matter – has ever p osited traits that are both innate and learned. The influence exerted by values on folk innateness judgments is similarly antithetical to what one would expect to find in systematic scientific inquiry. There are, of course, many difficult q uestions about the role of value judgments in scientific inquiry, and different scientists may adopt different views about these questions (Douglas 2009). nevertheless, it is doubtful that s cientists would accept the kind of pattern we find in folk intuitions about innateness. Specifically, it seems remarkable that two scientists who agreed on all the purely descriptive facts in a given case, and disagreed only about their moral significance, should end up disagreeing about any purely scientific issue. Certainly, there are no examples of innateness hypotheses from recent s cience that exhibit this pattern. Assuming that this is so, what cognitive processes might explain these departures in a scientific context from the folk innateness judgments elicited in the studies outlined earlier? Three main hypotheses come to mind: Overwriting: Scientific training leads to the elimination of the folk concept of innateness and its replacement by a scientific concept. Among other things, this new concept would emphasize the distinction between learned and non‐learned capacities, and it would have no place for the sorts of value considerations outlined earlier. Conceptual Addition: More scientific patterns of innateness judgments depend in part on the acquisition of a new scientific concept, but without the loss of the old one. On this view, s cientists hold onto the folk concept but also acquire a scientific one that they use under appropriate conditions – such as those that obtain when doing science. Both of these proposals assume some augmentation of the scientist's conceptual resources – presumably as a result of appropriate professional training. But there is a third option, which Knobe and Samuels called the filtering hypothesis: Filtering: Scientists never acquire a distinctively scientific concept of innateness. Instead they continue to use the folk concept. However, in arriving at judgments about individual cases scientists do not rely merely have the innateness concept; they also have certain general principles about which considerations are relevant to innateness judgments. If they see that a pattern of judgments would violate these general principles, this pattern of judgments will be "filtered out" and a different pattern will be used in its place. So, for example, on the filtering hypothesis, scientists never acquire a new concept of innateness in which value judgments play no role. Rather, they continue to have a concept in which value judgments do play some role, but they also adhere to a general principle that says "Do not allow your judgments about innateness to be affected by your value judgments." When they see explicitly that their judgments are violating this principle, they reject these judgments and try to answer the question in a way that shows no influence of values. 35.5.2 Predictions notice that the above three hypotheses make quite different predictions about how the patterns of judgments exhibited by folk and scientists in the relevant fields. If the overwriting hypothesis is true, we should expect scientists in the relevant fields only to exhibit a pattern of innateness THE COnCEPT OF InnATEnESS AS An OBjECT OF EMPIRICAL EnquIRY 515 judgments in which learning‐theoretic considerations exert an influence and moral ones do not. If the conceptual addition hypothesis is correct, we should expect a systematic difference b etween folk innateness judgments and those make by scientists in the relevant disciplines. Scientists might sometimes use the folk innateness concept, and so exhibit the folk pattern of judgments. But when they have time to reflect carefully on a given case and use their scientific approach (while avoiding the influence of their folk concept), we should expect them to make innateness judgments that are sensitive to learning‐theoretic considerations, but not moral ones. In contrast, the folk should never exhibit this pattern of sensitivity and insensitivity since, by assumption, they lack the distinct and purely scientific concept of innateness. Finally, if the filtering hypothesis is correct, we should expect scientists' patterns of innateness judgments to sometimes be the same as the folk pattern, and sometimes to exhibit the characteristic scientific pattern. In this regard, it makes the same predictions as the conceptual addition hypothesis. Where the two hypotheses diverge, however, is in their predictions about folk judgments. In contrast to the conceptual addition hypothesis, which predicts that folk will not manifest the scientific pattern, the filtering hypothesis allows that non‐specialists may, under appropriate circumstances, exhibit the characteristic pattern of judgments. This is because the filtering hypothesis does not presuppose that the scientific pattern in innateness judgments results from the acquisition of special scientific concepts or knowledge. Instead it is wholly compatible with the idea that the relevant filtering processes are available to scientists and non‐scientists alike. In view of this, if it were to turn out that people with no relevant scientific training also exhibit the distinctively scientific pattern of judgment, we would have reason to prefer filtering to conceptual addition. 35.5.3 Experiments In order to adjudicate between these competing hypotheses, Knobe and Samuels conducted a large online questionnaire study. Participants were recruited from two very different populations. The first population was a sample of researchers actively working in fields that used the concept of innateness – for example, psychology, linguistics, and biology. The second population – the non‐researchers – was composed of people who might be generally scientifically literate but who had no special training in disciplines which deploy the concept of innateness. Within each of these groups, we compared the judgments participants made when they were focusing on individual cases to the judgments they made when they were focusing more on general principles. In particular, we presented the kinds of vignettes outlined in Section 35.3, but used the "joint‐separate" technique (Hsee 1996). Participants were assigned to either a case‐based condition in which they received just one condition from each of the pairs of cases in a between‐ subject design, or they were assigned to a principled condition in which they received both versions and were asked explicitly whether there was any relevant difference between the two. This latter way of presenting the question tends to make participants think in a more principled way about which considerations are and are not relevant; and this, we supposed, might allow us to discriminate between the filtering and conceptual addition hypotheses by facilitating whatever tendency there might be for participants to filter out their intuitive responses. Procedure. Each participant received, in random order, the three questions outlined earlier: the Mother's Milk question, the Trait X question, and the Learning question. Each participant was assigned either to the case‐based condition or to the principled condition. Participants in the case‐based condition received each of the questions in precisely the same form used in the earlier experiments. Hence, for each question, each participant was randomly assigned to receive one or the other condition. By contrast, participants in the principled condition received two versions of each vignette in a within‐ subject design. Within each vignette type, the order of the two versions was counterbalanced. RichaRd SamuelS 516 Participants in the principled condition were told at the outset that the two versions differed only in a few words (which were underlined for easy identification) and that we specifically wanted to know whether they thought that this difference was relevant to whether the trait was innate. After reading each version, they were asked to rate their agreement with the statement about innateness for that version. Finally, after getting an innateness rating for each statement, they were given a few lines to "explain why the difference between the two passages either was or was not relevant to the question of innateness." Finally, participants were asked whether they were working in philosophical or scientific research. Those who answered yes to this question were then asked to indicate an area of specialization from the options: "psychology," "genetics," "linguistics," "biology" and "other." Each researcher was free to classify herself as falling into multiple categories. Results. Out of a total of 6549 participants who completed the entire questionnaire 1506 indicated that they were researchers. More specifically, there were 350 psychologists, 89 geneticists, 158 linguists, 435 biologists, 221 philosophers and 557 who indicated that they fell in some other category. Means and standard deviations for each condition are displayed in Table 35.1. Mother's Milk: In the case‐based version, people gave higher ratings in the abilities condition (M = 4.56) than in the disabilities condition (M = 3.90). In the principled version, there was only a small difference between ratings for the abilities condition (M = 4.62) and the disabilities condition (M = 4.33), but because of the very large sample size, this small difference was statistically significant. In short: in the principled condition the effect of value – enhanced ability as opposed to disability – was substantially reduced. But equally importantly for our purposes, the populations of researchers and non‐researchers behaved in much the same manner. In the case‐based condition both groups were equally prone to the influence of value; and in the principled condition, the influence of value was similarly reduced. Trait X: In the case‐based version, we again found that people gave higher ratings in the decent treatment condition (M = 4.10) than in the bad treatment condition (M = 3.48. In the principled version, this difference was small (3.92–3.79), but still significant. In short: in the principled condition the effect of value was substantially reduced. But equally importantly, the populations of researchers and non‐researchers behaved in much the same manner. As with the Mother's Milk question, in the case‐based condition both groups were equally prone to the influence of value; and in the principled condition, the influence of value was similarly reduced. Learning: In the case‐based version, the difference between ratings for the learning condition (M = 4.61) and the neuroscience condition (M = 4.75) was quite small, but still significant. In the principled condition, there was a more substantial difference between the learning condition (M = 4.2) and the neuroscience condition (M = 5.3). Moreover, and equally importantly, both the researcher and non‐researcher populations exhibited much the same pattern. That is, in the case‐based condition neither group's judgments were much influenced by learning‐theoretic considerations, whereas in the principled condition learning‐theoretic considerations exerted a far more substantial influence. Implications. What implications do these results have for the relative plausibility of the three hypotheses outlined in Section 35.5.1? First, the data count against the overwrite hypothesis. On this hypothesis, specialist researchers should no longer have any vestige of the folk concept and should, therefore, show the distinctively scientific pattern of judgments, even in the case‐based condition. Yet this is not what happens. Rather it is only in the principled condition that researchers' innateness judgments are influenced learning‐theoretic considerations and not moral ones. THE COnCEPT OF InnATEnESS AS An OBjECT OF EMPIRICAL EnquIRY 517 Second, the data suggest that the conceptual addition hypothesis is implausible. On this h ypothesis specialized scientific training is required for the acquisition of new conceptual resources that non‐researcher simply do not have. In which case, we should expect researchers to differ from non‐researchers in the principled condition. But this is not what the data suggest. Rather, researchers and non‐researchers behave alike in both conditions. This leaves the filtering hypothesis as the one best supported. Indeed, the results are precisely what one would expect if the filtering hypothesis were true. Within the case‐based condition, both ordinary folk and trained scientists are influenced by moral considerations. However, when the experimental stimuli are designed in such a way that participants become explicitly aware that the question is about an influence of value considerations they filter out the result of their usual intuition and instead conclude that this factor is not relevant. (Thus, participants in the principled condition were both less inclined to attribute innateness in morally good cases and more inclined to attribute innateness in morally bad cases.) Similarly, people's intuitions are sometimes insensitive to the distinction between learned and non‐learned traits, but when they see explicitly that the question targets this distinction, they adjust their usual intuitions and c onclude that the distinction is a relevant one. Overall, then, the present results suggest that s cientists have not replaced or supplemented the folk concept innateness with a purely scientific one. Instead, it seems that scientists continue to use the folk concept but that, on reflection, they reject those aspects of the concept that they deem unhelpful in scientific research. 35.6 Conclusion In this chapter I first set out the evidence for the three‐feature account of folk innateness judgments. Second, I argued that this evidence fails to bolster the standard criticism of the innateness concept. Finally, I presented evidence which supports a filtering hypothesis about scientific innateness judgments, and thereby supports one presupposition of the standard criticism – namely that scientists use the same folk innateness concept that non‐scientists use. This may appear to be bad news for the role of innateness concept in the sciences. After all, if the folk concept is problematic, then so too is the one that figures in scientific innateness judgments. Even so, the filtering hypothesis also points in the direction of an oft‐neglected possibility. Problematic concepts can be used for beneficial theoretical and explanatory purposes in the sciences. This is plausibly true of such concepts as gene, species, and element; and as Fiona Cowie recently argued, the same may be true of the innateness concept as well (Cowie 2009). The filtering hypothesis Table 35.1 Descriptive Statistics for Experiment Comparing Scientist and non‐Scientist Innateness judgments Case‐based Principled Folk Researchers Folk Researchers Mother's Milk Ability 4.56 (2.27) 4.51 (2.15) 4.67 (2.35) 4.51 (2.22) Disability 3.95 (2.38) 3.72 (2.30) 4.36 (2.39) 4.26 (2.26) Trait X Decent 4.13 (2.32) 4.09 (2.29) 4.08 (2.38) 3.80 (2.32) Bad 3.40 (2.27) 3.65 (2.26) 3.94 (2.37) 3.70 (2.31) Learning neuroscience 5.02 (2.18) 4.66 (2.20) 5.34 (2.12) 5.19 (2.08) Learning 4.55 (2.34) 4.78 (2.31) 4.16 (2.39) 4.13 (2.33) Inference 4.76 (2.22) 4.73 (2.19) n/A n/A RichaRd SamuelS 518 suggests one kind of process which may facilitate the beneficial use of problematic concepts in general, and the folk innateness concept, in particular. under the appropriate circumstances – when we have time to reflect, and the informational context is structured in a manner that facilitates attention to relevant factors and salient general principles – the deleterious inferential effects of a concept can be filtered out and substituted by preferable inferential patterns. 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i ii 2 Perpustakaan Nasional: Katalog Dalam terbitan (KDT) Hudjolly (Editor) Nalar dan Destinasi/Hudjolly. Cet.1.-Yogyakarta:Re-Kreasi,2010. 209 hlm; 14,5cm __________________ISBN 978-602-97554-0-4 Nalar dan Destinasi Oleh: Hudjolly, M.Phil., dkk Desain sampul : Grafika, Kebumen Percetakan : Grafika printing Penerbit : Re-Kreasi. Perum Harmoni Grahatama kav A-3, Redjowinangun, Jln Wonosari Km 5, Yogyakarta 3 DAFTAR ISI Daftar isi............................................................................................................1 Epilog.................................................................................................................4 1. Pengantar ........................................................................................................11 Filsafat Simbol dalam Pandangan Hidup Orang Papua dan Jawa: Dari Simbolisme Menuju Eksistansialisme'. Oleh Hudjolly.,M.Phil.....................................................................................11 Pendahuluan.....................................................................................................11 Pendekatan Simbol .........................................................................................15 Fisiologi Masyarakat Papua dan Jawa ............................................................19 Filsafat Simbol: Dari Simbol menuju Eksistansialisme..................................34 Simbol Personal ..............................................................................................35 Simbol Publik .................................................................................................41 Penutup: Sebuah catatan .................................................................................46 2. Pengantar .......................................................................................................49 Telaah Metafisik Upacara Kasada: Nalar Mitologi dalam Homo Religious Masyarakat Tengger. Oleh Dr (cand) Muhammad Anas.,M.Phil...................50 Proses Pembentukan Sistem Budaya dan Religi.............................................50 Upacara Keagamaan Lokal': Hari Raya Kasada............................................54 Upacara Kasada: ―Yang Sakral‖ (―real‖) dan ―Yang Profan‖ (―tidak real‖)................................................................................................................61 Sakralisasi Alam dan Ruang............................................................................61 Sakralitas Waktu..............................................................................................63 Tradisi, Perjalanan Melacak Yang Transenden...............................................64 Sistem Simbol dalam Nalar Kearifan Dukun................................................. 68 Eksistensi Mitos dan Metafisika Masyarakat Tengger....................................70 Identitas Lokal yang Tetap Permanen.............................................................74 Catatan Kritis dan Kesimpulan........................................................................77 3. Pengantar.........................................................................................................81 Kosmologi Orang Baduy: Sistem Opat Buana'. Oleh: Arip Senjaya, M.Phil.............................................................................82 Identitas Nusantara..........................................................................................82 Kosmologi Masyarakat Baduy........................................................................83 Baduy: Pergulatan Kultural Adminsitratif .....................................................84 Cara Pandang terhadap Manusia.....................................................................85 Sistem Opat Buana': Asal muasal Alam Semesta..........................................88 Cara Pandang Baduy terhadap Tuhan'...........................................................91 4. Pengantar.........................................................................................................95 4 Filsafat Hukum Manusia Bugis dan Bali. Oleh Ramli Semawi.,M.Hum........96 Pendahuluan.....................................................................................................96 Konsep Hukum Masyarakat Bali dan Bugis: Perbandingan singkat...............98 Bali dan Bugis: Sebuah Catatan....................................................................110 5. Pengantar.......................................................................................................114 Manusia Sunda: Penelusuran Histori dan Identitas. Oleh Iffan Ahmad G., M.Phil........................................................................115 Istilah Sunda dan Jawa Barat.........................................................................115 Siapa Itu Orang Sunda?.................................................................................117 Aspek Sejarah Sunda.....................................................................................120 Aspek Struktur Sosial Masyarakat Sunda......................................................127 Penutup..........................................................................................................135 6. Pengantar.......................................................................................................138 Gaukang dan Keraton: Strategi Kekuasaan. Oleh Hudjolly.,M.Phil dan Marjaka M.,Phil ....................................................................................139 Pola Kekuasaan Masyarakat Bugis...............................................................139 Simbol Kekuasaan Bugis: Ajjoareng dan Gaukang......................................144 Keraton dan Gaukang: Titik Idiom Sentralitas Simbolisme Nalar Kekuasaan dalam Dua Tradisi.......................................................................................149 7. Pengantar ......................................................................................................156 Analitika Hermeneutis dalam Budaya Pakeliran. Oleh Hudjolly.,M.Phil...................................................................................157 Pendahuluan..................................................................................................157 Proses Hermeunetika.....................................................................................160 Hubungan Konsep Nyata, Konsep Formal dengan Proposisi........................165 8. Pengantar.......................................................................................................175 Tat Twan Asi sebagai Semiotika Kebudayaan Masyarakat Bali Oleh Abdurahman Kader...............................................................................175 Latar Belakang...............................................................................................175 Hubungan Interhumanitas Orang Bali...........................................................176 Hubungan Manusia dengan Alam.................................................................177 Hubungan Manusia dengan Mahluk Gaib.....................................................186 5 Epilog Penggunaan data etnografi untuk memaparkan kebudayaan nusantara, barangkali bahasa sederhana yang dapat menggambarkan adalah „Kebo nusu gudel‟, sebuah peribahasa yang relevan dengan harfiah buku ini. Sebab filsafat yang sejatinya merupakan Induk dari semua ilmu, demi istilah baru filsafat nusantara' harus berpijak pada paparan yang bersifat antropologis sebagaimana isi berbagai tulisan dalam buku ini. Ya, filsafat sebagai sebuah bidang studi, mesti nusu, menyusu pada salah satu anak terbarunya, antropologi, sehingga memberikan jalan bagi kemungkinan melihat khazanah nusantara, berbagai pernik kebudayaan lokal nusantara, sebagai mozaik filsafat dunia. Tetapi mungkinkah? Peribahasa' di atas menggambarkan sebuah reduksi-sebagaimana filsafat nusantara adalah reduksi besar-besaran-dari reformulasi filsafat kebudayaan yang bertitik tolak pada segala hasil produk karsa, pemikiran atau akal manusia secara global yang tidak terbatas pada regionitas, pada hal-hal yang bersifat tradisi (antropologi budaya). Sedangkan filsafat nusantara sudah menyiratkan suatu batas regionitas sekaligus menegaskan distingsi kebudayaan berdasarkan ragam tradisi. Melalui reduksi itu, filsafat nusantara hendak berbicara soal jejak' etnografis yang khas pada masyarakat tertentu. Dengan demikian, filsafat nusantara harus menjelaskan status dirinya lebih dahulu di antara antropologi budaya dan filsafat kebudayaan. Menurut Kusumohamidjojo (2009:26-27) antropologi budaya berpijak pada pendekatan induktif melalui jalan mengobservasi, melakukan pendataan, mencatat, mengelompokan, mencari dan menghubungkan antar data etnografis dalam suatu kerangka dan konsep-konsep yang koheren, sedangkan filsafat kebudayaan melakukan jalan deduktif untuk mendekati fenomen manusia dan segala produk kebudayaannya (akal dan pemikiran). Dua kutub pendekatan tersebut menjelaskan betapa riskan' meletakkan filsafat nusantara yang bekerja memanfaatkan data antropologi budaya sekaligus menggunakan potret manusia sebagai fenomen dalam status produk dan produsen (subjek sekaligus objek) sampai akar terdalamnya. 6 Jika yang dilakukan filsafat nusantara' adalah bagaimana interpretasi falsafati (interpretasi ilmiah) tradisi-tradisi maka ia akan mengarah pada pembentukan teoriteori kebudayaan, dan menjadi studi kebudayaan. Satu keunggulan interpretasi falsafati adalah kemampuannya melepaskan diri dari jerat empirisme dalam studi tentang kebudayaan manusia, namun kemampuan tersebut sejatinya menjadi wilayah filsafat kebudayaan. Dan satu kelemahannya ialah tidak memiliki rangka operasional aplikatif dari apa yang telah dirumuskannya tanpa meminjam disiplin lain. Apalagi jika jalan yang dipakai filsafat nusantara adalah menggiring berjuta pernik tradisi hanya untuk dihubungkan dan diterangkan secara ilmiah (sistematis-filsafati) berdasar pemikiran filsafat atau pemikiran tokoh filsafat tertentu, maka ia menjadi blunder bagi dirinya dan membatasi filsafat nusantara sebatas fungsi mufasir', manafsirkan makna atau penyamaan terhadap pandangan-pandangan barat yang sudah ada. Sebab, selalu saja ada hal yang sama atau berlawanan atau bahkan baru, (dalam filsafat dunia vis a vis filsafat nusantara) semisal konsep kekuasaan Marxis, kuasa Michael Foucault terhadap konsep kekuasaan bangsa Bugis-Makassar sebagaimana dipaparkan pada tulisan kecil di sini. Contoh lain, tentang simbolisme orang Papua yang melampaui sistem eksistansialisme Jean Paul Sartre. Namun, predikat simbolisme orang Papua' dan filsafat Kekuasaan orang Bugis-Makassar', bahkan simbolisme Jawa' justru tidak bisa terkuak manakala kebudayaan berdiri sendiri sebagai sebuah bidang ilmu 'terapan'. Dari titik ini baru sangat mahfum dipahami kenapa kebudayaan' terus dipertahankan, diproduksi oleh masyarakat Papua, Bugis, Jawa, dan semua rumpun masyarakat, karena semua kebudayaan menunjukkan kemengadaan manusia yang memproduksi kebudayaan tersebut. Sementara itu, kondisi filsafat yang secara umum, melulu berkutat pada alam pemikiran, dalam satu hal, tidak memiliki ketajaman kritis mentransfer fenomena sosial, struktur dan perilaku sosial masyarakat ke dalam sistem sosial, yang dapat dilakukan adalah pemindahan narasi penggubahan realitas ke bahasa baru kemudian dirantingkan dan diproduksi. Sehingga dibutuhkan daya operasional disiplin 7 kebudayaan beserta sub-sub kelasnya (antropologi, sosiologi, etnografi, filologi, sejarah) yang telah berhasil memotret berbagai khazanah mutiara terpendam tradisitradisi di nusantara menjadi naskah-naskah' yang baru bisa ditelan oleh filsafat sebagai bidang ilmu. Itupun tidak semua pisau ilmu kefilsafatan (bukan filsafat itu sendiri) mampu membongkar konstruksi filosofis metodis kebudayaan nusantara menjadi postulat falsafati, dan saya sendiri menyadari bahwa beberapa tulisan di sini masih mengalami ambiguitas posisi diantara ranah filsafat kebudayaan dan antropologi budaya. Namun, ada nilai minimal yang mencoba diangkat yakni bagaimana semua artefak hasil pemikiran dan akal manusia itu (tradisi) yang dipikirkan bekerja dalam suatu nalar tertentu. Dengan cara itu, barulah ia memasuki lingkup berfilsafat'. Secara akademik, usaha mempertemukan (ber)-filsafat (nusantara) melalui antropologi budaya ternyata tidak mudah, setidaknya dua hari workshop yang digelar oleh Laboratorium Filsafat Nusantara' nyaris tidak menghasilkan postulat dalam kerangka metodologi konstruktif-taktis untuk membangun sistem operasional ilmu baru' bertajuk Filsafat Nusantara. Bahkan tidak hanya sekali workshop semacam itu digelar, sudah dua kali dalam tahun akhir 2008 lalu dan sekitar 2007 silam. Beberapa pembicara antara lain Prof. Dr. PM Laksana, maestro antropologi dari Pusat Studi Asia Pasifik, Dr. Argo Triwikromo (antropolog), Dr. Arqom Kuswanjono (Filsafat Kontemporer), Dr Joko Siswanto (Metafisika) Dr. M. Mukhtasyar Syamsuddin (Dekan Fakultas Filsafat UGM) dan beberapa nama lain, berada dalam arus pemikiran yang sukar' dipertemukan meskipun ada benang merah' yang nampak jelas dalam pembicaraan beda waktu tersebut. Diantara benang merah itu adalah etnolinguistik dan hermeneutika ilmu sosial. Filsafat sebagai ilmu induk yang mengatasi semua ilmu pasti memiliki ruang untuk bidang' baru Filsafat Nusantara, tapi ia sendiri harus tertatih mencari bentuk formalnya di tengah kerumunan belantara filsafat nan sepi. Pertama, mencari pijakan karena dalam rumusan model filsafatnya, yang terkadang tak jauh dari derajat 8 mufasir', usaha-usaha mentafsirkan bentuk-bentuk parsial tradisi menjadi bahasa umum, atau ditelisik menggunakan kacamata pemikiran barat, bahkan lebih sempit lagi didekati hanya dalam satu perspektif pemikiran filusuf. Kedua, dari tiga model penulisan di atas, jangan-jangan yang terbangun justru sebuah usaha pembenaran akademik, atau (maksimal) pembenaran bagi tradisi-tradisi yang sedang ditantang untuk berkompetisi dalam percaturan global. Sehingga nama yang tepat adalah Nalar Nusantara, karena istilah filsafat' itu sendiri menuntut prasyarat tertentu seperti tersistematisir, tertulis, dan syarat lain selayaknya ilmu'. Barangkali tuntutan ke-global-an itulah yang menyebabkan kekayaan tradisi nalar nusantara yang khas mendadak dihadapkan dengan pemikiran barat dan dipaksa mengglobal. Kita terasing di negeri sendiri. Padahal yang harus kita sadari dalam nalar nusantara tersebut terdapat rumusan filosofis' yang memiliki sistematika tersendiri, barangkali bukan sistematika yang biasa kita kita kenal dalam dunia akademik filsafat sehingga predikat yang dilekatkan padanya selalu bersandar pada sistematika kaidah akademik'. Sebelum menyentuh sistematika yang tersembunyi dalam nalar nusantara untuk kemudian menghakiminya, kita mesti melakukan koreksi dan melihat ulang bagaimana sistematika, standar akademik' itu berdiri, diwariskan lantas direproduksi dari masa ke masa dari generasi ke generasi melintasi batas negara, misalnya nalar nusantara mengenal ke-mpu-an dan bukan ke-doktor-an. Maka sistem, pola, model, pendidikan' yang melatasi filsafat sebagaimana dikenal dalam dunia akademik Indonesia sekarang berbeda dengan sistem, pola, model, pendidikan' nalar nusantara yang tidak mengenal pembakuan institusional. Untuk merujuk nalar nusantara, Mpu Prapanca, Mpu Kanwa, Ranggawarsita hingga Sultan Agung adalah mozaik entri awal bagi filsafat nusantara yang equivalen dengan filsafat (bercorak) Jerman, Filsafat Perancis, Filsafat Cina, Filsafat Amerika. Filusuf Jerman, Perancis, Cina, India, Amerika, Inggris memiliki core tertentu yang dalam skala tertentu ikut mempengaruhi gaya berpikir, tradisi gramatikal, dan budaya sang filusuf dalam berfilsafat. 9 Demikian pula, filusuf nusantara itu memiliki sistem' filsafat tersendiri yang bukan dalam bahasa terbuka saat ini (karena perbedaan sistem pendidikan). Bahasa majas, gurindam, syair, tembang, simbol, ritual, adalah bahasa akademik'nalar nusantara yang tidak harus ditarik-digubah-lebih celaka diukurkan-kepada bahasa terbuka (deskripsional) sebagaimana lazim diajarkan di sekolah modern sebagai satusatunya model bahasa akademik yang sah saat ini. Terlepas dari pergumulan pikir di atas, beberapa tulisan berikut adalah sebuah refleksi awal', untuk melakukan intro atas nalar nusantara yang combaign dengan filsafat non nusantara. Sebagian tulisan ada yang berhasil menyampaikan sistematika khas' nalar nusantara, sebagian lagi adalah corak pendekatan-pendekatan yang bersifat komparatif semata dalam melihat nalar lokal dengan kacamata baca nalar filsafat akademik yang telah dimapankan. Tetapi jalan komparasi bukan tanpa alasan, menggunakan format komparasi merupakan usaha intelektual untuk menunjukkan bahwa dalam khazanah lokal itu sudah terdapat alur filsafat sebagaimana berkembang di Barat, hanya perlu dienkripsi agar kompatibel dibaca menggunakan software yang biasa kita pakai. Sebab software pikir masyarakat ialah perangkat lunak cara pikir budaya non nusantara, maka membaca nalar nusantara yang ditulis dalam format berbeda menjadi tidak terbaca, tidak akademik, njlimet, etnik, dan terkesan dipaksakan. Usaha penulisan ini dilakukan bukan dalam upaya justifikasi, apalagi menafsir kearifan lokal dengan paradigma yang sudah mapan. Bagaimanapun juga selalu ada celah dan kelemahan dalam suatu rumusan pemikiran yang merasa diri mapan. Demi keilmuan itu sendiri, yang diperlukan adalah kerelaan dan kerendahan hati untuk tidak mendewakan dan menjadikan sistem ilmu filsafat yang dikenal selama ini sebagai satu-satunya filsafat yang absah, hanya karena kita dibesarkan dalam budaya akademik seperti saat ini. File yang ditulis dalam format berbeda bukan berarti file tersebut tidak bisa dibaca, salah, tetapi perangkat lunak yang kita gunakan itulah yang 10 mesti kompatibel untuk membaca file-file nusantara dalam format exe, docx, mpeg, rmvb, avi, flv‟, dan seterusnya. Apabila diberi pertanyaan, manakah yang lebih eksis' antara rumusan pemikiran sebagaimana dikenal saat ini, yang berujud ratusan halaman buku, berjilidjilid dan dipelajari terus menerus tetapi tidak pernah riil di tangan para pembelajarnya, dibandingkan dengan pemikiran-tepatnya nalar-yang bagi para pembelajarnya bersifat „living‟, secara sadar diterima dan membatinkannya, tapi tidak pernah berwujud dalam lembar-lembar kertas?. Setidaknya ada beberapa argumen menjawab hal tersebut. Pertama, jika persoalannya ada pada apakah disistematisir atau tidak', ditulis atau tidak, disusun tematik atau tidak, akademik atau tidak, maka sudahkah pemahaman semacam itu ditilik ulang. Bagaimana dan kenapa term-term diatas menjadi otentik sebagai alat ukur'? Apakah kebenaran hanya terukur dari yang demikian itu, apakah di luar batasan itu tidak ada kebenaran, tidak ada ilmu pengetahuan yang mapan?. Seberapa banyak pemahaman, kesadaran dalam otak manusia bisa disistematisir, ditulis bahkan dalam mencerap hal-hal sepanjang hidupnya. Dan, jika hal-hal yang tidak ditulis, tidak disistematiskan lantas dianggap tidak ada dan tidak sah sebagai kebenaran, maka seberapa banyak kebenaran yang ada dalam benak kita?. Bahkan dalam banyak hal yang-sudah dilakukan secara otomatik seperti saat bangun tidur- akankah diterapkan sistematisasi seumpama akan membuka mata yang mana dulu?, kanan atau kiri dulu atau serentak atau perlahan-lahan?, turun dari tempat tidur dipikirkan kaki kanan atau kiri dulu?. Apa yang dikerjakan tersebut tidak disertai alur sistematika' tertentu, tetapi habit yang dalam enkripsi kebudayaan tertentu berujud tradisi, ritual, simbol. Sistematisasi sebagaimana berkembang saat ini bukan standar tunggal dan sakral. Kedua, dalam melihat local indigenous banyak cendekia terjebak pada latah intelektual sebagaimana terjadi dalam ilmu alam. Ketika science berhasil 11 merumuskan metode eksperimental, maka semua hal yang ada di bumi nusantara diperlakukan demikian. Buah nangka dilihat dengan eksperimen laboratorium untuk melihat kandungan apa yang ada di dalamnya. Kebiasaan semacam itu secara tidak sadar diadopsi oleh dunia ilmu filsafat (dan disiplin ilmu sosial lainnya). Menggunakan kacamata baca teori-teori barat yang mapan sebagai mikroskop formal untuk melihat semua fenomena budaya' di tanah air sebagaimana buah nangka diletakkan di laboratorium. Hasil test laborat ditemukan kandungan kimiawi buah nangka, lalu kita berharap di bawah kacamata teori mapan akan didapatkan rumusan kimiawi filsafat nusantara dalam kerangka ontologi, epistemologi, dan aksiologi. Barangkali pilot project‟ yang dipertunjukkan oleh Levi Strauss saat melakukan penelitian di suku-suku Indian dan Pierre Bourdieu saat melakukan penelitian di suku Kabyle Aljazair adalah segelintir contoh bagaimana mereka melihat ke-lokal-an tapi berhasil melahirkan rumusan filsafat strukturalisme dan rumusan habitus yang kini dikenal sebagai aliran filsafat (sosial). Itulah mekanisme kerja yang dapat dilakukan dalam menggubah bahasa terutup nalar nusantara menjadi filsafat nusantara sebagai bahasa terbuka. Ketiga, tidak semua teori-teori yang mapan itu dapat dipakai untuk melihat local indigenous, contohnya terminologi ruang publik. Bahwa kebenaran ada jika bisa direpresentasikan dalam ruang publik. Padahal ruang publik selalu dipengaruhi kekuasaan, kapital dan kesempatan akses. Ketika budaya (:tradisi) tidak mampu menembus ruang publik dengan sendirinya ia tidak ada, tidak pantas diakui. Kalaupun berhasil di-ruang publik-an maka harus mengalami rekayasa komunikasi' (lihat logika ruang publik Habermas). Tentu saja penjelasan atas masalah ini memerlukan pembahasan mendalam tersendiri. Keempat, salah satu kepastian dalam filsafat itu sendiri ialah ketiadaan kemapanan. Dari Yunani hingga Thomisme sampai kontemporer, postmo, masing-masing mengajukan dialektika' pemikiran-pemikiran. Tema apa itu substansi' saja mengalami dialog panjang semenjak Plato dan Aristoteles hingga berkembang ke 12 Kantian, Hegel sampai Whitehead. Demikian juga dalam metafisika', dialektika itu berkembang dari Yunani hingga deklarasi kematian metafisika barat oleh kaum dekonstruktif. Namun demikian bukan berarti tesis dialektika' juga terbukti benar. Dialektika hanya pilihan bahasa yang menggambarkan adanya pergumulan pemikiran, atau meminjam Kuhn ada paradigm shift dalam perjalanan nalar dunia. Nalar nusantara hanyalah salah satu bagian dari nalar-nalar dunia yang tidak tercover dalam sistematika nalar dunia' yang sudah banyak dieksplore filusuf. Kelima, berkaca dari Levi Strauss, Michel Foucault, Jurgen Habermas, Jacquas Derrida, Jean Boudrillard, Pierre Bourdieu, Paul Ricoeur pengalaman sosial mereka dalam dunia yang khas Eropa, Amerika, Perancis, Jerman, mempengaruhi corak pemikiran yang khas dalam sistem filsafatnya. Misalnya, mereka semua mengabaikan adanya rasa inside dalam diri manusia yakni: kerelaan, kejujuran, pengabdian, cinta, ikhlas, yang dominan hanyalah kecurigaan bahwa selalu ada skema kekuasaan, pemuasan hasrat, penonjolan diri, yang beroperasi dalam relasi-relasi budaya manusia. Sehingga sistem filsafat tokoh di atas layak disebut filsafat kecurigaan. Ketika genealogi pemikiran para filusuf kecurigaan itu mendadak dicabut dari latar historis-tradisi kelahirannya, diambil dari alur teori-teori bangunan filsafatnya saja, lantas dipakai secara teoritik untuk membedah indigenous di nusantara, apakah tidak ada persoalan? Apakah dijamin cocok?. Atau hanya cocok secara akademik, sesuai berdasarkan logika serba sistematik dan budaya tulis saja?. Distorsi dalam pembacaan nalar nusantara berpotensi menjadi sumber deviasi makna. Dalam perspektif nasionalisme, nuansa ke'lokal'an ini adalah perjalanan panjang mencari dan terus-menerus merumuskan jatidiri ancient bangsa sendiri, seolah kita hendak mengatakan-bukan sekedar berbuai dalam visi-bahwa corak pemikiran bangsa ini diilhami oleh local genius kita sendiri. Proses semacam itu, sekali lagi, hanya memberikan tafsir-tafsir atas indigenous, seperti nasib malang indigeneous Pancasila yang berusaha diberi tafsir-tafsir pemikiran falsafati ala kadarnya. Ketika Pancasila diterangkan dengan cara unik' nan khas dengan 13 pernyataan antara lain: ―masing-masing sila saling menjiwai dan mendasari‖, ―monopluralis‖, adalah sistem pernyataan yang menggambarkan ketiadaan pemikiran filosofis tentang Pancasila itu sendiri. Nyaris tidak ada pemikiran filsafat yang dibangun dari indigeneous Pancasila selain skematik penjelasan dalam alur ilmu filsafat. Lima ayat dalam Pancasila cukup ditinjau sepintas lalu dalam frame ontologis, epistemologi dan aksiologis, dan dengan tiga aspek itu serta merta sudah memenuhi syarat kajian berlebel Filsafat Pancasila‖. Menyitir perbincangan dengan Dr Matteo Mandairini, professor Filsafat Politic dari Quen Mary University di ujung tahun 2009, bahwa corak-corak lokal itu sangat menentukan karakter bangsa yang dibangun diatasnya. Pancasila adalah kelokalan, Pancasila memiliki kekhasan, dan ia berhasil merekatkan' nusantara, dan menentukan karakter bangsa yang dibangun di atasnya. Tetapi struktur Filsafat Pancasila seperti apa yang dihasilkan, teori-teori kebenaran mana yang lahir dari rahim postulat sistem Pancasila itu sendiri masih bersifat adaptasi pemikiran nun jauh di sana. Selayaknya kita familiar dengan khazanah pemikiran local genius yang masih berbentuk prosa, mitos, petitih, ungkapan dan di balik simbol-simbol yang tidak (harus) ditarik dalam pemikiran tokoh-tokoh filsafat sistematis (atau disistematisasikan nilai-nilainya sebagaimana dilakukan oleh bidang ilmu-ilmu sosial). Bentuk semacam itu adalah format enkripsi nalar nusantara, dan itulah perbedaan filsafat bangsa kita dengan Eropa Kontinental atau Amerika. Berkas pemikiran leluhur terenkripsi dalam suatu tradisi bahasa tertutup, tidak akademik', sedangkan pemikiran leluhur Eropa dan Amerika berwujud bahasa terbuka yang sistematik, berpredikat ilmu', sebagaimana kita lihat sekarang ini. Akhirnya, tulisan ini-sekiranya segala sesuatunya memungkinkan- memiliki maksud sebagai awal entri bagi upaya sistematisir', karena yang diterima dan diberi ruang untuk berdialog saat ini hanya hal-hal yang tersistematisir dan ilmiah saja, maka dari situlah akan dimulai sebagai entri sekaligus intro. Tujuannya sederhana: agar dapat mereguk air kelapa nusantara di balik kerasnya tempurung 14 mitos, berbalut sabut folklor, prosa, tembang, nan padat yang tidak harus dipecahkan dengan logika sistematika barat. Dengan demikian, dunia filsafat tanah air berhutang banyak pada Prof Dr. Heddy Shri Ahimsa Putra serta Dr. M.Mukhtasyar Syamsuddin yang mulai menyulut gagasan Filsafat Nusantara' sebagai bidang ranting ilmu filsafat mandiri, dan sebagian besar tulisan dalam editing ini adalah untuk memenuhi tantangan' Prof Heddy agar membedah filsafat nusantara melalui data antropologis yang telah tersedia. Jika Laboratorium Etika sebagai salah satu cabang kajian filsafat sudah mengibarkan bendera maka tiada mustahil Filsafat (nalar) Nusantara sebagai cabang baru filsafat mengambil jejak yang sama: merumuskan kenusantaraan melalui nalarnya sendiri dan berkontribusi pada bidang praktis. Untuk itu sumbang saran, kritik membangun yang disertai solusi dan kajian pikir sangat dinantikan keluarga besar komunitas peminat nalar nusantara atau local indegenous seperti Dr.(cand)Muhammad Annas., M.Phil, M Irfan., M.Phil, Hudjolly., M.Phil, Ramli Semawi.,M.Hum, Arip Senjaya., M.Phil; Dede Mulyanto, M.Phil.; Ari Abi Aufa M.Phil dan Abdurahman Kadeer . Mari kita mulai ‖dari nusantara untuk dunia‖. Yogyakarta,1 Maret 2009 (Hudjolly, Editor) 15 Simbol merupakan salah satu bahasa enkripsi yang dipakai dalam produk kebudayaan. Semua produk kebudayaan modern atau ancient memakai sarana simbol. Secara umum simbol-sebagaimana digunakan oleh masyarakat Papua dan Jawa-mengandung dua dimensi: simbol publik dan simbol personal. Bahasa simbol sebagai enkripsi pengetahuan masyarakat diproduksi untuk mempertahankan kelangsungan siklus pertukaran sosial. Bahasa simbol tidak sebatas pada pemakaian kumpulan tanda untuk menggambarkan kehadiran suatu objek yang lebih besar. Simbol pada masyarakat Papua dan Jawa digunakan sedemikian rupa sehingga efektif sebagai sarana survivalitas kelompok dan kekuasaan. Simbol memiliki kekuatan yang lebih besar dari makna semiotika yang dikandungnya karena simbol adalah personifikasi eksistensi (komunal dan individu), sehingga simbol layak dikatakan sebagai sebuah sistem filsafat yang living sekaligus melandasi segala output tradisi. Filsafat Simbol dalam Pandangan Hidup Orang Papua dan Jawa: 'Dari Simbolisme Menuju Eksistansialisme' Oleh: Hudjolly 1 Pendahuluan Tata hidup masyarakat berisi berbagai macam relasi yang berbeda satu sama lain, setiap relasi punya aturan kekhasan tersendiri. Relasi yang terjalin dalam masyarakat bisa dipecah dalam tiga relasi (bagi orang modern hanya mengakui dua relasi) yang setiap relasi memiliki subrelasi-subrelasi. 1 Hudjolly, Peneliti di Lembaga Penelitian STAI Bakti Negara Kab Tegal, Jurnalis dan Editorial writers, Redaktur desk opini SKU Harian Pagi Nirmala Post 16 Pertama, relasi antara satu (individu) anggota masyarakat dengan individu lain, relasi antara satu anggota masyarakat dengan kelompoknya atau keluarga, relasi antara satu kelompok dengan kelompok masyarakat lain. Kedua, relasi manusia dengan alam sekitarnya. Relasi antara manusia dengan alam sekitar bisa dipecah dalam beberapa subrelasi, antara lain: hubungan manusia dengan alam fisik, seperti tanah/lahan pertanian, laut atau sungai, hutan dan kebun. Hubungan manusia dengan hewan-hewan dan hubungan manusia dengan tetumbuhan. Dua jenis relasi tersebut merupakan hubungan yang paling banyak dan mudah teramati dari luar yang sampai saat ini masih terus berlanjut dalam tingkat dan perkembangan tertentu. Ketiga, suatu hubungan yang pada masa sekarang kerap terabaikan-padahal pada zaman sebelum sain positivistik berkembang hubungan tersebut sangat diperhatikan-yakni relasi antara manusia dengan dunia numinus seperti alam di luar manusia (gaib), dunia ruh, dunia dewa atau kekuatan adimanusia yang tetap dijaga dengan tatacara dan alasan tertentu. Hubungan manusia dalam bentuk peribadatan atau penyembahan dikategorikan dalam relasi ini. Selain menggunakan pengelompokan di atas, juga terdapat pengelompokan secara sederhana menjadi dua matra saja yang bersifat kompleks, karena di dalamnya terkandung sub-sub relasi. Matra pertama ialah matra fisik, yaitu hubungan manusia dengan semua benda atau wujud fisik sekitar yang bisa terinderai. Dunia hewan tumbuhan, alam, dan semua kategori yang bisa dicerap langsung oleh indera. Semua hubungan manusia dengan alam sekitar, baik sesama manusia, antara anggota masyarakat terhadap komunitasnya sendiri, antara kelompok dengan kelompok lain dikategorikan dalam matra fisik. Matra kedua ialah hubungan manusia dengan sistem kepercayaan atau keyakinan yang berkembang dalam benak manusia/masyarakat. Hubungan matra kedua lebih mirip sebagai hubungan personal antara manusia dengan sesuatu yang 17 diyakini, alam imajinal, dan dunia numinus. Instrumen pencerapan, sistem indera manusia tidak dapat mengenali secara fisik obyek-obyek dimaksud, yang biasanya secara singkat diberi lebel gaib', (supra) berkenaan dengan ruh atau alam ke-dewaan. Sebenarnya kosakata gaib dalam makna bahasa Indonesia sebagaimana dikenal khalayak kurang sesuai untuk menggambarkan kondisi tersebut. Pada setiap suku bangsa, selalu ada konsep mengenai tatacara membangun hubungan-hubungan setiap relasi. Secara luas relasi dapat disebut sebagai aktivitas komunikasi terhadap obyek-obyek relasional, baik alam, hewan, tumbuhan, manusia, masyarakat, alam gaib. Sangat kecil kemungkinan seorang manusia tidak melakukan hubungan apapun terhadap obyek lain baik di luar dirinya atau dalam dirinya sendiri, bahkan jika tinggal sendirian dalam hutan pun, ia masih tetap melakukan relasi. Sehingga kita bisa menyebut ada kewajiban' melakukan hubungan, dengan demikian relasi dapat disebut sebagai sifat alamiah manusia. Selanjutnya hubungan itu dapat dikatakan sadar atau tidak sadar. Lantaran sifat kealamiahan (yakni mengada dalam intelek tanpa pembuktian benar atau valid) itulah maka sistem atau tatacara hubungan yang diterapkan satu kelompok manusia dengan kelompok manusia lain sangat berbeda. Ada peluang kesamaan atau ada kemiripan bahkan bertolak belakang sekalipun. Terjadinya sistem relasional tersebut akibat kerja nalar manusia, yang disebabkan interaksi atau hanya aktivitas perabaan aktivitas pikiran saja yang disusun berdasarkan konsepsi sederhana. Setiap produk nalar dan pemikiran, apapun bentuknya adalah produk kebudayaan, karena kebudayaan meliputi semua houtput dari nalar dan pemikiran manusia (Hamidjojo, 2009:26). Dengan demikian relasi tersebut bersifat otentik. Relasi kemudian ditransfer, tercetak dalam sistem hidup, sistem tanda (bahasa) sesuai pemahaman konstruktor, yang membuat setiap relasi-dapat-berbeda-beda dan sangat beragam. Meskipun hasil cetak nalar relasi-relasi itu beragam, tetapi ada sistem identik yang dipakai dalam mencetak setiap nalar relasi semua suku bangsa 18 yakni penggunaan bahasa dalam level sederhana seperti penggunaan simbol sebagai tatacara pengungkapan, pewarisan pemahaman suatu sistem relasi. Cukup menarik kiranya sebuah pembahasan mengenai penggunaan sistem kode berupa simbol-simbol yang dianut (tradisi) oleh sebuah masyarakat. Bahasa pengungkapannya adalah bahasa simbolik, bukan bahasa deskripsional. Simbol digunakan sebagai mekanisme membangun relasi, terdapat di semua masyarakat, sebagaimana bahasa yang selalu ada pada setiap masyarakat modern'. Bahasa, simbol, dan segala macam aturan relasi itulah yang menarasikan' berbagai bentuk peradaban, kebudayaan, kepercayaan yang menjadi pandangan hidup masyarakat. Kompleksitas peradaban dan kebudayaan bisa berbeda-beda disebabkan perbedaan nalar pengetahuan konstruktor (dalam bentuk paling sederhana sekalipun), lingkungan hidup, kontak dengan budaya lain. Menurut Liliweri (2007:151) bahasa dapat dikategorikan sebagai unsur budaya yang berbentuk nonmaterial, selain nilai, norma dan kepercayaan. Pemahaman simbolis memiliki ciri utama berupa perajutan tanda nuansa, suasana, atau bagian-bagian realitas yang tidak sempat atau tidak mampu dirumuskan secara logis. Maka bahasa kode dipakai sebagai susunan simbol sekedar untuk membahasakan ruang-ruang yang melampaui pemetaan logis, rasionalitas, yang mensyaratkan sistematisasi runtut, clear and distinct, bersifat mengurai atau menganalisa yang cara kerjanya didasarkan pada dua hal yaitu pengelompokan dan kategorisasi. Penggunaan simbol dipakai untuk menyampaikan maksud rasa, citarasa, nuansa, nilai intrinsik, kondisi beyond logic. Seperti bahasa sastra yang sering menggunakan sistem simbol untuk menyampaikan maksud yang sukar diwakili oleh kalimat kategoris sederhana (Sutrisno, 2005:2). Namun demikian sistem simbol, bahasa simbolik tidak bisa hidup sendirian, ia hanya bisa eksis sebagai pelengkap sistem tanda (bahasa) secara umum. 19 Pendekatan Simbol Dalam tataran tertentu dari filsafat, simbol dapat diartikan sebagi sebuah sistem kode. Sebagaimana sistem tanda pada bahasa, maka kita bisa melanjutkan pada pertanyaan bagaimanakah sistem kode itu digunakan oleh suatu masyarakat, dan apakah ada kesamaan kode, kesamaan simbol atau justru berlawanannya penggunaan simbol-simbol. Pada pembahasan berikutnya akan terlihat menarik manakala simbol yang dianut suatu masyarakat disandingkan dengan sistem kode yang dianut masyarakat lain. Studi singkat ini menjatuhkan pilihannya pada masyarakat Jawa dan masyarakat Papua. Kenapa dua masyarakat tersebut dipilih, bukankah akan jelas menampakan perbedaan ? Ada beberapa alasan yang melatarinya, antara lain: 1. Dalam rentang sejarah nusantara, kontak dua kebudayaan tersebut dimungkinkan lebih kecil, sedikit sekali literatur yang menunjukkan adanya interaksi kebudayaan, kontak intensif antara peradaban dua masyarakat tersebut, merujuk pada catatan Slamet Mulyana (2007) semenjak zaman kerajaan Majapahit. Dibandingkan dengan masyarakat Borneo, Sumatera atau Makassar terhadap masyarakat Jawa, tiga masyarakat ini sudah melangsungkan komunikasi, kontak cukup lama. Bahkan Makassar dan Sumatera menjadi salah satu daerah kesatuan akibat ekspansi wilayah era Majapahit. Akibat ekspansi dan interaksi yang aktif pada dua kebudayaan itu menimbulkan kecenderungan inkulturasi-akulturasi, pencampuran budaya sampai proses imitasi pada level tertentu. Jika pada penggunaan sistem kode masyarakat tersebut terdapat kesamaan, posibilitasnya menjadi tinggi, lumrah (tetapi tidak sederhana karena menyangkut kesediaan satu identitas menerima sistem identitas lain) namun sangat mungkin dipengaruhi oleh hubungan historis tersebut. Hanya saja keberhasilan proses komunikasi antara budaya 20 selalu tergantung pada tujuan dan keterlibatan partisipan memberikan makna dalam komunikasi yang dipertukarkan (Liliweri, 2007:227). 2. Ketika kemungkinan terjadinya kontak peradaban semakin kecil, maka kemungkinan besar sistem kode yang hidup di masyarakat Papua merupakan hasil olah pikir orisinil masyarakat tersebut atau hasil turunan interaksi dari budaya lain, seperti budaya dari rumpun masyarakat di PNG. Sebaliknya, mengingat rentang sejarah yang panjang masyarakat Jawa, dapat dikategorikan kebudayaan Jawa telah mengalami proses arbsorbsi, penyerapan berbagai kebudayaan besar. Misalnya dalam catatan De Graft (1986) mengenai orang-orang Makassar yang lari akibat runtuhnya Kerajaan Bone oleh VOC masuk ke Jawa menjadi pengikut Trunojoyo menyusun pemberontakan Mataram pada era Amangkurat I. Trunojoyo bahkan tidak lagi mampu mengendalikan orang-orang Makassar yang jadi pengikutnya, dan pada akhirnya mereka membentuk pemukiman sendiri dan menetap di berbagai daerah sepanjang pesisir Jawa, membawa serta budaya lokal masingmasing ke pemukiman baru di tanah Jawa. Demikian juga masyarakat Palembang, Madura, Sumatera, terlebih Bali. Suku-suku besar itu sedikit banyak memberikan pengaruhnya pada sistem kode masyarakat Jawa terutama simbolisasi dalam matra fisik. 3. Berkat orisinalitas' dua masyarakat tersebut kita bisa melihat adanya kecenderungan masing-masing masyarakat terhadap pemilihan, penggunaan simbol tertentu untuk mengungkapkan suatu pesan nilai. Penggunaan dan pemilihan suatu simbol tertentu untuk mengungkapkan maksud mencerminkan kandungan nilai, pandangan hidup masyarakat. Pemilihan itu merupakan bentuk lain representasi kolektif yang diidentifikasi sebagai prinsip bersama hingga mendapat kualitas monolitis, tidak bisa diubah disebabkan bagianbagian dari kesadaran induvidual tidak bisa mempengaruhi (Badcock, 2006:96). Dengan demikian, simbol memiliki sistem unik yang hanya dimiliki oleh masing– 21 masing kelompok pengguna simbol, yang dianut terus menerus, dipegang teguh oleh setiap individu kelompok sehingga mereka sadar menerima semua konseksuensinya dalam kehidupan sehari-hari. Contohnya kita dapat melihat penggunaan gunungan nasi untuk melambangkan maksud tertentu pada masyarakat Jawa. Atau penggunaan babi sebagai pengganti nyawa manusia di masyarakat Papua (Boelaars, 1986:105). Dalam bahasan sederhana ini, menghindari sedapat mungkin penyebutan suku',(kecuali yang sudah teridentifikasi sebagai bentuk kesukuan) karena suku bisa diartikan sistem masyarakat yang bercorak cenderung tertutup', intrinsik, hanya dibatasi oleh wilayah kecil (sebagaimana di Papua) atau didasarkan satu garis keturunan, klan saja. Beda klan bisa berarti beda suku meskipun hidup dalam satu wilayah kecil bersama, sebagai gantinya digunakan kata orang' atau masyarakat'. Meskipun istilah tertentu, tradisi memang hampir senantiasa terikat pada batasan wilayah, batas-batas fisik yang telah menjadi dasar pendefenisian keberadaan suatu tradisi/kebudayaan, terutama hal-hal yang bersifat fisik (Abdullah,2007:2). Sedangkan penggunaan kata masyarakat' mengandaikan adanya sebuah populasi yang hidup, tumbuh dan berkembang di suatu daerah yang tidak dibatasi wilayah kecil, garis keturunan, klan atau marga. Sehingga kita memandang suku-suku (kecil) di Papua yang jumlahnya ratusan lengkap beserta keanekaragaman bahasa masing-masing sebagai satu kesatuan utuh bernama Masyarakat Papua'. Demikian juga penggunaan Masyarakat Jawa' tidak sebatas pada sistem yang hidup di sekitar Surakarta atau Yogyakarta, tetapi dari perbatasan daerah Sunda, mulai dari Cirebon, merayapi daerah pesisiran, naik ke pedalaman sampai bertemu tempat wilayah hidup masyarakat Madura. Sangat disadari bahwa pengungkapan sistem simbol semacam ini berpotensi mencerabut akar budaya lahirnya simbol. Penggunaan simbol merupakan komunikasi yang disampaikan oleh satu generasi pada generasi selanjutnya, dan proses pewarisan makna berpotensi melahirkan bias pemaknaan simbol lain. Sehingga simbol menjadi bukan makna mati yang tidak bisa ditafsirkan ulang secara berbeda dari maksud 22 pembuat simbol. Data yang diambil dalam tulisan menggunakan kekayaan dan ketajaman antropologi dalam mengkodifikasi sistem hidup, budaya suatu masyarakat, terutama pada masyarakat Papua. Manusia sebagai makhluk simbolis cenderung hidup dalam proses menciptakan simbol dan mambaca atau memaknai simbol-simbol dalam proses interaksi, sedangkan simbol terus mengalami konstruksi yang berlangsung secara dinamis. Simbol sebagai sistem penyampaian makna bersifat universal, dimiliki oleh semua suku bangsa. Bahkan pada masyarakat modern sekalipun penggunaan simbol berupa bendera, lambang, logo, kop, stempel sampai pemasangan foto kepala negara di ruang kantor pemerintahan adalah penggunaan simbol yang dianut oleh masyarakat modern, simbol masih merupakan bagian dari kebudayaan modern. Lebih luas lagi, sistem simbolis tertuang dalam upacara hari pahlawan, pengibaran bendera simbol. Kenyataan itu membantah bahwa simbol merupakan tradisi kuno sebelum bahasa lahir. Dalam konteks modern, sistem simbolis masih dipakai sebagai artikulasi kelompok penguasa terhadap publik. Sistem simbolis pada masyarakat tradisional diantaranya tercermin pada upacara adat, ritual, prosesi. Menurut Anton Bakker (1997), dalam tindakan simbolis komunikasi bersifat lama, walaupun tindakannya sendiri berlangsung terbatas, namun bersifat timbal balik dengan menempuh komunikasi yang bebas manusiawi sehingga terjamin karakter universalitas bagi sembarang orang dan lintas zaman. Bahasa simbol akan menciptakan suasana simbolis pula yang tertuang dalam tindakan-tindakan penggunaan lambang-lambang untuk mewakili maksud tertentu, semua itu tercermin dalam tindakan manusa yang menjadi penanda lahirnya budaya, olah rasa-karsa manusia. Selanjutnya, Koentjaraningrat (1974) mengajukan analisa univerasilitas budaya melalui tujuh unsur sistem: sistem religi dan upacara keagamaan, sistem organisasi kemasyarakatan, sistem pengetahuan, bahasa, kesenian, mata pencaharian, 23 sistem teknologi atau peralatan hidup. Unsur-unsur yang terdapat di semua kebudayaan, perwujudan hasil karya rasa dan karsa manusia dirangkum dalam tujuh sistem kategoris. Karenanya bukan sesuatu yang mustahil untuk mencari bentuk konkret penggunaan simbolisme dalam sistem hidup suku bangsa yang berbeda kultur dan latar historisnya. Interaksi dalam diri manusia dengan keadaan di sekitarnya atau dirinya sendiri membuat adanya pengetahuan-pengetahuan. Kecenderungan pengetahuan itu tergantung pada alat yang digunakan, akal (nalar) dan intuisi, corak berpikir rasionalis belum dikenal atau justru tidak dipakai oleh masyarakat. Hal tersebut menyangkut aspek kelahiran pengetahuan, bagaimana memperoleh pengetahuan tersebut. Fisiologi Masyarakat Jawa dan Papua a. Pandangan Hidup Orang Papua Setiap kebudayaan memiliki sistem kepemimpinan, demikian juga orangorang Papua. Keyakinan tersebut merupakan kesadaran kosmologi mengenai hakekat manusia sebagai personalitas lemah sehingga perlu dibimbing, oleh type ideal personalitas manusia yang sesungguhnya, (Anim-ha). Mereka mengenal juga berupa konsep bigman/pria berwibawa melalui tahapan pencapaian, keberhasilan pendistribusian kekayaan, kepandaian berdiplomasi dan berpidato, ukuran tubuh, keberani-an berperang, konsep semacan ini dikenal oleh orang Dani, Asmat, Me, Meybat, Muyu. Berdasarkan catatan Ian Boelars (1986), secara umum orang-orang Papua dikelompokan menjadi dua jenis berdasarkan sistem bertahan hidup mereka. Pertama kaum peramu antara lain suku Marind-Anim, suku Yah'ray, suku Asmat. Suku Marind-anim berada di sekitar pantai selatan Papua, hingga berbatasan dengan PNG, sampai pulau Yos Sudarso. Suku ini mengenal dua musim, musim hujan dan musim kering, mereka mencari ikan di laut, mungkin juga berlayar sekitar pantai. Kebudayan dan pandangan hidup kaum peramu hampir identik satu sama lain. Sebuah kampung 24 suku Marind-anim dibagi-bagi dalam lingkungan kecil yang dihuni oleh klan, dan para anggotanya memakai nama yang sama. Pembagian klan berasal dari tokoh mitis tertentu yang disebut Dema, mahkluk dari zaman purba yang menata alam dan mengatur tata dunia. Kemampuan dema beralih pada manusia, binatang, tumbuhan, benda dan segala hal yang membentuk alam. Setiap tokoh dema mempunyai totem, suatu hubungan istemawa antara dema dan klen, misalnya kelapa menjadi totem Ge-ze, burung Kasuari menjadi totem klan Kei-ze. Tokoh-tokoh dema mistis tercermin dalam segenap klan, dan alam hal-hal yang menjadi bagian dari totemnya diurus oleh klan. Upacara-upacara diselenggarakan sebagai usaha mempertahankan dan merumuskan susunan dema-totem. Dalam hubungannya dengan dema orang Papua mengandalkan kekuatan gaib, menghubungi dema melalui upacara atau tekhnik tertentu sehingga dapat mengajukan permohonan. Segala gerak-gerik dan dan tekhnik dalam ritual itu menjadi semacam rumusan (formula) untuk memajukan kehidupan. Jenazah seseorang dikuburkan tetapi beberapa hari kemudian digali untuk mencari penyebab kematiannya. Kaum wanita meletakkan sedikit makanan ditempat orang–orang yang sudah meninggal, kemudian diadakan lagi perjamuan satu malam. Setelah satu tahun jenazah digali lalu tulang-tulangnya dicat merah dan dikubur kembali. Dengan demikian larangan menggunakan tanah pada kuburan hanya berlaku setahun, yakni selama tulang si mayat belum dicat merah. Sesudah dicat merah tanah kubur boleh digunakan lagi. Perhiasan kaum pria berupa simpul besar sebagai sambungan dari rambutnya, bermahkota bulu cendrawasih di kepala, gigi taring babi tertusuk dihidung, taji burung Kasuari sebagai anting-anting, gelang rotan di lengan, seluruh tubuhnya dibaluri lemak. Wanita dianggap lebih superior daripada pria, karena pria mengalami masa gaib di dalam perut wanita, dan secara ekonomi tugas wanita sebagai pengumpul bahan makanan, menyimpan air, sehingga anggota keluarga bergantung pada kerja kaum wanita. 25 Selain itu terdapat praktek homoseksual yang dikategorikan sebagai tindakan utama dari kebiasaan, adat istiadat serta kepercayaan di sebagian besar wilayahnya, homoseksualitas bagian dari upacara adat (Dumatubun,2003). Hal ini dapat dilihat di sepanjang pantai selatan New Guinea (Papua), bahwa upacara adat yang berhubungan dengan heteroseksual sangat merata pada upacara homoseksualitas atau "boyinsemination‖ (Knauft, 1993:80). Di sebelah utara kediaman suku Marind-Anim, berdiam suku Yah'ray. Sebuah suku yang mampu melakukan pengayauan (memburu kepala) sampai Tanah Merah Digul dan Pulau Yos Sudarso. Mereka berada di kawasan suku Awyu yang pada akhirnya tersisih. Kediaman suku Yah'ray merupakan kawasan perbukitan, sekitar rawa dan sungai, berdekatan dengan hutan sagu, makanan pokok orang Papua. Mengolah sagu dikerjakan oleh wanita, sedangkan berburu dikerjakan kaum pria, menangkap ikan dikerjakan oleh keduanya. Karena kerap pergi mengayau, kaum Yah'ray merasa sering terancam. Di beberapa klan, kampung dibangun menyerupai benteng yang dikelilingi pohon pisang sebagai tempat persembunyian ketika ada serangan mendadak. Anak-anak kecil tinggal di rumah kaum wanita, menjadi pengantar makanan dari pria ke wanita dan sebaliknya, setelah beranjak remaja diperbolehkan tinggal bersama kelompok pria. Ketika menikah barulah ditentukan pembagian kelompok, meski pada dasarnya orang Yah'ray bersifat merdeka dalam menentukan kelompok, namun melalui pernikahan terjalin keistimewaan pertalian individual. Menurut Boelaars (1986), kepemimpinan bersandar pada keberhasilan memburu kepala (mengayau), semakin banyak memenggal kepala semakin legitimate memimpin, dan kaum wanita berada pada posisi yang rendah terutama yang sedang hamil. Bayi dalam kandungan boleh dipenggal kepalanya oleh pengayau lain, sehingga suami-suami harus benar-benar melindungi. Suasana konflik, pertikaian bisa terjadi dalam satu kampung, termasuk pembunuhan tetapi kepalanya tidak dikayau. Kepala orang lain hasil mengayau dijadikan hiasan ketika melangsungkan 26 perkawinan, digantungkan di lengan kiri mempelai wanita. Boelaars mengatakan bahwa suku ini memang suka sekali berkelahi, berperang dan mengayau, dengan cara itu mereka bisa memperoleh tanah, bertahan di sekitar suku Awyu. Kepala orang yang dikayau memberikan kekuatan tambahan dan dianggap sebagai burung Kasuari, bukan manusia. Julukan pada para pengayau ulung adalah ―Matahari yang abadi‖. Matahari menjadi simbol kekuasaan, penciptaan dan sangat berkuasa, sehingga banyak mitos yang ditujukan pada Matahari atau mengambil tokoh Matahari. Di pantai barat daya berdiam orang Asmat, sekitar teluk Flamingo dan Teluk Cooks namun bahasa suku ini sudah berbeda dengan Yah'ray dan Marind-anim, meski cara hidup, makanan, kegiatan berburu masih sama. Karena belum mengenal peralatan mematangkan makanan, (periuk dan belanga) makanan dibenamkan dalam abu panas. Rona kawasan didominasi rawa, lumpur sehingga tidak ada aktivitas meladang. Rumah dibuat di atas tonggak kayu sekitar 1 meter di atas tanah, terdapat satu rumah pusat sebagai tempat pertemuan kelompok dalam merencanakan pengayauan. Di dalam rumah terdapat tungku untuk tiap-tiap orang. Rumah kepala– kepala kampung ada di tepian, di tengah ada rumah bujang yang dihuni pemuda dan orang yang tidak lagi berkeluarga. Ketika peresmian rumah bujang, dilakukan upacara dan dua tetua harus melakukan hubungan kelamin di tengah rumah. Dalam keyakinan mereka, kematian kerap disebabkan oleh magi hitam sehingga perlu dilakukan penuntutan balas, dengan cara mengayau sebagai suatu tindakan pemulihan kehormatan. Sebelum mengayau, suku Asmat membuat pahatan dan diberikan pada seseorang sebagai hadiah, lalu si penerima harus membantu mengayau. Orang-orang yang sudah mendapat pemulihan kehormatan, sudah dikayaukan, maka namanya diukir di batang-batang kayu besar yang harus diambil dari hutan. Dengan cara demikianlah orang Asmat merasa sudah memelihara keseimbangan melalui pemulihan kehormatan dan memberikan tempat pada arwahnya. 27 Secara singkat dapat disebut bahwa ketiga suku ini memiliki pandangan hidup tentang kebutuhan kedamaian antar matra lewat jalan pembalasan, simbol-simbol banyak digunakan untuk menyatakan berbagai keberhasilan usaha pembalasan. Pemikiran inti tentang pandangan hidup mereka adalah keterikatan mereka dengan orang-orang yang sudah meninggal, yang diikuti acara pembalasan dendam', pengayauan. Inilah cara menghormati leluhur yang datang dari atas dan membawa serta peraturan yang suci, benda-benda keramat, membawa orang-orang untuk menerima kedatangan Mahkluk Tertinggi (Boelaars, 1986:52) Kelompok kedua adalah kaum petani, antara lain suku Mandobo, Ekagi, Dani dan Ayfat. Dalam banyak hal mereka memiliki kebudayaan yang berbeda dengan kaum peramu. Mereka merasa bahwa dunia sekitarnya merupakan suatu keluarga besar, di dalamnya semua makhluk yang telah mati atau masih hidup menjalani kehidupannya, semuanya bekerjasama untuk menghasilkan keuntungan bersama. Di antara Muara Sungai Digul berdiam suku Mandobo, diapit oleh suku Awyu dan suku Muyu karenanya masih terdapat hubungan sosial dengan dua suku tersebut. Pembunuhan balasan masih berlaku bagi mereka, sebagai hutang yang harus ditagih. Rumah berdiri di atas tonggak kayu besar, berisi tiga ruangan. Ditengah untuk suami, kiri dan kanan untuk istri dan anak-anak. Mereka menanam pohon berjenis umbi-umbian, membiakkan ulat sagu, memelihara anjing untuk membantu berburu, membuat tambak ikan dan terpenting adalah beternak babi. Sistem perdagangan atau pertukaran benda-benda bergerak dan tidak bergerak dinyatakan dalam uang siput'. Hubungan kekerabatan terjalin lewat perkawinan, dan kebanyakan pria tua memiliki istri lebih dari satu orang. Anak-anak tinggal bersama kaum wanita, kecuali jika memperoleh bayi kembar, kedua bayi bisa dibunuh atau yang paling lemah dibunuh. Bayi berpotensi dimasuki roh karenanya nama-nama diujicobakan dulu untuk mengetahui nama mana yang disukai roh-roh. Ketika menginjak remaja, anak-anak diinisiasi sebagaimana anggota pada suku lain. Sedangkan perkawinan ditandai dengan penggunaan simbol bertukar gigi anjing dari orangtua masing–masing. Tata 28 cara penghapusan kesalahan, mengharap berkah dilakukan melalui hubungan seks di sekitar mayat hewan buruannya lalu mencampur cairan mereka dengan bulu mata hewan buruan sebagai jimat keberuntungan dan pendorong kekayaan (Boelaars,1986:71). Kekuatan roh dan pengaruh jahat diakui suku Mandobo, bayi yang masih menyusui meninggal adalah hasil perbuatan roh jahat, demikian juga kematian pada pria/wanita dewasa yang sehat merupakan hasil perbuatan magi hitam. Pusat kesadaran kosmis mereka terletak pada pohon Kimit, melalui pohon itulah orang hadir di dunia dan akan kembali pulang lewat pohon Kimit juga. Pohon Kimit terlarang untuk ditebang. Terdapat mitos tentang babi keramat sehingga babi dianggap begitu penting. Bagi suku Ekagi yang tinggal di sekitar tiga danau besar di pegunungan barat daya, perumahan dibentuk lebih kecil-kecil berukuran 3,5 meter persegi. Tungku perapian terdapat di tengah dan kerjasama antara lelaki dan perempuan sudah terjalin apik terutama terkait pertanian. Kaum pria berburu, menggali parit dan membuat pagar, kaum wanita membuat pematang dan mengurus pupuk, menggali umbiumbian dan beternak babi. Suasana kekerabatan terasa pada pembagian makanan, istri mementingkan keluarganya dan pria mementingkan klannya. Kaum pria menguasai penataan aturan di sekitar lingkungannya, mempertahankan diri dengan membuat pagar. Tetapi ketegangan ekonomi tercermin dari keretakan hubungan seksual, wanita merasa dihancurkan dan pria merasa berhasil menaklukan wanita. Penolakan istri pada permintaan suami berujung pada kekerasan, tetapi kaum pria takut pada darah menstruasi, sampai ada larangan dan perlakuan khusus bagi wanita muda yang mengalami menstruasi pertama, memoleskan darahnya pada daun lalu menyimpan jangan sampai tersentuh saudara pria. Menurut orang Ekagi, sperma mengalir dari otak karena kekuatan matahari, darah wanita mendidih karena sperma menetes ke vagina. Setelah usia kandungan lima bulan, hubungan seksual dihentikan, 29 saat melahirkan sisa darah dijaga, disimpan jangan sampai terganggu oleh roh jahat yang berdampak pada bayi. Orang Ekagi lebih mengutamakan kekuatan dari pada menjaga kehormatan, kaidah hidup tersebut dilambangkan melalui benda-benda tertentu. Orang Ekagi berpandangan ada suatu mahkluk asal yang memanifestasikan dirinya di dalam gejala-gejala dunia, matahari identik dengan wanita, sebagai 'ibu-asal'. Sinarnya memberikan kesuburan bagi manusia, dan sinar itulah sang pria. Bumi disamakan sebagai ibu yang memangku anak-anaknya, lantai rumah juga disamakan sebagai ibu bumi, tiang rumah disamakan sebagai bapak yang memberi status pada rumah, ketinggian status. Pada umumnya roh-roh mempunyai nama khusus, bertindak dalam gejala berpasangan jantan dan betina. Nama roh paling sentral disebut Teege, makhluk yang mewakili kekuasaan pembalasan dendam, pengganjar. Tetapi kuasa roh-roh itu bisa dikenda-likan oleh rumus-rumus tertentu yang dilakukan oleh dukun. Pola-pola yang cenderung mencari obyek-obyek indentik juga terlihat dalam penyamaan manusia dengan babi, anak babi disamakan seperti anak bayi dalam hal perlakuan oleh para wanita. Karena babilah yang menggantikan manusia dan bersedia mengorbankan diri untuk meredakan kemarahan Teege, darah seekor babi muda yang dikebiri dapat menyuburkan tanah. Pada orang Biak, terutama yang tinggal di pedesaan, hidup dari berladang dan menangkap ikan. Mata pencaharian pertama berladang dilakukan oleh sebagian besar penduduk, sedangkan mata pencaharian yang kedua, menangkap ikan, dilakukan terutama oleh penduduk yang bertempat tinggal di Kepulauan Padaido, Biak Timur dan di Desa Rayori (Sowek), Supiori Selatan. Teknik berladang yang digunakan ialah ber-pindah-pindah biasanya menanam talas dan keladi. Batang pohon, dahan dan daun dibiarkan membusuk menjadi penyubur tanaman (Dumatubun, 2004). Kaum pria membuat pagar keliling. 30 Pada sisi timur, Pegunungan Jaya Wijaya terletak lembah Baliem, lembah besar yang menjadi hunian suku Dani. Kedudukan istimewa pada babi juga ditemukan di daerah ini, terutama menjelang perayaan persatuan klan-klan suku Dani. Setahun sebelum perayaan, larangan memotong babi diumumkan ke seluruh anggota suku. Saat itu persiapan perkawinan juga disiapkan yang didahului dengan memberikan babi sebulan sebelum perkawinan. Seluruh anggota suku mencari kayu bakar dan menyimpannya, tempat-tempat membembam babi disiapkan oleh kaum wanita. Inisiasi dan pemberian berkat pada calon mempelai ditunjukkan melalui daging babi yang dioleskan tepat diantara dua payudara mempelai perempuan, dan di atas kepala mereka. Semalam suntuk calon pengantin perempuan dilarang tidur, tubuh mereka dibaluri lemak bertujuan untuk mengusir ganguan roh jahat. Pembagian babi dalam upacara tersebut dilakukan sebagai bentuk pembagian kekuasaan dalam satu persatuan klan, pembagian daging babi menyatakan kebersamaan diantara suku Dani. Pada saat tertentu juga dilakukan upacara untuk menghormati jenazah yang mati ketika mengayau dan memimpin pembalasan dendam. Para pemuda menuntut pembalasan dendam sedangkan anak-anak serta wanita menunjukkan rasa duka mereka dengan cara memotong satu ruas jari mereka, ini menyatakan bela rasa dengan orang yang meninggal sebagai tanda kenangan hidup. Sesudah satu atau dua tahun dilakukan upcara pelepasan untuk semua orang yang meninggal. Daging babi juga diartikan sebagi alat penghormatan dilakukan oleh seorang pemuda kepada pamannya dalam upacara inisiasi. Persoalan pembalasan dilakukan dengan dua cara yakni memusnahkan seluruh penduduk suatu kampung dan membakar desanya atau melakukan pembalasan secara tradisional melalui peperangan di lapangan. Untuk keperluan kedua (peperangan) para pemimpin perang menyimpan benda-benda sakral. Ketika melalui masa paceklik, saat babi-babi menjadi kurus dan umbi-umbian tidak tumbuh besar, para pemuka menyalahkan para ruh sehingga menyembelih satu 31 babi kecil sebagai pengorbanan. Minyak babi digunakan untuk melumuri anak panah untuk menolak gangguan roh-roh jahat, beberapa benda juga dilumuri lemak untuk menghindarkan terjadinya kecelakaan pada kaki orang yang melakukan pengayauan, atau berburu. Suku Dani memandang dunia mereka sebagai suatu alam semesta yang hidup, ibarat seorang ibu-asal', yang menampakan diri bagai matahari. Di sebuah suku terda-pat batu-batu matahari', tempat orang-orang mempersembahkan babi. Pada suku lain, misalnya orang Jae juga berhubungan sangat erat dengan alam sekitarnya. Mereka percaya bahwa, hutan, bukit, sungai dihuni oleh roh-roh dan makhluk-makhluk halus yang dibedakannya dari roh yang ada di dalam diri manusia. Roh di dalam diri manusia boleh selalu ingin hidup berkreasi karena terkait dengan roh di luar manusia yang bersifat baik meski ada yang bersifat tidak baik. Mereka percaya, roh penghuni alam sekitar yang bersifat baik selalu melindungi manusia. Sedangkan roh yang bersifat tidak baik selalu mengganggu hidup manusia. Kepercayaan tradisional mereka ini juga ada yang terkait dengan mitos, totem dan tabu, yang juga mendasari klasifikasi tentang makanan dan bukan makanan, tentang makanan yang bisa dimakan dan yang tidak bisa dimakan (Apomfires,2002). Pada suku Dani, perang merupakan bentuk pertahanan diri atau pemulihan kesimbangan dalam kekuatan dan jumlah, perang tidak dilakukan untuk merebut tanah, menghapus hubungan dagang. Namun mereka tetap siaga pada resiko jadi sasaran pengayau. Menurut Boelaars, orang Dani tidak bersungguh-sungguh berhubungan dengan arwah leluhur, orang yang telah meninggal, karena orang yang meninggal dapat saling menipu. Bagian paling barat yang biasa disebut Kepala burung' sekitar Teluk Bintuni terdapat banyak suku, Moi, Marej, Karon, Kebar dan Ayfat, semuanya membangun persekutuan yang ditandai saling menukar kain'. Kesatuan kerabat terdiri dari orang tua dan anak-anak, ditambah beberapa orang yang diterima menempati rumah 32 panggung. Apabila ada kelahiran, perkawinan, kematian diselenggarakan upacara. Selain kain ada benda-benda lain seperti gelang-gelang dari kulit siput, taring buaya atau babi, kalung-kalung, ikat pinggang bertahta hiasan manik-manik dan pisau. Kekerabatan darah dinilai penting sejauh orang masih tinggal bersama atau menikah, tanah dan lokalitas mengikat utama anggota kelompok. Inti kelompok paling kuat dinamakan persekutuan makan terdiri dari 5-20 orang yang tidur dalam satu atap. Ketika memberikan nama-nama pada benda-benda, diambil nama-nama burung sebagai ungkapan lain bentuk persembahan. Yang mencolok dalam suku ini adalah rasa tidak percaya terhadap orang lain selain persekutuan inti, tetapi dalam hal utang orang lain bisa menagihnya pada keturunannya mesti yang bersangkutan sudah meninggal. b. Pandangan Hidup Orang Jawa Masyarakat Jawa memiliki perikatan anggota kelompok yang luas, tidak terdapat suku-suku yang saling menuntut balas menegakkan kehormatannya. Anggota kelompok diikat oleh wilayah, suatu kawasan agak luas yang meliputi pemukiman atau perkampungan beserta ladang-sawah mereka. Sistem kekerabatan diikat oleh garis darah keturunan dan perkawinan, hubungan dan terutama perolehan status sosial ditentukan oleh kemurnian darah bangsawan. Demikian juga dalam hal kepemimpinan, kepala kelompok ditentukan oleh garis keturunan. Kemampuan berhubungan dengan roh-roh dari alam lain menempati kedudukan tinggi di mata kelompok. Mata pencaharian bersifat terbuka, dalam satu kelompok memungkinkan terdapat beberapa mata pencaharian sekaligus. Posisi lelaki lebih dominan dalam hal ekonomi, meskipun peran perempuan juga diberi ruang leluasa untuk melakukan aktivitas ekonomi. Rumah didirikan di atas tanah secara langsung yang biasanya memusat menjadi suatu perkampungan. Hubungan antar sesama anggota kelompok dalam perkampungan sangat penting dan memiliki arti karena skema kerja kolektif seperti kerja gotong royong, sambatan masih menentukan peran seorang anggota kelompok. Kepentingan kelompok dianggap lebih penting daripada posisi pribadi. 33 Kehormatan juga berhubungan dengan kelompok (rukun), garis keturunan, dengan dunia lain (numinus) dan kemampuan seseorang dalam membawa diri dalam hubungan antara anggota kelompok perkampungan dan perkampungan lain (selaras). Perang diidentikan dengan tapa, kondisi yang di dalamnya memuat ujian kesabaran dikelilingi penderitaan dan pengorbanan, sehingga sekalipun wujudnya berbeda, tetapi makna dan fungsinya sama. Laku tapa seorang pendeta bermakna sama dengan peperangan seorang prajurit di medan juang. Keduanya memiliki tujuan mencapai keluhuran, keduanya juga mempersyaratkan sifat-sifat tidak boleh sombong (aywa kaselan meda), memadukan sifat ksatrian, keprajuritan (sinatriya) dengan watak kependetaan, religius (pinandhita) persatuan keduanya akan mengantarkan pada kondisi manusia sempurna. Seorang ksatria harus berjuang untuk mencapai ilmu yang tinggi (prajanya), sedang seorang suci harus mencapai kesucian serta keluhuran budi (suci dan paramarta) dan keduanya menjadi sempurna dalam diri seorang satriya-pinandhita (Sadewa, 1989:6). Konsepsi mengenai hubungan dengan kekuatan lain diluar manusia tercetak dalam kesadaran kosmis yang cukup kuat dan mendasari bentuk-bentuk perilaku. Meminjam anggapan Hildred Gertz, sebagaimana dikutip oleh Franz Magnis (2001:39) bahwa pola hubungan masyarakat Jawa memiliki dua kaidah. Pertama prinsip kerukunan yang bertujuan untuk mempertahankan suasana harmonis anggota masyarakat. Rukun dimaknai keadaan selaras, tenang dan tentram tanpa perselisihan sehingga bisa saling membantu. Rukun juga menghilangkan tanda-tanda ketegangan sesama anggota kelompok yang ditunjukkan dengan sikap tenang dan menyingkirkan unsur-unsur yang menimbulkan perselisihan. Keselarasan dan ketenangan sudah ada dengan sendirinya dan tidak perlu diganggu, bagaikan air laut yang tenang bila tidak diganggu angin. Mengutamakan keuntungan pribadi tanpa memperhatikan sikap kelompok dinilai jelek, demikian pula dalam tindakan sebaiknya dilakukan bersamasama. Hal itu merupakan bentuk peletakkan kepentingan kelompok daripada kepentingan pribadi. 34 Adanya kepentingan antar anggota kelompok merupakan satu-satunya pengancam ketenangan, sehingga perilaku-perilaku dan tatanan dalam kelompok diminta untuk dipatuhi agar tidak timbul pergesekan. Apabila sampai terjadi gesekan, maka sebaiknya tidak diutarakan dalam bentuk langsung tetapi diredam sedemikan rupa sehingga tidak sampai terjadi konflik terbuka. Perbuatan tidak mengenakan akan disikapi secara pasif oleh orang lain, biasanya didiamkan, tidak diajak berkomunikasi (jothakan), atau mengacuhkannya sama sekali. Konflik terbuka dan melibatkan pembunuhan-pembunuhan jarang terjadi kecuali dalam memperebutkan tujuan besar tertentu seperti kekuasaan atau membela anggota kelompok yang dianiayai kelompok lain. Perdamaian bisa diusahakan oleh pemimpin yang lebih tinggi atau melibatkan anggota yang bertikai dalam suatu musyawarah, pembicaraan antara pemuka masyarakat. Sikap penolakan pada tindakan orang lain juga dicerminkan dalam hubungan yang dingin, tidak menolak secara langsung tetapi mendiamkan, atau menggunakan majas sebagai ungkapan menolak. Berbagai ungkapan mewakili aktivitas tertentu, sehingga masyarakat Jawa terbiasa dengan kosakata majas dan metafora. Upacara adat atau ritual dalam perkawinan, perjodohan, kelahiran anak juga dipenuhi berbagai ungkap-ungkapan pengantar, yang dilengkapi pemakaian simbol-simbol tertentu sebagai pengganti ungkapan. Dalam hal bentuk bangunan, ungkapan ditransformasi pada simbol-simbol yang bisa divisualisasikan ke bentuk ornamen bangunan tertentu. Misalnya, dua buah naga di keraton Yogya memberikan makna penjaga kedamaian dan keberanian, ini menandakan kesadaran kosmis. Kesadaran, pengakuan pada kekuatan gaib, hubungan antara manusia dengan alam semesta terlihat dalam penentuan pusat orientasi makna manusia. Bangunan rumah atau keraton yang berbentuk mandala menjadi penanda kosmis, menyatukan pusat orientasi sesama anggota kelompok. Rumah pemimpin, dianggap pusat kosmos (pusering jagad), dan pemimpin di dalamnya merupakan personifikasi pencipta,Tuhan atau Dewata. Mandala menyiratkan kharisma, sumber kehidupan. 35 Yang memusat di istana pimpinan tertinggi, sekaligus tanda kedudukan pimpinan/raja sebagai pusat kosmis, penghubung antara kehidupan masing-masing manusia anggota kelompok secara indvidual (jagad cilik) dengan alam semesta (jagad gedhe), perantara tunggal antara manusia dengan Tuhan, sangkan paraning dumadi, asal dan tujuan makhluk (Mangunwijaya, 1995:86-90). Tugas kosmis raja adalah membangun ketentraman semua matra, perwujudan keberadan kekuasaan Tuhan bagi manusia, sebaliknya raja, para pemimpin kelompok berkewajiban membimbing mengantarkan rakyat agar bisa menyatu bersama Tuhan, yang bermanifestasi pada sosok raja, disebut manunggalnya kawula lan Gusti, sumber kesejahteraan sejati makhluk manusia (Moertono, 1985: 42). Adanya perbedaan status sosial masing-masing anggota kelompok tidak bisa menghindarkan potensi konflik akibat gesekan, ketersinggungan, maka ditetapkan prinsip saling menghargai anggota kelompok berdasarkan status sosialnya, Magnis menyebutnya sebagai prinsip hormat. Ditandai oleh sebutan yang terlihat dalam panggilan, sebutan atau predikat lain. Tetapi tidak terbatas pada prestasi yang berhasil diraih oleh seseorang, namun lebih berdasar pada hirarki kekeluargan. Berdasarkan aturan ini seorang berusia lebih tua bisa mendapat kewajiban memakai kata panggilan yang bersifat menghormati pada seseorang yang lebih muda. Tetapi ada kesadaran lain bahwa rasa hormat bukan semata-mata ketimpangan derajat (status sosial), melainkan hormat sebagai rasa empati yang tulus dari rakyat pada pemimpinnya, dari yang muda pada orang tua, atau junior' pada senior'nya Kekuasaan hanya terfokus pada raja saja, kepemimpinan di daerah-daerah atau di kampung merupakan kepimpinan non formal, karena raja lah yang menempatkan bawahannya untuk berkuasa di suatu daerah (Magnis, 2001:105). Kekuasaan bisa diperoleh melalui penyatuan kuasa alam numinus, maka tidak dapat direbut, jumlah kekuasan di alam senantiasa sama, manakala terjadi perpindahan kekuasaan tak ubahnya sebagai pengurangan pemusatan kekuasan di satu titik dan pengurangan di titik lain. 36 ―Kekuasaan sebenarnya tidak dapat dipakai melainkan terdapat, hadir, penguasa tidak menerapkannya melainkan hanya membiarkan mengalir sendiri dan satu-satunya yang bisa dilakukan ialah menampung dan membiarkannya mengalir‖ (Magnes, 2001:111). Kedudukan raja memperoleh makna sebagai personifikasi Tuhan, atau inkarnasi dewa Wisnu, sosok sempurna ratu-pinandhita sang penyelamat dunia (Ricklefs, 1974: 81). Namun demikian, ketika kekuasaan raja di pusat sedang mengalami kevakuman, maka bangsawan dan para pemimpin lokal bisa menyatakan diri sebagai pemimpin kawasan yang menyerupai tantangan bagi kekuasaan pusat. Jika tak mampu menetralisir pernyataan tersebut maka pusat kekuasaan bisa berpindah ke tempat yang baru, daerah kekuasaanya runtuh, sistem feodal mutlak pada dasarnya tidak dikenal oleh masyarakat Jawa. Tujuan pemimpin diformulasikan dalam salah satu ungkapan: sepi ing pamrih, rame ing gawe, sugih tanpa banda lan menang tanpa ngasorake, giat bekerja tanpa pamrih, kaya tanpa harta benda dan menang tanpa menurunkan derajat lawan. Derajat sebagai sarana dalam menjalankan tugas kepemimpinan, kekuasan, diangap buah kewajiban dari rakyat untuk menegakkan aturan bukan sarana untuk menguasai orang lain (Herusatoto, 2008:134). Di sisi lain, juga terdapat beberapa praktek pemusatan kekuatan dengan cara memuja berbagai manifestasi dewa dalam bentuk demonis sebagai perusak semua kekuasaan lawan, penyatuan kekuaatan mistik semacam itu bisa memberikan kekuasan pada bidang-bidang khusus, misalnya kekuasaan atas demonis-demonis (Zoetmulder, 1965:267). Pemahaman demikian terbetik dalam kelompok penganut aliran Bhairawa, dan sebagian aliran kebatinan. Kepercayaan-kepercayaan atau pengalaman religiusitas masyarakat Jawa dapat ditemui dengan mudah pada masyarakat secara terbuka dan beragam, tiada batas khusus atau pembagian wilayah berdasarkan kepercayaan, setiap orang bebas meyakini suatu kepercayaan dan diberi hak untuk melaksanakannya sejauh mentaati prinsip hormat dan prinsip keselarasan kelompok dan tidak menganggu orang lain. Jika terbuka konflik karena perbedaan aliran kepercayaan biasanya memicu konflik 37 terbuka yang melibatkan lebih banyak orang dan berakhir pertumpahan darah secara masal. Terdapat juga berbagai mitos-mitos mengenai dewa-dewa tertentu yang menguasi satu benda atau daerah. Seperti mitos Dewi Sri yang dianggap sebagai penjelmaan seorang dewi menjadi makanan (beras/padi). Perlakuan khusus pada pertanian padi, beras dihormati sebagai tanda penghormatan pada kuasa dewi-dewi (Herusatoto, 2008:160). Pengabaian terhadap hal ini dapat mengakibatkan gangguan keseimbangan antara jagad kecil manusia dengan kekuasaan dunia dewa-dewa, kekuatan gaib. Kesuburan bisa terancam, gagal panen atau mendapatkan kutukan, hukuman dari kekuatan gaib, sebagaimana upacara selametan‟ digelar demi memperoleh keselamatan dalam hidupnya, tidak diganggu oleh kekuatan gaib yang negatif. Bagi petani, bahaya yang datang akibat dari alam gaib karena membuka pintu pada roh-roh bisa mengakibatkan kecelakaan hingga kematian (Magnis,2001:124) Secara umum dapat disimpulkan jika masyaraakat Jawa mempunyai pandangan hidup relogius dan mistis, selalu menghubungkan segala sesuatu dengan tuhan, hal-hal yang rohaniah, magis. Sikap menghormati arwah nenek moyang dan leluhurnya serta kekuatan-kekuatan yang tidak nampak oleh indera yang ditampakkan melalui simbolisasi berbagai benda ketika melalui fase-fase kehidupan tertentu, sejak ritual kelahiran sampai ritual kematian. Sementara sikap hidupnya berfokus pada sikap untuk senantiasa menjunjung tinggi moral dan derajat hidup (Herusatoto, 2008:139). Usaha menghindari kekerasan sebagai upaya untuk mencapai kemenangan tanpa merusak derajat lawan, agar tidak ada pembalasan, dan menjadi strategi menarik simpati dan kesediaan membangun sebuah persekutuan tambahan, dengan cara tersebut musuh bisa menjadi kawan, sebagaimana terlihat pada perebutan kuasakuasa semasa era kerajaan Mataram. Bersikap baik, tidak melukai perasaan orang lain, berusaha membuat bahagia, mencegah saling mengganggu antara anggota kelompok dirumuskan dalam tatakrama dan perangkat kelakuan dengan tujuan 38 berusaha mewujudkan keadaan keseimbangan, keselarasan di semua matra( Zoetmulder,1975 :38). Filsafat Simbol: Dari Simbol menuju Eksistansialisme Dari uraian fisiologi diatas, ada suatu core keserupaan tentang pemakaian simbol yang terdapat dalam pandangan hidup orang Papua dan orang Jawa. Keserupaan bukan berarti sama atau identik, tetapi menunjukkan suatu mekanisme nalar orang Jawa dan orang papua yang bekerja secara sama tanpa ada pertemuan' kebudayaan. Faktor pembeda dalam pemakaian simbol hanyalah berdasar asumi-asumsi yang digunakan ketika nalar bekerja menyusun simbol. Asumsi yang berangkat dari kesadaran kosmis adalah bentuk lain pemakaian akal-atau meminjam istilah Levi Strauss: nalar-manusia dalam berhubungan dengan alam sekitarnya, hal-hal yang tidak dipahami oleh nalarnya sendiri, tetapi keberadaan kelompok menuntut terjelaskannya hubungan manusia dengan alam sekitarnya. Nalar tak ubahnya sebagai logika (Ahimsa, 2006:75), sebuah konstruk pemahaman manusia mengenai keberadaan dirinya (human mind). Logika dasar manusia tadi terwujudkan dalam berbagai aktivitas kehidupan sehari-hari, penggunaan simbol menggambarkan bagaimana nalar bekerja dalam menciptakan kebudayaan. Kesadaran, selanjutnya, ialah mempertautkan suatu obyek, benda sebagai penada bagi sebentuk hubungan dalam kelompok sebagai tanda yang menunjuk keberadaan tertentu. Hal tersebut sama dengan kemampuan menyadari (intention) keberadaan lingkungan sekitarnya, keadaan diri dan kelompoknya, menyadari bagaimana semua itu bermula lalu akan berujung ke mana, sebuah kesadaran epistemologis. Jalan untuk menjawab pertanyaan tersebut hanya alam, dan sekaligus jadi sumber informasi untuk menerangkan relasi-relasi kesadaran akan ketidak sendirian di alam, maka kekuatan-kekuatan alam diidentifikasi sebagai kekuatan yang menyebabkan munculnya semua kehidupan. Berbagai bentuk alam yang dinalar memiliki kekuatan ditransformasi sedemikan rupa menjadi pamahaman 39 nalar yang konstrukif (mesti bernuasa imajinatif) dalam bentuk mitos sebagai sarana bahasa pengetahuan, mitos menjadi media menjelaskan sesuatu (perantingan pengetahuan) sekaligus memberi informasi pesan pada orang lain dari satu generasi atau antar generasi dengan mengaitkan pada kebiasaan alamiah manusia (Ahimsa, 2006:80). Karena kebutuhan pengetahuan, mitos terlestarikan secara oral dan sebagian dalam bentuk bahasa simbol (ritual atau bentuk karya kerja) Seperti pemahaman kawin, berketurunan, memberi kesadaran bahwa alam sekitarpun mengalami proses serupa, dan identifikasi benda-benda alam dikelompokan menjadi pira dan wanita, matahari dipersonifikasi sebagai pria, bumi identik dengan wanita. Kesadaran akan bahasa biner. Pada gilirannya penggunaan simbol dikaitkan, didasarkan oleh kebutuhan kelompok (simbol publik) atau kebutuhan perseorangan (simbol personal). Dalam mitos yang dikembangkan oleh suatu kelompok (Papua dan jawa) dapat direduksikan menjadi unit-unit kecil sesuai nalar lokal, masing-masing. A. Simbol Personal Simbolisasi pengukuhan identitas diri tercermin dalam upacara inisiasi, ini terdapat merata pada semua suku-suku di atas, misalnya simbolisasi dilakukan oleh orang-orang Papua, terutama pada anak lelaki muda yang hendak beranjak dewasa (inisiasi). Menandai perpindahan dari dekapan kaum wanita, karena selama masa kecil tinggal bersama kaum wanita menuju pengakuan kaum pria-diterima secara sosial dan menunjukan posisi status sosial tertentu-mulai tinggal bersama kaum pria atau diberi koteka pertama. Meski ada sedikit perbedaan tentang pola pengasuhan anak-anak menunju dewasa antara masyarakat peramu dan peladang yang sudah mempunyai pola pemukiman tunggal seluruh anggota keluarga tinggal satu rumah hanya berbeda ruang, kiri atau kanan, tengah dikhususkan bagi kepala keluarga, hanya menunjukkan pengambilan asumsi dan bekerjanya nalar secara arbitrer imajinal. Pada perempuan muda yang menginjak dewasa diisolir sementara, darah 40 menstruasi yang menetes berafiliasi pada eksistensi' roh jahat sehingga mesti disimpan terlarang untuk tersentuh saudara pria. Pola ini merupakan pengukuhan identitas individual sebagai bagian dari pengidentifikasian eksistensi personal baru tapi terbalut melalui mitos dan simbol-simbol yang menunjukan kesadaran kosmis sekaligus menunjukkan peran wanita-pria dan bagaimana relasi diantara peran tersebut. Eksistensi manusia tertinggi yang berusaha dicapai adalah Anim-ha, manusia utuh, sebagai Matahari abadi yang dapat diartikan pengesahan aktualisasi diri sebagai personifikasi kuasa pencipta, ‖titisan‖ penata alam atau berhubungan langsung dengan penyebab pertama mahkluk-mahkluk. Bagi orang Jawa eksistensi individual mulai dimunculkan ketika anak lakilaki dianggap telah bisa mewakili bapaknya dalam cara slametan, upacara memberikan berkah keselamatan bagi semua penduduk. Dengan cara ini pemahaman relasi dan peran personil (pribadi) serta peran sosial mulai diajarkan, sekaligus tetap memberikan pesan pada semua anggota kelompok tentang sentralitas kelompok bagi kelangsungan eksitensi semua anggota. Seseorang menggelar acara slametan mengundang tetangga sekitar dan mengharap kehadiran mereka sebagai bentuk kerukunan sosial, keselarasan antara alam nyata dengan alam numinus mereka. Mengundang orang lain' berarti menyatakan kesadaran terhadap keberadaan seseorang, mengakui eksistensinya dan membuka komunikasi relasional tertentu dalam konteks sosial atau kelas sosial. Hanya kaum pria yang biasanya menghadiri acara ini, apabila berhalangan hadir terkadang anak lelaki diperbolehkan datang menggantikan eksistensi ayahnya dalam kelompok. Absensi dalam acara kolektif seperti ini bisa ditafsirkan negatif, karena selametan merupakan bahasa ungkapan dalam bentuk ritual. Absensi juga menunjukkan keberadaan personal dalam identitas kelompok menempati peran sentral sebagai penentu hubungan kerukunan (selaras). Tidak diakui kelompok berarti tidak eksis, eksistensi kelompok menandai eksistensi individu. 41 Atribut pakaian yang melekat pada anggota kelompok, menandakan kebutuhan tingkat pengakuan. Semakin eksistensi individual kian dihargai atau dianggap penting maka semakin berbahagia, mentalitas beserta kesadarannya seolaholah menemukan jatidiri sebenarnya. Eksistensi berhubungan dengan kebahagiaan dan kesuksesan menjalani laku hidup. Tanda pengakuan eksistensi yang kokoh tercermin dalam penggunaan simbol kebesaran melalui ekspresi berbagai bentuk busana, pakaian, atribut atau pemakaian manik-manik, hiasan tubuh dalam jumlah tertentu. Keberhasilan mengayau misalnya, ditandai dengan hiasan tertentu serta berlanjut pada pengakuan eksistensi yang makin tinggi. Eksistensi sebagai pinandhita atau ksatria ditandai lewat pengageman, simbol pakaian tertentu. Pengakuan eksistensial menjadi kebutuhan nirsadar anggota kelompok, karena tanpa pengakuan berarti mengeliminasi keberadaan personal dari eksistensi kelompok, eksistensi dirinya ditolak dan hal itu sama dengan menegasi ke-manusia-an manusia. Kondisi tersebut sama dengan penderitaan, pengucilan oleh anggota kelompok akan mendatangkan kerusakan psikis. Kondisi semacam itu digambarkan oleh Levi Strauss sebagai lenyapnya kepribadian sosial seseorang meskipun secara fisis integritasnya masih utuh (Levi Strauss, 1997:73). Eksistensi orang Papua juga terkait dengan keberadaan komunitas mereka. Para pria yang tidak mampu mengayau dianggap tidak memiliki eksistens, tidak ada sehingga tidak layak mendapatkan atribut kemanusiaan apapun dari kelompoknya. Sedangkan pengakuan dari kelompok lain sangat nihil, kecuali dianggap sebagai ancaman, eksisten negatif. Keikutsertaan dalam upacara adat, dalam mengayau dan penyematan berbagai aksesoris yang menunjukkan sebagai pengageman' atribut sosial merupakan demonstrasi simbolik kebutuhan keberadaan diri, Ada ketika dianggap Ada. Pengakuan-pengakuan itu identik dengan posisi seseorang dalam konteks sosialnya, mengayau menunjukkan semacam strategi mempertahankan martabat kelas dengan jalan ekstensif. Pada intinya jalan kebudayaan tersebut dilakukan sebagai upaya survival secara biologis atau psikis dan survival dalam hubungan dengan yang transendent dan relasi di luar manusia. 42 Eksistensi hilang dapat disebabkan berbagai macam sebab, misalnya bagi orang Papua diasosiasikan pada kepemilikan sifat malas, pengecut, tidak berani berperang, tidak berani mengayau atau tidak berani menuntut balas, tidak mampu mengakhiri masa berkabung. Sifat-sifat tersebut secara niscaya dirasakan sebagai sesuatu karakter yang inferior, dan posisi inferior berarti tidak memiliki bargain sosial tertentu. Segala hal yang inferior (negatif) berusaha dilawan dan dihindarkan, ini terdapat dalam skema nalar hampir di semua jenis kebudayaan. Bahkan dalam hal ekstrim, inferioritas dapat dilekatkan pada datangnya kutukan, hukuman dari kekuatan alam lain akibat perbuatan buruk' (kontra survival) versi suku setempat. Bagi orang Jawa, eksistensi semakin berkurang karena ketidakcakapan menyusun relasi sosial, tidak bisa melakukan penghormatan pada orang lain berdasarkan prinsip saling menjaga eksistensi diri dan harga diri yang dicerminkan dalam sebutan, panggilan atau gelar yang ditujukkan padanya. Ketika tidak bisa mematuhi tatakrama, tidak bisa menekan ego diri, tidak tampil tenang bertindak gegabah dan membuat disharmoni maka orang tersebut tidak layak menyandang predikat dewasa, belum njawani atau bahkan diberi olok-olok ―masih anak-anak‖ (Magnis,2001:53). Kondisi tersebut adalah bentuk kontra survival bagi masyarakat Jawa. Termasuk kontra survival adalah ketidakcakapan menjaga eksistensi juga berkait dengan kegagalan menjaga hubungan harmonis dengan alam numinus. Masyarakat sosial tidak menerima keburukan hubungan dengan alam numinus, bahkan acara/ritual adat seperti selametan, tulak balak merupakan tindakan kolektif untuk menjaga hubungan manusia dan alam numinus (tindakan melawan kontra survival). Jika terjadi pengabaian, menegasikan aturan main manusia dengan alam numinus merupakan bentuk lain gradasi eksistensi. Dalam hal seorang pria dewasa yang kerap diwakili oleh anak-anak pada acara ritual adat dianggap kurang sempurna sebagai pengganti posisi tertentu masyarakat, karena keberadaan anak-anak dianggap belum memiliki keberadaan fungsional meski secara fisis sudah ada. Acara selametan 43 diadakan untuk mencapai keseimbangan kosmis (transendent survival),sedangkan pembalasan dendam menjadi cara (biologis survival) yang dienkripsi sebagai upaya mencari jalan mendamaikan arwah saudara atau anggota kelompok yang mati dibunuh kelompok lain. Arwah orang mati dibunuh memerlukan pembalasan kematian si pembunuh sehingga rekan-rekan orang yang masih hidup berkewajiban menentramkan si arwah lewat jalan pembalasan. Pada gilirannya kesadaran kosmis semacam itu memberikan reprosikal pembunuhan pembalasan, sebuah siklus usahausaha berbagai kelompok menentramkan orang yang sudah dibunuh pihak lain. Peperangan antar pemilik kesadaran semacam itu tidak dapat dihindarkan lagi menjadi bagian dari kegiatan menentramkan arwah yang diapresiasi sebagai keberhasilan prestasi seorang anggota kelompok karena mereka memberikan rasa aman dari ancaman pembunuhan pihak lain, menuntaskan masa berkabung sehingga siklus kehidupan bisa berjalan. Bahkan perkawinan baru dapat dilangsungkan sesudah masa berkabung lewat. Pihak lain akan berpikir ulang manakala hendak membunuh seorang anggota dari suku yang dikenal memiliki pengayau-pengayau hebat atau kelompok yang bisa mendatangkan sihir dan magis. Ini sebuah strategi mempertahankan kelas dalam bahasa lokal yang demikian khas. Untuk mencapai strategi tersebut diperlukan prestasi mengayau, magi dan hal itu dibutuhkan oleh anggota suku sehingga apresiasi tinggi diberikan pada mereka yang mempertahankan kehormatan kelompok dari incaran pihak lain. Nalar meniscayakan penghargaan atas prestasi individu hingga membuahkan penghargaan kelompok. Dalam bahasa tradisi dengan kode survivalitas, perilaku yang berkebalikan dari itu semua dianggap menyurutkan eksistensi kelompok di mata kelompok lain, ancaman. Penanda eksistensi berujud simbol penghargaan yang menyertai keseharian mereka, sebuah fase-fase eksistensi subyektif dalam kerangka eksistensialime Kierkegaard, yakni kesadaran bahwa ia adalah seorang yang eksis, sebuah usaha untuk meninggalkan yang fisis menuju yang abstrak sehingga seseorang bisa menguasai alam (Martin,2003:11-16). Pada gilirannya menuntut pemakaian 44 sikap etik ketika berhubungan dengan person yang eksis seperti itu, untuk pemenuhan kekuasan dalam bentuk membuat pilihan menentukan tujuan. Penilaian subyektif diekspresikan dalam berbagai bentuk sistem yang ditopang mitos (narasi pengetahuan), seperti pandangan suku Marind-Anim yang percaya manusia (pria) kuat bisa memberikan kekuatan ampuh melalui cairan semen untuk mengusir roh-roh jahat pengganggu kampung. Manusia kuat berarti menduduki peringkat sosial tinggi, sebagai pemegang peringkat sosial yang tinggi ia harus menyandang kemampuan mengatasi semua masalah yang kontra survival bagi masyarakat yang menopang kepemimpinanya. ―Sperma bagi suku bangsa MarindAnim merupakan suatu kekuatan yang diperoleh dari seorang pria yang perkasa, kuat. Sperma secara konseptual mempunyai makna yang kuat, sebagai konsep kesuburan, kecantikan, kekuatan menyembuhkan dan kekuatan mematikan‖(Dumatubun, 2003:Vol 1, no 3). Eksistensi besar membawa kekuatan yang bermuara pada kepemimpinan di pusat-pusat kekuasaan, semakin digdaya kasekten seorang raja maka semakin luas pancaran kuasanya hingga ke daerah-daerah. Semakin tinggi kuasa raja maka kemampuan mengatasi hal-hal yang kontra survival harus tinggi pula (menjangkau wilayah yang luas). Bahasa etik-etnologis yang dipakai Franz Magnes (2001) dalam Etika Jawa, menggunakan perumpamaan berupa cahaya lampu dan sumber lampu, makin jauh dari pusat cahaya maka cahaya akan meredup dan hilang, makin dekat dengan posisi kekuatan semakin kuat pancaran cahayanya. Cahaya itu memberikan berbagai kemakmuran orang-orang yang ada dalam naungan penguasaannya, hubungan individu dan kelompok sangat erat, bersifat komplementer demi menunjukkan eksistensi masing-masing. Untuk mencapai suatu eksistensi kokoh, seorang individu berkait dengan keberadaan kelompok, menjaga relasi dengan relasi matra nonfisik. Jalan untuk menguatkan eksistensi dilakukan dengan mengayau, membalas dendam, menghapus 45 duka dan menjaga relasi-relasi atau dengan jalan menjunjung tinggi tatakrama, menekan ego diri, tidak mengabaikan keinginan kolektif serta menjaga relasi-relasi. Segala aturan dalam semua relasi meniscayakan simbol-simbol yang diakui kelompok. Penjagaan atas relasi-relasi berujung pada stabilitas harmoni alam manusia (aspek private) dan alam non fisik (aspek publik). B. Simbol Publik Konsep eksistensi diakui dalam kehidupan sehari-hari berwujud penandaan sistem simbol non struktural. Manusia membuat asosiasi diri dan kelompoknya pada suatu benda yang dianggapnya sebagai manifestasi kuasa yang lebih kuat untuk menandakan posisi Ada kolektif' (berkuasa). Ada kolektif menunjukkan kekuatan yang mencipta dan menata kehidupan manusia beserta lingkungan hidupnya. Ini merupakan kesadaran kosmis, kesadaran metafisis yang disimbolisasi pada berbagai benda-benda yang pada gilirannya dijadikan simbol yang diakui bersama anggota kelompok sendiri dan kelompok lainnya. Seperti asosiasi suku Geb-ze pada pohon kelapa yang menjadi personifikasi eksisten kuasa kosmic bagi sukunya (totem), pada suku lain eksistensi personmagi' diasosiasikan kepada kasuari, buaya, hewan tertentu, benda tertentu. Tentu saja pandangan ini agak menyeberang dari paham eksistensi ala barat yang mengabaikan kuasa adikodrati sebagai sesuatu yang eksis fisis, dan memusatkan eksistensi hanya pada persona humanitas. Namun demikian konstruknya masih bisa disederajatkan. Eksistensi manusia sebagai pusat kuasa kebendaan mendapatkan tempat dalam term Jean Paul Sartre, dunia di bawah manusia sekedar Ada, sedangkan manusia mencipta-kan keberAdaan dirinya sendiri (Martin, 2003:31). Untuk menunjukkan keberadaan dirinya dibentuk sistem penanda eksis-nya person, manusia memiliki kebebasan menentukan dirinya menjadi apa saja, benda-benda maupun nilai-nilai untuk dirinya sendiri. Orang Papua berhasil menyusun, membentuk hakikat (nalar)nya sendiri, orang Papua menciptakan dirinya sendiri dalam bahasa simbol yang khas. Menandakan dirinya berbeda dengan 46 diri, eksisten lain, sebuah capaian gemilang dalam kondisi serba sederhana dan nalar rasional yang masih dalam tahap tumbuh (Hipotesis ini pernah juga dikemukakan dalam diskusi klasikal di hadapan Prof Heddy Shri Ahimsa Putra, 2008). Simbol lain yang disepakati bersama dalam kelompok, misalnya, aturan– aturan yang disimbolkan dalam meminta pengembalian kehormatan, melalui sistem mengayau. Salah satu simbol tersebut yaitu babi, yang menjadi eksisten pasif (substitutif) atas eksisten manusia. Keberadaan babi dapat menggantikan nyawa manusia, orang mau menerima pelunasan hutang kehormatan asalkan ditebus dengan beberapa ekor babi. Nalar mengajukan sistem substitutif yang kemudian diterima kolektif dalam bahasa tradisi. Kenapa babi? Pemilihan simbol pada babi tidak bersifat arbriter tetapi memuat alasan alam' seperti latar geografis, botani dan sistem pengetahuan tertentu. Demi tercapainya keadaan itu, babi yang dapat menggantikan nilai eksistensi manusia, tentu dibutuhkan kesamaan kesadaran, persepsi kolektif, nalar publik dari semua suku yang bertikai. Persepsi kolektif tersebut bukan kuasi kausalitas alasan/motif menerima eksisten' babi sebagai setara eksisten orang. Bahkan sejauh orang/suku lain telah menerima babi, maka acara pembalasan dendam selesai. Secara tidak langsung, ini menyiratkan adanya dorongan untuk menciptakan suasana damai, terjaga keharmonisan'nya antara pengakuan seorang anggota kelompok dengan pengakuan kelompok. Mengayau adalah cara untuk menegakkan kehormatan suku, kehormatan yang menjadi penanda eksistensial kelompok, keberadaan kolektif, tidak ada kaitannya dengan kebengisan atau tradisi yang haus darah. Tanpa kehormatan dianggap mustahil menunjukkan eksistensi kolektifnya, kehormatan dipilih sebagai penanda eksistensi. Perlu diingat bahwa terminologi pembalasan dendam dalam konteks mangayau dengan dendam' antar inividu merupakan hal berbeda. Dendam dalam mengayau ialah nilai kolektif dan usaha mencapai keselarasan dengan alam numinus, dendam dalam pemahaman umum, merupakan upaya meluapkan amarah individual yang tidak terkait dengan relasi lain. 47 Dalam hal makanan, orang-orang Papua mempunyai sistem yang syarat simbol juga. Misalnya larangan memakan jenis hewan tertentu yang dianggap sebagai simbol personmagi' kelompoknya, sebagaimana larangan untuk menebang pohon Kemit karena kemit merupakan simbol jalan kembalinya eksistensi fisis. Tidak semua makanan yang yang berafiliasi kepada totem bersifat terlarang untuk dimakan. Misalnya totem dari klan Keijai adalah burung Kasuari, walaupun Kasuari disucikan tetapi binatang tersebut bisa disentuh atau dimakan oleh klan Keijai. Begitu pula klan Kewamijai yang bertotem sagu, namun sagu tetap dimakan oleh warga klan tersebut (Apomfires,2002). Jadi larangan' itu tidak berlaku dalam pola yang tetap, larangan berarti sistem relasional tertentu yang bersifat tradisi. Sekali lagi fakta yang menujuk pada kemampuan membentuk kreasi eksistensi dirinya. Simbol dalam wujud totem diakui bersama, tetapi aturan yang melekat padanya tidak senantiasa identik satu sama lain. Kesadaran kosmis tentang benda-benda yang tak bisa dicermati secara utuh seperti gunung, matahari, bulan dan bumi diasosiasikan pada hal-hal tertentu, terutama pada proses kelahiran, pada proses percintaan. Matahari dan bumi paling banyak disebut dalam mite orang Papua, dan sifat kuat prestasi eksisten tinggi dipersonifikasi pada keberadaan matahari atau bumi, meskipun hal ini tidak terjalin dalam pola yang tetap, kesamaan sifat atau karakter, namun dapat dijadikan alasan tindakan asosiatif. Sosok roh jahat termanifestasikan dalam segala hal yang tidak mereka sukai, kematian dianggap datang dari dunia ruh jahat, terutama jika jenazah berasal dari orang sehat bugar lalu tiba-tiba mati. Hal demikian tidak mereka sukai, sebagaimana mereka tidak menyukai hal-hal jahat lain, personifikasi kembali berlaku. Hal-hal jahat disimbolkan pada benda-benda yang tidak disukai oleh kesadaran kolektif, misalnya arwah musuh. Bagi orang Jawa personifikasi eksistensi diproklamirkan lewat tindakan berhubungan sosial dengan eksistensi lain. Keberadaan orang lain menentukan bagaimana eksistensi dirinya dibentuk. Seorang junior, atau orangtua, lantaran 48 kehadiran seorang pemuda yang diakui oleh nalar simbolis-struktural memiliki peran tertentu, harus menempatkan diri dalam situasi tertentu pula yang menunjukkan bagaimana eksistensi dirinya dan bagaimana eksistensi orang lain. Prasyarat untuk terciptanya pengakuan eksistensial semacam ini adalah kemauan menerima berbagai sistem tanda dalam hubungan sosial. Nalar pertama yang dibutuhkan adalah kesadaran kosmis, bahwa manusia tidak ada dengan sendirinya, tetapi dicipta, dan akibat penciptaan itu mereka diminta untuk menemukan jalan kembali, jalan persatuan antara pencipta dan yang dicipta, simbol utamanya tercermin dalam pemahaman atas konsepsi kekuasan dan raja-raja. Raja adalah perwujudan Dewata, Wisnu di muka bumi, berhak memerintah karena alam adalah milik para dewata, dikendalikan melalui kekuatan adikodrati. Rangkaian pemahaman ini sudah terkodifikasi dalam bentuk rekaman pesan yang disampaikan secara turun-temurun melalui mitos Dewa Ruci. Konsepi manunggaling Kawulo Gusti dalam konstruksi religius juga menunjukkan kesadaran semacam itu. Sebagai simbol dewata, darah dan keturunannya suci bagaikan titisan dewata, mereka manusia-manusia yang layak diberi hormat. Simbol yang dituju bersifat absrak karena dominasi alam sudah berkurang, dan dalam hal tertentu alam masih berpengaruh pada sistem simbol sebagaimana terlihat pada acara sedekah bumi dan sedekah laut. Pola abstrak dalam sistem simbol lebih dominan karena produk nalar kebudayaan adalah bahasa yang serba implisit, melalui metafor, ungkapan, pengendapan ago diri, ngerti dan menitik beratkan pada penguasaan rasa. Konsepsi eksis komunal tetap bergantung pada keberadaan orang lain. Dalam konteks kepemimpinan, pertanyaan bagaimana jika tidak terdapat keturunan dewata yang menandai perbedaan eksistensi manusia, maka pusat kesadaran kosmis memberikan arah pada proses kekuatan penciptaan manusia, dilahirkan di lingkungan keluarga yang serba memberi bermacam perlindungan (dalam suasana serba normal), kesadaran berdasarkan prinsip hubungan darah berlaku di berbagai tempat. Tetap saja 49 manusia memerlukan keberadaan orang lain untuk menandakan dirinya eksis seperti apa. Namun, kondisi itu tidak mutlak kemauan mencitrakan diri dalam bentuk prestasi penguasaan kekuatan gaib juga menandakan eksisten lain. Kuasa alam gaib dapat disatukan dalam diri manusia, sehingga eksistensi tertinggi bisa diperoleh. Tetapi kondisi ini tetap membutuhkan prasyarat berupa kesadaran kolektif untuk menerima konsepsi bahwa kepemimpinan, konsep pengakuan eksisten tertinggi berdasarkan kuasa alam gaib yang tersatukan dalam diri seseorang-manakala tiada kesepahaman mengenai hal tersebut-bergantung pada kemampuan menguasai alam numinus, dan hal ini jelas sejenis prestasi yang mengundang kekaguman. Keberhasilam menguasai alam numunis adalah wujud keharmonisan relasi, dan ini menentukan survival kelompok. Ketika pusat kehidupan disimbolkan kepada mandala keraton, nalar bekerja pada tataran pemahaman yang menyatakan kekuasaan dan kehidupan teratur perlu ada dalam naungan suatu kepemimpinan, dan ini adalah hal penting. Sedangkan acara selametan, menyatakan pengakuan eksistensi identitas magis, pertautan manusia dengan kekuatan lain sulit dibangun sehingga satu-satunya penanda eksistensi adalah berada lingkup kelompoknya atau orang lain (kesadaran terhadap the others). Jika orang tidak bertemu dengan orang lain sulit menentukan keberadaan dirinya, karena pandangan hidup Jawa memberikan arahan agar meniadakan ego, menghilangkan eksistensi diri dalam bentuk pemenuhan kebutuhan diri, pengakuan orang lain. Sehingga klan atau ikatan apapun yang membentuk identitas diri dapat berubah cepat, pemakaian nama menjadi tidak penting lagi. Fase ini disimbolkan dengan atribut kesucian yang ditandai menguasai barang-barang mistis atau bentuk-bentuk aktivitas gnostik. Satu sistem nalar yang bekerja adalah kesadaran bahwa pengakuan ditentukan oleh kelompok bukan oleh dirinya sendiri. 50 Penutup: Sebuah catatan Patut diingat bahwa kondisi diatas mengandaikan eksistensi dalam konstruksi intersubyektif. Meminjam kacamata ukur Sartre, penciptaan diri manusia melalui perjalanan menyelami kesunyian diri, mencari pemahaman bagaimana diri manusia ada lalu eksis. Cara membentuk eksistensi adalah dengan perjalanan memulai pencarian makna eksis-tanpa bermaksud melakukan komparasi dan penafsiran- jelas agak berlawanan dengan logika eksistensi sebagaimana dikenalkan Sartre, yang berangkat dari abstrak menuju yang nyata, dari pemikiran menuju eksistensi diri. Manusia Jawa dan Papua berjalan dari alam nyata ke alam pemikiran. Prinsip perlawanan ini menyadarkan pada kita adanya perbedaan dalam sistem berpikir eksistensialisme para filusuf barat (yang mapan) yang dipengaruhi oleh paham absurditas, nir penciptaan, manusia ada dengan sendirinya (Martin, 2003:50). Sekedar untuk menggubah bahasa tradisi ke bahasa akademik filsafati, pertautan eksistansialisme Jawa dan Papua lebih cocok dialih bahasakan menggunakan analogi metafisika Husserl. Sesuatu yang muncul dalam kesadaran selalu menunjuk keluar atau berhubungan dengan realitas di luar pikiran, atau kesadaran itu dipandang sebagai kesadaran saja (intentionalitas). Untuk mencapai hakikat manusia, semua fenomen-sesuatu yang muncul dalam kesadaran-yang bersifat kebetulan atau hanya berhubungan dengan obyek individual harus disingkirkan dulu (Siswanto,1998:100-101). Dalam pandangan hidup Jawa, konsep tersebut merupakan prinsip penegasian yang diwujudkan dalam realitas sehari-hari seperti menekan ego sentrisme, menekan emosi ke titik nol dalam kondisi tenang, berbuat tidak dipengaruhi oleh keramaian dunia luar. Berbuat tidak atas dasar kepentingan diri sendiri (sepi ing pamrih) atau membuat keadaan orang lain tidak terluka meski terdepresiasi oleh keberadaan kita, keinginan untuk diakui kemenangannya, menguasai (menang tanpa ngasorake) dan hal-hal yang bersifat individual dinegasikan. Termasuk kegiatan mengayau, dilakukan bukan untuk 51 kepentingan diri si pengayau tetapi demi menjaga relasi alam numinus (kelompok) dan alam nyata. Pada prinsipnya penggunaan simbol sebagai filosofi hidup, dikenal sebagai pembentuk penyusun kebudayaan-kebudayaan. Di luar makna strukturalisme penggunaan simbol menyatakan pengetahuan, nalar dan kesadaran mengenai alam sekitarnya, keberadaan dirinya. Simbol di level sistem tanda bisa ditemukan pada semua suku atau kelompok masyarakat, namun konstruksi yang membentuk simbol by simbol bisa berbeda atau berlawanan satu sama lain, sekalipun dalam tingkat sistem tanda' sebenarnya sederajat. Simbol tidak hanya berbatasan perangkat bahasa, simbol merupakan mekanisme strategis untuk menentukan pertukaran dan positioning individu terhadap kelompok dan antar kelompok sosial, sistem sosial bekerja di atas parts simbol-simbol yang dimainkan secara artistik dalam nalar global. Satu perbendaharaan yang mesti ditambahkan ke dunia filsafat sosial-poltik adalah mekanisme simbol sebagai strategi kekuasaan dan sosialitas. Simbol dalam bahasa orang Papua menunjukkan eksistensi dirinya (dalam bahasa deskripsional, telah diterangkan oleh eksistensialisme Sartre dan Kierkigaard) Sedangkan simbol dalam bahasa orang Jawa tak ubahnya eksperimentasi kesadaran yang tertuju pada objek. Sebagai penutup saya meminjam bahasa Sartre (2002:103) bahwa: menilai orang lain adalah hal yang juga tidak dapat kita lakukan. 52 DAFTAR PUSTAKA Abdullah,Irwan.,2007, Konstruksi dan Rekonstruksi Kebudayaan, Pustaka Pelajar, Yogyakarta. Ahimsa Putra, Heddy Shri.,2006 Strukturalisme Levi Strauss, Mitos dan Karya Sastra, Kepel Press, Yogyakarta. Badcock, Christopher R.,2006, Levi-Strauss, Strukturalisme dan Teori Sosiologi, Insigth, Yogyakarta. Boelaars,Jan.,1986, Manusia Irian, Dahulu, Sekarang dan Masa Depan, Gramedia, Jakarta. Bakker, Anton dalam Suryanto Puspowardoyo.,1977, ―Bunga Rampai Filsafat Manusia‖, PT Gramedia, Jakarta. Herusatoto, Budiono., 2008, Simbolisme Jawa, Ombak, Yogyakarta. Koentjaraningrat., 1974, Kebudayaan, Mentalitet dan pembangunan, PT Gramedia, Jakarta. Levi Strauss, Claude., 2001, Mitos, dukun dan Sihir, Kanisius, Yogyakarta. Liliweri, Allo., 2007, Makna Budaya dalam Komunikasi Antar Budaya, LkiS, Yogyakarta. Magnis Suseno, Franz., 2001, Etika Jawa, PT Gramedia, Jakarta. Martin,Vincent OP.,2003, Existansialism :Soren Kierkegaard, Jean Paul Sartre,Albert Camus" terj Taufiqurrohman,Pustaka Pelajar, Yogyakarta. Sartre, Jean Paul., 2002, Existansialism and humanism" terjemahan Yudhi Murtanto, Pustaka Pelajar, Yogyakarta. Siswanto,Joko.,1998, Sistem-sistem Metafisika Barat, Pustaka Pelajar, Yogyakarta. Sutrisno, Mudji., 2005, Sejarah Filsafat Nusantara, Galang Pres, Yogyakarta. Jurnal : Apomfires,Frans., 2002, ‖Makanan pada Komuniti Ada jae: Catatan SepintasLalu Dalam Penelitian Gizi,‖ dalam Jurnal Antroplogi Papua Volume 1 No 2, Desember. Dumatubun, A.E, 2003., ‖Pengetahuan, Perilaku Seksual Suku Bangsa MarindAnim‖ dalam Jurnal Antropologi Papua, Volume 1. NO. 3 April. ------------------------------- Muhammad Anas menulis masyarakat Tengger, data yang dipaparkan memuat prosesi ritual keagamaan Upacara Kasada, dan bagaimana upacara tersebut sangat berarti bagi masyarakat Tengger itu sendiri. Ritual Upacara Kasada masyarakat Tengger merupakan nalar dalam bentuk bahasa religio kultural yang khas sebagai sistem pengetahuan, menjadi living dan dipertahankan dalam skema tradisi tertentu, demi merantingkan pengetahuan kosmogoni sekaligus mempertahankan eksistensi (kolektif-personal) secara kolektif. Juga memberikan (mengajarkan) bagaimana berbicara dalam bahasa relasional antara manusia terhadap matra-matra yang ada. Menggunakan nalar ritualisitik tersebut masyarakat Tengger menunjukkan mekanisme perubahan kekuasaan, kepemimpinan secara khas yang tidak berbasis akumulasi kapital tetapi pengujian atas penguasaan kapital budaya dan kapital simbolik dalam kurun waktu tertentu menjelang masa peralihan kepemimpinan. Kekuasaan tidak hanya bertumpu pada seberapa banyak kapital dimiliki tetapi yang urgen adalah bagaimana menguji penguasaan kapital yang dimiliki seseorang sebelum ia berhak menempati posisi sosial tinggi, ini sebuah pembalikan logika kekuasan: bukan menguasai kapital tetapi menguji penguasaan kapital. Simbol yang terangkum dalam ritual mengatur mekanisme pergantian kepemimpinan, atas dasar nalar berbalut religi-transendent (kharisma), sehingga pertarungan interest masyarakat Tengger yang terpecah dalam 4 kabupaten secara otomatik tidak potensial. Simbol dan ritual (melalui Upacara Kasada) menjadi nalar komunikasi antar kelompok sosial, identitas juga dibentuk dalam skala kolektif sebagai strategi survive sosial. Religi dan tradisi mekar sebagai sistem yang sedemikian rupa mengintegrasikan anggota masyarakat Tengger yang terpecah secara geografis dan komunal yang ditandai dengan kepatuhan terhadap sakralitas pengetahuan yang dimuat dalam bahasa tradisi Upacara Kasada. 54 Upacara Kasada sekaligus mengenkripsi pola relasi antar matra yang ditunjukkan secara kolektif dalam format penyatuan hubungan „dunia sana‟ dengan „dunia sini‟ menyatukan perubahan yang sakral dan yang profan. Pengakuan eksistensial dan perubahan diferensiasi person dalam masyarakat diatur lewat skema tradisi yang terbuka bagi anggota masyarakat itu sendiri. Termasuk bagaimana konsep pemahaman kosmologi dan pengetahuan tentang alam, manusia, beserta lingkungan, dibentuki dari sistem religi yang dirangkai dalam nalar tradisi ritualistik (sebagai survive transendent). Secara intrinsik, telaah metafisik memberikan paparan bagaimana nalar bekerja dalam sistem kearifan hidup masyarakat Tengger yang terefleksikan dalam produk kebudayaan: Prosesi Upacara Kasada Telaah Metafisik Upacara Kasada: Nalar Mitologi dalam Homo Religious Masyarakat Tengger Oleh. Dr (cand) Muhammad Anas.,M.Phil (Dosen UIN Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta) Proses Pembentukan Sistem Budaya dan Religi Dalam perspektif sejarah, dahulu masyarakat suku Tengger hanya mempunyai kepercayaan dinamisme dan animisme, seperti ditegaskan oleh Supriyono (1991), bahwa agama pertama dianut adalah kepercayaan terhadap ruh halus (animisme) dan kepercayaan terhadap benda-benda yang dianggap mempunyai kekuatan gaib (dinamisme). Tempat-tempat yang mempunyai nilai religi bagi masyarakat itu sampai sekarang masih tetap dilestarikan. Sejak awal kerajaan Hindu di Indonesia, nama Tengger sudah dikenal dan diakui sebagai tanah hila-hila (Tanah Suci). Para penghuni daerah Tengger ini dianggap sebagai Hulun Spiritual Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa (Abdi Spiritual yang 55 Patuh terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa). Hal ini dapat dilihat dari prasasti-prasasti Tengger. Salah satu Prasasti Tengger yang terbuat dari batu menunjukkan angka tahun 851 Saka atau bertepatan dengan tahun 929 M. Disebutkan bahwa sebuah desa yang bernama Desa Walandit yang terletak di pegunungan Tengger, adalah suatu tempat suci. Sebab, desa ini dihuni oleh para hulun Dewa-Dewi agama Hindu. Dalam sebuah naskah yang berasal dari Kraton Yogyakarta yang berangka tahun 1814 M, dituturkan bahwa daerah Tengger termasuk wilayah yang diberikan kepada Panglima Besar Patih Gadjah Mada oleh Kraton Majapahit karena prestasi kerjanya. Sehingga sampai abad ke-18 oleh Kraton Yogyakarta, para penghuni Tengger dinamakan sebagai tiang Gadjah Mada. Sekitar abad ke-15 Kraton Majapahit runtuh, semua tradisi yang pernah jaya hilang, kecuali masyarakat Hindu yang masih tetap bertahan di daerah pegunungan Tengger, mereka tetap setia mempertahankan tradisi, budaya dan spiritual mereka. Di abad ke-16 dan ke-17, Jawa bagian Timur mengalami kekacauan politik yang sangat serius, seperti perang saudara, penggarongan, dan musim paceklik. Pada awal abad ke-17, situasi politik di Jawa mulai bertiup perubahan. Pusat pemerintahan bergeser dan mulai dikendalikan oleh Sultan Agung yang beragama Islam, sebagai Raja Mataram (1613 -1646 M.). Semua daerah di Jawa Timur dapat ditaklukkan dan dikuasai, kecuali daerah pegunungan Tengger yang tetap bersikukuh melawan kekuasaan Sultan Agung dan mereka tetap mempertahankan ajaran agama Hindu yang mereka anut. Walaupun pengganti Sultan Agung mencoba ingin menguasai daerah Tengger (pada tahun 1647 M.), namun usaha tersebut tetap sia-sia. Oleh sebab itu, daerah Tengger mempunyai kekhasan tersendiri terutama jika dibandingkan dengan tradisi kerajaan Mataram, khususnya wilayah Jawa tengah . Konteks sosio-politik di Jawa Timur pada zaman itu masih belum bebas dari perang dan kekacauan huru-hara politik. Pada tahun 1680 M pasukan Trunojoyo yang melawan Kraton Mataram dan Belanda, melarikan diri ke daerah Tengger. Demikian 56 pula pasukan Untung Suropati, juga terdesak ke daerah Tengger ketika melawan tentara Mataram dan Belanda. Dalam perlawanan tersebut, baik Trunojovo maupun Untung Suropati banyak dibantu oleh orang-orang Tengger. Baru pada tahun 1764 M., daerah Tengger dapat dikuasai oleh pasukan Belanda. Kraton Hindu di Blambangan juga dapat ditaklukkan pada tahun 1771 M. Dengan demikian, seluruh daerah Jawa Timur dapat dikuasai oleh Belanda. Dan pada saat itu maka semua tradisi Hindu hilang kecuali para penghuni Tengger yang dapat mempertahankan keberadaan tradisi Hindu yang merupakan warisan zaman Kerajaan Majapahit. Pada abad ke-19, terjadi perubahan situasi politik terutama di daerah-daerah lain yang termasuk padat penduduk, sehingga banyak orang luar daerah Tengger yang berdatangan ke Tengger. Hal ini mengakibatkan jumlah penduduk di sekitar daerah Tengger menjadi lebih besar. Daerah-daerah tersebut di antaranya adalah Poncokosumo, Gubukkelakah, Nongkojajar, Sukapura, dan daerah Sumber. Namun tradisi adat masyarakat ini terpisah dengan tradisi adat masyarakat suku Tengger. Pada abad ini pula, pemakaian istilah Budha di Tengger digunakan untuk membedakan dan menegaskan bahwa orang Tengger tidak memeluk agama Islam. Hal ini dapat dipahami karena pada zaman kerajaan Majapahit, agama yang berkembang besar dan pesat adalah agama Budha dan Hindu. Jika orang Tengger menyatakan dirinya beragama Budha, bukan berarti mereka mengakui Sidharta Gautama. Namun mereka sangat yakin bahwa agama yang dianutnya adalah keturunan agama Hindu yang murni. Bahkan hanya daerah Tengger yang menurunkan tradisi spritual yang berdasarkan prinsip-prinsip agama Hindu yang berlaku sejak Zaman Majapahit . Setelah Indonesia merdeka, pemerintah melakukan pembinaan terhadap keberadaan agama dan kepercayaan yang berkembang di seluruh wilayah Indonesia. Hal ini tidak disia-siakan oleh para sesepuh Tengger untuk menggali dan mempelajari sejarah nenek moyang dan nilai-nilai tradisi yang pernah ada dan berjaya di zaman Majapahit. Agama yang dianut oleh masyarakat suku Tengger pada waktu itu masih 57 belum jelas, namun orang Tengger mengaku memeluk agama Budha tetapi dalam kenyataan dan ciri-ciri pelaksanakan keagamaannya tidak menunjukkan ciri sebagai pemeluk agama Budha, bahkan lebih menonjol ciri agama Hindu. Baru pada abad ke-20, secara jelas dan terbuka, para penduduk Tengger berupaya untuk menggali lebih mendalam sejarah spritual mereka dihubungkan dengan Zaman Majapahit dan keberadaan Hindu seperti sekarang ini. Akhirnya pada tahun 1973, secara resmi pemerintah Indonesia mulai mengadakan pembinaan agama Hindu Dharma bagi orang-orang yang berada di Tengger. Pada tahun 1973, para pini sepuh (golongan tua) suku Tengger di kawasan Gunung Bromo, dipimpin bapak Utjil (Sartali), mengadakan urun rembug (musyawarah) secara mufakat di Balai Desa Ngadisari Kecamatan Sukapura Kabupaten Probolinggo. Tujuan diadakannya musyawarah tersebut guna mempersatukan masyarakat suku Tengger. Warga akhirnya menyepakati salam khusus (sapaan) bagi masyarakat Tengger yang berbunyi: Houng Ulum Basuki Langgeng, kurang lebih artinya demikian, ―Tuhan tetap memberikan keselamatan/kemakmuran yang kekal abadi kepada kita‖. Salam ini biasanya diucapkan atau digunakan masyarakat Tengger pada awal dan akhir pertemuan resmi serta upacara-upacara tradisional. Suatu sapaan yang khas lokalitasnya dan terbentuk dalam ruang publik yang berhasil didiskursuskan. Pada tahun yang sama, agama Hindu Dharma Bali juga mulai berpengaruh di kawasan Tengger. Hal ini terlihat dari pergantian salam agama Hindu Tengger dengan salam baru yang berbunyi „Om Swatyastu„ yang bermakna Semoga anda dalam keadaan baik atas karunia Hyang Widhi' Selain itu, upacara adat yang dilakukan menunjukkan adanya salah satu upacara agama Hindu yang dikenal dengan upacara Galungan dan beberapa mantra yang biasa dibaca setiap upacara adat. Lebih lanjut Simanhadi (1994) menegaskan, saat ini telah diajarkan keimanan terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa berupa Panca Sradha, yaitu (1) percaya kepada sang Hyang Widhi, Tuhan Pencipta Alam; (2) percaya adanya Atma (n), yaitu ruh leluhur 58 atau ruhnya sendiri; (3) percaya adanya Karmapala yaitu hukum sebab akibat. Percaya adanya karmapala merupakan inti ajaran agama Hindu dan agama Budha. Artinya, bahwa semua perbuatan manusia itu pasti terikat pada hukum sebab akibat yang akan dialami oleh manusia baik sekarang muaupun pada hidup yang akan datang; (4) percaya kepada Purnabawa atau Reinkarnasi. Kepercayaan ini berasal dari agama Hindu dan Budha, bahwa manusia terikat pada hukum hidup berkali-kali sesuai dengan Dharma hidup sebelumnya; (5) percaya kepada Moksa atau Sirno, yaitu jika manusia telah mencapai Moksa, tidak akan terikat kembali pada Purnabawa, mereka berada pada tempat kedamaian abadi. Upacara Keagamaan „Lokal‟: Hari Raya Kasada Hari Raya Kasada adalah hari raya khusus masyarakat Tengger, dan tidak berlaku bagi agama Hindu pada umumnya. Dan, terdapat lokalitas yang berbeda dengan agama-agama besar. Tahapan-tahapan yang harus dilalui pada Hari Raya Kasada adalah sebagai berikut: a. Pengambilan air tirta atau air suci di Gunung Widodareng. Tirta atau air suci ini diambil untuk melakukan ritual, yang dikenal dengan nglukat umat, bermakna penyucian jiwa masyarakat Tengger di Poten. Tirta itu diambil oleh para dukun dari setiap desa di kawasan Tengger dua atau tiga hari sebelum acara pembukaan Hari Raya Kasada. Pengambilan Tirta itu dilakukan dengan upacara tertentu dan disertai bacaan-bacaan mantra tertentu oleh dukun. Tirta dimasukkan ke dalam botol untuk kemudian digunakan untuk nglukat umat. b. Pembukaan Hari Raya Kasada, dibuka oleh ketua panitia dihadiri pimpinan Parisade lainnya, serta para dukun-dukun dari seluruh desa di kawasan Tengger. Upacara tersebut dihadiri pula oleh para pejabat pemerintah, mulai dari tingkat I Propinsi Jawa Timur dan kadang-kadang dihadiri oleh Menteri Pariwisata, bertempat di Balai Desa Ngadisari dan sekitarnya. Setelah peresmian, dilanjutkan acara inti berupa pertunjukan Sendratari Rara Anteng dan Jaka Seger, setelah 59 diramaikan dengan hiburan-hiburan yang diikuti oleh berbagai daerah di Jawa Timur. Tempat pertunjukan ini juga sebagai tempat berkumpulnya rombongan peserta upacara dari masing-masing desa yang dipimpin oleh dukun dan istrinya, para legen (sesepuh), dan kaum tua masing-masing desa dengan berpakaian adat, seperti udeng (ikat kepala) coklat, jas hitam, baret coklat. Dibawa pula ongket yang berisi kembang-kembang, buah-buahan segar, sayur-sayuran yang tumbuh di desanya, seperti kembang pujang, kembang tanah layu, janur, kubis, kentang, dan wortel. Acara ini diikuti oleh umat masing-masing, mereka biasanya membawa bekal, sebab upacara di Poten (lautan pasir) berlangsung hingga keesokan harinya. Peserta upacara Kasada juga berdatangan dari Kabupaten Malang, Pasuruan dan Lumajang, paling sedikit diikuti oleh 6 orang dukun beserta umatnya. Setelah mengikuti upacara pembukaan sekitar jam 23.00, para dukun dengan umatnya secara berkelompok meninggalkan tempat upacara di Balai Desa Ngadisari dan sekitarnya menuju ke Poten tempat upacara ritual Hari Raya Kasada dilaksanakan. Mereka berjalan kaki dari Ngadisari melalui Cemoro Lawang menuju lautan pasir dengan membaca mantra-mantra. Laut Pasir menurut kepercayaan Tengger merupakan tempat yang sangat sakral. Oleh karena itu, urusan keamaan dan pemuka-pemuka adat serta peserta upacara diatur pada tempat yang telah ditentukan. c. Upacara ritual Kasada di Poten, dilakukan pada tanggal 15 bulan purnama pada bulan ke-12 (Kasada), menurut perhitungan masyarakat Tengger. Upacara itu dilakukan di lautan pasir atau Poten, sisi utara kaki Gunung Batok, mulai dari jam 02.00 Wib sampai jam 07.00 WIB dengan rangkaian acara sebagai berikut: i) Persiapan upacara dimana para dukun, legen dan pini sepuh adat Tengger mengatur tempat-tempat penting, seperti tempat padmasana, mandala utama, kursikursi para dukun, dan mengatur kesempurnaan dwipa, wewangen, dan bija yang akan dibagikan kepada para peserta upacara; ii) Kidung-kidung semacam uyon60 uyon diringi gamelan, menyanyikan kidung yang bersifat religius dan pujianpujian yang berbunyi: //Kidung mijil sulastri// Utamane wong arep mamuji// Dadap-dadap tanggap//Yenpita mantepe karya// Kinar suci mesi dipasti//Aja nganti lali// Dan masih banyak lagi kidung-kidung yang lainnya. 3) Nglukat umat, upacara ini dimaksudkan untuk menyucikan tempat-tempat persembayangan, seperti Padawasana atau tempat dewa-dewa, mandala madya atau tempat para pendeta dan dukun; 4) Pembacaan kitab suci Weda, biasanya pembacaan ini dilakukan secara bergantian oleh pembaca-pembaca yang memiliki suara bagus dan indah, termasuk baik bacaannya. Salah satu doa yang dibaca adalah doa syukur seperti berikut; //Om Dewa Suksama pornama acintyaya//Nama swaha sarwa karya prasidanthan//Om santhi, santhi, santhi, om.// (Ya Tuhan dalam wujud Prama Acitya. Yang Maha ghoib, atas anugrahMu lah, maka pekerjaan ini berhasil dengan baik, damai di dunia, damai selamanya); 5) Pembacaan sejarah Kasada, perkawinan Rara Anteng dan Jaka Seger. Diceritakan secara bertutur, dalam perkawinan Rara Anteng dan Jaka Seger yang telah lama kawin, namun mereka juga belum mendapatkan anak. Upaya untuk mendapatkan anak dilakukan dengan bersemedi di Gunung Pananjakan dengan memohon kepada Dewa agar dikaruniai anak. Dalam semedi itu keduanya berjanji, jika mereka dikarunai anak, maka anak yang terakhir akan dikorbankan kepada Dewadewa di kawasan Gunung Bromo. Upaya itu rupanya mendatangkan hasil. Akhirnya pasangan itu dikarunia 25 anak. Maka, sesuai dengan janji Rara Anteng dan Jaka Seger bersama 25 anaknya pergi ke tepi kawah Gunung Bromo untuk 61 melaksanakan janjinya. Namun, hanya anaknya yang terakhir yang ke-25 yang bernama Raden Kusuma yang rela berkorban dan masuk ke dalam bawah Gunung Bromo dalam keadaan gelap gulita dan petir menyambar. Setelah keadaan mulai reda dan tenang terdengar suara gaib dari kawah Gunung Bromo yang berbunyi sebagai berikut, sebagaimana dituturkan oleh salah seorang dukun: "He bapak karo ibu lan dulur-dulur kabeh//Reang wis urip seneng ana kene//Iling nyang pesane reang//Saban rembulan handadari wektu Kasada//Reang njaluk tandur tuwuhe lemah kene//Muga-muga slamet sak turunan-turunanmu kabeh//Wis sak mono wae reang" 6) Nglukat umat, acara ini dilakukan untuk membersihkan jiwa umat (Suku Tengger) dari jiwa yang kotor dengan: (a) pembagian bija yang ditempelkan di bagian muka, jika kelebihan bija sebaiknya jangan dibuang tetapi lebih baik dimakan, (b) pemberian wewangen atau bunga yang diletakkan di telinga sebelah kanan, (c) membakar dwipa di Perapen, dan (d) memercikan tirta di kepala dan muka umat. Setelah semua peserta upacara mendapatkan itu semua, maka dilakukan persembahyangan; 7) Muspa atau persembahyangan, upacara persembahyangan dipimpin oleh Pinandita dan dibantu para pemuka dengan mengapitkan kedua tangan yang di tengahnya diselipkan bunga kemudian diangkat sambil membaca doa sesuai maksud masingmasing, baik sebagai dukun maupun sebagai masyarakat biasa. Dalam acara ini, ada juga doa bersama yang dipimpin oleh Pinandita dengan membaca mantra yang sangat panjang. Ada juga doa khusus menurut keinginan desa masing-masing serta ada juga doa yang dilakukan sendiri-sendiri untuk meminta keselamatan serta permintaan khusus. Doa-doa yang dibaca dalam persembahyangan tersebut sebagian ada yang dilakukan dengan Puspa Puyung (kosong), ada juga dengan Puspa putih, Puspa merah dan bahkan ada yang dengan Puspa campuran (putih, merah, dan kuning). Jenis atau macam doa yang dibaca dalam persembahyangan 62 tersebut, yang paling penting dan sering dibaca ialah doa untuk tiga waktu, yaitu waktu pukul 06.00 pagi hari, waktu pukul 12.00 siang hari, dan waktu pukul 18.00 sore hari. Doa tersebut berbunyi sebagai berikut: Mantra Trisandiya: -Om Bhur tat savitur varenyam bhargo davasya dhimahi dhiyojo pracodayat -Om Narayanna evedam sarvan yad butham yac ca bahvyam niskalanko niranjanu nilvikalpo suddo deva eko Narayano na dvitiyo‟sti kascit (Tuhan adalah Bhur Swah, kita memusatkan pikiran pada kecemerlangan dan kemulyaan Hyang Widhi semoga ia berikan semangat pikiran kita) -Om tvam sivah tvammahadevah isyarah paramevarah brahma vinusca purusca parikirtitah (Ya Tuhan Narayana, adalah semua ini apa yang ada dan apa yang akan ada bebas dari noda, bebas dari kotoran, bebas dari perubahan, tak dapat digambarkan, sucilah dewa Narayana. Ia hanya satu tidak ada yang dua) -Om papo ham papakarmaham papatma papasambhavah mampundarikaksa sucih (Ya Tuhan, engkau dipanggil Syiwa, Mahadewa, Iswara, Parameswara, Brahma, Wisnu, Rudra, dan Parusa). -Om ksamasva mam mahadeva sarvaprani hitankara mam macosarva papeb yah payasva sada siva (Ya Tuhan, hamba ini papa, lindungilah hamba, Hyang Widhi sucikanlah jiwa dan raga hamba). 63 -Om ksantavyah kayiko dosah ksantavyo manaso dosan tat paramadat ksamava mam, (Ya Tuhan, ampunilah hamba Hyang Widhi, yang memberikan kepada semua mahkluk, bebaskanlah hamba dari semua dosa, lindungilah hamba, oh Hyang Widhi). -Om Santhi, Santhi, Santhi Om (Ya Tuhan, ampunilah dosa anggota badan hamba, ampunilah dosa pikiran hamba, ampunilah hamba dari kelahiran hamba, ya Tuhan, semoga damai, damai, damai selamanya). (doa sehari-hari menurut agama Hindu 1991: 10); 8) Doa pascasembah, doa ini sangat penting dibacakan pada Hari Raya Kasada yang biasanya dinamakan juga Keramaning Sembah yang terdiri dari lima mantra, yang artinya sebagai berikut : i). Ya Tuhan, Atma atau jiwa dan kebenaran, bersihkanlah hamba. Ii). Ya Tuhan sinar Hyang Surya Yang Mahahebat, engkau bersinar merah, hamba memuja engkau. Hyang Surya yang bersinar ditengahtengah teratai putih hamba memuja engkau yang menciptakan matahari berkilauan. iii). Ya Tuhan, kepada Dewata yang bersemayam pada tempat luhur, kepada Hyang siwa yang ada di mana-mana, kepada Dewata yang bersemayam di tempat duduk bunga teratai di suatu tempat, kepada Arahanarisvari hamba memuja. iv). Ya Tuhan, engkau yang menarik hati, pemberi anugerah, anugerah pemberian Dewata, pujaan segala pujaan, hamba memuja-Mu sebagai pemberi segala anugerah. Kemahasiddhian pada Dewa dan Dewi berwujud zat yang suci, kebahagiaan, kesempurnaan, panjang umur, bebas dari rintangan, kegembiraan dan kemajuan ruhani dan jasmani. v). Ya Tuhan, hamba memuja Engkau Dewata yang tidak terpikirkan, Maha tinggi dan Maha goib, Ya Tuhan, anugrahkanlah pada kedamaian, damai, damai, Ya Tuhan. 64 9) Pemilihan Calon Dukun. Pemilihan atau penetapan seseorang menjadi dukun di masyarakat Tengger harus memenuhi syarat-syarat sebagai berikut: a) pernah menjadi legen selama beberapa tahun, b) hafal sebagian besar mantra-mantra yang dibacakan pada bermacam-macam jenis upacara adat, c) telah memenuhi sebagian syarat lain yang harus dipenuhi oleh pemangku adat Tengger, dan d) seseorang dapat diangkat menjadi calon dukun, apabila di tahun sebelumnya (dalam 44 hari sebelum Kasada) di desa tempat tinggal calon dukun tersebut tidak ada orang meninggal dunia. Calon dukun tersebut hanya diundang menghadiri upacara di Poten. Penetapan menjadi dukun dilakukan dengan upacara sakral pada waktu Hari Raya Kasada disaksikan para pejabat, pemimpin Parisada dan para pemangku adat, dan sebagian masyarakat Tengger yang hadir pada waktu itu. Calon dukun yang akan dilantik harus memakai pakaian adat, bisanya berupa hem putih, jas hitam, udeng coklat, selempang kuning yang dipasang dibagian dada sebagai tanda menjadi dukun resmi 10) Acara lelabuhan sesajen di kawah Gunung Bromo.Acara ini dilakukan setelah prosesi persembahyangan di Poten, di Pura Agung di tengah lautan pasir di kaki Gunung Bromo sekitar pukul 06.00 pagi hari. Acara sesaji lelabuh sesajen (membuang sesajen di kawah Gunung Bromo) diatur dengan cara berbaris dengan berjalan kaki dari Poten menuju ke kawah Gunung Bromo secara berkelompok sesuai rombong masing-masing dari setiap desa. Posisinya sebagai berikut: (a) rombongan pertama para pejabat pemerintah bersama pejabat Parisada Hindu Dharma, (b) rombongan kedua adalah rombongan para dukun yang datang dari empat kabupaten (Probolinggo, Malang, Pasuruan, dan Lumajang), (c) rombongan ketiga adalah pembawa onkek yang dibawa oleh para legen dan sebagian peserta upacara, dan (d) rombongan keempat adalah kelompok dari tiaptiap empat kabupaten tersebut. Mereka berjalan secara teratur sampai ke mulut kawah Gunung Bromo, kemudian membuang sesajen yang di bawa tersebut dengan membaca mantra atau doa, sesuai niatnya masing-masing; 65 11) Slametan (pepujan) desa, akhir dari peringatan Hari Raya Kasada biasanya ditandai dengan upacara slametan desa masing-masing sehari sesudah upacara di Poten. Slametan desa ini biasanya diikuti semua warga yang dilaksanakan di Sanggar atau Pura masing-masing desa atau bisa juga di Balai Desa masingmasing desa. Dalam upacara Slametan desa ini, pembacaan doa atau mantramantra dipimpin oleh dukun dan dibantu para Legen serta sesepuh desa, sedangkan sambutan diberikan Kepala Desa. Isi sambutannya berkenaan dengan pembinaan dan pembangunan di desa masing-masing. Upacara Kasada: "Yang Sakral" ("real") dan "Yang Profan" ("tidak real") Inti dari agama (kepercayaan) dalam pandangan Mircea Eliade adalah dialektika (hubungan timbal balik antara yang sakral dan yang profan (Mangunhardjono, 1983). Manusia beragama selalu berusaha hidup dalam dunia yang sakral atau di tengah benda-benda yang suci. Hal itu sama dengan term to be or not to be. ―Yang sakral itu merupakan kekuatan bagi dia. ―Yang sakral‖ itu sama dengan syarat untuk berada atau bereksistensi. Pertentangan antara ―yang sakral‖ dengan ―yang profan‖ sesungguhnya dapat disetarakan dengan ―yang real‖ dan ―yang tidak real‖, seperti dalam problem metafisika yang mempertanyakan hakikat ada. Sebetulnya usaha hidup relegius sama saja dengan usaha ―berada‖ atau bereksistensi, usaha untuk bereksistensi dalam mengambil bagian dalam realitas, melengkapi diri dengan kekuatan.Upacara Kasada merupakan bentuk eksistensial masyarakat Tengger, usaha mengadakan' diri mereka dengan tidak bersifat dualistik ketika berhadapan dengan alam. Tetapi merupakan bentuk eksistensial manusia manunggal, menyatu dalam keharmonisan dengan alam dan yang ghaib. 1. Sakralisasi Alam dan Ruang Banyak hierofani berkaitan dengan alam atau berkenaan kejadian alam (guntur, gempa bumi, gunung meletus dan sebagainya). Hampir apa saja yang ada di alam bisa 66 menjadi simbol relegius. Langit, matahari, batu serta benda-benda lainnya bisa menjadi hierofani karena menjadi simbol relegius. Sementara penghayatan mengenai ruang sakral memungkinkan pendasaran dunia (kosmisasi). Sebab ruang tidak homogen, manusia Tengger membentuk dunia di mana ia dapat hidup. Karena itu diberikan suatu titik teguh, yang dapat dijadikan poros tetap (axis mundi). Dalam masyarakat kuno, orang mau mendirikan desa baru, atau membangun rumah baru, terlebih dahulu harus mendapatkan titik teguh semacam itu. Hal tersebut mempunyai makna eksistensi bagi orang beragama. Ia tidak akan dapat diam di sebuah tempat tersebut kalau tidak ada titik teguh serupa. Kebanyakan tradisi kebudayaan bangsa-bangsa di Indonesia dan juga di beberapa daerah lain, mempunyai tempat yang disakralkan di dalam rumah, misalnya di perapian atau dapur di mana orang tidak boleh berbuat sembarangan. Dalam skala religius kolektif, tempat menggelar upacara juga terletak di suatu tempat seperti di pusat desa, umumnya tempat tersebut secara khusus digunakan hanya untuk upacaraupacara yang melibatkan partisipasi seluruh warga masyarakat dan tempat tersebut juga dianggap sebagai pusat dari aktivitas desa. Kecuali tempat-tempat sentral' tersebut, masih banyak terdapat tempat yang dianggap sakral, seperti di tengah ladang, sawah, pantai laut, atau bahkan lautan pasir Gunung Bromo atau Poten (dalam istilah masyarakat Tengger). Tempat upacara yang sakral biasanya merupakan suatu tempat yang dikhususkan dan tidak boleh didatangi oleh orang yang tidak berkepentingan. Bahkan orang yang mempunyai kepentingan pun tidak boleh sembarangan berbuat di tempat upacara tersebut. Setiap orang dari masyarakat Tengger harus berhati-hati dan memperhatikan berbagai macam aturan, larangan ataupun pantangan. Pada masyarakat Tengger upacara ini biasanya dilakukan di sekitar Gunung Bromo, Sanggar Pemujaan, Gua Widodaren (tempat pengambilan air suci), Poten (di sekitar Gunung Batok), dan masih banyak tempat upacara yang disakralkan bagi masyarakat suku Tengger. 67 Tempat upacara tersebut menalarkan sebuah kebutuhan kolektif yang bebas interest dari semua kepentingan anggota kelompok, maka ia identik sebagai ruang publik' yang disakralisasi untuk membebaskan diri dari semua anasir penguasaan sosial. Lautan pasir menurut kepercayaan masyarakat Tengger merupakan tempat sangat sakral. Pemilihan tempat ini bukan sekedar agar upacara dapat dilaksanakan secara leluasa, tetapi lebih dari itu, masyarakat Tengger meyakini tempat-tempat tersebut mempunyai poros yang tetap. Peristiwa hierofani juga nampak kental mewarnai upacara tersebut di atas. Peristiwa penampakan Yang Suci ini terjadi kapan saja, pagi, siang, sore, maupun malam dan lewat apa saja, bisa melalui medium manusia, hewan, tumbuh-tumbuhan dan benda-benda dunia lainnya. Dengan menampakkan diri, Yang Suci tak lagi menjadi sesuatu yang Absolut, kini Ia terbatas dalam benda-benda. Dan karena benda-benda tersebut telah menjadi medium bagi Yang Suci, maka bendabenda tersebut ikut tersucikan dan menjadi sakral. Batu itu lalu menjadi suci, lalu di anggap tabu, dimintai pertolongan. Batu tersebut setiap saat diziarahi, menjadi medium mengantarkan manusia berkomunikasi' dengan Yang Sakral. Batu merupakan hierofani yang dianggap tanpa ruang, tanpa waktu, dan tanpa perubahan apapun. Karena itu, dia melambangkan kemuliaan, kekuasaan dan keabadian yang berasal dari yang ilahi‖ . 2. Sakralitas Waktu Sebagaimana ruang yang bersifat homogen, waktu juga demikian. Ada waktu sakral ada pula waktu profan. Waktu sakral berlangsung bila manusia merayakan pesta-pesta perayaan yang bersifat periodik. Waktu profan adalah waktu ketika peristiwa-peristiwa sehari-hari berlangsung. Tak ada kontinuitas antara dua jenis waktu. Tetapi dengan ritus manusia bisa beralih dari waktu biasa menuju waktu yang kudus. Perbedaan hakiki antara kedua jenis waktu tersebut adalah waktu sakral menurut kodratnya adalah reversibel, dapat dibalikkan, dalam arti masa lampau bisa 68 dihadirkan kembali. Sedangkan ciri khas waktu biasa tak mungkin bisa terulang kembali dan telah lewat selama-lamanya. Waktu sakral adalah waktu yang berlangsung dalam mitos-mitos. Waktu di mana berlangsung peristiwa-peristiwa yang diceritakan mitos-mitos, seakan-akan suatu ―waktu sekarang‖ yang abadi, yang selalu dapat dihubungi dan dihadirkan kembali. Upacara Kasada tak lain dari sistem kosmogoni, penciptaan dunia oleh dewadewa, artinya tak lain dari menghadirkan penciptaan dunia. Waktu dalam upacara Kasada tersebut menandakan bahwa di sana berarti keluar dari waktu yang profan dan masuk ke dalam waktu yang sakral (waktu mitis) yang dihadirkan dalam pesta tersebut. Saat pelaksanaan upacara biasanya dirasakan sebagai saat-saat yang "genting" dan penuh keheningan, bahkan beresiko karena penuh dengan bahaya gaib. Tradisi, Perjalanan Melacak Yang Transenden Transendensi adalah dasar eksistensi, sebab eksistensi tidak mempunyai dasar dalam dirinya sendiri. Baru karena hubungannya dengan Transendensi maka manusia menjadi eksistensi yang sungguh-sungguh; eksistensi baru mendapatkan kesadaran sebenarnya tentang keterbatasannya melalui Transendensi. Walaupun Transendensi seolah-olah berbicara melalui dunia tetapi Transendensi tidak dapat dibatasi oleh kategori-kategori, tidak pula hadir sebagai realitas empiris. Pengalaman eksistensial tentang Transendensi tidak dapat dirumuskan secara memuaskan, karena Transendensi itu merupakan realitas yang tidak terberikan, tidak dapat dikenal. Oleh karena itu kita tidak sanggup memikirkan Transendensi secara objektif (sebagai objek), maka manusia hanya dapat berbicara tentang pengalaman Transendensi secara simbolis . Transendensi hanya dapat dikenal melalui chiffre-chiffre atau ―tulisan-tulisan sandi‖. Istilah chiffre dalam bahasa Inggris chipher, berasal dari bahasa Arab Sifr berarti ―nol‖ atau ―kekosongan‖. Makna terminologi chiffre berarti simbol-simbol 69 atau tulisan yang menunjukkan pada Transendensi. Tulisan-tulisan sandi yang berarti simbol adalah adalah yang menandakan eksistensi dan Transendensi. Simbol yang memperantarai ―naskah‖ yang ―ditulis‖ oleh Allah, dan yang ―dibaca‖ manusia. Pembacaan terhadap naskah tersebut disebut ―metafisika‖. Ia dianggap juga sebagai ―Transendensi yang immanen‖, ―kehadiran Transendensi tanpa isi‖. Kehadiran dan ketidakhadiran menjadi satu di dalamnya. Tidak ada sesuatu apapun yang tidak dapat menjadi chiffre; alam, sejarah, kesadaran murni, manusia sebagai pribadi, kesatuan manusia dengan alamnya, kebebasan. Diantaranya terdapat bidang-bidang tertentu yang berbicara sangat jelas sebagai chiffre, seperti semua situasi batas, kebebasan, seni dan cinta . Bagi Jaspers, metafisika mempunyai tempat yang istimewa karena metafisika merupakan sistem spekulatif yang menjawab pertanyaan-pertanyaan paling dalam tentang Allah, manusia dan dunia, itu kini tidak mungkin lagi (Hamersma, 1983). Yang masih mungkin dipertanyakan dalam problem metafisika sebagai ―jalan mistik dalam pemikiran‖. Metafisika yang ―membaca‖ seluruh kenyataan sebagai buku yang ditulis Allah, dan yang hanya terdiri dari simbol-simbol . Upacara ritual ini merupakan ritual yang memiliki nilai sakral sangat penting bagi kehidupan mereka, sehingga upacara ritual ini tidak hanya dilaksanakan oleh mereka yang beragama Hindu, namun juga umat Islam. Peringatan upacara ritual "Kasada" yang sakral, unik serta sarat dengan nilai religi yang sangat tinggi ini telah dikenal oleh masyarakat luas, bahkan perkembangan terakhir ini momen tersebut dijadikan sebagai objek wisata, baik bagi turis domestik maupun mancanegara. Dalam pandangan Eliade, manusia dalam homo religious adalah tipe manusia yang hidup dalam suatu alam sakral, penuh nilai-nilai religius dan dapat menikmati sakralitas yang ada atau yang tampak pada alam semesta, alam materi, alam tumbuhtumbuhan, alam binatang dan manusia (Bertens, K,tt). Pengalaman dan penghayatan akan yang sakral ini lalu mempengaruhi, membentuk, serta ikut menentukan corak 70 cara hidupnya. Dalam konsepsi homo religious, dunia tidak hanya terdiri dari satu tingkat, tetapi terbangun atas dua dunia yakni: dunia bawah' yang dihuni sekarang ini, dan dunia atas' yang terdiri dari dunia para dewa, nenek moyang dan para pahlawan purba. Kedua dunia ini berhubungan satu sama lain oleh sebuah poros, axis mundi, poros dunia. Keyakinan akan adanya dunia atas' tersebut membuat homo religious rindu akan keberadaan dunia atas tersebut, dan setiap kali merindukannya ia harus melakukan ritual upacara-upacara yang sesuai dengan penciptaannya. Ironisnya, dunia seperti sekarang ini bukan lagi dunia yang murni, seperti pada saat baru lahir atau diciptakan oleh para dewa. Dunia sekarang ini telah jatuh, sudah rusak, makin bertambah umur dan menuju kehancuran. Karena itulah dunia ini setiap kali harus diperbaharui, dibangun dan diciptakan kembali. Kosmogoni merupakan model percontohan untuk segala macam tindakan kreatif dalam segala bidang pembaharuan, pembangunan dan penciptaan kembali. Maka pembaharuan dan penciptaan dunia dilakukan dengan upacara-upacara yang pada dasarnya merupakan tindak peragaan atau pengulangan kembali mitos kosmos . Simbolisme dan upacara-upacara yang berhubungan dengan perpindahan itu mengungkapkan suatu gagasan mengenai situasi hidup manusia di dunia ini. Sewaktu dilahirkan di dunia, manusia belum sempurna adanya. Untuk menjadi sempurna, manusia harus mengalami berbagai upacara perpindahan, upacara inisiasi, atau rite de passage. Dengan upacara itu manusia dipindahkan dari suatu tingkat hidup yang satu ke tingkat hidup yang lain. Dengan kata lain, manusia sempurna itu tidak terjadi dengan sendirinya melainkan harus dibuat, dibentuk. Upacara perpindahan, di mana manusia dinaikkan tingkat kehidupannya ini, bukan berasal dari mereka sendiri, melainkan dari nenek moyang, sebagai barang warisan yang berharga . Dalam pandangan Franz Magnis Suseno (2001), berbicara tentang pandangan hidup masyarakat Jawa bukanlah dalam pengertian agama dalam arti sempit (seperti pengertian yang selama ini berkembang di masyarakat Barat dan dunia pada 71 umumnya). Menurutnya, pandangan dunia Jawa menyangkut berbagai ritus-ritus, dalam menaman padi dan perayaan panenan, tentang kehidupan keluarga dan seni tari-tarian, tentang mistik dan susunan desa. Pandangan dunia orang Jawa digolongkannya menjadi empat lingkaran. Salah satu lingkaran adalah bersifat ekstrovet, yakni sikap terhadap dunia luar yang yang alami dengan kesatuan numinus (pengalaman spiritual) antara alam, masyarakat dan alam adi kodrati. Pengalaman ini terejawantah dalam berbagai ritus, tanpa refleksi eksplisit terhadap dimensi batin sendiri. Kesatuan masyarakat, alam dan alam adi kodrati sebetulnya terungkap dari kepercayaan bahwa setiap kejadian yang bersifat empiris selalu berkaitan dengan hal yang adi kodrati atau metaempiris. Kesatuan masyarakat, alam dan adikodrati ini diwujudkan dengan sikap hormat pada nenek moyang, melakukan ritual sesaji, slametan dan berbagai ritus lainnya. Karena setiap kejadian di alam empiris ini selalu terkait dengan alam adi kodrati, maka sesorang dalam perilakunya harus memperhatikan dan melakukan ritus-ritus tersebut sebagai upaya untuk menyelematkan diirinya dari berbagai kejadian yang tidak diinginkan. Lebih dari itu, agar segenap tindakannya terkontrol dengan baik, maka diciptakannya sistem klasifikasi tentang arah, tentang alam, dan kosmos. Dalam konteks inilah kemudian dikenal Buku Primbon, sebuah kitab yang berisi petunjukpetujuk yang baik dalam menjalankan aktivitas duniawi. Buku ini kemudian dijadikan rujukan untuk pengobatan penyakit, penentuan hari-hari yang baik, dan berbagai hal lainnya yang berhubungan dengan dunia adi kodrati . Upacara Kasada terdiri dari suatu deretan ritus dan ajaran-ajaran lisan. Tujuannya mengubah status religius dan sosial seseorang. Dengan menjalani berbagai upacara ini manusia mengalami perubahan eksistensial. Ia dilahirkan kembali menjadi manusia baru, manusia yang lain daripada sebelumnya. Oleh karena itu, masyarakat Tengger selalu mengadakan upacara untuk menghadapi tahap baru dalam 72 hidupnya. Misalnya, kelahiran, pernikahan, dan meninggal dunia, atau bahkan mengalami status perubahan religius dari masyarakat biasa menjadi tokoh spiritual atau dukun. Dengan menjalani upacara tersebut, juga terjadi semacam peralihan status. Dari status natural ke status religius dan kultural. Dalam relasinya dengan sosial, upacara tersebut mampu mengantar sosok individu menjadi manusia yang bertangung jawab pada lingkungannya, masyarakatnya dan bahkan tradisi nenek moyangnya. Sistem Simbol dalam Nalar Kearifan Dukun Dalam film Dances With Wolf yang dibintangi Kevin Costner digambarkan seorang kepala suku kebingungan mengambil sebuah keputusan yang berkaitan dengan kemaslahatan masyarakat banyak. Jalan yang kemudian ditempuh adalah meminta advise (nasihat) kapada dukun (penasihat spiritual) yang disaksikan oleh orang-orang penting dari suku (Sioux) di daerah tersebut. Ketika nasehat telah diberikan maka serta merta yang hadir akan mengamininya. Peryataan tunduk dan patuh kepada dukun bukan karena sifat otoriternya, karena dukun adalah simbol kebijaksanaan yang mempunyai kewenangan untuk itu. Sikap tunduk patuh semacam itu tidak bisa dilepaskan dari kharisma yang terpancar dari seorang dukun atau ketua adat. Dengan kata lain, ada wewenang yang bersifat karismatik pada diri dukun atau kepala adat. Wewenang kharismatik pada dasarnya merupakan wewenang yang bertumpu pada kualitas, yaitu suatu kemampuan khusus (kharisma) yang ada pada diri seseorang. Kemampuan khusus tadi melekat pada orang tersebut karena anugerah dari Tuhan yang Maha Esa. Orang-orang di sekitarnya mengakui adanya kemampuan yang dimilki atas dasar kepercayaan dan pemujaan, karena mereka menganggap bahwa sumber kemampuan tersebut adalah sesuatu yang berada di atas kemampuan manusia. Sebagai seorang dukun yang mampu memusatkan suatu takaran kakuatan 73 kosmis yang besar dalam dirinya sendiri. Sumber kepercayaan itu muncul karena pernah terbukti manfaat dan kegunaannya bagi masyarakat. Demikian pula yang tergambar dalam prototipe dukun (ketua adat) di Masyarakat Tengger. Untuk menjadi seorang dukun harus memenuhi kreteria tertentu antara lain: a) pernah menjadi legen selama beberapa tahun, b) hafal sebagian besar mantra-mantra yang dibacakan pada bermacam-macam jenis upacara adat, c) telah memenuhi sebagian syarat lain yang harus dipenuhi oleh pemangku adat Tengger, dan d) seseorang dapat diangkat menjadi calon dukun, apabila di tahun sebelumnya (dalam 44 hari sebelum Kasada) di desa tempat tinggal calan dukun tersebut tidak ada orang meninggal dunia. Penetapan menjadi dukun dilakukan dengan upacara sakral pada waktu Hari Raya Kasada dengan disaksikan oleh para pejabat, pemimpin parisade dan para pemangku adat dan sebagian masyarakat Hindu Tengger yang hadir pada waktu itu. Dengan kreteria yang begitu ketat bisa dipahami bahwa dukun adalah tokoh adat yang sangat dihormati dan berkharisma. Kharisma yang dimiliki oleh seseorang dukun berimplikasi pada proses internalisasi nilai tradisi yang lebih mudah. Ini dapat terjadi karena interaksi sosial berlangsung dengan kekuatan kharisma maka yang dominan adalah pengaruh sugesti dari ketua adat. Proses sugesti bisa terjadi karena kelompok masyarakat menganggap apapun yang dikatakan oleh ketua adat adalah sebuah kebenaran yang harus diamini. Para pemuka upacara keagamaan dalam berbagai macam religi dari berbagai macam suku bangsa di dunia biasanya dapat dibagi ke dalam 3 golongan, yaitu (1) Pendeta, (2) Dukun, dan (3) Syaman. Dalam upacara ritual Kasada ini pemuka upacara keagamaan dilaksanakan oleh dukun yang dibantu oleh para legen, yang diikuti oleh: a). Para dukun. b). Masyarakat Tengger yang telah menyebar di 4 Kabupaten: Probolinggo, Malang, Pasuruan, dan Lumajang. 74 Para pelaku tersebut adalah pemuka agama selaku pemimpin dan diikuti oleh orang-orang yang satu keyakinan. Peran pemimpin upacara dalam suatu kegiatan ritus agar kegiatan dapat berjalan sesuai tujuan kosmologis yang akan dicapai, pemimpin juga berfungsi sebagai mediator yang dianggap mampu menghubungkan antara alam gaib dengan masyarakat pengikutnya. Karena kegiatan ritus ini dianggap sakral, di mana salah satu akibatnya jika tidak dihadapi dengan hati-hati dapat menimbulkan bahaya terhadap diri seseorang, maka petunjuk dan arahan pemuka agama atau pemimpin kegiatan ritus sangat besar pengaruhnya. Meskipun arus deras perubahan sosial terus menghantam masyarakat Tengger, yang prosesnya terjadi melalui perkembangan pariwisata, namun upaya menjaga kelestarian berbagai tradisi dilakukan dengan pelembagaan secara formal melalui aparatur pemerintah desa. Maka tidak heran kemudian dalam proses pemilihan kepala desa bukan hanya persoalan kemampuan manajemen kepemimpinan modern semata, tetapi bagaimana sosok kepala desa yang dipilih adalah sosok kharismatik, utamanya mampu menjaga kearifan-kearifan lokal turun temurun yang diwarisi hingga generasi sekarang. Eksistensi Mitos dan Metafisika Masyarakat Tengger Kebenaran tentang sesuatu realitas (being) bukanlah masalah kesesuaian antara pemahaman atau konsep atau esensi dan realitas objektif atau things in itself, melainkan penyingkapan realitas tersebut. Satu-satunya media bagi penyingkapan things in itself itu adalah eksistensi manusia itu sendiri sebagai knower, interpreter, atau subjek yang mengetahui, membicarakan dan menyingingkapkan. Senyatanya, manusia dalam menyingkapkan dan memahami sesuatu tidak bisa melepaskan dari faktisitas eksistensialnya, dari nilai-nilai miliu yang melingkupinya. Makna tentang ada selalu hanya bisa dimengerti dan diinterpretasikan melalui eksistensi manusia. Oleh karena itu, hermeneutika tidak lebih dari suatu penafsiran diri manusia itu sendiri. Kenyataan ini menunjukkan bahwa Ada selalu di dalam ruang waktu, dan 75 kefaktaan inilah yang disebut Heidegger dengan Dasein (Heidegger,1962). Sedangkan Gadamer menggambarkan kefaktaan ini dengan istilah Vorurteil. Jadi, hermeneutika eksistensial menegaskan bahwa upaya memahami dan menafsirkan sesuatu tidak bisa dilepaskan dari eksistensi manusia atau ruang waktu manusia yang sedang mengetahui. Secara tradisional, Being atau "Ada" dimengerti sebagai tidak memiliki batasbatas waktu dan ruang. Pemahaman being dalam arti ini berlangsung lama sejak filsafat Yunani yang tergambar dalam perdebatan para ahli metafisika, kemudian masuk ke periode filsafat abad tengah, sampai era modern, era filsafat Enlightenment (Siswanto, 2004). Bagi Heidegger, "ada" dalam pengertian tersebut di atas menjadi sesuatu yang tidak mungkin, karena bagaimanapun "ada" selalu terkait dengan "waktu", "Ada" selalu dimaknai oleh manusia dalam konteks ruang dan waktu tertentu. Bagi Heidegger, seperti ditulis oleh Chatterjee (1973): "man‟s being is situated, situated in time and place".(keberadaan manusia disituasikan, disituasikan dalam ruang dan waktu). Dengan kata lain, keberadaan manusia itu selalu situasional. Keberadaan manusia inilah yang menentukan "ada", bukan "ada" yang menentukan manusia. Keberadaan manusia yang situasional inilah yang melahirkan suatu pemahaman tertentu, dan perbedaan situasilah yang menimbulkan perbedaan pemahaman. Oleh karena itu, "ada" bergantung pada faktisitas eksistensial manusia, bukan sebaliknya. Man's being there menunjukkan bahwa eksistensi manusia selalu bersifat thrown into a world (terlempar ke dalam suatu dunia). Dunia di sini berarti suatu ruang-waktu, situasi, lingkungan, konteks sosio-politis-kultural-filosofis religius atau mudahnya suatu tradisi tertentu. Hal ini secara konkret bisa dilihat dengan cara menyadari keberadaan kita masing-masing. Misalnya kita dilahirkan dalam keluarga muslim taat tertentu, dalam lingkungan sosial atau tradisi Islami tertentu pula, maka cara kita mengetahui sesuatu khususnya lagi tentang keislaman selalu berangkat dari nilai-nilai, prinsip-prinsip, kepercayaan-kepercayaan, pandangan-pandangan yang 76 diberikan oleh tradisi di dalam mana kita hidup, dibentuk dan dipengaruhi. Pengaruh situasi kita dalam tradisi inilah yang merupakan tempat darimana kita memperoleh warisan pengetahuan, sikap-sikap, pandangan-pandangan, dan kepercayaankepercayaan, dan merupakan tempat keterbukaan awal kita mengetahui dan memahami dunia lain. Dalam konsepsi Heidegger seperti itu berarti dia menganggap persepsipersepsi a priori faktor penting dalam memahami sesuatu, Kesadaran subjek dalam memahami dan memproyeksikan makna sesuatu tidak harus dianggap sebagai suatu tabula rasa sebagaimana ini muncul dalam fenomenologi Husserl‖. Bagi Heidegger, persepsi diri atau sikap a priori tidak harus dibuang atau dikesampingkan, karena hal ini tidaklah mungkin. Sikap a priori adalah isi dari kesadaran seorang knower sebagai wujud internalisasi nilai-nilai dari tradisi yang mengitarinya. Sikap ini tidak negatif tetapi justru sebaliknya. Ia sebagai keterbukaan awal dalam menghadapai suatu realitas, dan bukan sebagai tujuan. Sebagai sebuah kondisi awal, ia kemudian mengembangkan horisonnya secara dialektik dengan the others. Masyarakat Tengger adalah konstruksi masyarakat yang dengan segala pengalaman hidupnya, situasi dan kondisi yang mengitarinya dalam memandang hidup dan dunia, memahami dan menginterpretasikan hidup, alam dan lingkungannya sebagaimana faktisitasnya, miliu yang melingkupinya. Oleh karena itu jika dilihat dari lingkup masyarakat Tengger yang sarat dengan bahasa eksistensial dan nilai-nilai religius, maka masyarakat Tengger dalam memandang hidup dan keterkaitannya dengan dunia sana' sangat terpengaruh dengan simbol-simbol eksistensial tersebut. Terkait dengan mitos Jaka Tengger dan Rara Anteng dapat dilihat dengan: Pertama, dalam memahami mitos bukan hanya berhenti ketika ditemukan bangunan logika yang mendasarinya, akan tetapi memahami mitos harus lebih diperluas, dan diperdalam pada budaya masyarakat tersebut. Kedua, dimunculkan konsep mytheme (miteme), suatu konsep yang menghubungan relasi-relasi terkait antar tokoh. 77 Pentingya untuk mengungkap keterkaitan antar tokoh agar dapat dikuak apa yang sebenarnya terjadi. Ketiga, menggunakan konsep fonem yang bersifat universal namun juga kultural, fonem berada dalam peralihan dari nature ke culture. Fonem adalah sebuah tanda yang tidak bermakna dan tidak mempunyai acuan, ia dapat bermakna ketika telah dirangkai dalam suatu kata atau morfem. Konsep ini diterapkan dalam fenomena pernikahan antar kelompok, pertukaran sosial, dan relasirelasi-relasi kekerabatan serta strategi analisis struktural yang menghubungkan relasirelasi sosial dengan relasi-relasi lain dalam mitos. Di samping itu, dalam pandangan Levi-Struss, mitos dimaknai dalam dua hal, yakni model off dan model for. Model off berarti mitos dipandang sebagai model untuk menafsirkan berbagai peristiwa yang terjadi, dan dalam kerangka berpikir tertentu, yang kemudian tidak menimbulkan kebingungan dan kecemasan. Sementara model for, berarti mitos dijadikan model untuk membangun sebuah kehidupan sosial yang diinginkan, dicita-citakan, sehingga mitos menjadi sumber inspirasi untuk mengatasi berbagai kesulitan yang dihadapi. Pemahaman mengenai model mitos ini sangat baru untuk kemudian bisa diterapkan dalam memahami mitos yang berlalu lalang di atas kita. Paradigma masyarakat Tengger tentang alam bersifat relasional, artinya alam dipahami sebagai sesuatu yang tidak bersifat material, tetapi spiritual. Keyakinan transendensi pada alam diejewantahkan dalam sebuah cara pandang yang melihat bahwa alamlah yang mampu memberi mereka kebutuhan ekonomis. Oleh karena itu, manusia dilarang untuk merusak alam, dan tindakan yang paling arif adalah menyelaraskan diri dengan alam. Ketika berbagai bencana alam terjadi pada mereka maka mitos-mitos yang berhubungan dengan kemurkaan alam sangat dominan mewarnai pola pikir masyarakat Tengger. Mitos memang merupakan ekspresi yang sangat hidup mengenai relasi manusia dengan ruang lingkupnya dan keseluruhan lingup hidupnya. Ia menjelaskan 78 tentang dirinya, asal usulnya, legitimasi kekuasannya, nasib dan keberutungannya, bahkan hidup dan kematiannya. Tetapi tidak hanya mengenai dirinya, melainkan mengenai relasinya dengan alam. Api, angin, laut, petir dan seterusnya semua dalam mitos bukanlah tampil sebagaimana adanya. Singkatnya, seluruh aktivitas alam sangat terkait dengan eksistensi manusia. Begitu juga dalam masyarakat Tengger yang mempercayai mitos Rara Anteng dan Jaka Tengger merupakan bentuk kepatuhan manusia kepada Sang Hyang Widhi (menjalankan perintah agama) dan mau bekerja keras untuk kelangsungan hidupnya dengan tetap mengedepankan kelestarian alam, yakni terwujudnya kearifan ekologis, agar manusia tidak mendapatkan murka dari alam yang mempunyai kekuatan otonom. Ketakutan pada kekuatan alam memaksa alam inilah yang berdampak pada refleksi hidup sehari-hari, yakni. Pertama, kepatuhan mereka pada tradisi nenek moyang. Kedua, konsep hidup yang menyatu dengan alam, hidup sederhana, jujur, penuh toleransi, ramah dan suka bergotong royong. Hal ini juga menggambarkan budaya spiritual yang bersifat non-fisik nampak terlihat dalam perilaku, sikap hidup penduduk yang toleran, dan patuh pada pemimpin. Mitos Rara Anteng dan Jaka Tengger merupakan bahasa peleburan eksistensi manusia. Eksitensi manusia yang dilebur untuk bisa menumbuhkan eksitensieksitensi yang baru. Sebuah bentuk pengorbanan yang dilakukan oleh anak terakhir pasangan Rara Anteng dan Jaka Tengger tentu saja bukan hanya sekedar keteladanan nilai pengorbanan dalam setiap hidup itu sangat dibutuhkan meskipun dirinya sendiri menjadi korban, tetapi lebih dari itu, bahwa makna eksistensi manusia sangat terkait dengan relasinya dengan yang lain. Karena bersentuhannya dengan yang lain menimbulkan ke-ego-an manusia disublimasikan begitu rupa untuk sebuah tujuan yang lebih tinggi, yakni hidup selaras dengan Tuhan, manusia dan alam. Identitas Lokal yang Tetap Permanen 79 Pada masyarakat suku Tengger, upacara adat yang dikaitkan dengan nilai-nilai keberagamaan yang mereka anut dan diyakini kebenarannya senantiasa dilakukan dengan memperhatikan berbagai prosedur dan tata cara pelaksanaannya. Sistem upacara keagamaan meliputi sistem nilai dan sistem norma keagamaan, ajaran kesusilaan, dan ajaran doktrin religius lainnya yang mengatur tingkah laku manusia dalam kehidupan bermasyarakat sekaligus menjadi rujukan bertindak. Sehubungan dengan hal tersebut, menurut Muhaimin (1989) dalam Problematika Agama Dalam Kehidupan Manusia' mengemukakan: Di dalam segala aspek kehidupan, manusia membutuhkan rasa kepercayaan, termasuk di dalamnya aspek agama. Kenyataan menunjukkan bahwa sering kali dijumpai bentuk-bentuk kepercayaan yang berbeda, masing-masing bentuk itu kemungkinannya mengandung nilai-nilai kebenaran dan kepalsuan yang bercampur baur. Oleh karena itu, faktor kepercayaan mutlak dalam agama, malahan agama tiada lain dan suatu bentuk yang diakui dan diterima sebagai kebenaran yang tertinggi atau mutlak. Pernyataan di atas secara implisit menggambarkan manusia sebagai makhluk religius wajib mempercayai agamanya sebagai suatu kebenaran yang harus dipatuhi dan diyakini. Segala aspek kehidupan manusia yang landasannya sudah diatur di dalam agamanya lalu diwujudkan dalam kehidupan sehari-hari, sehingga mempunyai arah yang jelas. Semua prosedur upacara religius pada masyarakat Tengger juga mengalami hal seperti dijelaskan di atas. Bahkan masyarakat adat Tengger sangat patuh dan taat pada semua aturan yang telah disepakati. Melalui peran dukun dan para pemuka atau tokoh masyarakat kharismatik, orang Tengger sangat memperhatikan semua prosedur yang telah ditetapkan untuk mendukung kelangsungan suatu upacara. Karena upacara merupakan bagian hidup dan sekaligus menjadi simbol dalam memaknai hidup dan berinteraksi dengan lainnya. Ketakutan pada kekuatan alam inilah yang berdampak pada refleksi hidup sehari-hari, yakni; pertama, sangat patuh terhadap kepercayaan pada zaman Majapahit dan melakukan 80 upacara penuh kepatuhan; kedua, konsep hidup yang menyatu dengan alam, hidup sederhana, jujur, penuh toleransi, ramah, suka bekerja keras, dan gotong royong . Dalam konsepsi homo religious, kisah-kisah tentang penciptaan dunia dan segala peristiwa yang mengakibatkan dunia ini ada tersimpan dalam mitos-mitos kosmogonis dan mitos-mitos asal usul. Mitos kosmogonis mengkisahkan terjadinya dunia secara keseluruhan. Mitos asal-usul mengisahkan segala kejadian asal-usul segala yang ada di dunia sekarang ini. Seperti manusia, binatang, pulau, tempat suci, tumbuh-tumbuhan dan seterusnya. Kisah mitos kosmogonis terjadi di alam dahulu kala, di waktu suci, yang dilakukan oleh para dewa, para leluhur, dan nenek moyang. Dalam pandangan masyarakat Tengger kisah-kisah mitos itu benar dan tak terbantahkan. Mereka mengalami sendiri apa saja akibat terhadap dirinya dari segala peristiwa yang dikisahkan dalam mitos mitos tersebut. Oleh karena itu, masyarakat Tengger juga mencari-cari norma-norma bagi kehidupannya. Bagi mereka mitos lalu merupakan arketipe, bersifat eksemplaris dan paradigmatis, yang wajib diteladani. Transmisi norma ini secara struktural melalui para dukun yang kharismatik, di samping melalui keluarga. Mereka beranggapan bahwa segala perbuatan manusia tidak mempunyai nilai dan arti pada dirinya sendiri. Tindakan manusia hanya akan mempunyai arti dan nilai kalau meneladani tindak paradigmatis sebagaimana dikisahkan dalam mitos-mitos. Norma tata kelakuan, yakni meneladan mitos-mitos ini berlaku untuk segala macam perbuatan manusia, baik dalam ritus atau upacara, dalam menanam tumbuh-tumbuhan, berburu hewan, ataupun pada sikap sesama manusia. Nilai-nilai dan norma-norma seolah-olah menjadi polisi lalu lintas yang mengatur masyarakat. Ketaatan untuk menjalankan tradisi leluhur adalah sesuatu yang tidak bisa ditawar lagi. Hal itu terwujud dari begitu banyaknya model upacara adat yang tetap mereka laksanakan. Bagi suatu masyarakat Tengger, terutama pada masa-masa kelahiran, pernikahan, kematian merupakan persimpangan lalu lintas 81 lintas, ketika dewa-dewa dan mitos-mitos kuno menjalankan fungsinya. Era kultural dalam kebudayaan menurut Ibrahim Ibn Sayyar an-Nadham–seorang pemikir Mu'tazilah ternama–terdapat kemungkinan ada dua gerakan, yakni gerakan statis (harakah i'timad) yaitu gerakan yang tetap pada tempatnya semula, dan gerakan dinamis (harakah naqlah) gerakan yang mengakibatkan perpindahan dari satu tempat satu ke tempat yang lain (Al Jabiri, 1993). Yang terjadi dalam gerakan statis adalah fase-fase pemikiran senantiasa bersifat akumulatif, tumpang tindih dan saling kompetensi, ia tidak ―menyatu‖ dan juga tidak ―terbagi‖. Dan yang terpenting bagi saya adalah bahwa gerakan dalam kebudayaan masyarakat Tengger merupakan gerakan statis, dengan demikian era kultural masyarakat Tengger adalah era yang ―stagnan‖ . Era kultural masyarakat Tengger dapat dikelompokkan menjadi empat era. (1). Era kerajaan Majapahit, era di mana identitas lokal masih menunjukkan kemurniannya. (2). Era agama Hindu-Budha yang masuk pada masyarakat Tengger, era ini kedua peradaban kultural terlibat intens, tetapi tetap saja mereka dalam melaksanakan kegiatan keagamaannya tidak menunjukkan ciri sebagai pemeluk agama Budha; (3). Era Islam (kerajaan Mataram Islam) yang tak mampu mempengaruhinya, perlawanan demi perlawanan dilakukan oleh masyarakat Tengger, baik secara politik maupun budaya; (4). Era penjajah atau kolonial Belanda yang mampu menguasai' wilayah Tengger. Lantas, persoalannya adalah apa yang tetap permamen dalam kesadaran kognitif masyarakat tengger ketika harus melewati empat era kultural yang bergelombang, berputar, memanjang, konflik ontologis dan bahkan secara intens bergumul?. Menurut saya, yang tetap ada dan permanen adalah sistem pengetahuan lokal dalam memandang hidup, dunia, dan lingkungannya. Inilah salah satu dimensi ontologis yang tetap melekat dalam kesadaran masyarakat Tengger. 82 Catatan Kritis dan Kesimpulan Melacak dimensi metafisik dalam upacara Kasada tidak hanya sekedar melihat ritual tersebut dari dimensi empiris belaka. Di samping nilai-nilai ketimuran sangat kuat dalam ritual tersebut, namun pelacakan dimensi metafisik melampaui simpulan sementara orang yang melihat bahwa dunia timur adalah dunia atau hidup yang dibangun di atas paradigma harmonis, selaras, dan sebangun dan seterusnya. Pertanyaannya sekarang, betulkah dimensi metafisik dunia timur demikian?. Jika bicara dalam konteks peradaban, maka sebuah peradaban akan hancur kalau tidak mengikuti arah metafisik tersebut. Persoalannya lagi adalah dalam keselarasan, apakah tidak ada sesuatu yang berubah?. Tetap dan berubah adalah problem penting yang harus ditemukan dalam berbagai ritual di dunia ketimuran. Di samping itu, pembicaran metafisika juga harus terkait dengan keilmuan lain. Jika dalam konteks tertentu, dibutuhkan analisis yang harus meminjam filsafat agama', maka mengapa tidak? Toh, dalam refleksi filsafat agama juga mengarah pada pencarian dimensi metafisik. Karena itu, pembicaraan metafisik lebih dari sekedar itu. Metafisika melacak, memaknai, merefleksikan dan bahkan bisa menjadi pengarah dalam memaknai dunia ke depan. Ini terbukti dalam, pencarian dimensi metafisik yang dilakukan oleh para filsuf Yunani. Ketika mitos begitu luas menggejala dan bahkan membakar dunia, maka filsafat datang memadamkannya dengan mampu menemukan the first principle dari setiap pengada. Masyarakat Tengger dengan segala ritual dan upacara Kasada yang diwarnai dengan mitos, dapat ditemukan dimensi metafisiknya adalah kehidupan untuk semua. 83 Daftar Bacaan: Al-Jabiri, M. Abid.,1993, Naqd al-„Aql al-„Arabi, tt ___________1993., ―Bunyah al- Aql al- Arabi‖, Dirasah Tahliliyah li Nazum AlSaqa fi al-„Arabi, al-Markaz as Saqo fi al- Arabiyyah. Beirut Beatty, Andrew.,2001, Variasi Agama di Jawa Suatu Pendekatan Antropologi, Murai Kencana, Jakarta. Bertens, K. ―Yang Sakral dan Yang Profan dalam Penghayatan Tradisional Homo Religious Menurut Mircea Eliade‖. Jurnal Ulumul Qur‟an.tt Chatterjee., 1973, Margaret The Existentialist Outlook, Orient Longman Ltd, New Delhi. Cassirer, Ernst.,1990, Manusia dan Kebudayaan, Sebuah Esai tentang Manusia, PT Gramedia Utama, Jakarta. Hamersma, Harry.,1983 ―Eksistensi dan Transendensi dalam Metafisika Karl Jaspers‖, dalam Manusia Multidimensional: Sebuah Renungan Filsafat, M. Sastrapratedja (ed.), Gramedia, Jakarta. Heidegger, Martin., 1962, Being and Time, terj. J. Marquairie, et-al, Harper & Row, New York. Juli, Astutik., 2003, ―Makna Ritual Upacara Kasada dalam Perspektif Antropologi‖, dalam Agama Tradisional, LKiS, Yogyakarta. Magnis-Suseno, Frans.,1985, Etika Jawa: Sebuah Analisa Falsafi tentang Kebijaksanaan Hidup Jawa, Gramedia, Jakarta. Mangunhardjono,1983., ―Homo Religious menurut Mircea Aliade‖, dalam Manusia Multidimensional: Sebuah Renungan Filsafat, M. Sastrapratedja (ed.), Gramedia, Jakarta. Muslimin, 1996. "Pengaruh Kepemimpinan Uwa' terhadap Motivasi dan Disiplin Kerja Masyarakat Tolotang di Kabupaten Sidrap". Tesis, Universitas Hasanuddin Ujung Pandang. Nurudin (ed.)., 2003, Agama Tradisional: Potret Keraifan Hidup Masyarakat Samin dan Tengger, Lkis, Yogyakarta. Simanhadi, Widyaprakoso.,1994. Masyarakat Tengger: Latar Belakang Daerah Taman Nasional Bromo,Kanisius, Yogyakarta. 84 Siswanto, Joko., 2004, Metafisika Sistematik, Taman Pustaka Kristen, Yogyakarta. Sontaq, Frederick., 2001, Pengantar Metafisika,Pustaka Pelajar, Yogyakarta. Supriyano dan Wirtayuhangga, Misjana.,1991,Di balik Keindahan Gunung Bromo. Tanpa Penerbit, Probolinggo. Suyitno dan Sapari, Achmad.,1999.Mengenal Masyarakat Tengger. Media Alas Dayu, Surabaya:. Tuanaya, Malik M. Thoha., 2000. "Pura dan Masjid: Konflik dan Integrasi Pada Suku Tengger", Tesis, Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang. Peursen, Van,C. A,.1988, Strategi Kebudayaan, Kanisius, Yogyakarta. -------------------------------------------- 85 Apabila dua tulisan sebelumnya berkaitan dengan bekerjanya nalar sebagai usaha manusia untuk menunjukkan dan mempertahankan eksistensi, maka pemahaman masyarakat Baduy yang dipaparkan oleh Arip Senjaya akan meringkas sekaligus membandingkan apa dan bagaimana kesalahpahaman umum terhadap masyarakat Baduy bertahan dalam pola enkripsi tradisi yang khas. Jalan yang dipakai mengenkripsi nalar kosmogologis (metafisika khusus) yang pada gilirannya menentukan posisi identitas Baduy berbasis kesadaran memerankan kategori metafisika umum: „orang pertama‟. Di dalam kesadaran tradisi Baduy, nalar memahami penciptaan semesta, menggubah karakter manusia Baduy dalam bersikap dan bagaimana peran serta relasi yang mesti dilakoni dari tiap-tiap perannya. Semua itu dilakukan dalam suatu intensionalitas penuh yang tertuju pada sistem kosmogoni yang menjadi living, bukan hanya ajaran. Nalar masyarakat Baduy „dimainkan‟ tidak hanya di level sistem peran-peran kemanusiaan, tetapi menyusun etika kontekstual terhadap alam dan lingkungan. Kesadaran kosmologis yang demikian living, dikerjakan bukan tanpa konsistensi nalar yang mengagumkan tetapi dalam suatu sistem perantingan pengetahuan nan logis jika ditilik dalam bahasa masyarakat modern. Apabila kosmologi berbicara melulu pada ke-semesta-an, Baduy menambahkan seperangkat „etika‟ yang menjadi satu bagian dengan sistem kosmologi umum, unique. „Etika‟ tidak menjadi pemandu apa itu „baik dan buruk‟ tetapi terluaskan, melibatkan peran nalar yang rasionable untuk menunjukkan kenapa memperhatikan „etika‟ menjadi penting. Intensionalitas itu digubah merupakan semacam strategi survival kolektif yang dilakukan melalui perangkat ini, etika, tetapi bersambung atau tidak terpisah dari kerangka acuan kosmologis opat buana masyarakat Baduy. Survivalitas tidak hanya berkutat pada sistem sosial dan pranata (tradisi) yang menjadi rumah bermainnya nalar, Baduy menyumbang teori bagi masyarakat modern bahwa: strategi sosial tidak melulu berpusar pada bagaimana aktor bermain dalam suatu 86 field. Pemimpin tidak harus menduduki sistem sosial yang tinggi-sebagaimana lazim dianut dalam logika sistem sosial modern-tetapi pemimpin justru bertugas memandu, menjamin perantingan pengetahuan (tradisi) tetap berlangsung dalam kesadaran etik-kosmologis. Kosmologi Orang Baduy: Sistem Opat Buana' Arip Senjaya (Dosen Universitas Sultan Ageng Tirtayasa, Banten) Identitas Nusantara Nusantara' agaknya lebih tepat dipahami sebagai sebuah wilayah kulturalkultural, tradisi-tradisi, adat-adat, filsafat-filsafat, agama-agama, identitas-identitas, merupakan tempat dari kumpulan keberbedaan. Nusantara' adalah wilayah yang tidak bisa diimajinasikan sebagai sebuah teks' tunggal. Oleh karena itu, menurut Ahimsa-Putra (2008: 1) tidak mungkin ada sebuah filsafat yang mencakup seluruh suku bangsa [di Nusantara]'. Dengan demikian semboyan negara yang berbunyi Bhineka Tunggal Ika adalah semboyan yang menerangkan keberbedaan-keberbedaan dalam ketunggalan negara-Indonesia, sebagai ruang geografis-bukan tunggal dalam satu kultur, atau dalam satu tradisi, atau dalam filsafat, sehingga nusantara' berada dalam keIndonesia-an dalam konteks geografis, namun konsep ke-Indonesia-an sendiri tidak mencakup seluruh konsep nusantara'. Karena pemahaman semacam itulah, kita sering mendengar pula orang Malaysia menyebut dirinya berada di Nusantara. Jadi, istilah nusantara' tidak identik dengan Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia 87 (bandingkan dengan penjelasan Ahimsa Putra yang mengatakan bahwa nusantara' identik dengan Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, 2008: 1). Meskipun esensinya demikian, nusantara' sebagai ruang bagi berlangsungnya keberbedaan-keberbedaan kultural, masih dapat memberi kita rangsangan berpikir positif' bahwa persamaan-persamaan itu sebenarnya ada. Adakah sebab lain yang menyatukan keberbedaan-keberbedaan itu selain persamaan-persamaannya? Sekelumit tulisan ini akan menunjukkan fenomena perbendaharaan filsafat yang melimpah dari masyarakat terasing' Baduy. Selanjutnya, penggunaan nama ―Baduy‖, dan bukan ―Badui‖, disesuaikan dengan kebiasaan penulisan masyarakat di Jawa Barat dan Banten. Dalam penulisan ini dipakai beberapa sumber literer tentang Baduy. Penulis menyertakan hasil pengamatan langsung ketika penulis secara sengaja mengamati masyarakat Baduy, meski secara relatif. Ditambah beberapa kali perjumpaan secara langsung dengan sengaja mengunjungi orang Badui serta perjumpaan tidak langsung dengan beberapa orang dari masyarakat Baduy luar yang sering ditemui di sekitar Kota Serang, Banten. Kosmologi Masyarakat Baduy Meskipun terpencil, masyarakat Baduy dan Sakai memiliki konsepsi khusus dalam memandang alam. Cara pandang tersebut melahirkan reaksi terhadap alam yang demikian mengagumkan. Juga persepsinya terhadap Tuhan', atau hal lain yang diagungkan, dipertuhankan. Paham kosmologis tersebut pada gilirannya memberikan tatacara tersendiri sebagai pernyataan eksistensialitas dirinya, eksistensi individual dan eksistensi kolektif. Tentu saja dua masyarakat itu tidak secara eksplisit menyatakan cara pandangnya sebagai sistem kosmologis dan pernyataan eksistansialisme, tetapi sikap hidup, behavior mereka itulah yang jika dikonstruksi 88 dapat tersusun sebuah sistem kosmologi. Menurut Olshewsky (1969: 4) mengkontruksi sebuah pandangan adalah salah satu kategori dari penelitian filsafat. Sebuah pengkontruksian dimungkinkan bila tujuan penelitian adalah tidak untuk menangani sebuah masalah. Baduy: Pergulatan Kultural Adminsitratif Apakah Baduy dapat disebut milik' Jawa Barat? Ataukah Baduy harus dikatakan milik Banten? Judul tulisan Judistira Garna "Orang Baduy di Jawa: Sebuah Studi Kasus Mengenai Adaptasi Suku Asli terhadap Pembangunan" (dalam Ghee dan Gomes, 1993: 142-160) adalah judul yang dapat menengahi problem rebutan klaim' antara Jawa Barat-daerah penutur Sunda-dan Banten sebagai provinsi baru yang wilayahnya terbagi dalam dua masyarakat penutur bahasa, Sunda dan Jawa. Di sisi lain Baduy adalah milik Jawa karena berada di Pulau Jawa. Alasan masyarakat Jawa Barat mengklaim Baduy sebagai bagian dari dirinya semata karena masyarakat Baduy menggunakan bahasa Sunda. Artinya, secara kultural, Jawa Barat dan Baduy adalah identik. Namun, mesti diingat bahwa istilah kultural tidak bisa direduksi ke dalam kemiripan bahasa semata. Sedangkan masyarakat Banten mengklaim Baduy sebagai bagian dari dirinya, karena alasan administratif: wilayah Baduy kini berada di wilayah Provinsi Banten. Ada pula sebagian masyarakat yang tinggal di Banten (terutama wilayah Pandeglang dan Lebak) yang mengklaim dengan alasan bahasa, bukan dengan alasan administratif, karena dua wilayah yang disebutkan tadi diisi oleh masyarakat penutur bahasa Sunda. Sedangkan wilayah Serang tidak terlalu merasa memiliki Baduy secara kultural, karena masyarakat Serang adalah pengguna bahasa Jawa Cirebonan, bukan bahasa Jawa yang digunakan oleh masyarakat Yogyakarta. Sedangkan masyarakat Banten yang tinggal wilayah Tangerang dan Cilegon, adalah masyarakat yang sudah hidup dengan dirinya sendiri: dua kota ini memiliki kebudayaan yang berbeda, kebudayaan perkotaan, tempat bercampurnya bermacam 89 bahasa: Jawa, Sunda, ada pula penutur-penutur lain seperti Batak, Lampung, Betawi, dan Makassar. Di beberapa pesisir Banten, di kampung-kampung nelayan, hidup orang-orang yang secara kultural tidak dapat disebut Sunda atau Jawa, karena pada umumnya mereka adalah masyarakat Bugis, seperti yang nampak di daerah Karang Antu. Oleh karena itu Baduy akan didudukkan dalam konsteks kultural: yakni sebuah masyarakat yang memiliki ciri-ciri kebudayaan yang tidak bisa begitu saja disamakan dengan masyarakat Sunda yang tinggal di Jawa Barat atau di Banten. Dengan cara itulah tercipta pembatasan antara Baduy dan bukan Baduy sehingga memudahkan pengamatan terhadap aspek-aspek filosofi masyarakatnya. Cara Pandang terhadap Manusia ―Baduy‖ kadang ditulis ―Badui‖, dan keduanya adalah sama. Namun, di dalam peta, nama Baduy atau Badui itu tidak ada (kecuali dalam peta wisata). Di dalam peta, kita akan melihat nama-nama kampung, seperti Kanekes, Cibeo, Ciboloeger, Gajeboh; karena nama ―Baduy‖ adalah nama kultural, nama identitas, yang diberikan oleh mereka yang pada zaman dulu hijrah dari agama asal (Hindu) ke agama baru (Islam). Istilah ―Baduy‖ adalah istilah yang distempelkan oleh mereka yang sudah masuk Islam itu kepada masyarakat lainnya yang tidak mau memeluk Islam, sebagaimana masyarakat Baduy di jazirah Arab yang tidak mau memeluk Islam (van Hoevell dalam Garna melalui Ghee dan Gomes, 1993: 144-145). Ada pula yang menghubungkan nama ―Baduy‖ dengan ―Budha‖ karena disinyalir agama masyarakat Baduy itu adalah Budha (lihat pendapat Spanoghe dalam Garna melalui Ghee dan Gomes, 1993: 144). Ada pula yang menghubungkan nama tersebut dengan nama sungai Cibaduyut' yang terletak di Jawa Barat. Mereka dinamai Baduy' sebab mereka adalah orang-orang yang pada zaman keruntuhan Kerajaan Pajajaran, berlari dan bersembunyi di daerah-daerah sekitar sungai Cibaduyut. Garna (dalam Ghee dan Gomes, 1993: 144) menghubungkan nama 90 Baduy' dengan nama sungai yang membentang di perkampungan mereka, Sungai Cibaduy. Beragam tafsiran terhadap istilah ―Baduy‖ menandakan bahwa memang pemBaduy-an itu adalah pelabelan dari pihak luar kepada mereka yang tinggal di perkampungan Baduy. Orang-orang Baduy sendiri, apabila mereka disapa di perjalanan, tidak akan pernah mau disebut orang Baduy'. Mereka akan menyebut kampung mereka, misalnya orang Kanekes', atau orang Gajeboh'. Dari sini, secara sederhana, dapat diturunkan satu sisi identitas masyarakat Baduy, bahwa mereka- meskipun bertahun-tahun lamanya disebut ―orang Baduy‖-tidak akan mengatakan diri mereka sebagai orang Baduy atau berasal dari Baduy. Mereka akan menganggap label itu sebagai label yang diberikan orang terhadap mereka sebagai label yang tidak pernah pas. Bagaimana masyarakat Baduy memahami dirinya, dapat dilihat dari cara pandang mereka terhadap mereka sendiri. Pertama, masyarakat Baduy menganggap dirinya sebagai manusia yang dalam hubungannya dengan manusia lain adalah setara. Ciri yang nampak terutama dari bahasanya. Bahasa Sunda yang digunakan oleh masyarakat Baduy adalah bahasa Sunda yang tidak mengenal lapis-lapis kasar, lemes, dan biasa (stratifikasi bahasa) sebagaimana dalam bahasa Sunda Priangan (Jawa Barat). Istri menyapa suami dengan bahasa suami menyapa istrinya. Anak menyapa bapak dengan bahasa bapak menyapa anak. Bahkan percakapan mereka dengan Jaro mereka (Jaro adalah pemimpin kampung), menggunakan bahasa yang digunakan Jaro kepada mereka. Sikap tersebut tidak hanya terlihat dalam bahasanya, namun juga nampak dari arsitektur dan atribut mereka. Pakaian yang digunakan Jaro sama saja dengan pakaian yang digunakan masyarakat biasa. Rumah Jaro sama saja dengan rumah warganya. (Bandingkan dengan Meijer dalam Garna melalui Ghee dan Gomes, 1993: 146 yang memandang bahwa bahasa Sunda Baduy masih semurni bahasa Sunda pada empat abad sebelumnya). 91 Prinsip kesetaraan itu tidak hanya mereka pegang di lingkungan intern, di luar perkampungannya sendiri, masyarakat Baduy akan memperlakukan orang lain setara dengan dirinya: mereka tidak akan menggunakan sopan-santun yang berlaku di kampung yang mereka datangi. Ke mana pun mereka pergi, dengan siapa pun mereka berhadapan, mereka akan menggunakan cara pandang yang sama terhadap manusia. Pada setiap bulan Kapat (sekitar bulan September), mereka biasa melakukan seba, membawa bermacam hasil ladang ke hadapan Gubernur Banten. Gubernur Banten akan disapa dengan bahasa Sunda Baduy, karena bagi mereka Gubernur Banten tak lebih dari sekedar kaka (kakak) atau dulur (saudara), bukan pemimpin yang harus ditakuti dan dihormati secara berlebihan. Tradisi seba sendiri bukanlah tradisi yang menunjukkan ketakutan mereka pada penguasa, tetapi ―sebagai tanda penghormatan terhadap orang luar‖ (Garna dalam Ghee dan Gomes, 1993: 152), dan tak lebih dari itu. Memberi sedikit hasil ladang adalah cara mereka menjaga tali silaturahmi dengan pihak luar. Pemahaman yang demikian itu tidak terlepas dari pemahaman mereka pada konsep kosmologisnya. Mereka memahami semesta ini dibagi dalam empat ruang, Buana Nyungcung, Buana Suci Alam Padang, Buana Panca Tengah, dan Buana Larang. Mereka saat ini hidup di alam Buana Panca Tengah, dan menganggap semua manusia hidup di ruang yang sama. Namun, meskipun ada cara pandang ―menganggap setara‖ terhadap sesama orang Baduy dan terhadap orang di luar dirinya, secara kolektif mereka membedakan tugas masing-masing: antara orang Baduy dan orang luar baduy terdapat tugas yang berbeda dalam hidup. Mereka menganggap dirinya manusia tiheula (awal, yang datang lebih awal), maka mereka merasa berkewajiban untuk saatnya napakeun dunya. Konsep ini menurut Garna (dalam Ghee dan Gomes, 1993: 151) dipahami dengan tidak tepat. Garna memahami pikukuh (pepatah adat) napakeun dunya dengan pengertian bahwa orang Baduy memahami dunia sebagai tempat pertapaan. Arti yang sebenarnya adalah mendiamkan hasrat keduniawian', karena itulah di lingkungan 92 masyarakat Baduy dikenal pribahasa nu pondok tong dipanjangkeun, nu panjang tong dipondokkeun (Yang pendek jangan dipanjangkan, yang sudah panjang jangan dibuat pendek). Maksud dari pribahasa itu adalah: hidup yang baik adalah hidup yang apa adanya. Sedangkan Garna dalam Koentjoroningrat (1993: 139), tidak memahami kaitan antara napakeun dunya dan pribahasa tersebut. Pikukuh hanya dimaksudkan untuk diri masyarakat Baduy sendiri. Mereka- kepada orang luar Baduy-menugaskan sebaliknya: harus ngaramekeun dunya (Garna melafalkannya salah: naramekeun dunga). Ngaramekeun dunya artinya harus terlibat dengan urusan dunia' alias jangan jauh dari keduniawian'. Sistem „Opat Buana‟: Asal muasal Alam Semesta Dunya dalam bahasa Baduy bukan dunia', tetapi duniawi'. Dunia sendiri diistilahkan buana'. Menurut orang Baduy, buana itu dibagi dalam empat bagian (opat buana), yaitu Buana Nyungcung, Buana Panca Tengah, Buana Larang dan Buana Suci Alam Padang yang terletak antara Buana Nyungcung dan Buana Panca Tengah. Alam yang dimaksudkan orang Baduy adalah Buana Panca Tengah, tempat manusia hidup. Menurut masyarakat Baduy, pada mulanya semesta ini hanya suatu ruang berkilau (ngenclong), dan pada suatu waktu ia menjadi keras dan memiliki bagianbagian. Ruang yang pertama terbagun dari kekosongan ini tidak bernama. Garna dalam Ghee dan Gomes, 1993: 152, menyebut ruang ini ada namanya, yakni Sasaka Pusaka Buana, padahal yang disebut dengan sasaka‟ adalah asal mula, bukan tempat', bukan ruang'. Ruang ngenclong itu sendirilah yang disebut dengan Pusaka Buana. Setelah mengeras ia mengalami pemisahan-pemisahan, yang lepas ke atas (langit) disebut Buana Nyungcung, yang turun ke bawah disebut Buana Larang, di antara kedua buana itu terdapat Buana Tengah, yakni tempat para manusia, pohonan, 93 dan binatang. Namun di antara Buana Tengah dan Buana Nyungcung terdapat ruang bagi para dewi padi, ruang tersebut bernama Buana Suci Alam Padang. Masyarakat Baduy menganggap bahwa di dunia ini hanya ada dirinya (manusia) dan benda-benda alam. Antara dirinya dan dunia-dunia lain itu amat sangat jauh, nalar ini menjadikan pemakaian waktu di Baduy adalah 24 jam. Baduy juga tidak mengenal tabu waktu' seperti dalam tradisi Sunda, karena mereka merasa alam ini ruang bagi mereka dan hanya berupa alam saja. Arwah-arwah, setan, jin, iblis, tidak tinggal bersama mereka. Di dalam pandangan masyarakat Sunda Jawa Barat, ada istilah-istilah wanci (waktu) yang harus dijaga oleh manusia apabila manusia mau selamat. Sebagai contoh, konsep wanci sareupna (waktu menjelang magrib) dipahami sebagai wanci yang berbahaya. Di dalam wanci tersebut manusia berada dalam posisi rawan, karena alam akan mengeluarkan kekuatan-kekuatan negatifnya. Sedangkan di Baduy tidak ada konsep-konsep seperti itu. Bagi masyarakat Baduy semua waktu dalam putaran pagi sampai pagi lagi, sama saja. Karena itulah mereka dapat keluar rumah kapan saja, turun kampung pada jam-jam larut sudah menjadi hal wajar. Anak-anak dapat bermain di kuburan pada wanci sareupna, dan mereka tidak takut pada kuburan karena mereka memahami bahwa buana bagi para arwah tidak berada di Buana Panca Tengah tersebut. Cara pandang yang bebas mitos takhyul' inilah yang membedakan masyarakat Baduy dengan masyarakat Sunda sebenarnya. Baduy memiliki nalar yang amat logis, sehingga terkesan sederhana. Misal, orang luar Baduy beranggapan bahwa seluruh binatang berkaki empat adalah haram menurut pikukuh Baduy. Penetapan larangan tersebut diberlakukan karena alasan ketiadaan binatang-binatang berkaki empat (kecuali anjing) menggunakan alasan logis: bahwa kerbau dan kambing dan babi adalah binatang-binatang yang dapat merusak huma (padi), sedangkan anjing diperbolehkan karena anjing dapat menjaga huma dari kemungkinan dirusak oleh babi hutan. Sedangkan ayam begitu dekat dengan mereka, bahkan hampir semua 94 rumah memelihara ayam, tak lain karena bagi mereka ayam adalah tukang meresihan' (hewan yang dapat membersihkan) bekas makanan manusia. Adanya larangan-larangan bagi masyarakat Baduy dari Puun dan Jaro mereka pada hal-hal tertentu semata karena alasan kausalitas saja. Misalnya, masyarakat Baduy dilarang menebang pohon dengan gergaji, karena gergaji simbol dari kerakusan. Apabila gergaji diperbolehkan, masyarakat Baduy dikhawatirkan sering membelah kayu, dan hal itu tidak sesuai dengan prinsip orang Baduy harus napakeun dunya. Maka, kayu-kayu yang digunakan untuk rumah-rumah mereka pun dibuat dengan menggunakan perkakas yang sederhana, golok dan kapak. Orang Baduy yang memiliki uang lebih memilih membeli kayu di toko bangunan di kampung-kampung luar sekitar perkampungan Baduy daripada membelah kayu sendiri dengan perkakas. Namun aktivitas membeli tidak boleh berlebihan, hanya disesuaikan dengan kebutuhan. Bahkan, mereka tak mungkin membeli lebih karena ketentuan membuat rumah sudah ada bentuk bakunya bagi setiap keluarga. Orang yang berkunjung ke komunitas Baduy harus melapor dahulu kepada Jaro (ketua kampung di wilayang Baduy Panamping, kampung Baduy yang terletak di sekeliling Baduy Jero. Daerah ini oleh Garna dalam Ghee dan Gomes, 1993: 153, disebut Baduy Tangtu'). Beberapa aturan akan disampaikan oleh Jaro, di antaranya larangan menggunakan sabun, shampo dan pasta gigi. Alasannya juga sederhana bahwa semua zat kimia itu dapat meracuni ikan-ikan di sungai dan dapat merusak kesuburan tanah. Kesuburan adalah perihal yang sangat dijaga oleh orang Baduy karena mereka menamam padi di huma hanya sekali tanam-sekali panen dalam jangka waktu 6-7 tahun. Bukan berarti mereka hanya menanam dalam setiap 6 atau 7 tahun sekali, tetapi tidak diperbolehkan menanam padi di tanah yang sama selama 6-7 tahun, dengan alasan akan membuat padi tidak bagus. Tanah dianggap mampu memulihkan kandungan zat-zat berguna untuk padi setelah melewati 6 atau 7 tahun. 95 Baduy sangat menghormati alam, bukan karena alam itu sakral, tetapi karena mereka tahu bahwa alamlah yang memberi kehidupan pada mereka. Oleh karena itu, penjagaan yang ketat terhadap leuweung kolot atau leuweung larangan (secara harfiah: hutan tua atau hutan terlarang), agar tidak dimasuki manusia, semata karena Baduy ingin menjaga keutuhan alam. Baduy menyadari bahwa sumber air yang merupakan unsur penunjang hidup yang penting bagi mereka, harus dijaga ketat, sebab air dikeluarkan dari leuweung kolot itu. Memasukinya dapat merusak tatanan hutan. Cara Pandang Baduy terhadap „Tuhan‟ Masyarakat Baduy tidak mengenal konsep Tuhan seperti konsep Tuhan bagi masyarakat yang beragama samawi. Konsep dewa' di masyarakat Baduy juga bukan konsep dewa' sebagaimana agama Hindu. Masyarakat Baduy lebih mementingkan karuhun dan kabuyutan. Karuhun artinya orang yang sudah meninggalkan Buana Panca Tengah, dan kabuyutan adalah ruang yang dianggap tempat tinggalnya para karuhun. Tapi ruang itu sendiri tidak berada di Buana Panca Tengah, kecuali ruang fisiknya. Ruang bagi para karuhun sendiri tidak di ruang fisik itu. Berbeda dengan pemahaman orang-orang Jepang yang biasa berziarah ke Gunung Osore, misalnya, mereka menganggap bahwa arwah-arwah yang sudah meninggal itu tetap ada di sekitar gunung (Ross, 2007: 20). Artinya, bagi masyarakat Jepang di ruang yang samalah para arwah itu tinggal, tapi manusia tidak dapat melihatnya. Sedangkan bagi masyarakat Baduy ruang fisik adalah ruang yang hanya terlihat oleh manusia dan para arwah tidak berada di ruang fisik. Mereka memahami dimensi yang berbeda pada penglihatan kabuyutan dalam kaca mata manusia dan dalam kaca mata para karuhun. Garna (Ghee dan Gomes, 1993: 154) mencatat bahwa bagi orang Baduy, pada zaman dahulu kala ada dua dari tujuh batara, bernama Batara Cikal dan Batara Patanjala, yang pernah memerintah suatu wilayah sangat luas, jauh melebihi daerah 96 Kanekes dan membentang antara Sungai Cihaliwung dan Selat Sunda (menurut Garna masyarakat Baduy menyebutnya Pasir Batang Baulahkulon, mestinya: Pasir Batang Beulah Kulon). Namun, sebuah kekuasaan tiba-tiba membatasi keluasan wilayah Baduy. Kekuasaan itu maksudnya adalah kekuasaan Hasanudin pada abad ke-18. Meskipun masyarakat Baduy tidak memandang para karuhun tinggal di ruang fisik yang sama terlihatnya oleh mata lahir manusia, mereka tetap menghormati ruang-ruang yang dianggap sebagai kabuyutan seperti Lebak Si Bedug, sebuah piramida berjenjang di daerah Kanekes bagian tenggara, Kosala, dan Sasaka Domas. Apabila dilihat dari patung-patung di Batu Sirit yang tidak menggambarkan sosoksosok dewa dengan jelas, terlihat bahwa Baduy sejak dulu tidak mudah terpengaruh paham ke-dewa-an. Hindu yang masuk ke lingkungan Baduy tidak diterima secara mutlak. Agama Hindu hanya berpengaruh kuat pada raja-raja dan keluarganya, sedangkan bagi orang-orang biasa, agama tersebut tidak terlalu berpengaruh (Garna,dalam Ghee dan Gomes, 1993: 148). Hal ini menunjukkan bahwa pikukuhpikukuh masyarakat Baduy sudah sangat lama menjadi pikukuh yang diterapkan, sejak sebelum Hindu masuk. Masyarakat Baduy memahami Tuhan sebagai bapak' dari manusia-manusia. Tuhan, apabila dipahami dengan batasan penyebab pertama' mengadanya kehidupan, mengacu pada Batara Tunggal. Batara Tunggal inilah yang menurut masyarakat Baduy menurunkan 7 anak (batara), dan masing-masing memerintah di 7 wilayah, yaitu Parahyangan (daerah Jawa Barat), Karang (Jawa Barat), Jampang (Jawa Barat), Sajra (Banten), Jasinga (Jawa Barat), Bongbang (Jawa Barat), dan Banten (Garna dalam Koentjaraningrat,1993:129). Orang Baduy meyakini bahwa asal muasal kesundaan dari tujuh batara tersebut. Kata asal-muasal' dalam bahasa Sunda disebut wiwitan‟, oleh karena itu istilah Sunda Wiwitan tidak berarti nama agama yang dianut oleh masyarakat Baduy. 97 Namun, belum terdapat penjelasan bagaimana dari 7 batara itu sampai lahirnya para karuhun yang melahirkan puun Baduy. Beberapa peneliti yang dikutip Garna (dalam Ghee dan Gomes 1993, atau dalam Koentjaraningrat, 1993), termasuk Garna sendiri tidak dapat menjelaskan keterputusan antara 7 batara dengan para karuhun tersebut. Garna (dalam Koentjaraningrat, 1993: 139) hanya menjelaskan bahwa para batara itu adalah berwujud manusia biasa namun sakti. Masyarakat Baduy Dalam berasal dari Batara Panjala yang melahirkan Dalem Janggala (bukan daleum' seperti yang disebutkan Garna dalam Koentjaraningrat, 1993: 140), dan dari Dalem Janggala lahirlah manusia-manusia Baduy di daerah Cikeusik. Batara Panjala melahirkan pula Dalem Lagondi yang melahirkan manusia-manusia Cikartawana. Terakhir, Batara Panjala melahirkan Dalem Putih Seda Hurip yang pada gilirannya melahirkan manusia-manusia Baduy di Cibeo. Cikertawana, Cikeusik, dan Cibeo memang dipahami masyarakat Baduy sebagai pusat atau inti dari Baduy. Di luar daerah itu, adalah manusia-manusia yang dilahirkan dari Batara Wiraswara, Batara Wishnu, Batara Brahmana, Batara Hyang Niskala, dan Batara Mahadewa, yang disebut juga keturunan muda. Pengaruh Hindu terhadap Baduy tidaklah begitu kuat. Karena pada akhirnya masyarakat Baduy lebih menaruh perhatian pada para karuhun, yaitu mereka yang sudah meninggalkan Buana Panca Tengah lebih dahulu. --------- 98 Daftar Pustaka Ahimsa-Putra, Heddy Shri., 2008. "Filsafat Nusatara dan Nilai Budaya Nusantara: Titik Temu dan Implikasinya." Sebuah makalah dalam Seminar "Quo Vadis Filsafat Nusantara?" Yogyakarta, 15 Desember 2008. Koentjaraningrat., 1993. Masyarakat Terasing di Indonesia, Gramedia Pustaka Utama, Jakarta. Lim Teck Ghee, Alberto G. Gomes, ed., 1993. Suku Asli dan Pembangunan di Asia Tenggara, Yayasan Obor Indonesia, Jakarta. Ross, Catrien., 2007. Mistik Jepang. Translated by Tim Penerjemah, Pinus Book Publisher, Yogyakarta:. Suparlan, Parsusi,. 1993. Orang Sakai di Riau: Masyarakat Terasing dalam Masyarakat Indonesia, Yayasan Obor Indonesia, Jakarta. Thomas M. Olshewsky., 1969. Problem in the Philosophy of Language, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York. --------------------------------------------- 99 Ternyata, pada beberapa tradisi, sistem-sistem relasi sosial horisontal sudah dibangun sedemikian apik, sebagian sudah sampai tersusun sistem yang demikian cair dalam bentuk perangkat operasional yang memandu bagaimana seseorang berada, bersikap, menyusun aksi individual pada suatu kontestasi sosial. Tat wan asi dan Siri sebagaimana dijelaskan oleh Ramli Semawi, adalah sekedar contoh dua puak tradisi (mekanisme survival) yang sudah operasional itu. Kesadaran kolektif yang terbahasakan dalam tradisi-tradisi berusaha disusun untuk mempertahankan identitas kolektif yang berbasis pengetahuan kosmologis. Ini merupakan strategi yang menyangkut survival transendent dan survival biologis melalui perangkat „aturan‟ hukum sekaligus mengatur cara beroperasi setiap peran individu dalam masyarakat, bahkan masyarakat yang besar:negara. Skema aturan yang dilahirkan dalam nalar-nalar tradisi bukan hanya menunjukkan makna-makna yang dipercayai oleh masyarakat sekitar, tetapi menentukan nilai kemanusiaan, membuat manusia menemukan titik balik tentang cara membangun relasi antara alam, manusia dan apa yang dia percayai (Tuhan). Dalam perangkat ini pula, nalar hukum tradisi tidak melulu berkutat pada bagaimana merentangkan keadilan, tetapi menitikberatkan pada persoalan identitas manusia yang menjadi pokok utama kenapa keadilan itu perlu ditegakkan. Hukum ditegakkan tidak berkaitan dengan azas kejeraan, atau menggunakan „tangan besi‟ via kekerasan demi menegakkan aturan, tetapi nalar hukum tradisi memberikan ruang bagi anggota masyarakat untuk menilai secara mandiri (auto correct) hukum yang dimiliki. Dari sini bisa diberangkatkan formula bahwa: hukum harus dibatinkan untuk mencapai keadilan. Nalar hukum tradisi dibatinkan sedemikian rupa dan menjadi perangkat yang mengawasi dirinya sudah mematuhi hukum atau belum, agar hidup tidak bertentangan dengan sistem nilai yang living di masyarakat. Menggunakan bahasa modern, sistem tradisi hukum ini merupakan model pembalikan dari model-model pengawasan. Lewat nalar hukum tradisi anggota 100 masyarakat merasa terawasi tanpa diawasi secara institusional. Harga diri dan kesadaran komunal harus eksis di tengah sistem sosial agar hukum bisa dibatinkan, bukan dipaksakan atau ditegakkan. Filsafat Hukum Manusia Bugis dan Bali Ramli Semmawi.,M.Hum (Dosen Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Mejene, Sulawesi) Pendahuluan Secara tegas, Pembukaan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 menyatakan : Atas berkat rahmat Allah yang Maha Kuasa dan dengan didorong oleh keinginan yang luhur, supaya berkehidupan kebangsaan yang bebas, maka rakyat Indonesia menyatakan dengan ini kemerdekaannya'. Amanat para pendiri Republik yang tercantum dalam pembukaan UUD 1945 mengandung pesan sarat makna. Bagaimana rakyat Indonesia dapat melaksanakan kehidupan yang bebas sebagai suatu bangsa merdeka, hal tersebut menuntut adanya prasyarat tertentu. Baik menyangkut perangkat hukum dan perundang-undangan, maupun sistem hubungan sosial dalam kehidupan masyarakat dengan berbagai aspek kehidupannya (Alkostar, 1997:v). Dalam sistem hubungan sosial, perubahan sosial merupakan hal yang sangat penting mendapatkan perhatian. Masalah sosial bukan saja terletak pada kompleksitas proses perubahan itu sendiri, melainkan pada kemampuan memahami proses perubahan. Pemahaman yang baik, tentu saja akan menjadi modal dasar dalam memahami bagaimana proses berlangsung, kekuatan apa saja yang ambil bagian dalam proses tersebut, serta prediksi mengenai masa depan. Apakah perubahan akan menjadi titik tolak kemajuan atau kehancuran. Sementara itu, kualitas dari 101 pemahaman, akan sangat ditentukan oleh perspektif yang dipakai dalam memahami fenomena perubahan sosial itu sendiri (Dwipayana, 2001:vii). Perubahan tersebut juga berdampak pada kondisi hukum kita. Dalam upaya membangun kerangka dasar hukum nasional, maka postulat moral dari kalimat Atas berkat rahmat Allah Yang Maha Kuasa'-perlu dipahami dan dihayati; agar setiap usaha mengkonstruksi dan membentuk hukum dan perundang-undangan tidak menyimpang dari spirit perjuangan dan landasan moral yang dipancangkan dalam Undang-Undang Dasar 1945. Menurut Alkostar (1997:vi) kalimat tersebut menunjukkan adanya struktur rohaniah dari bangsa kita-di mana ciri rasa keadilan, kemerdekaan, spirit kerakyatan, kesamaan kedudukan, dan norma-norma yang berlaku dalam masyarakat-berhubungan secara berjalin dan berkelindan sehingga tidak dapat dipisahkan. Telaah mengenai hukum yang adil serta korelasinya dengan keadilan sosial, bagi seorang intelektual, Prof. Muchsin Qari'ati (1991:72), mengemukakan bahwa, hampir tidak terdapat satu masyarakat pun yang tidak membicarakan keadilan, kebenaran dan hukum-hukum yang rasional. Atau tidak ada penguasa manapun yang tidak mengklaim dirinya menjunjung tinggi hak-hak dan kesejahteraan masyarakatnya. Penggunaaan corak hukum tertentu dalam suatu negara, secara teoritis dapat dilacak pada madzhab atau aliran-aliran hukum yang dipakai, apakah aliran hukum alam, positivisme, sejarah, sociological jurisprudence, legal realism, dan lain sebagainya. Namun, manipulasi kekuasaan serta berbagai bentuk penyimpangan atau perkosaan hak warga masyarakat dari suatu rezim pemerintahan, dapat terlihat dari produk hukum yang ditinggalkanya. Di Indonesia, dapat dilihat berbagai aturan hukum yang dipakai pada masa pemerintahan Kolonial Belanda atau masa demokrasi terpimpin. 102 Hukum yang secara esensial selalu ada dan mengada di dalam masyarakat, senantiasa terkait dengan postulat moral masyarakat. Konseptualisasi moralitas yang agamis maupun yang psikologis senantiasa terjalin erat dalam proses eksistensi hukum, moralitas dan kebiasaan tingkah-laku sosial. Pada saat bersamaan, juga terlihat adanya kawasan-kawasan yang berbeda antara hukum, moral, dan kebiasaan tingkah-laku sosial. Sebagai pedoman tingkah-laku dan tata pergaulan sosial,hukum memerlukan prinsip-prinsip akhlak atau moral spiritual yang langgeng. Pola perilaku dari masyarakat pendukung norma hukum tersebut-sebagai eksponen faktual- memerlukan pedoman tata nilai agar perjalanan masyarakat tersebut mempunyai kepastian arah dalam menuju kebenaran dan keadilan, atau tatanan kehidupan masyarakat yang ideal mampu melindungi, meningkatkan harkat dan martabat kemanusiaannya. Setiap bangsa atau masyarakat kebudayaan mempunyai nilai-nilai pokok yang mempengaruhi pikiran dan perasaan dalam masyarakat bangsa tersebut. Nilai pokok yang merupakan nilai terpenting dalam suatu bangsa merupakan inti kebudayaan suatu bangsa (Mangemba, 2002:218). Identitas hukum nasional, sebagai permasalahan yang mendasar dalam pembangunan hukum, selalu terkait dengan masalah sukma, materi, dan bentuk/wujud dari hukum nasional. Wujud atau materi hukum nasional yang cocok dengan struktur ruhaniah masyarakat bangsa Indonesia, tidak akan lepas dengan tuntutan kebutuhan akan hukum yang bersumber dari falsafah Pancasila. Konsep Hukum Masyarakat Bali dan Bugis: Sebuah perbandingan singkat Konsep Hukum Masyarakat Bali Kalau kita merenungkan apa yang menjadi nilai dasar dari kehidupan hukum adat Bali, maka akan dihadapkan pada sesuatu yang abstrak, hanya dapat diamati melalui refleksi budi manusia. Orang atau masyarakat Bali-dalam hal ini kita beri pengertian sebagai manusia atau masyarakat yang dalam kehidupannya dituntun oleh 103 nilai-nilai kebudayaan Bali bercorak Hindu-selalu berusaha mencapai sikap seimbang terhadap alam sekitarnya. Hal tersebut dilandasi kesadaran bahwa alam semesta adalah kompleksitas unsur-unsur yang satu sama lain terkait dan membentuk suatu sistem kesemestaan. Sehingga dapat dikatakan, bahwa nilai dasar dari kehidupan adat di Bali adalah nilai keseimbangan. Nilai keseimbangan akan terwujud ke dalam dua unsur yakni: pertama, selalu ingin menyesuaikan diri dan berusaha menjalin hubungan dengan elemen-elemen alam dan kehidupan yang mengitarinya. Kedua, ingin menciptakan suasana kedamaian dan ketentraman antar sesama makhluk dan juga terhadap alam di mana manusia hidup sebagai salah satu elemen dari alam semesta raya (Dharmayudha, dan Cantika, 1994:6). Kedua unsur tersebut oleh masyarakat Bali, dianggap serbagai azas yang harus dipakai pedoman atau tuntunan dalam segala kegiatan hidupnya. Nilai dan azas-azas tersebut kemudian dipersepsikan ke dalam ajaran Tri Hita Karana (Dharmayudha, dan Cantika, 1994:6). Ajaran Tri Hita Karana dirumuskan sebagai tiga hal yang menyebabkan manusia mencapai kesejahteraan, kebahagian dan kedamaian. Menurut I Gusti Ketut Kaler(1983:86), secara harfiah Tri Hita Kirana berarti: Tri artinya tiga; Hita artinya adalah kebaikan, senang, gembira, lestari; Karana berarti sebab-musabab, atau sumbernya sebab. Lebih lanjut I Gusti Ketut Kaler menyatakan bahwa unsur-unsur Tri Hita Kirana adalah terdiri dari: Unsur jiwa (Atman); Unsur tenaga, kekuatan (Prana);Unsur badan wadag (Sarira). Ketiga unsur Tri Hita Kirana ini kemudian dipakai selayaknya maket atau pola oleh masyarakat Bali, misalnya dalam pembuatan rumah, desa dan sebagainya. Menurut I Nengah Sudharma (1971:13) unsur-unsur dari ajaran Tri Hita Karana adalah: Sang Hyang Widhi, yang merupakan super natural power, Bhuwana merupakan makrokosmos, Manusia merupakan mikrokosmos. Ketiga unsur ini tak dapat dipisahkan dalam tata hidup masyarakat Bali, bahkan senantiasa diterapkan dan dilaksanakan sebagai suatu kebulatan yang padat, 104 erat-melekat pada setiap aspek kehidupan secara harmonis-dinamis-produktif (Sudharma, 1971:13). Tri Hita Karana yang mengajarkan pola hubungan yang seimbang di antara ketiga sumber kesejahteraan dan kedamaian ini, diharapkan manusia selalu berusaha menjaga keharmonisan hubungan di antara ketiga unsur itu yakni: Hubungan yang harmonis antara manusia dengan Tuhan, Hubungan yang harmonis antara manusia dengan alam, Hubungan yang harmonis antara manusia dengan manusia. Kehidupan masyarakat Bali yang didukung oleh adat istiadat yang kuat dalam hubungan antara warga yang satu dengan warga yang lain didasarkan atas azas moral yang telah melembaga dalam setiap individu. Asas dasar itu adalah Tat Twam Asi‟ (Dharmayudha, dan Cantika, 1994:24). Secara harfiah Tat berarti itu' (ia-Indonesia), Twam artinya kamu' dan Asi artinya adalah'. Secara keseluruhannya berarti Itu (ia) adalah Kamu'. Saya adalah Kamu dan segala makhluk adalah sama, inilah spirit equality before the law. Hal tersebut dapat diartikan bahwa menolong orang lain berarti menolong diri sendiri, menyakiti orang lain sama dengan menyakiti diri sendiri (Parisada Hindu Dharma, 1968:51). Pengertian dasar Tat Twam Asi ini dalam kehidupan adat Bali diberi pengertian (dikonsepsikan) ke dalam empat. Pertama, azas suka duka (artinya dalam suka dan duka dirasakan bersama-sama).Kedua, azas Paras Poros, artinya orang lain adalah bagian dari diri sendiri dan diri sendiri adalah bagian dari orang lain. Ketiga, azas Salunglung Sabayantaka, berarti baik buruk, mati hidup ditanggung bersama. Keempat, azas saling asih, saling asah, saling asuh, artinya saling menyayangi/mencintai, saling memberitahu/mengkoreksi, saling membantu/tolong menolong antara sesama hidup ( Dharmayudha, dan Cantika, 1994:24). Pada dasarnya keempat azas tersebut merupakan perwujudan dari prinsip Tat Twam Asi, menegaskan suatu prinsip selalu hidup rukun dan damai, mengembangkan sikap tenggang rasa serta setiap saat mawas diri. Dalam terminologi filsafat hukum 105 adat, azas-azas tersebut lebih populer dengan sebutan azas kekeluargaan, yang maknanya bahwa satu sama lain di antara kita harus saling kasih mengasihi, saling memperhatikan dan saling tolong menolong dalam irama kerja sama yang harmonis seperti dalam kehidupan keluarga. Atau sering diistilahkan dengan azas kebersamaan/komunal berarti dalam keadaan suka duka dirasakan bersama, lebih mengutamakan kepentingan bersama di atas kepentingan pribadi seklaigus mengembangkan suasana kegotongroyongan. Perwujudan nyata dari azas-azas ini dapat kita saksikan dalam lembaga adat seperti Sekehe-sekehe, Banjar, Desa Adat dan Subak. Dalam aktivitasnya sehari-hari ada perbuatan-perbuatan seperti misalnya „Adat Metetulung' yaitu menyediakan diri untuk datang ke rumah atau ke tempat warga masyarakat yang lain yang mempunyai atau mengadakan suatu kegiatan misalnya upacara, membangun rumah, selamatan dan lain-lain (Dharmayudha, dan Cantika, 1994:25). Azas kekeluargaan atau azas kebersamaan di samping mengandung aspek yang horizontal, juga mengandung aspek vertikal. Prof. Soediman Kartohadiprodjo pernah menyatakan bahwa azas kekeluargaan pada hekekatnya adalah Bhineka Tunggal Ika yaitu kesatuan dalam perbedaan (unity in diversity). Ini mengandung arti bahwa azas kekeluargaan itu menyelaraskan atau merukunkan dari berbagai sikap dan kapasitas masing-masing individu sebagai anggota keluarga, apakah karena perbedaan usia, jenis kelamin, pendidikan, hobi dan sebagainya. Segi vertikal akan nampak antara yang lebih besar dengan yang lebih kecil, ayah/ibu dengan anak-anak, adik dan kakak dan seterusnya. Dalam kondisi yang berbeda ini dikembangkan asas „Sesana manut linggih, linggih manut sesana‟ artinya peranan atau sikap sesuai dengan kedudukan dan kedudukannya harus membawa peranan yang sesuai. Maknanya setiap orang harus menyadari benar tentang status pribadi dan sosialnya, sehingga dari kesadaran akan statusnya itu akan berakibat peranan yang dijalankan sesuai dengan status yang dimiliki. Demikian juga sikap kita pada orang lain harus benar-benar diperhitungkan, peran apa yang harus kita berikan sesuai dengan 106 kedudukan yang dimiliki. Dengan azas sesana manut linggih hubungan antar sesama anggota masyarakat penuh nuansa saling pengertian, saling hormat dan saling menghargai satu sama lain (Suasthawa, 1987:21). Dalam lingkungan keluarga Bali ada orang-orang yang dituakan, dan umumnya dikelompokkan menjadi tiga yang disebut „Tri Kang Sinanggeh Werda (Matuha)' artinya tiga yang disebut tua (dituakan) Yaitu: Wahya Werda, mereka yang disebut tua karena umurnya. Jnana Werda, mereka yang disebut tua karena ketinggian ilmu pengetahuannya, baik ilmu pengetahuan keduniawian maupun kerohanian. Tapo Werda, mereka mendapat julukan tua karena telah banyak menimba pengalaman hidup. Ketiga kelompok ini dalam masyarakat Bali selalu mendapatkan penghormatan sesuai dengan ketuaan yang dimiliki dan selalu diperitungkan dalam setiap acara atau kegiatan sesuai peranannya masing-masing. Apabila azas kekeluargaan ini dicari implementasinya dalam hukum adat terefleksikan dalam konteks hukum pertanahan adat yang kita kenal adanya tanah-tanah yang berisi Ayahan' (kewajiban) seperti tanah pkd (Tanah Pekarangan Desa), tanah Ayds (Tanah Ayahan Desa). Ayahan, walaupun dalam bentuk konkritnya berupa „ngayah' dan „pepesan‟ akan tetapi makna ayahan yang sesungguhnya adalah berkorban, kebersamaan, rasa persatuan, saling menolong, rasa bhakti, dan mengutamakan kepentingan umum. Di bidang hukum keluarga adat ada ketentuan yang disebut „Sidhikara‟ (sidhi adalah baik, rahayu dan kara adalah berbuat, tangan), yang berarti berbaik demi kesejahteraan sesama anggota keluarga. Sidhikara ini terdiri dari: Sidhikara sumbah (sembah), yaitu saling hormat-menghormati termasuk ketunggalan sanggah. Sidhikara parid, yaitu saling tolong-menolong termasuk mau makan surudan banten tataban masing-masing. Sidhakara waris, yaitu saling waris mewaris atau saling bagi 107 harta warisan termasuk mau menerima kebaikan serta kejelekan masing-masing (jele melah gelahang bareng-bareng). Dalam bidang hukum pidana adat (delik adat), dikenal sanksi berupa upacara pembersih desa' atau merayascita desa, yaitu membuat upacara untuk mengembalikan keseimbangan (magis) desa akibat perbuatan cemar yang dilakukan oleh salah seorang warga desa (termasuk orang luar) misalnya salah krama, gamia gamana, memandung pretima dan lain-lain. Melakukan upacara pembersih desa sebenarnya merupakan cermin dari rasa sepenanggungan warga desa dalam arti perbuatan jelek seseorang dampaknya ditangguh semua isi desa. Bahkan bagi masyarakat Bali, alam pun dipersonifikasikan sebagai keluarganya. Sering dalam lontara kita temukan ucapan Bapa Asaka dan Ibu Pertiwi'. Langit dianggapnya sebagai Bapak (Purusa) dan Bumi dianggap sebagai Ibu (Pradana), dan diri manusia dianggap sebagai anaknya. Dalam lontar Gong Besi disebut begini: Rikalanign Ida melingga ring sanggar Kemulan: Ring Rongn Tengah Mapesengan Hyang Guru (I Bapa), Ring Rongan Kiwa mapesengan Hyang Bhatari (I Meme), Ring Rongan Tengah mapesengan Hyang Manusa Sakti (Ragane, Dewek). Panyukseman: I Bapa meraga Paratma I Meme meraga Siwatma, Ragane meraga Suniatma. [ Manakala Beliau (Ida Sang Hyang Widhi) Berstana pada Sanggah Kemulaan: pada ruangan Kanan bernama Hyang Guru (Sang Ayah), ruangan kiri bernama Hyang Bhatari (Sang Ibu) dan pada ruangan Tengah bernama Hyang Manusa Sakti (Diri Sendiri) ] Maksudnya, Sang Ayah sebagai Paratma, Sang Ibu sebagai Siwatma dan Diri sendiri sebagai Suniatma (Dharmayudha, dan Cantika, 1994:27). Dengan demikian makin nyatalah bahwa masyarakat Bali memang telah menyatu, akrab, berbaur dengan alam dan Ida Sang Hyang Widhi dalam menciptakan kedamaian hidup melalui resapan getaran harmoni dalam wadah keseimbangan. Menurut Ketut Soebandi Sanggar Rong Tiga sebagaimana tersebut di atas sering juga diistilahkan dengan Kawitan, Kamimitan, Kamulan, Dewa Kompyang atau Dewa Hyang, dan bangunan suci yang berbentuk Rong Tiga ini adalah merupakan 108 Kayangan Tiga Keluarga. Dilihat dari sejarah, bentuk, status dan fungsinya Pura atau Kahyangan selain sebagai tempat memuja, menghubungkan diri pada Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa, juga merupakan tempat pemujaan arwah para leluhur yang sudah disucikan atau roh para Rsi yang telah dianggap berjasa dan sudah berstatus Dewa atau BhataraBhatari. Pura atau Kahyangan itu menjadi alat pemersatu di dalam semua aspek kehidupan dan kegiatan masyarakat penyusunnya baik dalam bidang sosial, budaya maupun agama yang dimulai dari kelompok kecil yaitu rumah tangga (keluarga) kesatuan keturunan (Warga) kesatuan masyarakat adat (Desa Adat atau Desa Pekraman) akhirnya sampai kepada tingkat masyarakat yang lebih luas (Kabupaten, Provinsi) (Soebandi, 1981:102-104). Konsep Hukum dalam Masyarakat Bugis Orang Bugis, terutama yang tinggal di desa-desa dalam kehidupan sehari-hari masih terikat oleh sistem, norma adat yang disebut „panngaderreng‟. Panngaderreng dapat diartikan sebagai keseluruhan norma hidup yang meliput bagaimana seseorang harus bertingkah lalu terhadap sesama manusia dan terhadap pranata sosial secara timbal balik. Sistem panngaderreng inilah disebut adat istiadat orang Bugis, yang terdiri atas lima unsur pokok: ade‟, bicara, Rappang, wari dan sara‟. Kelima unsur pokok itu terjalin satu sama lain, sebagai suatu kesatuan organis dalam alam pemikiran Bugis, yang memberi dasar perasaan kewargaan masyarakat dan rasa harga diri yang semuanya terkandung dalam konsep siri'. Kelima unsur pokok panngaderreng menjadi pedoman dalam tingkah laku sehari-hari. Ade‟ berarti tata tertib yang bersifat normatif. Bicara berarti aturan formal yang menyangkut peradilan dalam arti luas.Rappang merupakan aturan tak tertulis untuk mengokohkan negara dengan undang-undang dan hukumnya. Wari' merupakan ketentuan dari bagian ade‟ yang mengatur batas-batas hak dan kewajiban tiap orang dalam hidup bermasyakat. Sara‟ berasal dari ajaran (syariat) agama Islam (R. Parmono. 1985:7778). Ade‟ :unsur bagain khusus dari panngaderreng, terdiri atas 2 hal: pertama, ade‟ 109 akkalabinengeng yakni norma mengenai hal ikhwal perkawinan serta hubungan kekerabatan yang mewujud sebagai kaidah-kaidah keturunan, aturan hak dan kewajiban rumah tangga, etika antara kaum kerabat. Kedua, Ade‟ lana yakni norma mengenai hal ikhwal bernegara dan memerintah, berujud sebagai hukum negara, hukum antar negara, etika pembinaan insan politik. Pengawasan dan pembinaan ade‟ dalam masyarakat orang Bugis biasa dilakukan oleh beberapa penjabat adat seperti pakta teni ade‟ puang ade‟. Bicara merupakan unsur bagian panggaderreng mengenai semua aktivitas dan konsep-konsep yang berkaitan dengan peradilan (kurang lebih sama dengan hukum acara, menentukan prosedur, hak-hak dan kewajiban seseorang mengajukan kasus di pengadilan). Rappang berarti contoh (perumpamaan, kias atau analogi). Sebagai unsur dari panngaderreng, Rappang menjaga kepastian dan kontinuitas suatu keputusan hukum tidak tertulis dalam masa lampau sampai sekarang. Ujud Rappang ialah idealitas kehidupan, etika kehidupan, pandangan keramat, mencegah tindakan yang mengganggu hak milik, ancaman terhadap keamanan. Wari' merupakan unsur panngaderreng yang melakukakan klasifikasi dari segala benda, peristiwa dan aktivitas kehidupan, masing-masing menurut kategorinya.Maksudnya ialah memelihara tata susunan/penempatan benda dalam kehidupan, memelihara jalur/garis keturunan dalam mewujudkan pelapisan sosial, memelihara hubungan kekerabatan antara raja dengan raja sesuatu negara dan memelihara tata upacara. Sedangkan Sara‟ sebagai pranata sosial yang bersumber hukum agama Islam yang melengkapi/menyempurnakan 4 unsur panngaderreng lainnya (Parmono. 1985:78-79). Religi orang Bugis pada jaman pra Islam seperti nampak pada Sure Galigo sebenarnya mengandung suatu kepercayaan kepada dewa yang tunggal, seperti pemakaian nama-nama: Patotoe: dia yang menentukan nasib, Dewata Seuwae yakni dewa yang tunggal, Turrie a‟rana atau kehendak yang tertinggi. Sewaktu Islam 110 masuk ke Sulawesi Selatan awal abad 17, ajaran Tauhid dengan mudah dapat difahami. Sara‟ yang berasal dari hukum Islam (syariat), diintegrasikan dalam panngaderreng, sebagai salah satu unur pokok, malahan kemudian menjiwai keseluruhannya. Unsur lain di luar panngaderreng: siri‟ (Parmono. 1985:79). Bagi manusia Bugis, menegakkan hukum terhadap suatu pelanggaran merupakan kewajiban. Dalam konsep Siri' (malu, harga diri) terungkap bahwa manusia Bugis yang berbuat semaunya dan tidak lagi mempedulikan aturan-aturan adat (etika panngadereng atau peradaban) dianggap sebagai manusia yang tidak mempunyai harga diri. Siri‟ atau harga diri merupakan landasan bagi pemimpin' untuk senantiasa menegakkan hukum tanpa pilih kasih. Pemimpin yang tidak mampu menegakkan hukum dianggap pemimpin lembek atau banci. Seseorang yang tidak lagi mempunyai Siri' diumpamakan sebagai bangkai berjalan, nilai kemanusiaanya lenyap. Dalam ungkapan Bugis disebutkan Siri' emmi to riaseng tau (hanya karena Siri'-lah kita dinamakan manusia). Itulah sebabnya mengapa para orang tua Bugis menjadikan Siri' sebagai hal yang amat penting dalam nasihat-nasihat, sebagaimana dituturkan oleh Muhammad Said sebagai berikut. Taro-taroi alemu siri' Narekko de' siri'mu inrekko siri' (Perlengkapilah dirimu dengan siri', Kalau tidak ada siri'-mu, pinjamlah siri'.) Dalam dunia realitas, sering dijumpai seorang manusia Bugis mengorbankan sanak keluarga yang paling dicintainya demi mempertahankan harga diri dan martabatnya di tengah masyarakat. Dalam sejarah disebutkan bahwa di Sidenreng Rappang pada abad XVI, La Pagala Nene Mallomo, seorang hakim (pabbicara), dan murid dari La Taddampare, menjatuhkan pidana mati terhadap putranya sendiri yang amat dicintainya karena telah terbukti mengambil luku orang lain tanpa seizin pemiliknya. Tentu saja kejadian itu telah mencoreng muka ayahnya sendiri yang dikenal sebagai hakim yang jujur. Ketika ditanya mengapa ia menjatuhkan pidana mati pada putranya sendiri, apakah dia menilai sepotong kayu sama dengan jiwa seorang manusia, sang hakim menjawab: "Ade'e temmakeana' temmakke eppo" 111 [Hukum tidak mengenal anak dan tidak mengenal cucu. (Abidin, dalam Alkostar, 1997:136)] Pidana mati itu dilakukan semata-mata untuk mempertahankan harga dirinya sebagai hakim yang jujur di tengah-tengah masyarakatnya. Sekiranya ia memberikan pengampunan kepada putranya sendiri, tentulah ia akan menanggung malu yang sangat dalam karena akan dicibir oleh masyarakat sekitarnya, dan wibawa sebagai hakim yang jujur akan hilang seketika. Bagi masyarakat Bugis, falsafah „taro ada taro gau‟ (satunya kata dengan perbuatan) adalah suatu keharusan. Manusia yang tidak bisa menyerasikan antara perkataan dan perbuatannya akan mendapat gelar sebagai manusia munafik' (munape), suatu gelar yang sangat dihindari oleh manusia Bugis. Adat yang telah merupakan jiwa dan semangat manusia Bugis berlaku umum dalam kehidupan masyarakat secara keseluruhan. Adat atau panngadereng tidak mengenal kedudukan, kelas sosial, derajat kepangkatan, status sosial ekonomi, dan lain-lain, dalam menjatuhkan sanksi atau hukuman adat terhadap manusia-manusia yang telah melakukan pelanggaran, semua sama derajatnya dihadapan hukum, equality before the law. Dari mana pun asal manusia itu, apakah dia seorang raja, putra mahkota, orang kaya, bangsawan, sama sekali tidak mempunyai hak istimewa dalam kehidupan panngadereng masyarakat Bugis. Kedudukan kelompok elite dan masyarakat biasa diperlakukan sama dalam kehidupan masyarakat. Faktor inilah yang telah menempatkan adat pada tempat yang teratas dalam diri manusia Bugis „Ade'temmakiana', temmakieppo‟ (adat tidak mengenal anak dan tidak mengenal cucu). Dalam masyarakat Bugis juga dikenal filosofi sulapak eppak e. Secara harfiah, berarti segi empat', karena melukiskan karakter manusia dan sifat manusia terbenih dalam sifat-bahkan nawa-nawa (pikiran, hati nurani) (Machmud,Hasan 1976:24), angin, api, air dan tanah (Abidin, dalam Alkostar, 1997:133). Orang yang 112 dapat menyeimbangkan keempat sifat dan pikiran itu dinamakan manusia yang mempunyai Siri' dan sesse babua (rasa kemanusiaan yang tersayat bak sembilu, karena penderitaan sendiri, keluarga, sekampung atau senegara). Orang yang menonjol sifat anginnya dilukiskan oleh La Tadamparek Puang ri Maggalatung sebagai berikut―..........bicara solangi tana: riona ritaue nadde tekeng bicara, nasabak riwerenna warangparang ri toribicarae, ianaritu mala pasosok sipak anging ritu ke dona. Angingnge mangkauk mautang tania lempuk, engkana mua maka naola naolai, pura pole oraik, pura pole alauk.........." (Musyawarah/keputusan yang merusak negeri ialah jikalau kegembiraan terhadap seseorang yang dipakai memutus persoalan/perkara, karena (pejabat yang memutus) telah diberikan harta benda oleh orang yang dipersoalkan/diadili. Itulah yang mengambil sogokan. Maka, perbuatannya bersifat angin. Angin itu berbuat dengan kekerasan yang tidak berdasarkan kejujuran, karena hanya melalui jalan satu-satunya yang ditemuinya (tanpa berusaha melalui jalan lain yang lebih baik). Angin itu datangnya dari Barat dan juga dari Timur)(Abidin, dalam Alkostar, 1997:134) Angin diibaratkan sebagai seseorang yang curang, karena suka korupsi, selalu mengambil jalan pintas, sekalipun tercela. Serta ia dapat dikategorikan to rangga sola, yaitu orang yang tidak tetap pendiriannya, tidak berprinsip, dan mata duitan. Sifat api dilukiskan oleh Puang ri Maggalatung sebagai berikut "Rekko gelinna ri taue naddatekeng bicara, naengngerangngi ri wetu engkana apasalanna ri alena naia nababarengngi, olo tongeng napasalai. Sipak apinna ritu kedo. Naia apie mangkauk maraja temmita munri. (Bilamana amarahnya terhadap orang lain yang dipakai memutus persoal/perkara, karena diingatnya pada waktu adanya kesalahan orang itu terhadap dirinya, dan itulah dipakai memukulnya (menghukumnya). Sesungguhnya ia harus membenarkannya tetapi dipersalahkannya...). Berarti lantaran sifat api bergerak, api tersebut berbuat melampaui batas dan tidak memperhitungkan akibatnya (Abidin, dalam Alkostar, 1997:135). Api diibaratkan seseorang yang suka 113 berang dan marah, cepat mengamuk atau bertindak hebat tanpa menggunakan rasio, serta tidak memperhitungkan akibat perbuatannya. Sifat air dilukiskan sebagai ".......esse babuana nabbicarang, ianaritu Pabbicara makkalenak na......"(Rasa kasihannya yang dipakai bermusyawarah/memutuskan perkara, itulah pejabat/hakim yang memihak, sebab yang tersangkut ialah sanak atau kawan akrabnya, maka ia melindungi mereka. Seharusnya dipersalahkannya, tetapi dibenarkannya: sifat itu bersifat air. Air itu pandai dan teliti, tetapi tak genang, di mana tempat yang rendah, di mana tempat yang hina-dina ke sanalah ia mengalir (Abidin, dalam Alkostar,1997:135-136). Air itu diibaratkan orang yang menggunakan belas kasih yang melanggar moral untuk menetapkan sesuatu hal, sehingga melindungi orang yang bersalah karena orang itu sanak atau sahabat kentalnya. Walaupun air itu pintar dan teliti, tetapi ia suka melakukan perbuatan yang hina. Barangkali, sifat air itu dipunyai juga orang yang suka menjilat ke atas dan menginjak ke bawah. Sifat air itu menggambarkan nepotisme. Sifat tanah terlukiskan sebagai „Pabbicara tongeng madecengngi napasisauksauk wali-wali urekna bicarae, napenisik isininna majak e namapaccing, naellaui ri Dewata Sauae tenriawa, tenriasiek, teccuku, teccengek, dek gaga barak seuana maelok nala sangadinna mua riatunna tongeng. Nasappa atettongenna tongengnge naweret toni asalanna salae. Ianaritu sipak tana kedo: Malimpuk namawatang. Latomi padecengi tana perajai wanua.........(Pejabat/Hakim yang benar, ialah yang meneliti keempat alat bukti kedua belah pihak yang bersengketa (lalu itu disabungnya atau dipertentangkannya), ditelitinya semua yang buruk dan setelah suci dimohonnya ke hadapan Tuhan Yang Maha Esa agar ia tidak di bawah (tidak merasa segan terhadap pihak yang kuat posisinya di masyarakat) dan tidak di atas (tidak memandang enteng pihak yang lemah), tidak tunduk dan tidak menengadah (tidak berpandangan vertikal ke atas), tidak ada yang akan ditetapkannya selain dari apa yang benar menurut kata hatinya. Ia mencari kebenarannya yang benar, yang bersalah 114 dicarikannya kesalahannya, dan bila ditemuinya yang baik, maka diberikannya kebenaran kepada pihak yang benar, dan diberikannya pun kesalahan kepada pihak yang salah. Itulah sifat tanah yang bergerak, jujur, dan kuat. Itu sajalah yang memperbaiki dan dapat membesarkan negeri (Abidin, dalam Alkostar, 1997:137). Menurut wisdom terdahulu, orang yang memiliki asal-usul baik menonjol sifat tanahnya, yang menetralisir sifat api, angin, dan air, itulah yang harus menjadi pemimpin (patuppu batu), dan orang demikian dianggap paling sempurna siri‟nya. Jadi, ada anggapan dahulu, bahwa makin tinggi kedudukan seseorang dalam masyarakat dan pemerintahan, makin dianggap mempunyai siri‟ yang sempurna daripada orang biasa (Abidin, 1983: 207). Siri‟ sebagai pancangan nilai etika hukum merupakan dasar keberlakuan kaedah-kaedah ade‟ (hukum) (Marzuki, 1995:140). Bali dan Bugis: Sebuah Catatan Masyarakat Bali dan masyarakat Bugis pada dasarnya memiliki falsafah hukum yang sama, yaitu dilandasi local wisdom, kekayaan nilai adat istiadat. Tri Hita Karana tak ubahnya sebagai paham kosmologi yang memandu masyarakat Bali sebagai ikatan masyarakat yang membentuk hukum, mengatur hubungan manusia dengan Tuhan, hubungan manusia dengan alam, dan hubungan manusia dengan sesamanya manusia. Masyarakat Bugis sangat menjunjung tinggi nilai panggadereng sebagai dasar dalam berbuat dan menjalin hubungan dengan sesamanya. Dalam masyarakat Bali dikenal „Tat Twam Asi‟ aku adalah kamu', konsepsi tersebut dapat diparalelkan dengan konsepsi siri‟ dalam masyarakat Bugis, bukankah terminologi siri' mempunyai dimensi invidual sekaligus dimensi sosial. Kedua prinsip tersebut sangat mempengaruhi corak kebudayaan masing-masing, sehingga dalam kehidupan sosial masyarakat Bali misalnya, „Tat Twam Asi‟ menjadi hukum 115 sama rasa, sama rata. Bila seseorang melanggar adat misalnya maka satu kampung di mana ia tinggal akan mendapatkan sanksi juga. Yang menjadi perbedaan dalam tradisi hukum kedua masyarakat tersebut adalah masyarakat Bali dalam setiap kegiatannya senantiasa melihat Tuhan/Sang Hyang Widhi, dalam setiap aktifitas sosial mereka. Sedangkan bagi masyarakat Bugis siri‟lah yang menjadi pusat gravitasi masyarakat Bugis ketika menjalin hubungan dengan sesamanya. Siri‟ sebagai harga diri dan rasa malu tidak hanya terdapat dalam diri individu tetapi juga merekatkan ikatan atau hubungan antara individu yang satu dengan invidu lain, sehingga mereka dapat mengatakan adanya satu Siri' antara orang yang berhubungan tersebut (Ahimsa, 2007:64). Pengaruh Revelasi Argumentasi yang menyatakan bahwa masyarakat Bali dalam setiap aktifitasnya senantiasa dipengaruhi oleh ajaran agama Tri Hita karana' karena prinsip tersebut terinspirasi dari pustaka suci Bhagawadgita, III. 10 yang bunyi slokanya sebagai berikut: Sahayajnah prajah srishtva. Puro „vacha prajapatih. Anena prasavishya dhavam. Esha vo „stv isthta kamadhuk (Dahulu kala Prajapati mencipta manusia bersama bakti persembahannya dan berkata: dengan ini akan berkembang biak dan biarlah ini jadi sapi perahanmu (kamdhuk) (Dharmayudha, dan K. Cantika, 1994:8). Yang dimaksud dengan sapi perahan yang bisa memenuhi segala keinginan itu (Kamadhuk) tidak lain adalah bumi, ibu pertiwi ini, sebagaimana disebutkan dalam kitab Mahabharata (edisi Bombay) VI.9.76: ―Alam pemberi segala kebaikan, alam adalah sapi yang bisa memenuhi segala keinginan (Kamadhuk)‖ (Sudharta, 1980:4). Sedangkan argumentasi yang melihat bahwa masyarakat Bugis tidaklah selalu mendasarkan filosofi hukumnya pada ajaran agama, terlihat dalam kultur tradisi rantau masyarakat Bugis. Di mana siri'lah yang menjadi pengikat manusia Bugis dalam kesehariannya. Bukti dari argumentasi ini adalah di Sulawesi Selatan terdapat 116 berbagai keyakinan ajaran agama dan hal tersebut tidaklah membatasi mereka untuk menjalin hubungan dan saling menjaga siri‟ mereka. Ternyata kearifan lokal dalam kepustakaan Bali dan Bugis masih sangat relevan dengan perkembangan zaman. Karena itu, kearifan lokal sebagai jati diri bangsa perlu direvitalisasi, khususnya bagi generasi muda dalam percaturan global saat dan di masa datang. Dengan demikian, identitas sebagai bangsa baik secara fisik maupun non fisik akan tetap terjaga. ---------- 117 Daftar Pustaka Abidin, Andi Zainal., 1995. ―Sumbangsih Budaya Sulawesi Selatan untuk Pembentukan Hukum Nasional‖, dalam Artidjo Alkostar (ed.), Identitas Hukum Nasional, Penerbit Fakultas Hukum Universitas Islam Indonesia, Yogyakarta. ----------------------------., 1999. Capita Selecta Kebudayaan Sulawesi Selatan I. Penerbit Hasanuddin University Press, Ujung Pandang. ----------------------------. 1999. Capita Selecta Kebudayaan Sulawesi Selatan II. Penerbit Hasanuddin University Press, Ujung Pandang. Ahimsa-Putra, Heddy Shri., 2007. Patron & Klien di Sulawesi Selatan: Sebuah Kajian Fungsional-Struktural,Kepel Press, Yogyakarta. Alkostar, Artidjo (ed.)., 1997. Identitas Hukum Nasional, Penerbit Fakultas Hukum Universitas Islam Indonesia, Yogyakarta. Dharmayudha, I Made Suasthawa dan I Wayang Koti Cantika., 1994. Filsafat Adat Bali, Upada Sastra, Denpasar. Dwipayana, AAGN Ari., 2001, Kelas dan Kasta: Pergulatan Kelas Menengah Bali, Lapera Pustaka Utama, Yogyakarta. Kaler, I Gusti Ketut.,1983. Butir-Butir Tercecer tentang Adat Bali, Jilid 1, Penerbit Bali Agung, Denpasar. ----------------------------.,1983. Butir-Butir Tercecer tentang Adat Bali, Jilid 2, Penerbit Bali Agung, Denpasar. Mangemba. H.D., 2002. Takutlah Pada Orang Jujur: Mozaik Pemikiran, Penerbit Pustaka Pelajar bekerja sama dengan Lembaga Penerbitan Universitas Hasanuddin Makassar, Yogyakarta. 118 Marzuki, Laica., 1995. Siri‟ Bagian Kesadaran Hukum Rakyat Bugis Makassar: Sebuah Telaah Filsafat Hukum, Hasanuddin University press, Ujungpandang. Parisada Hindu Dharma., 1986. Upadeca Tentang Ajaran-Ajaran Agama Hindu.TK, TP Parmono, R., 1985. Menggali Unsur-Unsur Filsafat Indonesia, Penerbit Andi Offset, Yogyakarta. Suasthawa, I Made dan I Wayan Koti Cantika., 1987. ―Asas Kekeluargaan Dalam Hukum Adat dan Implementasinya Dalam Pembinaan Hukum Nasional‖, dalam Kerta Patrika No. 42 Th. XIII Desember 1987. Sudharma, I Nengah., 1971. Desa Adat (di Bali) Sebagai Lembaga Sosial Religius berdasarkan Falsafah Tri Hita Karana, TP, Denpasar. ------------------------------ 119 Untaian tulisan Iffan Ahmad Gufron lebih banyak berpusar pada paparan latar historis suatu masyarakat, Sunda. Iffan memaparkan bahwa identitas manusia Sunda sudah tidak lagi memiliki tipologi yang khas, yang tersisa hanya tipikal yang identik orang Kanekes (Baduy). Dalam banyak hal telah direntangkan oleh Arip Senjaya terutama mengenai jarak dan perbedaan Kanekes dan Sunda. Tetapi pesan yang hendak disampaikan Iffan adalah sifat terbuka masyarakat Sunda sedemikian open sehingga akulturasi-di sebagian tempat Iffan menyatakan sinkretisasi- budaya Sunda dan asing sedemikian tinggi. Akibatnya identitas kolektif „tinggal‟ berbasis pada sistem kekerabatan dan sistem sosial yang menjadi nalar masyarakat Sunda dalam mempertahankan eksistensi kolektif mereka. Dari modal budaya yang terbatas itu, garis genetika dan hereditas dijadikan sumbu utama dalam membentuk identitas. Sebagaimana nampak dalam banyak sistem kebudayaan, Urang Sunda terlibat dalam skema segitiga hubungan: AlamTuhan-sesama manusia, sehingga relasi sosialnya terpengaruhi dalam bentuk usahausaha menjaga harmonisasi antara manusia-alam-Tuhan. Mitos tetap efektif menjadi bahasa perantingan pengetahuan untuk mempertahankan identitas (strategi survival), sekaligus sebagai usaha terus-menerus mempertahankan kelompok inti atau membentuk kelompok inti yang lebih besar. Di sisi lain, relasi sosial merupakan faktor penting dan menentukan dalam membentuk identitas urang Sunda. Karena kepemilikan kapital mempengaruhi stratifikasi sistem sosial, maka pola perkawinan dan pemekaran kelompok tetap memperhitungkan pertukaran akumulasi kapital. Strategi survivalitas transendent tidak dominan dibandingkan dengan survivalitas kelompok inti. Pertimbangannya sederhana, eksistensi tidak berkaitan dengan status wilayah tertentu, urang Sunda bisa tetap menjadi Sunda tanpa harus berdiam di wilayah Jawa Barat. Eksistensi individu tidak harus berhubungan dengan penguasaan teritorial tetapi bagaimana mempertahankan sistem nalar pengetahuan (tradisi) yang bersifat Sunda. Maka 120 tradisi Sunda adalah eksplisitasi identitas itu sendiri. Seolah Urang Sunda hendak menyatakan suatu hypotesis bahwa: identitas tidak harus mensyaratkan teritorial Manusia Sunda: Penelusuran Histori dan Identitas Oleh: Iffan Ahmad Gufron Istilah Sunda dan Jawa Barat Mendengar istilah Sunda', yang terbenak adalah gambaran suatu orang tertentu di Indonesia, suku Sunda yang menggunakan bahasa Sunda sebagai bahasa komunikasi sehari-hari dan tinggal di pulau Jawa bagian barat. Demikian juga ketika orang mendengar istilah Jawa Barat' yang terbayang adalah suatu wilayah yang dihuni oleh sebagian besar orang sunda dan berbicara menggunakan bahasa Sunda. Anggapan tersebut tidak semuanya salah karena berbicara Sunda, tidak akan lepas dari pembicaraan tentang wilayah yang didiami oleh sebagian besar orang yang mengaku sebagai orang sunda pada suatu wilayah di Pulau Jawa bagian Barat, Jawa Barat. Setelah reformasi, provinsi Jawa Barat telah mengalami pemekaran, dan sebagian daerahnya, Banten menjadi provinsi tersendiri. Istilah Sunda menurut R.W. Van Bemmelen menyangkut daerah yang lebih luas, yaitu untuk menyebut daratan bagian barat laut wilayah India Timur, yang dikelilingi oleh sistem Gunung Sunda yang melingkar sepanjang sekitar 7.000 km. Dataran ini terdiri dari dua bagian utama. Yaitu bagian utara yang meliputi kepulauan Filipina dan pulau-pulau karang sepanjang lautan Pasifik bagian barat serta bagian selatan yang terbentang dari timur ke barat mulai Maluku bagian selatan sampai lembah Brahmaputra di Assam, India. Atau dibentuk oleh pulau Banda di timur terus ke barat melalui pulau Jawa, Sumatera, kepulauan Andaman, Nikobar sampai ke Arakan Yoma di Burma (Myanmar), daratan bersambung dengan kawasan sistem Gunung Himalaya di barat dan Dataran Sahul di timur. Di samping itu terdapat istilah Sunda Besar dan Sunda Kecil. Sunda Besar adalah istilah yang digunakan untuk 121 menyebut himpunan pulau-pulau seperti Sumatera, Jawa, Madura, dan Kalimantan yang semuanya merupakan pulau-pulau besar. Sedangkan Sunda kecil dipakai untuk menyebut himpunan pulau-pulau kecil yang kini masuk dalam wilayah Provinsi Bali, Nusa Tenggara, dan Timor (Ekadjati, 1995: 1-2). Penjelasan tersebut mengindikasikan bahwa istilah sunda digunakan untuk menyebut wilayah dataran yang sangat luas. Wilayah yang sekarang disebut Jawa Barat (sebelum pemekaran Banten) merupakan bagian dari dataran yang disebut Sunda pada zaman pra-sejarah yang diperkirakan muncul dari dasar laut setelah timbulnya Benua Asia (Kosoh dkk, 1994: 4). Adapun istilah sunda yang menunjukkan pengertian wilayah Pulau Jawa bagian barat muncul pertama kali pada abad ke-11 Masehi. Istilah itu tertulis dalam sebuah prasasti yang ditemukan di Cibadak, Sukabumi. Dalam prasasti itu, seorang Raja bernama Sri Jayabhupati menyebut dirinya sebagai raja Sunda dan tercatat angka tahun 952 Saka atau sekitar 1030 Masehi. Selain itu dalam prasasti Kebantenan yang ditemukan di Bekasi dan empat naskah berbahasa Sunda kuno yang dibuat sekitar abad ke-15 dan ke-16 Masehi menunjuk istilah sunda sebagai nama kerajaan atau nama wilayah atau tempat. Di dalam prasasti itu dijelaskan adanya tempat (dayeuhan) yang bernama Sundasembawa dan Jayagiri, keduanya termasuk dalam teritorial kerajaan Sunda. Sedang dalam empat naskah tersebut, Sunda disebut bersama atau berhubungan dengan wilayah lain, seperti Jawa, Lampung, Baluk, dan Cempa dan di dalam naskah terakhir diterangkan batas wilayah Sunda dan Jawa, yaitu sungai Cipamali (Kali Pemali), suatu daerah dekat Brebes (Ekadjati, 1995: 4). Berbeda dengan sunda, istilah Jawa Barat baru muncul pada abad ke-19 Masehi sebagai terjemahan dari West Java. Pada waktu itu pemerintah kolonial Hindia Belanda telah menguasai Pulau Jawa dan melakukan pembagian wilayah atas Pulau Jawa menjadi tiga daerah militer, yaitu Daerah Militer I West Java, Daerah Militer II Midden Java, dan Daerah Militer III Oost Java. Pada tahun 1925 penggunaan istilah daerah tersebut menjadi resmi dan populer dengan dibentuknya 122 daerah otonomi tingkat provinsi. Maka terbentuklah Provincie West Java, Provincie Midden Java dan Provincie Oost Java, yang dalam bahasa Indonesia menjadi Provinsi Jawa Barat, Provinsi Jawa tengah, dan Provinsi Jawa Timur. Wilayah Jawa Barat terdiri dari Banten, Batavia (Jakarta), Priangan, dan Cirebon. Setelah Indonesia merdeka, wilayah administrasi pemerintahan tingkat provinsi diaktifkan kembali setelah pada zaman pendudukan Jepang sempat dihapuskan. Wilayah Provinsi Jawa Barat sama seperti sejak pembentukannya tahun 1925, namun sejak tahun 1964, wilayahnya dikurangi oleh Jakarta, yang menjadi Daerah Khusus Ibukota (DKI) setingkat provinsi (Ekadjati, 1995: 9-12). Saat ini wilayah Jawa Barat mengalami pengurangan lagi setelah Banten menjadi provinsi tersendiri. Dari uraian diatas, terlihat istilah Sunda lebih mengakar dan menyejarah bagi masyarakat yang tinggal di pulau Jawa bagian barat dibanding istilah Jawa Barat, tak heran kalau orang-orang tersebut lebih menyukai wilayahnya disebut Sunda, Pasundan atau Tatar Sunda dibanding Jawa Barat (Rosidi, 1984: 129). Jawa Barat sebagai wilayah administratif tingkat provinsi (sebelum pemekaran Banten), sebenarnya tidak hanya dihuni oleh masyarakat suku Sunda ada wilayah-wilayah yang dihuni oleh masyarakat non–sunda seperti di wilayah Cirebon dan Indramayu (Jawa-Cirebon), Karawang (Jawa-Karawang), Banten (Jawa-Banten), serta Jakarta dan sekitarnya (Melayu-Betawi). Di samping itu di daerah-daerah yang termasuk dalam teritorial Jawa Tengah yang dulunya termasuk dalam teritorial Kerajaan Sunda terdapat kelompok-kelompok orang yang masih menggunakan bahasa Sunda (Rosidi, 1984: 129), seperti di Bantarkawung (Brebes), Pasir Batang (Purwokerto), Sidareja (Cilacap). Siapa Itu Orang Sunda? Sebutan bahwa orang Sunda adalah orang-orang yang tinggal di wilayah Provinsi Jawa Barat, sebagaimana pemaparan sebelumnya, maka akan timbul berbagai penolakan, karena yang tinggal dan menjadi penghuni di daerah Jawa Barat 123 tidak hanya orang Sunda (Rosidi, 1984: 128). Selain itu di luar wilayah Jawa Barat ada juga kelompok-kelompok masyarakat di daerah tertentu yang mengaku sebagai orang Sunda (urang Sunda). Secara sederhana, orang Sunda adalah orang yang mengaku dirinya dan diakui oleh orang lain sebagai orang Sunda. Dari definisi tersebut ada dua kriteria tentang siapa yang disebut orang Sunda itu?, Kriteria pertama, terkait keturunan (hubungan darah), disebut orang Sunda apabila orangtua, baik ayah maupun ibu atau keduanya adalah orang Sunda, di mana pun ia tinggal dan dibesarkan. Sedangkan kriteria kedua, terkait sosial budaya, bahwa yang disebut orang Sunda adalah orang yang dibesarkan dalam lingkungan sosial budaya Sunda dan dalam hidupnya ia mengenal, menghayati, menggunakan, dan mengamalkan norma-norma dan nilai-nilai sosial budaya Sunda dalam hidupnya (Ekadjati, 1994: 8). Menggunakan kriteria pertama, definisi orang Sunda bersifat tertutup, berarti seseorang dapat disebut orang Sunda hanya jika leluhurnya orang Sunda dan ia tetap menjadi orang Sunda walaupun ia tidak memahami dan mengamalkan nilai-nilai budaya Sunda. Merunut kriteria kedua, bersifat lebih terbuka, keturunan tidak menjadi satu-satunya faktor penentu, seseorang bisa saja menjadi orang Sunda walaupun leluhurnya bukan orang Sunda, apabila ia dilahirkan, dibesarkan, dan hidup dalam lingkungan Sunda serta menghayati, mengamalkan nilai, norma-norma sosial budaya dalam hidupnya. Sebagaimana Ajip Rosidi (1984:129), penulis juga sependapat bahwa kriteria kedua lebih bisa mewakili siapa orang Sunda itu?. Maka secara umum dapatlah dikatakan bahwa yang disebut orang Sunda adalah mereka yang sehari-hari mempergunakan bahasa Sunda dan menjadi pendukung kebudayaan Sunda. Lebih lanjut dalam memandang karakteristik orang/masyarakat tertentu seperti Sunda perlu kehati-hatian dan kajian lebih mendalam. Ada anggapan bahwa orang Sunda itu humoris dan periang, tidak terlepas dengan tokoh yang sangat digemari oleh orang atau masyarakat Sunda yaitu Kabayan, yang memiliki karakter 124 lugu, humoris dan periang. Namun, kegemaran akan humor bukanlah merupakan monopoli orang Sunda. Suku-suku lain juga menyukai humor, hal ini dapat dilihat pada tokoh-tokoh yang mirip Kabayan dalam cerita rakyat pada masyarakat lain di Indonesia, seperti: Pan Balang Tamak di Bali, Si Meuseukin di Aceh, Pak Pandir di Medan, Lebai Malang di Sumatera Barat dan lain sebagainya (Rosidi, 1984: 130). Kesulitan menentukan kekhasan orang Sunda, dialami juga oleh penelitipeneliti yang mengkaji kekhasan suku-suku lain di Indonesia (lihat Magnis-Suseno, 1985: 3). Setiap manusia bisa dikatakan memiliki individualitasnya masing-masing. Ketika ada orang Sunda mengatakan bahwa orang Sunda berwatak lemah lembut, sopan, halus, berjiwa satria, tenggang rasa terhadap orang lain dan ciri-ciri lainnya, semuanya itu merupakan tipe-tipe ideal belaka (Rosidi, 1984: 130-131). Tidak semua orang Sunda mempunyai ciri-ciri yang sedemikian itu, bahkan banyak juga yang berwatak keras dan sebagainya yang bertolak belakang dengan ciri-ciri ideal tersebut, sehingga bisa dikatakan orang Sunda memiliki tipikal variatif. Dilihat dari adat istiadat yang masih nampak, dan dari naskah-naskah kuno, cerita-cerita pantun atau bentuk sastra lisan lain, orang atau masyarakat Sunda memperlihatkan kehidupan yang demokratis. Artinya masyarakat Sunda walaupun secara historis dipengaruhi oleh budaya Hindu, namun dalam pembagian masyarakat, tidak ada menunjukkan bentuk kasta-kasta seperti dalam masyarakat Hindu. Dalam masyarakat Sunda tidak terdapat tilas sejarah yang membuktikan adanya suatu birokrasi feodal yang mengakar kuat atau suatu tempat atau kraton sebagai pusat kehidupan atau pusat kebudayaan (Rosidi, 1984: 132). Masyarakat Sunda seperti halnya masyarakat Jawa (lihat Ahimsa, 2006: 339341) dalam sejarahnya merupakan masyarakat yang terbuka terhadap pengaruh yang datang dari luar kebudayaannya (Rosidi, 1984: 133). Sehingga akulturasi budaya ataupun sinkretisasi' antara budaya lokal (Sunda) dengan budaya asing yang datang melahirkan sinkretisme' budaya Sunda yang baru. 125 Mengenai kehidupan orang Sunda, sebagian besar dari mereka bermata pencaharian petani dan buruh tani, karena faktor kesuburan tanah. Sebagian terdapat profesi nelayan dan pedagang (Rosidi, 1984: 136). Saat ini, akibat pertumbuhan sektor industri, ditambah makin menyempitnya lahan pertanian, banyak orang Sunda yang semula bertani atau menjadi buruh tani berganti profesi sebagai pekerja pabrik, buruh bangunan. Selain itu banyak juga yang menjadi pegawai pemerintah dan swata serta beragam profesi lain. Aspek Sejarah Sunda 1. Zaman Neolitikum Di tanah Sunda, pada masa neolitik (zaman batu )telah ada kehidupan manusia, itu terbukti dengan ditemukannya benda-benda prasejarah di beberapa tempat, seperti di Pesisir Utara antara Tangerang-Rengasdengklok, Kelapa Dua (Jakarta), Kampung Muara dan Pasir Angin (Bogor), Dataran tinggi Bandung, Lembah Leles (Garut), dan Kuningan. Benda-benda Prasejarah yang dimaksud antara lain berupa alat perkakas hidup sehari-hari seperti beliung persegi, kapak corong, ujung tombak, mata panah, batu asah, periuk yang terbuat dari batu, perunggu, besi, dan tanah liat. Serta alat-alat upacara keagamaan seperti menhir, batu dakon, dolmen, batu undakan, lesung batu, peti batu, arca/patung nenek moyang, yang terbuat dari batu dan perunggu (kosoh dkk.,1994:27-29). Penemuan ini tidak hanya menunjukkan tentang adanya kehidupan yang telah hidup dalam suatu kelompok masyarakat yang teratur (Rosidi,1986: 308), walaupun masih sangat sederhana. Masyarakat ini terus mengalami perkembangan budaya dan memasuki masa sejarah (Ekadjati, 1984: 77-78). Masyarakat di tanah Sunda pada masa prasejarah telah menganut kepercayaan animisme yaitu pemujaan terhadap arwah nenek moyang. Hal tersebut timbul karena percaya bahwa arwah nenek moyang selalu berada di sekitar mereka meski alamnya 126 telah berbeda. Arwah orang yang meninggal terutama leluhur dapat bersemayam di tempat-tempat tertentu seperti di atas menhir, dolmen, dan patung-patung. Mereka juga percaya bahwa arwah nenek moyang juga dapat memasuki tubuh orang tertentu yang masih hidup, seperti seorang dukun atau syaman. Melalui jasad dukun itu arwah nenek moyang dapat berbicara. Selain itu masyarakat juga mempercayai tenaga atau kekuatan alam yang terdapat pada benda-benda, seperti pedang, tongkat, baju jimat, cincin dan gelang. Kepercayaan akan adanya kekuatan sakti pada benda-benda itu dinamakan dinamisme (Kosoh dkk,1994: 33-35). Dari penjabaran di atas, masyarakat Sunda pada masa prasejarah telah mengenal dua kepercayaan yang secara umum dianggap merupakan kepercayaan masyarakat lama, yaitu animisme dan dinamisme, kedua kepercayaan ini akan menjadi dasar bagi perkembangan kepercayaan pada masa-masa berikutnya. 2. Masa Kerajaan A. Kerajaan Tarumanagara Kerajaan Tarumanegara adalah pintu masuk tanah Sunda ke dalam masa sejarah. Tarumanegara merupakan kerajaan tertua di Indonesia sesudah kerajaan Kutai di Kalimantan Timur. Kerajaan Tarumanagara dapat diketahui sejarahnya lewat penemuan beberapa prasasti di tanah Sunda yang ditulis dalam huruf Pallawa berbahasa sansekerta, di tepi sungai Ciaruteun, Kebon kopi, Pasir Jambu, muara sungai Ciaten dan di Tugu (Cilincing, Jakarta). Prasasti-prasasti itu menunjukkan bahwa di daerah tersebut terdapat suatu kerajaan yang bernama Taruma atau Tarumanagara, yang salah seorang rajanya bernama Purnawarman (Kosoh dkk., 1994: 42-43). Selain itu disebut pula dua nama yang kemungkinan masih merupakan raja Tarumanagara yaitu Rajadhiraja Guru dan Rajarsi (Ekadjati, 1984: 80)5. Namun dari semua prasasti yang ditemukan, tidak satu pun yang menyebut angka tahun tentang kapan kerajaan Tarumanagara berdiri dan berakhir. Dari salah 127 satu prasasti yang ditemukan di Tugu, hanya dapat diketahui bahwa pada waktu itu raja Purnawarman telah memerintah selama duapuluh dua tahun. Akan tetapi berdasarkan penelitian para ahli, prasasti yang tertua diperkirakan berasal dari pertengahan abad ke-5 Masehi (kosoh dkk.,1994:43). Saat itu, ibukota Tarumanegara diperkirakan berada di tepi sungai sekitar Bekasi-Karawang sekarang. Sedang akhir dari kerajaaan Tarumanagara berdasarkan prasasti Kota kapur, akibat serangan dari kerajaan Sriwijaya (Ekadjati, 1984: 81). Sistem kepercayaan yang dianut penduduk Tarumanagara adalah agama Hindu aliran Syiwa, terutama kalangan Istana (Ekadjati, 1984: 81). Namun demikian kalangan rakyat pada umumnya masih melakukan ritual animisme dan dinamisme. B.Kerajaan Sunda Setelah kerajaan Tarumanagara runtuh-yang diperkirakan menjelang akhir abad ke-7 Masehi-di tanah Sunda muncul kerajaan-kerajaan kecil, seperti Kuningan, Galuh, Sunda. Kerajaan-kerajaan kecil itu kemudian digabungkan menjadi satu disebut kerajaan Sunda (Ekadjati, 1984: 81-82). Sejarah kerajaan Sunda dimulai dari tokoh Sanjaya, seorang putra Sena, raja di Galuh. Menurut naskah Kropak 406 dan Carita Parahyangan, Sanjaya menjadi menantu raja Terusbawa, raja Sunda yang mendirikan Pakuwan Pajajaran. Setelah raja Terusbawa wafat, Sanjaya naik tahta kerajaan Sunda dengan sebutan raja Harisdarma. Sejak itulah kerajaan galuh dan Sunda bergabung menjadi kerajaan Sunda, dengan pusat kerajaan di Galuh. Berdasarkan prasasti yang ditemukan di Cibadak, Sukabumi. Pada tahun 1030 Masehi memerintah seorang raja bernama Srijayabuphati di kerajaan Sunda (Kosoh dkk., 1994: 47-48). Dalam keterangan Ekadajti (1984:83-87),Raja Srjayabuphati identik dengan Sang Rakeyan Darmasiksa yang disebut dalam naskah-naskah Sunda kuno. Dari garis ayah, ia keturunan raja-raja Sunda, sedang dari ibu ia keturunan rajaraja Jawa Timur. Pada mulanya ia menjadi raja di Saunggalah (1018-1030), kemudian pindah ke pakuan sebagai raja Sunda (1030-1108). Tiga abad kemudian pusat 128 kerajaan berpindah ke Kawali (sekarang masuk daerah Ciamis), tidak ada petunjuk kapan perpindahan berlangsung, tetapi ketika raja Maharaja menjadi penguasa, pusat kerajaan sangat mungkin sudah berada di Kawali. Raja Maharaja adalah raja yang gugur di Bubat (1357), tatkala mengantarkan puterinya yang akan dinikahi oleh Hayam Wuruk, raja Majapahit. Sepeningal raja Maharaja, kerajaan dipegang oleh Hyang Bunisora (1357-1371). Setelah itu Wastu kancana menjadi penguasa Sunda yang memerintah selama 104 tahun (1371-1475). Sekitar tahun 1482, cucu Wasta Kancana, Sri Baduga Maharaja menjadi raja Sunda. Ia memerintah selama 39 tahun (1482-1521). Pada masa pemerintahannya ibukota kerajaaan kembali ke Pakuwan Pajajaran. Merujuk pada prasasti Batutulis, Sri Baduga Maharaja merupakan raja yang banyak jasanya, seperti membuat tanda peringatan gugunungan, jalan, hutan larangan dan telaga Kepercayaan yang dianut pada masa kerajaaan Sunda merujuk pada naskah ratu Pakuwan, sejak Tarumanagara sampai akhir abad ke-16 Masehi di tanah Sunda (wilayah kerajaan Sunda) hidup dan berkembang agama Hindu yang bercorak SundaHindu dan Sunda-Buddha, juga Hindu-Buddha yang bercampur dengan unsur-unsur kepercayaan leluhur yang pernah berkembang sebelumnya (sinkretis). Setelah Islam masuk ke tanah Sunda banyak kepercayaan yang hilang, namun ada beberapa aspek unsur-unsurnya yang tidak hilang sama sekali (Kosoh dkk., 1994: 84-87). C. Masuknya Pengaruh Islam Sekitar abad ke 15 dan 16 Masehi, kerajaan Sunda dengan pusat kerajaan terakhirnya di Pakuwan (Bogor sekarang) mulai mengalami kemunduran, pada masa itu ada dua gangguan yang menjadikan kerajaan Sunda terdesak hingga terus melemah. Gangguan dari dalam adalah terjadinya pemberontakan daerah-daerah yang ingin merdeka dari Pakuwan, seperti Cirebon, Raja galuh, Telaga, dan Banten, sedang dari luar, penyebaran Islam sangat cepat, bahkan pengaruhnya sudah mulai masuk Cirebon dan Banten (Kosoh dkk, 1994: 94). 129 Sejak berdirinya Cirebon berada dalam kekuasaan kerajaan Sunda, pada tahun 1479 Syarif Hidayat di angkat oleh raja Sunda menjadi kepala daerah Cirebon dengan pangkat Tumenggung dan Sunan Gunung Jati. Sejak tahun 1528 Sunan Gunung Jati berkeliling ke pelosok-pelosok tanah Sunda utuk menyebarkan agama Islam ke segenap lapisan masyarakat. Kedudukannya sebagai kepala penguasa Cirebon diwakilkan kepada putranya yang bernama pangeran Pasarean, ketika pangeran Pasarean wafat tahun 1552 di Demak, kekuasaan diberikan kepada menantunya Fadhilah Khan. Sunan Gunung Jati sendiri meninggal tahun 1568 dan dimakamkan di Pasir Jati Puncak Bukit Sembung, Cirebon (Ekadjati, 1984: 91-92) Sementara itu, setelah Banten jatuh ke tangan pasukan Islam yang dipimpin Faletehan, Sunan Gunung Jati mengangkat putranya Hasanuddin menjadi kepala daerah Banten. Pada tahu 1552 pangeran Hasanuddin dinobatkan menjadi sultan Banten. Pada masa pemerintahannya Pangerah Hasanuddin terus menerus merintis jalan dan memimpin usaha pengislaman penduduk Banten sampai ke pedalamannya. Usaha pengislaman dilanjutkan oleh putranya Maulana Yusuf, yang menjadi sultan Banten menggantikan ayahnya (1570-1580). Maulana Yusuf memfokuskan pengislaman ke pusat kerajaan Sunda yang masih bertahan yaitu Pakuan Pajajaran. Tahun 1579, pasukan Banten berhasil merebut Pakuan Pajajaran. Dengan jatuhnya ibukota kerajaan sunda ke tangan kaum muslimim, maka penyebaran Islam ke wilayah pedalaman Sunda terbuka lebar dan tidak ada lagi kekuatan yang menghalanginya. Namun sekelompok masyarakat Banten selatan tetap bertahan dengan kepercayaannya, merekalah masyarakat kanekes, sebelah selatan kota Rangkasbitung, sampai sekarang mereka tetap mempertahankan tradisi yang hidup pada masa kerajaan Sunda (Ekadjati, 1984: 92-94). D. Masa Pengaruh Mataram Dan Kolonial Belanda Setelah runtuhnya kerajaan Sunda dengan datangnya Islam dari dua tempat, yaitu Cirebon dan Banten yang kemudian menebarkan pengaruhnya seantero tanah 130 Sunda, kerajaan Sunda tidak langsung menghilang begitu saja tanpa penerus, tapi muncul sekitar tahun 1580, apa yang disebut Sumedanglarang yang dapat dipandang sebagai kelanjutan dari kerajaan Sunda. Menurut Ekadjati (1984: 101-104),pusat kekuasaan Sumedanglarang terletak di Kutamaya sebelah barat kota Sumedang (sekarang). Kutamaya didirikan dengan maksud menggantikan Pakuwan Pajajaran, ibukota tanah Sunda. Penguasa Sumedanglarang yang pertama adalah Prabu Geusan Ulung. Keabsahan Sumedanglarang menjadi pengganti Kerajaan Sunda, dikuatkan dengan asal usul Parbu Geusan ulung yang berasal dari Galuh yang merupakan leluhur Pakuwan Pajajaran. Kemudian 4 mantan pembesar Pakuwan Pajajaran yang mampu meloloskan diri saat diserbu pasukan Banten (1579), yaitu Jayaperkosa, Terongpeot, Kondanghapa, dan Nangganan, keempatnya menjadi pendukung dan pembantu Prabu Geusan Ulun dengan mmeprakarsai dan melaksanakan pembangunan Kutamaya, mengangkat Prabu Geusan Ulin sebagai penguasa Sumedang dengan persetujuan kepala-kepala daerah di wilayah itu yang belum masuk Islam dan selalu mendukung tindakan yang melawan Cirebon. Sumedanglarang meliputi daerah sebelah timur Sungai Cisadane sampai sebelah barat sungai Cipamali. Tentunya dengan mengecualikan daerah Jayakarta, Bogor, dan Cirebon yang Islam. Prabu Geusan ulun memerintah Sumedanglarang selama 28 tahun (1580-1608). Tahun 1620, ketika itu Aria Suriadiwangsa (putra Parabu Geusan Ulun) yang menjadi penguasa Sumedanglarang menggantikan ayahnya, menyerah pada Sultan Mataram Kekuasaan Mataram di tanah Sunda hanya berlangsung sekitar 50 tahun, karena wilayah kekuasaan Mataram di tanah Sunda kemudian diserahkan kepada pemerintah kolonial Belanda sebagai upah (1677 dan 1705). Di samping itu bahasa Jawa sempat menjadi bahasa resmi dalam pemerintahan dan menjadi alat budaya di wilayah Priangan sampai pertenagahan abad ke-19 Masehi (Ekadjati, 1984: 107). Tak heran bahasa sunda sedikit banyak memiliki kemiripan dengan bahasa Jawa. 131 Gubernur Jenderal Daendels (1808-1811), membagi wilayah-wilayah tanah Sunda yang dikuasainya ke dalam dua wilayah. Wilayah pertama, dimasukkan dalam pemerintahan Batavia en Jakatrasche Preanger-regentschappen, yang meliputi Tangerang, Karawang, Bogor, Cianjur, Sumedang, Bandung, dan Parakan Muncang. Wilayah kedua, disebut Kesultanan Cirebon en Cheribonsche Preangerregentschappen, yang terdiri dari Cirebon, Limbangan, Sukapura, dan Galuh (Ekadjati, 1984: 112). 5. Masa Kemerdekaan Masuknya pengaruh kekuasaan asing ke tanah Sunda, dibarengi dengan munculnya gerakan yang menantang kekuasaan itu. Hal ini disebabkan keinginan kepada kehidupan yang bebas dan merdeka seperi zaman kerajaan Sunda dahulu, walaupun gerakan itu terkadang mengalami kegagalan. Perlawanan Dipati Ukur bersama rakyatnya terhadap Mataram (1629-1632) bertujuan membebaskan diri dari ikatan dengan Mataram. Perjuangan rakyat Banten dipimpin Kiai Tapa dimaksudkan untuk mengusir Belanda dari Jakarta. Perlawanan Bagus Rangin di Cirebon. (180618018) ditujukan untuk melenyapkan pemerasan dan kekuasaan orang asing yang merajalela di Cirebon. Proklamasi Kemerdekaan Indonesia yang dibacakan oleh soekarno dan ditandatangani oleh Soekarno dan Muhammad Hatta, yang mewakili bangsa Indonesia pada tanggal 17 Agustus 1945, merupakan puncak perjuangan bangsa Indonesia, termasuk di dalamnya orang Sunda dalam melawan penjajah asing atas tanah airnya. Pada waktu mencari format negara yang paling ideal pasca Indonesia merdeka, sebagian orang Sunda memilih format negara federal. Sehubungan dengan itu merujuk pada hasil konferensi Jawa Barat, berdirilah pada tahun 1948, negara Pasundan sebagai bagian dari Republik Indonesia Serikat (RIS), namun ketika Indonesia memutuskan kembali kepada negara kesatuan republik Indonesia, tahun 1950 Negara Pasundan membubarkan diri. 132 Aspek Struktur Sosial Masyarakat Sunda 1.Sistem Kekerabatan Orang Sunda menganut sistem kekerabatan atau bentuk keluarga yang bersifat parental dan bilateral, artinya orang Sunda mengakui garis kekerabatan baik melalui garis keturunan ayah maupun dari garis keturunan ibu. Jadi keduanya mempunyai hak yang sama terhadap anak-anaknya. Seorang ego dalam masyarakat Sunda menjadi anggota kekerabatan dari garis bapak juga menjadi anggota kekerabatan dari garis ibu. Maka ketika menikah, ia menjadi anggota kekerabatan istrinya atau suaminya. Hubungan kekerabatan orang Sunda berdasarkan perbedaan generasi dibedakan atas tiga golongan, pertama, golongan orang tua (sepuh, kolot); generasi yang setingkat lebih atas dari ego, yang terdiri atas kakek, nenek, bapak, dan ibu. Kedua, golongan saudara (sadulur) dalam pengertian sempit, yaitu saudara kandung (dulur saindung-sabapa) atau kalau ada, saudara tiri (dulur sabapa misah indung, dulur saindung misah bapa). Disebut lanceuk, bila lebih tua usianya (kakak), dan adi atau rayi bila lebih muda usianya (adik). Sadulur merupakan satu generasi dengan ego. Ketiga, golongan anak, merupakan keturunan ego, anak ego, baik laki-laki maupun perempuan (Ekadjati, 1995: 204). Perbedaan generasi ini juga akan menjadi dasar dari digunakannya undak-usuk basa (tatakrama bahasa) dalam komunikasi dengan golongan-golongan tersebut apakah menggunakan bahasa Sunda lemes ataupun kasar. Sistem kekerabatan orang Sunda perbedaan jenis kelamin juga ditekankan. Setiap jenis kelamin memiliki istilah kekerabatan tersendiri, sebagai contoh sebutan Kaka, akang, kakang bagi saudara laki-laki yang lebih tua umurnya; teteh, ceuceu bagi saudara perempuan yang lebih tua; mamang, paman, emang bagi adik laki-laki ayah atau ibu; bibi, embi untuk adik perempuan ayah atau ibu. Serta aki, untuk sebutan bagi kakek dan nini untuk sebutan ibu dari ayah dan ibu. 133 Ada perbedaan tingkat hubungan antara kerabat seketurunan seperti, dulur, anak, incu (cucu), bapa (ayah), indung (ibu), aki (kakek), nini (nenek) dengan kerabat bukan satu keturunan, seperti, dulur misan (saudara sepupu), suan, kapiincu, aki ti gigir, nini ti gigir. Hubungan dengan kerabat seketurunan lebih erat, dekat dan penting. Akan tetapi bisa saja orang yang bukan kerabat seketurunan, bahkan diluar kerabat seketurunan dan bukan seketurunan menjadi dekat dan penting, yaitu dengan cara perkawinan. Misalnya, hubungan kekerabatan terhadap adik istri atau suami yang disebut adi beuteung (adik ipar), kaka istri atau suami (dahuan), orang tua istri atau suami (mitoha), suami atau istri anak (minantu). Adapun hubungan antara orang tua suami dan orang tua istri disebut warang atau besan. Sistem kekerabatan orang Sunda juga mengenal apa yang disebut sadulur deukeut (kerabat dekat) dan sadulur jauh atau laer (kerabat jauh). Sadulur deukeut meliputi tiga generasi secara vertikal dan tiga generasi secara horisontal, Secara vertikal sampai tingkat buyut (cicit) dan horisontal sampai tingkat dulur misan mindo (saudara satu buyut). Di samping itu sadulur deukeut terbagi atas tiga golongan, yaitu pertama, sadulur saindung sabapa (saudara kandung), sadulur saindung misah bapa (saudara tiri se-ibu), dan saudara sabapa misah indung (saudara tiri se-ayah); kedua, sadulur saaki-sanini (saudara satu kakek atau nenek); ketiga, sadulur sabuyut (saudara satu buyut). Sedangkan sadulur jauh meliputi kerabat generasi keempat dan selanjutnya, baik secara vertikal maupun horisontal. Secara vertikal mulai dari generasi bao dan secara horisontal mulai dari generasi dulur mertelu (Ekadjati, 1995: 205-206). Mengenai masalah perkawinan, orang Sunda melihatnya sebagai persoalan keluarga bahkan persoalan kerabat juga. Penentuan jodoh tidak hanya ditentukan oleh orang tua, tetapi juga melibatkan paman, bibi, kakek, serta nenek. Apabila ada anggota keluarga yang hendak melangsungkan perkawinan, saudara-saudaranya yang sudah berumah tangga berkewajiban membantu kelangsungan perkawinan tersebut (Ekadjati ed., 1984: 217). Perkawinan bukan hanya menyangkut hubungan dua 134 manusia, yakni suami dan istri, melainkan terjalin pula hubungan kekerabatan antara dua kerabat yang berasal dari pihak istri dan kerabat dari pihak suami. Dalam tradisi Sunda tidak ada larangan menikah dengan anggota kerabat sendiri (Ekadjati ed., 1984: 215), ini dilakukan dalam rangka mendekatkan hubungan kekerabatan antara pengantin laki-laki-laki dan pengantin perempuan beserta kerabat keduanya. Di samping itu, perkawinan antara sesama anggota kerabat bertujuan agar harta kekayaan orang tua kedua belah pihak tidak jatuh ke tangan orang di luar kerabat, tetapi justru bergabung dalam satu kerabat. Akan tetapi tidak semua tujuan perkawinan antara sesama anggota kerabat itu tercapai. Kelangsungan perkawinan itu menghadirkan dua kemungkinan, pertama, ikatan perkawinan itu kokoh sampai kedua pasangan suami-istri itu lanjut usia, sebagaimana ungkapan „nepi ka pakotrek iteuk‟(sampai sama-sama bertongkat yang sering berantukan). Kemungkinan kedua, perkawinan itu rapuh, sehingga terjadi perceraian, sebagaimana ungkapan „pondok jodo, panjang baraya‟ (jodoh pendek, tetapi persaudaraan tidak terputus). Terkadang perceraian ini menimbulkan perselisihan yang akibatnya hubungan kekerabatan antara kedua belah pihak keluarga menjadi renggang. Makanya di daerah yang presentase perceraiannya tinggi, orang Sunda menghindari perkawinan dengan sesama kerabat. Menyangkut hal menetap setelah perkawinan, masyarakat sunda lebih cenderung pada model matrilokal, yaitu menetap di rumah sang istri, Itu disebabkan anggapan bahwa anak permpuan merupakan pengganti ibu dalam mengasuh dan mendidik adik-adiknya, serta hubungan anak perempuan dengan rumah dan keluarganya lebih erat. Di dalam tradisi Sunda terdapat peribahasa „bengkung ngariung, bongkok ngaronyok‟, yang menunjukkan sikap dan pandangan orang Sunda yang tidak mau berpisah atau berjauhan dengan kerabat, artinya berkumpul dengan sanak keluarga, dipandang lebih penting dari segalanya. Tak heran orang Sunda dalam membuat rumah untuk tempat tinggal setelah mampu mandiri, lebih menyukai berdekatan dengan keluarga dan kerabatnya. 135 Dalam masalah anak sebagai hasil perkawinan, orang Sunda cenderung merasa bangga jika memiliki banyak anak. Bagi mereka, banyak anak adalah anugerah dari Tuhan, karena anak merupakan titipan' Tuhan. Dengan demikian istilah banyak anak banyak rezeki' menjadi relevan bagi orang Sunda. Di samping itu banyak anak merupakan jaminan hari tua bagi orang tuanya. Mengenai anak perempuan, orang Sunda lebih suka menikahkannya secepat mungkin. Orang tua yang memiliki anak perempuan yang sudah besar tapi belum kawin akan merasa malu, sebab takut menjadi gunjingan tetangga mereka. Sebutan perawan tua memberi rasa malu baik bagi si gadis maupun orang tuanya, makanya ada pribahasa Sunda „kawin ayeuna, isuk pepegatan‟ (kawin hari ini, besok bercerai) yang menunjukkan pandangan orang Sunda yang lebih memilih segera mengawinkan anak perempuannya daripada membiarkan anak perawannya tidak kawin atau kawin dalam usia lanjut. Tak heran di beberapa tempat di Jawa Barat terdapat jumlah perceraian yang cukup tinggi (Ekadjati ed., 1984: 216). Dalam masyarakat Sunda dikenal pula keluarga poligami atau dalam istilah Sunda dikenal dengan sebutan nyandung, yaitu seorang laki-laki yang mempunyai istri lebih dari satu (Surjadi, 1974: 132). Hal ini memberi penilaian negatif terhadap laki-laki Sunda oleh orang non-Sunda, yang dianggap punya kecenderungan untuk nyandung. Padahal dalam kenyataannya banyak juga laki-laki Sunda yang tidak nyandung, bahkan dapat dikatakan laki-laki yang nyandung jumlahnya sangat sedikit sekali. Dalam masyarakat Sunda, unit kelompok terkecil adalah kulawarga (keluarga). Keluarga yang dimaksud adalah keluarga inti atau batih, yang terdiri dari orang tua dan anak-anaknya. Terkadang jumlahnya akan bertambah dengan masuknya anak kukut (anak angkat), pembantu, atau orang lain yang diakui sebagai anggota keluarga. Terdapat istilah kulawedet atau bondoroyot yang mempunyai pengertian yang hampir sama dengan sederek atau baraya (saudara dalam pengertian luas, seluruh anggota kekerabatan, baik karena keturunan atau perkawinan, baik 136 menetap di desa tertentu atau menetap diluar desa itu), hanya dalam hal ini menunjuk kepada leluhur/tokoh tertentu yang menjadi pangkalnya, bisa dikatakan kekerabatannya cenderung berdasarkan keturunan (Ekadjati, 1995: 207). Di tinjau dari sudut tingkat generasi, Kekerabatan yang berlaku secara umum dalam masyarakat Sunda dipertimbangkan sampai keturunan ke tujuh ke atas maupun ke bawah. Ke atas mulai dari ego kepada pertama, bapa, kolot, sepuh (ayah); kedua, embah, eyang, aki/ nini (kakek/ nenek); ketiga, buyut; keempat, bao; kelima, janggawareng; keenam, udeg-udeg dan ketujuh, gantung siwur. Sedangkan ke bawah mulai dari ego kepada anak, incu, buyut, bao, janggawareng, udeg-udeg, dan gantung siwur. Dengan demikian perbedaan istilah hanya terjadi pada dua generasi awal sedangkan istilah generasi ketiga baik ke atas maupun ke bawah memiliki kesamaan. Sehubungan dengan itu, maka sistem kekerabatan yang lengkap dalam masyarakat Sunda hanya sampai generasi embah untuk generasi ke atas dan generasi incu untuk ke bawah. Di kalangan orang Sunda dikenal istilah pancakaki, yang berarti hubungan seseorang dengan orang lain menurut silsilah. Ini penting bagi orang Sunda, makanya apabila dua orang Sunda yang satu sama lain belum kenal kemudian bertemu, yang pertama-tama mereka percakapkan adalah mencari hubungan silsilah. Pada mulanya mereka mencari orang yang sama-sama dikenal oleh keduanya, selanjutnya mencari hubungan masing-masing dengan orang itu. Selalu ada upaya untiuk mencari titik temu dengan orang yang diajak bicara, salah satunya dengan pancaraki (Rosidi dalam Ekadjati, 1984: 153-154). Dalam pancakaki, perbedaan umur bukan merupakan patokan, bisa saja putra uwa (putra dari kakak ayah atau ibu) yang dalam hubungan pancakaki adalah lanceuk (kaum tua), usianya lebih muda dari ego. Dalam hal ini, ego harus memperlakukan dia sebagai lanceuk (kaum tua) (Ekadjati, 1995: 211). Pengelompokan secara pancakaki memisahkan antara kaum tua dan kaum muda. Kedua kelompok ini 137 mempunyai hak dan kewajibannya masing-masing. Kaum tua mempunyai hak untuk dihormati oleh kaum muda, di samping kewajibannya untuk membimbing dan menasihati serta memberi tauladan bagi kaum muda. Sebaliknya kaum muda juga mempunayai hak untuk dibimbing dan dinasihati oleh kaum tua, namun juga berkewajiban untuk menghormati kaum tua. Dalam kehidupan sehari-hari pengelompokkan ini akan nampak, misalnya pada saat makan bersama kaum muda selalu mempersilahkan kaum tua untuk mengambil makan lebih dulu, baru setelah kaum tua selesai maka kaum muda mengambil makanan. Pada perkawinan, pengantin laki-laki hendaknya termasuk kaum tua, sedangkan pengantin perempuan termasuk kaum muda. Dalam perkawinan yang lebih muda tidak boleh mendahului yang lebih tua, kalupun terpaksa maka perlu diadakan upacara adat untuk menghindari akibat buruk yang menimpa yang mendahului maupun yang didahului. Di samping orang tua, uwa, paman, dan bibi dalam kekerabatan orang Sunda dianggap sebagai orang tua ego juga, apalagi kalau orang tua ego telah meninggal dunia. Mereka harus dihormati, tetapi mereka juga berkewajiban membimbing ego. Pada kasus lain, embah memilki kedekatan dengan incu (cucu), hal ini merupakan ganti pelampiasan curahan kasih sayang kepada anaknya yang terhalang dengan adanya minantu (menantu, maka kasih sayangnya dilampiaskan kepada cucunya. Sedangkan hubungan minantu (menantu) dengan mitoha (mertua) sangatlah kaku, pada satu pihak, menantu harus menjaga ucap, sikap, dan tindakannya terhadap mertua, agar tidak menimbulkan ketidaksenangan, salah pengertian atau dianggap tidak hormat. Sedangkan mertua di pihak lain merasa tidak bebas jika berhubungan dengan menantu. Hubungan yang kurang mesra antara menantu dan mertua banyak dillukiskan dalam cerita-cerita tentang si Kabayan dan dalam gurauan sehari-hari. Dalam cerita si Kabayan, Abah Ontohot, mertua Kabayan dilambangkan orang tua yang berkuasa dan 138 mapan sering dipermainkan oleh si Kabayan yang digambarkan sebagai menantu yang malas namun cerdik (Rosidi, dalam Ekadjati, 1984: 156). Ada yang menarik dalam kaitannya dengan hubungan antara saudara di kalangan orang Sunda, yang menunjukkan suatu hubungan yang kurang erat, bahkan sering terjadi hubungan yang renggang dan kurang baik. Ada satu pribahasa hubungan yang kurang harmonis tersebut artinya kalau jauh wangi bagaikan bunga', tetapi kalau berdekatan bau busuk. Kaitannya dengan hubungan darah, orang Sunda sangat memegang erat hal itu, bagi mereka hubungan darah tidak dapat diputuskan ataupun dipisahkan. Hal ini digambarkan dalam suatu pribahasa „salaki atara pamajikan mah aya urutna; ari dulur mah tara aya urutna' Artinya orang dapat mengatakan bahwa ia punya mantan istri atan mantan suami; tetapi tak mungkin orang mengatakan mantan saudara (Rosidi dalam Ekadjati, 1984: 156-157). 2. Struktur Sosial Selain sistem hubungan yang berdasarkan kekerabatan, pengelompokan dalam masyarakat Sunda didasarkan pula atas kekayaan, umur, dan jenis kelamin. Orang sunda mengenal pengelompokan atas kelompok orang kaya (jelema beunghar atau jegud) dan orang miskin (malarat) yang didasarkan atas kekayaan yang dimiliki seseorang. Meski dari pengelompokan ini terlihat hubungan yang bersifat superiorinferior, tetapi dari sisi lain menunjukkan hubungan yang kooperatif asosiatif. Masyarakat Sunda yang tinggal di pedesaan yang sebagian besar bermata pencaharian sebagai petani memandang kepemilikan tanah adalah merupakan unsur yang menentukan status seseorang dalam masyarakat. Berdasarkan kepemilikan tanah tersebut, masyarakat Sunda dapat digolongkan kepada dua macam kelompok, yaitu kelompok petani pemilik tanah (nu baga tanah) dan kelompok petani penggarap (nu ngagarap), dalam kelompok ini termasuk di dalamnya buruh tani yang bekerja sebagai buruh dalam usaha pertanian 139 Dalam penggarapan lahan pertanian berlaku prinsip bagi hasil maro (pembagian sama rata atau bagi dua) atau mertelu (pembagian sepertiga bagi pemilik tanah dan dua pertiga bagi penggarap) antara pemilik tanah dengan penggarapnya. Sistem maro merupakan sitem pembagian hasil dengan model pembagian yang sama antara pemilik tanah dengan penggarap, yang mana biaya pengolahan ditanggung penggarap, sedangkan biaya yang menyangkut bibit ditanggung oleh pemilik tanah. Sedangkan sistem mertelu merupakan pembagian hasil sebesar sepertiga kepada pemilik tanah dan dua pertiganya menjadi bagian dari penggarap. Biaya bibit, pengolahan dan pemupukan semuanya menjadi beban penggarap (Ekadjati ed., 1984: 208-209). Struktur yang lain adalah berdasarkan umur. Kelompok ini dibedakan antara kelompok anak, kelompok pemuda, kelompok orang dewasa, dan kelompok orang tua. Dalam struktur model ini kelompok orang dewasa dan orang tua-lah yang berpartisipasi penuh dalam kehidupan sosial. Sedangkan kelompok pemuda sudah dapat berpartisipasi tapi sifatnya tidak penuh. Dari pengelompokan ini sebenarnya terjadi hak dan kewajiban yang timbal balik, yang lebih muda berhak dibimbing yang tua dengan kewajiban menghormati yang lebih tua sedangkan yang lebih tua mendapat hak untuk dihormati disertai kewajiban membimbing yang lebih muda. Menurut jenis kelamin masyarakat Sunda terbagi atas kelompok laki-laki dan kelompok perempuan. Laki-laki sebagai kepala keluarga yang bertangung jawab atas ekonomi keluarga, sedangkan kaum perempuan mempunyai kewajiban mengatur kehidupan keluarga dan mengasuh anak-anak. Dalam mata pencaharian pertanian, perempuan dimungkinkan mengerjakan pekerjaan ringan, seperti menyiangi sawah, menuai padi, dan menumbuk padi. Di samping itu banyak organisasi dan struktur sosial lainnya, seperti berdasarkan keagamaan, sifat formal-informal yang dibuat agar terjadi keselarasan dan keseimbangan dalam kehidupan masyarakat. Tiap individu mempunyai 140 kewajiban untuk menjaga keseimbangan hidup masyarakat dengan menjalankan kewajibannya masing-masing sesuai fungsi dan perannya. Kewajiban sosial itu menyangkut hubungan-hubungan sosial, yaitu hubungan antara individu dengan individu lain dalam masyarakat. Hubungan sosial memiliki sifat bertingkat sesuai peran dan posisi masing-masing. Anak-anak dengan para pemuda tidak sama kewajibannya dengan orang tua. Pemimpin dengan rakyatnya mempunyai kewajiban yang berbeda. Namun hubungan-hubungan itu harus bersifat kekeluargaan. Kepentingan individu dikesampingkan demi kepentingan masyarakat banyak. Pada akhirnya orang Sunda berpandangan bahwa hubungan pergaulan antara sesama manusia dalam hidup bermasyarakat harus dilandasi sikap silih asih, silih silih asah, dan silih asuh, yaitu saling mengasihi, saling meningkatkan kepandaian dalam berlomba-lomba dalam kebaikan, serta saling mengingatkan atas kekurangan masingmasing atau saling mendidik sehingga tercipta suasana kehidupan masyarakat yang rukun aman, tentram, damai dan kekeluargaan (Warnaen dkk., 1987: 172). Penutup Dari penjabaran tentang latar sejarah urang Sunda, manusia Sunda telah mengalami berbagi fase kehidupan baik sejak masa pra sejarah, masa kerajaan praIslam, masa pengaruh Islam dan masa kemerdekaan sampai masa sekarang. Kebudayaan Sunda juga mengalami proses akulturasi terus menerus setiap menghadapi pengaruh unsur-unsur budaya asing, sehingga pasca akulturasi ditemukan tradisi Sunda dalam bentuk baru. Orang Kenekes yang dianggap sebagai tipologi masyarakat Sunda lama juga tidak terlepas dari pengaruh luar, terbukti adanya unsur Hindu dan Islam dalam mitologi kepercayaan mereka. Namun demikian pengaruh budaya asing tidak se-frontal dalam masyarakat Sunda lain. ----------- 141 142 Kekuasaan sebagian dijalankan sebagai penguasaan melalui: situasi tidak alamiah (perang), kesepakatan bersama (konsensus/demokrasi) atas dasar adanya pengakuan kedaulatan individu. Kekuasaan dapat juga dijalankan dengan cara lain seperti kemampuan melakukan dominasi melalui pemaknaan, hereditas, wacana dan penguasaan sejumlah sumber daya manusia. Dua mode di atas merupakan typikal dominan kekuasaan yang sudah dipraktekkan manusia kontemporer di dunia ini. Sementara itu nalar nusantara mengenal strategi penguasaan berbeda, yakni melalui jalur kemampuan penyeimbangan segitiga relasi kebudayaan:alam-manusia-tuhan. Strategi tersebut tidak dibahasakan dalam datum eksplisit berupa „bahasa strategi‟. Nalar nusantara mengenkripsi strategi kekuasaan pada olah bahasa khas: tradisi pusaka dan gaukang, yang di dalamnya termuat cara menyeleksi dan mencari format kepemimpinan ideal yang sesuai dengan nalar yang dominan di daerah bersangkutan. Tidak ada episteme, isu yang dapat diolah sebagai manuver untuk menggusur kekuasaan selain faktor ancaman terhadap keterguncangan segitiga relasi alam-manusia-tuhan yang berpengaruh pada kelangsungan hidup bersama. Keterguncangan adalah ancaman bersama, sedangkan manuver dan isu kekuasaan apapun, sejauh tidak berafiliasi terhadap keterguncangan (disharmoni) tidak mampu mengganggu konsep kepimpinan tradisional. Bahkan sekalipun isu keterguncangan bisa dijadikan manuver, kemampuan menggubah disharmoni menjadi harmonis seperti sediakala harus dibuktikan dengan perangkat tradisi pula. Isu dan klik saja tidak cukup. Kalampoang, gaukang, pusaka merupakan instrumen tradisi penggubah disharmoni ke harmoni. Satu sisi, pada sebagian gaukang dan pusaka adalah olah budaya manusia yang menunjukkan suatu level penguasaan olah metalurgi dan arts yang demikian khas dan unik. Unik karena memadukan kuasa numinus, memasukan konsep segitiga kebudayaan yang build in dalam produk kebudayaan fisik. Di sisi lain, gaukang dan pusaka mentransformasi imajinasi massal sehingga menempati ruang pengetahuan 143 common people sebagai satu-satunya simbol yang menjadi tanda jejak (trace) akan suatu kualifikasi personal pemiliknya. Menguasai gaukang dan pusaka berarti adanya kemampuan menjaga harmonisasi relasi manusia-alam, manusia-tuhan. Faktor pelanggeng kekuasaan seperti traktat kedaulatan, kesediaan diperintah dan keunggulan hereditas, hanya menempati ruang pendukung bagi kemampuan penguasaan gaukang, pusaka (adimanusiawi) tersebut. Bahkan ketika keterguncangan melalui jalan non alamiah (seperti perang) terjadi, gaukang dan kalampoang tetap menjadi simbol yang ditaruhkan. Kalah dan menang dalam perang hanya berkaitan dengan kekuatan fisik, tetapi pengakuan kekuasaan pasca kemenangan perang tanpa gaukang atau pusaka hanya membuahkan kekuasaan represif yang memanfaatkan naluri psikis ketakutan dan keterpaksaan masyarakat yang kalah perang. Gaukang dan pusaka adalah strategi mekanisme siklus kekuasaan itu sendiri. Gaukang dan Keraton: Strategi Kekuasaan Oleh: Hudjolly dan Marjaka Pola Kekuasaan Masyarakat Bugis Proses politik merupakan awal berangkatnya kebudayaan Bugis-Makassar, tesis ini dapat dilihat dari fakta sejarah' bahwa hampir semua kerajaan atau sistem pemerintahan di Bugis dan Makassar terbangun dari adanya perjanjian politik antara kelompok (Anang) dalam wilayah pemukiman masing-masing (Wanua) untuk mengangkat To Manurung sebagai pemimpin atau raja mereka. Seperti di Kerajaan Luwu, Kerajaan Gowa, Kerajaan Bone, Kerajaan Pammana, Kerajaan Soppeng, Kerajaan Sinjai, dan Kerajaan Toraja yang meyakini bahwa founding fathers kerajaannya adalah To Manurung. 144 Terlepas dari berbagai perspektif mengenai mitos To Manurung, secara mendasar telah terjadi sebuah kontrak politik untuk membangun sebuah hubungan sosial politik, baik kerajaan kecil atau besar beserta sistem hukum, sistem sosial budaya yang disepakati bersama dan dipimpin oleh satu orang: Karaeng, yang merupakan perwujudan dari kebutuhan atas keberadan orang yang dianggap kapabel untuk mempersatukan dan menjaga mereka dari kondisi masyarakat yang kacau. Fenomena tegaknya kekuasan di era kerajaan-kerajaan Bugis-Makassar terlihat pada kepercayaan adanya konsep manusia yang berasal dari langit dapat memberikan keteraturan pada masyarakat (Ahimsa,2007). Masa sebelum era konsep To Manurung turun disebut sianre balé taué (Poelinggomang, 2004). Kehadiran To Manurung sebagai sosok yang mengatur masyarakat, untuk berkuasa merupakan personifikasi sosok dengan berbagai kelebihan yang diawali dari konsensus yang menghasilkan sejenis traktat kesepakatan bersama atau perjanjian antara Anang dan To Manurung agar ia mau memerintah. "Oo lamarupa, kami datang pada anda untuk memohon agar anda mengasihani kami dan meminta anda agar tidak meninggalkan kami tetapi tetap tinggal bersama kami dan menjadi raja kami, Kami bersedia menjadi bawahan anda. Anda akan menjadi milik kami dan hanya perintah-perintah anda yang akan kami laksanakan. Kami bersama anak-anak kami telah menyetujui, jika anda menolak maka kami akan melepaskan, tetapi kalau anda tinggal bersama kami anda akan menjadi raja kami ―(Ahimsa,2007). Perbincangan masyarakat dengan calon raja ini bisa dianggap sebagai sebuah ikrar atau perjanjian (traktat) awal. Dan dari raja yang baru ditahbiskan oleh masyarakat itulah, peraturan bermunculan. Berikutnya keturunan To Manurung ini menjadi penguasa-penguasa pada kerajaan masing-masing. Tetapi kisah To Manurung itu tidak hanya terjadi pada satu kerajaan, konsep To Manurung dikenal pada beberapa kerajaan. 145 Kesediaan rakyat menjadi bawahan mengindikasikan suatu tanda kepatuhan pada aturan. Perjanjian antara To Manurung dan Matoa/Ulu Anang termaktub dalam lontara' attoriolonna to-Bone dan berkembang menjadi semacam sumpah jabatan. Perjanjian serupa dapat ditemukan dalam dengan perjanjian To Manurung di Soppeng yang bernama La Tammamala Manurungnge ri Sekenyiliq dengan Arung Bila, bersama Matoa lain (Gusnawati,2000). Fase kekuasaan berikutnya adalah sesudah berdirinya kerajaan, yakni era keturunan para To Manurung. Struktur kenegaraan, fungsi dan susunan berbeda-beda antara kerajaan yang satu dengan lainnya. Di Kerajaan Bone memiliki sistem pemerintahan konfederasi. Jabatan tertinggi atau pemimpin kerajaan adalah Arung Mangkau (Raja yang berdaulat). Dalam proses pengambilan kebijakan dibantu oleh sebuah dewan yang anggap sebagai wakil rakyat yang berjumlah tujuh orang, makanya disebut Arung Pitu‟ atau Matoa-Pitué. Ketujuh anggota Dewan Matoa-Pitué selain menjadi anggota dewan pemerintahan Kawérrang Tana Bone juga tetap menjalankan pemerintahan atas wanua asalnya secara otonom serta mengkordinasikan wanua-wanua lain yang tergabung padanya. Setiap wanua yang merupakan angggota konfederasi Kerajaan Bone dipimpin oleh Arung yang memiliki organisasi dan hukum sendiri. Dalam hal ini Bugis telah memperlihatkan konsepsi kekuasan tidak hanya datang dari kuasa kosmis (Vox Dei) tetapi pengakuan kedaulatan dari rakyat melalui konsep perwakilan, ini sesuatu yang nampak lebih modern daripada Jawa tradisional-yang bercorak Monarchi-feodal-meskipun ada juga strata kekuasaan kolektif di bawah Patih. Kecuali sistem kekuasaan pada kerajaan di Jawa era Dewan Wali yang menentukan keabsahan pengangkatan rajaraja/adipati di daerah pesisir Jawa. Sistem konfederasi ini berlaku hingga Raja Bone ke-9 yang selanjutnya berubah menjadi sistem sentralisasi kekuasaan yang ditandai dengan kelengkapan kekuasaan pusat yang lebih besar dan lebih kuat. Matoa wanua tidak lagi merangkap jabatan di matoa-pitué. Dewan matoa-pitué berperan sepenuhnya sebagai pejabat 146 kekuasaan Pusat Tana Bone yang selanjutnya dirubah menjadi (Dewan) Ade‟ Pitué yang merupakan Dewan Menteri Tana Bone. Selanjutnya disebut pampawa ade‟ atau pakatenni ade‟ (Mattulada,1975). Sedangkan di Wajo merupakan salah satu kerajaan besar Bugis, namun tidak memiliki konsep kepemimpinan To Manurung. Yang menarik adalah mereka bersama-sama memlih pemimpinnya (matoa) yang memenuhi syarat-syarat kepemimpinan yang telah ditentukan sebelumnya. Calon matoa bisa berasal dari tiga kelompok masyarakat yang merupakan awal Kerajaan Wajo, yaitu Betteng Pola, TaloTénreng dan Tua'. Bisa juga berasal dari luar kalangan mereka, tentunya jika memenuhi syarat kepemimpinan tadi. Pemimpin tertinggi disebut Arung Matoa Wajo. Di sini kekuasan merupakan kondisi bersyarat yang tidak melekat pada darah dan kemurnian keturunan semata. Arung Matoa Wajo dalam menjalankan pemerintahannya dibantu oleh tiga orang yaitu Paddanréng atau Ranréng (sekutu) yaitu Paddanréng Betteng Pola, PaddanréngTolaTénreng, dan Paddanréng Tua'. Pembagian tugas keamanan, ekonomi dan kuasa lain menggambarkan pertumbuhan administrasi pemerintahan dan pembagian kekuasaan yang tidak terpusat, sharing of power. Disamping itu juga terdapat lembaga yang disebut Suro ri Bateng, beranggotakan tiga orang yang berasal dari 3 wanua asal, tugasnya untuk menyampaikan hasil permufakatan dan perintah dari Paddanreng kepada rakyat, menyampaikan perintah-perintah Bate-Lompo kepada rakyat, dan menyampaikan hasil permufakatan dan perintah dari Petta Wajo. Jadi terdapat 40 orang dalam lembaga pemerintahan Tana Wajo, yang terdiri atas 1 orang Arung Matoa, 6 orang Arung Ennengnge, 30 orang Arung Mabbicara, dan 3 orang Surori Bateng. Ke 40 orang atau jabatan ini disebut Arung Patappuloe (pertuanan yang empat puluh) atau Puang ri Wajo (penguasa Tana Wajo). Punggawa-punggawa ini sering disebut inanna tau megae (induk dari semua orang). Para Matoa atau Punggawa menjalankan 147 pemerintahan secara otonom dan juga menjadi perpanjangan tangan antara Petta Wajo dengan para Arung Lili‟ (Raja-raja bawahan) di seluruh Tana Wajo. Sesudah struktur kekuasaan itu terbentuk, ada legitimasi yang dibutuhkan untuk menguatkan kekuasaan. Penguasaan atas sumberdaya tertentu berakibat pada posisi sosial dan budaya dan tercermin pada tingkat kekuasaan yang dimilikinya. Pengakuan terhadap status sosial memperkuat stratifikasi sosial dalam masyarakat Bugis. Namun ada pemahaman bahwa ada dua jenis manusia. Pertama, mereka yang berdarah putih' yang keturunan déwata dan kedua adalah jenis manusia yang berdarah merah' yaitu rakyat biasa, rakyat jelata, atau budak. Darah tersebut tidak boleh bercampur, mutlak dan tidak boleh tercampur. Untuk menegaskan hirarki dalam masyarakat tradisional Bugis maka terbentuklah simbol-simbol tertentu yang menunjukkan status sosial mereka. Dengan simbol ini maka masyarakat kemudian mengetahui dengan siapa mereka berinteraksi. Hal tersebut berkaitan dengan tata cara berperilaku yang seharusnya menurut nilainilai sosial yang telah ditetapkan. Berkaitan dengan pembagian dua jenis strata sosial orang Bugis yaitu hierarki status seseorang berdasarkan warna darah' atau keturunan dan kedua adalah hierarki sistem pemerintahan yang terdiri atas teritorial tertentu dengan hukum dan pemimpinnya masing-masing. Secara alamiah (natural) akan terjadi persaingan atau perselisihan antar mereka yang sederajat dan kadang terbangun assosiasi antar strata sosial, baik yang sederajat ataupun yang tidak sederajat. Hingga pada titik tertentu terjadi afiliasiafiliasi antar kelompok atau antar individu untuk merealisasikan atau mempertahankan suatu kepentingan politik atau ekonomi tertentu. Pada titik inilah patron-klien muncul sebagai hubungan yang saling menguntungkan (Ahimsa,2007). 148 Simbol kekuasaan Bugis: Ajjoareng dan Gaukang Konsep patron-klien telah terjadi sejak lama dan terdapat dalam semua masyarakat (dunia), bahkan hingga masa modern pun konsep ini masih efektif. Setiap bangsawan ( yang berperan sebagai patron) mempunyai sejumlah orang dari tingkat strata yang lebih rendah ( yang berperan sebagai klien) yang berharap perlindungan darinya. Para klien sebenarnya adalah orang bebas namun bergantung dengan keadaan patron. Para pemilik patron ini biasa disebut dengan Ajjoareng. Hubungan patron-klien sangat dekat, bahkan digambarkan oleh Ahimsa Putra (2007) bahwa pernah terjadi suatu kelompok klien melakukan bunuh diri lantaran patron mereka mati tenggelam saat melarikan diri melewati sungai. Hubungan patron dan klien dibangun berdasarkan hak dan kewajiban timbal-balik yang bersifat turun temurun. Patron berkewajiban untuk menjaga kliennya dari musuh-musuh dan melindunginya dari tuntutan hukum, dari gangguan penguasa yang lain. Di samping itu patron juga membantu keluarga kliennya dalam hal ekonomi, dengan memberikan lahan kepada pengikut (klien) agar dapat menghidupi seluruh anggota keluarganya. Klien berkewajiban membantu patronnya dalam kondisi tertentu. Model patron-klien ini juga diterapkan pada berbagai masyarakat dalam berbagai periode sejarah. Hubungan patron-klein menjadi bagian dalam sistem sosial politik masyarakat, hubungan ini menandakan simbol kekuasaan yang bergerak dalam ruang non verbal pada ruang relasi hubungan antar masyarakat, antar kelompok sosial. Tidak semua kekuasaan berbasis pada kemurnian darah, beberapa patron mendasarkan dirinya pada pengaturan kekuatan serta jalur mendapatkan jabatan. Bukan pada pewarisan kedudukan atau kepemilikan tanah. Kondisi demikian berubah pada masa pemerintahan kolonial yang menerapkan komersialisasi ekonomi. Sehingga pada fase berikutnya, pola kekuasaan ditentukan oleh dua hal. Pertama kepemilikan tanah kemudian menjadi pemicu munculnya gejala patron-klien. Kondisi kedua ditandai dengan perbedaan penguasaan sumber daya namun tidak berhasil 149 diikuti adanya institusi yang dapat menjamin keamanan individu baik menyangkut status maupun kekayaan. Dalam masyarakat Bugis patron biasanya diduduki oleh kalangan bangsawan yang disebut Ajjoareng atau Pappuangeng, atau Karaeng, kendati kebangsawanan bukan satu-satunya penyebab terciptanya patron. Klien berasal dari kalangan masyarakat biasa yang disebut joa‟ atau anakaraeng, atau ana‟ guru (pengikut). Sebaliknya, klien berkewajiban untuk memberikan pelayanan kepada patronnya, misalnya, dengan bekerja di lahan atau rumah tuannya, atau menjadi prajurit, dan mengerjakan berbagai kegiatan-kegiatan lainnya (Ahimsa,2007). Konsep kekuasaan orang Bugis tradisional, tindak senantiasa berlandaskan garis keturunan sebagai jaminan untuk mendapatkan posisi kekuasaan. Tidak ada aturan mutlak yang dapat dijadikan pedoman dalam proses suksesi suatu kerajaan. Namun terdapat sebuah petunjuk yang menggariskan bahwa untuk jabatan tertentu, calon yang akan dipilih biasanya mesti salah seseorang dari sekian banyak keturunan pemegang jabatan sebelumnya, dan dia sendiri berasal dari status tertentu saja. Jadi akan terdapat beberapa kandidat yang memiliki hak yang kurang lebih sama untuk berkompetisi dalam suksesi tersebut. Faktor utama yang dapat memenangkan adalah kandidat yang memiliki pengikut paling banyak serta didukung oleh pengikut yang paling berpengaruh. Jadi secara mendasar pengikut (joa‟) dapat dibedakan dua jenis. Pertama, pengikut dari kalangan orang biasa, yang mengabdi langsung kepadanya dengan, misalnya, menjadi prajurit dalam pasukannya. Kedua, adalah pengikut dari kalangan bangsawan yang menjadi pendukung, yang juga memiliki pengikut dan pendukung sendiri. Berangkat dari fenomena tersebut di atas, maka seorang patron harus berupaya untuk memperluas jaringan kliennya. Terdapat beberapa cara untuk membangun dukungan jaringan klien. Cara pertama adalah dengan menunjukkan kedermawanan dan membangkitkan rasa hormat dari kalangan pengikut dengan 150 melindungi dan menjaga kesejahteraan mereka lebih baik dibanding yang lain. Cara lain adalah dengan membangkitkan kebanggaan pengikut. Pengikut pada gilirannya akan merasa ikut terhormat, dan berharap memperoleh keuntungan dari jabatan pemimpinnya, karena dengan memegang jabatan tersebut meningkatkan peluang patron mereka untuk mendistribusikan kembali kekayaan yang diperolehnya. Pengembangan relasi kekuasaan juga dilakukan dengan cara lain yaitu jalan perkawinan, sebagai cara menjaga kemurnian darah putih mereka. Ada juga 'perkawinan politik' yaitu dengan menikahi keturunan atau keluarga bangsawan yang memiliki joa‟ yang banyak serta pendukung yang berpengaruh atau kharismatik (Pelras:2006). Perkembangan tersebut meniscayakan adanya kesempatan orang untuk mendapatkan predikat ajjoareng meski bukan dari kalangan kalangan bangsawan karena berhasil menduduki posisi kekuasaan yang strategis. Meski demikian ada juga yang berasal dari kalangan bangsawan tapi cenderung atau tepatnya tidak memperlihatkan simbol-simbol kebangsawanan dengan mengganti nama kebangsawanannya. Kemampuan ajjoareng cukup berguna untuk meningkatkan kharisma kekuasaan mereka, misalnya bangsawan yang memiliki latar belakang militer (ksatria). Kekuasaan ajjoareng semakin bertambah pengaruh jika memiliki gaukang. Gaukang adalah benda-benda yang oleh masyarakat dianggap memiliki ciri yang khas dan berbentuk aneh. Selain Gaukang, ada benda-benda tanda kebesaran dari suatu kesatuan pemerintahan atau kerajaan yang disebut kalompoang (Poelinggomang, 2004) keseluruhan benda-benda tersebut menjadi simbol kekuasaan. Kekhususan ciri dan bentuk yang dimiliki benda tersebut menyiratkan adanya kesucian, benda titisan dan memiliki kekuatan gaib, itulah sebab benda tersebut dianggap pelindung masyarakat. Menurut Poelinggomang (2004), masyarakat dalam hubungannya dengan gaukang memberikan pelayanan, membuatkan tempat dan menyediakan tanah serta 151 bangunan bagi pemeliharaan gaukang yang biasanya berbentuk batu. Tanah yang menjadi tempat diketemukan gaukang disebut tanah kebesaran (butta kalompoang). Kalompoang dan pemegangnya merupakan kesatuan yang menunjukkan kepemimpinan untuk mengikat ketaatan dari yang dipimpin. Berkaitan dengan kekuatan kalompoang itu, ada contoh menarik sebagaimana dituturkan oleh Peolinggoman (kebetulan kejadian ini sama dengan era pada pasa terbangunnya keraton Yogya,1776) " ... salah satu sebab yang membuat I Sangkilang menyatakan diri sebagai Batara kerajaan Gowa dan dapat memiliki pengikut yang banyak, serta berhasil mengikat ketaatan, kesetiaan pengikut bahkan beberapa bangsawan istana karena ia menunjukkan bahwa ia memiliki sebuah kalompoang kerajaan Gowa yaitu sudanga, dengan dukungan bangsawan dan pengikutnya ia berusaha merebut kekuasan Gowa..."( Poelinggoman, hal 57). Dengan demikian, para pemilik kalampoang dianggap rakyat sebagai juru bicara dari penguasa kalampoangnya. Ini menandakan adanya perikatan yang masih kuat dengan konsepi kekuatan adimanusiawi. Penguasa atau para pemimpin mendapatkan legitimasi dari kekuatan kalampoang dan kekuatan untuk menegakkan kekuasaan dan pemerintahannya. Para penguasa yang berhasil menegakkan kekuasaanya adalah orang-orang yang sukses menjaga, memelihara kalampoang yang ada pada mereka. Pandangan iniah yang menyebabkan Poelinggoman menarik kesimpulan bahwa kalampoanglah yang memiliki kekuasaan utama. Bentuk kekuasaan yang mewujud berkat adanya kalampoang bernama bori. Suatu pemerintahan yang berpaut pada pemimpin bori (ajjoareng) yang memiliki gaukang itulah yang bisa menyandang nama Karaeng (Poelinggoman,59). Bisa dikatakan bahwa pengakuan pada kekuatan kalampoang sebagai bentuk kesadaran kosmis masyarakat. Kesadaran kosmis merupakan bagian dari kesadaran umum yang menyertai adanya konsepsi kekuasan. Kesadaran mengabdi pada atasannya, ajjoareang atau karaeng, serta pengabdian para pemimpin bori pada raja, atau 152 penguasa yang lebih tinggi. Kesadaran pengabdian tersebut dinamakan kasuwiyang, sebuah bentuk penunaian kewajiban para pengabdi, rakyat terhadap kekuasaan. Umumnya penguasa daerah, pemimpin bori, mendahulukan kewajibannya (kasuwiyang) mereka pada penguasa yang lebih tinggi sebagai tanda kesetiaan dan pernyataan sebagai bawahan. Hal ini menandakan pengakuan secara sadar terhadap konsepsi' yang dalam bahasa modern disebut pengakuan kedaulatan pada kekuasaan sebuah negara atau kerajaan. Bagi masyarakat biasa, kasuwiyang diwujudkan ketika mereka memberikan bagi hasil panenan (hasil bumi) mereka pada pemimpin atau pemilik tanah si pemegang kalampoang. Fenomena ketergantungan pada gaukang, juga dilaporkan oleh Ahimsa. Kekuasaan kepala daerah di wilayah Mandar dipinjam dari berbagai kekuasaan benda pusaka (Ahimsa,2007:111). Kebesaran gaukang tidak hanya terkait pada kekuasaan, tetapi benar-benar diperlakukan sebagai pelindung masyarakat. Sekitar tahun 18641865, ketika wabah kolera mengganas di Sulsel, menelan ribuan orang, maka penduduk menggelar upacara ritual ornamen, yakni membawa berkeliling semua gaukang yang dimiliki ke setiap daerah. Uniknya seusai acara ritual tersebut wabah kolera berangsur hilang. Kejadian tersebut berulang juga di tahun 1874-1875, tentu saja upacara (ritual) ornamental berada di bawah pengawasan Belanda, sebagai pemerintah yang berkuasa kala itu. Dari fenomena tersebut, posisi metafisis gaukang dan peristiwa yang berkait dengan kebutuhan terhadap gaukang meniscayakan sentralitas gaukang, baik secara ontologis maupun eksistensial dianggap sangat penting sekaligus menguasai hajat hidup orang banyak. Untuk bisa menguasai atau meminta bantuan kuasa gaukang maka karaeng harus memiliki kekuatan yang besar pula agar bisa mengendalikan prabawa (tuah) gaukang. Syarat tersebut sebenarnya menandakan bahwa Aru atau karaeng yang memperantarai kekuatan gaukang, mempunyai kuasa yang tidak dimiliki manusia awam, kuasa tersebut dianggap sebagai juru bicara gaukang, karena 153 itu turut menentukan terpeliharanya tatanan dari masyarakat, berhak atas kekuasaan (Ahimsa, 2007:114). Ini sebuah nalar seleksi kepemimpinan tanpa kekerasan yang berbasis prestasi individual. Keraton dan Gaukang: Titik Idiom Sentralitas Simbolisme Nalar Kekuasaan dalam dua Tradisi Bukanlah sebuah kebetulan mengenai adanya kesamaan dalam konsepsi kekuasaan dua masyarakat Jawa dan Bugis-Makassar. Kesamaan itu bisa dicermati dalam pengakuan terhadap kekuatan asing, kekuatan di luar manusia yang oleh Franz Magnes disebut sebagai alam Numinus. Masyarakat Jawa mendefinisikan kekuasaan melekat pada pemimpin sebagai perwujudan, titisan, dewata dalam bentuk manusia. Bahkan dalam kosmologi kuno (khasanah wayang) Prabu Kresna merupakan titisan dewata, Prabu Yudistira dan para pandawa juga berkait dengan perwujudan dewadewa kahyangan yang turun ke Bumi (lihat Lakon Kresna Duta atau lakon Mahabarata). Tetapi tiada maksud membandingkan fenomena sosial struktur kekuasaan Bugis-Makasar yang real dengan khazanah cerita perwayangan (simbolisme) Jawa. Meski tidak sama persis tetapi terlihat hal yang setara bahwa kekuasaan di mata orang Bugis-Makassar berasal dari putra langit. Kekuasaan berasal dari luar manusia, dengan kata lain manusia hanyalah mahkluk yang lemah, ia menjadi kuat lantaran berbagai penyatuan kekuatan asing dari luar dirinya. Masyarakat Jawa mengenal laku tapa untuk menyatukan kekuatan gaib, dunia numinus agar individuindividu yang berkuasa punya kekuatan batin. Sehingga kekuatan politik (kekuasaan) merupakan ungkapan realitas numinus (Magnis,2001). Adapun bentuk-bentuk dalam keraton adalah simbol, upaya pengungkapkan kesadaran kosmologis antara alam real, alam numinus dan alam ke-batin-an(alam mental). Tidak akan dibahas mengenai penggunaan simbol pada bangunan karena keterbatasan data bangunan pada masyarakat Bugis-Makassar dalam istana-istana masing-masing, meskipun kajian ini 154 sangat menarik. Namun garis merahnya sudah berhasil ditangkap yakni: bahwa ada pengakuan pada kekuatan adimanusiawi, kekuatan non manusia yang memberikan hak' berkuasa, melegitimasi pemegang kepemimpinan sosial atau negara/kerajaan. Sedangkan legitimasi dalam bentuk status sosial seperti relasi kekerabatan merupakan prasyarat pengbsah lain yang dimiliki oleh calon pemimpin. Bisa saja seorang anak bangsawan dan berdarah masih putih, tetapi tidak menjadi pemimpin borinya, hanya karena ia tidak memiliki gaukang, apabila saudara sekandungnya banyak menyimpan gaukang, maka kuasa numinus dari gaukang yang dimilikinya berubah menjadi legitimasi kekuasaan. Pemegang gaukang yang hebat menandakan kepemilikan kekuatan yang cakap pula, untuk mengendalikan tuah dari gaukang. Dengan demikian pengendali gaukang berarti memiliki kecakapan tertentu, seperti memapu menguasai emosi, berpikir secara jernih, bukankah semakin tinggi kesadaran psikis semakin menggambarkan kematangan emosional. Raja dalam masyarakat Jawa menyatukan sedemikian rupa kekuatan kosmis alam untuk melebur dalam dirinya, sehingga ia layak menjadi pemimpin karena kuasa numinus sudah bersatu dengannya. Legitimasi bersatunya kekuatan alam lain ditransliterasi' dalam perwujudan berbagai macam simbol, penguasaan sistem tanda alami (waskita, bijak membaca gejala alam) untuk menjamin measurebilitas pengambilan keputusan. Kekuatan gaukang yang menyembunyikan kuasa numinus, mendapat perlakukan khusus melalui penempatannya di ruang tersendiri, diberi rumah dan tanah khusus sehingga orang-orang yang ditugasi merawatnya dapat memeliharanya dengan baik. Simbolisme ruang pertemuan' antara raja Jawa dan Ratu Pantai Selatan merupakan bahasa bertemunya atau persatuan dua kekuasaan, kuasa actus dan kuasa potentia alam, dengan cara demikian kekuasaan raja Jawa semakin legitimate di mata rakyat. "pada prinsipnya kekuatan adiduniawi itu ada dimana-mana, tetapi ada tempat, benda dan manusia dengan pemusatan dengan pemusatan yang lebih 155 tinggi. Orang yang dipenuhi dengan kekuatan itu tidak bisa dikalahkan dan tidak bisa dilukai, mereka itu sekti"(Magnis, 2001:99) Orang-orang yang memperoleh kekuasaan dapat dibayangkan sebagai wadah yang memuat sebagian dari fluidum kekuatan kosmis. Di sini perlu dibedakan, gaukang dengan benda pusaka di Jawa, barangkali secara bahasa (kata ganti penunjuk benda), keduanya memiliki nama yang sama. Tetapi gaukang bukan pusaka dalam materialnya yang berbentuk senjata, gaukang merupakan pemberian alam, bersifat ditemukan. Gaukang sebagai sumber kekuatan mewakili kuasa alam yang menetas dan menyatu dalam benda pusaka. Sedangkan pusaka' merupakan barang yang bersifat buatan memiiliki dua aktualitas: pusaka sebagai pusoko (form) dan sebagai senjata (materia). Form merupakan predikat rekayasa manusia yang mampu menguasai fluidum kosmis (sekti), sehingga benda pusaka itu teremanasi fluidum kosmis. Konsep ini mudah ditemukan pada masyarakat Jawa tetapi dalam format yang masih mistis. Jadi mesti berhati-hati untuk menentukan mana gaukang kalompoang dan mana pusaka'. Selanjutnya benda pusaka dibagi dalam dua tingkat: pusaka keramat dan pusaka empu. Yang pertama merupakan emanasi fluidum kosmic dan yang kedua merupakan fatsal kausasi penyatuan forma dan material. Perlu dibedakan dimensi pengakuan kekuaasan yang dilekatkan suatu kebudayaan masyarakat pada bendabenda ciptaan mereka, temuan mereka sebagai bentuk nalar tertinggi yang di dalamnya banyak dikandung informasi bias sains. Hal tersebut terkait dengan pemahaman kosmis suatu kebudayaan, selanjutnya benda-benda tersebut memiliki kedudukan khusus dan memberikan arti dan sebagai lambang keabsahan, kekuatan, ke-kstaria-an dan seterusnya. Ketika pusaka, gaukang memiliki kedudukan dalam struktur kekuasaan dan berpengaruh pada relasi-relasi sosial masyarakat yang terbentuk akibat kehadiran benda tersebut maka penambahan fungsi hingga perubahan status sosial subyek pemilik gaukang dan pusaka merupakan bagian dari strategi perubahan kebudayaan. 156 Memang,nilai simbolis tampak diintrepetasikan berbeda oleh kelompok yang berbeda pula, namun orientasi nilai kelompok yang sudah sejak semula terbentuk telah berperan dalam mengendalikan ekspresi dan praktik setiap kelompok etnis (Abdullah,2007). Dengan cara tersebut, wujud dan isi kebudayaan dapat kita rujukan pada pendapat Koentjaraningrat bahwa wujud kebudayaan sebagai suatu kompleks dan ide-ide, gagasan-gagasan, nilai-nilai dan norma-norma, yang berada dalam pemikiran warga masyarakat yang dapat dijumpai dalam bentuk tulisan-tulisan, karangan warga masyarakat yang bersangkutan, termasuk kreasi arsitektur. Wujud kebudayaan juga dapat dikatakan sebagai suatu kompleksitas aktivitas kelakuan berpola dari manusia dalam masyarakat berupa sistem sosial yang berstruktur. Dalam hal ini wujud kebudayaan merupakan benda hasil karya manusia yang berupa kebudayaan fisik dalam konstruksi nyata (Koentjaranngrat:1974). Kekuasaan tergantung pada siapa yang berhasil menguasai pertautan kekuatan fluidum kosmis, kekuatan alam, kekuatan yang melampui kekuatan manusia. Masyarakat Bugis-Makassar memiliki kecenderungan bahwa gaukanglah yang menjadi pemersatu kekuatan elemental, pada beberapa kejadian tidak sedikit gaukang merupakan milik pemimpin terdahulu dipelihara terus-menerus sepanjang keturunan, jadi tidak setiap gaukang yang ada merupakan barang baru. Kisah mengadanya gaukang tidak jarang berbalut berbagai cerita rakyat, misalnya, kisah yang berbeda dari keberhasilan gaukang membuat tawar wabah penyakit berbeda dari satu masyarakat ke masyarakat lain. Intinya, kekuasan tidak datang dari luar, ex nihilo, tetapi datang dari emanasi daya netral gaukang, dan pemimpin hanya meminjamnya emanasi kekuasaan dari gaukang. Ada persoalan metafisis mengenai kenapa gaukang mengada dan untuk apa, kenapa unsur elemental maujud dalam gaukang, topik ini menjadi ide menarik namun memerlukan pendekatan di luar konsepsi kekuasaan gaukang itu sendiri. 157 Masyarakat Jawa percaya bahwa raja adalah titik pemusatan kekuatan kosmis, pertautan kekuatan kosmis terangkum dalam pribadi seorang. Raja merupakan orang yang berhasil memusatkan suatu takaran kekuasaan kosmis yang besar dalam dirinya sendiri (Magnis, 2001). Kekuatan raja terukur lewat keberkahan dan ketenangan yang dipancarkan dari perpaduan kuasa adiduniawi, semakin luas wilayah raja maka semakin besar kekuatan adimanusia, keberhasilan pertanian juga dikaitkan dengan keberhasilan raja memelihara kekuatan kosmis untuk menguntungkan dan mendukung rakyat yang dipimpinnya. Bahkan bencana alam, wabah penyakit, dan hama tikus diartikan sebagai kemunduran kasekten (keampuhan) penguasa yang mengkhawatirkan sebagai penyurutan penyatuan kekuatan-kekuatan adimanusia (Magnes, 2001). Apabila seseorang sudah berhasil menjadi raja, penguasa, lalu datang hasratnya untuk memperluas wilayah, maka ia akan mengumpulkan kekuatan magis yang terdapat dalam wilayah kekuasaannya, termasuk dari benda-benda pusaka kerajaan. Jika kehilangan pemusatan kekuatan itu maka hilang pula kekuasaan yang melekat padanya. Jelas dibedakan kekuasaan yang bersumber dari adanya kesadaran untuk taat pada pemimpin yang sudah dipilih, dibanding ketundukan rakyat lantaran adanya sanksi ancaman yang menyertai sebuah aturan hukum (hadat). Ketaatan menunjukan fase kerelaan menerima perintah, menerima sebagai obyek keterpimpinan, ketundukan rakyat karena ancaman saksi hukum merupakan unsur keterpaksaan, ketakutan pada jatuhnya ancaman. Disini perbedaan dimensi hukum antara local jenius dengan determenisme hukum dari luar (Barat/Eropa). Hukum tidak senantiasa berdiri berdasar tekanan dan memaksa, namun kekuasaan, hukum merupakan regulasi untuk membentuk realitas. Bagi Michael Foucault, kuasa bekerja tidak senantiasa melalui penindasan dan represi tetapi normalisasi dan regulasi. Normalisasi dalam arti menyusun norma-norma dan regulasi dalam arti mengadakan aturan (Bertens,1996). Kerelaan untuk diperintah dan kesediaan untuk mengabdi sebagai bawahan sebagaimana kisah rakyat Bugis-Makassar yang meminta 158 pada To manurung, (atau masyarakat Jawa yang rela ngabdi pada titah raja) untuk segera bertahta menjadi pemimpin, meniadakan unsur keterpaksaan tetapi unsur struktur kuasa, yang dalam terminologi kuasa Foucault disebut strategi taktis kuasa. Lalu bagaimana hubungan raja dan keraton yang disimbolkan dalam berbagai ornamen arsitekural kosmis?. Keraton itu bukan semata suatu pusat politik dan budaya, tetapi keraton merupakan pusat keramat kerajaan, hunian dari berbagai benda-benda pusaka dan simbol pengumpulan kuasa transendent raja. Keraton menjadi rumah „gaukang-gaukang‟ kerajaan. Bagi Magnis keraton adalah tempat bersemayamnya raja, dan raja merupakan pusat kekuatan kosmis yang mengalir ke bawahnya, membawa ketentraman dan keberhasilan pertanian, keadilan kesuburan. Hal tersebut bisa ditilik dari kecenderungan pemakaian nama-nama raja, antara lain pemangku bumi, Paku Jagad raya, atau Yang Memangku Jagad raya atau ada juga Yang Memangku Negara. Keruntuhan kekuasaan terjadi apabila raja terkena perbuatan mengharapkan imbalan baik berupa pujian, atau material sehingga kekuasaan kosmisnya tergerus. Salah satu prinsip penyatuan dan penguasaan dunia numinus adalah sepi ing pamrih, membebaskan diri dari pamrih, mencapai kesejahteraan bersama' dalam logika kekuasaan marxis, bukan penumpukan kapital modal. Penguasaan tanah Ajjoareng, raja, matoa tidak diakumulasi untuk kekayaan ansich, sebab penumpukan kekayaan hanya pada patron tapi meniadakan distribusi kekayaan terhadap klien akan meruntuhkan sistem patron-klien. Kekuasaan, dalam arti kuasa untuk membentuk regulasi dan sistem norma akan susut jika pemegang gaukang justru memperlihatkan model penguasaan yang membuat para klien tidak merasa nyaman dalam naungannya, perlahan para klien akan berpindah karena mereka tidak memiliki keterikatan, identitas dan kelompok. Kekuasan bagi dunia timur tidak serta merta menggambarkan sistem penindasan atas nama kelas dan strata sosial kebangsawanan, bangsawan tanpa kuasa 159 numinus, tanpa strategi taktis menguasai alam dan menyatukan regulasi norma, tidak menarik rasa ketundukan dari rakyat. Kuasa tidak senantiasa taktis-praktis melainkan bernilai ontologis dan dibalik yang materi manusia itself. 160 Daftar Bacaan Ahimsa Putra, Heddy Shri., 2007, Patron Klien di Sulsel, Kepel press, Yogyakarta. ____________., 2006, Strukturalisme Levi Strauss, Mitos dan Karya Sastra, Kepel Press, Yogyakarta. Brongtodiningrat., KPH. 1978, Arti Kraton Yogyakarta, Museum Keraton, Yogyakarta. Gusnawaty., 2000, Masyarakat Madani dalam Lontara; Beberapa Konsep Pembinaan Masyarakat Sulawesi Selatan, tt, tp Koentjaraningrat.,1974, Kebudayan, Mentalitet dan Pembanguan, PT Gramedia, Jakarta K. Bertens.,1996, Filsafat Barat Kontemporer, PT Gramedia, Jakarta. Suseno, Franz Magnis., 2001,Etika Jawa, PT Gramedia, Jakarta. Marzuki, Laica., H.M, 2005, Perjanjian Pemerintahan (Govermental Contract) pada Kerajaan-Kerajaan Bugis-Makassar, Tt Tp -- Mattulada., H.A, 1975, Latoa; Suatu Lukisan Analisis Terhadap Antropologi Politik Orang Bugis, Disertasi, Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta. Mulyono, Sri., 1989, Simbolisme dan Mistisisme dalam Wayang. CV Haji Masagung, Jakarta. Mulyana, Slamet., 2006, Tafsir Nagara Kretagama,LKiS, Yogyakarta. Poelinggomang, Edward PL.,2004, Perubahan Politik dan Hubungan Kekuasaan, Makassar 1906-1942, Ombak, Yogyakarta. 161 Tulisan berikut merupakan pendekatan berbeda dari tulisan-tulisan sebelumnya. Yakni meminjam model analitika (filsafat bahasa) digunakan untuk berdialog secara inside dalam sastra pakeliran. Pakeliran (wayang) kebanyakan ditanggapi dalam konteks „mufasir‟ dan mengalihbahasakan peribahasa dan ajaran yang telah living bagi masyarakat Jawa. Untuk menghindarkan peribahasa „menggarami air laut‟, cara analitika terhadap pakeliran dipilih agar mampu berbicara tentang dirinya sendiri (pakeliran). Maka persoalannya bermula pada bagaimana sastra pakeliran menggunakan narasi dan mengendalikan perlokusi bahasa yang dipakainya. Persoalan antara imajinasi dan nalar pemindahan „yang real‟ kepada „yang imajinatif‟ dibahasakan dalam langgam analitika yang berbunyi dialektika konsep formal dan konsep nyata. Pemakaian perspektif beberapa tokoh analitika dan hermeneutika digunakan untuk „menyamakan suara‟ dengan bahasa ilmu filsafat sehingga sisi analitika yang termuat dalam sastra pakeliran makin kompatibel didengar. Karena bahasa itu sendiri selalu terbatas untuk menggambarkan realitas, nalar meminjam system kode sastra pakeliran untuk mentransformasi penggambaran realitas kepada bahasa agar longgar merantingkan pengetahuan-pengetahuan yang tidak terbahasakan secara eksplisit. Analitika Hermeneutis dalam Budaya Pakeliran Oleh: Hudjolly Pendahuluan Indonesia hampir disebut sorga bagi para pemimpi, kaum yang suka berimajinasi, baik sastra atau bentuk budaya lain. Belum menjadi sorga bagi dunia imajinasi karena nilai etik dan norma fungsionalis imajinasi dihadapkan pada budaya lain yang lebih besar, yakni budaya etis dan budaya sopan. Imajinasi yang telah menyatu dengan masyarakat dalam skala besar-besaran adalah imajinasi pakeliran 162 (wayang). Dapat dipastikan, belum ada kebudayaan yang melampui imajinasi massal seperti yang terjadi pada pewayangan, hingga dalam banyak hal imajinasi pakeliran ditangkap sebagai realitas bagi masyarakat. Menurut Paul Stange (1998) istilah wayang diambil dari bahasa Jawa yang berati bayangan (wayangan). Struktur dasar cerita dalam karya imajinatif wayang diambil dari wiracarita India, Mahabarata dan Ramayana dan ditambah dengan berbagai konsep mengenai imajinasi kedewaan dalam berbagai penggalan cerita yang disesuaikan dengan karakter Jawa, seperti pengambilan seting cerita dan kejadian yang menggunakan tempat-tempat di Jawa. Misalnya dalam kitab Babad Tanah Jawi, S Haryanto (1995) menjelaskan versi cerita Kalimasada berasal dari ucapan fundamental seseorang yang akan memeluk agama Islam. Dalam narasi bahasa disebut Prabu Darmakusuma (Puntadewa) melakukan pertemuan dengan Sunan Kalijaga di hutan Ketangga. Tentu saja sulit menyebut narasi bahasa tersebut adalah real adanya, meskipun tokoh Sunan Kalijaga merupakan tokoh yang real dalam sejarah Jawa. Babad Cirebon menyebut pertemuan Sunan Kalijaga dan Prabu wayang di Gunung Dieng. Narasi cerita Kalimasada dan narasi cerita Ilmu Kasampurnan Sejati dikreasikan hingga melahirkan narasi Dewaruci (Susetya, 2008). Segala tutur kisah yang dipentaskan dalam pakeliran merupakan teks-teks literer yang dengan mendengarkannya menjadi seolah-olah melihat secara langsung apa dan bagaimana imajinasi yang hendak disampaikan dalam kisah tersebut. Bahasa yang disampaikan dalam kisah pewayangan merupakan penggambaran kejadian, penggambaran keadaan setting, penggambaran karakter tokoh pesan dan nilai moral yang hendak disampaikan dalam setiap penggalan dialog. Narasi tersebut merupakan proposisi-proposisi yang bermaksud menggambarkan suatu realitas' imajinatif. Dan pemikiran teori gambar yang disampaikan oleh Wittgeinstein, sebagaimana dikutip Kaelan (2002), dapat menjelaskan mengenai proposisi cerita untuk menggambarkan realitas imajinatif. 163 Dalam hal ini proposisi dalam teori gambar yang dimaksud adalah prosisi yang mengandung kesalahan' dalam arti tidak berkesesuaian dengan realitas. Sebuah proposisi memiliki dua macam kutub yaitu suatu prosisi mengandung suatu kebenaran jikalau berkesesuaian dengan kebenaran suatu peristiwa, dan sebaiknya sebuah proposisi mengandung suatu kesalahan manakala berkesesuaian dengan keberadaan suatu peristiwa (Kaelan, 2002). Meskipun demikian ada sedikit masalah pembiasan untuk menyebut teori gambar dengan narasi bahasa pakeliran (wayang), yakni teori gambar bermaksud menggambarkan suatu keadaan, mendeskripsikan keadaan, peristiwa melalui pilihan kata dan kalimat, proposisi yang ada, relitas nyata agar bisa dipahami orang. Dalam pakeliran bahasa dan prosisi yang digunakan seluruhnya menggunakan narasi deskriptif, menggambarkan suatu keadaan tetapi keadaan yang digambarkan bukan alam nyata, realitas faktual melainkan keadaan imajinasi. Ketika seorang dalam menggambarkan watak dan karakter Gatutkoco dengan kalimat populer: otot kawat balung wesi (otot terbuat dari kawat dan tulang sekeras besi), tak lain penyaji cerita ingin menyampaikan suatu gambaran sesosok tokoh yang mempunyai ciri fisik sangat kuat, memiliki tulang sekeras besi dan otot sekuat kawat. Demikian juga untuk menggambarkan Hanoman, atau Dewi Shinta yang merupakan sosok imajinatif. Dan sangat tidak mungkin menggambarkan keadaan Gatutkaca dengan prosisi pilihan berbunyi: ―berkulit lembut berwajah ayu dan mudah memikat wanita‖. Tokoh yang digambarkan sebagai sosok lembut tersebut tentu saja merujuk pada Arjuna. Gatutkaca dan Arjuna keduanya sosok imajinatif dalam pakeliran, tetapi prosisi yang digunakan untuk menyampaikan gambaran pada orang lain tidak bisa serampangan, artinya sealu berdasar pada realitas imajinatif' cerita wayang (pakem). Untuk mengatakan Bima adalah sosok yang lembut sama dengan membuat proposisi negatif, karena kenyataan' imajinatifnya, Bima adalah sosok yang kasar. Selanjutnya setiap sosok dan keadaan dalam cerita pakeliran telah memiliki bentuk 164 yang khas sendiri sendiri, atau istilahnya pakem, dan penggambaran ciri, pemakaian teori gambar yang tidak sesuai dengan pakem adalah proposisi yang salah. Masalahnya bagaimana menginterpretasikan proposisi (kalimat), itu sebagai alat yang bisa digunakan untuk melihat apa yang dimaksud oleh si penutur. Jelas perangkat hermeunetis-lah yang dapat membantu mencari jawabannya. Sebab hermeunetika menawarkan suatu cara untuk melihat bahasa (interpretasi), yaitu bahasa dilihat sebagai cara kita memahami kenyataan' dan cara kenyataan' tampil pada pikiran kita (Kaelan, 2002). Tentu saja kenyataan yang dimaksud adalah kenyataan dalam pakem pakeliran, bukan kenyataan asali dalam dunia nyata. Dalam pengertian hermeunetis tersebut fungsi bahasa yang dipakai dunia pakeliran ialah fungsi transformatifnya, bagaimana bahasa bisa membentuk gambaran (transformatif) mengenai dunia pakeliran dan melalui bahasa hermeunetika itu kita dapat menangkap maksud cerita pakeliran sebagai wakil kritik bagi alam nyata kita sehari-hari. Hubungan antara keadaan imajiner dan keadaan nyata dihubungkan oleh segi hermeunetika terutama oleh pembawa cerita dan pendengar cerita. Contohnya ketika pembawa cerita pakeliran menyampaikan kritik haus kekuasaan dan perebutan tahta dalam lakon Mahabarata, dan para pendengar bisa merasakan bahwa yang sedang disinggung oleh pembawa cerita (dalang) adalah keadaan terkini di alam nyata yang sedang gandrung perebutan kekuasaan. Inilah fungsi transformatif metode hermeunetika, yang mengatur pemilihan kata tertentu, sehingga membawa perlokusi cerita tidak hanya dipahami sebagai struktur cerita tokoh-tokoh wayang, makna semata melainkan menjadi pusat gravitasi yakni ada yang bisa dimengerti dalam bahasa pewayangan. Manusia bukanlah makhluk yang sekedar natural belaka melainkan lebih sebagai produk kultural, yaitu suatu konstruk linguistik, oleh sebab itu bahasa memungkinkan manusia berpikir, sehingga cerita bahasa tidak hanya dilihat sekedar medium, bukan pula representasi (Kaelan,2002). Bahasa yang digunakan dalam 165 paparan pakem-pakem wayang tentu saja menggambarkan totalitas keadaan dunia wayang secara utuh, bukan sekedar memperlihatkan alur cerita saja. Dan itu semua bagi pendengar kisah wayang (kebanyakan orang Jawa) berusaha menangkap pesan realitas nyata pada cerita pewayangan dalam konteks aktual, pemahaman. Proses Hermeunetika Menurut F.Schleiermacher (1768-1834), pemahaman adalah suatu rekonstruksi yang bertolak dari ekspresi yang telah diungkapkan dan mengarah kembali kesuasana kejiwaan dimana ekspresi tersebut diungkapkan. Selanjutnya dapat dilihat dalam keadaan tersebut ada dua hal saling berhubungan dan saling berinteraksi yakni momen tata bahasa dan kejiwaan, lingkaran inilah yang diistilahkan dengan lingkaran hermeneutika. Selanjutnya manakala seseorang pendengar lakon pakeliran, ia memahami maksud yang hendak disampaikan dengan jalan membandingkan alur kisah dengan pemahaman dirinya atas realitas nyata di sekelilingnya. Schleiermacher menerangkan lebih jauh bahwa sesuatu yang diketahuinya-seperti kisah dalam wayang tersebut-membentuk suatu kesatuankesatuan sistematis atau juga membentuk suatu lingkaran yang terdiri atas bagianbagian. Lingkaran yang dimaksudkan sebagai suatu keseluruhan, menentukan masing–masing bagian demi bagian tersebut secara bersama-sama membentuk suatu lingkaran pemahaman (Kaelan, 2002). Bahasa merupakan unsur paling fundamental dalam hermeneutika, yang pemaknaannya akan ditentukan lewat fungsionalitas makna kata pembentuk kalimat. Dalam hal pakeliran, tentu saja bahasa yang dipakai penutur cerita memiliki pilihan pesan yang hendak disampaikan sebagai narasi pembentuk cerita. Misalnya, hendak menyampaikan bagaimana kemampuan spiritual, kepatuhan dan bakti murid pada guru lebih penting dan lebih mulia daripada sekedar memperturutkan intrik politik, maka narasi yang dipakai adalah lakon Dewa ruci dan Bima Suci. 166 Oleh karena, loncatan intuitif sebagaimana disyaratkan oleh Schleiermacher bergantung pada bagaimana narasi-narasi deskriptif dipakai oleh penutur cerita, dan sisi inilah yang menjadi de facto antara si penutur cerita dengan pendengarnya. Sebab hampir seluruh manusia Jawa yang mendengarkan kisan pakeliran sudah memiliki suatu pemahaman tersendiri mengenai ide cerita yang disampaikan oleh penutur (dalang). Karena pemahaman awal inilah, pendengar mampu merekonstruksi kesepahaman antara maksud yang hendak disampaikan dalang dengan apa yang ditangkap oleh pendengar. Dengan pengetahuan pra cerita, seorang pendengar dapat meloncat ke pemahaman hermeneutika, lewat cara ini pikiran si penutur cerita dapat ditangkap, narasi yang dimaksud untuk menyampaikan kritik pada masa aktual terbaca pendengar. Di satu sisi, ada nilai keabsolutan dalam cerita wayang, yaitu pakem itu sendiri. Meskipun dalam banyak kasus berbagai pakem itu sudah banyak dilanggar dan hanya menggunakan karakter dasar yang melekat pada tokoh-tokoh bersangkutan. Namun bagaimana itu terjadi, para pendengarnya masih bisa menyimak dan memahami secara jernih apa yang hendak disampaikan oleh penutur. Pada titik ini tidak lagi dibutuhkan bagaimana pengetahuan pra cerita, karena cerita sudah tidak utuh lagi. Yang dipahami adalah semangat dalam cerita yang sudah dipermak itu, bagaimana spirit yang bisa ditangkap mengenai lakon Kresna yang menjadi duta politik penyatu perdamaian antara Kurawa dan Pandawa, namun dalam banyak kisah lakon semacam ini tidak jarang dimodifikasi di sana-sini untuk menyampaikan keadaan: kegagalan lobi dan pencegahan peperangan antara dua negara (Sarjono,2006). Di sisi lain, masih banyak cerita yang diplesetkan tetapi tetap mengenai perasaan pendengar, pendengar memahami skenario yang dibahasakan meskipun sudah tidak lagi sesuai pakem. Dari Teks dan Pemahaman 167 Apakah wayang dapat dikatakan sebagai teks? Jawabnya ya, sejauh narasi wayang adalah salah satu karya sastra yang berwujud dalam teks cerita Mahabarata dan Ramayana dan di Jawa mengalami penyesuaian narasi sehingga terasa adanya corak Islam dan corak latar belakang kejadian di tanah Jawa. Dari sini terlihat adanya bias yaitu teks Mahabarata dan Ramayana asli dari India dinterpretasikan sedemikian rupa sehingga sastrawan Jawa dapat menyesuaikan dengan konteks keJawaan. Narasi Kalimasada dan Dewaruci adalah salah satu contohnya. Pada titik ini ada pemahaman teks narasi dalam berbagai babad cerita yang melahirkan cerita baru lagi setelah direkonstruksi, padahal tidak tertutup kemungkinan bahwa si rekonstruktor cerita, si pembuat cerita baru tersebut hendak menyuguhkan pesan baru dan pemahaman baru pada pendengarnya. Nyatanya tujuan yang dilakukan si pembuat cerita itu berhasil melahirkan alam imajinasi baru, melahirkan pemaknaan baru yang sama antara pendengar satu dengan pendengar lain. Bahasa narasi-narasi dalam kisah tersebut berhasil menjembatani adanya jarak antara teks dengan pemahaman, tangkapan seseorang. Lantaran dalam batas teks itulah kerap terjadi perbedaan pembacaan teks. Misalnya dalam tradisi wayang yang hidup dalam keraton Yogyakarta mempunyai narasi tersendiri mengenai terjadinya kisah Layang Kalimasada, yakni berkaitan dengan narasi Lahirnya Sekutrem (nenek moyang Pandawa) (Susetya,2008). Dalam kaitanya dengan teks itulah, narasi wayang terlihat sebagai konsep formal dalam analogi Filsafat Bahasa, karena konsep formal dalam hubungannya dengan logika bahasa tidak dapat dihubungkan dengan sesuatu yang nyata, bahkan konsep formal tidak bisa dinyatakan dalam satu proposisi, tetapi konsep itu ditunjukkan dengan simbol untuk suatu obyek tertentu (Kaelan, 2004). Penunjukan karakter naratif seperti Arjuna, Gatutkaca, Bima, Nakula, Sadewa, Kresna, Sengkuni tidak lain simbol-simbol yang menunjukkan karakter formal tertentu. Perilaku atau karakter yang dimasukan secara naratif kepada salah 168 satu bentuk tokoh seperti Semar, Arjuna secara implisit menampakan suatu pandangan kosmologis yang luas yang mengamanatkan bahwa lingkungan seimbang dan selaras adalah tujuan dalam perilaku manusia (Sarjono,2006). Menurut Damardjati (2001) tokoh Bhatara Ghuru merupakan simbol penunjuk yang melambangkan angan-angan, kakaknya Togog melambangkan kekayaan. Oleh karena itu dalam interpretasi narasi wayang kepada kondisi aktual, keadaan para tokoh itu selalu dilekatkan pada kondisi real, yakni obyek nyata yang dapat dipersesi. Misalnya Bhatara ghuru melekat pada konsep kepemimpinan masyarakat atau negara, dan karakter semar dan para punakawannya melekat pada obyek nyata kawula alit, rakyat jelata. Dengan cara ini pembacaan obyek formal wayang seolah-olah membaca kondisi aktual meskipun menggunakan analogi narasi cerita yang sudah berabad-abad. Namun demikian, konsep formal tidak dapat dinyatakan oleh suatu fungsi, tokoh Kresna tidak bisa melekat pada fungsi kepala pemerintahan, sebab karakteristik sifat formal tidak dinyatakan oleh suatu fungsi. Pernyataan dari suatu ciri formal adalah ciri dari simbol tertentu dan oleh karena dinyatakan dalam suatu simbol, fungsi formal harus diisi oleh konsep nyata, yang dalam hermeneutika wayang akan selalu mengaitkan dengan kondisi aktual pesanan pemegang hajat pagelaran wayang. Untuk membedakan secara jelas mengenai konsep formal dan konsep nyata, dapat dicontohkan bahwa konsep nyata seperti kereta dapat diganti dengan vaiabel x, sehingga dapat berbunyi ―x ada‖ namun variabel x ada' menjadi tanda dari konsep formal adanya kereta. Jadi variabel x adalah tanda sebenarnya dari obyek semu, sebab kata obyek' tentang benda, entitas, benda dan lainnya secara benar dipakai dalam simbolisme logis bernama variabel. Sehingga 100 kereta perang' tidak sama maknanya dengan proposisi ada kereta perang'. Banyak proposisi dalam narasi wayang dapat diperiksa menggunakan strukur logis seperti itu, misalnya ―kubu yang benar akan membasmi keangkaramurkaan‖ merupakan prosisi formal yang harus diisi 169 dengan obyek nyata yakni kehadiran obyek bernama Kurawa sebagai sumbu keangkaramurkaan dan Pandhawa sebagai kubu yang benar. Proposisi konsep nyata dari bentuk konsep formal di atas ialah: ―Pandhawa akan membasmi Kurawa‖. Demikian banyak hal-hal dalam narasi wayang yang menggunakan narasi formal dan menunggu untuk ditransformasikan dalam konsep-konsep nyata, terlebih pembacaan hermeneutis masa kini akan melahirkan konsep real yang selalu aktual Konsepsi formal sebagaimana ditujukan pada Semar, (sebagai Titisan Wisnu), Bataraguru, Bisma dan bahkan analog sengkuni menjadi konsep-konsep atomis formal. Sebab Kresna, atau Bisma sendiri merupakan atribut yang masih memerlukan kehadiran obyek nyata sebagai penjelas obyek formal tersebut. Konsep atomik formal merupakan susunan terkecil dari proposisi formal dalam wayang, misalnya konsep atomik kebenaran mengarah pada Pandhawa, yang di dalamnya ada berbagai macam peringkat dan jenis-jenis kebenaran sesuai dengan penggambaran masing-masing individu tokoh, seperti Bima yang benar tetapi kaku, Yudistira benar tetapi selalu ragu, Arjuna benar tetapi terlampau lembut. Konsep kebijaksanaan dewata' mengarah pada putusan putusan masing-masing dewa yang menunjuk pada masing– masing karakter atomik kedewaan Batara Wisnu, Batara Yamadipati, Pramesti Guru, dan seterusnya. Karakter atomik ialah karaker yang bersifat terperinci, ada unit terkecil yang tidak terdiri dari karakter-karekter lain. Masing-masing konsep formal kebijakan dewata yang sudah nyata dengan nama-nama tersebut menunjuk pada keadaan karakter kedewaaan secara khusus seperti Wisnu identik dengan konsep formal pemegang pengawasan dan keadilan', Yamadipati merujuk simbol formal pemegang hukuman dan kebinasaan' Pramesthi guru simbol formal dari hukum dan penegakan aturan' . Namun konsep atomik formal itu masih membutuhkan obyek riil agar bisa bermakna, seperti konsep penebar kebinasaan sangat abstrak dan tidak memiliki makna. Maka konsep formal Yamadipati menjadi konsep nyata dengan analog Dyu Sangkapati, tokoh yang menjadi juru jagal bayaran dari Kurawa ketika mencari dan 170 hendak membunuh Semar yang berstatus pendamping panglima perang BarataYuda, Kresna. Konsep formal atomik dari pemegang pengawasan dan keadilan' diwakili oleh konsep nyata bernama Prabu Kresna. Adanya tokoh Prabu Kresna, Dyu Sangkapati dan nama-nama lain yang dalam analog wayang menggunakan proposisi titisan' tepatnya titisan dewata menunjukkan pola formal bertingkat. Sebab hampir semua karakter tokoh secara individual adalah bagian-bagian terpisahkan yang mewakili satu konsep formal dalam alam kadewaan. Bahkan sampai para kurawa dan para raja yang membela kurawa adalah titisan-titisan dewata. Kata titisan menjadi kata penghubung yang menerangkan proses perubahan dari analitika dalam Konsep Formal menjadi Konsep Nyata agar sebuah prosisi memiliki makna riil. Jikalau dilakukan analisis berdasarkan analisis linguistik kerap mengalami kebuntuan karena struktur tata bahasa yang sama antara proposisi formal dan proposisi nyata tiada memiliki beda padahal struktur logika yang dikandungnya tidak sama. Berdasarkan kenyataan, konsep formal harus diisi dengan konsep nyata. Hubungan Konsep Nyata, Konsep Formal dengan Proposisi Dasar pengertian proposisi tidak dapat dipisahkan dengan prinsip teori gambar, yang mengembangkan doktrin bahwa realitas dapat digambarkan menggunakan bahasa, bahwa bukan hanya realitas empirik saja yang dapat digambarkan oleh bahasa melainkan realitas imajinasi seseorang dapat digambarkan dan dilihat orang lain secara persis sama melalui penggunaan bahasa. Namun, menurut Bertens (1981), meskipun gambaran imajinatif yang dibahasakan tetap mengacu pada keadan dunia realitas yang ada dan nyata. Misal cerita yang memberikan narasi adanya perang besar, Barata Yuda, bahasa yang digunakan akan mengacu pada keadaan-keadaan yang nyata' menganai keadaan genting menjelang perang, mengenai persiapan menjelang perang dan keresahan yang dialami rakyat ketika dua negara akan berperang. 171 Kondisi-kondisi yang diceritakan dalam narasi wayang pra BarataYuda tetap mengandaikan atau mengacu pada keadan yang sesungguhnya mengenai keadaan pra peperangan. Mpu Walmiki menggambarkan keadaan pra perang sebagaimana sering terjadi di India dan dipakai untuk mengutarakan keadaan sebelum BarataYuda. Jadi Walmiki tidak mengkonstruksi keadaan perang BarataYuda berdasarkan kenihilan, melainkan melalui pengalaman nyata empirik. Berdasarkan prinsip tersebut, maka prinsip proposisi menurut tidak dapat dipisahkan dengan realitas dunia dan pikiran manusia. Proposisi juga mengandung makna dalam suatu bahasa yang digunakan untuk menyampaikan isi pikiran dalam menangkap suatu realitas tertentu atau hendak menyatakan suatu keadaan pada orang lain. Aspek pengertian dalam menggambarkan realitas dunia sebagaimana dilihat dan dipersepsi seseorang itu terletak dalam struktur logika. Ketika Walmiki menggambarkan keadaan kerajaan Alengka yang gemerlap namun penuh keangkaramurkaan, bertebaran libido sexualis, para pendengar wayang bisa melihat bagaimana keadaan negara Alengka sebagaimana dimaksud dalang. Atau menggambarkan konsep formal Rahwana, Dursasana dan tokoh lain sesuai dengan perangai dan alegori suara sehingga seorang pendengar secara logis dapat menangkap struktur keadaan sebagaimana diharapkan narator. Pengertian yang dikandung dalam pernyataan-pernyataan dalang menunjukkan satu fungsi proposisi sebagai proyeksi dari suatu keadaan peristiwa. Dewa Ruci, misalnya, menyuguhkan proyeksi untaian proposisi tentang perjalanan moral seorang pencari kebenaran. Menggunakan metode Gadamer maka narasi dipandang sebagai wacana simbolik. Dalam metode ini teks dikaji sebagai bentuk pelambangan' atas sesuatu yang lain. Sesuatu yang lain itu memiliki cakrawala' yang luas dibandingkan dengan cakrawala harfiah teks. Menurut Gadamer ada empat cakrawala tersembunyi dalam suatu teks filsafat atau sastra. Empat cakrawala itu ialah (1) Bildung atau pandangan keruhanian yang membentuk jalan pikiran seseorang, termasuk di dalamnya pandangan hidup (way of life), system nilai 172 Weltanschauung; (2) Sensus communis, yaitu pertimbangan praktis, yang dalam sastra bisa terwujud dalam pemilihan tema atau permasalahan dengan mempertimbangkan perasaan komunitas di mana pengarang hidup; (3) Judgment atau pertimbangan, berhubungan dengan apa yang harus disampaikan dan diajarkan kepada masyarakat dengan mempertimbangkan baik buruknya; (4)Taste atau selera, cara-cara menyajikan sesuatu yang sesuai dengan selera masyarakat sezaman (Sumaryono 1993:78-79). Merujuk pada sistem konsepsi nyata dan konsepsi formal dalam narasi wayang, terdapat secara jelas model-model turunan srukturalis yang didapatkan dari narasi hidup dan keadaan sebuah negara. Keterkaitan antar tokoh satu sama lain menunjukkan pola kekerabatan sekaligus membawa impliksi berupa adab dan tatacara sosiologis yang dibangun. Teks-teks narasi pada akhirnya memberikan sebuah konstruksi sosial yang bertaut dengan kondisi realitas nyata. Teks dalam narasi wayang menjadi jembatan antara realitas sosial dan imajinasi kolektif. Dalam kaitan obyek imajinasi kolektif inilah, menurut Siswanto (2003) wayang secara ontologis membahas persoalan persoalan dasar realitas nyata, terutama obyek yang ada' (manusia). Keterkaitan konsep formal menjadi konsep formal oleh kebanyakan orang disebut sebagai fenomena sumber makna. Tidak mengherankan apabila wayang dijadikan salah satu acuan untuk menyusun kerangka moral, atau wayang sebagai sumber inspirasi. Pada dasarnya bukan wayang yang menjadi sumber inspirasi tetapi perubahan, transformasi konsep Formal menjadi Konsep Nyata itulah yang dikenal sebagai inspirasi. Namun demikian, model transformasi berdasarkan filsafat analitika semacam itu, bukan satu-satunya sumber untuk melahirkan pemaknaan teks wayang dengan kondisi real. Setiap orang (dalam wilayah yang luas dan berlaku umum), atau bahkan setiap filsuf (peminat kajian filsafat dan bersifat khusus) dapat memahami modelmodel transformasi konsep wayang sesuai dengan alur dan gaya pikiran masing173 masing. Dalam posisi itulah kita kembali pada obyek narasi wayang sebagai salah narasi bahasa yang bisa dibaca dengan pola hermeneutika, baik hermeneutika yang umum seperti Gadamer, atau hermeneutika yang lebih khusus seperti Amin Abdullah. Namun salah satu pola umum yang dapat ditangkap mengenai model hermeneutis wayang adalah pemikiran yang berkembang dari kosmologis wayang ke antroposentris, dari alam kedewaan menuju alam kemanusiaan. Dari serba kehendak dewata menjadi kehendak manusia berdasarkan watak masing-masing tokoh, sesuai simbol yang ditautkan. Selanjutnya wayang kebanyakan hanya didekati sebagai salah satu sumber simbolisme antropomorphisme (manusia sebagai sentral gravitasi), termasuk karakter simbolik yang dilekatkan pada tokoh imajinatif dewa-dewa wayang itu ter'emanasi' sebagai karakter, sifat manusia-manusia, konsepsi dewa termanusiakan. Berkaitan dengan simbol tersebut, ada baiknya melihat pendapat Joko Siswanto (2003) yang mendekati wayang secara ontologis sebagai obyek simbolik. Menurut Siswanto, bahwa dalam filsafat wayang, pergelaran wayang dianggap sebagai simbol hidup' (wewayangane ngaurip). Hidup sebagai prinsip pertama filsafat wayang dengan jelas disimbolkan dengan kayon'(gunungan berdiri di tengah) sebelum pergelaran dimulai dan sesudah lakon wayang selesai dipentaskan. Oleh karena itu hidup' dapat dikatakan sebagai prinsip pertama dalam ontologi wayang. Maka sebelum sampai pada kategorial ontologis wayang; di sini perlu dijelaskan dua pengertian dasar yaitu simbol dan hidup. Masih menurut Siswanto, secara etimologis simbol berasal dari bahasa Yunani: sumballo (sumballein), artinya berwawancara, merenungkan, memperbandingkan, bertemu, melemparkan jadi satu, menyatukan. Simbol tidak hanya berdimensi horizontal imanen, tetapi juga berdimensi transenden vertikal. Dari pandangan Dibyasuharda (1990) berkesimpulan bahwa simbol berkaki' (berakar) dua. Di satu kaki dalam bahasa, dan kaki lain dalam kenyataan. Simbol menantang 174 untuk berpikir, untuk berpikir dibutuhkan bahasa. Bahasa simbol hanya dapat ditangkap maknanya melalui interpretasi atau hermeneutika (Siswanto,2003). Namun menurut FW Dillistone (2002) simbol agak terpisah dari dunia, sedangkan petunjuk dan tanda pertama–tama diterapkan pada dunia sebagaimana adanya, sedangkan penunjuk dan tanda beroperasi dalam lingkungan yang relatif statis, yakni ketika kata dan gerak-gerik digunakan untuk mendeskripsikan suatu barang. Pandangan Dillistone tersebut mendekati pendekatan simbol sebagai teori gambar sebagaimana dalam kasus wayang. Gerak dalang, dan kehadiran anak-anak wayang lengkap dengan gerak-gerik, sistem tanda, karakternya ada' untuk mendeskripsikan suatu barang, kata barang' dalam hal ini tentu saja merujuk karakter human being, manusia pada umumnya. Lain lagi dengan pandangan dari Whitehead (1928) pada karya Symbolism halaman 9: ―pikiran manusia berfungsi secara simbolis apabila beberapa komponen pengalamannya menggugah kesadaran, kepercayaan, perasaan, dan gambaran mengenai komponen-komponen lain pengalamannya. Perangkat komponen yang terdahulu adalah simbol' dan perangkat kompnen yang baru membentuk 'makna' simbol. Keberfungsian organis yang menyebabkan adanya peralihan dari simbol kepada makna akan disebut sebagai referensi‖ (Dillistone, 2002:18). Dalam konsepsi wayang, konstruksi Walmiki membentuk nama-nama, karakter tokoh adalah komponen pertama' yang membentuk simbol, sedangkan para dalang, pembaca epos Ramayana-Mahabarata terlibat sebagai perangkat komponen yang baru' sehingga pada pembaca, dalang dan orang-orang yang membaca/mendengar narasi wayang membentuk makna-makna simbol, mereka mengalami referensi. Lalu bagaimana dengan realitas wayang itu sendiri? Secara hermeneutik wayang menjadi titik-pangkal menjelaskan realitas melalui berbagai bentuk simbolik. Meminjam pendekatan Siswanto, menjelaskan kehidupan tidak hanya diterangkan secara mekanis-kemis-fisis melainkan finalitas; artinya yang menyebabkan dan 175 menggerakkan kehidupan ialah tujuannya. Konsepsi ini merupakan salah satu prinsip vitalisme yang berpendapat bahwa dalam realitas ada suatu daya yang tak tampak dan yang tidak dapat ditujukan secara empiris, tetapi menentukan seluruh organisme. Joko Siswanto menyebutnya sebagai daya metafisik yang bersifat potensi, namun mengejawantahkan diri dalam organisme, sehingga boleh disebut jiwa' organisme itu. Sehingga daya kehidupan mengatasi rintangan materi dengan mempergunakan dan mengorganisirnya. Ambil perbandingan derivasi' wayang berbentuk gerak: wayang wong atau wayang orang. Dalang' tetap ada hanya berperan sebagai narator, sedangkan para tokoh lakonnya diperagakan oleh manusia sebagaimana wayang, pemain menari bergerak sesuai karakter tokoh yang dibawakan dan berbicara sejalan dengan narasi dalang'. Setidaknya ada tiga bentuk seni wayang wong, yaitu ringgit tiyang Mataraman, ringgit tiyang gagrak Surakarta, dan ringgit tiyang pedhangsulan atau pedhalangan. Perbedaan gaya-gaya itu menunjukkan salah satu sisi hermeneutis bahwa para seniman/dalang memiliki model tersendiri atau semacam kebebasan dalam menginginterpretasi pemahaman-pemahaman tentang simbol-simbol pewayangan. Menurut budayawan, Manu J Widyaseputra (2008) berpendapat ada tiga perubahan hermeneutik wayang di Indonesia, yakni Maya, Suluk dan Lila. Dalam pertunjukan wayang menurut tradisi wayang Yogyakarta, pengertian maya memainkan peran yang sentral. Sebagai kekuatan, maya dapat disamakan atau disejajarkan dengan sakti, yang juga berarti kekuatan, tenaga dalam'. Wayang ditafsirkan berkarakter religius-mistis sehingga hanya dipentaskan pada kesempatankesempatan suci tertentu, seperti misalnya upacara perkawinan, upcara ritual sraddha, dan untuk tujuan-tujuan ruwat. Bahkan disertai penggunaan simbol numinus lainnya seperti pembakaran kemenyan di bawah kelir, dan juga upacaraupacara yang merupakan representasi sistem berpasangan dari fenomena alam, manusia-dewa, antroposentris-kosmosentris. 176 Model wayang wong juga menunjukkan transformasi konsep formal menjadi konsep nyata, dan ini bisa dilihat pada hadirnya upacara-upacara dalam pertunjukan wayang menjadi sarana turunnya Dewa' ke dalam tubuh individual wayang' yang dimantrai dalang. Konsep formal dewa membutuhkan konsep nyata manusia. Sedangkan wayang sebagai suluk, memiliki hermenutika islamis akibat adanya perubahan kultural Hindu-Buddha ke Islam, akulturasi kebudayaan sekaligus penggunaan budaya sebagai penyebaran ajaran Islam. Dalam hermenutika model ini, kosep formal menunjuk pada sifat-sifat manusia yang ditunjukan oleh karakter tokoh wayang dan konsep nyatanya adalah perbuatan si pemilik sifat pada perbuatan aktual, seperti sifat culasnya Sengkuni (konsep formal) ditunjukkan dengan perbuatan menipu Yudistira dalam judi dadu (konsep nyata). Disamping itu, padanan konsep formal-nyata dalam bentuk kosmosentris-antroposentris ditunjukkan dengan gagasan tentang sifat Sang Ilahi (konsep formal) yang bersemayam di dalam diri manusia (konsep nyata), dengan kata lain ada konsep hadirnya kehidupan Ilahi dalam setiap pribadi. Konsep-konsep formal yang sangat terkenal antara lain Sangkan paraning dumadi', sangkan paraning manungsa', Manunggaling Kawula-Gusti‟, Sura dira jayaningrat lebur dening pangastuti‟, banyak dibaca secara hermeneutik hingga menghasilkan pemaknaan yang berbeda-bedam meski kebanyakan ditransliterasi saja. Misalnya manunggaling Kawulo-Gusti‟ secara umum diinterpretasikan memberikan konsep nyata secara religius sebagai persatuan pencipta dengan makhluk yang dicipta, atau ada interpretrasi memberi konsep nyata sebagai berikut: hubungan yang tidak berjarak antara para pemimpin dengan rakyatnya, para pemimpin mau merakyat. Sangkan paraning manungsa memiliki konsep nyata sebagai filsafat moral sosial, sangkan paraning dumadi berkonsep nyata sebagai konsepsi aktual filsafat proses dan filsafat manusia. 177 Hermeneutika yang beragam itu menandakan bahwa kuantitas realitas yang hendak ditunjuk oleh simbol wayang itu memiliki banyak dimensi. Jika realitas kenyataan itu satu atau tunggal, maka tidak lagi dibutuhkan simbol dan gerak yang beragam untuk menunjuk satu entitas realitas semata. Bahkan realitas tunggal itu sendiri nyaris mustahil, sekalipun dalam tangkapan empiri, realitas batu bisa ditangkap sebagai benda keras berwarna hitam di halaman. Namun realitas batu itu bisa juga ditangkap secara empiri sebagai kerekatan partikel padat yang sedemikian solid sehingga bersifat keras dan membentuk bongkahan besar yang gaya tarik menarik partikel di dalamnya sangat kuat. Manakah realitas batu yang sesungguhnya? Jadi realitas itu senantiasa beragam, karakter manusia itu senantiasa beragam dan tidak hanya bisa dilihat secara hitam putih. Apakah Pandhawa adalah pihak yang sepenuhnya benar atau Kurawa adalah pihak yang sepenuhnya salah, tentu saja tidak bisa dilihat melalui realitas tunggal. Kita membaca narasi Kurawa salah dalam konteks ia berada dipihak dengan kondisi dan syarat tertentu, yakni ketika enggan memberikan separuh istana Astina sesuai hasil perundingan antara pihak Kurawa dan Pandhawa yang disaksikan para sepuh kerajaan. Lagipula Kurawa benar dalam ketika ia berusaha mempertahankan apa yang merasa menjadi miliknya, kehormatannya sebagai para ksatria yang menduduki suatu jabatan dalam suatu negara (apapun cara yang digunakannya). Bahkan pendukung Kurawa, seperti Resmi Bisma, Resi Durna menjadi tidak salah memerangi Pandhawa lantaran alasan dedikasi pembelaan pada tanah Astina. Keberadaan Amarta, kerajaan Pandhawa dianggap mengancam keutuhan kerajaan Astina, sehingga para resi ini membela negara mereka, bukan membela Kurawa atau memerangi Pandhawa. Demikian banyak sudut formal yang diturunkan secara berbeda-beda dalam konsep nyata. Formalisme benar dan salah hampir nisbi ketika dihadapkan pada momentum, realitas yang beragam. Termasuk dalam koteks ketika, salah satu karakter menggunakan simbol ,misalnya, Bima yang memiliki macam-macam warna: merah. Kuning, putih, dan hitam, pada pakaiannya. Warna-warna ini melambangkan nafsu, yang sekaligus juga 178 melambangkan empat unsur (anasir) bumi: api, tanah, udara, dan air (Siswanto: 2003). Di dalam Bima Suci, Bima menjelaskan rahasia dari warna-warna yang ia jumpai pada saat melakukan perjalanan. Empat warna pertama menunjukan hakikat manusia dan tuhannya, empat warna lain: (konsep) merah menunjuk pada konsep nyata sifat iri pada manusia dan sifat pemberani. Konsep hitam merujuk konsep nyata: suka makan, suka tidur dan ambisius, konsep kuning menunjuk sikap suka curang, bohong serakah pada sesuatu yang bukan miliknya, jahat tetapi tekun dan hemat, Putih merujuk pada sikap pasrah, tidak mau berusaha, menghindar dari pekerjaan dan selalu diam tak berbuat (Teguh, 2007). Simbol-simbol besar, yakni tokoh dan karakter wayang ataupun simbol kecil yakni atribut pakaian, senjata/pusaka, dan benda-benda yang menjadi ciri dari suatu tokoh wayang merupakan narasi bahasa analitika untuk menyebut berbagai kondisi realitas yang tidak cukup diutarakan dengan menggunakan teori gambar, atau paparan deskriptif. Simbol memiliki keluasan bentuk hermeneutis lebih dari pada analitika gambar. Seluruh kenyataan, realitas, itu tidak senantiasa melulu ruhani atau bersifat spiritual, melainkan ada realitas jasmani, fisik. Dua sumbu ini tidak berdiri terpisah melainkan satu kesatuan, form dan materia merupakan unitas tunggal. Jadi konsep formal dan konsep nyata tidak berdiri terpisah-pisah, melainkan bertaut sebagai logika simbol dan meneruskan rantai referensi pengalaman pertama pada komponen pangalaman selanjutnya. Narasi narasi wayang tidak lain kumpulan pengalaman pertama yang dirangkum secara simbolik untuk dibaca secara hermeneutis bagi orang lain, selain Walmiki. Menyitir metafisika Joko Siswanto (2003), dalam pandangan wayang, realitas selalu dilihat dari dua perspektif, yaitu dunia lahir' (outer side) dan dunia batin' (inner side). Dunia lahir bukanlah esensi dari realitas itu sendiri, tetapi adalah bayangan realitas, namun demikian harus ada keseimbangan antara keduanya. 179 Daftar Pustaka Kelan., 2002, Filsafat Bahasa, Paradigma, Yogyakarta. _____., 2004, Filsafat Analitis Menurut Ludwig Wittgenstein, Paradigma, Yogyakarta. Mulyono, Sri.,1982, Wayang Asal-usul dan Masa Depannya, Haji masagung, Jakarta. Sarjono, Wasis.,2006, Semar Gugat, Kuntul Press, Surakarta. Siswanto, Joko., 2003, ―Metafisika Wayang, Dimensi Ontologis wayang sebagai Simbol Kehidupan‖. Jurnal Filsafat, April 2003, Jilid 33, Nomor 1. UGM, Yogyakarta. Sumaryono, E., 1993, Hermeneutik: Sebuah Metode Filsafat. Kanisius. Yogyakarta Susetya, Wawan., 2008. Bharatayuda, Kreasi Wacana, Yogyakarta. Teguh., 2007, Moral Islam dalam Lakon Bima Suci, Pustaka Pelajar. Yogyakarta. 180 Judul tulisan Abdurahman Kader ini ditilik dari semiotika bertujuan menunjuk suatu perubahan dimensional dari satu formulasi hukum Tat Twan Asi sebagaimana telah dibahas Ramli Semawi M.Hum. Satu produk kebudayaan tidak melulu menjadi entri bagi satu bidang. Tradisi sebagai bahasa pengetahuan yeng terenkripsi adalah „epistemologi‟ ancient yang menandai lahir dan bekerjanya sistem-sistem sosial kemasyarakatan. Ide dasar pengakuan kesamaan interhumanitas ( Tat Twan Asi = saya adalah Kamu) dijadikan foundament relasi harmonis dengan segitiga kebudayaan: tuhan-alam-manusia di-breakdown-kan dalam modus pernik tradisi yang berbalut sistem tanda, sistem kode, dan kodifikasi simbol. Kesatuan simbol dan tanda seperti larangan hewan sembelihan, aturan ritual, yang dilanggamkan, dilatasi suatu pemikiran dasar: kesadaran bahwa manusia memiliki kemampuan memahami struktur simbol dan sistem tanda yang dirajut dengan cara yang khas. Kesadaran tersebut adalah rule dari pola hubungan masyarakat, standar dasar untuk menyusun relasi dan mengatur pertukaran identitas seperti melalui perkawinan, upcara ritual, atau strategi survival komunitas lainnya. Bagaimana ide dasar Tat Twan Asi berkembang di tingkat operasional dan aplikatif dalam sistem tradisi Bali, berikut telaah Abdurahman Kader: Tat Twan Asi Sebagai Semiotika Kebudayaan Masyarakat Bali Oleh: Abdurahman Kader (Dosen STIE KieRaha) a. Latar Belakang Gejala mendasar yang dapat dirasakan pada abad 21 ini menampakkan perubahan dunia yang diawali dari perubahan sosial-budaya yang sangat cepat. Timur dan Barat, Modern-Tradisional, dalam segala pernik kebudayaannya mengalami pertukaran sedemikian rupa. Maka sistem kode dan kebudayaannya juga terimbas dalam fase transformasi kebudayaan. Sistem kode kebudayaan tidak lagi dimiliki oleh satu masyarakat dan secara an sich mendominasi, inilah era transnation. Perubahan 181 ini sebagai akibat dari perkembangan ilmu pengetahuan dan teknologi, yang menyempitkan dunia ini dengan kecanggihan alat-alat teknologi seperti telepon, peralatan transportasi dan sebagainya. Terjadinya kontak sosial yang akan mempengaruhi setiap kebudayaan atau pandangan hidup suatu daerah atau suku bangsa ini. Wacana bangsa Indonesia yang mengembangkan makna dan kepribadian bangsanya dari beragam dan perbedaan suku bangsa yang merupakan ciri khas nusantara ini, merupakan bentuk lain dari transformasi sistem kode kebudayaan. Misalnya budaya masyarakat Bali, memiliki kode kebudayaan yang dalam bahasa berbeda terdapat pula dalam masyarakat lain. Persamaan pandangan hidup inilah yang dapat memperkaya khasanah local wisdom di nusantara ini karena dapat melahirkan makna-makna atau pandangan hidup/prinsip hidup suku sebagai suatu kesatuan bangsa yang melahirkan suatu pandangan mengglobal tentang pandangan hidup bangsa ini. b. Hubungan Interhumanitas Orang Bali Kehidupan masyarakat Bali yang didukung oleh adat istiadat yang kuat dalam hal hubungan antara warga yang satu dengan warga yang lain didasarkan atas asas moral yang telah melembaga dalam diri individu. Asas dasar dalam pandangan masyarakat Bali yaitu : "Tat Twam Asi". Tat: Itu (ia), Twam : Kamu, Asi : Adalah. Jadi Tat Twam Asi artinya Saya adalah Kamu dan segala makhluk adalah sama, juga berarti menolong orang lain berarti menolong diri sendiri, dan menyakiti orang orang lain berarti menyakiti diri sendiri. Ini postulat dasar yang pada akhirnya melandasi sistem kebudayaan sebagaimana tercermin dalam pernik-pernik tradisinya. Istilah Tat Twam Asi mengandung arti keseteraan kedudukan manusia, yang terkandung di dalamnya suatu prinsip dasar kesusilaan yang selalu dikembangkan sebagai personifikasi sifat-sifat kebijaksanaan, kebajikan, keluhuran dan lain-lain sifat keutamaan yang menjadi sistem kode dalam pergaulan hidup antar sesama 182 mahluk. Secara operasional prinsip dasar Tat Twam Asi ini dalam kehidupan adat Bali di beri pengertian ke dalam asas-asas sebagai berikut : 1. Asas Suka Duka (artinya dalam suka dan duka dirasakan bersama-sama) 2. Asas Paras Paros (artinya orang lain adalah bagian dari diri sendiri dan diri sendiri adalah bagian dari orang lain). 3. Asas Sulunglung Sabayantaka (artinya baik buruk, mati hidup ditanggung bersama). 4. Asas Saling Asih, Saling Asuh, (artinya saling menyayangi/mencintai, saling memberi tahu/mengoreksi, saling membantu/tolong menolong antar sesama hidup). Jadi pada dasarnya keempat asas tersebut yang merupakan perwujudan dari prinsip dasar Tat Twam Asi ini mengajarkan kepada kita hendaklah selalu hidup ―Rukun‖ dan ―Damai‖ mengembangkan sikap ―Tenggang Rasa‖ serta setiap saat ―Mawas Diri‖. Prinsip tersebut teraplikasi dalam sistem hidup yang dianut masyarakat, dipatuhi tanpa pengawasan. Sejumlah kepustakaan di bidang hukum adat menyebut asas-asas tersebut di atas dengan sebutan asas kekeluargaan, yang maknanya bahwa satu sama lain di antara kita harus saling kasih mengasihi, saling memperhatikan dan saling tolong menolong dalam irama kerja sama yang harmonis seperti dalam kehidupan keluarga. Sebuah prinsip keseteraan, atau sering diistilahkan dengan asas kebersamaan/komunal yang berarti dalam suka dan duka dirasakan bersama mengutamakan kepentingan bersama di atas kepentingan pribadi dan mengembangkan suasana kegotong-royongan. c. Hubungan Manusia Dengan Alam 1. Alam Nyata. 183 Paham subyektif terhadap alam dari masyarakat Bali sangat jelas sekali nampak dari konsepsi "Bhuana Agung dan Bhuana Alit". Konsepsi ini didasari oleh ide dasar yaitu "ide kesatuan", dimana manusia harus melakukan penyatuan terhadap alam secara serasi, selaras dan seimbang. Dari ide kesatuan ini muncullah kesadaran identifikasi terhadap alam. Manusia secara hakiki adalah identik dengan alam. Dengan demikian manusia itu adalah alam juga. Maka jadilah alam semesta disebutnya sebagai "Bhuana Agung" (makrokosmos), dan diri manusia sendiri disebutnya sebagai "Bhuana Alit" (mikrokosmos). Penentuan kedudukan ini selanjutnya mempengaruhi cara manusia membangun relasi terhadap alam, agar suasana harmonis alam-manusia tetap terjaga. Apabila hubungan antara makrokosmos dengan mikrokosmos tidak harmonis akan menimbulkan ekses-ekses negatif terutama terasa di Bhuana Alit antara lain berupa sakit, gusar, perasaan tidak enak masyarakat tidak merasakan ketentraman dan lain-lainnya. Itulah sebabnya manusia senantiasa menjaga keharmonisan kedua kosmos itu demi kesejahteraan dan kebahagiaan lahir bathin (I Gusti Gd Ardana dkk, 1981/1982 : 56). Secara eksplisit keadaan alam (Bhuana Agung) disebut memiliki tingkat yaitu : "Alam Atas" (Swah Loka), "Alam Tengah" (Bhuah Loka) dan "Alam Bawah" (Bhur Loka). Dan masing-masing alam tersebut mempunyai sifat, Swah Loka adalah "Utama", Bhuah Loka adalah "Madya", dan Bhur Loka adalah "Nista" (Lih. Fred. B. Eiseman, 1985:1). Stratifikasi ini mengkodekan pola terbangunnya relasi antara manusia dan pihak eksternalnya. Pensifatan tersebut didasarkan pada susunan, bahwa Swah Loka adalah tempat para Dewa yang berada di atas (lebih utama) dari kehidupan manusia, Bhuah Lola adalah tempat manusia hidup, dan Bhur Loka adalah alamnya para makhluk rendahan. Adanya tingkat-tingkat kekuatan eksternal manusia, akan menentukan bagaimana manusia bertingkah laku dan menjalin hubungan dengan pihak eksternal tersebut. Sebab manusia juga berkedudukan sebagai pusat (centrum) dari semua 184 tingkatan tersebut. Model berelasi antara tingkatan alam itu memunculkan sistem kode berupa pasangan antinomis seperti: 1. Hutu-Teben, yaitu hulu adalah kepala, utama dari teben adalah hilir, nista. Di Bali konsep hulu-teben ini digunakan untuk memberi kwalitas pada arah, dan patokannya adalah Gunung dan Laut. Arah Gunung disebutnya "Keadya" (Kaja) atau utara yang merupakan hulu, dan arah laut disebut "Kelod/Kelod" atau selatan yang merupakan teben (Putra, tt : 30). 2. Pradaksina-Prasawya, yang artinya berputar ke kanan dan berputar ke kiri. Berputar ke kanan (Pradaksina) digunakan sebagai simbul upacara penyucian yang tertuju pada Swah Loka. Sedangkan berputar ke kiri (prasawya), dipakai simbul upacara peleburan atau pengembalian kepada Bhuta menuju Bhur Loka. Jadi Pradaksina nilainya utama dan prasawya nilainya nista. 3. Kiwa-Tengen, yang artinya kiri dan kanan. dalam dunia mistik Bali sering juga disebut "Pengiwa-Penengen" (de kunst van de linkerhand de kunst van de rechterhand) yang artinya ilmu kiri dan ilmu kanan. Pengiwa adalah ilmu hitam yang mengambil kekuatan dari alam Bhuta Kala, sehingga bernilai negatif (Bhur Loka) dan Penengen adalah ilmu putih yang lebih banyak untuk pengobatan (husada) yang menerima kekuatan dari alam kedewaan (Swah Loka), sehingga nilainya positif, menurut Hooykaas, (I Made Suasthawa, 1994 : 15) Hula-teben dan kiwa-tengen digunakan sebagai ukuran dalam menentukan arah, tempat, tata letak dalam adat membuat rumah, desa, tempat suci maupun dalam menempatkan seseorang dalam hubungan dengan "sor singgih" (tinggi rendahnya derajat/kedudukan seseorang). Tempat suci selalu letaknya di Utara (Kaja) atau Timur, dan dalam menyusun atau meletakkan jajar pelinggih di pura-pura, dimana pelinggih utama berada di deretan sebelah kanan. Dalam "athiti puja" (penerimaan tamu) diusahakan para tamu yang lebih terhormat men¬duduki tempat di sebelah kanan (Lih. I Made Ridjasa, 1977 : 9). Putaran ke kiri dan ke kanan dipergunakan 185 dalam rangkaian upacara "ngaben" (upacara kematian) dan "penglukatan" (upacara penyucian). Antinomi dan pemetaan baik-buruk dalam alam tersebut secara tidak lsngsung membuat demarkasi klasifikasi baik dan buruk, yang menciptakan adanya etika baik dan buruk di masyarakat. Sekaligus memandu bagaimana manusia harus bertindak dari pilihan yang baik' dan yang buruk'. Disamping keadaan dan sifat alam tersebut di atas, alam pun punya situasi tertentu, dinamika, dan gerak alam sesuai dengan hukum-hukumnva. Matahari dapat bergeser ke utara (uttarayana) dan ke selatan (daksinayana) akibat perputaran atau rotasi bumi, sebagaimana dijelaskan oleh ilmu alam. Ada musim panas, hujan, bulan dapat bersinar penuh (Purnama) dap bulan mati atau gelap (Them) ditambah pula pergeseran planet-planet dan bintang-bintang. Kesemuanya itu dapat mempengaruhi kehidupan manusia. Gerak atau perputaran Alam Semesta (Bhuana Agung) dituangkan ke dalam lukisan Swastika. Prinsip manusia sebagai centrum menyebabkan adanya sistem komunikasi hubungan antara gejala alam dan manusia. Lambang Swastika adalah hasil kreasi yang memberi inspirasi hidup yang mengakui kebesaran Ida Hyang Widhi Wasa dimana manusia beserta sekalian makhluk hidup mempunyai keserasian menyesuaikan hidupnya dengan hukum alam atau cakra pranawa (I Gusti Agung Oka, 1968 : 15). Contoh konkrit dapat kita lihat serasinya hubungan manusia dengan gerak alam adalah sistem tanda (peraturan denah) pembuatan rumah menetap umat Hindu di Bali mempunyai pola Swastika dengan gedong di Utara, Bale Dangin di Timur, Bale Dauh di Barat, yang masingmasing mempunyai bentuk ukuran dan Hama-Hama tertentu menurut asta kosali sedangkan di selatan adalah Paon (dapur). Demikian juga "Padewasan" atau "Wariga Derrasa" yang merupakan pedoman atau patokan-patokan dengan memakai perhitungan-perhitungan yang didasarkan pada baik buruknya waktu (ala ayuning dewasa). Baik buruknya waktu ini adalah bertitik tolak dari situasi-situasi atau gerak alam yang diperlihatkan oleh 186 Bhuana Agung, termasuk pula perputaran siklus waktu,hari, bulan dan seterusnya. Produk operasional dan taktis dari sistem tersebut adalah munculnya tradisi perhitungan padewasan untuk menentukan kapan saat sebaiknya kawin, membuat bangunan, menamam padi, turun ke laut dan sebagainya. Melalui pedoman ini setiap orang bertindak sesuai dengan perencanaan dan tidak semena-mena terhadap alam, sehingga terjaga keharmonisan hubungan manusia dengan alam dan tetap terjaga kelestariannya. Ketidaksemenaan ini merupakan rangkaian kode penghormatan kesamaan perlakuan dari ide dasar saya adalah kamu', dalam hal ini alam adalah kamu' yang saling pengarh mempengaruhi dengan saya sebagai centrum. Sebagai contoh dalam wariga dewasa ditentukan "ingkel" (larangan)yaitu: Ingkel Wong, adalah saat tidak baik memulainya aktifitas ritual terhadap manusia; Ingkel Sato, adalah saat yang tidak baik untuk menangkap atau menyembelih hewan; Ingkel Mina, adalah waktu yang tidak baik untuk menangkap atau mencari ikan; Ingkel Manuk, adalah saat yang dilarang untuk segala kegiatan yang berkaitan dengan unggas; Ingkel Taru, yaitu saat yang tidak bagus untuk menebang jenis pepohonan; Ingkel Kuku, adalah waktu yang tidak dibenarkan untuk menebang tanam-tanaman yang beruas. Menurut I Wayan Koti Cantika, (I Made Suasthawa, 1994 : 16) dengan mengikuti petunjuk Padewasan ini manusia tetap menjalin hubungan secara lestari kepada lingkungan alam sekitarnya yang pada akhirnya akan bermuara pada kesejahteraan dan kedamaian kehidupan manusia beserta sekalian mahluk lainnya. Dalam kaitannya dengan Padewasan, sangat tepat sekali dengan apa yang ditulis oleh IBG Agastia sbb :"...betapapun juga kita yang hidup di Bumi ini yang secara mitologis disebut sebagai salah satu "Telor Brahman" (Brahmanda) ini, tidak dapat lepas dari pengaruh Surya dan Candra (bulan) yang adalah telor-telor Brahman yang lain, tidak dapat lepas dari siang dan malam. Dan seluruh alam semesta adalah sebuah kesatuan sistem (IBG Agastia, 1988 : IV). Memang sesungguhnya demikianlah bahwa manusia akan sangat ter-gantung dari kehidupan makhluk lainnya dan alam yang mengitarinya, sehingga setiap manusia berkewajiban untuk tetap 187 menjaga keseimba¬ngan kosmis sebagaimana yang telah tertuang dalam asas hukum adat Bali khususnya. 2. Alam Tidak Nyata/Alam Gaib Dalam hubungan dengan alam gaib, masyarakat Bali mengenal istilah "Sekala Niskala" atau "nyata tidak nyata". istilah "Sekala" mempunyai arti berwujud dalam ruang dan waktu, yang dalam bahasa ilmu pengetahuan menempati ruang dan waktu. Sedangkan "Niskala" artinya hakekat yang tak bisa dikatakan, tidak bisa diucapkan, tidak bisa dinamakan, tidak bisa digambarkan dan sebagainya (Lih. Cede Pudja, 1979 :18). Kekuatan-kekuatan yang tidak nampak, makhluk-makhluk halus, "semua itu menempati alam niskala. Termasuk pula dalam pengertian niskala ini adalah para Dewa/Tuhan sebagai unsur niskala yang tingkatannya di atas manusia. Konsepsi Sekala-Niskala ini merupakan refleksi dari penghayatan dua sifat alam yang satu sama lain berbeda. Dalam masyarakat Bali populer dengan sebutan "Rwa Bineda" atau dua hal yang berbeda, yaitu Siang-malam, panas-dingin, baik-buruk, ada-tidak ada, nyata-tidak nyata, laki-perempuan, bawah-atas dan seterusnya. Sistem oposisi biner dalam aplikasi tradisi ini tetap mengkodekan baik-buruk dna pada akhirnya memandu pada bagaimana perilaku masyarakat Bali secara ideal. Bagi orang Bali perbedaan yang berpolakan "Rwa Bineda" ini tidak harus dipertentangkan melainkan diharmoniskan. Sehingga kata harmonis dapat mengandung arti: kesatuan dalam perbedaan, perbedaan dalam kesatuan, dan aktifitasnya dapat berupa (secara pokok): (i) Diserasikan: kesatuan pola, bentuk atau struktur, (ii) diselaraskan: kesatuan gerak atau proses; (iii) diseimbangkan: mengusahakan persesuaian, perimbangan diantara hal-hal yang tidak sepadan. Sekarang dapatlah diringkaskan bahwa bentuk-bentuk upacara adat agama yang merupakan kelanjutan dan penerapan Samskara atau "Sa-ngaskara" menurut Agama Hindu akan berperanan atau berfungsi dalam tiga manfaat. Pertama, untuk menghilangkan atau melenyapkan pengaruh-pengaruh negatif dari alam gaib seperti 188 roh-roh halus, yang disebut Bhuta Kala, Paisaca, dan roh-roh jahat lainnya. Kedua, untuk menarik atau meminta agar pengaruh-pengaruh yang baik yang berasal dari Tuhan dan para Dewa datang meraga sukma ke dalam tubuh permohonnya. Ketiga, untuk menunjukkan rasa terima kasih kepada-Nya atas segala rahmat yang telah dianugrahkan (Lih. Jugs Gede Pudja, 1977 : 40-43). "Tetabuhan" adalah taburan zat cair yang dapat berupa: tuak, arak, berem, air dan darah. (Lih. juga Proyek Bantuan Kegiatan Keagamaan/Transmigran Dan Pura Luar Bali, 1975 : 12-13). Tetabuhan berupa darah diambil dari binatang korban seperti ayam, itik, angsa, babi, anjing, kambing, sapi, kerbau dan lainnya yang disesuaikan menurut jenis serta jenjang caru yang dipergunakan dalam upacara. Tetabuhan mempunyai makna usaha atau tindakan menyeimbangkan gerak makrokosmos dengan gerak mikrokosmos. Unsur-unsur zat cair seperti air tuak, arak, berem adalah zat-zat cair yang terdapat di Bhuana Agung. Darah adalah zat cair yang terdapat di tubuh binatang dan manusia. Sehingga manusia tidak menaburkan darahnya sendiri untuk korban atau yadnya, akan tetapi dapat mewakilinya kepada darah binatang. Pemilihan simbol darah, air tuak, arak dan seterusnya tidak dilakukan secara arbriter, acak melainkan memiliki karakter dan pertimbangan komunikatif (tradisi) dengan ide-ide dasar sistem kosmogoni orang Bali. Dengan demikian menyembelih hewan/binatang dalam upacara Bhuta Yadnya/Mecaru merupakan operasionaliutas semiotika dari tindakan simbolis penundukan dan penguasaan kepada kecenderungan-kecenderungan nafsu hewan yang terdapat dalam diri manusia (Ketut Ginarsa, 1979:19). Untuk pelaksanaan taburan darah (tabuh rah), yang secara simbolis berarti mencari persesuaian unsur antara Bhuana Agung dengan Bhuana Alit. Pemilihan sistem simbol itu berhubungan dengan stratifikasi alam-manusia, seperti penentuan simbol darah merupakan unsur yang dominan dalam diri manusia dan air adalah unsur yang dominan di bumi (Bhuana Agung) dan taburan darah merupakan simbul penyesuaian untuk mencapai keharmonisan (Lih. Ida Bagus Putu Purwita, 1978:18). Sebagai pengganti manusia, 189 ini disimboliskan melalui "Sengkwi wong-wongan" yaitu daun kelapa yang dianyam sebagai gambar kerangka manusia, yang dipergunakan sebagai alas dari banten caru itu. Di atas sengkwi inilah ditaruh banten caru dengan binatang yang dijadikan korban. Sistem kode itu tidak berdiri mandiri, binatang yang dijadikan korban misalnya, memiliki sistem tanda yang lebih konkrit (kriteria) seperti: binatang piaraan, karena binatang piaraan sudah menjadi anggota keluarga manusia. Penggunaan binatang yang bukan piaraan adalah tanda bukti kesungguhan manusia untuk mempersembahkan korban. Binatang tersebut diusahakan yang masih mudamuda dalam arti belum beranak atau belum bertelur (Puts, Et : 52-53). Ada unsur Banten yang disebut "Gayah" pada pelaksanaan caru, yaitu yang terdiri dari daging hewan dan tumbuh-tumbuhan, serta dipasang terpancang pada alas dari buah kelapa atau kepala hewan yang disembelih, lalu di atasnya dikerubuni dengan "jejaringan' (selaput tipis dari perut hewan). Daging-daging hewan ini ditusuk seperti sate yang berbentuk bagai senjata Dewa Nawasanga, yaitu senjata Dewa-dewa yang ada pada perjuru mata angin. Gayah inilah menurut Ketut Ginarsa merupakan lambang (simbolis), yang mempunyai makna untuk menyelaraskan hubungan antara kekuatan suci Bhuana Agung dengan kekuatan suci Bhuana Alit sehingga tercapai hakekat keseimbangan (Ketut Ginarsa, 1979:20). Detail ritual ini tidak arbriter tetapi merujuk pada sistem kode tertentu yang dianut masyarakat Bali dari sistem kode yang lebih besar. Yaitu suatu kode keseimbangan Bhuana Agung dengan Bhuana Alit, yang terverifikasi (akan nyata) melalui ucapan/Mantram sewaktu menuangkan tetabuhan yaitu: > Om ebek Segara, ebek Danu, ebek Banyu Pramanah ing ngulun.>Artinya: Ya Tuhan, penuh Lautan, penuh Danau, penuh pula ukuran air dalam diri hamba. Keyakinan masyarakat Bali terhadap alam niskala demikian kuatnya, terbukti dengan adanya tradisi "metenung", yaitu minta petunjuk dan mencari tahu dari kekuatan gaib alam niskala. 190 Ada beberapa jenis metenung :pertama, Mepewacakan, adalah metenung untuk bayi setelah berumur 42 hari. Kedua Nyanjan, adalah metenung untuk memilih dan menentukan seseorang untuk menjadi atau memegang jabatan tertentu seperti, Pemangku Kelihan/Kelian dan lain-lain. (catatan : dalam memilih Kelian atau Pemangku di Bali dikenal beberapa cara yaitu : nyanjan (metenung) nyerod (keturunan), nyane (melempar dengan cane, siapa yang kena ia dipilih), milih (dipilih). Ketiga, Nyemega, adalah metenung yang dipergunakan untuk upacan Ngaben. Keempat, Nunas Taos, adalah metenung dalam peristiwa-peristiwa seperti sakit kehilangan dan sebagainya. d. Hubungan Manusia Dengan Mahluk Gaib Dalam pandangan adat Bali hubungan manusia dengan Sang Pencipta dikonsepsikan sebagai "Kaula" (yang dikuasai) dan "Gusti‖ (Yang Menguasai). Hubungan kaula dan Gusti ini melahirkan paham "Tuhan sebagai Sang Sangkan Paraning Dumadi" atau Tuhan sebagai asal dan tujuan, hidup manusia. Menyadari dirinya sebagai hamba atau yang dikuasai, pada akhirnya kesadaran seperti ini, mewujudkan Asas Berbhakti atau Bhakti atau dapat pula dikatakan asas bhakti ini merupakan cerminan dari perasaan dalam diri yang menyadari sepenuhnya bahwa dirinya hanya sebagai suatu kecil saja yang ikut terbawa oleh proses peredaran alam semesta yang maha besar sebagai hasil ciptaan Yang Maha Kuasa. Asas bhakti menumbuhkan loyalitas untuk mengabdi. Sesuai dengan keyakinan masyarakat Bali, bahwa rasa bhakti diwujudkan dalam bentuk Yadnya atau persembahan yang ditujukan kepada Sang Hyang Widhi ((I Made Suasthawa, 1994 : 9). Hampir setiap kegiatan terlebih-lebih dalam pelaksanaan adat didahului atau disertai upacara agama, sebagai manifestasi rasa keagamaan dan tanda ingat selalu pada Ida Sang Hyang Widhi. Demikianlah seorang penari tidak lupa mohon pasupati, seorang petani tak lupa membuat pengaci sebelum dan sesudah menanam padi, pedagang di pasar selalu menghaturkan canangsari di pura Melanting sewaktu 191 berdagang. Demikian juga adat memakai Cane (yaitu, suatu sesajen selaku sarana keagamaan yang digunakan dalam suatu rapat atau sangkepan) yang bermakna mohon restu dan sukses jalannya rapat yang ditujukan kepada Tuhan dalam manifestasinya sebagai "Bhagawan Panyarikan". Semua itu adalah sistem kode tentang relasi manusia dan superbeing yang menjadi modus keselamatan kolektif dari kuasa adimanusia (survival transendent). Dan diekspresi melalui sistem yang lebih operasional dalam hubungan manusia dengan benda-benda di sekitarnya. Pada Buku Pemda Tk. I Bali dijelaskan bahwa suatu pekerjaan yang bermakna "pembangunan" seper¬ti pembuatan rumah, jalan, candi pemerajan dan sebagainya sudah selesai maka akan diikuti dengan rangkaian upacara adat agama "diplaspas" dan "diurip" (disucikan dan dihidupkan). Setiap bangunan dan juga barang-barang berharga lainnya seperti mobil, motor, dan sebagainya dianggap sebagai suatu mahluk yang hidup. Dengan kata lain benda-benda tersebut di atas agar supaya memiliki kekuatan untuk menjaga keselamatan dan ketentraman rohani pemiliknya, maka perlu diberi kekuatan, energi (prana). Kekuatan atau prana ini iahir dari persatuan antara Atman dengan Badan (pada manusia) atau antara Paramatman dengan Dunia (pada alam semesta). Dengan upacara diplaspas dan diurip dimaksudkan sebagai suatu upacara untuk memohon prana kehadapan Tuhan sebagai Paramatman, sehingga barang-barang dan benda-benda yang diplaspas maka secara religius akan dianggap hidup secara rohaniah religius pula (I Made Suasthawa, 1994 : 11). Makna simbolisasi dari upacara tersebut dapat diamati melalui lambanglambang yang terdapat dalam banten atau sajen. Sebagai contoh dapat dilihat dari susunan tanda dan simbol yang dipakai dalam rangkaian banten pengurip-urip untuk bangunan rumah misalnya :-gambar "Acintya" pada "ulap-ulap" (yaitu secarik kain putih yang digantungkan pada kolong atap rumah) adalah melambangkan Tuhan telah memberi kekuatan prana. Gambar Acintya adalah lambang "Atmaraksa" (jiwa telah menyatu). Gambar bunga padma (teratai) adalah lambang kesucian. Bentuk bunga 192 temu yang terdapat pada "orti" (yaitu bunga-bungaan yang terbuat dari daun lontar) melambangkan bertemunya bangunan itu dengan kekuatan hidup (prang). Sistem tersebut merupakan penegasan tanda bahwa bangunan itu telah mendapat restu dari Ida Sang Hyang Widhi, maka pada tiang atau tembok akan digoreskan darah ayam (warna merah), arang (warna hitam) dan kapur (warna putih) yang masing-masing melambangkan Dewa Brahma, Dewa Wisnu dan Dewa Siwa, yang merupakan manifestasi Tuhan sebagai Pencipta, Pemelihara dan Pengembali ke asal. e. Penutup Dalam menentukan status (kedudukan) seseorang dalam masyarakat adat Bali, juga diukur dari adanya upacara yang tertuju pada Tuhan, misalnya upacara "mewinten" (yaitu upacara penyucian Pemangku, Dalang, Tukang Banten dan sebagainya), "pawiwahan" (upacara perkawinan), Ngraja Singa dan Ngraja sewala (upacara bagi laki-laki dan wanita yang telah menginjak dewasa). Melalui upacara keagamaan seperti ini, maka oleh masyarakat Bali diakui syah menurut adat (hukum adat). Dan ini akan dipakai landasan untuk menetapkan tugas dan kewajiban termasuk pula leluputannya (perkecualiannya) dalam bermasyarakat (misalnya "mebanjar dan medesa") yang diwujudkan lewat tingkat ayahannya (beban kewajibannya kepada Desa). Proses upacaranya, perbuatan-perbuatan sebagaimana tersebut di depan supaya dapat pengakuan lewat hukum adat dan hukum agama, harus memenuhi persyaratan Tri Upasaksi (tiga kesaksian) yaitu: Bhuta Saksi, bersaksi pada para "Bhutakala" yang dilambangkan dengan banten yang diletakkan dibawah. Manusa Saksi, bersaksi masyarakat dimana kepala adat dan pemerin¬tah sebagai wakilnya. Dewa Saksi, bersaksi Tuhan yang dilambangkan dengan sajen yang diaturkan ke Surya dan Mrajan. Menurut I Gusti Ketut Kaler (I Made Suasthawa, 1994 : 11), mengatakan bahwa Pelaksanaan Tri Upasaksi dalam upacara pewiwahan walaupun sajen¬nya 193 mungkin sangat minim misalnya : sekedar "biokaon angiu" (sajen untuk Bhuta Saksi) wakil Bhur Loka (alam bawah), disaksikan oleh Prajuru Desa (manusa Saksi), wakil Bhuah Loka (alam Tengah/manusia), sekedar sebuah Pras Daksina'Suci di Surya dan Mrajan (Dewa Saksi), wakil Swah Loka (alam atas, alam Dewa-Dewi/Tuhan).Tentu raja Sajen Ayaban Sesayut selaku tanda "Panunggalan pribadi yang bersangkutan" merupakan tambahan yang perlu diadakan. Masyarakat bali menunjukkan sebuah penerapan sistem simbol yang sangat operasional dan living sebagai pengatur kelangsungan hidup kelompok. 194 DAFTAR PUSTAKA I Made Suasthawa Dharmayudha dan I Wayan Koti Cantika. 1994. Filsafat Adat Bali; Upada Sastra. Bali I Gusti Ketut Keler. 1983. Butir-butir Tercecer Tentang Adat Bali; Bali Agung. Denpasar-Bali.

HYPOTHESIS ANDTHEORY ARTICLE published: 02 January 2012 doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00393 Music, neuroscience, and the psychology of well-being: a précis Adam M. Croom1,2* 1 Positive Psychology Center, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA 2 Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA Edited by: Dan Lloyd, Trinity College, USA Reviewed by: Andrea Eugenio Cavanna, Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust, UK Douglas Bruce Johnson, Music Conservatory of Westchester, USA *Correspondence: Adam M. Croom, Positive Psychology Center and Department of Psychology, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA. e-mail: [email protected] In Flourish, the positive psychologist Seligman (2011) identifies five commonly recognized factors that are characteristic of human flourishing or well-being: (1) "positive emotion," (2) "relationships," (3) "engagement," (4) "achievement," and (5) "meaning" (p. 24). Although there is no settled set of necessary and sufficient conditions neatly circumscribing the bounds of human flourishing (Seligman, 2011), we would mostly likely consider a person that possessed high levels of these five factors as paradigmatic or prototypical of human flourishing. Accordingly, if we wanted to go about the practical task of actually increasing our level of well-being, we ought to do so by focusing on practically increasing the levels of the five factors that are characteristic of well-being. If, for instance, an activity such as musical engagement can be shown to positively influence each or all of these five factors, this would be compelling evidence that an activity such as musical engagement can positively contribute to one's living a flourishing life. I am of the belief that psychological research can and should be used, not only to identify and diagnose maladaptive psychological states, but identify and promote adaptive psychological states as well. In this article I advance the hypothesis and provide supporting evidence for the claim that musical engagement can positively contribute to one's living a flourishing life. Since there has not yet been a substantive and up-to-date investigation of the possible role of music in contributing to one's living a flourishing life, the purpose of this article is to conduct this investigation, thereby bridging the gap and stimulating discussion between the psychology of music and the psychology of well-being. Keywords: music, neuroscience, well-being, positive emotions, relationships, flow, achievement, meaning INTRODUCTION In Flourish, the positive psychologist Seligman (2011) identifies five commonly recognized factors that are characteristic of human flourishing or well-being: (1) "positive emotion," (2) "relationships," (3) "engagement," (4) "achievement," and (5) "meaning" (p. 24). Although there is no settled set of necessary and sufficient conditions neatly circumscribing the bounds of human flourishing (Seligman, 2011), we would mostly likely consider a person that possessed high levels of these five factors as paradigmatic or prototypical of human flourishing. Accordingly, if we wanted to go about the practical task of actually increasing our level of wellbeing, we ought to do so by focusing on practically increasing the levels of the five factors that are characteristic of well-being. If, for instance, an activity such as musical engagement can be shown to positively influence each or all of these five factors, this would be compelling evidence that an activity such as musical engagement can positively contribute to one's living a flourishing life. I am of the belief that psychological research can and should be used not only to identify and diagnose maladaptive psychological states, but also to identify and promote adaptive psychological states as well. In this article I advance the hypothesis and provide supporting evidence for the claim that musical engagement can positively contribute to one's living a flourishing life. Since there has not yet been a substantive and up-to-date investigation of the possible role of music in contributing to one's living a flourishing life, the purpose of this article is to conduct this original investigation, thereby bridging the gap and stimulating discussion between the psychology of music and the psychology of well-being. First of all, what is music and what counts as musical activity? As easy as it is to recognize instances of music and musical activity when one encounters them in practical situations – for instance, when one perceives another person using an instrument to create a structured auditory stimulus that incorporates a combination of pitch, melody, and rhythm (Zatorre et al., 2007, p. 549), as when a friend plays a piece on the piano for you – there has in fact been much debate among scholars about how to precisely define these terms (for example, see the discussion in Cross, 2001). In fact, several scholars have argued against the appropriateness and very plausibility of there being precise and agreed upon definitions for concepts like music and art, articulated in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, and have instead sought to understand these concepts in terms of relations that Wittgenstein called "family resemblances" (Wittgenstein, 1953; Sect. 67). In an influential article published in Cognitive Psychology, Rosch and Mervis (1975) characterized a "family resemblance relationship" as one in which, for every item subsumed under some category X, "each item has at www.frontiersin.org January 2012 | Volume 2 | Article 393 | 1 Croom Music, neuroscience, and the psychology of well-being least one, and probably several, elements in common with one or more other items,but no,or few,elements are common to all items" (p. 575; for an application of the family resemblance approach to concepts of natural language see Croom, 2011a; especially pp. 355–357). For instance, in an influential article published in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Weitz (1956) argued that the "attempt to discover the necessary and sufficient properties of art [or music] is logically misbegotten," and that the "contention that "art" [or "music"] is amenable to real or any kind of true definition is false" because art or music "has no set of necessary and sufficient properties"(p. 28; for discussion see also Kaufman, 2007; Tilghman, 2008; Irwin, 2011). So on this kind of view, there is no feature x such that possession of x is necessary and sufficient for some event y to be categorized as a musical one. Instead, this view suggests that for each of the various events that we categorize as musical, we will more realistically find "a complicated network of similarities [among them that are] overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail" (Wittgenstein, 1953, Sect. 66). It is not my purpose in the present article to put a dog into this fight. This topic has been discussed elsewhere (Kaufman, 2007; Tilghman, 2008; Irwin, 2011) and a proper analysis and critique of these discussions should be reserved for its own occasion. Accordingly, for the purposes of the present article I will simply adopt an influential and intuitively appealing working definition of music that was proposed by the musicologist Ian Cross. As Cross suggests,"musics can be defined as those temporally patterned human activities, individual and social, that involve the production and perception of sound and have no evident and immediate efficacy or fixed consensual reference" (Cross, 2001, p. 33). As it will become clear throughout the course of this article, I will disagree about the inefficacy of music that is suggested by this definition, and so one might find it appealing to think of the features that we have so far identified in this section as features characteristic of music rather than features the possession of which are necessary and sufficient for the circumscription of music, an idea that is clearly compatible with the family resemblance conception (Wittgenstein, 1953; Rosch and Mervis, 1975; Kaufman, 2007; Tilghman, 2008; Croom, 2011a; Irwin, 2011). However, as a working definition, Cross's (2001) proposal is largely helpful and will be suitable for the purposes of the present discussion. (Importantly, one should also note that in this article certain kinds of musical activity will be associated with certain effects, and often these details will be evident in the context of discussion; however, more specific details about particular musical activities and their effects can always be found in the corresponding studies cited). Now, it has long been speculated that musical activity might be good for the mind, body, or community at large (for instance, see Needham et al., 1962), but it has not been until recently that serious empirical work has been done on the behavioral, physiological, and psychological effects of human musical engagement. The recent increase in neuroscientific and psychological studies on human musical behavior are well motivated, for music is an intimate part of the human form of life and psyche. For instance, it has been well argued that music is a universal and crossculturally present feature shared by all humans (Darwin, 1871, p. 878) and is persistent throughout hominid evolutionary history (Merriam, 1964; Blacking, 1995; Trevarthen, 1999; Cross, 2001; Levitin, 2006; Molnar-Szakacs and Overy, 2006; Brandt, 2008). Like linguistic competence, musical competence is unconsciously and automatically acquired upon exposure and develops along a standard biological timetable (Miller, 2000, p. 335), with a sensitive period (after which musical skill is substantially more difficult to acquire) occurring around 7 years of age (Habib and Besson, 2009, p. 279; see also Elbert et al., 1995; Schlaug et al., 1995; Watanabe et al., 2007). Structural features of music, such as pitch interval and pitch contour, are automatically encoded by all individuals (Trainor et al., 2002), which suggests that the functional architecture of the human brain has been adapted to process such musical stimuli (Peretz et al., 2001) and that human life has presumably found an intimate partner in musical activity for quite some time. In fact, musical instruments over 35,000 years old have been found (Conard et al., 2009), suggesting that the human preoccupation with music has been an enduring one, and that"music was an integral part of human life far earlier than first thought" (Miller, 2009, p. 19). Given the fact that human life finds an intimate partner in musical activity and has done so throughout our evolutionary history, one is naturally left wondering what musical activity might have to offer and how one might potentially benefit from it. Might musical activity do one some good, and possibly even facilitate a life of well-being? And if so, by what means can musical activity accomplish this? In order to understand how music interacts with human sensitivities and influences human responses, it is helpful if we first discuss several features of our human constitution and evolution first. Now, thanks to our evolutionary history,we have been handed down many interesting and important biologically functional features (e.g., see Cosmides and Tooby, 1994; Cosmides and Tooby, 2000), only a few of which I will be able to discuss here for the purposes of this article. First, given the practical importance of being able to predict and anticipate future events (for instance, approaching food sources, predators, or mating prospects), it is not surprising that we find such future-oriented capacities among the functional capacities that our evolutionary history has handed down to us. Over 500 million years of naturally selective forces has favored the development of perceptual and cognitive systems with the capacity to predict and anticipate what is likely to occur, better enabling individuals to avoid dangers and capitalize on opportunities. Thus, it has been well argued by scholars that the biologically adaptive function of expectation is to prepare the organism for "appropriate action and perception" with regard to future objects and events (Huron, 2006, p. 3), which is an undeniably crucial capacity for successful survival and reproduction. Since the world is a dangerous place and it is safer for us to react to hundreds of false alarms than to neglect a single genuinely life-threatening event, nature has endowed us with perceptual and cognitive equipment that is sensitive to perceptual stimuli and susceptible to deviant or over-reaction, which musicians and "Composers can [exploit by] fashion[ing] passages [of patterned or structured auditory stimuli] that manage to provoke remarkably strong emotions using the most innocuous stimuli imaginable" (Huron, 2006, p. 6). In fact, it has been well argued that, "Since accurate predictions are of real benefit to an organism, it would be reasonable for psychological rewards and punishments to arise in response solely to the accuracy Frontiers in Psychology | Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology January 2012 | Volume 2 | Article 393 | 2 Croom Music, neuroscience, and the psychology of well-being of the expectation" (Huron, 2006, p. 12, original italics). In other words, even though what we expect in music is typically of no practical harm to us, the fact that we expect in music still enables us to reap the experiential "rewards and punishments that arise in response solely to the accuracy of the expectation" we experience when we're actively listening to something as "innocuous" as music itself. In addition to our capacity for anticipation and expectation, another functional feature that evolution has endowed us with is concerned with energy regulation. All biological organisms consume and require energy for the general maintenance of life, as energy is required for nervous, muscular, and metabolic functioning. Since one's energy must be generated from the food one consumes, and since the foraging for food and hunting of food is risky and time-consuming, organisms in general and humans in particular place a high premium on expending their energy efficiently. The importance of energy conservation is evidenced by the fact that brains and bodies drift toward low arousal states when action and thought are not required or when one's environment is static and unchallenging (Huron, 2006). Our body, including our brain, conserves energy by declining toward lower states of arousal when ecological conditions do not solicit our activity. Likewise, our bodies, including our brains, incline toward higher states of arousal when ecological conditions do solicit our activity (Huron, 2006). The purpose of the aforementioned biological features (of expectation and energy conservation) is to prepare our bodies, including our brains, to appropriately interact with upcoming events while at the same time attempting to do so as economically as possible in terms of energy expenditure (Huron, 2006). It is important to note that our level of arousal and attention does not simply incline and decline in accord with the occurrent demands of our ecological context or practical situation, but also with anticipated demands. And as one's various arousal states adjust in accord with one's changing expectations (which themselves adjust in accord with changing ecological conditions), the use of structured auditory stimuli to manipulate one's expectations could also thereby manipulate one's level of arousal and phenomenological experiences as well. It is also important to note that different autonomic, physiological, and psychological responses are often solicited at different times and for different durations during emotional and anticipatory episodes. For instance, responses have often been characterizes as being of two types: (1) short-lived but immediate reaction responses, and (2) more contextually nuanced but slower appraisal responses (Huron, 2006). These two types of responses have been investigated by researchers and are typically distinguished in the following way. First, there are (1) reaction responses, which are usually composed of immediate reactions and learned schemas (Huron, 2006, p. 14), that are fast (e.g., usually reaction responses are solicited within 150 ms of stimulus presentation), non-conscious, and typically "defensive or protective in function" (Huron, 2006, p. 13). Affective arousal, for instance, has been shown to occur at an early stage of perceptual processing, often before one is even consciously aware of the perceptual stimulus (Zajonc, 1980; Bayens et al., 1990; Murphy and Zajonc, 1993; Esteves et al., 1994; Lang, 1995; Fox, 1996; Bargh, 1997). Interestingly, the presentation of a stimulus that is below the threshold level of one's conscious awareness can even influence one's affective ratings of other stimuli and can induce in one various novel physiological responses (Frijda, 1999). Secondly, there are (2) appraisal responses, which are characterized as being slower than reaction responses (e.g., usually appraisal responses are solicited after 150 ms of stimulus presentation) and conscious, taking into consideration environmental, social, and other contextual factors (Huron, 2006). The more cognitive factors influencing emotional arousal range from prior conditioning operating over simple associations, confirmation or disconfirmation of what is familiar (Zajonc, 1980) or expected (Meyer et al., 1991), and various degrees of arousal afforded by memory. Cognitive factors influencing emotional arousal also involve the use of schemas, complex pattern comparisons, or other inferential processes (Landman, 1993; Gilovich and Medvec, 1995). Cognitive factors also play a major role in the elicitation of emotion because emotions are typically aroused by events that are appraised as relevant to one's tasks and concerns. In fact, it has been argued that determining which emotion is aroused by an event is largely dependent upon cognitive factors, since one's emotional reactions are largely dependent upon what one expects,personal assessments of causal agency and controllability, appraisals of task challenges and possible task-relevant actions,and so on (Lazarus,1991; Frijda, 1999). Since goals and values differ among individuals, the relative emotional significance of an event will differ among individuals as well (Lutz, 1988; Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Mesquita et al., 1997; Frijda, 1999). Thus, emotional experiences include primary appraisals of an object as being of positive or negative affective valence – that is, as good or bad, pleasant or unpleasant (Lazarus, 1991) – as well as higher order cognitive appraisals of why the object was evaluated as it was (James, 1884, 1890, 1894; Lange, 1922). Reaction responses and appraisal responses are independent and need not (and often are not) consistent with one another (Huron, 2006), and the different combination of factors that mix into the cup of our emotional lives can make our emotional experiences quite variable and complex (Leventhal and Scherer, 1987), involving both lower and higher level processes. As Huron nicely puts it in Sweet Anticipation: Music and the Psychology of Expectation, different variations in our emotional responses evoke in us various feeling states, which "combine [in us] to create a distinctive limbic cocktail" (Huron, 2006, p. 18). Huron explains that "the emotions accompanying expectations are intended to reinforce accurate prediction, promote appropriate event-readiness, and increase the likelihood of future positive outcomes," and that "music making taps into these primordial functions [of emotion] to produce a wealth of compelling emotional experiences. In this way, musicians are able to create a number of pleasurable emotional experiences, including surprise, awe, "chills," comfort, and even laughter" (Huron, 2006, p. 4). Fiske (1996), summarizing an account of auditory expectation proposed by Meyer (1956, 1973), explains the relationship between auditory expectation and emotional arousal in the following way: During the course of a musical work listeners create on-going expectations about what particular tonal-rhythmic events are likely to occur "next" in the piece. The expected next-event is based upon the culmination of events that have occurred www.frontiersin.org January 2012 | Volume 2 | Article 393 | 3 Croom Music, neuroscience, and the psychology of well-being in the piece so far. If this expected event is delayed or fails to occur at all, then emotional arousal will be stronger than it would be if the event had occurred as predicted [. . .] For a piece to be meaningful, the composer must tread a thin line between absolute predictability of musical events and the fulfillment of predictability versus absolute unpredictability through the frustration, inhibition, and avoidance of expected events. (p. 19, 107) To mention just a few examples, Huron points out that, "tragedy can be evoked by using predominantly minor chords played within rich sonorities in the bass register. Suspense can be evoked using a diminished seventh chord with rapid tremolo. Surprise can be evoked by introducing a loud chromatic chord on a weak beat" (Huron, 2006, p. 2). In order to account for how music and expectation interact to produce rich emotional experiences in music listeners universally, Narmour (1991) proposed that there are innate principles of auditory expectation that are universal and largely fixed in human psychology, presumably due to the fact that we have come preequipped with them as a result of our evolutionary constitution. Follow-up studies conducted by Schellenberg (1996) provided empirical support for Narmour's proposal, as well as confirming other data concerning the formation of expectations in music (Carlsen, 1981; Unyk and Carlsen, 1987). Some of the innate principles of auditory expectation that have been highlighted in the literature include, for instance, continuity of intervals, large tonal changes followed by a resolution toward an original tone, grouping by symmetry, similarity, and proximity, and others (see also Kubovy, 1999). These innate and universally present principles of auditory expectation form a bottom-up system that interacts with a top-down system of auditory expectation, which has instead been developed as a result of culturally acquired musical experience. For instance, top-down schemas include "practiced motor skills (such as brushing your teeth) or perceptual norms (such as watching traffic flows) [. . .] social norms (such as polite greeting rituals) or cultural norms (such as framing an object so that it is recognized as "art")," and insofar as a "schema is well entrenched in a mind, it becomes possible to provoke reaction responses by violating the schematic expectation" (Huron, 2006, p. 14). Different combinations of delay, violation, and satisfaction of one's auditory expectations cause arousal and tension in the listener, and the resolution of this tension can afford the listener pleasure (Rozin, 1999). By manipulating a listener's uncertainty of what will be heard and when they will hear it, musicians are able to produce different emotional responses in listeners, including positive emotional states (Huron, 2006). For instance, if an upcoming stimulus accords with our expectation of it we typically experience an emotion of positive valence, whereas if an upcoming stimulus does not accord with our expectation of it we typically experience an emotion of negative valence (Mandler, 1975; Huron, 2006). This psychological principle is typically regarded as the primary affect (Olson et al., 1996). Even when an upcoming stimulus is negative, people tend to experience a positive emotional response when their expectation of the negative stimulus is satisfied; as Huron nicely puts the point, "It is as though brains know not to shoot the messenger: accurate expectations are to be valued (and rewarded) even when the news is not good" (Huron, 2006, p. 13). Again, this psychological principle seems to underwrite an appropriate biological function. Since what will happen to us in the near and far future is of the utmost importance to us, and since we generally respond better to events that we are physically and cognitively prepared for than to those that we are not, the capacity to anticipate changes in upcoming events provides us with the opportunity to reorient and prepare ourselves to appropriately engage with potential events and situations. It should also be noted, before moving on, that the pleasure we experience from apt violations of expectation, along with their resolution, is not a pleasure peculiar to music alone, but is found in other forms of pleasurable entertainment as well, such as comedy. For instance, several theories of pleasure in humor (see, e.g., Suls, 1972, 1977; Apter, 1982; Wyer and Collins, 1992) are similar to theories of pleasure in music (see, e.g., Kubovy, 1999, p. 146). Now that we have a preliminary understanding of how music can interact with human sensitivities and influence human responses, we will next turn our discussion to the question of how musical activity can positively influence each of the five factors that have been identified as characteristic of well-being. First, we will discuss recent findings from neuroscience that demonstrate how music can influence our emotions and lead us to positive emotional states. MUSIC AND POSITIVE EMOTION Recently, neuroscientists have been attempting to get clear on exactly which biological components are involved in musical pleasure and what role each of these components play. In a study published in Nature Neuroscience, Salimpoor et al. (2011) used a combination of techniques to investigate the biological mechanisms involved in musical pleasure. They were interested in investigating how "Music, an abstract stimulus, can arouse feelings of euphoria and craving, similar to tangible rewards that involve the striatal dopaminergic system" (Salimpoor et al., 2011, p. 257). In particular, they used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and found that intense pleasure in response to music can lead to dopamine release in the striatal system. Further, they found that the anticipation of an abstract reward can result in dopamine release in an anatomical area distinct from the area implicated during experiences of peak emotional responses to music, namely, that the caudate was more involved during states of anticipation and the nucleus accumbens was more involved during the experience of peak emotional pleasure. So recent work in neuroscience has helpfully advanced our knowledge of which biological components are implicated during the pleasure we experience when listening to and anticipating music. It has also been shown, in a study published in Brain by Sarkamo et al. (2008), that "music listening activates a wide-spread bilateral network of brain regions related to attention, semantic processing, memory, motor functions, and emotional processing," that "Music exposure also enhances emotional and cognitive functioning in healthy subjects and in various clinical patient groups," and that their "findings demonstrate for the first time that music listening during the early post-stroke stage can enhance cognitive recovery and prevent negative mood" (p. 866). In yet another article entitled, "Music enhances the effect of positive emotional Frontiers in Psychology | Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology January 2012 | Volume 2 | Article 393 | 4 Croom Music, neuroscience, and the psychology of well-being states on salivary IgA," published in Stress Medicine, McCraty et al. (1996) demonstrated that "music affects autonomic function and [. . .] can be designed to enhance the beneficial effects of positive emotional states" (p. 173). They also proposed that, "music and emotional self-management may have significant health benefits in a variety of clinical situations in which there is immunosuppression and autonomic imbalance" (p. 167). An article published in Heart by Trappe (2010) also suggests that, "Music may not only improve quality of life but may also effect changes in heart rate and heart rate variability" (p. 1868). In that article Trappe (2010) further proposes that, "a proposed regimen of listening to music while resting in bed after open-heart surgery is important in clinical use" (p. 1868). In short, there is a growing body of work being published in neuroscience and medical journals arguing for the use of music to facilitate patient's recovery, health, and well-being, and my proposal is that music can be used to facilitate the well-being of normal individuals also. The finding that musical engagement can lead to intensely pleasurable experiences in music listeners, and that these intensely pleasurable responses to music can lead to dopamine release in the striatal system (Salimpoor et al., 2011), is a useful finding, especially since it has been reported that individuals with high positive emotion experience less heart disease, are approximately 18% less likely to die of any cause (Seligman, 2011, p. 192), and develop fewer colds than people with average positive emotion and low positive emotion. Due to a difference in the presence of interleukin-6, a protein that causes inflammation, Seligman reports finding that, "The higher the positive emotion (PES), the lower the interleukin-6 (IL-6), and so the less the inflammation [. . . and that] Sheldon replicated this study with flu virus as well as cold virus, with the same results: positive emotional style is the driving factor" (Seligman, 2011, p. 200). Seligman further reports that, "More fibrinogen leads to more blood clots in the circulatory system [. . .] People with high positive emotions show less of a fibrinogen response to stress than those with low positive emotion" (Seligman, 2011, p. 207). So musical engagement might be implemented as a means of achieving positive physiological states such as these through its influence on our positive emotions. In fact, music has been one of our oldest forms of stress reduction (Lehrer and Wookfolk, 1993, p. 9) and Avant et al. (1990–1991) report that musical engagement was shown to be more effective than, for example, progressive muscle relaxation and focused imagery in relieving stress. Music has been used to facilitate psychological well-being among the elderly (Laukka, 2007), and as one woman suffering with chronic illness reported, "I have this sensation of my body being a set of electrical circuits and the energy in the music passes right through my body and it feels like a cleansing or an undoing of kinks" (quoted from a woman going by the name "Celia," in Nicol, 2010, p. 356). Consistent with first person reports such as these, Krueger (2011) has rightly suggested that music is often a tool that can be used to "enact micro-practices" that can influence an individual's regulatory functions, such as their emotions (p. 2; see also Trevarthen, 1999; Juslin and Sloboda, 2001; Molnar-Szakacs and Overy, 2006, p. 239). Moreover, there is now much empirical data collected showing that music can enhance the physiological states and emotional well-being of neonates while they are in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (DeNora, 2000, p. 81; Standley, 2001, p. 213; Krueger, 2011, p. 9). Some of the positive benefits reported include facilitating various kind of "physiological and micro-behavioral stability" (Krueger, 2011, p. 9), including the stabilization and regularization of heart rate, blood pressure, and sleep cycles (DeNora, 2000, p. 81), while also reducing stress and calming infants, facilitating neurological and social development, and increasing the oxygen saturation levels of infants and reducing the time of their hospital stays (Standley, 2001, p. 213). In fact, the positive benefits of music can be extended to infants before they are even born. For instance, from as early as the 24th week of an unborn infant's life, their perceptual world is embedded within the sound of their mother's heartbeat (Hicks, 1992, p. 31). The child is not grown in an acoustic vacuum, but rather in an environment textured by the regularly occurring beats of the mother's heart and the melodic contours of her physiological states. These temporally regularized acoustic textures provide security to the infant as their regularity affords an environment in which the infant's expectations can be repeatedly satisfied and secured (Krueger, 2011, p. 13). It is unsurprising, then, that "one of the most stressful changes that occurs during the transition from intrauterine to extrauterine life is the loss of rhythm that the fetus has become accustomed to through months of being exposed to maternal movements, breathing, and heartbeat" (Collins and Kuck, 1991, p. 24). Research has suggested that an infant's transition from intrauterine to extrauterine life, and as a result, their transition from a more rhythmic to a more chaotic acoustic environment, "has the unwelcome effect of disrupting the infant's basic life processes [. . . and] adversely affects neonatal biorhythms which, in turn, affect sleep regulation and state lability" (Krueger, 2011, pp. 8–9; see also Kaminski and Hall, 1996, p. 46). In short, babies have good reason to be kicking and screaming as they enter the new world; for the new world is acoustically unstable, unpredictable, and in a constant state of unharmonious disequilibrium (Krueger, 2011, pp. 8–9). The physiological, neurological, and emotional benefits of musical engagement are not restricted to neonates and infants, but extend to many others also (Koelsch, 2010). For instance, in a study published in Cerebral Cortex, Hutchinson et al. (2003) found that the brains of male musicians with piano experience showed significantly greater absolute and relative cerebellar volume compared to the brains of male non-musicians, and Gaser and Schlaug (2003) found in a study published in The Journal of Neuroscience that the brains of musicians showed a greater volume of auditory cortex compared to the brains of non-musicians. Schlaug et al. (1995) also found that the anterior half of the corpus callosum was significantly larger in musicians relative to non-musicians, and since the corpus callosum is the main fiber tract responsible for transmission of information between the left and right hemisphere of the brain, these findings suggest that inter-hemispheric integration and transfer of information is thereby enhanced in musicians relative to non-musicians. Bangert and Altenmuller (2003) also found that 20-min of music training was sufficient to elicit durable improvements in sensory–motor integration (see also Pascual-Leone et al., 1995), while Bangert et al. (2006) discovered that the benefits of such sensory–motor integration can even occur at an unconscious, precognitive level. www.frontiersin.org January 2012 | Volume 2 | Article 393 | 5 Croom Music, neuroscience, and the psychology of well-being A study conducted by Rosenkranz et al. (2007) utilizing transcranial motor stimulation (TMS) demonstrated that musicians have increased brain plasticity in motor areas relative to nonmusicians, and another study conducted by Bengtsson et al. (2005) utilizing diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) demonstrated greater white-matter coherence in the internal capsule of professional musicians. Bengtsson et al. (2005) showed that musicians that practiced the piano since childhood had a more structured pyramidal tract than non-musicians and that long-term musical practice implicates neural activity resulting in increased myelination of the fiber tracts involved during activity (although such plasticity in white matter was shown to become more limited as one matures with age). More recent studies using positron emission tomography (PET) and fMRI have also shown that white-matter bundles pertaining to the motor circuits in the brain are better structured in musicians than non-musicians (Habib and Besson, 2009, p. 280). Work by Chandrasekaran and Kraus (2010) suggests that musical training "induces neuroplastic changes throughout the nervous system" (p. 297) and work by Habib and Besson (2009) suggests that "beyond its effect on the plasticity of specific brain areas, music training, especially if started early in life, may enhance general plasticity of the brain and thus generalize to other learning domains" (p. 282). The enhanced cross-modal properties of the brains of musicians facilitates their audio–visual transfer of information, and several researchers have even used non-linguistic audio–visual games to successfully treat French dyslexic children (see Kujala et al., 2001; Magnan et al., 2004; Santos et al., 2007; Habib and Besson, 2009). In another interesting study published in Science, data from magnetic source imaging (MSI) showed that musicians with extensive experience playing a stringed instrument had a larger cortical representation of the digits of the left hand compared with a control group of non-musicians (Elbert et al., 1995), which provides compelling evidence that practiced musical behavior can induce significant changes in the function and organization of the brain. Musical practice can even benefit patients with Parkinson's disease by helping them with "regulating gait and arm control" via priming and "entrainment of the motor system to the beat of the music," and stroke patients have been found to benefit from piano and drum training since these activities help to refine their motor skills, resulting in increased precision, speed, and smoothness of their movements (Koelsch, 2010, p. 132). Such findings are consistent with previous work demonstrating that musical training can facilitate greater concentrations of gray matter in motor cortices (Gaser and Schlaug, 2003). Further, musical training has been shown to improve many aspects of auditory processing (Trainor et al., 2003; Peretz and Zatorre, 2005), including but not limited to improvements in pitch perception (Schneider et al., 2002), auditory stream segregation (Beauvios and Meddis, 1997), auditory attention (Strait et al., 2010), phonological skills (Forgeard et al., 2008), and the processing of prosody (Wong et al., 2007; Chandrasekaran et al., 2009; Bidelman et al., 2011) and emotions (Strait et al., 2009) in speech. Chandrasekaran and Kraus (2010) further point out that, "Musicians show less degraded brainstem representation of speech relative to non-musicians, as evidenced by faster neural timing, enhanced spectral representation, and better stimulusto-response correlations" and that "the differences in spectral representation between musicians and non-musicians are large, suggesting that musical experience protects against the debilitating effects of background noise" (p. 301; see also Parbery-Clark et al., 2009). Chandrasekaran and Kraus (2010) further demonstrated in their study that: Musicians showed enhanced induced gamma-band activity (GBA), which is oscillatory activity in the 25 Hz-100 Hz range. Induced GBA is argued to reflect integration of topdown and bottom-up sensory processing [(Trainor et al., 2009)] [. . .] One year of music training in children has been shown to increase induced GBA relative to untrained participants [(Shahin et al., 2008)] [. . . and the evidence suggests that] GBA changes reflect increased efficiency of top-down processes, and that music has dramatic effects on cognitive-sensory interaction. (pp. 302–303) Musical activity can also improve certain cognitive functions, as it has been shown to increase an individual's digit span (Fujioka et al., 2006) and working memory (Parbery-Clark et al., 2009). Although musical engagement implicates a vast range of brain areas, a detailed discussion of which would require an article in its own right (for instance, see the nice review by Zatorre et al., 2007), it is worth briefly mentioning that music has been shown to influence the amygdala, hippocampus, nucleus accumbens, anterior cingulate cortex, and insular cortex (Koelsch, 2010, pp. 133, 135). Music's influence on the amygdala, hippocampus, and the nucleus accumbens reflects the fact that music often influences the listener's emotional state (Koelsch, 2010, p. 133), and since music can influence the functioning of the hippocampus it has been argued that music training could cause "upregulation of neurogenesis in the hippocampus," helping both patients with depression and PTSD (Koelsch, 2010, p. 135). It is plausible that the different forms of improved functioning resulting from musical experience that we have discussed above could either directly or indirectly influence our positive emotional states; directly, if positive affect is directly associated with improved functioning in the forms mentioned above, or indirectly if these forms of improved functioning lead one to greater practical success (e.g., through becoming talented, then rich, and famous), which may in turn solicit positive affect. Further, these findings are of practical import since studies have shown that individuals spend a significant amount of time and energy structuring their lives in ways that will facilitate positive feelings and emotions (Gollwitzer, 1993; Mischel et al., 1996), and so people may be able to implement knowledge from further music studies to facilitate positive feelings and emotions in their life. Indeed, many people seem to use music for this purpose intuitively, for as Frijda has pointed out, emotional regulation is often the major reason for "listening to music, or going out dancing" (Frijda, 1999, p. 205). MUSIC AND RELATIONSHIPS Musical engagement, however, can do more than simply influence one's emotional states. Musical engagement can also positively strengthen one's social bonds with others. In an article published in Heart and Lung, Nilsson (2009) demonstrated that actively Frontiers in Psychology | Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology January 2012 | Volume 2 | Article 393 | 6 Croom Music, neuroscience, and the psychology of well-being listening to soothing music can increase a listener's level of oxytocin, a neuropeptide that plays a central role in the formation of social attachment and relationships in humans (Kosfeld et al., 2005) and other non-human species (Carter, 1998). Furthermore, music can influence our emotional states, which in turn influence our orientation toward the world, our comportment, and our action readiness, all of which are usually manifested in our observable behavior. Since our emotional states typically influence our observable behavior, and since others often take our observable behavior into consideration when interacting with us, our emotional states can also typically influence our interactions and relationships with other people. For example, the presence of positive emotions (such as happiness) tends to increase liking and social interaction with others, whereas the presence of negative emotions (such as sadness) tends to decrease liking and social interaction with others (Clark et al., 1996). So one way music can influence our relationships with other people is by influencing our emotions that in turn influence our relationships with other people. Emotional regulation is one of the important reasons for establishing relationships with others in the first place (Zillmann et al., 1986), and music is a useful medium for establishing those relationships. Through their influence on the emotions, music can facilitate the strengthening of bonds with others by demonstrating commitment in relationships and by providing evidence of those commitments to others (Frank, 1988). "Emotions have powerful effects in shaping and regulating social interactions, even outside the interactions that the emotions are about," Frijda claims, and "These social effects can be of large scope and magnitude" (Frijda, 1999, p. 205), being able to influence one's social functioning for time periods extending long after the event that originally initiated the emotional response (Frijda, 1999). Indeed, many evolutionary psychologists have argued that social bonding and cooperation are fundamental features of human nature that facilitated our ancestor's survival and reproduction (Caporael and Brewer, 1991; Myers, 1999). For instance, many group selectionists argue that musical behavior is evolutionarily adaptive because it promotes group coordination and cohesion among members, synchronizing group actions, emotions, and identity (Merriam, 1964; Turnbull, 1966; Lomax, 1968; Hood, 1971; Seeger, 1987; Richman, 1987; Feld, 1994; Freeman, 1995; McNeill, 1995; Richman, 2000, p. 304; Brown, 2000a, p. 296; Brown, 2000b, pp. 231, 238; Trevarthen, 1999; Cross, 2001, p. 37; Christensen-Dalsgaard, 2004, Sect. 2.1; Levitin, 2006, p. 258; Brandt, 2008, pp. 6–7; see also Croom (2010b, 2012, under review) for a new account of the evolutionary origins of music that is based on principles of biological synchronization and efficiency, which is more explanatorily powerful than previous accounts but is still consistent with the particular points made here by group selectionists). For instance, synchronized chorusing has been found in certain species of insects (Otte, 1977; Greenfield and Shaw, 1983) and frogs (Wells, 1977; Klump and Gerhardt, 1992), and fireflies have been shown to synchronize their bioluminescent flashing at night (Buck, 1988). Researchers have also found that there are at least several hundred species of birds that perform precisely synchronized duets in order to stay in sync reproductively, strengthen partnership bonds, or defend territories (Brown, 2000b, p. 247). So it is plausible, many group selectionists argue, that musical behavior likewise evolved in humans to unite individuals into groups and strengthen partnership bonds (Brown, 2000b, p. 247). "[S]inging, marching, and laughing tunes the group," as Seligman (2011, pp. 144–145) says. In his article"A neurobiological role of music in social bonding," Freeman (2000) proposed that the rhythmically repeated and predictable motions between agents that we find in music and dance facilitate joint action through the synchronization of attention and expectation between agents (p. 420). This, in turn, is hypothesized to facilitate interpersonal coordination, social bonding, and possibly even reproductive benefits. For instance, one hypothesis that has been suggested is that a group of male chimpanzees, upon discovering a resource such as large fruit trees, synchronize their chorusing in order to produce a stronger vocalization than other groups of males for the purpose of attracting the attention of – and thus increasing the probability of mating with – migrating females (Merker, 2000, pp. 318–320; see also Wrangham, 1975; Wrangham, 1979). In this sort of way, synchronized group chorusing among chimpanzees and even humans might have conferred reproductive advantages, in addition to more obvious advantages in hunting and combat. Further, in order to explain the fact that the cranial capacity of our hominid ancestors' skulls doubled in size from approximately 600 cm3 5000,000 years ago to approximately 1,200 cm3 in the present, Humphrey (1986) has argued that those with larger, more robust brains had more computational power with which to solve social problems and dilemmas, which in turn positively contributed to their sociality and interpersonal relationships (see also Seligman, 2011). In any case, regardless of the specific details of our evolutionary past, a great deal of our behavior today is in fact oriented toward strengthening our social bonds with others, and we typically experience better physical, mental, and emotional health when we have others to bond with (Argyle, 1999; Myers, 1999). Our positive emotions are largely influenced by and directed at others (Seligman, 2011) and it has been shown by several scholars that participating in enjoyable activities with friends is predictive of subjective well-being (Heady et al., 1985). Argyle, for instance, mentions that "social clubs, music, and voluntary work all show strong positive effects" for the well-being of the individuals participating in these activities (Argyle, 1999, p. 353). Given the fact that musical performances are often done with or for others, a commitment to a musically engaged life could positively contribute to one's wellbeing. Commitments such as career involvement, marriage, and religion have been associated with improved overall life satisfaction (Batson and Ventis, 1982; Kessler and Essex, 1982; Cantor and Sanderson, 1999), and since a musically structured life is one constituted by genuinely engaged involvements and commitments to musical investments, rehearsals, and performances, we have good reason to believe that musical activity can also positively contribute to one's overall life satisfaction. As Argyle writes: A lot of leisure activities [for example, musical activities] are done in groups, such as [. . . music bands,] choirs, and teams, and this is a source of happiness [. . .] the moodinducing nature of the[se] activities, such as dancing and music, and also the social support and social integration [involved in these activities, all positively contribute to one's www.frontiersin.org January 2012 | Volume 2 | Article 393 | 7 Croom Music, neuroscience, and the psychology of well-being level of wellbeing]. Indeed, it is possible to fulfill a variety of social needs through such activities – [for instance, one's needs] for intimacy, public performance, cooperation, and so on. (Argyle, 1999, p. 364; see also Argyle, 1996) Other work has shown that individuals in close relationships with others cope better with stress and illness (Cohen,1988; House et al., 1988; Nelson, 1988) and are less likely to die prematurely (Abbey and Andrews, 1985; Perlman and Rook, 1987) than individuals lacking in close relationships. Individuals that have a network of social support are likely to live longer than individuals that do not (Vaillant, 2003), and when participants were asked which element in life would bring them the most happiness, most cited love, or close interpersonal relationships (Freedman, 1978; Berscheid, 1983; Pettijohn and Pettijohn, 1996). It should be clear that participating in a band or musical group can serve as a means for building close relationships with others, since the mastery of a musical work provides the band members with a common purpose, common ground, and a potentially extensive amount of time together for the sake of rehearsal and performance. That is to say, participation and commitment to activities, such as musical events, often involves participation with and commitment to others, as many activities involve a social component and are of sociocultural significance (Erikson, 1950; Havighurst, 1972). Furthermore, Brickman and Coates (1987) have shown that individuals often benefit more from helping and caring for others than they do from being helped and cared for themselves, and so, as Cantor and Sanderson (1999) point out, social contact and participation with others "may be associated with well-being not only directly by providing social support and assistance, but also indirectly by providing individuals with opportunities to care for others" (p. 235). In fact, Seligman (2011) reports that doing kind deeds for others produces the most reliable momentary increase in well-being than any exercise his team has tested and that "Other people are the best antidote to the downs of life and the single most reliable up" (p. 20). Musicians, like other performers, have the opportunity to care for others every time they perform. Insofar as music listeners enjoy listening to music, musicians have the opportunity to provide listeners with something that they enjoy, and thereby have the opportunity to perform a kind deed for others every time they perform. And insofar as performing kind deeds for others can reliably produce momentary increases in well-being, as Seligman (2011) has argued, this suggests that performing music for others can produce momentary increases in well-being also. Furthermore, insofar as a musician is cognizant of the fact that their performance is providing pleasure and momentary increases of well-being to their listeners, that musician is afforded evidential support for believing that they have actually accomplished something (see Music and Accomplishment) and that their actions are meaningful or purposeful (see Music and Meaning; see also Seligman, 2011). Thus, participation and commitment to shared activities can facilitate social bonding or connection with others (Baumeister and Leary, 1995), often times through the development of shared sensitivities and norms for evaluative ascriptions (Croom, 2010a,b, 2011a,b, 2012), which influence both the individual and the larger community within which that individual participant is engaged (Putnam, 1995). MUSIC AND ENGAGEMENT Musical activity is not only of practical application for the cultivation of positive emotions and strong interpersonal relationships, although musical activity often does serve these functions. Music can also positively influence other features that we have identified as characteristic of a flourishing life. Another important feature that we identified as characteristic of a flourishing life was the presence of flow experiences, i.e., experiences where "psychic energy flows effortlessly" (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, p. 36) and one is attentively absorbed and skillfully engaged in an activity that one finds valuable. As Seligman describes it, "engagement, is about flow: being one with the music, time stopping, and the loss of selfconsciousness during an absorbing activity" (Seligman, 2011, p. 11). Features of flow experiences include perceptions of control, task focus, and a resultant absence of public self-consciousness (Vallerand et al., 2003; Mageau et al., 2005; Forest et al., 2008; Philippe et al., 2009). Previous research has shown that, in contrast with people that do not experience flow, people with flow experiences typically report higher levels of well-being (Haworth and Hill, 1992; Haworth and Evans, 1995; Haworth, 1997; Csikszentmihalyi, 1999; Eisenberger et al., 2005; Carpentier et al., 2011), positive emotions, positive moods, and pride (Han, 1988; Clarke and Haworth, 1994; Bloch, 2002; Delle Fave and Massimini, 2004). The experience of flow is no stranger to musicians, and in fact, Tchaikovsky had famously said that, "Do not believe those who try to persuade you that composition is only a cold exercise of the intellect. The only music capable of moving and touching us is that which flows from the depths of a composer's soul when he is stirred by inspiration" (quoted in Vernon, 1970, p. 58). Of this fluid, flowing state of the mind and body, Tchaikovsky further remarked that it was "a great thing if the main ideas and general outline of a [musical] work come without any racking of brains, as the result of that supernatural and inexplicable force we call inspiration" (p. 58). Wolfgang Mozart also reported that, "When I am, as it were, completely myself, entirely alone, and of good cheer [. . .] my ideas flow best and most abundantly. Whence and how they come, I know not; nor can I force them" (quoted in Vernon, 1970, p. 55). One psychologist that has done extensive research in this area is Csikszentmihalyi, and in his (1990) book Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience, he reports finding that people are happiest when they are most absorbed in their actions and experiencing flow. In their article "Effects of asynchronous music on flow states and shooting performance among netball players,"Pates et al. (2003) show that musical engagement can indeed "enhance performance [on concentration tasks] and trigger emotions and cognitions associated with flow" (p. 426). Work carried out by Chandrasekaran and Kraus (2010) also suggests that, "Musicians show less degraded brainstem representation of speech relative to non-musicians, as evidenced by faster neural timing, enhanced spectral representation, and better stimulus-to-response correlations" and that "the differences in spectral representation between musicians and non-musicians are large, suggesting that musical experience protects against the debilitating effects of background noise" (p. 301; see also Parbery-Clark et al., 2009). Findings like this are relevant for our understanding of flow because, insofar Frontiers in Psychology | Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology January 2012 | Volume 2 | Article 393 | 8 Croom Music, neuroscience, and the psychology of well-being as background factors that distract someone from engaging attentively with their current activity interrupts their experience of flow (Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi, 2002; Carpentier et al., 2011), and insofar as the reduction of background noise that musical experience affords can help facilitate one's engaging attentively with their current activity, it is arguably the case that musical experience can thereby positively contribute to one's becoming fully absorbed in their actions and achieving the experience of flow. Kubovy (1999) has previously linked Csikszentmihalyi's (1975) work on flow to the experience of virtuosity, and he explains that in flow experiences we often experience the exercise of virtuosity, whereby "an act is performed with virtuosity if it is difficult for most people to do but is carried out with ease and economy" by oneself, and often accompanied by "the pleasure we have when we feel we are doing something well" (Kubovy, 1999, pp. 147–148). We can even experience the pleasures of virtuosity relative to our prior lack of ability, as, for instance, Sudnow (1978, 1979) describes his experience of accomplishment over the 6 year period in which he learned to improvise jazz on the piano. "The pleasures of virtuosity make us want to do things well," Kubovy (1999) remarks, "and hence we play in order to achieve this pleasure, which gives us skills we need to survive" (p. 148). In flow experience we are optimally attentive and tuned in to what we are doing, deploying our most developed skills which in turn afford us feedback in the form of positive emotions, a sense of accomplishment and purpose, and even better relationships (Seligman, 2011, p. 24). So musical practice and performance, as a conduit for flow experiences, likewise offers us an avenue for attunement, perceptual and cognitive exercise, the accomplishment of successful motor execution, the experience of positive emotional states and pleasurable auditory stimulation, the meaning derived from participating in a larger social entity and offering a distinctive contribution, and connecting with others. MUSIC AND ACCOMPLISHMENT Up to this point we have now discussed how musical engagement can positively influence one's positive emotions, relationships with others, and flow experiences. Next, we will discuss how music can positively influence one's sense of accomplishment and meaning in life. First, it seems clear that music can in fact contribute to one's sense of accomplishment. For instance, Tchaikovsky once said of his musical career that, "I can affirm with joy that I make continual progress on the way of self-development, and am passionately desirous of attaining the highest degree of perfection of which my talents are capable" (quoted in Vernon, 1970, p. 60). Many practicing musicians are likely to feel the same way, and accordingly, musical involvement can help people attain a sense of personal accomplishment. Numerous findings have demonstrated that those individuals that made the most significant accomplishments in their field of practice were those that spent the most time devoted to carefully practicing what it is that they do (Chase and Simon, 1973a,b; Hayes, 1981; Bloom, 1985; Ericsson et al., 1993; Weisberg, 1999). For instance, Bloom (1985) conducted a study based on interviews of accomplished professionals from a broad range of fields – including, for instance, highly accomplished scientists (e.g., mathematicians and neurologists recognized for excellence in early career development), musicians (e.g., award-winning pianists), artists (e.g., award-winning sculptors), and athletes (e.g., Olympic swimmers and tennis players recognized among the world's top 10) – and found that accomplishment by individuals in each of these fields required years of dedicated and attentive practice to their particular activity, while also partly depending on the support provided by one's friends and family, and the informed guidance provided by one's parents, coaches, and role models (Bloom, 1985; Weisberg, 2006). A study conducted by Ericsson et al. (1993) that focused on the accomplishment of musicians in particular found that accomplished professional musicians spent, not only more time practicing than less accomplished musicians, but also more time sleeping, suggesting that sleep can facilitate learning from attentive and effortful musical practice (Ericsson et al., 1993; Weisberg, 2006). But the main finding for our purposes here is that what distinguishes a truly outstanding musician, or any other specialist or professional, from those of less or no skill is the amount of structured motor behavior they have unreflectively available for action, which is itself typically the result of undergoing hard-earned practice and repetitive motor drill (Seligman, 2011). For instance, studies have found that world-class musicians averaged 10,000 h of solo practice by the time they were 20 years old, in contrast to 5,000 h for the next lower level musician, and in contrast with 2,000 h for merely serious amateur musicians (Ericsson et al., 1993; Weisberg, 2006). Similar findings have been demonstrated outside of the domain of musical performance – for instance, in musical composition, poetry, and chess (Chase and Simon, 1973a; Hayes, 1981; Weisberg, 1999) – and this consistent finding is now frequently referred to as the 10-year rule (Hayes, 1981, 1989; Gardner, 1993; Weisberg, 2006) for the straightforward reason that "if you want to become world class at anything, you must spend 60 h a week on it for 10 years" (Seligman, 2011, p. 115). Thus, Aristotle's insight on the nature of excellence seems to have been on the right track. As Aristotle advised, "virtues are formed in man by his doing the actions [. . .] the Good of Man comes to be "a working of the Soul in the way of Excellence" [. . .] for as it is not one swallow or one fine day that makes a spring, so it is not one day or a short time that makes a man blessed and happy" (Aristotle, 1911; Book II, 4; Book I, 7). "Human excellence," in musicality as in morality, comes about as a result of habit (Aristotle, 1911; Book II, 1). I previously mentioned in Section "Music and Relationships" that one can use participation in a band or musical group as a means for building close relationships with others, since the mastery of a musical work provides the band members with a common purpose, common ground, and a potentially extensive amount of time together for the sake of rehearsal and performance. But not only are individual members brought together to collectively constitute the larger whole that is their band, but this collective constitution also typically assigns each member a unique role to perform within that larger whole. Since each member is assigned a role to perform, and since each member can perform that role poorly or proficiently, the musician's ability to come through and deliver during their musical opportunities can provide them with the sense of accomplishing their musical part successfully, instead of with ineptitude. A well executed and emotionally inspiring www.frontiersin.org January 2012 | Volume 2 | Article 393 | 9 Croom Music, neuroscience, and the psychology of well-being musical performance requires not only musical knowledge and technique, but also a performer's confidence and social grace, and the collective manifestation of these features in a single musical act by the performer surely counts as a bona fide accomplishment (indeed, audiences often pay good money to witness such accomplishments). Also, since people often listen to music because they enjoy it, the musician's act of performing a musical work for an audience of listeners is at the same time an act of providing listeners with something that they enjoy. Thus, the musician's ability to competently bring joy and pleasure to others through their musical performances can provide them with another way in which to feel like they have genuinely accomplished something. MUSIC AND MEANING Finally, musical engagement can afford one a sense of meaning or purpose in life. The emotion that music is capable of soliciting from us may influence our well-being, not only through positively influencing our social interactions and relationships with others, but also by positively influencing our sense of coherence in the world and our sense of identity (Frijda, 1999). Indeed, having a sense of meaning or purpose in life is important, since it has been shown that the absence of meaning in one's life can cause depression (Seligman, 2011). Research has shown that pursuing and making progress toward goals that one finds valuable, such as becoming a more proficient musician, are associated with positive affect, as well as physical and psychological well-being (Diener, 1984; Emmons, 1986; Cantor and Sanderson, 1999). A consistent commitment to goals and tasks may even provide consistency to one's life in times of adversity, helping individuals cope with the various problems they face at each of life's developmental stages (Cantor and Sanderson, 1999). It has been suggested that this is because commitment to particular goals can provide one with a consistent sense of personal agency (Cantor, 1990), structure, and purpose in their daily life (Klinger, 1975; Little, 1983; Cantor and Sanderson, 1999). In this way, musical goals can provide one with a consistent sense of personal agency (e.g., I am a musical performer), structure (e.g., routine practices and performances), and purpose (e.g., I am the alto saxophonist in the band X and play the sax solo in song Y ) in their daily life. Since an individual that participates with others in a band or musical group is also thereby provided the opportunity to play a distinctive and significant role in something larger than themselves, and as "The Meaningful Life" has often been characterized by positive psychologists as "belonging to and serving something that you believe is bigger than the self" (Seligman, 2011, p. 12), an individual that participates with others in a band or musical group can thereby positively influence their experience of having meaning or purpose in life. For instance, the solo saxophonist during a jazz band performance plays a vital social and esthetic function during the musical context in which all ears are on him, and the ability to come through and deliver in those musical moments keeps his style and identity, as well as his band's, intact. Each band member, as a dependable musical comrade, has a role and a responsibility to the larger band to which they submit themselves as constituent members. And insofar as one consistently performs their social role and responsibility as a contributing musical member, this can provide the musician with a venue through which to continually re-experience a moment of purpose in their life. Various musical performances that the musician has previously accomplished with success could also provide the musician with salient memories of those prized moments when he had served his musical purpose successfully in the past. POTENTIAL MALADAPTIVE CONSEQUENCES OF MUSICAL ACTIVITY It should be mentioned before concluding this article that musical activity does not always or necessarily lead to well-being. In fact, there are various risks associated with musical activity, like any other physically demanding activity that can be done excessively or incorrectly (Sataloff et al., 1991; see also Fishbein et al., 1988; Middlestadt and Fishbein, 1988; Zaza, 1998). Some of these risks are more instrument-specific than others. For instance, pianists are particularly susceptible to musculoskeletal pain and problems in the hands and wrists (Yoshimura et al., 2006), whereas woodwind players are particularly susceptible to problems in the orofacial musculature (Fuks and Fadle, 2002). Others problems, however, are more general and include psychosomatic symptoms associated with performance anxiety (Langendörfer et al., 2006) as well as injuries resulting from inappropriate practicing techniques, poor posture, and poor physical conditioning. The British Association for Performing Arts Medicine, for instance, conducted a study on 1,046 musicians and found that 52% of them had problems resulting from technical faults or inappropriate practicing procedures. Specifically, they found that improper performance techniques, excessive practicing without breaks or rest, poor posture, insufficient exercise, and general misuse of the body drastically increased one's susceptibility to music-related injuries (Wynn Parry, 2004, p. 47). Another study by Kreutz et al. (2008) also suggested that "significant proportions of [the] health problems among music performance students emerge from general dispositions, such as posture [which can affect the spine and upper extremities] and fatigue, and thus are not specific to the instrument played" (p. 3). Accordingly, research suggests that musicians wanting to prevent or downplay potential music-related injuries while maximizing music-related benefits should spend an appropriate amount of time warming up, cooling down, and resting at intervals during practice sessions, pay particular attention to the posture of their spine and upper limbs, and maintain a healthy diet and exercising regimen (Wynn Parry, 2004; Kreutz et al., 2008). Kreutz, Ginsborg, and Williamon have suggested that "These [more general] issues should take priority perhaps even over those that are specific to the voice or individual instrument being played" (Kreutz et al., 2008, p. 11). Fortunately, music departments and conservatories have become increasingly aware of the potential risks associated with musical practice and performance, and have been actively creating special programs concerned with both the prevention and treatment of musicrelated injuries (Chesky et al., 2006). For further discussion I refer the reader to the literature (Fishbein et al., 1988; Middlestadt and Fishbein, 1988; Sataloff et al., 1991; Liu and Hayden, 2002; Wynn Parry, 2004; Spahn et al., 2005; Chesky et al., 2006; Williamon and Thompson, 2006; Kreutz et al., 2008, 2009), as a more focused discussion of this topic is admittedly beyond the scope of the present article. Frontiers in Psychology | Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology January 2012 | Volume 2 | Article 393 | 10 Croom Music, neuroscience, and the psychology of well-being CONCLUDING REMARKS Like any other activity that imposes physical demands on performers, there are potential risks associated with music-related activities; we briefly reviewed some of these and discussed preventive solutions in Section "Potential Maladaptive Consequences of Musical Activity."But as these issues have been discussed elsewhere (Fishbein et al., 1988; Middlestadt and Fishbein, 1988; Sataloff et al., 1991; Liu and Hayden, 2002; Wynn Parry, 2004; Spahn et al., 2005; Chesky et al., 2006; Williamon and Thompson, 2006; Kreutz et al., 2008, 2009), the main purpose of this article was to offer new insight into the question of whether musical activity can positively contribute to one's living a flourishing life. My claim was that musical activity can do this, and throughout the course of this article I have offered new evidence in support of this claim. Specifically, I began by presenting the five commonly recognized factors characteristic of human flourishing or well-being: (1) "positive emotion," (2) "relationships," (3) "engagement," (4) "achievement,"and (5)"meaning"(Seligman, 2011, p. 24). In order to determine whether musical activity could actually increase one's level of well-being, we investigated whether it could actually increase one's level of positive emotions, strong interpersonal relationships and rapport with others, commitment in engaging activities, level of accomplishment, and experience of meaning or purpose in life. In Section "Music and Positive Emotion" I argued that music can positively influence one's level of positive emotions, in Section "Music and Relationships" I argued that music can positively influence one's interpersonal relationships and rapport with others, in Section "Music and Engagement" I argued that music can positively influence one's commitment in engaging activities, in Section "Music and Accomplishment" I argued that music can positively influence one's level of accomplishment, and in Section "Music and Meaning" I argued that music can positively influence one's experience of meaning or purpose in life. Thus, throughout the course of this article we have established that musical engagement can positively influence all five of these factors, and as a result, we have compelling evidence that musical engagement can positively contribute to one's living a flourishing life. Since prior to this study there had not yet been a substantive and up-to-date investigation of the possible role of music in contributing to one's living a flourishing life, this study offers a novel contribution to existing work by carrying out this original investigation, thereby bridging the gap and stimulating discussion between the psychology of music and the psychology of well-being. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would first and foremost like to thank Marty Seligman and the Positive Psychology Center at the University of Pennsylvania for generously offering me financial support to carry out this research. I have also greatly benefited from conversations with Stephen Amico, Liz Camp, Yale Cohen, Paul Guyer, Robert Kurzban, Jairo Moreno, Carol Muller, Alex Rozin, Paul Rozin, Susan Schneider, and Dmitri Tymoczko, and I owe them much thanks. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to Dan Lloyd and the two reviewers of this article for their very helpful comments and suggestions. 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Conflict of Interest Statement: The author declares that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest. Received: 22 September 2011; accepted: 15 December 2011; published online: 02 January 2012. Citation: Croom AM (2012) Music, neuroscience, and the psychology of wellbeing: a précis. Front. Psychology 2:393. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00393 This article was submitted to Frontiers in Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, a specialty of Frontiers in Psychology. Copyright © 2012 Croom. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial License, which permits non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in other forums, provided the original authors and source are credited. www.frontiersin.org January 2012 | Volume 2 | Article 393 |

Word count (including references and notes): 7897 Experimental Philosophy and Causal Attribution Jonathan Livengood University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign David Rose Rutgers University Abstract. Humans often attribute the things that happen to one or another actual cause. In this chapter, we survey some recent philosophical and psychological research on causal attribution. We pay special attention to the relation between graphical causal modeling and theories of causal attribution. We think that the study of causal attribution is one place where formal and experimental techniques nicely complement one another. Keywords: Causal attribution, attribution theory, actual causation, graphical causal model, experimental philosophy, default-deviant, norms, responsibility, blame Acknowledgements: Thanks to Wesley Buckwalter, Tobi Gerstenberg, Joshua Knobe, Justin Sytsma, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier versions of this chapter. Humans routinely solve a variety of different kinds of causal reasoning problems. In this chapter, we focus on problems having the following basic form. An agent has various bits of information about some things that happen in the world: the order in which things happen, the frequencies and conditional frequencies with which they happen, the things that are associated with interventions, and so on. The agent observes something happen, and she wants to know what caused that thing to happen. More specifically, she wants to know what actually caused the thing she observed to happen, not what might have caused it to happen or what typically causes similar things to happen. For example, she might want to know what actually caused her heartburn last night or she might want to know whether the bridge collapse was actually caused by microfractures in its box girders. Following Heider (1958), Jones and Davis (1965), Jones et al. (1972), Kelley (1967, 1971, 1972, 1973), Kelley and Michela (1980), and Weiner et al. (1971), we will call such problems causal attribution problems, though many other labels might have been appropriate as well: diagnostic inference problems, explanatory inference problems, and actual (or token) causation inference problems to name a few possible alternatives. For Heider and the social psychologists influenced by him, attribution theory was an account of how people construct causal explanations, and the theory was primarily intended to describe how people explain the actions of others, e.g. by appeal to intentions, personality, situational factors, and so on.i Kelley (1973, 107) gives several examples of the kinds of questions of social perception that the theory was designed to handle, including the following (quoted verbatim): If a person is aggressively competitive in his behavior, is he this kind of person, or is he reacting to situational pressures? If a person advocates a certain political position, does this reflect his true opinions, or is it to be explained in some other way? If a person fails on a test, does he have low ability, or is the test difficult? According to Kelley, "In all such instances, the questions concern the causes of observed behavior and the answers of interest are those given by the man in the street ... what Heider has called 'naïve psychology.'" In the fifty years since Heider, psychologists and philosophers have made several suggestions about how ordinary causal cognition works. Various researchers have implicated ANOVA-like covariation (Kelley 1973), knowledge of mechanisms (Ahn et al. 1995), causal fields (Mackie 1965, 1974; Einhorn and Hogarth 1986), violations of normality (Hilton and Slugoski 1986; Knobe 2009; Hitchcock and Knobe 2009), and blameworthiness (Alicke 1992), to name just a few. In this chapter, we survey several recent suggestions for understanding causal attribution, paying special attention to how the large body of research in attribution theory is related to recent work on graphical causal models. Here is how we will proceed. In Section 1, we situate causal attribution problems within a graphical causal modeling approach to causal reasoning. In Section 2, we review some recent research on structural approaches to causal attribution. In Section 3, we discuss a model that augments causal structure with a default-deviant distinction. In Sections 4 and 5 we discuss broadly normative considerations that influence causal attributions. Then we conclude in Section 6 with a discussion of some open questions and topics that we neglect in this chapter owing to the limitations of space. 1. Graphical Causal Models and Causal Attributions Graphical causal models are an increasingly popular approach to thinking about causation in the philosophy and psychology literatures (see Burns and McCormack 2009; Danks THIS VOLUME; Fernbach and Sloman 2009; Glymour 2001; Glymour 2010; Gopnik et al. 2004; Gopnik and Schulz 2007; Griffiths and Tenenbaum 2009; Lagnado and Sloman 2006; Lagnado et al. 2007; Park and Sloman 2013; Park and Sloman THIS VOLUME; Pearl 2000; Reips and Waldmann 2008; Rottman and Keil 2012; Rottman et al. 2014; Schulz et al. 2007; Sloman 2005; Sobel and Kushnir 2003; and Spirtes et al. 2000). In graphical causal modeling, we begin with a primitive relation of direct structural causation that takes variables as its relata. If a variable X is a direct structural cause of another variable Y with respect to some collection V of variables, then we write X → Y in a directed graph over V. As an illustration, we will provide a graphical model for the following simple story. In a certain park, there are two clowns, Bozo and Zobo. Also, there are lots of peculiar children. What makes the children peculiar is the causal law that governs when they smile. Each child is such that she smiles just in case she receives a balloon from a clown. To model this story, we use three binary variables: B, Z, and S. For each child, the variable B represents whether or not Bozo gives the child a balloon, the variable Z represents whether or not Zobo gives the child a balloon, and the variable S represents whether or not the child smiles. According to the story, both B and Z are direct structural causes of S. And we represent that fact with the graph in Figure 1: Figure 1: Causal Graph for the Clown Story Formally, a causal model is a pair <V, F> consisting of a collection V of variables and a collection F of functions relating elements of V. For each variable V ∈ V, there is a function fV ∈ F that either specifies the value of V directly (in which case, V has no causes in the model and is said to be exogenous) or specifies how the value of V is determined by the values of the direct structural causes of V. In the clown-smile story, we have the following equations: Z = UZ B = UB S = B ∨ Z Where UB and UZ are the values that the functions fB and fZ assign to B and Z, respectively. (Typically, variables like UB are interpreted as representing all of the unmeasured causes of the associated variable-in this case, B.) We can give a non-reductive definition of direct structural causation in terms of ideal interventions that set the values of selected variables to specific values. The basic idea is to imagine testing whether one variable causes another by first holding every other variable fixed and then wiggling the first variable. If the second wiggles along, then the first causes the second. The formal construction looks like this. Suppose the variables X and Y are members of the collection V of all of the random variables in our model. Let Z be the collection V \ {X, Y}, and let YW=w denote the value Y would have if one were to set the variables in W to the values w by directly manipulating them. We can then say that X is a direct structural cause of Y relative to V iff there exists a vector z of values for the variables in Z and a pair of values x1 and x2 for X such that YZ=z, X=x1  YZ=z, X=x2. With these formal tools in hand, a causal attribution problem amounts to saying, for a pair of variables V1 and V2 evaluated with respect to some unit u, whether or not V1(u) = v1 is an actual cause of V2(u) = v2. Consider Bozo and Zobo again. Suppose that Bozo, but not Zobo, gives little Suzy a balloon in the park, and Suzy smiles-as she must according to the structural equations: Z(Suzy) = 0 B(Suzy) = 1 S(Suzy) = B ∨ Z = 1 Where B(u) equals one if Bozo gives a balloon to unit u and equals zero if Bozo does not give a balloon to unit u. Where, similarly, Z(u) equals one of Zobo gives a balloon to unit u and equals zero if Zobo does not give a balloon to unit u. And where S(u) equals one if unit u smiles and equals zero if unit u does not smile. In this case, although both B and Z are structural causes of S, only B(Suzy) = 1 is an actual cause of S(Suzy) = 1. Cases like the clown story are straightforward. Many will agree that Bozo-but not Zobo-actually caused Suzy to smile. However, as the story illustrates, the actual causes of a variable taking on the value it does are not always equivalent to the graphical ancestors of that variable or to the value(s) taken by those graphical ancestors. In order to identify the actual causes of a given variable taking on a specific value, we need more than just a list of the target variable's structural causes. But exactly what the something more should be turns out to be a very difficult question. 2. Actual Causation and Causal Structure Several competing theories of actual causation have appealed to purely structural features of causal models as the extra something.ii The accounts have varying degrees of complexity, but the basic idea for each account is that a variable taking on some value is an actual cause of another variable taking on some value if there is some appropriate, possibly non-actual context in which the second variable taking on its actual value counterfactually depends on the first variable taking on its actual value. To illustrate how such proposals are supposed to work in a bit more detail, consider Woodward's (2003) account of actual causation. When X is a direct structural cause of Y, we write X  Y. A path of length n > 0 from a variable Vi to another variable Vj in a directed graph is a sequence V(1), ..., V(n+1) such that Vi = V(1), Vj = V(n+1), and V(k)  V(k+1) for k = 1, ..., n. Let W denote an ordered n-tuple of variables, let w denote an ordered n-tuple of values of the variables in W, and let the expression do(W = w) denote an ordered n-tuple of manipulations that set the variables in W to the values in w. We say that w is in the redundancy range of the path P if carrying out the manipulations in do(W = w) leaves all of the variables on the path P at their actual values. Now, according to Woodward (2003, 74-77), X(u) = x is an actual cause of Y(u) = y iff the following two conditions are satisfied: (H1) The actual value of X is x and the actual value of Y is y, for unit u. (H2) There exists a path P from X to Y and there exist manipulations do(X = x*) for x* ≠ x and do(W = w) for w in the redundancy range of P such that YX=x*(u) ≠ y whenever the variables in W are fixed by the manipulation do(W = w). In other words, X(u) = x is an actual cause of Y(u) = y if one can find some path P from X to Y and some choice of (possibly non-actual) values for all of the variables not on path P such that the variables on P retain their actual values and some change in the value of X would result in a change in the value of Y, if one were to set the variables not on path P to those values. If we think of graphical modeling accounts of actual causation (like Woodward's) as models of naïve causal attributions, then they make predictions about what people will say in various cases. Though no one has published direct tests of these models, Livengood compared folk attributions of causation in a pilot study involving two simple voting scenarios. Each participant saw one of two vignettes describing a small election. In one vignette, every vote for the winning candidate is pivotal for the outcome, meaning that the result counterfactually depends on each of the votes for the winning candidate. In the other vignette, the outcome is over-determined: the result does not counterfactually depend on any single vote. The vignette with counterfactual dependence reads like this: Thirteen votes were cast in an election involving three candidates, Smith, Jones, and Murphy. The vote totals were as follows: Smith 6 Jones 5 Murphy 2 Greg voted for Smith. Was Greg's vote a cause of Smith winning the election? [yes / no] The other vignette was identical except that the 13 votes were assigned differently: ten for Smith, two for Jones, and one for Murphy. The relative percentage of "yes" answers for each of the two vignettes is pictured in Figure 2. Figure 2: Causal Attributions with and without Counterfactual Dependence Understood as models of ordinary causal attributions, all of the graphical accounts predict that Greg's vote will be counted as a cause of Smith winning the election regardless of whether the outcome counterfactually depends on Greg's vote.iii But people do not treat Greg's vote the same way in both cases.iv Livengood's study raises some doubt about the adequacy of graphical models of actual causation as accounts of naïve causal attribution, but it is hardly definitive. A different graphical modeling proposal by Chockler and Halpern (2004) has been more extensively tested. The main idea is to measure the degree of causal responsibility of a given variable's value in terms of the number of changes that would need to be made to the actual model in order to make the target variable's value pivotal. In the counterfactual-dependence condition of the voting experiment, we do not need to make any changes to the model for Greg's vote to be pivotal. Greg's vote is already pivotal in the actual model. By contrast, in the nodependence condition we need to make three changes-move three votes from Smith to Jones- in order to make Greg's vote pivotal. Chockler and Halpern (2004) propose to measure the degree of causal responsibility of X(u) = x for Y(u) = y according to the equation 1 deg( , ) 1 X x Y y N     where deg is degree of causal responsibility, and N is the minimal number of changes needed in order to make X(u) = x pivotal with respect to Y(u) = y. In Livengood's election vignettes, Greg's degree of causal responsibility is 1 in the dependence condition and 1⁄4 in the no-dependence condition. Gerstenberg and Lagnado (2010) tested Chockler and Halpern's proposal against two other models-the counterfactual model and the matching model-with the Triangle Game. In the Triangle Game, participants are given a short period of time to count the number of triangles in a complex display. Participants played as part of a group, and the conditions under which a team won or lost were manipulated. For example, winning might require all of the players to give answers close enough to the truth, or winning might require at least one of the players to give an answer close enough to the truth. After answering, participants saw the correct answer and the answers given by the other players. Then they were asked to rate each player's degree of responsibility for the team's win or loss. Gerstenberg and Lagnado looked at how well the predictions of the three models correlated with the responsibility ratings of their participants. They found that the median correlation between model and participant was greatest for the structural model and that the structural model had the best fit to the ratings of 52 of their 69 participants. Lagnado et al. (2013) improve on the model by incorporating a second structural feature: how important some variable's value is expected to be before any of the values are known. The structural models considered by Lagnado and colleagues are designed to handle attributions of causal responsibility when many variables contributed to some outcome, which limits their applicability. A more serious limitation, which plagues structural models of actual causation generally, is the threat of isomorphisms (Hall 2007; Halpern and Hitchcock forthcoming). To illustrate, consider the following two cases due to Hiddleston (2005): Overdetermination: Billy and Suzy both throw a rock at a window at the same time. Both rocks reach the window, shattering it upon impact. Bogus Prevention: Killer plans to poison Victim's coffee, but has a change of heart and refrains from administering the lethal poison. Bodyguard puts an antidote in the coffee that would have neutralized the poison (had there been any present). Victim drinks the coffee and (of course) survives. Simple graphical models of both Overdetermination and Bogus Prevention have the same vshaped causal structure as the model of Bozo and Zobo in Section 1. They're structurally isomorphic. Hence, any purely structural account of actual causation must treat Billy, Suzy, Bozo, Zobo, Killer, and Bodyguard exactly alike. Yet, to many it has seemed that in Overdetermination, both Billy and Suzy are actual causes of the window shattering, while in Bogus prevention, Bodyguard is not an actual cause of Victim surviving.v 3. Modeling the Default-Deviant Distinction Many researchers (e.g. Menzies 2004, 2007; Hall 2007; Halpern and Hitchcock forthcoming; Hitchcock 2007; Hitchcock and Knobe 2009; Livengood 2013) have inferred from the problem of isomorphisms and other considerations that purely structural accounts of actual causation need to be supplemented with a default-deviant distinction. Identifying some values as default and some as deviant would allow modelers to distinguish isomorphic causal models and better capture ordinary causal attributions. But there are many different ways to augment structural models with a default-deviant distinction. In this section, we describe Hitchcock's (2007) attempt to incorporate defaults into graphical causal models. Let <V, F> be a causal model, and let X, YV. Define a causal network connecting X to Y in <V, F> to be the set N  V that contains exactly X, Y and all variables Z in V lying on a path from X to Y in <V, F>. Say that a causal network N connecting X to Y is self-contained iff for all ZN, if Z has parents in N, then Z takes a default value when all of its parents in N take their default values and all of its parents in V \ N take their actual values. According to Hitchcock, counterfactual dependence is necessary and sufficient for actual causation in a selfcontained network, a claim he formalizes as follows: TC: Let <V, F> be a causal model, let X, YV, and let X = x and Y = y. If the causal network connecting X to Y in <V, F> is self-contained, then X = x is an actual cause of Y = y in <V, F> if and only if the value of Y counterfactually depends on the value of X in <V, F>. If TC is a correct description of the psychology of causal attribution, we can make predictions provided we have the right causal model and the right choice of default values for the variables in the model.vi Livengood et al. (ms) tested Hitchcock's TC using modified versions of a thought experiment due to Knobe. In one experiment, participants read a story about Lauren and Jane, who work at a company with an unstable computer system such that if more than one person logs in at the same time, the system crashes. Participants are told that one day, both women log into the system at the same time, and it crashes. They were then asked to rate their level of agreement with the following three claims: (1) Lauren caused the system to crash, (2) Jane caused the system to crash, and (3) the instability in the system caused it to crash. The results are pictured in Figure 3. Figure 3: Causal Attributions in Lauren and Jane Experiment Whether the data confirm or disconfirm TC as a model of causal attribution depends crucially on the choice of default values for the variables. If the default values for Lauren and Jane are "logs in," then the experiment confirms Hitchcock's account. But if the default values are "does not log in," then the experiment is disconfirming. Livengood et al. argue that on Hitchcock's account, the default value for Lauren and for Jane is "does not log in," since the act of logging in is a voluntary departure from a rest state. But plausibly, participants regarded the actions of Lauren and Jane as having default status because they were in some sense normal actions in the circumstances.vii Such a possibility calls for more research on how people make normality judgments and on which kinds of normality judgments matter for causal attributions. We take up the latter topic in the next section. 4. Varieties of Norms and Their Influence Hitchcock and Knobe (2009) suggest that normative considerations matter for causal attributions in virtue of the fact that paying attention to what is abnormal helps an agent to choose which counterfactuals to evaluate in a given context. The distinction between causes and mere background conditions, for example, depends on judgments of normality. Normal states of affairs are regarded as potential enabling background conditions; whereas, abnormal states of affairs are regarded as potential causes. Hitchcock and Knobe were not the first to draw a connection between causation and abnormality: Hart and Honoré (1959) discuss the role of abnormality in causal attribution in the law; Hilton and Slugoski (1986) discuss the interplay between norm-violation and information called on by covariational models of causal attribution; and Kahneman and Miller (1986) discuss the role of category norms in causal attributions.viii The main novelty in Hitchcock and Knobe's theory-as we understand it-is that they explicitly treat norms and norm-violations as including much more than statistical facts or facts about how well one exemplifies membership in a natural kind or category. Hitchcock and Knobe argue that only overall judgments of normality matter for causal attributions. However, they distinguish three types of norms relevant to causal attributions: statistical norms, prescriptive norms, and norms of proper functioning. Statistical norms have to do with what is typical or atypical. For example, a lightning strike in a forest is atypical, violating a statistical norm. But the presence of oxygen in the forest is typical, conforming to a statistical norm. By contrast, prescriptive norms have to do with what is right or wrong. For example, jaywalking violates a prescriptive norm, even if people regularly do so. And telling the complete truth to the police conforms to a prescriptive norm, even if people only rarely do so. Finally, norms of proper functioning concern the behavior of mechanisms designed or selected to do a specific thing. For example, a smoke detector that beeps just in case there is smoke conforms to a norm of proper functioning, while a bicycle with a stuck brake violates a norm of proper functioning. In what follows, we will consider some recent evidence regarding the extent of the influence of various normative considerations on causal attributions. Evidence that normative considerations affect judgments of actual causation comes from a range of studies, although the studies do not always support the theoretical picture advocated by Hitchcock and Knobe. Knobe and Fraser (2009) provided evidence that ordinary causal attributions are influenced by prescriptive norms in their pen case: The receptionist in the philosophy department keeps her desk stocked with pens. The administrative assistants are allowed to take pens, but faculty members are supposed to buy their own. The administrative assistants typically do take the pens. Unfortunately, so do the faculty members. The receptionist repeatedly e-mails them reminders that only administrators are allowed to take the pens. On Monday morning, one of the administrative assistants encounters Professor Smith walking past the receptionist's desk. Both take pens. Later that day, the receptionist needs to take an important message...but she has a problem. There are no pens left on her desk. When asked to indicate the extent to which the administrative assistant and the professor caused the problem, participants were much more likely to indicate that the professor was a cause of the problem. Further evidence for the claim that prescriptive norms influence causal attributions is adduced in Kominsky et al. (2014). Hitchcock and Knobe (2009) provide some evidence that norms of proper functioning also matter to causal attribution in their wires case: A machine is set up in such a way that it will short circuit if both the black wire and the red wire touch the battery at the same time. The machine will not short circuit if just one of these wires touches the battery. The black wire is designated as the one that is supposed to touch the battery, while the red wire is supposed to remain in some other part of the machine. One day, the black wire and the red wire both end up touching the battery at the same time. There is a short circuit. (p. 604) After reading the wires case, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they thought the red or black wires touching the battery caused the machine to short circuit. Hitchcock and Knobe found that people were more willing to say that the red wire's touching the battery was an actual cause of the short circuit. Figure 4: Hitchcock and Knobe (2009) Wires Case Hitchcock and Knobe explain their finding by appealing to the fact that according to its design, the red wire is not supposed to be touching the battery. Roxborough and Cumby (2009) modified Knobe and Fraser's pen case so that the administrative assistants do not typically take pens. They found that participants in their study made lower causal ratings for the professor than did participants in Knobe and Fraser's study. Roxborough and Cumby take this to provide support for the claim that statistical norm violations do, indeed, affect folk judgments of actual causation. Sytsma et al. (2012) distinguish two subtypes of statistical norm: population-level and agent-level.ix Sytsma et al. found that causal attributions were not sensitive to violations of population-level statistical norms and that while the agent-level statistical norms they tested mattered, they did so in the exact opposite way as that predicted by Hitchcock and Knobe: agent-typical behaviors were more likely to be judged as causes than were agent-atypical behaviors. The upshot is that we have good evidence that normative considerations affect causal attributions, but we do not currently have a good theoretical model describing precisely how they do so. 5. Causal Attributions and the Desire to Blame A further wrinkle in providing an adequate account of causal attribution is the influence of a desire to blame on causal attributions. The best current account of the way praise and blame figure in causal attribution is Alicke's Culpable Control Model (Alicke 1992, 2000; Alicke and Rose 2010; Alicke, Rose, and Bloom 2011). According to the CCM, in the realm of harmful and offensive actions, ordinary causal attributions are biased by a desire to blame those who we evaluate negatively. We exaggerate an actor's causal role in bringing about an event since doing so allows us to support our desire to blame the actor.x In support of the CCM, Alicke, Rose, and Bloom (2011) conducted experiments suggesting that blame judgments cause ordinary causal attributions. Participants read a story in which a character named Edward Poole is shot by a character named Mr. Turnbull in Turnbull's home. Alicke et al. varied whether Poole was characterized positively or negatively and the mode of Poole's death. Participants in the positive condition were told that Poole was a physician who was house-sitting for the Turnbulls while they were out of town. Participants in the negative condition were told that Poole was an ex-convict who had broken into the house. In each of the positive and negative characterization conditions, participants were told that Mr. Turnbull shot Poole in the chest. Each participant was told one of three things about the gunshot and Poole's death-that the shot killed Poole instantly or that the shot killed Poole but he had an inoperable terminal brain tumor or that Poole had an aneurysm at almost the same time that he was shot. In all conditions, participants rated the extent to which Mr. Turnbull was the cause of Poole's death and the extent to which Mr. Turnbull was deserving of blame. Alicke et al. found that ratings of blame statistically screen off the way Poole is characterized (positively or negatively) from causal ratings, indicating that blame ratings mediate the effect of Poole's characterization on causal attributions. Moreover, they found that although the mode of Poole's death was independent of the way Poole was characterized, those two variables were dependent conditional on causal attributions. They thus inferred that the correct causal model for participants in their experiment is as pictured in Figure 5. Figure 5: Causal Graph for Poole Experiment Since the pattern of counterfactual dependence is the same in both the positive and negative conditions, the Poole Experiment suggests that in some cases, what matters for causal attribution is not the salience of various counterfactuals-as maintained by the structural and norm-violation views we have seen so far-but the desire to blame. Experiments like the Poole Experiment raise a difficult problem in many cases as to whether the observed causal attributions are due to sensitivity to norms or rather are due to sensitivity to a desire to blame. Hence, in many instances, the CCM is in competition with norm-violation accounts of causal attribution, though we think that it is possible for some version of both views to be correct. 6. Open Questions and Neglected Topics We are now nearly out of space, so it's time to wrap things up. We have seen that graphical models offer an interesting way to unify much ongoing research on the problem of causal attribution. We considered some purely structural models of causal attribution and some of their limitations. We looked at one attempt to augment structural models with a default-deviant distinction and one serious modeling challenge for such approaches. We reviewed some research suggesting that norms influence causal attributions and some research suggesting that causal attributions are biased by a desire to blame people. The questions addressed by the research we have reviewed are mostly still open. In closing, we want to mention a few more open questions and some issues that we did not have time to talk about in any detail. One big question is the scope of the influence of norms on causal attribution. Causal attributions have been shown to happen in a wide range of cases that seem to lack norms of the sort that figure in Hitchcock and Knobe's account. These range from cases of launching and causal perception (Michotte 1963; Scholl and Tremoulet 2000; Scholl and Nakayama 2002), to related force dynamics cases (Talmy 1988; Wolff 2007), to attributions based on touch (Wolff et al. ms), to covariational cases (Danks et al. 2013), to simple vignette cases like Livengood's voting experiment. Normative considerations matter, but they are not the whole story for causal attribution. And it is an open question exactly when and why they matter. Another big question hinted at but not explicitly raised in this chapter is whether sensitivity of causal attributions to normative considerations, the desire to blame or praise, and so on is best understood as a standard to be embraced or as a bias to be avoided. Two related issues come up at this point. The first is whether the concept of causation itself has normative content. If the ordinary concept of causation is fundamentally normative in character (as suggested by McGrath 2005 and in a different way by Sytsma et al. 2012), then it is unsurprising and (perhaps) unthreatening that ordinary causal attributions are sensitive to normative considerations. But now the second issue arises. What exactly is the point of attributing causation? By what standard should we judge the success or failure of causal attributions? What benefit accrues to an agent in virtue of her ability to solve a causal attribution problem? Some attention has been paid to these and related questions, but much more research needs to be done (see Hitchcock and Knobe 2009 and Danks 2013 for illuminating work on these issues and Fisher 2014 for a basic framework within which experimental philosophy of this sort might proceed). Related to these concerns is another issue that arises in many areas of experimental philosophy: namely, to what extent should we trust ordinary intuitions (whatever those are) about causation? The answer may very well depend on an interaction between the shape our concept takes and the ends to which we put that concept (see Korman 2009; Rose 2015; and Rose and Schaffer ms, for discussions of these issues in a different setting). 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See Livengood (2013) for much more detail. iv A total of 196 participants were recruited on the Philosophical Personality website and randomly assigned to either the counterfactual-dependence vignette or to the no-counterfactual-dependence vignette. Of the 103 assigned to the dependence vignette, 71 said that Greg was a cause of Smith winning (68.9%); whereas, of the 93 assigned to the no-dependence vignette, 33 said that Greg was a cause of Smith winning (35.5%). A chi-square test of proportions shows that the proportion of "yes" answers was statistically significantly different in the two conditions: χ2 = 20.63, df = 1, p = 5.6e-6. According to Cohen's h, the effect size is given by h = arcsin(0.689) – arcsin(0.355) = 0.397, which would ordinarily be classified as somewhere between a small and a medium effect. Both proportions were also statistically different from chance, though in different directions. v Purely structural accounts of actual causation must treat isomorphic causal structures the same way. Chockler and Halpern's account as well as Gerstenberg and Lagnado's development are purely structural, and the Overdetermination and Bogus Prevention cases appear to be isomorphic. And yet, the Overdetermination and Bogus Prevention cases appear to elicit different judgments. If the cases are really isomorphic and if ordinary people really say different things about the two, then the accounts are deficient. No data has been gathered on this question as far as we know. Moreover, Blanchard and Schaffer (forthcoming) argue that the simple model on which Overdetermination and Bogus Prevention appear to be isomorphic is not apt and that differences in the judgments elicited by Overdetermination and Bogus Prevention may be explained by differences in the structural models that are appropriate for the two cases. vi What makes a choice of causal model or default values the right one depends on one's goals and on one's attitudes toward psychological models. For example, if the goal is to say how the cognitive mechanism works, the right causal model and default values will need to reflect representations that people actually have, but if the goal is more instrumental, the right causal model and default values might just be the ones that let a researcher reliably predict behavior. vii An interesting alternative suggested by Knobe (personal communication) is that deviant status might be something that comes in degrees, and that people might regard an event as more causal to the extent that it is deviant. Halpern and Hitchcock (forthcoming) provide one framework for integrating graded causality, norms, and pivotality. viii Hitchcock and Knobe were well-aware of previous work on the relation between abnormality and causation. They explicitly discuss Hart and Honoré, Kahneman and Miller, Hilton, and others in their paper. ix Population-level statistical norms are statistical norms relative to a group of individuals. For instance, it's a population-level statistical norm that two year old children don't smoke: statistically speaking, two year old children, as a group, tend not to smoke cigarettes. In contrast, agent-level statistical norms are statistical norms relative to a particular agent's pattern of behavior. For instance, Aldi is a two year old who smokes every day (http://abcnews.go.com/Health/smoking-baby-today/story?id=14453373). While Aldi's smoking a cigarette is abnormal at the population level, it's a normal behavior for him. x For ease, we are only discussing the role of blame in causal judgment. But, as Alicke, Rose, and Bloom (2011) argue, causal assessments can also be influenced by a desire to praise.

GLOBAL JUSTICE : THEORY PRACTICE RHETORIC (9/1) 2016 PHILIP PETTIT The Globalized Republican Ideal Abstract: The concept of freedom as non-domination that is associated with neorepublican theory provides a guiding ideal in the global, not just the domestic arena, and does so even on the assumption that there will continue to be many distinct states. It argues for a world in which states do not dominate members of their own people and, considered as a corporate body, no people is dominated by other agencies: not by other states and not, for example, by any international agency or multi-national corporation. This ideal is not only attractive in the abstract, it also supports a concrete range of sensible, if often radical international policies. Keywords: freedom, republicanism, non-domination, global justice • Introduction How to apply neo-republican thinking to the international realm?1 How to take the ideal of freedom as non-domination and use it to identify an image of the global order that might plausibly be considered just? 1 An up-to-date list of English works in neo-republican thought should include these books: P. Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Q. Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); W. Brugger, Republican Theory in Political Thought: Virtuous or Virtual (New York: Macmillan, 1999); L. Halldenius, Liberty Revisited (Lund: Bokbox Publications, 2001); I. Honohan, Civic Republicanism (London: Routledge, 2002); M. Viroli, Republicanism (New York: Hill and Wang, 2002); J. Maynor, Republicanism in the Modern World (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003); F. Lovett, Justice as Nondomination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); J. L. Marti and P. Pettit, A Political Philosophy in Public Life: Civic Republicanism in Zapatero's Spain (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); E. MacGilvray, The Invention of Market Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); P. Pettit, On the People's Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); A. Gourevitch, From Slavery to the Cooperative Commonwealth: Labor and Republican Liberty in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014); P. Pettit, Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World (New York: W.W.Norton and Co., 2014b); these collections of papers: M. van Gelderen and Q. Skinner, Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); D. Weinstock and C. Nadeau (eds.), Republicanism: History, Theory and Practice (London: Frank Cass, 2004); I. Honohan and J. Jennings (eds.), Republicanism in Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 2006); C. Laborde and J. Maynor (eds.), Republicanism and Political Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007); S. Besson and J. L. Marti, Law and Republicanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); A. Niederbeger and P. Schink (eds.), Republican Democracy: Liberty, Law and Politics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012); B. J. Buckinx, J. Trejo-Mathys and T. Waligore (eds), Domination and Global Political Justice: Conceptual, Historical, and Institutional Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2015); and a number of studies that deploy the conception of freedom as non-domination, broadly understood: J. Braithwaite and P. Pettit, Not Just Deserts: A Republican Theory of Criminal Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); H. Richardson, Democratic Autonomy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); S. Slaughter, Liberty beyond Neo-Liberalism: A Republican Critique of Liberal Government in a Globalising Age (London: Macmillan Palgrave, 2005); R. Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defense of the Constitutionality of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); J. Bohman, Democracy Across Borders: From Demos to Demoi (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007); C. Laborde, Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); S. White and D. Leighton (eds.), Building a Citizen Society: The Emerging Politics of Republican Democracy (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 2008); J. Braithwaite, H. Charlesworth and A. Soares, Networked Governance of Freedom and Tyranny: Peace in East Timor (Canberra: ANU Press, 2012). For a recent review of work in the tradition see F. Lovett and P. Pettit, 'Neo-Republicanism: A Normative and Institutional Research Program', Annual Review of Political Science 12 (2009), 18-29. 48 GLOBAL JUSTICE : THEORY PRACTICE RHETORIC (9/1) 2016 THE GLOBALIZED REPUBLICAN IDEAL This question needs to be addressed against the background of empirical assumptions about the sort of order that is feasible across the globe. Thus it might be addressed on the relaxed assumption that any sort of order is possible, including a stateless order at one extreme, a world state at the other. Or it might be addressed on the stricter assumption that an order of states of the kind with which we are all familiar is more or less bound to continue in existence, although perhaps with some modifications to the boundaries and the powers of different states. I consider the question here on the basis of this second assumption, because it is hard to see how the world could cease to be organized on a state-bound pattern.2 Assuming that every state is going to care about the welfare of all or at least some of its members – surely a functional precondition of its survival – it is rarely going to be in the interest of any state to abdicate unilaterally; that would simply be to allow some other state to take over its territory. Thus states are individually locked into the state-bound order that they collectively create. And short of their agreeing to abdicate together in favor of some different order – surely, a highly unlikely scenario – they are bound to maintain the status quo, each asserting a claim to a monopoly of legitimate force in their own territory. To take this line about the assumptions against which to explore the republican approach is not to deny the interest of considering the approach on the basis of other assumptions too. It may well be that the republican ideal would be better satisfied in a stateless world or under a world state. And it would certainly be interesting to explore the implications of the ideal under such conditions.3 It's just that that is not what I propose to do here. What does the republican ideal of freedom as non-domination imply for the international order, under the state-bound assumption? I argue that it supports two related ideals: two ideals that are so related, indeed, that they prove, as we shall see later, to be two aspects of the same ideal. First, human beings should be organized into free peoples – peoples whose members count as suitably undominated – with everyone belonging to at least one such group. And, second, free peoples should constitute corporate bodies that enjoy freedom as non-domination in their relations with one another and with other global bodies. These two ideals are relatively utopian, in the sense that the actual world falls far short of realizing them. Having given an account of the ideals in the 2 See too C. Laborde and M. Ronzoni, 'What is a Free State? Republican Internationalism and Globalization', Political Studies (Forthcoming). 3 Bohman (2007), J. L. Marti, 'A Global Republic to Prevent Global Domination?' Diacritica 24 (2010), 31-72; J. L. Marti, 'Republican Freedom, Nondomination and Global Constitutionalism', in R. Uitz (ed.), Freedom and its Enemies. The Tragedy of Liberty (The Hague: Eleven, 2015). 49 GLOBAL JUSTICE : THEORY PRACTICE RHETORIC (9/1) 2016 PHILIP PETTIT first two sections of the paper, then, I comment briefly on their practical implications in the third. These implications bear on which agencies should act for the realization of the ideals and what obligations they might be required to discharge in pursuing them. One final comment may be useful before proceeding with the argument. The republican approach belongs to a family of philosophies that take the yardstick of political progress to be, not modally undemanding benefits like pleasure or preference-satisfaction or even distributive equality, but modally demanding benefits like freedom as non-domination. These include freedom as independence,4 non-subordination5 and social equality.6 Where modally undemanding benefits require that things be contingently thus and so, modally demanding benefits require that they be robustly thus and so: that the actual benefit involved – say, non-interference or equal status - should continue to be available even under counterfactual circumstances where others turn indifferent or hostile or whatever.7 Expanding on this idea, you do not enjoy freedom as non-domination or independence just by virtue of actually escaping interference; it must also be that you would not suffer interference even if you had wished to act otherwise or others had not wanted you to be able to act on your wishes. And you do not enjoy non-subordination or social equality just by virtue of not actually counting as inferior to others; it must also be the case that you are guaranteed not to count as inferior, no matter how others individually happen to regard you: that is, guaranteed to enjoy non-inferiority robustly over variations in their individual attitudes towards you. A full discussion of the themes of this paper would require an investigation of what each of these robust ideals would support in the international world, not just a discussion of the republican ideal. But space makes it impossible to extend the discussion to those issues. 4 A. Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant's Legal and Political Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009); L. Valentini, Justice in a Globalized World: A Normative Framework (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 5 N. Kolodny, 'Rule over None I: What Justifies Democracy?', Philosophy and Public Affairs 42 (2014a), 195-229; N. Kolodny, 'Rule over None II: Social Equality and the Justification of Democracy', Philosophy and Public Affairs 42 (2014b), 287-336. My assumption that non-subordination is modally demanding may not actually be congenial to Kolodny himself. 6 E. Anderson, 'What is the Point of Equality', Ethics 109 (1999), 287-337; S. Scheffler, 'Choice, Circumstance and the Value of Equality', Politics, Philosophy and Economics 4 (2005), 5-28. On which side of the divide should we place the functioning capability approach that A. Sen, Commodities and Capabilities (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1985), and M. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2006) defend? I have argued elsewhere that it is best interpreted - admittedly, however, the interpretation is charitable - as supportive of a robustly demanding good in much the same way as freedom as non-domination; see P. Pettit, 'Capability and Freedom: A Defence of Sen', Economics and Philosophy 17 (2001), 1-20. For a recent defense of a related form of robustness, see M. Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011), p. 165, which is based on A. de-Shalit and J. Wolff, Disadvantage (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007). I am grateful to Julian Culp for advice on this issue. 7 P. Pettit, The Robust Demands of the Good: Ethics with Attachment, Virtue and Respect (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015c). 50 GLOBAL JUSTICE : THEORY PRACTICE RHETORIC (9/1) 2016 THE GLOBALIZED REPUBLICAN IDEAL Thus I limit the discussion to the requirements of the republican ideal, not to the demands of those neighboring ideals. And, as already indicated, I limit it also to what the republican ideal requires on my particular understanding of that ideal and under my particular assumptions about feasible conditions. Thus I neglect much of what has been written from within other republican perspectives – see the various contributions in Buckinx, Trejo-Mathys and Waligore (2015) – and speak for myself alone.8 Human Beings Should be Organized Into Free Peoples State and People In order to introduce the notion of a free people, we need to be clear about what a people is. And in order to be clear about that we need in turn to have an agreed conception of the state. The state, as it is conceived in international law, is a corporate entity with a more or less well defined population and territory that claims the right to a monopoly in the exercise of coercion within its boundaries and a right to represent its people without.9 The state performs in the manner of an agent insofar as it espouses purposes or goals that it more or less reliably pursues and conducts that pursuit under the guidance of more or less reliably formed judgments or beliefs about the circumstances of action. But the state is not an agent in the fashion of a mute agent such as a simple robot or animal. Like other corporate bodies such as churches and associations and businesses – and like individual human beings – it speaks for itself in the manner of a conversable agent or person. Thus the state does not just leave it to others to interpret its attitudes. It uses words to avow and even pledge its attitudes, inviting others to rely on its living up to those words – that is, to act as the attitudes they convey would require it to act – and exposing itself to complaint and sanction in the event that it fails to do so.10 The state supports such avowals and pledges in legislating on the forms of behavior possible and permissible within its boundaries; in entering into arrangements with other international bodies, in particular other states; and in putting forward policies for the realization of certain governmental goals, 8 The paper recasts in a different pattern some of the views presented in P. Pettit, 'Legitimate International Institutions: A Neorepublican Perspective', in J. Tasioulas and S. Besson (eds.), The Philosophy of Intenational Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); P. Pettit, 'The Republican Law of Peoples: A Restatement', in B. Buckinx, J. TrejoMathys and T. Waligore (eds.), Domination and Global Political Justice: Conceptual, Historical, and Institutional Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2015b), 37-70, and, at a popular level, in Pettit (2014b), Ch. 6). For a fine defense of a more or less congenial view see Laborde and Ronzoni (Forthcoming). 9 T. Nagel, 'The Problem of Global Justice', Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (2005), 113-47. 10 C. List and P. Pettit, Group Agency: The Possibility, Design and Status of Corporate Agents (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); P. Pettit, 'Group Agents are not Expressive, Pragmatic or Theoretical Fictions', Erkenntnis 79 (2014a), 1641-1662. 51 GLOBAL JUSTICE : THEORY PRACTICE RHETORIC (9/1) 2016 PHILIP PETTIT whether via the variable initiatives of elected authorities or via the standing operations of unelected, relatively independent bodies like the courts, an auditor general's office, a bureau of statistics, a variety of regulatory agencies, and a central bank.11 When a state speaks for itself via such different voices, of course – when it operates, in effect, under a mixed constitution – it has to have procedures for removing or renegotiating any conflicts of commitment; these may take any of a number of forms.12 Else, as Hobbes13 argued, it will represent 'not one person, nor one sovereign, but three persons, and three sovereigns'. But what now is a people? As I use the term, it is the body of individuals over whom a state exercises coercive, territorial rule and in whose name it claims to speak and act. Those individuals – or at least those who are adult, able-minded and more or less permanently resident – count as the citizens of the state. They may or may not have the common marks associated with a nation or culture or ethnicity; what unites them may just be their being organized under the same state. Thus there can be no people, on the conception I have in mind, without a state. And on the natural way of elaborating on that conception, there can be no state without a people. Wherever there is a state, there is a people for which that state claims to speak and act; and wherever there is a people, there must be a state that makes that claim in its regard. The state that makes such a claim may be the elaborate form of state with which we are familiar but equally, of course, it may be something much more rudimentary like a tribal authority.14 The first of the two global republican ideals requires that human beings be all organized as free peoples. Assuming that the earth is ordered in a state-bound manner, human beings are bound to be organized as peoples. What this first ideal of global order dictates is that those peoples should ideally constitute free peoples. The Notion of Freedom On the republican ideal of freedom as non-domination, you are free in making a given choice, whatever that choice may be, to the extent that you are not subject to a power of arbitrary interference on the part of another – you are not dominated – in making it. I will have a power of arbitrary interference in the choice to the extent that I have the ability to interfere intentionally in one of the options without your permission or control; in the limit case, I can interfere at no cost, with no difficulty, and subject to no opposition or obstruction. The interference I have the power to exercise comes itself in different varieties. 11 J. McLean, 'Government to State: Globalization, Regulation, and Governments as Legal Persons', Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 10 (2004), 173-97. 12 List and Pettit (2011), Ch. 3. 13 T. Hobbes (E. Curley, ed.), Leviathan (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), Ch. 29.16. 14 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford Unviersity Press, 1961). 52 GLOBAL JUSTICE : THEORY PRACTICE RHETORIC (9/1) 2016 THE GLOBALIZED REPUBLICAN IDEAL It may consist in removing an option or replacing an option by a penalized alternative, whether I take those initiatives covertly or overtly. Or it may consist just in misrepresenting the options to you, whether by deceiving you about the options, manipulating your grasp of the options, or making a bluff threat to remove or replace one of them.15 The ideal of being a free person is conceptualized in almost every tradition, and certainly within republican circles, as a universal ideal that everyone in a society ought to be able to enjoy at one and the same time. That means that being a free person can only require the enjoyment of freedom – say, freedom as non-domination – in certain choices available to all; for example, it cannot feasibly require the freedom to interfere arbitrarily with others. In the republican tradition, being a free person is conceptualized so that it requires the enjoyment of free choice – indeed the enjoyment of free choice under the protection of the laws – in the sphere of the basic or fundamental liberties.16 Consistently with the universality constraint, the basic liberties are required to be a set of choices that are not unnecessarily restricted in extent and that can be simultaneously exercised and enjoyed by everyone in the society: in that sense they are required to be compossible choice-sets.17 But different systems of law may identify somewhat different sets of basic liberties. One system might allow everyone the freedom to try to gain the upper hand in competitive exchanges, for example – this is implicit in the ideal of market freedom – while another might argue that competition of that kind ought to be severely regulated.18 By the most common accounts of the basic liberties, however – broadly defensible, as I see it, on republican premises – they ought to include some versions of the liberties of thought and speech, association and religion, occupation and residence, as well as the liberty of enjoying certain rights of ownership and exchange. How far does someone have to be protected – and, as it may have to be, socially and personally resourced – in the exercise of their basic liberties, in order to count as a free person? A plausible index of the level of protection and resourcing required is the following eyeball test: that the protection should enable the person to be able to look others in the eye - by the strictest local standards - without anyone else's power of interference giving them 15 Domination, as it is defined here, can exist only between agents, individual or corporate. But to live under structures that facilitate domination by other agents - private or public domination, to anticipate a distinction made later - is to be subject to structural domination (Pettit (2012) and Pettit (2014b)). Relieving agential domination will often argue in the first place for combatting such structural domination. 16 Pettit (2012). 17 H. Steiner, An Essay on Rights (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). 18 In this case the ideal of not unnecessarily restricting the basic liberties is likely to argue for market freedom but the issue is ultimately one for the society as a whole to resolve. 53 GLOBAL JUSTICE : THEORY PRACTICE RHETORIC (9/1) 2016 PHILIP PETTIT reason for fear or deference. This test fits well with the image of the liber - in English, the freeman - celebrated in the long republican tradition from Rome to the Renaissance, and from seventeenth century England to America of the revolutionary period. The Basic Notion of a Free People Assume that the citizens of a state do relatively well in the enjoyment of a plausible set of basic liberties that the law defines. What, then, is required if they are to count as a free people: a body of free individuals? That the members of a society enjoy a suitable level of protection and resourcing under the law means that they do not suffer domination at one another's hands, or at the hands of various associations or businesses that they may construct; they have a level of private non-domination that enables them to look one another in the eye without reason for fear or deference. But the members of the society might enjoy this private non-domination under the rule of a benevolent colonial government, or a benevolent local elite, or indeed a benevolent despot. And in that case, plausibly, they would be subject to public domination. They would live under a state that provided quite well for them in their relations with one another but that had a power of arbitrary interference in their individual lives. In this hypothetical scenario, the state does actually serve them well as a state - as a source of private, protective law - but it is not under any pressure to continue to do so. For all the constraints imposed by nature, or by people in concert, it can choose to serve some or all citizens very badly indeed; its serving them well is due to its being of a good will, not due to its will being constrained to provide such a service.19 This observation points us towards a plausible account of what it is for a people to be free. The citizens of a state will count as free just to the extent that they each avoid public domination by their state. And even a state that does very well in guarding against private domination will dominate its members publicly to the extent that it operates according to an alien will: to the extent that it can interfere with them individually according to its own will, without cost or difficulty, opposition or obstruction. Those uninvolved in government - and in the colonial extreme, none of them may be involved - will be subject to an arbitrary power that rules over them. What is required if citizens are to avoid public domination and constitute 19 The distinction between private and public domination raises the question as to how they should be ranked: the question, in effect, as to the relative importance of achieving private non-domination (social justice, as it might be taken) and public non-domination (political justice or legitimacy). On this issue see P. Pettit, 'The Asymmetry of Good and Evil', in M. Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 5 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015a), 15-37. 54 GLOBAL JUSTICE : THEORY PRACTICE RHETORIC (9/1) 2016 THE GLOBALIZED REPUBLICAN IDEAL a free people? It cannot be necessary that the state should act in a way that conforms to the will of each citizen, since individuals may disagree about what the state should do. Yet it cannot be sufficient that the state act only in a way that conforms to the will of the majority amongst them. This would be acceptable only in the vanishingly unlikely event that there were no more or less fixed minorities, say of an ethnic or religious kind, for whom a majoritarian state would represent an alien will. The condition necessary for the freedom of a people has to be, not that the state acts in a way that conforms to the will of each, but that it acts in a way that conforms to terms that everyone acquiesces in imposing on the state. Or if not everyone, at least everyone who accepts that they are not special. Let someone reject this condition in their own case, denying the moral equality of citizens, and there is no plausible normative ground on which they might claim a share in control of the state. Henceforth I shall assume that citizens all accept this constraint of moral equality. People will agree about the terms to be imposed on the state insofar as their rival arguments about state policy presuppose converging reference points or standards. Such common standards – say, of equality or prosperity, freedom of speech and association, rule of law or popular election – are likely to materialize over the long haul of debate and compromise. Or at least they are likely to do so under the assumption that no ideology is going to survive a culture in which argument and debate is the order of the day. People will impose their terms on the state insofar as they force those in authority to disavow standardincompatible policies – let any government agency promote such policies and it will face opposition and dismissal – and to rely only on standard-compatible processes in choosing between rival policies that conform to the standards. We cannot hope to look here at how this sort of condition might be institutionally realized; see Pettit (2012) and Pettit (2014b) for the sketch of a model. But without exploring those possibilities, we are in a position to see that the condition envisaged is likely to prove sufficient as well as necessary for countering public domination and making a people free. Were the state to operate under the dispensation envisaged – a rule of common standards, we might call it – then the authorities within the state might enjoy a certain degree of discretion. But they would enjoy such discretion only within the limits imposed by the people they govern. They would not have a power of interfering arbitrarily in people's lives, only a power of interfering under popularly imposed constraints: that is, of interfering on the people's terms. 55 GLOBAL JUSTICE : THEORY PRACTICE RHETORIC (9/1) 2016 PHILIP PETTIT A Test for the Freedom of a People But would the limitation imposed thereby be enough to ensure public nondomination? It would be enough, plausibly, if it satisfied an index – the toughluck test – that pairs nicely with the eyeball test mentioned earlier. Citizens are most likely to have reason to see the state as a dominating presence in their life when it introduces a law or policy that favors others in a competition of interests or that goes against their views as to the laws or policies that are for the common good. Perhaps it involves a law that reduces the chance of immigration by family members elsewhere, or a form of taxation that affects their particular business, or a policy that would lead to the construction of a prison in their particular neighborhood. A good index of the state's not dominating its citizens, then, will be the absence of any reason for them to think of the initiative in such a case as the product of a hostile or indifferent or partial will. They can reasonably think of the setback, in the way they might think of a natural catastrophe, as just tough luck. They can see it as the product of a system that operates, not under the direction of a particular will, but according to terms that all the citizenry agree in imposing on government. Returning to the main line of thought, then, the first element in the republican ideal of global order is that the human beings on earth should be organized as free peoples or, equivalently, that they should live under the rule of states that avoid public domination: that is, under forms of government that satisfy the tough-luck test for being properly controlled by their own members or citizens. Without going into detail on how it might be institutionally implemented, it should be clear that this is a high ideal; that we may have to live for the foreseeable future in a world that falls far short of achieving it; and that in the interim we may have to settle for a certain threshold of approximation as a goal at which to aim. Even the best states in existence fail in some measure to establish the sort of popular control envisaged. That observation raises the question of what then are the practical implications of the ideal. But before turning to that issue we need to look first at the second republican ideal of global order. Free Peoples Should Enjoy Freedom as Non-Domination The People as an Agent, Externally Free We saw earlier that every state must count as an agent, indeed as an agent of a conversable kind that presents its actions as answerable to its words. If a state is subject to the control of its citizens, however, then the actions of its official authorities – those, for example, in the executive, legislature or judiciary – can be ascribed, not just to the state, but to the body of the people as a whole. The 56 GLOBAL JUSTICE : THEORY PRACTICE RHETORIC (9/1) 2016 THE GLOBALIZED REPUBLICAN IDEAL state, in John Rawls's20 words will be 'the political organization of the people'. Thus we the citizens of a state can think of the laws it introduces, the treaties it enters or the policies it pursues as laws, treaties and policies that we the people endorse. We the people will count as an agent on the basis that the entity that speaks and acts for us – the state – is itself an agent and relates to us, the people, as to a principal. Once we recognize that a free people is an agent, however, we can see that even if it is publicly un-dominated from within – even if its members control the state under which they live – it may still be dominated from without. It may be subject to a power of arbitrary interference on the part of other global agents. Those agents may be stronger states or transnational churches, terrorist networks or multinational corporations, or indeed the sorts of bodies, such as the World Bank, the IMF or the World Trade Organization, that are set up by international treaty.21 Any body of that type will have a power of arbitrary interference in the decisions of a free people – in effect, the decisions of the state that speaks and acts for that people – to the extent that it has the ability to remove various options otherwise available in those decisions, or replace them by penalized alternatives, whether in a covert or overt manner; or, indeed, to the extent that it can deceive or manipulate that people in the exercise of those decisions, or expose it to credible, bluff threats. The forms that interference might take in the decisions of a people or state are various. Another state might intervene militarily to remove or penalize certain of the available options. Or it might intervene economically to impose sanctions that dramatically alter the character of one or more of the options involved, as when the option of annexing a certain territory gets to be the option of annexingthat-territory-and-paying-the-economic-cost. Or it might threaten to make it difficult for that state to secure entry or acceptance in important international forums or agreements in the event of its not taking a certain option in one of those decisions. The possibilities of domination in the decisions of a people are not limited, of course, to the powers of another state or group of states. A transnational church might threaten to expose some members of that people to a feared, religious form of sanction - some variety of excommunication or interdiction or fatwah - unless the people go along with its wishes. A military network might expose it to threats of terror unless it agrees to satisfy certain demands. A multinational corporation might let it be understood that if the people or their state does not reduce corporation tax, or weaken environmental regulations, or remove certain 20 J. Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 26. 21 Laborde and Ronzoni (Forthcoming). 57 GLOBAL JUSTICE : THEORY PRACTICE RHETORIC (9/1) 2016 PHILIP PETTIT workplace regulations, it will relocate to another country and cause problems of unemployment. Or an international agency might threaten to withhold certain important forms of recognition or assistance unless the people or state agrees to take one of the options endorsed by that agency. The Sovereign Liberties We saw earlier that an individual does not suffer domination as a person, and does not fail to count as a free person – a liber, in the Roman sense – just because of being inhibited from performing certain actions: say, actions injurious to others. What freedom as a person requires is, first, that the individual should not suffer domination in a suitable set of publicly identified basic liberties – choices that each can exercise and enjoy at the same time as others – and, second, that the individual should enjoy the protection and, if necessary, the resourcing of the law in the exercise of those choices. The possibilities otherwise open to others of interfering in someone's exercise of the basic liberties must be subjected to such costs and difficulties, by virtue of public laws and associated norms, that the person can look others in the eye without reason for fear or deference. The power of interference at the disposal of others must be reduced sufficiently, by local standards, for them to be able to enjoy that sort of equal status in dealing with any others. This observation teaches us an important lesson about what is going to be required for a free people to enjoy a free status in the society of peoples: to be free, not just in relation to its own state, but also in relation to alien powers. The individual person is one amongst many persons and can only expect to be able to avoid domination by other individuals in choices where all members of the society can be enabled to avoid it. And in the same way a people is one amongst many peoples and can only expect to be able to avoid domination by other bodies in choices where all peoples can be enabled to avoid it. The parallel suggests that as a person is free in the society of others just insofar as they enjoy protection and perhaps resourcing in the exercise of a common set of choices – the basic liberties – so a people will be free in the society of peoples just insofar as it enjoys protection and perhaps resourcing in the exercise of a common set of choices: in choices that we may describe, for want of a better term, as its sovereign liberties. The basic liberties defined by any system of law are going to be confined, as we saw, to liberties of acting in ways that do not directly harm others or adversely affect them in an indirect manner. The sovereign liberties that a free people may hope to exercise without external domination will naturally have to be limited in the same way. They will not include the liberties of interfering with other 58 GLOBAL JUSTICE : THEORY PRACTICE RHETORIC (9/1) 2016 THE GLOBALIZED REPUBLICAN IDEAL peoples in a military, economic or diplomatic manner, except perhaps by way of retaliation for previous offences; more on this in the next section. And of course they will not include liberties of one-sidedly exploiting global goods – natural resources such as fishing stocks, for example – or of one-sidedly contributing to global bads like harmful climate-change or the rise of bacteria that are resistant to antibiotics.22 The freedom of the individual person, understood on republican lines, is only possible on the basis of a system of law that serves to define the basic liberties for a society and to provide appropriate protection and resourcing for the person's exercise of their basic liberties. The freedom of the free people – in particular, its external freedom in relation to other bodies, including other peoples – is only possible, so we can now see, on the basis of an international order that serves two purposes. It helps to define the sovereign liberties relevant for each state; these may emerge only over the long haul of debate and compromise. And it helps to protect and perhaps resource individual peoples so that they can exercise and enjoy their sovereign liberties.23 That order might emerge on the basis of the ability of states to organize internationally in determining and policing the order appropriate and to organize individually or in concert with other similarly positioned states to defend their rights under that order. The sovereign liberties of peoples or states were given a radical interpretation in the wake of the seventeenth-century Westphalian treaties that established the international order that obtained more or less into the twentieth century. Under those treaties peoples – or rather their princes – were entitled to act more or less as they wished within their own boundaries or in territories and seas designated as international. Clearly the sovereign liberties that any people – ideally any free people – can expect to be granted under a contemporary international order are bound to be much more limited than that. The manifest unsustainability of various forms of activity by states – or by bodies like corporations over which states can gain control – means that it is imperative to establish clear limits on what each state can expect to be able to do or to license without facing international resistance or sanction. A major task in international political theory, then, is to work out the range of sovereign liberties – the domain of sovereign control – that ought to be accorded to free peoples in their dealings with one another and with other globally powerful bodies.24 22 The first neo-republican ideal requires that neither will they include the liberty of oppressing their own peoples in any manner. 23 M. Ronzoni, 'Two Conceptions of State Sovereignty and their Implications for Global Institutional Design', Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 15 (2012), 573-591. 24 Ronzoni (2012). 59 GLOBAL JUSTICE : THEORY PRACTICE RHETORIC (9/1) 2016 PHILIP PETTIT Gauging and Valuing a People's External Freedom These remarks give us a general conception, however abstract, of what is required for an internally free people to have freedom also in its relations to other peoples and other powers. But the observations leave two questions in place. One, what degree of protection do states have to enjoy in the exercise of their sovereign liberties in order for their peoples to count as free? Two, and even more significantly, why does the freedom of peoples matter? In answer to the first question, the natural response is that as in the other cases, we have to fall back on an intuitive index or test; there is no abstract metric of what counts as a sufficiency of protection or indeed resourcing. The test I suggest here is a straight-talk test. Different peoples enjoy freedom as nondomination in relation to others - and in relation to non-state bodies - to the extent that their representatives can talk straight in dealing with one another. This test is an analogue of the eyeball test used in determining whether people enjoy non-domination in relationship with one another although, admittedly, it is not quite so vivid or persuasive. The requirement is that there should be nothing - or at least nothing that is remediable over the long haul - to block a pattern of straight talking and square dealing among the representatives of different countries. While they may well resort to strategy in seeking to bargain with others, no one is forced to adopt the mealy-mouthed tones of the supplicant and not is entitled to adopt the tones of a master. The second question raised bears on why the domination of free peoples matters. Why is it important, not just that each people should live under an un-dominating state, but that the corporate body involved - the state and ultimately the people for which it speaks and acts - should not itself be subject to external domination? The question is important because, while it may be obvious why the freedom of an individual matters, it may not be so clear why the freedom of a corporate body or agent should have the same significance. The freedom of the individual human being is important insofar as it is an aspect of the person's ability to function well as an agent and is, by most lights, something manifestly desirable. If not intrinsically good, it is at least a primary good in John Rawls's25 sense of the term: a good such that no matter what other goods you value and seek, you are likely to want it as a means to achieving those ends. Freedom as non-domination is essential if an agent is going to be able to pursue their own wishes without having to keep an eye on how far the pursuit will put them out of favor with the powerful. 25 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). 60 GLOBAL JUSTICE : THEORY PRACTICE RHETORIC (9/1) 2016 THE GLOBALIZED REPUBLICAN IDEAL The value of an individual's freedom as non-domination, which is hardly open to challenge, is sufficient to explain why the internal freedom of a people matters, as that was introduced in the first section: it would ensure that individual members of the people are not subject to the arbitrary power of the state under which they live. But the value of an individual's freedom as nondomination is also enough to explain why the freedom of a people in relation to external bodies matters as well. Insofar as a people is externally un-free – insofar as the state that represents them is subject to the arbitrary will of other bodies – its internal freedom is going to fail as well. Suppose the lack of external freedom means that the state is effectively hindered or inhibited from adopting certain sorts of laws or policies or initiatives. It is subject to constraints that it does not itself endorse, unlike the constraints that it may opt into endorsing, as under an international covenant or treaty. To the extent that that it lacks external freedom in this sense, it must also be true that citizens do not effectively control the state. Reflecting the power of outside dominators, the state will not be in the control of citizens alone and to one or another extent it will channel that external power into their lives. This means that whether or not we think there is disvalue in the domination as such of a corporate body – for the record, I do not think there is – we must recognize that there is disvalue in the domination of a free people: the domination of the state that speaks and acts for them. In order to be free, not only must a people be un-dominated by the state; that state in turn must be un-dominated from without.26 The Expanded Notion of a Free People The first part of the global republican ideal presupposes a characterization of a free people as a body of citizens none of whom is dominated by the state. But what we can now see is that the second part has the same claim as the first to figure in the definition of a free people. The second does not represent an ideal that a people might or might not enjoy in addition to the first, and yet remain a free people. Rather it identifies an ideal that a people must satisfy, equally with the first, if it is to count as free.27 There are two aspects to the freedom of a people, then, and the freedom of the citizens who comprise a people. One of them looks to the constitution of power in the make-up of the state – this is the aspect stressed in the first global 26 This means that international regulation may be essential for national democracy. On related points see J. Habermas, The Postnational Constellation (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001). 27 See too Laborde and Ronzoni (Forthcoming). 61 GLOBAL JUSTICE : THEORY PRACTICE RHETORIC (9/1) 2016 PHILIP PETTIT republican ideal – and the other looks to the constitution of power in the global space within which the state operates. That space is occupied by other states as well as by transnational churches, power networks, commercial corporations and international agencies. No matter how free a people is on the inside – no matter how far individual citizens control their state – a people can only be free insofar as an outside condition is satisfied too. That condition is that the space it inhabits is curved to the requirements of the freedom of the body that its members constitute. The other bodies in that space must be sufficiently restricted by a common international order to let the people enjoy security in the exercise of its sovereign liberties. The Practical Implications of the Globalized Republican Ideal The Addressees of Global Political Theory If we endorse the global republican ideal in its two aspects, the next question that arises is what practical initiatives this ideal would support. But initiatives for whom? Any political manifesto as to what ought ideally to be the case constitutes only an aesthetic – a metaphysical wish-list – if it fails to identify a relevant set of agents to whom it recommends the ideal, in particular a set of agents who are positioned to do something about it. Who then are the agents that global political theory ought to address? Ideally it ought to target agents who can understand the ideals it proposes and are in a position to act on them; they are able to nudge the global order in an appropriate direction, if not actually to transform the way things are. So are there agents with a capacity, on the one hand, to understand and be moved by consideration of the ideal proposed here and, on the other to be able to take steps, however incremental, towards the implementation of that ideal? Individual human beings are certainly capable of understanding the appeal of the ideal and, so long as they can coordinate with one another in acting, to help advance its realization. But they can coordinate reliably with one another, and do so over the time required for having a serious impact, only if they form corporate agents that are capable of embracing the ideal and letting it dictate what they seek to achieve. So an important question in global political theory is whether there are already in existence corporate agents that might reasonably be challenged to recognize the ideal described and charged with doing something to implement it. There are three sorts of corporate body that come to mind immediately in response to this question. A first category are states, a second are the wholly or partly international agencies that states form or authorize for certain roles, and 62 GLOBAL JUSTICE : THEORY PRACTICE RHETORIC (9/1) 2016 THE GLOBALIZED REPUBLICAN IDEAL a third are the non-governmental bodies – some independent, some linked with organizations like churches – that pursue various global purposes. Are all these bodies constituted in such a way that it makes sense to expect them to be able to heed the demands of the republican ideal? It may seem that many states are not going to be appropriate addressees for our theory, either because they are not suitably controlled by their peoples – they are authoritarian or even oppressive – or because it is patently in their interest to use their superior power against other states. But it is a striking fact that most states claim to speak and act for their own people, and to care about having a world of equally free peoples. This hypocrisy may just be the tribute that vice pays to virtue. But it means that even states that appear to flout the republican ideal in practice can be recruited to discussion of what an ideal of free peoples requires in this or that situation. If they display indifference to the ideal, say out of a wish to secure some particular result, then they will presumably suffer disesteem in the eyes of other states and find that their power of influence over those states – their soft power, as it has been described28 – is seriously diminished. As states may be treated as addressees of global political theory, and in particular of the republican ideal sketched here, so the same is true of formal international agencies and of INGOs: international non-governmental organizations. International agencies are generally constructed on the basis of national representation, with some deference to the realities of history and power, as in the fact that only five countries are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. And being representative of different states and peoples, such agencies are clearly well placed to hear arguments about ideals of global order. The same is even more clearly true of INGOs. These are organized on a voluntary basis to act across different countries for a variety of causes: for the claims of women or prisoners or refugees, or for causes like those of sustainable development or the relief of poverty, medical provision or the resolution of conflict. The main actors in the global scenario, and the primary addressees, are bound to be states and, in particular, the global or regional or interest-bound networks of states that are organized enough to be agents in their own right. If we can form an idea of the ends they ought to be seeking, and of how they ought to be constrained in pursuit of those ends, we will naturally have a sense of how INGO's, and indeed individual agents, should be behave in supporting or complementing that performance. 28 J. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Perseus Books, Public Affairs, 2004). 63 GLOBAL JUSTICE : THEORY PRACTICE RHETORIC (9/1) 2016 PHILIP PETTIT Is it possible to offer any indication, however abstract, of what republican ideal would counsel in the global arena? We can distinguish the broad ends that it would support into two categories, each with three salient elements. And we can also identify some constraints that it would put on state action in the international domain. Two Republican Sets of Ends The first category of republican ends involves those goals that states and agencies ought to pursue in establishing a non-dominating order within which free peoples can operate as equals. These goals are: • Identifying a common set of sovereign liberties that each people ought to be able to exercise with impunity, determining the global goods that argue for limitations on those liberties, and establishing an effective system of international law and justice in support of the move. • Ensuring against the dangers from criminal and terrorist networks and the powers of multinational corporations: these will naturally exploit the desire for foreign investment to encourage states to compete in lowering corporate tax, relaxing workplace regulations and reducing environmental standards. • Providing for shared initiatives to promote global goods, say in advancing sustainable development, in creating a non-dominating commercial order, in fostering public health, and in guarding against various forms of international free-riding. While I have presented these three ends as goals in the pursuit of which states can unite on a global basis, it is worth noting that sometimes they may be best promoted by less than fully international bodies: say, by particular states or by organizations of states with a common interest, regional or commercial. Thus it might well be in the interest of states with rich natural resources to combine together to guard against environmental degradation by the multinational mining companies they will often compete to attract. And it may well be essential for states that are weaker in certain ways, say on the economic front, to combine in resistance to stronger states rather than just relying on the protection of fully international bodies; those bodies may be subject to the undue influence of the stronger states. Apart from the three goals mentioned, there is also a second set of ends that we should require states and their organizations to pursue in light of republican ideals; they involve helping to remedy the problems that less fortunate peoples are liable to confront. 64 GLOBAL JUSTICE : THEORY PRACTICE RHETORIC (9/1) 2016 THE GLOBALIZED REPUBLICAN IDEAL • Resourcing the members of a people whose state fails to provide even for their basic welfare – fails to guard, for example, against famine or pestilence – where this resourcing is directed to getting the state back to par rather than leaving it in a dependent position. • When collateral costs allow, protecting the citizens of states against public discrimination or oppression by their own state, where this protection is aimed, like international resourcing, at getting the state back to a proper level of functioning. • Providing for refugees from countries where famine or pestilence, discrimination or oppression, has made it more or less impossible – perhaps by the evidence of the risks endured in flight – for them to stay and lead a normal life. Three Republican Constraints Where the ends in the first category are constitutive of the republican approach, identifying what is required in any possible world for a regime of equally free peoples, the ends in the second are remedial in character and identify what the approach would plausibly require of states and their organizations in a world as imperfect as ours. But the republican approach that supports the pursuit of ends in these two categories also argues that the states and organizations involved should act only under certain operational constraints. These are broadly of three kinds: • The organizations that states form should seek to elicit common standards that all can recognize - global public reasons - and to restrict themselves to policy objectives and decision-making processes that are consistent with those standards; otherwise they may dominate their own members. • The states that operate for remedial purposes under the lead of international organizations should do so on a multi-lateral basis, say in providing aid to the needy or relief to the oppressed; a single benefactor state might make the assisted people dependent on its goodwill and effectively dominate them.29 • Being disciplined by common standards, international interventions should only be undertaken when they are supported by currently recognized standards, not just by contestable ideals: say, when the cause of widely established human rights calls for intervention30 and not just the cause of an idealized set of rights.31 29 A. I. Applbaum, 'Forcing a People to be Free', Philosophy and Public Affairs 35 (2007), 359-400. 30 C. Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 31 Thus the domestic criterion of political legitimacy that determines when revolution is inappropriate - say, a criterion requiring a certain degree of internal freedom - may be more demanding than the international criterion of legitimacy: that is, the criterion determining when international intervention is inappropriate. 65 GLOBAL JUSTICE : THEORY PRACTICE RHETORIC (9/1) 2016 PHILIP PETTIT These comments should help to underline the possibility of deriving substantive recommendations on issues of international order from the globalized republican ideal. That is a high ideal insofar as it requires the absence of domination in the global world: specifically, the absence of domination in peoples' exercise of their sovereign liberties. Thus the ideal is much more demanding than one like the Westphalian ideal that would require merely the absence of interference in the sphere of those liberties: this might come about, after all, just by the goodwill of the powerful. But it is an ideal nonetheless that can teach quite concrete institutional lessons for how states should organize and operate, both separately and together, in the international world. And it is an ideal, therefore, that can provide direction for those of us who seek to identify what we or our states may best do, or what the INGO's with which we identify may best do, in seeking a more just global order. Conclusion It may be useful in conclusion to draw together the main claims defended, albeit sketchily, in this paper. 1. Neo-republican theory belongs to a family of political philosophies that take the yardstick of political progress to involve a modally demanding good; it targets freedom as non-domination where others target freedom as independence, equality in a social sense, or non-subordination. 2. What does neo-republican theory support as an ideal for the global order, assuming that the world is going to remain state-bound? 3. There are two related ideals: one, human beings should be organized into free, internally un-dominated peoples; and two, free peoples should also enjoy freedom as non-domination in their external relations with one another and with other bodies. 4. The notion of a people is tied up with that of a state. Wherever there is a state there is a people that that state, having the form of an agent, represents; and wherever there is a people there is a state, however rudimentary, that represents it. 5. The main task of a republican state is, first, to identify a set of basic liberties that are not unnecessarily restricted and that are available at the same time to each citizen; and, second, to protect and resource everyone adequately in the exercise of those choices: to ensure that each can pass the eyeball test, being able to look others in the eye without reason for fear or deference. 66 GLOBAL JUSTICE : THEORY PRACTICE RHETORIC (9/1) 2016 THE GLOBALIZED REPUBLICAN IDEAL 6. But the state that does this might itself dominate the very individuals it protects and resources: it might involve a benevolent despotism, for example, or an enlightened colonialism. And in that case the people living under the state would not be internally free in the sense of the first neo-republican ideal. 7. A people will be internally free just to the extent that its members are not dominated by their own state: that state is disciplined by cost or difficulty or opposition so that in exercising government it is forced to operate on terms that its citizens agree to impose; it cannot interfere arbitrarily in the lives of its people. 8. In the neo-republican picture assumed here, the internal freedom of a people can be secured just to the extent that the constitution of the state allows for the emergence of common standards and ensures that the policies adopted, and the processes used in adopting policies, are all compatible with those standards. 9. A good test of such internal freedom – the tough-luck test – is that members of the people whose interests or opinions lose out in political decision-making can treat this setback as tough luck, not as evidence of the presence of an arbitrary power in their lives. 10. Turning to the second neo-republican ideal – that of external freedom – it is essential to observe that if the state is an agent, and if its people are internally free, then the people will count as a principal the state serves, and will itself assume the form of an agent: an incorporated group of individuals. 11. The consequence of this is that while being internally free in the sense defined, a people might be externally unfree in a distinct sense: it might be dominated by other states or bodies – say, international agencies or multi-national corporations – being exposed to a power of arbitrary interference on their part. 12. How might a people come to enjoy external freedom on a par with other peoples? As the freedom of a citizen in relation to other citizens presupposes an agreed system for identifying and protecting their basic liberties, the freedom of a people presupposes an agreed system of sovereign liberties. 13. As citizens can enjoy freedom as non-domination only within a system of law imposed by a state, so peoples can enjoy external freedom as non-domination only within an internationally 67 GLOBAL JUSTICE : THEORY PRACTICE RHETORIC (9/1) 2016 PHILIP PETTIT established system: this must fix the choices that states ought to be able to exercise – their sovereign liberties – beyond a power of interference by other bodies. 14. A good test of external freedom in this sense – the straight-talk test – is that those who represent different states and peoples in international forums and negotiations are able to deal with one another, as a matter of common recognition, in straight talking and square dealing; none must be a supplicant, none may be a master. 15. Why does the external freedom of states and peoples matter? Because the external domination of a state would put limits on how far the citizens of the state could individually enjoy internal freedom; the state could be disciplined and controlled by its citizens only within an area allowed by international constraints. 16. This observation means that the two neo-republican ideals of global order are really two aspects of one and the same ideal. Freedom as non-domination matters, not just in the mutual relations of individuals, but in their relation to the state. And that freedom requires both the internal and external freedom of the people. 17. The neo-republican ideal of global order is very demanding insofar as it requires, not just that states and peoples escape the arbitrary interference of other states and bodies, but also that they be more or less proof against such interference: international and regional arrangements must give them effective standing against arbitrary, external power. 18. But, however demanding, the neo-republican ideal has practical implications for how states and the international agencies formed by states ought to perform, and for how international nongovernmental organizations ought to press them to perform. 19. States and their agencies ought to identify and police a common set of sovereign liberties; ensure against dangers they all face, whether from terrorist organizations or multi-national corporations; and provide for shared initiatives to promote global goods or avoid global bads. 20. Again, they ought to help resource peoples whose states fail to provide for their basic welfare, trying to get them back to par; 68 GLOBAL JUSTICE : THEORY PRACTICE RHETORIC (9/1) 2016 THE GLOBALIZED REPUBLICAN IDEAL when collateral costs allow, they ought to protect peoples against oppression by their own states; and they ought to develop agreed, humane measures for dealing with refugee problems. 21. But apart from pursuing such ends, neo-republican theory argues that states and international agencies ought also to satisfy three crucial constraints. 22. The agencies ought to elicit and abide by agreed standards governing policy and process. States ought act for the relief of impoverished or oppressed peoples in the name of those agencies only on a multi-lateral basis that guards against benefactor domination. And states ought to take such action only when established standards, and not just contestable ideals, support it.32 32 I benefitted enormously in revising an earlier version of the paper from the comments received from the team of editors under the leadership of Laura Valentini. Philip Pettit Princeton University and Australian National University email: [email protected]

PB April 2009 REVIEWS For review in PRABUDDHA BHARATA, publishers need to send two copies of their latest publications. The Brahma Kumaris as a 'Refl exive Tradition' John Walliss Motilal Banarsidass, 41 UA Bungalow Road, Jawahar Nagar, Delhi 110 007. Email: [email protected]. 2007. xiv +131 pp. Rs 295. eligious traditions are one of those social structures humans create to fulfi l their multifarious needs. Over time, as with all structures, religious traditions lose their following as they are seen inadequate in addressing the changing needs of society. While some traditions appear to doggedly cling to their existing patterns, new movements spring up, supposedly bringing solutions to the questions left unanswered by the older traditions. While some New Religious Movements (nrms) bring a refreshing change in religious understanding and practice, some others differ from the mainstream religiosity merely to appear novel and more suited to contemporary society. Engaged in a constant process of adapting themselves to society, religious institutions have never been completely traditional, and constant questioning and rethinking have been integral to them. However, trends of reassessing past traditions and the emergence of new refl exive movements appear to be more pronounced in these postmodern times of ours. Interestingly, most of these new movements draw heavily from the mainstream religiosity, both in their philosophy and practice. For example, while many concepts of mainstream Hinduism like Brahma, Vishnu, and Lakshmi have been woven into the philosophy of the Brahma Kumaris, concepts like raja yoga, kalpa, and yuga have been radically reinterpreted. nrms freely reinterpret established principles of religion and supplement or complement them in consonance with the contemporary drift of social thought. For instance, if scientifi c spirit is dominating the minds of people in a given period, nrms of that period draw parallels to scientifi c developments and resort to 'name-dropping' involving scientifi c thinkers. Evolved from his doctoral thesis, this timely book by John Walliss is a sociological analysis of the refl exivity of new religious movements and the extent of their 'detraditionalisation'. 'Refl exivity', in sociology, refers to the application of social patterns to the very institutions creating these patterns. Not giving any defi nition of refl exivity himself, Walliss tries to 'advance and develop Philip Mellor's notion of "refl exive traditions" as a hermeneutic tool for the examination of "post-traditional" spirituality'. Th rough the example of the inner workings of the Brahma Kumaris, also called Brahma Kumaris World Spiritual University, Walliss brings out the typical characteristics of an nrm. Aft er discussing various theories of refl exivity of traditions, he proceeds to study Brahma Kumaris in the light of these theories. In his charmingly candid style, he takes us through an intricate study of the phenomenon of refl exive traditions, which will undoubtedly enhance the thought of students of sociology and religion. Like other new religious movements, Brahma Kumaris had to face severe social opposition before becoming a socially acceptable institution. Consequently, their outlook has become more accommodating in contrast to an earlier isolation. Th e patterns of the benefi ciaries of this movement have been minutely analysed to show the mixed nature of the nrm's following. Th ough the Brahma Kumaris may not be a typical representative of nrms, striking similarities to other such movements cannot be denied. Being a millenarian movement, the Brahma Kumaris have to constantly reinterpret their prophecies and alter or postpone the time of the apocalypse. Th ese reinterpretations have led to inner strife in the institution. Walliss brings forth such diff erences- which are generally known to crop up amongst the followers of nrms-by discussing the case of 'Advance Party', a breakaway faction of the Brahma Kumaris, and shows how such factions could themselves be prey to the failings of their parent institution. Concluding this remarkable work on religious movements in the late modern era, Walliss maintains that all religious traditions are refl exive and that the R -No bleed here- PB April 2009304 Prabuddha Bharata56 forces of tradition and refl exivity are less dualistic and more dynamic. Swami Narasimhananda Advaita Ashrama, Kolkata So Far So Near Amal Kumar Roy alias Kinkar Krisnananda Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Kulapati Munshi Marg, Mumbai 400 007. E-mail: brbhavan@bom.vsnl.net.in. 2008. xviii + 165 pp. Rs 150. This is the English version of the original Bengali work Tad Dure Tadu Antike published in 2004. Th e title is culled from the Isha Upanishad to signify the immanence and transcendence of Sri Sitaramdas Omkarnath's being. Th e author had the privilege of hearing directly from his master about four instances of divine communion on the occasion of the master's eighty-ninth birthday celebrations at Mehsana. Th ese form the substance of the book, which has been prefaced by Dr Karan Singh and carries an introduction by the Dalai Lama. Th e latter had occasion to meet Sri Sitaramdas and was impressed by his deep spirituality and genuine global sympathies. Th e four mystic incidents in the life of Sri Sitaramdas recorded in this book are: (i) his naming as Prabodh, (ii) a vision of Shiva at the age of six, (iii) a second vision of Shiva and an esoteric experience of the phenomenon of Creation originating from the primordial sound Om, and (iv) his merger in mahakasha, cosmic space, with the vision of his Chosen Deity. Th e author interprets these mystic experiences and related utterances of his master in the light of the Upanishads, Kashmir Shaivism, and modern scientifi c thought. Many ideas from the Tantras and yoga are also woven into the text. Th e theory of Creation proceeding from sphota, Logos, is elaborated upon, reiterating the Upanishadic stand that this world is a projection of God. Th e master's intense spiritual practices and his disregard for bodily comforts evoke awe. His willingly stretching his legs to feed hungry mosquitoes is an eye-opener and speaks of his selfsacrifi cing nature. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan is one of India's major cultural institutions and has been publishing important works representing the Indian spirit and culture. However, the present book could do with careful editing and systematic presentation of ideas. A brief life sketch of Sri Sitaramdas would also have been welcomed by readers. Th e details in the book are sketchy and the frequent use of Sanskrit and Bengali terms hampers readability. A glossary of such terms would have helped. Hopefully these issues will be addressed by the author and publishers in the next edition. Swami Atmajnananda Advaita Ashrama, Kolkata Śiva Sūtras: The Supreme Awakening Swami Lakshmanjoo Munshiram Manoharlal, Post Box 5715, 54 Rani Jhansi Road, New Delhi 110 055. Website: www.mrmlbooks.com. 2007. xxviii + 322 pp. Rs 400. Coming from the line of the masters of Kashmir Shaivism, Swami Lakshmanjoo brings out the wisdom of his spiritual experiences in this translation of the commentary on Shiva Sutra, called 'Shiva Sutra Vimarshini' by Kshemaraja. Th e Shiva Sutra comprises aphorisms on the knowledge of Godconsciousness as revealed by Bhagavan Shiva to his devotee Vasugupta. Th e result of recordings of the swami's lectures, transcribed and edited by John Hughes and aptly subtitled 'Th e Supreme Awakening', this masterly commentary will guide spiritual seekers in unravelling and awakening the Consciousness inherent in them. Th e volume contains the original Sanskrit texts of the Shiva Sutra and 'Siva Sutra Vimarshini' as appendices, and is an essential read for students of Kashmir Shaivism. PB BOOK RECEIVED Truth and Cosmic Rhythm in the Vedas vis-à-vis Physical Sciences of Today Dinendra Marik Hem-Tara Foundation, 17 Broad Street, Kolkata 700 019. 2006. 58 pp. Rs 35. Sri Anirvan is one of the few ori-ginal modern interpreters of the Vedas. His works Veda Mimamsa and Rig Veda Samhita: Gayatri Mandala have received high critical acclaim. Th is small book is an exposition of some of Sri Anirvan's thoughts in the light of the concepts and fi ndings of modern physics.

 MABINI REVIEW| VOLUME 6 (2017): 7-19 © 2017 Kristoffer A. Bolaños | ISSN 2012-2144 Confronting the Nihilism of Our Day with Thomas Nagel's Ethical Objectivity Kristoffer A. Bolaños Polytechnic University of the Philippines Manila, Philippines [email protected] abstract There are few scholars today who are challenging the notion "nothing is objectively right or wrong because nothing objectively matters," one such scholar is Thomas Nagel; we will pursue in this essay a keener understanding of the possibilities of ethical objectivity in the face of the popularity of the position mentioned above (often understood as "nihilism"). We will attempt to articulate Nagel's alternative, a "view from nowhere," as a way out of the rather relativistic and reductionistic tendencies of moral philosophies today. keywords: Thomas Nagel, Ethics, Nihilism, Philosophy, Ethical Objectivity C O N F R O N T I N G T H E N I H I L I S M O F O U R D A Y M A B I N I R E V I E W [ 8 ] V O L U M E 6 ( 2 0 1 7 ) Introduction: The Quest for Objective Understanding It has been a century and a half after the demise of the philosopher dubbed as one of the great founding fathers of existentialist thought--it was Søren Kieerkegaard (1813-1855) who became the very exemplar of a mode of philosophy that dared to defend the "subjectivity" of man in the face of a modern, highlytechnological, mechanistic world, a world that threatens to dehumanize the human subject, transforming him from being a legitimate center of meaning into a mere thing that can be manipulated, exploited, controlled, driven into calculative thinking. Existential phenomenology gave us good reason to suppose that our personhood is something inexhaustibly profound and irreducible to "cog in the machine," or "a jar of chemicals," a living human being is much more than just a mass of bones, tissues and cells-we are, after, all embodied subjects. However, we also realize that we are bodies, we conduct scientific procedures on ourselves as bodies whenever we treat bodily ailments and diseases; it is also true that brain activity is partially explained by the movement of electrical signals to and from the brain. Science demands us to be objective about what we know concerning ourselves and reality, and we conduct investigations and experiments that somehow would be methodical and would have a high degree of repeatability; science endeavors to conceive of knowledge about the world. In similar fashion, ethics demands objectivity with regard to reasons for doing what we ought to do. Thomas Nagel (1937--) woke up to this intellectual climate when the so-called tension between subjectivity and objectivity is already in place. In the opening pages of his masterful work The View From Nowhere he addresses the problem of reconciling the subjective standpoint with the objective standpoint, but rather than aiming at complete unification (which he thought could occur occasionally but not always), he is quick to point out the often ignored intuitiveness drawn from the juxtaposition itself, the interplay of these two conceptions: "I find it natural to regard life and the world this way-and that includes conflicts between the standpoints and the discomfort caused by obstacles to their integration. Certain forms of perplexity-for example, about freedom, knowledge and the meaning of life-seem to me to embody more insight than any of the supposed solutions to those K . A . B O L A Ñ O S M A B I N I R E V I E W [ 9 ] V O L U M E 6 ( 2 0 1 7 ) problems."1 The tension itself is quite useful and we draw conceptions that will prove worthwhile, especially when it comes to knowing ourselves. Science and reason have for the longest time been demanding that we undertake the objective method of understanding. Traditional academic inquiry suggests that objective understanding, often grounded on justified belief in accordance to available evidence, is to differentiated from subjectivity which casually refers to raw, visceral, even "unargued or unjustified personal feelings and opinions."2 Drawing from this definition, it becomes impossible to create reconciliation, let alone a kind of back-and-forth interaction between objective and subjective, leaving us empty-handed. But Nagel endeavors to clarify further what he means by objective and subjective standpoints, which appear to be modified from the traditional meaning, and there is value in the tension itself: "To acquire a more objective understanding of some aspect of life or the world, we step back from our initial view of it and form a new conception which has that view in its relation to the world as its object...we place ourselves in the world that is to be understood [even if] the [initial] view [will come] to be regarded as an appearance... subjective...and correctable and confirmable by reference to it."3 There are occasions, however, when the subjective standpoint cannot be subordinated, and as Nagel heeds the warnings of Nietzsche, we often wonder why it is easier for us to generate false objectifications than truer or sensible ones, "not all reality is better understood the more objectively it is viewed."4 For instance, the ideas of "thought" or "emotion" are not reducible to brain circuits or organ functions, the idea of love is not simply a "trick of nature" as what material reductionists may have supposed, that religiosity may be more profound than the usual dismissal of it as simply a psychological delusion-there are plenty of human attributes that cannot be reduced to functionalism or calculativity. Nagel's answer to the crisis of subjectivity is quite different from that of existential phenomenology, although he raises his own objections to the reductionistic tendencies of the sciences. The 1Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 4. 2See Robert Solomon, "Subjectivity," The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, ed. Ted Honderich (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). 3Nagel, The View From Nowhere, 4. 4Ibid. C O N F R O N T I N G T H E N I H I L I S M O F O U R D A Y M A B I N I R E V I E W [ 1 0 ] V O L U M E 6 ( 2 0 1 7 ) important thing to realize is that the interplay of the two standpoints aforementioned is necessary and essential. A Critique of the Nihilism of the Age The necessity of ethical practice will always constitute a problem in philosophy. The situation today is easily likened to that of Greek antiquity wherein Plato apparently called for ethical practice in order to prevent further moral and political degradation in the polis.5 We have come to realize, however, that the practice of ethics, Nagel is quick to say, must look up to objective values; they are necessary as conditions for its possibility, and it seems Nagel is more than willing to assert that reaching objectivity is the primary problem of ethics, it demands objectivity even more than science.6 It has become a kind of capitulation to human weakness when we absolutize our most base, whimsical, often malevolent, capricious interests; ethics demands, then, that we strive for objectivity, that we step back from our initial perspective (which include subjective appearances) and form an impersonal perspective about the world. In other words, we must create room for "the possibility...for the recognition of values and reasons that are independent of one's personal perspective and have force for anyone who can view the world impersonally, as a place that contains him."7 But this does not mean that subjectivity did not play a rather transient role in constituting objective values: "when we detach from our individual perspective and the values and reasons that seem acceptable from within it, we can sometimes arrive at a new conception which may endorse some of the original reasons but will reject some as false appearances."8 Even if we are eventually going to end up with a centerless view, we must acknowledge that its formative stages necessitated a deliberation of our subjective reasons and values. But insofar as we are generating an objective set of values, we must recognize their capacity as normative judgments, if they are to be sensible at all, so that a fine ethical question would not so much be about "what should I do?" but rather "how should anyone act 5Ethel M. Albert, Theodore Denise and Sheldon Peterfrund, Great Traditions in Ethics, Fifth Edition (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1984), 8. 6Nagel, The View From Nowhere, 8, 138. 7Ibid., 140. 8Ibid. K . A . B O L A Ñ O S M A B I N I R E V I E W [ 1 1 ] V O L U M E 6 ( 2 0 1 7 ) under such-and-such circumstances?" Daniel Bonevac alludes to the example of the Chinese philosopher Mencius: for very real reasons, it is expected that any adult ought to be ready to rush to the rescue of a child who is about to fall into a well!9 This ethical objectivity, however, will not remain uncontested, especially with today's moral climate, we have a Facebook generation where men and women are highly motivated by spectacular appearances, who will use the most squalid, shallow, or profane stuff of Hollywood movies (of course, there are a few exceptional films out there) as their only basis for truth, who have no regard at all for sound and level-headed research of what they ought to know and understand, many have lost the sentiment of becoming accountable to truth itself, many are more than willing to capitulate to their base consciousness and to be played for fools by political forces who master the populace-a lazy generation, if the likes of Nietzsche might characterize us. And so it appears most of us have ceased from hoping for any basis for objective values, an attitude that Nagel can only describe as a nihilistic form of thinking: But the claim that there are objective values is permanently controversial, because of the ease with which values and reasons seem to disappear when we transcend the subjective standpoint of our own desires. It can seem, when one looks at life from the outside, that there is no room for values in the world at all. So to say, "There are just people with various motives and inclinations...when we regard all this from the outside, all we see are psychological facts...[it would appear as if the] ascent to an objective view, far from revealing new values that modify the subjective appearances, reveals that appearances are all there is...Beyond that it applies here with a nihilistic result: nothing is objectively right or wrong because nothing objectively matters.10 While such nihilistic position might be attractive for many, a number of seasoned philosophers have expressed their rejection of it. Nietzsche for one, despite the fact that he is branded as "nihilist" by mostly still untrained and haphazard scholars; a more rigorous understanding will show that Nietzsche, by claiming that "values 9Daniel Bonevac, Today's Moral Issues: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives, Fifth Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006), 7. 10Nagel, The View From Nowhere, 141. C O N F R O N T I N G T H E N I H I L I S M O F O U R D A Y M A B I N I R E V I E W [ 1 2 ] V O L U M E 6 ( 2 0 1 7 ) that are not transitory do not exist," is not telling us to embrace nihilism, but is inviting us to become physicians of culture, to replace bad, anti-life sentiments with life affirming valuations.11 Reading in context is everything. In The View From Nowhere, Thomas Nagel delivers yet another critique of nihilism, dismissing it outright as a lazily reductionistic view, likening it to physicalism in science,12 it is a doctrine that tempts one to believe that appearances are all there is, since the physical world is all there is; We must naturally admit that there are occasions when physicalism turns into a form of myopia, one that pretends to capture the entire reality but simply is pretentiously sophisticated. As we have contemplated on earlier, there is something debilitating about pursuing a science that claims to be able to physicalize all sorts of phenomena, including human thought and mental states, as in admiring a painting, as if all these were explainable in terms of motions of matter, atoms--the laws of physics alone; here we end up not only with a dry but also an incomplete account of reality. That is also the reason why, explains Nagel, "current attempts to understand the mind by analogy with man-made computers that can perform superbly some of the external tasks as conscious beings will be recognized as a gigantic waste of time."13 This simply is the result of passivity, of not being able to transcend the senses if one already needs to, or simply a lack or a laziness to exercise one's powers of imagination. It also undermines the role of the subject in giving meaning to things. Furthermore, the nihilistic position for Nagel is a constant temptation to reoccupy a Humean position,14 this time scholars have applied Humean skepticism to ethics, in the attempt to justify the view that nothing can be objectively right or wrong. Hume originally claims that knowledge consists of nothing more than a succession of rather loose perceptions (ideas and impressions) that we associate with each other by sheer associative imagination (that is, without real objective basis) so that causality cannot really be explained in a meaningfully rigorous way.15 This, then, is the 11See Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Modern Library, 1995), 116. 12Nagel, The View From Nowhere, 141. 13Ibid., 16. 14Ibid., 141. 15Reginald F. O'neill, Theories of Knowledge (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1960), 189. K . A . B O L A Ñ O S M A B I N I R E V I E W [ 1 3 ] V O L U M E 6 ( 2 0 1 7 ) unimaginative approach to ethics by some: since all that what we have are loose appearances, there cannot be any right or wrong about them. Those who adhere to this view are content to provide a "naturalistic explanation" to values, analogous to a physicalist explanation of phenomena, which is also a "psychological explanation" about how we might arbitrarily choose reasons for our actions and behavior. Nagel objects to this view: "What we see" when people take action with regard to how they ought to act, "is not just people being moved to act by their desires, but people acting and forming intentions and desires for reasons, good or bad."16 He contends that if our choices about how we ought to act are to make sense as normative judgments at all, they must be driven by very real causes, not by arbitrary, fictional or fancied ones; and as the very agents that make choices, we are active agencies, not passive ones. To us the reasons behind our actions may be viewed as meaningful reasons, not tricks of nature or passive, even capitulating, automatized reactions to external stimuli, as some behaviorists might suppose they are. Objectivity in Ethics We will find it useful here to probe a few more objections to ethical objectivity and to take a closer look at Nagel's defense of such position as well as the notion that values are not illusions, that they are driven by real causes in real situations. It seems the idea that what appear to be normative judgments are always arbitrary assumptions generated from a confused collection of mere appearances, and therefore cannot constitute anything objective, is a misleading one. To illustrate this point, Nagel invokes one of the suggestions presented in John Mackie's Ethics. Nagel finds unacceptable the latter's claim that values are "not part of the fabric of the world," retorting instead that we can have objective reasons and values even with regard to the cognition and treatment of pain, or perhaps we can objectively say that anyone would have very real reasons, as opposed to "imagined" ones, to get rid of a certain form of pain, such as a headache. Nagel replies to Mackie, "The objective badness of pain...is not some mysterious property that all pains have, but just the fact that there is reason for anyone capable of viewing the world 16Nagel, The View From Nowhere, 142. C O N F R O N T I N G T H E N I H I L I S M O F O U R D A Y M A B I N I R E V I E W [ 1 4 ] V O L U M E 6 ( 2 0 1 7 ) objectively that they want it to stop. The view that values are real is not the view that they are real occult properties, but that they are real values."17 Even if one was to say that "my pain is entirely mine" and that "you cannot experience my pain," nevertheless, the fact that we experience pain and that we have objective reasons to be rid of it is very real and not a fabrication of imagination. Now, if we are willing to expand our notion of pain to cover not only immediate physical pain but also the "pains" that humanity experiences in the social sphere, we will see an even better explication of Nagel's point. Anyone who is still in the right mind will definitely object to the notion that history consists of mere appearances so that even the great social evils committed against mankind are nothing more than illusions, explainable psychologically or metaphysically in terms of the negativity of being. Can we not actually derive real reasons for the valuing of human life, or valuing human dignity, or protection of human rights? The sensible answer seems to be that we actually can. Here we can probably hope for a higher degree of objectivity. It is impossible for anyone to deny the evil of the Islamic State,18 their threat of global terrorism, the possibility that another holocaust can occur (despite that many muddle-headed history teachers nowadays assert that the Nazi holocaust did not happen!), we do not need to see people actually being beheaded before coming to our senses and realizing that evil is real. The modern excess of eugenics by enforced sterilization, as it was driven by real evil causes, cannot be denied. The writer Ladelle McWhorter once stressed the importance of bringing out into the open the knowledges subjugated in history, such as the enforced sterilizations that were done in Virginia State in the 1920's by the US government (this includes forcibly taking out the ovaries of "fickle-minded" women), carried out with the goal of ensuring that the part of the population responsible for bringing about "imbecile" or "fickle-minded" or "dumb" offspring 17Nagel, The View From Nowhere, 144. 18The IS, Islamic State, formerly known as ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), designated as a terrorist organization by UN and composed mainly of Sunni Muslim jihadist fundamentalists. They are known for chopping people's heads off and creating a public display of them. For more information, See Jim Muir, "Islamic State Group: The Full Story," BBC News, 20 June 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middleeast-35695648, accessed November 3, 2016. K . A . B O L A Ñ O S M A B I N I R E V I E W [ 1 5 ] V O L U M E 6 ( 2 0 1 7 ) will not propagate.19 We cannot continue to be ensnared by the nihilism of our time, lest we all become armchair scholars, unable to act, and can do no other than just describe what is happening and explain away the human blunders of history in terms of, say, the metaphysics negativity of being, as if they were to be causes of celebration rather than embarrassment! Let us share this sentiment with Negri and Hardt: [T]he tragic philosophers of Europe...from Schopenhauer to Heidegger...turn these real destructions into metaphysical narratives about negativity of being, as if these actual tragedies were merely an illusion, or rather as if it were our ultimate destiny...from the killing fields of Verdun to the Nazi furnaces and the swift annihilation of thousands in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the carpet bombing of Vietnam and Cambodia, the massacres in Setif and Sweto to Sabra and Shatila.20 There are even misguided scholars today who claim that the proposition "values are not real at all" is an objective one. Again such a proposition is unacceptable to Nagel. It can be demonstrated in this way: If we push ourselves towards our objective standpoint far enough, we are tempted to believe that we are detaching ourselves from all forms of personal values, or personal interests, so that we end up with an objective view that is free from all forms of value, "we discover that there is nothing-no values left of any kind: things are said to matter at all only to individuals within the world. The result is objective nihilism,"21 describes Nagel. Nagel acknowledges this temptation especially if one is to attempt at a centerless view, an objective conception of the world from nowhere. But Nagel insists that the centerless, objective view does not simply dismiss personal values and interests, "But the objective view has more to go on, for its data include the appearance of value to individuals with particular perspectives, including oneself."22 We must bear in mind that in generating the objective view, we become 19See Ladelle McWhorter, Racism and Sexual Oppression in Anglo America: A Genealogy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009). 20Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Massachusets: Harvard University Press, 2001), 46. 21Nagel, The View From Nowhere, 146. 22Ibid., 147. C O N F R O N T I N G T H E N I H I L I S M O F O U R D A Y M A B I N I R E V I E W [ 1 6 ] V O L U M E 6 ( 2 0 1 7 ) active participants in it, it is our reasons that will constitute what will be acceptable later on in the objective framework, with all the necessary tests for objectivity involved. In other words, Nagel seems to suggest that the objective view was a product of much deliberation, and only rational agents deliberate about values. Objectivity does not even entail the complete dissolution of all personal values: "the problem is not that values seem to disappear but that there seem to be too many of them, coming from every life and drowning out those that arise from our own."23 Nagel has already elucidated that these personal values arising originally from the subjective standpoint are subject to correction, confirmation, or even dismissal if they don't seem to fit the objective view.24 And nothing will stop us from deliberating about values. There is another argument raised against the objectivity of values, one which Nagel would refer to as the empirical argument: "if we consider the wide cultural variation in normative beliefs, the importance of social pressure and other psychological influences to their formation, and the difficulty of settling moral disagreements, it becomes highly implausible that they are anything but pure appearances."25 Depending on the reader's grasp of philosophical schools, one might see this position as closely associated with what many would term as moral relativism, as Bonevac explicitates: "let us say that an ethical relativist believes that fundamental ethical truth-the basic truth about how one should live and what one should do-is relative to a group smaller than humanity as a whole. Something may be fundamentally right for one group but fundamentally wrong for another."26 Moral relativism has become highly popular in the academe so much so that Allan Bloom in The Closing of the American Mind wrote: "There is one thing a professor can be absolutely certain of: Almost every student entering the university believes, or says he believes, that truth is relative."27 The empirical argument earlier described by Nagel seems to be one of the direct logical implications of this relativist philosophy; it is easy to imagine how a relativist might suppose that the reasons for choosing a norm for action are simply trivial and arbitrary, hence, not 23Ibid. 24Ibid., 4. 25Ibid., 147. 26Bonevac, Today's Moral Issues: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives, 2. 27Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987). 25. K . A . B O L A Ñ O S M A B I N I R E V I E W [ 1 7 ] V O L U M E 6 ( 2 0 1 7 ) only can they not constitute objectivity but they may be deemed empty and unreal. Nagel clearly objects to this: "anyone offering [the empirical argument] must admit that not every psychological factor in the explanation of an appearance shows that the appearance corresponds to nothing real."28 That there are variations in normative beliefs does entail that the prejudices embodied in them cannot be transcended, neither does it necessitate that the agents that hold these normative beliefs are simply passive minds: "the degree to which agreement can be achieved and social prejudices transcended in the face of strong pressures suggests that something real is being investigated...that there are certain reasons for action,"29 it is just that people often make a mistake of taking prejudiced, undeliberated "normative judgments" (which are disguised appearances) to be the best accounts for reality when, in fact, they are not. But the fact that people can deliberate, set standards, agree and disagree is very telling of what rational agents can do; what is lacking is practice of this capacity. Conclusion The nihilism of this age and time, the notion that "nothing ever matters objectively" is certainly debilitating and discouraging to say the least; proceeding in nihilistic fashion, we are unable to foster for ourselves the much-needed ethical accountability with regard to the reasons we hold behind our valuations. Perhaps the most important lesson in this paper is that we ought to disengage from such nihilistic frame of mind. In fact, ethics is quite the reverse of nihilism, it should be, from the outset, all about responsibility, or accountability with regard to our comings and goings, as even the ancients might have suggested with the term ascesis; such concept is applicable not only to religious life but to ethics in general, suggesting that one, borrowing a term from Michel Foucault, ought to put oneself in the activity of thought.30 But we are not simply passive scholars; such a nihilistic manner of proceeding is not something that we can continue consenting to, as it has been the 28Nagel, The View From Nowhere, 147. 29Ibid., 148. 30Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume 2: The Use of Pleasure, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 9. C O N F R O N T I N G T H E N I H I L I S M O F O U R D A Y M A B I N I R E V I E W [ 1 8 ] V O L U M E 6 ( 2 0 1 7 ) product of a confused, impulsive, irresponsible, often programmatic instruction. Again as Nagel puts it, objectivity is the main course of ethics, and should be its main problematic, even in teaching ethics in contemporary education. We believe he has good reasons for the claim, and it is our hope in this paper that we are able to give justice to some of Thomas Nagel's useful insights with regard to how we can be ethically objective about things or how normative judgments based on realistic reasons can be arrived at. We are, of course, made aware by Nagel of the difficulties involved in this pursuit for objectivity. It was admitted that there seems to be "no preset method of carrying out a normative investigation,"31 although there is hope for objectivity because the act of stepping back, which might involve what he terms as "integrating" the subjective with the objective, is not impossible-that itself should set certain conditions or parameters. Nagel continues, "the process...can go on indefinitely...some aspects of practical reason may prove to be irreducibly subjective, so that while their existence must be acknowledged from an objective standpoint their content cannot be understood except from a more particular perspective. But other reasons will irresistibly engage the objective will."32 Again we stress that there is no guarantee for success, but such undertaking is worthwhile, if we have already made up our minds about not succumbing to the nihilistic mindset. In this paper, then, we highly commend Nagel for his contributions especially in the study of ethics, although it is undeniable that his work traverses other realms in philosophy. Bibliography Albert, Ethel M., Theodore Denise and Sheldon Peterfrund. Great Traditions in Ethics. Fifth Edition. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1984. Bloom, Allan. The Closing of the American Mind. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987. Bonevac, Daniel. Today's Moral Issues: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives. Fifth Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006. Foucault, Michel. The History of Sexuality Volume 2: The Use of Pleasure. Trans. Robert Hurley. New York: Vintage Books, 1990. 31Nagel, The View From Nowhere, 149. 32Ibid. K . A . B O L A Ñ O S M A B I N I R E V I E W [ 1 9 ] V O L U M E 6 ( 2 0 1 7 ) Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri. Empire. Massachusets: Harvard University Press, 2001. Honderich, Ted., ed. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. McWhorter, Ladelle. Racism and Sexual Oppression in Anglo America: A Genealogy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009. Muir, Jim. "Islamic State Group: The Full Story". BBC News. 20 June 2016. Accessed November 3, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle east-35695648. Nagel, Thomas. The View From Nowhere. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. Nietzsche, Friedrich. Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: The Modern Library, 1995. O'neill, Reginald F. Theories of Knowledge. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1960. About the Author Kristoffer A. Bolaños holds an MA in Philosophy acquired from Ateneo de Manila University, and is currently a PhD in Philosophy student of University of the Philippines Diliman. He is teaching philosophy courses at Polytechnic University of the Philippines. His growing research interests include Foucault, Nietzsche, Negri and Hardt, Plato, and most recently Nagel, Wittgenstein and Kant.

• ARS LITURGICA Jlrom the Image of Glory to the Images of the Idols of Modernity Edited by Dumitru A. _VANCA, Mark J. CHERRY, Alin ALBU Vol.1 With the blessing of His Eminence, IRINEU Archbishop of Alba Iulia Alba Iulia, 2017 ~ REINTREGIREA ~__...,......,. DTP & Layout: Nicolae ALOMAN, Andrei MOTORA, Alin V. GOGA Vo)ume published as a supplement of 'Altarul Reintregirii' Journal ISSN: 1584-8051 Published by: • F acuity of Orthodox Theology in Alba Iulia • The Research Center for Interreligious Studies and Christian Pedagogy • The Theological Doctoral School in Alba Iulia • The Romanian Orthodox Archbishopric of Alba Iulia Lecturers: Ana ILTIS, Mark CHERRY ISSTA 2017 secretary: Razvan BRUDIU EDITORIAL OFFICE: Mail: FACULTATEA DE TEOLOGIE ORTODOxA Bd. ,1 Decembrie 1918", 13; 510207, Alba Iulia; RO Romania Te1.iFax: 0040-0258-835901; Web: http://www.fto.ro/ E-mail: [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] © ISSTA 2017 DISTRIBUTION: Mail: EDITURA REiNTREGIREA Str. Mihai Viteazu1, 16 510010; Alba Iulia (AB) Romania Te1: 0040-258 81 16 90 I 0040358 40 11 96 Fax: 0040-258 8127 97 Web: http://www.reintregirea.~ E-mail: libraria@reintregirearo [email protected] International Symposium on Science, Theology and Arts. • 16th International Symposium on Science, Theology and Arts ORGANIZED BY The Faculty of Orthodox Theology The "1 Decembrie 1918" University of Alba Iulia and its parteners: The Romanian Orthodox Archbishopric of Alba Iulia The Romanian Orthodox Bishopric of Deva The State Secretariat for Religious Affairs The 'Eudoxiu Hurmuzachi' Institute Bucure~ti SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE DumitruA. VANCA, '1 Decembrie 1918' University, Alba Iulia, Romania; MarkJ. CHERRY, 'St. Edward's University', Austin, Texas, U. S. A AlinALBu, '1 Decembrie 1918' University, Albalulia, Romania Mariyan STOYADINOV, 'St Cyril and St Methodius' University, Veliko Tamovo, Bulgaria Mihai HIMCINSCHI, '1 Decembrie 1918' University, Alba Iulia, Romania Ana lL11S, 'Wake Forest University', Winston-Sa1em, North Carolina, U. S. A ORGANIZING COMMITTEE Mlhai HIMCINSCHI ( chainnan), '1 Decembrie 1918' University of Alba Iulia, Romania Nicolae BRiNZEA (eo-chair), University ofPite~ti; RCizvanBRUDIU(secretary), 'lDecembrie 1918' University; Duinitru A. V ANCA, '1 Decembrie 1918' University; Alba Iulia; AlinALBu, '1 Decembrie 1918' University, Albalulia; Ovidiu PANAITE, '1 Decembrie 1918' University, Alba Iulia; * Tiberiu APOLZAN, secretary at '1 Decembrie 1918' University. ' Published with the support of The State Secretariat for Religious Affairs The 'Eudoxiu Hurmuzachi' Institute, Bucure~ti, Romania. THE ICONICAL ONTOLOGY OF ST. MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR Aleksandar Djakovac Abstract: St. Maximus the Confessor claims that the logos of created beings represents their essence as an icon. This claim gives us the opportunity to understand the term essence as an dynamic reality and not as a static given. Essence is not something that the being is, but what it is supposed to be. The idea of icon is herein present as ultimately ontological. The icon is no mirror of reality, but rather its eschatological realization. That which will be uncovers the truth of the being. This way, St. Maxius has founded a dynamic ontology, which is a fundamental step away from the Hellenic heritage. The equalization of the essence of beings and icon is only possible in an Eucharistic view of the world, wherein the Eucharist represents in an iconic way the presence of the eschatological truth in history. Keywords: logos, essence, icon, Eucharist, eschaton 1. Paradeigma, Mimesis, Anagogy According to Plato, time is a mobile image (εἰκών) of eternity1. The mobility of the image is a sign of its ontological secundarity. The truth of things is in that, which is eternal and immobile, which therefore has, because of that, ontological priority. Plato specifically tries to clarify the relation between icon and paradeigma (παράδειγμα). The cosmos was fashioned after an eternal model.2 For Plato, icon is either imitation of imagination. "We must remember that there were to be two parts of the image-making class, the likeness-making and the fantastic  Assistent Professor, University of Belgrade, Faculty of Orthodox Theology), Belgrade, Serbia. 1 Plato, Timaeus 38b 6-c3. 2 Eric VOEGELIN, Plato, University of Missouri, 2000, p. 195. 16th International Symposium on Science, Theology and Arts (ISSTA 2017) 58 (φανταστικὸν) if we should find that falsehood really (ψεῦδος ὄντως) existed and was in the class of real being."3 Icon can therefore either be a shadow of reality or an illusion and it depends fully on reality, though reality itself is understood as transcendent, as ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας.4 For Plato, the reflection of the sun in the water is εἰκών:5 It is understood as essentially mimetical. According to Philostratus, if we don't have an idea about what is represented in a picture, we can't enjoy it.6 The world we see is not simply a mirroring of the transcendent one. Its imperfection is mirrored in the multiplicity which should rather go in the direction of radical simplicity.7 The highest goal of humanity is to become like God, its ideal.8 In Neo-Platonism, the icon still represents a higher reality. According to Plotinus, the soul is the icon of nous9, while matter is the icon of being.10 Damascius11 claims that the soul has to imprint its own image into the body. The material shows itself thus as something which is twice indirect. In the Christian interpretation there are certain dilemmas in the understanding of icon from the beginning, which oscillate between the biblical view and the Hellenic one. Ramelli notes that Clement of Alexandria takes over Plato's definition of time, but with a meaningful alteration, so that for him ἠ σήμερον γὰρ ἀιδίου αἰώνων ἐστὶν εἰκών.12 This age (αἰών) shows itself as being not simply a mirroring of the eternal reality, but as its beginning, since ζωὴ αἰώνιος is ζωὴ μέλουσα for it. For Climent, the icon designates participation in that what it represents. Man was created according to the icon of God, and that means that man takes part in God's reality. God created man and inspired him with his spirit. That which belongs to God in a man is that 3 Sophist 266DЕ. 4 Republica 6.509B. 5 Phoedo 99D. 6 Vita Apollonii II.22; Göran SÖRBOM, „The Classical Concept of Mimesis", in: A Companion to Art Theory, Wiley-Blackwell, 2007, p. 21. 7 Thomas M. JEANNOT, „Plato and Aristotle on Being and Unity", The New Scholasticism 60/4, 1986,p. 426. 8 Theaetetus 176-177. 9 Enneades 5, 8, 12. 10 Enneades I, 8,3. 11 in Phaedo III, 4. 12 Protrepticus 9,84,6; Ilaria RAMELLI, The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena, BRILL, 2013, p. 130. ARS LITURGICA. From the Image of Glory to the images of the idols of Modernity 59 what makes him an icon of God.13 Origen transfers the platonistic transcendence onto God, so for him „God does not even participate in being".14 Especially not in a material way, which is why Origen very energetically dismisses the idea that man was created as an icon of God in a corporal way. „We do not understand, however, this man indeed whom scripture says was made according to the image of God to be corporeal. For the form of the body does not contain the image of God".15 Celsus cites the teaching of the Scripture about Imago Dei to show that the Christian criticism towards the Hellenic anthropomorphism is inconsistent.16 Origenes counters that, but his reasons are not only of apologetic nature. He essentially accepted the neo-platonistic despisal of the material as a pale icon of a higher reality. He understands Jesus' words „He that has seen me has seen the Father" (Јn 14, 9) in that way. Jesus as an icon of the Father does not represent a stable reality, which is why He shows himself to everyone in a different way, according to their inner abilities.17 For him, icon is an ontological μίμησις, "of moral and voluntary assimilation to the archetype".18 Based on Origen's understanding, Evagrius develops the idea of the imageless prayer, as a perfect contemplative method which leads to true θεολογία.19 In the Apophthegmata Patrum, we can find a warning by Abba Sopatros that a monk should not allow women in his cell, that he shouldn't read apocrypha and that he should not "think about icon".20 It seems that the accusations against Origenists, that they were the ideological inspirers of iconoclasm, maybe weren't unfounded. 13 Pedagogus I, 3; cf., Nonna Verna HARRISON, "The human person as image and likeness of God", in: The Cambridge Companion to Orthodox Christian Theology, (Edited by Mary B. Cunningham and Elizabeth Theokritoff), Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 78. 14 Contra Celsum VI, 64. 15 Homiliae in Genesim 1, 13. 16 Contra Celsum VII, 62 17 Contra Celsum II, 64 18 John A. MCGUCKIN (ed.), The Westminster Handbook to Origen, Westminster John Knox Press, 2004, p. 133. 19 Stewart 2001: 178 20 PG 65, 413A. Though there ware later "purges", in many sayings one can recognize traces of origenism. 16th International Symposium on Science, Theology and Arts (ISSTA 2017) 60 We also have a different tradition, founded in the Holy Scripture, which sees the icon in the light of the eschatological reality. Stephanus of Gabala said that the cross is an icon of the immortal kingdom (ἀθανάτου βασιλέως)21, which brings the idea of icon nearer to the idea of symbol, but takes it away further from the platonistic meaning. According to Kittel, such a meaning of the idea of icon is founded in the New Testament: "In the NT the original is always present in image. ... When Christ is called the εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ in 2Cor 4,4; Col 1, 15, all the emphasis is on the equality of the εἰκὼν with the original".22 But even Logos himself, as an icon of the Father, is at the same time an invisible icon of ἀόρατος εἰκών23, since He reinforces the real icon in man, which had been blurred by sin.24 Still, there was no strict distinction between the platonistic and Christian understanding of icon. For Gregory Nazianzene, the icon is still a copy of the archetype: αὕτη γὰρ εἰκόνος φύσις, μίμημα εἶναι τοῦ ἀρχετύπου.25 The Cappadocians didn't have a developed theology of the icon, but we can understand the meaning of the concept. So Gregory of Nyssa, while speaking of human nature which was created in accord with the icon of God, says: "For as, in men's ordinary use, those who make images of princes both mould the figure of their form, and represent along with this the royal rank by the vesture of purple, and even the likeness is commonly spoken of as "a king," (καὶ λέγεται κατὰ συνήθειαν καὶ ἡ εἰκὼν βασιλεύς) so the human nature also, as it was made to rule the rest, was, by its likeness to the King of all, made as it were a living image, partaking with the archetype both in rank and in name".26 Gregory accents likeness as the basic attribute of icon, and by doing that, he stays in the platonistic tradition. But, his claim that the 21 Geoffrey H. LAMPE, A Patristic Greek Lexicon, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 411. 22 KITTEL, Gerhard, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1965, p. 395. 23Athanasius, De decretis, 27. 24 Ilaria RAMELLI, The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis, p. 197. 25 Orationes 36. 26 De hominis opificio: PG 44, 136C. ARS LITURGICA. From the Image of Glory to the images of the idols of Modernity 61 icon of the emperor by likeness will be called emperor, too, and that the human nature by same principal is partaking with the archetype both in rank and in name, gives a base for development, which we will find later in the works of St. Maximus. Dionysius the Areopagite sees the icon as an anagogical representation of man's ascension to unity with God, with the whole world being included in that hierarchy. "Material lights are images of the outpouring of an immaterial gift of light".27 The world being an icon is an old platonistic idea, but the anagogical understanding of icon was something new.28 The Areopagite sees the anagogical model in a hierarchical ladder: "Proportionately to us ourselves, as I said, our hierarchy is somewhat symbolical, needing sensible things for our more divine 'anagogy' from them to the intelligible things".29 Maximus the Confessor will introduce fundamental changes into this concept, basing them on the ideas of the Cappadocians and the areopagite scriptures. 2. Shadow and Icon In the teachings of St. Maximus the Confessor we see meaningful distinction between shadow and icon. He says that „the things of the old Testament are shadow (σκιά); those of the new Testament are image (είκών) future goods".30 The difference between shadow and icon is, for Maximus, fundamental. What icon represents in the platonistic tradition is shadow for him. A shadow is a representation of a higher reality which it implies and in which it partakes only in a passive way.31 On the other hand, icon implies future goods, by already partaking in those goods. The meaning of the idea of icon nears here the meaning of the idea of symbol, which is a bridge between this side and the other side 27 De celesti hierarchia: PG 3, 121D-124A. 28 Though Rorem successfully made a connection to Iamblichus (Paul ROREM , "Iamblichus and the Anagogical Method in Pseudo-Dionysius' Liturgical Theology", Studia Patristica, Vol. XVII, Part 1, 1982, pp. 453-460). 29 De ecclesiastica hierarchia: PG 3, 377A. 30 Capita Theologica et Oeconomica I, 90: PG 90, 1120D. 31 Such a meaning of shadow we can find in the works of Iamblichus, who says that shadows follow bodies, but that they don't have their own hypostasis. Iamblichus, De communi mathematica scientia 8.6. 16th International Symposium on Science, Theology and Arts (ISSTA 2017) 62 through identification with that what it represents. The Hellenic meaning of symbol is based on natural cycles, like the seasons, while the christian symbolism is based on the fact of the Incarnation as a supernatural event, because of which symbolism can't be based on natural properties.32 In a scholium on the Areopagite we can find the following formulation: truth is a thing of the future age ἀλήθεια δὲ ἡ τῶν μελλόντων κατάστασις.33 The shadow is a thing of the past, and its destiny is to vanish, since it has no content, while the icon implies presence.34 The presence is historical, though in history the eschatologicsal fullness of the parousia still isn't fully realized. All historic events get their meaning from the future, not from the past, so that the symbol in Christian thought is mainly eschatological. The Areopagite sees icon and symbol as an imprint (picture) of a parallel reality, while St. Maximus moves this perspective towards eschatology. 3. The logoi of the icon To understand Maximus' moving of the understanding of the iconic from anagogic to eschatological, we have to remember his teachings on logoi. Logoi are equal to God's predestination (προορισμοί), where Maximus follows the Areopagite, and they're designated as God's wishes (θεῖα θελήματα): "we say that God knows existent things as the products of his own acts of will".35 The key dimension of Maximus' understanding of the divine logoi is tied to Christology. Logos, Son of God, Second Person of the Holy Trinity, is the One who gathers all the logoi of nature in Himself. Logos himself is the inner Logos of the logoi of nature, which means that in Him and through Him the final meaning of everything in existence is realized. The Logos incarnate shows the true logoi of the nature of everything created, but the logoi of the Divine remain inaccessible, since Logos 32 John ZIZIOULAS, The Eucharistic Communion and the World, Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2011, p. 86. 33 Sch. in eccl. hier. 3, 3:2. Though it was probably not written by Maximus, the scholium is written in his spirit. 34 Ιωάννης ΖΗΖΙΟΥΛΑΣ, „Το Μυστήριο της Εκκλησίας και το Μυστήριο της Αγίας Τριάδος", Sabornost 8, 2014, p.49. 35 Ambiquorum liber : 7, PG 91, 1085B. ARS LITURGICA. From the Image of Glory to the images of the idols of Modernity 63 communes with us by hypostasis and not by nature. The logoi of nature aren't equal to God the Logos, since He as God transcends them infinitely, but He is the paradigm of the logoi of nature, and as the One in Whom the creation and Creator unite, He is their realization. The Son of God, the eternal Logos is, according to Maximus, the One who holds all the logoi: "He (the divine Logos) held the logoi of all things which subsisted before the ages, and by His gracious will brought the visible and invisible creation into existence out of nothing in accordance with these logoi; by word (logos) He made, and continues to make, all things at the proper time, universals as well as particulars".36 Maximus' logoi differ from platonistic ideas exactly because they do not represent some eternal parallel reality. When we understand logoi this way, we can see that the process of world's creation is still not finished and that the final truth of the world will not be realized before the eschatological Kingdom of God. Maximus' understanding of logoi gives us a particular understanding of icon. After Christ, history is not a shadow anymore, not an empty mirror of reality, but an icon, representing a part of what will show itself as the final truth of the world in Eschaton. 4. Nature: necessity and freedom Maximus follows the tradition of Alexandria in his understanding of created nature. St. Athanasius already understood that nature is mortal because it was created, and that salvation happens on an ontological level. The nature of created things is weak and mortal because it was made out of non-being, so that without the Savior, there was danger that "the Universe should be broken up again into nothingness".37 Through partaking in the Mystery of Christ, the created nature is supposed to overcome its own limits which exist because of the fact that it is created. When we read St. Maximus: „The purpose of the giver of the commandments is to free man from the world and from nature 36 Ambiquorum liber : 7, PG 91, 1085A. 37 Contra Gentes, 41, 2-3. 16th International Symposium on Science, Theology and Arts (ISSTA 2017) 64 (κόσμου καὶ φύσεως ἐλευθερῶσαι τὸν ἀνθρωπον)",38 it is clear, that the salvation of man from nature doesn't only mean salvation from death, but from the mortal way of existence. Death is not something added from the outside to the created nature, but something that is inherent for it, and therefore man is supposed to be freed from his own nature, which is designated as the one which enslaves. "'The mystery of the salvation' is brought about by things that are willed, and not by the things found under the tyranny (of nature)".39 In another place, we find important and much more precise formulations by Maximus: "Nature is, according to the philosophers, the principle of movement and rest; but for the Fathers it is genus of the many and different members, applied to what something is. Ousia is, according to the philosophers, a self-existing thing which does not need something else in order to be constituted; but according to the Fathers, it is the natural being of many and different hypostases".40 Maximus tells us here that, according to philosophers, nature is a principle of movement and rest. The nature represents a diastemic way of existence, which is separation and dissemination.41 Nature is that which is formed and determined by decay. But, according to the Fathers, says Maximus, nature refers to genus and designates that what something is. What something is is not determined by the principle of movement and rest. That means that what something really is, is not determined by its special-temporality. Otherwise death would be the only possible way of existence for created beings. Nature not being necessarily diastemic, according to the Fathers, means that it is ecstatic. Nature has in itself a potential to overcome itself and to overcome the 38 Epistole. 9, PG 91, 448C. 39 Orationis dominicae expositio: PG 90, 880B; John Panteleimon MANOUSSAKIS, For the Unity of All: Contributions to the Theological Dialogue between East and West, Cascade Books, 2015, p. 75. 40 Opuscula Theologica et Polemica: PG 91, 276A. 41 Blowers (Paul M. BLOWERS, „Aligning and Reorienting the Passible Self: Maximus the Confessor's Virtue Ethics", Studies in Christian Ethics, 26(3), 2013: 185) shows that Maximus understood diastema as designating spati-temoral extension (Ambiquorum liber 10: PG 91, 1157A). ARS LITURGICA. From the Image of Glory to the images of the idols of Modernity 65 limits of its own createdness. So essence (οὐσία), according to philosophers, is a self-existing thing, which doesn't need anything else to constitute itself. According to the Fathers, says Maximus, οὐσία is the natural being of many and different hypostases. Maximus leans on the Cappadocian differentiation between essence and hypostasis, wherein hypostasis is equal to personality. The concept of personality appears in a strictly ontological meaning. Maximus says: "Hypostasis is, according to the philosophers, ousia with idiomata. But according to the Fathers, it is the particular man as distinct prersonally from the other man".42 Essence and nature, as is noted by Balthasar, don't have a consistent abstract meaning and cannot be understood as simply contrary to existence.43 Hypostasis is the way nature exists (τρόπος υπάρξεως) and cannot exist without nature, just as nature cannot exist without hypostasis. Τρόποσ υπάρξεως is essentially personality, because of which "the distinction according to the τρόπος υπάρξεως is not separating but unifying".44 Nature, therefore, exists in a hypostatical way. In The Disputation with Pyrrhus, Pyrrhus presented the argument that the human will of Christ cannot be natural, because natural things are always a necessity (τό δέ φυσικόν πάντως καί ἠναγκασμένον). Maximus responds: "Not only does the divine and uncreated nature have nothing natural by necessity (οὐδέν ἠναγκασμένον ἔχει φυσικόν), but the same goes for the rational and created one (ἀλλ οὐδέ ἡ νοερά καί κτιστή)" ... "the natural properties of rational beings are not bound by necessity (οὐκ ἄρα ἠναγκασμένα τά τῶν νοερῶν φυσικά)" ... if natural means always bound by necessity (εἰ γάρ κατ αὐτήν τό φυσικόν πάντως καί ἠναγκασμένον), and God is God by nature, by nature good, by nature creator, then it means that God is bound by necessity to be God (ἀνάγκῃ ἔσται ὁ Θεός Θεός), to be good, and to be a creator." The question arises – how to harmonize Maximus' claims about the tyranny of nature with the claim that nature does not imply necessity? To understand this problem, we have to remember that Maximus takes over the Cappadocian triadological terminology which 42 Opuscula Theologica et Polemica 16: PG 91, 276B. 43 Hans Urs von BALTHASAR, Cosmic Liturgy – The Universe According to Maximus the Confessor, San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2003, p. 225. 44 Panayiotis CHRISTOU, „Maximos Confessor on the Infinity Of Man", Actes du Symposium sur Maxime le Confeseur (Fribourg, 2-5 september 1980), (eds. F. Heinzer, C. Scönborn), Éditions Universitaires, Fribourg Suisse, 1982, p. 266. 16th International Symposium on Science, Theology and Arts (ISSTA 2017) 66 gives the ontological priority to hypostasis in relation to nature. Since nature is always hypostasized, it cannot, in relation to God and rational beings, be looked at neither separately nor statically. The nature Maximus talks about is not a static given. Neither God nor rational beings are without the aspect of will. The natural will shows the ecstatic potential of nature. In the case of created beings that ecstatic potential is the possibility to overcome natural limits through a change in the way of existence, which is why Maximus constitutes his iconic ontology. 5. Iconic ontology In Maximus' Letter to Marinus, in the scholia, we find an interesting claim, which says that "essence is that wich is according to icon. And that is logos" (Οὐσία γὰρ τὸ κατ' εἰκὀνα, ὁ λόγος)45. If we read Maximus in the platonistic key in which logoi are the same as ideas, this claim could mean that the essences of beings are the icons of their logoi as a reflection of some higher reality. Such interpretation is not in accord with Maximus' equalization of the logoi with the wishes of God or His intentions, of which we wrote earlier on. Maximus himself gives us explanations which sound platonistic, but are essentially different from them. He says: "all present goods are in comparison to the ones to come only mirror images of their logoi. They are therefore only icons of their true Archetype, still not having their own image fully realized..."46 We see that the present goods are only mirror images of their logoi. But those logoi are not something that exists objectively – only in the future will there be authentic expressions of the logoi of God. When history is eschatologically fulfilled, we will be able to say that the logoi of God are realized. Therefore icon isn't understood as a mirror or paradigm, but as the real truth of being. Everything that is not in accord with the logoi will not exist, so the future is the final measurement of the present. The present dissemination, which is the mortal way of existence, will be overcome by unity. One nature has been "disseminated into many parts (εἰς 45 PG 91, 37BC. 46 Questiones ad Thalassium 46: PG 90, 420B. ARS LITURGICA. From the Image of Glory to the images of the idols of Modernity 67 πολλὰς μοίρας τὴν μίαν φύσιν)", and by "gnomic will it has armed up against itself (αὐτὴν καθ' ἑαυτῆς τὴν φύσιν διὰ τῆς γνώμης ἐξώπλισε)". Christ is the one who harmonized gnomic will with nature, and thus destroyed the "anomaly of nature (τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν)", showing in himself which is the true "way of existence of logoi in the icon of God" (τίς τοῦ κατ' εἰκόνα λόγου ὁ τρόπος).47 That "unity that will be... which we now anticipate and have in icon... to overcome the last enemy above us – death."48 This way, Maximus constitutes an iconic ontology. His iconic ontology is not eschatological in a linear way, since the Eschaton is already present in icon, which is why the basic context of Maximus' iconology is ecclesiological: "The same way the holy Church of God will be shown to perform in us deeds similar to deeds of God, since it is his icon and archetype."49 The iconic presence of Eschaton is real, since it in history paves the base for the real truth of being, which is a thing of the future age. References 1. BALTHASAR, Hans Urs von, Cosmic Liturgy – The Universe According to Maximus the Confessor, San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2003. 2. BLOWERS, M. Paul, „Aligning and Reorienting the Passible Self: Maximus the Confessor's Virtue Ethics", Studies in Christian Ethics, 26(3), 2013, pp. 333–350. 3. Christou, PANAYIOTIS, „Maximos Confessor on the Infinity Of Man", Actes du Symposium sur Maxime le Confeseur (Fribourg, 2-5 september 1980), (eds. F. Heinzer, C. Scönborn), Éditions Universitaires, Fribourg Suisse, 1982. 4. HARRISON, Nonna Verna, "The human person as image and likeness of God", in: The Cambridge Companion to Orthodox Christian Theology, (Edited by Mary B. Cunningham and Elizabeth Theokritoff), Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 78-92. 5. IVANOVIC, Filip, Symbol & Icon: Dionysius the Areopagite and the Iconoclastic Crisis, Wipf & Stock Publishing, 2010. 47 Diversa Capita 1, 46: PG 90, 1196BC. 48 Ambiquorum liber 7: PG 91, 1076A. 49 Mystagogia 1, 3: PG 91, 665CD. 16th International Symposium on Science, Theology and Arts (ISSTA 2017) 68 6. JEANNOT, M. Thomas, „Plato and Aristotle on Being and Unity", The New Scholasticism 60/4, 1986, pp. 404 – 426. 7. KITTEL, Gerhard, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1965. 8. LAMPE H. Geoffrey, A Patristic Greek Lexicon, Oxford University Press, 1969. 9. LOUDOVIKOS, Nikolaos. „Being and Essence Revisited: Reciprocal Logoi and Energies in Maximus the Confessor and Thomas Aquinas, and the Genesis of the Self-referring Subject", Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 72/1, 2016, pp. 117-146. 10. MANOUSSAKIS, John Panteleimon, For the Unity of All: Contributions to the Theological Dialogue between East and West, Cascade Books, 2015. 11. MCGUCKIN A. John (ed.), The Westminster Handbook to Origen, Westminster John Knox Press, 2004. 12. RAMELLI, Ilaria, The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis : A Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena, BRILL, 2013. 13. ROREM, Paul, "Iamblichus and the Anagogical Method in PseudoDionysius' Liturgical Theology", Studia Patristica, Vol. XVII, Part 1, 1982, pp. 453-460. 14. SÖRBOM, Göran, „The Classical Concept of Mimesis", in: A Companion to Art Theory, (Eds. Paul Smith, Carolyn Wilde), WileyBlackwell, 2007, pp.19-28. 15. STEWART, Columba, "Imageless Prayer and the Theological Vision of Evagrius Ponticusm", Journal of Early Christian Studies, 9/2, 2001, pp. 173-204. 16. VOEGELIN, Eric, Plato, University of Missouri, 2000. 17. ZIZIOULAS, John, The Eucharistic Communion and the World, Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2011. 18. ΖΗΖΙΟΥΛΑΣ, Ιωάννης, „Το Μυστήριο της Εκκλησίας και το Μυστήριο της Αγίας Τριάδος", Sabornost 8, 2014, pp. 43-52.

Two Ways to Particularize a Property Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2015, 1(4), 635-652. Robert K. Garcia Texas A&M University [email protected] www.robertkgarcia.com Request from the author: If you would be so kind, please send me a quick email if ... • you are reading this for a university or college course, or • you are citing this in your own work. It is rewarding to know how my work is being used, especially if it has been adopted as required or recommended reading. Thank you. Citation Information: • Garcia, Robert K. (2015) "Two Ways to Particularize a Property" Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2015, 1(4), 635-652. Journal of the American Philosophical Association http://journals.cambridge.org/APA Additional services for Journal of the American Philosophical Association: Email alerts: Click here Subscriptions: Click here Commercial reprints: Click here Terms of use : Click here Two Ways to Particularize a Property ROBERT K. GARCIA Journal of the American Philosophical Association / Volume 1 / Issue 04 / December 2015, pp 635 652 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2015.21, Published online: 29 December 2015 Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S2053447715000214 How to cite this article: ROBERT K. GARCIA (2015). Two Ways to Particularize a Property. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 1, pp 635-652 doi:10.1017/apa.2015.21 Request Permissions : Click here Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/APA, IP address: 50.24.68.155 on 31 Dec 2015 Journal of the American Philosophical Association (2015) 635–652 C⃝ American Philosophical Association doi: 10.1017/apa.2015.21 Two Ways to Particularize a Property abstract: Trope theory is an increasingly prominent contender in contemporary debates about the existence and nature of properties. But it suffers from ambiguity concerning the nature of a trope. Disambiguation reveals two fundamentally different concepts of a trope: modifier tropes and module tropes. These types of tropes are unequally suited for metaphysical work. Modifier tropes have advantages concerning powers, relations, and fundamental determinables, whereas module tropes have advantages concerning perception, causation, character-grounding, and the ontology of substance. Thus, the choice between modifier tropes and module tropes is significant and divides the advantages of trope theory simpliciter. In addition, each resulting trope theory is unstable: modifier trope theory threatens to collapse into realism, and module trope theory threatens to collapse into austere nominalism. This invites reflection on the stability of trope theory in general. keywords: tropes, universals, nominalism, ontology, substance Questions concerning the existence and nature of properties remain the subject of vigorous and far-reaching debate. The most general disagreement concerns whether properties exist at all (for recent overviews, see Edwards 2014 and Koons and Pickavance 2015). Austere nominalists hold that, strictly speaking, there are no properties but only primitively charactered objects; there are spherical objects- billiard balls and the like-but no sphericity (or sphericities) per se (for discussion, see Loux 2006 and Carroll and Markosian 2010). Other philosophers hold that properties exist in some sense or other but disagree on what properties are like-on the kind of entity that plays the role(s) of property (see Edwards 2014; Koons and Pickavance 2015; Lewis 1983; Oliver 1996; and Swoyer 1999). Among those An ancestor of this paper is forthcoming in Spanish as 'Sobre la expresión "propiedades particularizadas?": Tropos modificadores y tropos módulo', (translated by E. Zerbudis) in E. Zerbudis (ed.), Poderes Causales, Tropos, y Otras Criaturas Extrañas: Estudios de Metafısica Analıtica (Buenos Aires: Tıtulo). For discussion I wish to thank audiences at the 2014 meeting of the North Carolina Philosophical Society, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; the Programa de Pós-graduação Lógica e Metafısica, Universidade Federal de Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; the Instituto de Filosofıa, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, Chile; the Tercer Coloquio de Metafısica Analıtica, 2012, Buenos Aires, Argentina; the Segundo Congreso Latinoamericano de Filosofıa Analıtica, 2012, Buenos Aires, Argentina; and the second annual Houston Baptist University Philosophy Conference, 2012. For helpful comments I especially thank several anonymous referees as well as Anthony Adrian, José Tomás Alvarado, Dong An, Richard Cross, Tobias Flattery, John Forcey, Sophie Gibb, John Heil, Rob Koons, Michael Loux, E. J. Lowe, Alex Oliver, Timothy Pickavance, Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, Jeff Snapper, Peter van Inwagen, and Ezequiel Zerbudis. 636 robert k. garcia positing unconstructed, fundamental properties, an important dispute concerns whether properties are universals (see Armstrong 1980a, 1980b, 1989, 1997; Moreland 2001, 2013; and van Inwagen 2004) or tropes (see Campbell 1990; Ehring 2011; Maurin 2002; Molnar 2003; and Williams 1953). Realists posit universals, which are shareable, or 'repeatable' properties. A universal is shareable in that it can characterize several wholly distinct objects at once. For example, on realism, it is possible that two distinct spheres exist simultaneously, such that the sphericity of one is (numerically) identical with the sphericity of the other; the sphericity is a universal. Trope theory is an increasingly prominent alternative to realism. In fact, the concept of a universal is often used as a foil for introducing the concept of a trope. This is captured in the recurring slogan that 'tropes are particularized properties'. As I show below, however, the slogan is ambiguous because 'particularizing' can be understood in at least two ways. These correspond to two concepts of a trope, to what I call modifier tropes and module tropes. The modifier/module distinction stems from a suggestion by Michael Loux (2015: 31). I should note, however, that for reasons given in Garcia (2015a: 133–34), I use the term 'module trope' for what Loux calls a 'troper', and I use 'modifier trope' for what he simply calls a 'trope'. The modifier/module distinction seems to track and illuminate what Anna-Sofia Maurin (2014) describes as a 'choice of model for the trope', between thinking of tropes as substances and thinking of tropes as properties. On her view, however, the choice is ultimately inconsequential: 'tropes are by their nature such that they can be adequately categorized both as a kind of property and as a kind of substance' (2014, emphases in original). I will argue to the contrary. Rather than representing an inconsequential choice between two ways of modeling a single kind of trope, the modifier/module distinction represents a significant choice between two fundamentally different kinds of tropes. The structure of the article is as follows. In the first section I distinguish the two concepts of a trope and situate the two resulting trope theories against rival views, such as realism and austere nominalism. In section 2 I argue that modifier tropes and module tropes are unequally suited for metaphysical work: modifier tropes have advantages concerning powers, relations, and fundamental determinables, whereas module tropes have advantages concerning perception, causation, charactergrounding, and the ontology of substance. This shows that the choice between modifier tropes and module tropes is significant and divides the advantages of trope theory simpliciter. In section 3 I argue that each resulting trope theory is unstable: modifier trope theory threatens to collapse into a version of realism, and module trope theory threatens to collapse into austere nominalism. This invites reflection on the stability of trope theory in general. In the concluding section, I briefly consider whether a trope theorist might gainfully employ both types of tropes. 1. Modifier Tropes versus Module Tropes The first way to particularize a property is to take a universal and simply render it unshareable. Understood in this way, the slogan says that a trope is a nonshareable two ways to particularize a property 637 version of what is otherwise a universal. That is, unlike a universal, a trope cannot characterize multiple nonoverlapping objects at once. On a theory of universals, it is possible that two distinct particles a and b exist simultaneously, where the property whereby a is negatively charged is (numerically) identical with the property whereby b is negatively charged. Whereas on trope theory, if there are two charged particles, a and b, then the property whereby a is negatively charged is nonidentical with (though exactly similar to) the property whereby b is negatively charged. Philosophers who gloss the slogan this way include Campbell (1990), Carroll and Markosian (2010), Ehring (1997), Lewis (2001), Martin and Heil (1999), Molnar (2003), and Oliver (1996). These discussions do not specify whether the working concept is that of a selfexemplifying or non-self-exemplifying universal. Nevertheless, the context suggests that tropes are being compared to something like Armstrong's universals, which are generally non-self-exemplifying (his [1980a: 71f] discussion of the third-man problem suggests that he denies that, generally speaking, universals are selfexemplifying). If so, the slogan says that shareability exhausts the conceptual difference between tropes and non-self-exemplifying universals. Thus understood, the slogan fixes on the concept of a modifier trope: a nonshareable and nonself-exemplifying property. On a modifier trope theory, a billiard ball is hard in virtue of its hardness trope and spherical in virtue of its sphericity trope, but the hardness trope is not itself hard and the sphericity trope is not itself spherical. Thus, a modifier trope does not confer its own character to an object, but confers character that somehow is grounded in and produced by the character of the trope itself. To elucidate the sense in which a modifier trope does not confer its own character to an object, it may be useful to compare a modifier trope to a truthmaker. Presumably, in some cases truthmaking is irreflexive, in that there is a truthmaker (verifier) that is not itself true but makes something else true. Similarly, a modifier trope is what we might call a character-maker (characterizer) in that it makes something else charactered but the trope is not itself charactered in that way. The latter caveat is necessary because it is misleading to say that a modifier trope isn't charactered at all. For example, although a sphericity modifier trope isn't spherical, it is charactered both formally (being a property, being self-identical, being nonshareable, etc.) and functionally (being a sphere-maker). Most trope theorists take the formal and functional character of a trope to be primitive and not grounded in (say) universals or higher-order tropes (for an exception see Ehring [2011], where a trope has its nature in virtue of belonging to primitively natural classes). The concept of a modifier trope offers one way to understand the nature of a trope on a substance-attribute ontology, like that of C. B. Martin (1980) or E. J. Lowe (2006). Lowe, for example, has (in personal conversation) rejected module tropes and although his writing is not entirely unambiguous on the module/modifier distinction, on balance it seems reasonable to take his 'modes' to be modifier tropes. There is a stronger sense of 'particularize' and so another way to understand the slogan-a way that fixes on the concept of a module trope. In a more robust sense, 'particular' means propertied thing or object. Understood in this 638 robert k. garcia sense, 'particularizing a property' involves ascribing objecthood to a property (and, perhaps by implication, unshareability as well). Unlike the weaker sense of particularization, this conceptual transformation seems to involve traversing categories-from property to object. In this stronger sense, particularization involves converting a shareable singly characterizing property (a universal) into a nonshareable minimally or singly propertied object (a module trope). The 'minimally or singly' is a hedge I address below. In the interim, I will simply use 'minimally'. The concept of a module trope appears in several discussions. Armstrong (1989: 115), citing A. J. Ayer, mentions a trope concept on which tropes are minimally charactered 'junior substances'. Peter Forrest reiterates the idea: As I understand it, tropes are not so much properties that familiar objects have as rather mini-substances that would ordinarily be thought of as having a location and one other property. (1993: 47) James van Cleve makes a similar comment: When I read accounts of what 'particularized properties' are supposed to be, I cannot help thinking that they belong to the category of particulars rather than to the category of properties. A 'particular redness' seems really to be a special kind of red particular. (Perhaps it is a particular that exemplifies just one property, redness, and that one essentially.) (1985: 101–02) These passages take a 'particularized property' to be a minimally propertied particular. Understood in this way, the slogan picks out the concept of a module trope. It is important to note that the strong sense of 'particularize' should not be conflated with substantializing a property in the sense of making the property into an independent entity-that is, into a property that can exist independently of its (or any) bearer. Indeed, both independent modifier tropes (transferable or even free-floating modifier tropes) and dependent (nontransferable) module tropes are conceivable. Thus, it seems that there are two conceptual distinctions here: between dependent and independent tropes and between modifier and module tropes. Although it might be natural to take modifier tropes to be dependent and module tropes to be independent, it is not obvious that these pairings are necessary, and in what follows I will not assume that they are. As the above quotations suggest, module tropes have similarities to bare particulars and to the ordinary objects of austere nominalism. To see this, suppose we have a spectrum representing the degree to which a theory's fundamental entities are primitively, intrinsically, and naturally (nonformally) charactered. At one end is the noncharactered bare particular; at the other end is the fully charactered ordinary object of the austere nominalist. The module trope sits somewhere on the theoretical turf between them. two ways to particularize a property 639 On the one hand, a module trope is similar to a bare particular in the following respect. Considered in itself, a bare particular is completely devoid of natural (nonformal) character. In contrast, aside from being minimally charactered, a module trope has no other natural character. It is, as it were, a barely-not-bare particular. On the other hand, module trope theory and austere nominalism agree that there are primitively naturally charactered fundamental entities. They disagree over the thickness of primitive character. Austere nominalism takes fundamental entities to be primitively fully charactered. On this view, an electron is primitively chargedand-massive. In contrast, module trope theory takes fundamental entities to be primitively minimally charactered. On this view, a fully charactered ordinary object is fully charactered in virtue of having several primitively minimally charactered tropes. Here, an electron is supposed to be charged and massive in virtue of having two distinct tropes, where one is primitively massive and the other is primitively charged. 2. Relative Merits I will now argue that modifier tropes and module tropes are unequally suited for metaphysical work. I'll do so by outlining several advantages of each theory over the other. 2.1 Merits of Modifier Tropes Modifier tropes enjoy an advantage in at least three areas, including powers, relations, and determinables. First, modifier tropes are better suited than module tropes to be the powers (or dispositions) of objects. Anna Marmodoro introduces her volume on powers with the following gloss: 'Powers are properties like fragility and electric charge, whose possession disposes their bearer in a certain way. The instantiation of fragility in the glass disposes the glass to break if struck in the appropriate circumstances' (2010: 1, emphasis mine). This is a typical and natural way to talk about powers, and it suggests that generally powers are not self-disposing. Rather, the natural way to understand a power is to take a power to dispose its bearer. On this way of thinking, magnetism is not itself magnetic; rather, magnetism disposes its bearer to attract nearby ferrous metals. The general assumption that powers are not self-disposing seems especially evident in discussions of the identity criterion for powers and the status of so-called higher-level powers. For example, Lowe's identity criterion includes the clause that token powers are identical only if their bearers are identical (2010: 12). This would be redundant if powers were self-disposing. With respect to higher-level powers, the idea is that something has (say) the power to roll down an inclined plane in virtue of having other (perhaps dispositional) properties including sphericity, rigidity, and heaviness. This would seem to require that each of the latter properties disposes something other than itself-a distinct bearer. The 640 robert k. garcia latter is jointly disposed by lower-level powers and thereby has the higher-level power to roll down a plane. Lower-level powers, then, would seem to be non-selfdisposing. But if powers are non-self-disposing, then if a power is a trope, it is a trope that does not have the character it grounds-that is, it is a modifier trope. Thus, modifier tropes are better suited than module tropes to be the powers of objects. Second, modifier tropes are better suited than module tropes to play the role of relations. In disputes about the status of relations on a trope ontology, the operative concept is almost certainly that of a modifier trope. Here, it would seem that the concept of a relation module trope is a nonstarter. Indeed, this is because the very concept of a relation module trope looks incoherent. On a trope ontology, disputes about relations largely focus on the putative relations of resemblance and compresence and typically concern whether the postulation (reification) of resemblance or compresence tropes would generate a vicious regress. For example, although relation tropes are rejected by Campbell (1990), they are explicitly postulated by more recent trope theorists, such as Maurin (2002) and Ehring (2011). More importantly, Armstrong's (1997: 12–13) 'ontological free lunch doctrine' is typically assumed in these discussions. Its bearing is this: if pairwise character supervenes on a pair of entities, then a genuine, reified, relation trope is not necessary to ground the pairwise character (Campbell 1990: 37). In other words, there is a two-place relation trope R only if the existence of the pair of R's terms is consistent with the nonexistence of R. Of course, if the existence of the pair of R's terms is consistent with the nonexistence of R, then the pair is not identical with R. Thus, a two-place relation trope is not identical with the pair it relates, and so either (1) a two-place relation trope is identical with a pair other than the pair whose pairwise character the trope grounds, or (2) a two-place relation trope is not identical with any pair. If (1), then the relation trope is itself a pair and thus is at least the kind of entity that could have pairwise character. Unfortunately, however, such a trope could have the pairwise character it grounds (i.e., it could be a module relation trope) only by introducing a seemingly vicious regress: If the pairwise character of the original pair requires grounding, then so does the similar pairwise character of the pair that is the relation trope. So (1) is not a viable option. Thus, there is a two-place relation trope only if (2) is the case. That is, the two-place relation trope is not identical with a pair. This means the relation trope cannot have pairwise character, and thus, the relation trope cannot have the character it grounds. In other words, a two-place relation trope cannot be a module trope. This argument generalizes to all many-place relations. If there are any such relations, they are not module tropes. Third, modifier tropes are better suited than module tropes to play the role of fundamental determinables. A determinable is a less than fully specific property. Examples include mass, color, and shape. Associated with (or 'falling under') the latter determinables are fully determinate properties, such as mass 1 kg, scarlet, and sphericity. A determinable property is fundamental if it is distinct from and irreducible to fully determinate properties (Wilson 2012: 5). To see how modifier and module tropes fare differently, consider the determinable triangularity and suppose that triangularity1 is a fundamental two ways to particularize a property 641 determinable trope. On module trope theory, triangularity1 would itself be triangularly shaped, but not in any fully determinate way. It would be something with three sides and three angles, but none of the angles would have a specific degree and none of the sides would have a specific length. Thus, triangularity1 would be a triangle but it would be neither equilateral, isosceles, nor scalene. Such an entity seems impossible. In contrast, on modifier trope theory, triangularity1 would not itself be triangularly shaped: it would be neither indeterminately triangularly shaped nor fully determinately triangularly shaped. There seems to be nothing impossible about such a modifier trope. It would ensure that its bearer is shaped in some triangular way or other, but it would not ensure that its bearer is (say) equilateral. Thus, in contrast to modifier trope theory, on module trope theory, postulating fundamental determinables seems to be a nonstarter. Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that many trope theorists deny that determinables are fundamental and, instead, identify determinables with so-called property classes (for example, Campbell 1990; Ehring 1996, 2011; and Williams 1953). On this view, a property class is a resemblance class of tropes, where membership in the class is defined in terms of degrees of resemblance. More precisely, a class C of tropes is a property class if and only if (i) each member of C resembles every other member of C to some specific degree, and (ii) no trope that is not a member of C resembles every member of C to that degree (Manley 2002: 77). For example, the determinable property shape is said to be identical with the (loose) resemblance class that contains all and only fully determinate shape tropes: all sphericities, all cubicities, etc. Property classes have been employed to play various roles within trope theory (for details, see Oliver 1996 and Manley 2002). Although many trope theorists have eschewed fundamental determinables, there are reasons to doubt that an adequate trope theory can do without them. Indeed, there are several ways they might earn their keep. I will mention three. To begin, fundamental determinable tropes might be needed to construct adequate property classes out of tropes. Building on Williams (1953), Campbell (1990) argues that property-classes of tropes can provide the semantic values for abstract terms while avoiding the occult universals of the realist and being immune to the well-known imperfect community and companionship problems raised by Nelson Goodman (1966) against object-class resemblance nominalism. This immunity thesis has been challenged by David Manley (2002), who argues that the project of constructing property-classes out of tropes runs into tropist versions of the imperfect community and companionship problems. Setting aside other issues (about which see Garcia 2015a), the important point is Manley's observation that a trope theorist might avoid both of the Goodman-style objections by postulating fundamental determinable tropes (2002: 88). To be sure, this move is not unproblematic. Manley notes several worries, including concerns about parsimony, persistence conditions, and causation. These worries cannot be assessed here, but recent work goes some distance toward addressing them, especially the work of Wilson (2012), to which we turn next. At the very least, the verdict is out on whether and to what extent these concerns are ultimately problematic. 642 robert k. garcia Jessica Wilson (2012) has argued that fundamental determinables are needed to ground certain modal facts about determinables. To illustrate, suppose we have spherical piece of clay. The piece has the determinable being shaped but that determinable might have been otherwise determined-it might have been (say) cubically determined rather than spherically determined. Thus, there are modal facts about determinables, and according to Wilson, fundamental determinables are needed to account for those facts. Finally, Ingvar Johansson has argued that fundamental determinables are needed 'to explain the basic scales of mathematical physics' (2014: 239). To illustrate the scales that Johansson has in mind, consider the fact that any pair of length tropes are more similar than any length trope and any mass trope. For example, a 10 m length trope differs less from a 10100 m length trope than from a 10 kg mass trope (2014: 238). In this sense, there is an 'ontological gap' between different kinds of tropes. Johansson argues that trope theory requires fundamental determinables to explain these gaps. To sum up, unlike the modifier trope theorist, the module trope theorist does not have the option of postulating fundamental determinables. But, all things being equal, a theory of tropes on which fundamental determinables are possible is better than one on which they are not. Moreover, arguably, there is important work for fundamental determinable tropes to do. Thus, it is an advantage of modifier trope theory that it allows for fundamental determinables. 2.2 Merits of Module Tropes Module tropes, however, have their own advantages. These concern perception, causation, character-grounding, and the ontology of substance. The first two are related. According to many trope theorists, an important advantage of tropes over universals is that tropes are uniquely suited to be the immediate objects of perception and the terms of causal relations (Campbell 1981; Ehring 1997; Lowe 2006; Schaffer 2001; and Williams 1953). Unfortunately, modifier tropes do not enjoy these advantages. First, contrary to how tropes are often advertised, modifier tropes seem ineligible to play a direct role in perception. According to Lowe, '[W]hen I see the leaf change in colour-perhaps as it is turned brown by a flame-I seem to see something cease to exist in the location of the leaf, namely, its greenness. But it could not be the universal greenness which ceases to exist, at least so long as other green things continue to exist.' (1998: 205) I will put the underlying argument here as follows: Suppose we have two green leaves, Leaf1 and Leaf2. As Leaf1 is subjected to a flame, we see its greenness cease to exist. Leaf2 is not subjected to heat, and we see its greenness continue to exist. Thus, when we saw Leaf1's greenness, what we directly perceived was neither the greenness of Leaf2, nor greenness in general (a universal). Rather, we directly perceived the particular greenness of Leaf1 (a trope). two ways to particularize a property 643 When generalized, this sort of argument suggests that, unlike universals, tropes are especially well-suited to play a direct role in perception: to be the basic percepts. Unfortunately, this sort of argument does not fare well on modifier trope theory. Let p stand for whatever it is that I directly perceive when I perceive the greenness of Leaf1. Presumably, a candidate entity e is eligible to play the role of p only if (P1) e is something unique to Leaf1 (as Lowe suggests, it is not something outside the location of Leaf1) and (P2) p is itself (greenly) colored. As I will discuss below, trope theorists have argued that an important advantage of tropes is that tropes, unlike universals, satisfy (P1) in virtue of being nonshareable. Indeed, the nonshareability of tropes ensures that (P1) is satisfied on both module and modifier trope theory: on each view, the greenness of Leaf1 does not characterize anything other than Leaf1 and is nonidentical with the greenness of Leaf2. However, it is not the case that (P2) is satisfied on both theories: a greenness trope is itself colored only on module trope theory. Thus, despite its nonshareability, a modifier trope is not the kind of entity one can immediately perceive, much less the sort of entity one can directly perceive to cease to exist in the location of a leaf. As such, a greenness modifier trope is not eligible to play the role of p, the immediate percept in the leaf case. But greenness modifier tropes are not unique in this regard. On the modifier view, a sweetness trope is not sweet, a temperature trope is not (say) hot, a smoothness trope is not smooth, and so on. Thus, unlike module tropes, modifier tropes seem ineligible to play a direct role in perception. Second, for similar reasons, modifier tropes seem ineligible to play a direct role in causation. Again, this is contrary to the usual billing. Consider Maurin's remarks: According to a majority of the trope theorists, tropes have an important role to play in causation. It is, after all, not the whole stove that burns you, it is its temperature that does the damage. And it is not any temperature, nor temperature in general, which leaves a red mark. That mark is left by the particular temperature had by this particular stove now or, in other words, it is left by the stove's temperature-trope. (2014, emphases in original) When generalized, this sort of argument suggests that, unlike universals, tropes are especially well-suited to play a direct role in causation: to be the basic causal relata. For reasons that are parallel to those concerning the perception case, this sort of argument does not fare well on modifier trope theory. To see why, call the stove in Maurin's example Stove1 and suppose there is another, Stove2, that is exactly alike with respect to temperature. Each is, say, 500 degrees Fahrenheit. Let c stand for whatever it is that is directly causally responsible for the burn mark on my hand. Presumably, a candidate entity e is eligible to play the role of c only if (C1) e is something unique to Stove1 (as Maurin says, the 'mark is left by the particular temperature had by this particular stove now') and (C2) e is itself hot. Trope theorists have argued that an important advantage of tropes is that tropes, unlike universals, satisfy (C1) in virtue of being nonshareable. Indeed, (C1) is satisfied on both module and modifier trope theory: on each view, 644 robert k. garcia the hotness of Stove1 does not characterize anything other than Stove1 and is nonidentical with the hotness of Stove2. However, it is not the case that (C2) is satisfied on both theories: a hotness trope is itself hot only on module trope theory. Thus, despite its nonshareability, a modifier hotness trope is not eligible to play the role of c, the immediate cause of the burn mark. But hotness modifier tropes are not unique in this regard. On the modifier view, mass tropes are not massive, charge tropes are not charged, and so on. Thus, unlike module tropes, modifier tropes seem ineligible to play a direct role in causation. Third, with respect to character-grounding, module tropes are less mysterious than modifier tropes. Put simply, unlike module tropes, modifier tropes give what they don't have. A sphericity modifier trope is not itself spherical, yet somehow makes it the case that its bearer is spherical; here, there is something in the result of character-grounding that does not exist in the character-grounder itself. Indeed, the result of character-grounding bears no qualitative resemblance to the charactergrounder itself. In contrast, on the module view, character-grounding need not involve the mysterious production of novel character. For example, a sphericity module trope is able to ground the sphericity of its bearer precisely because the trope is itself spherical. Indeed, a module trope theorist might even say that the bearer's being spherical amounts to nothing more than the bearer's having a proper part (a trope) that is spherical (a strategy I discuss in Garcia, forthcoming). Thus, unlike modifier tropes, module tropes go some distance toward dispelling 'the ancient mystery of predication' (Williams 1953: 11). Fourth, module tropes are better suited than modifier tropes for a bundle theory of substance (for more on this issue, see Garcia 2015a and forthcoming). Trope theorists are divided over bundle theory. Several reject it, including Heil (2012), LaBossiere (1994), Lowe (2006), and Martin (1980). According to many, however, taking properties to be tropes, rather than universals, makes it possible to do without substrata and to maintain that objects are bundles of all and only properties (Campbell 1990; Ehring 2011; Maurin 2002; and Schaffer 2001). The idea is that, unlike tropes, shareable properties cannot differentiate qualitatively indiscernible objects, and thus, taking properties to be universals requires an additional category of differentiating entities: substrata or bare particulars (for more on bare particulars see Garcia 2014 and Pickavance 2014; for the subtle differences between substrata and bare particulars see Gracia 1988: 87). Thus, tropes are said to have the advantage over universals of allowing for a parsimonious mono-category ontology and avoiding mysterious and paradoxical substrata (Schaffer 2001: 248). Unfortunately, it is doubtful that modifier tropes can do without substrata. Even if substrata are not needed on either version of trope theory to differentiate substances, there is other work for substrata to do for which modifier tropes are not suited. Suppose sphericity1 is a sphericity trope. In its role as a charactergrounder, sphericity1 is supposed to account for the fact that something is spherical. Call the latter something a 'trope-bearer'. On module trope theory, because sphericity1 is itself spherical, there is at least the theoretical option of identifying the trope-bearer with sphericity1 (see Garcia, forthcoming). On modifier trope two ways to particularize a property 645 theory, however, sphericity1 is not itself spherical, and thus the entity which is spherical (in virtue of the trope) must be something numerically distinct from sphericity1. In other words, on modifier trope theory, a trope-bearer is a distinct entity that is characterized by a trope. If sphericity1 is a modifier trope, then it spherizes its bearer. It seems, then, that modifier trope theory requires a category of trope-bearers in addition to a category of tropes-not to differentiate substances, but to be the literal subjects of characterization-to be the entities that are charactered in virtue of having tropes. This, however, is one of the traditional roles played by substrata. Differentiating substances is not the only role they are supposed to play. Thus, unlike module tropes, modifier tropes seem to rule out the much lauded advantages that come with a mono-category ontology that avoids substrata. (See Garcia 2015a and forthcoming for more on these issues and for a discussion of how the choice between modifier and module tropes bears on the choice between bundle and substance-attribute theories of substance.) In this section I have argued that modifier tropes have advantages concerning powers, relations, and determinables, whereas module tropes have advantages concerning perception, causation, character-grounding, and the ontology of substance. In this way, modifier tropes and module tropes are unequally suited for metaphysical work. This is not to say, however, that they are equally unsuited for metaphysical work-that the choice between them is a wash. Although I take each of the disadvantages of each type of trope to be significant, I do not undertake here the difficult task of determining the relative weights of those disadvantages. 3. Theoretical Instabilities I have argued that there are several ways in which modifier tropes and module tropes are unequally suited for metaphysical work. Drawing from several of these inequalities, in the remainder I will argue that each trope concept is unstable: modifier trope theory threatens to collapse into realism, and module trope theory threatens to collapse into austere nominalism. 3.1 Modifier Trope Theory and Realism Perhaps the most fundamental disagreement between trope theorists and realists concerns shareability. Indeed, it is fair to say that the ideological hallmark of trope theory is the judgment that taking properties to be nonshareable secures several important advantages over realism, advantages that outweigh whatever costs may be incurred by nonshareability (such as curtailing parsimony and explanatory power). Thus, if it turns out that the nonshareability of tropes is neither necessary nor sufficient to secure those advantages, then much of the rationale for trope theory is lost. In this section I will argue that this is how things turn out. That is, that on modifier trope theory, nonshareability is neither necessary nor sufficient to secure the important advantages that tropes are supposed to enjoy over universals. The advantages I have in mind are the four standard rationales for trope theory, as noted by Jonathan Schaffer (2001: 247–48). I will discuss each in turn. 646 robert k. garcia The first advantage that nonshareability is supposed to secure is that of safeguarding the intuitively plausible principle that no entity is wholly located at two or more nonoverlapping places at once. Following Reinhardt Grossmann (1992: 13), I will call the latter principle the Axiom of Location (AOL). Preserving AOL is routinely advertised as one of trope theory's important virtues and advantages over immanent realism. On the latter view, defended most prominently by D. M. Armstrong (1980b, 1989, 1997), universals 'are as fully present in space and time as their bearers' (O'Leary-Hawthorne and Cover 1998: 205). Immanent realism faces the long-standing objection that its shareable properties violate AOL. One way to put the objection is as follows. Suppose I am holding two billiard balls, one in each hand. According to realism, sphericity is literally shared by the two balls. That is, the sphericity of the ball in my right hand is identical with the sphericity of the ball in my left hand. Thus, because sphericity is shared by the balls, it is wholly located at two nonoverlapping locations at once, thus violating AOL. Worse, because sphericity is wholly located in both hands, it somehow moves away from itself as I spread my arms. In this way, shareability is said to saddle realism with significant, perhaps prohibitive, implausibility and counterintuitiveness. Trope theory is said to enjoy the advantage of avoiding this scandalous and counterintuitive result by denying that properties are shareable (Campbell 1981: 477). In this way, the preservation of AOL provides a rationale for the nonshareability of tropes and secures an advantage for trope theory not enjoyed by immanent realism. But shareability by itself does not violate AOL. Rather, the violation results from the conjunction of shareability and the principle that a property characterizes a located object only if the property is wholly located where that object is located. Call the latter principle '(L)'. Given (L), a property that can characterize several remote objects at once can thereby be wholly located at multiple nonoverlapping places at once. But without (L), shareability does not violate AOL. In light of points made above, however, it seems that on modifier trope theory there is little to no motivation for (L). In fact, modifier trope theory seems incompatible with (L). Above I argued that a modifier trope is intrinsically charactered only formally (being a property, being self-identical, being nonshareable, etc.) and functionally (e.g., being a sphere-maker). For example, not only is a sphericity modifier trope not spherical, presumably it is not shaped at all-it is not, say, cubical-and, a fortiori, it is not sized, massive, charged, temperatured, and so on. I also argued that a modifier trope is neither immediately perceivable (a greenness trope is not colored so you cannot directly perceive it) nor the sort of entity that could play a direct causal role (a hotness trope is not temperatured so it cannot be the immediate cause of a burn). These considerations make it difficult to see how a modifier trope could be spatiotemporally located. After all, how could an entity be spatially located if it is incapable of being the direct cause of anything and is neither shaped, nor sized, nor massive, nor temperatured, and so on-that is, if it is entirely devoid of natural character? But if a modifier trope cannot be located, then modifier trope theory is incompatible with (L). two ways to particularize a property 647 If (L) is false, then a property can simultaneously characterize several distinct objects without being wholly located in multiple places at once. In other words, if (L) is false, then AOL is consistent with shareability. Thus, the falsity of (L) would be sufficient to preserve AOL, regardless of whether or not properties are shareable. But if AOL is preserved independently of the nonshareability of properties, then preserving AOL fails to provide a rationale for nonshareability. Thus, given that (L) is false on modifier trope theory, AOL is preserved independently of the nonshareability of modifier tropes. Thus, preserving AOL fails to provide a rationale for the nonshareability of modifier tropes. To sum up, in itself, a modifier trope is neither an immediate percept nor a direct cause, and it is, moreover, devoid of natural character, being only formally and functionally charactered. Minimally, this suggests that there is nothing about a modifier trope that requires it to be spatiotemporal. Arguably, it suggests that modifier tropes are non-spatiotemporal. Either way, it suggests that modifier trope theory is compatible with the falsity of (L). But the falsity of (L) would suffice to safeguard AOL. Thus, although modifier trope theory enjoys the advantage over immanent realism of safeguarding AOL, nonshareability does not play a role in securing this advantage. Thus, the preservation of AOL fails to provide a rationale for the nonshareability of modifier tropes. The second advantage that nonshareability is supposed to secure concerns perception. As previously, many trope theorists hold that an important advantage of tropes over universals is that tropes are uniquely suited to be the immediate objects of perception. Unfortunately, modifier tropes do not enjoy this advantage. This was illustrated above, where I noted two necessary conditions-(P1) and (P2)-for being whatever it is that I directly perceive when I perceive the greenness of Leaf1. Unlike a greenness universal, both modifier tropes and module tropes satisfy (P1) in virtue of being nonshareable. As before, however, although a greenness modifier trope is nonshareable, it does not satisfy (P2). More generally, the nonshareability of modifier tropes is not sufficient to make them immediately perceivable. Unlike module tropes, modifier tropes do not enjoy the advantage over universals of being eligible to be the immediate objects of perception. Thus, securing this advantage fails to provide a rationale for the nonshareability of modifier tropes. The third advantage nonshareability is supposed to secure concerns causation. In virtue of being nonshareable, tropes, unlike universals, are supposed to be uniquely suited to be the basic terms of causal relations. For reasons akin to those concerning perception, modifier tropes do not enjoy this advantage. This was illustrated in the case concerning the hotness of Stove1, where I noted two necessary conditions-(C1) and (C2)-for being whatever it is that is directly causally responsible for the burn mark on my hand. Unlike a hotness universal, both modifier tropes and module tropes satisfy (C1) in virtue of being nonshareable. Again, however, although a hotness modifier trope is nonshareable, it does not satisfy (C2). More generally, the nonshareability of modifier tropes is not sufficient to make them eligible to be direct causes. Unlike module tropes, modifier tropes do not enjoy the advantage over universals of being eligible to be the basic 648 robert k. garcia terms of causation. Thus, securing this advantage fails to provide a rationale for the nonshareability of modifier tropes. The fourth advantage nonshareability is supposed to secure concerns the ontology of substance. As previously, many trope theorists hold that taking properties to be nonshareable allows for a bundle theory-a parsimonious monocategory ontology that avoids mysterious and paradoxical substrata (Schaffer 2001: 248). As argued above, however, modifier trope theory requires a category of trope-bearers in addition to tropes-not to differentiate substances, but to provide the entities that are characterized by modifier tropes. In being subjects of characterization, trope-bearers play one of the traditional roles assigned to substrata. Thus, because modifier tropes require distinct trope bearers, the nonshareability of modifier tropes is not sufficient to secure the advantage over universals of making bundle theory viable. Thus, securing this advantage fails to provide a rationale for the nonshareability of modifier tropes. I have considered four important advantages that nonshareability is supposed to secure for tropes over universals. Perhaps there are other advantages that nonshareability might secure, but the above four comprise a large and important part of the standard rationale for taking properties to be tropes rather than universals. I have argued, however, that the nonshareability of modifier tropes is not necessary for the first advantage and not sufficient for the second, third, and fourth advantages. Thus, on modifier trope theory, principled motivations for the nonshareability of tropes are in short supply. In this way and in this sense, modifier trope theory threatens to collapse into realism. 3.2 Module Trope Theory and Austere Nominalism It is time to reconsider the recurring hedge that module tropes are 'minimally' charactered. This hedge marks a latent ambivalence concerning the exact degree to which a module trope is primitively charactered. More importantly, it harbors a theoretical instability. Sometimes tropes are described in a way that suggests that they are only singly charactered-witness the above remarks by van Cleve and Forrest as well as Campbell (1976: 216, fn 12 and 1981: 485). More often, however, trope theorists describe tropes in a way that suggests that tropes are multiply charactered. As Armstrong notes, trope theorists 'tend to give [tropes] spatial and temporal characteristics: shape, size, and duration. In this way the trope is swelled up a bit' (1989: 115). The idea that tropes are (or can be) primitively multiply charactered is clearly the working assumption of some trope theorists, such as Campbell (1990) and Robb (2005). It is also tacitly assumed by prominent critics of trope theory, such as Moreland (1989, 1997, 2001) and Manley (2002). To be sure, however, the tendency to thicken the primitive character of module tropes is a principled one. After all, it is difficult to see how anything could be (say) spherical without also being charactered in other ways, such as being sized. Manley, for example, takes it for granted that the shape trope of a square would itself not only have to be square, but would have to have perpendicular sides and an interior right angle (2002: 85). two ways to particularize a property 649 Unfortunately, however principled it may be, this thickening tendency threatens to collapse module trope theory into austere nominalism. Both views ultimately deploy the same general strategy: postulate primitively multiply charactered entities. That is, they agree that one need not give an analysis of multiply charactered objects. But the module trope theorist takes a further, speculative step: she takes the character of fully charactered objects to demand an analysis and meets this demand by taking fully charactered objects to have a theoretically novel metaphysical structure consisting in less-than-fully, yet multiply charactered tropes. However, if the character of multiply charactered objects can be primitive, then why not dispense with postulating a structure and simply take the character of fully charactered objects to be primitive? Absent an answer to this question, it is not clear how module trope theory is either different from or better than austere nominalism. A module trope theorist might respond by following Schaffer (2003) in resisting the thickening tendency. Schaffer argues for the metaphysical possibility of a mass trope that is massive but not otherwise charactered. Such a (module) trope would be a primitively singly charactered object. However, to forestall the collapse into austere nominalism, the module trope theorist must upgrade Schaffer's thesis in two significant ways. First, its scope must be extended to include all possible types of tropes. And second, it must be strengthened from affirming the possibility of singly charactered tropes to affirming the impossibility of multiply charactered tropes. Whether these upgrades are plausible and motivated merits reflection. I have my doubts. 4. Going Forward Trope theory is a leading alternative to realism and austere nominalism. But it suffers from an ambiguity concerning the nature of a trope. Disambiguation reveals a distinction between modifier tropes and module tropes. These types of tropes are unequally suited for metaphysical work. Modifier tropes have advantages concerning powers, relations, and fundamental determinables, whereas module tropes have advantages concerning perception, causation, character-grounding, and the ontology of substance. Thus, the choice between modifier tropes and module tropes is significant and divides the advantages of trope theory simpliciter. In addition, each resulting trope theory is unstable: modifier trope theory threatens to collapse into realism, and module trope theory threatens to collapse into austere nominalism. This invites reflection on the stability of trope theory in general. (To this end, in 'Tropes as Divine Acts' (2015b), I argue that a modifier trope theory may be improved by taking modifier tropes to be identical with certain divine acts.) Going forward, it is natural to ask whether a trope theorist might gainfully employ both types of tropes. Such an approach-call it the 'hybrid view'-is discussed by Koons and Pickavance (2015: 122) and is tacitly equated with trope theory by others. According to G. S. Rosenkrantz, for example, some tropes are modifier tropes and some are module tropes. On his understanding of trope theory, a wisdom trope is a modifier trope: 'A trope such as Aristotle's wisdom would not, of course, itself be wise: it is Aristotle who is wise' (1993: 5, fn 7). But a squareness 650 robert k. garcia trope is a module trope: 'it appears that the particular squareness of a certain object is square, and hence possesses spatial parts' (1993: 5, fn 7). Nevertheless, although it is not entirely unheard of, the hybrid view marks a relatively uncharted region of theoretical space, and it is not clear whether the view has ever been seriously defended. Thus, I think it would be more judicious to invite further exploration of the view rather than to risk a precipitous verdict. That said, I'd like to conclude by offering a few general remarks about the hybrid view and by briefly considering a possible instance of it. It seems doubtful that the hybrid view would mitigate the foregoing concerns about each type of trope. Consider, for example, the most natural way to develop the hybrid view: take module tropes to be characterized by modifier tropes. With respect to the theoretical instability problems, it is not clear that this move would stabilize either type of trope. On the one hand, the nonshareability of modifier tropes would be no more motivated than it was before. Thus, the hybrid view adds nothing to modifier tropes that would forestall their collapse into universals. On the other hand, it is less clear whether the hybrid view could forestall the collapse of a module trope into an object on par with the primitively multiply charactered object of the austere nominalist. As previously, to prevent this collapse, the hybrid view must deny that a module trope is multiply primitively charactered. It cannot be, say, primitively spherical-and-sized. And, on pain of converting the module trope into a bare particular, the view must affirm that a module trope has some primitive natural character-that is, the trope must be primitively naturally charactered in at least one way. It must be at least, say, primitively spherical. Thus, the hybrid view forestalls the collapse into austere nominalism only if it takes every module trope to be, in itself, only singly primitively charactered. By my lights, this marks a significant condition for the viability of the hybrid view. It may be that the trope bundle theory developed by David Robb is a hybrid view. According to Robb, the principle of unity for bundles at the lowest mereological level is identity: 'For any substantially simple object O and properties F and G: F and G are qualitative parts of O iff F and G are each identical with O' (2005: 486). Here, the tropes of simple objects are identical with their bearers. Thus, if (say) a mass trope is identical with its bearer, then the trope is itself massive. It is, in other words, a module trope. More generally, on Robb's view, it seems that the tropes had by (and thus identical with) simple substances are module tropes. Robb also allows that at higher mereological levels there are tropes that are structured (ultimately) on simple substances (where the latter, I take it, are module tropes). Thus, Robb's view is a hybrid view if higher level tropes characterize their base(s) in the way that a modifier trope characterizes its bearer. However, it is not clear if this is how the view is supposed to work. Where t is a higher level trope, it is not clear whether t's being structured on simple substance O involves t's existentially depending on O or also t's characterizing O (in the way that a modifier trope would). So it is not clear whether Robb's is a hybrid view. Regardless, however, his module tropes (simple substances) are threatened with the instability described above. His view is predicated on the assumption that (at least some) simple substances have multiple tropes. Without this assumption, there would be no motivation for the strategy of two ways to particularize a property 651 unifying the simple substance (qua bundle) via identity. Thus, where O is a simple substance that is identical with multiple module tropes, O is primitively multiply charactered. For example, if simple object O has a charge trope and a mass trope, then O is identical with those tropes, and thus, O is primitively charged-andmassive. In this way, Robb's simple substances (module tropes) are on a par with the multiply primitively charactered objects of the austere nominalist. Hence, the threat of collapse remains unmitigated. robert k. garcia texas a&m university [email protected] References Armstrong, D. (1980a) Nominalism and Realism: Universals and Scientific Realism. Vol. 1. New York: Cambridge University Press. Armstrong, D. (1980b) Universals and Scientific Realism: A Theory of Universals. Vol 2. New York: Cambridge University Press. Armstrong, D. (1989) Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Armstrong, D. (1997) A World of States of Affairs. New York: Cambridge University Press. Campbell, K. (1976) Metaphysics: An Introduction. Encino, CA: Dickenson. Campbell, K. (1990) Abstract Particulars. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Campbell, K. (1981) 'The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars'. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 6, 477–88. Carroll, J., and N. Markosian. 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Abstract for Reflections on Moral Disagreement, Relativism, and Skepticism About Rules By Denis Robinson, University of Auckland Part I of this paper discusses some uses of arguments from radical moral disagreement - in particular, as directed against absolutist cognitivism - and surveys some semantic issues thus made salient. It may be argued that parties to such a disagreement cannot be using the relevant moral claims with exactly the same absolutist cognitive content. That challenges the absolutist element of absolutist cognitivism, which, combined with the intractable nature of radical moral disagreement, in turn challenges the viability of a purely cognitivist account of moral judgments. Such a conclusion could be staved off if it could be held that a sufficient condition for commonality of cognitive content in moral judgments could consist, despite the presence of radical moral disagreement, in the parties' acceptance of a common set of fundamental moral principles. Part 1 begins, and Part 2 further develops, a destructive critique of that idea, leading thereby to a skeptical appraisal of the important role sometimes assigned, in meta-ethical theorizing, to moral rules. Inter alia the paper is intended to suggest the possibility of overlap between relativist and particularist agendas. Reflections on Moral Disagreement, Relativism, and Skepticism About Rules This paper consists of two main parts. Part I discusses the use of arguments from radical moral disagreement - in particular as directed against absolutist cognitivism1 - and surveys a number of issues made salient by such arguments. Part 2 discuss the role of moral rules in underwriting moral judgment, and in particular, in determining the meanings of terms of moral evaluation, attacking a doctrine I call "RFMM" – "Rules Fix Moral Meanings". I hope each part has some independent interest, but the important link between them is that RFMM is sometimes suggested as a rejoinder to the kind of critique of absolutist cognitivism discussed in Part I. Arguments from radical moral disagreement can be seen to challenge the objectivity of moral claims, or the epistemic accessibility of moral truths. But 1 I comment briefly on my use of some key meta-ethical terms in a Terminological Appendix at the end of this article. 2 they are at their most powerful when given, broadly speaking, a semantic twist. So taken, they challenge what we might call the presumption of stable cognitivist univocity: the presumption that there is a single cognitive content P such that one party to the disagreement unequivocally asserts P, and the other unequivocally denies P. Such a presumption relies on the view that terms of moral evaluation used by disputing parties speaking a common natural language use terms of moral evaluation reliably to express the same cognitive content. Since this is hard to reconcile with the existence of radical moral disagreements, given simple cognitivist assumptions such disagreements demand some kind of relativist, rather than an absolutist, interpretation of those terms.2 It is commonly suggested that such threats to absolutist cognitivism can be rebutted by appeal to alleged pervasive agreement about Fundamental Moral Principles. This would only work if agreement about moral principles could somehow provide a guarantee, contrary to appearances, that the relevant terms are being used by the disputing parties with an exactly equivalent, absolutist sense. This is the doctrine I refer to above as "RFMM".3 The longest portion of Part 2 comprises an argument which surveys a range of ways in which moral rules might figure in determining agents' particular moral judgments. As these possibilities become more and more lifelike, I suggest, it becomes increasingly evident that some key components of moral judgment and understanding cannot plausibly be represented in terms of allegiance or conformity merely to a set of moral rules. I conclude by considering some possible implications of my discussion, and some illustrative analogies which may help to convey the attitude to moral principles which I advocate. This attitude has obvious affinities here with 2 For the purposes of this paper I consider only disputes between speakers of what is prima facie a common natural language, mostly avoiding issues about translation of moral vocabulary between distinct natural languages. This somewhat artificial restriction, if anything, favours my opponents. Naturally, I think similar points can be made about moral judgments expressed in a range of languages, and issues about translating them. Tersman(2006) makes claims about constraints on translation central to his argument; see especially Chapter 6. 3 My interest in RFMM was sparked by some remarks, reminiscent of it, appearing (in the context of a more complex and sophisticated position) in the work of Frank Jackson. See Jackson(1998); also Robinson(2009). 3 particularism. Without discussing the point at length, I certainly intend my discussion to suggest that particularism and relativism might have more in common than is often acknowledged. I need to say clearly here that I do not principally talk about moral choice, but about moral evaluation, even though I talk as if a principal target of moral evaluation is actions - past or future, our own or others'. My supposition in effect is that the sine qua non of moral choice is the general ability to morally evaluate actions. We may favour various mental procedures in choosing an action which will stand up to our own retrospective moral evaluation. But for all that I say, these may be merely techniques for hitting a certain target, where merit attaches to hitting that target, not to the techniques. This may be anathema to anyone wishing to base moral evaluation of actions primarily on the processes by which actions are chosen or generated. My discussion may not absolutely exclude such a view, but certainly does not presuppose it. Part 1: Radical Moral Disagreement, and Moral Rules: Setting Context, Surveying Landscape 1.1 On stabilizing meanings It is reasonable to ask questions like the following about terms such as "right" and "wrong", used in English to express moral evaluations. Are there usefully expressible criteria which constitutively govern correct application of those predicates to particular cases, or which are constitutive of the concepts those predicates express? How are those predicates given their meaning, or those concepts given their content, and how are those meanings, or concepts, taught, transmitted, stabilized, and kept constant, so as to enable successful communication and mutual comprehension within a community which uses such terms, or employs such concepts - crucially, in applying them to particular events and actions? We might ask, quite generally, what if anything anchors, fixes or sustains constancy of meanings across populations and times. When millions of people, over centuries, speak a common language, what ensures that words of that language are used with a common meaning, across that diverse and scattered population, and from one generation to the next? Notwithstanding the legacy of lexicography, the most general answer is surely "nothing in particular, beyond the mere practice of using and transmitting the language". Languages surely spread and develop, to a large extent, through unconscious and, broadly speaking, evolutionary processes. RFMM, if correct, would constitute 4 an exception to this quietist generalization, since it singles out a quite small and fixed subset of contexts of moral terms as having a unique and controlling status in fixing the meanings of those terms. Would this be a sui generis exception to our generalization, or are there other exceptions which might to some extent provide models for this one? One class of such exceptions might involve procedures consciously dedicated to ensuring stability and commonality of meanings of particular words or word-families, where meaning-variation would be particularly inconvenient. Cases might include the sciences (think of standard physical units, and of biological, chemical, and medical taxonomies), the law, and organized competitive games (as in "the Laws of Rugby"). These cases provide only a limited model for understanding RFMM. One reason for this is the fact that there is no good moral analogue (in current secular society) for the recognizable and empirically testable expertise of the scientific community, nor for the canonical rule-fixing status of the International Rugby Board. But though limited, the model has some relevance, since RFMM does assign a special place - and potentially, a recognized one - to fundamental moral principles as stabilizing moral meanings. When thinking about how words are anchored and stabilized in their meanings, we must also acknowledge that for many words in our ordinary descriptive vocabulary this is done by straightforwardly referring to natural kinds, so that nature's own joints in effect constantly calibrate our usage. Just as water flows naturally into gullies, verbal distinctions, it might be said, gravitate naturally towards distinctions in nature. Indeed the development and systematization of canonical meaning-fixing stipulations and procedures in the sciences involve building on precisely that basis, as science reflexively improves our understanding of it. 1.2 Radical moral disagreements and the issue of semantic "anchoring" for moral terms Can we exploit a version of this natural-kind-oriented, self-calibrating model in our portrayal of RFMM? I think not. Note first that this model certainly does not apply to all ordinary language terms and distinctions. (Consider for instance distinctions drawn in rules governing behavior around the scrum in rugby.) There is little plausibility in the view that moral terms and concepts are anchored to instances of natural kinds which, through their stable patterns 5 of effects, may be identified as the kinds playing such and such causal roles.4 One of several reasons to doubt such a view is the existence of an important subset of moral disagreements, those where dispute over uncontroversially descriptive facts is not in play. A premise of what follows is that such fundamental moral disputes may be important, deeply intractable, and in principle irresolvable, in the following quasi-technical sense: neither side can cite grounds for declaring the other side wrong, which could not reasonably be called question-begging in the context. These are what - in line, pretty much, with contemporary usage, I am calling "radical moral disagreements".5 These are not, it seems to me, situations where one might appropriately attempt to refute either party by seeking to backtrack along reference-transmitting causal chains, searching for a less than obvious "real essence", to determine the true content of the relevant terms of moral evaluation.6 Moreover, an attempt to account in this kind of way for such stability of meaning as moral terms have, would make a poor fit with the narrow restriction of canonical occurrences of such terms to a relatively small number of Fundamental Moral Principles. To further clarify the notion of radical moral disagreement, let's consider a sort of case which, though it blocks attempts at resolution, is not a case of this kind. Consider a dispute over the right way to dispose of a person's estate, involving different opinions of the probable contents of a lost will. Here the disagreement is not a product of ignorance about any hidden or inaccessible moral facts (and a fortiori it is not a case of ignorance about some moral "real essence" of which observable features of the situation might or might not be causal products). Unlike cases of radical moral disagreement, the case puts no pressure on any view about the nature of moral facts or of the semantics of moral terms. The contents of the lost document have a bearing on what it is right to do, nevertheless insofar as it turns on those contents, the dispute is 4 See Robinson(2004) and (2009) for discussion of some pertinent issues about words, concepts, and semantics. 5 Tersman(2006) provides a penetrating exploration of such disagreements and their significance. 6 These issues surface again below, in part 1.3. A more nuanced discussion than I can supply here, would need to consider some well-known and important debates pitting "Cornell Realists" against Gilbert Harman. My views are closer to Harman's. 6 not properly speaking a moral one at all. Moral education is no more directed at learning how to find - or guess the probable contents of - lost documents, than it is directed at learning which observable syndromes probabilify an aetiology involving hidden real essences. Radical moral disagreements start when agreement has been reached about all such potentially relevant nonmoral facts, but moral disagreement remains. (The disputants might abandon appeal to claims about the probable contents of the will and begin debating what it is right to do on the agreed assumption that those contents will never be known, but that would make the case a different one.) Radical moral disagreements are doubly puzzling, on cognitivist and absolutist assumptions. On the one hand (we could call this "the primary puzzle") they present what, at least in another context, might seem like paradigmatic evidence of terms being used with different senses – albeit, in a relativist or indexical way, with contextually sensitive but importantly similar senses.7 Thus these disagreements push cognitivists in the direction of relativism. On the other hand, these disagreements do not present the appearance we would expect if we viewed them in the light of a simple relativism (we could call this "the secondary puzzle"). For such a view would leave unexplained the appearance of a genuine disagreement: it would predict that the proponents would be "talking past each other", and not genuinely in disagreement, robbing the entire dispute of any point once the misunderstanding - mistaking relative terms for absolutes - is recognized. As I see it, this problem is to be rectified only by moving to a hybrid view which combines a kind of constrained cognitivist relativism with noncognitivist elements.8 (This two-step is what I earlier called "the semantic twist" on arguments from moral disagreement.) 7 Here we basically need a distinction reminiscent of Kaplan's, between different tokens of indexical expressions which in one sense have a common type-meaning - the same "character" - yet in another sense have different, contextually-determined token-meanings - different "contents". 8 The implications of radical disagreements are explored in Robinson(2004) and (2009). I suggest in Robinson(2004) that there are radical disagreements about personal identity which are, as it were, radical moral disagreements by proxy. There I call the kind of hybrid view I believe is needed, "quasi-relativism", and radical disagreements "quasi-disagreements". I believe my standpoint here is at least broadly consonant with Tersman's(2006). 7 I do not have an account to offer of the details of such a view. This much seems clear: it will not be a view of the "besires" kind which entails a kind of lock-step between belief, and some desire-like or desire-related, motivating attitude like "valuing". If there is anything remotely right in the philosophers' idea of the so-called "psychopath" or "amoralist" who can mirror the beliefs and moral claims of the person who genuinely judges something to be wrong, whilst having absolutely none of the accompanying motivation required by the so-called "internalism" constraint, it can't be that there is an attitude which of necessity involves a correct proportionality between degree of belief and degree of motivation. Indeed if (much less controversially) it is merely the case that two morally concerned agents can be equally convinced of something's being a clear-cut case of wrongdoing, but differ in the extent or force of the motivation which that judgment involves or generates in them - a situation entirely common in our world of morally concerned people who are less than saints - then we must surely think of ordinary moral judgments and their normal motivational accompaniments as packages of two logically orthogonal components, the force or degree of which can vary independently. If we can sensibly talk of these two "components" of moral judgments, then it is at least possible to ask which of them is better thought of as essential for type-individuating particular moral judgments. The "latitude idea" expounded in Tersman(2006) implies, rightly I think, that reflection on radical moral disagreements shows that at least for some purposes it is the motivational element which is more fundamental. Cases of radical moral disagreement, on this view, are not mere cases of talking past one another, despite the expressed beliefs not being logical contraries, since there is genuine contrariety between the practical implications of the opposing claims due to the associated motivational differences they express. (None of this entails that the latitude allowed on the belief dimension of moral judgments is unconstrained: that is why a pure non-cognitivist view cannot serve here.) Full development of a view of this genre would require carrying out the difficult task of saying how the content (not just the force) of the particular motivation-related part of the moral-judgment package relates to the proposition, event, state of affairs, or what have you, of which the appropriate property of rightness, wrongness, or goodness is predicated in the cognitive component of the package. Prima facie, the latter must change as we move from taking a prospective view, regarding a possible future action, where we can coherently want to perform it (or want someone else to), to a retrospective view of an already performed action. In the latter case we cannot coherently 8 desire that anyone either perform or un-perform that particular action. In this change from prospective to retrospective evaluation, the object of our attitude changes from an abstract action-type to a concrete action-token. This is one of many difficulties in constructing a detailed hybrid account. 9 Having briefly touched on the need for, and some challenges posed by, the aim of articulating a hybrid view, let's next examine some issues which bear on, or pave the way for, a critique of the suggested rebuttals, mentioned in my opening paragraph, to the style of argument which leads to it. These responses suggest to me a view according to which indeed there are statable rules determining the correct application of predicates of moral evaluation, and expressing a set of canonical moral principles, so that it is by teaching of and reference to this set of moral principles that the meaning of moral predicates is shared, communicated, and kept stable. The most extreme form of such a view - the view I dub "RFMM" - would hold that the truths belonging to this canonical set of principles somehow collectively distil and encode the foundations of all moral truth, and in so doing, fix, anchor and preserve the meaning of key moral terms. 1.3 Core/periphery approaches to meaning-fixing That makes RFMM an instance of what I call the "core/periphery" strategy for attempting to rebut arguments from Radical Moral Disagreement, which have a semantic slant aimed at absolutist, cognitivist moral realism. This is the strategy - a thoroughly questionable one, in my opinion - of drawing (often tacitly) a "core/periphery" distinction within moral truths. It is as if Absolutist Cognitivists divide moral claims into two categories (aristocrats and commoners, as it were). Then two steps are taken. The first of them denies that disputants "really" disagree about morality provided they don't disagree about "core" (or "aristocratic") moral claims, even if they irrevocably disagree about "peripheral" (or "commoner") claims. The second step asserts that 9 It must be remembered that although "cognitivism" is associated with a view of moral judgments as primarily akin to beliefs, motivational states may be intentional states - propositional (or de se) attitudes - also, and thus also have "cognitive content". Where a moral judgment is a hybrid combination of a desire-like and a belief-like state it is perfectly reasonable to ask what the relationship is between these two kinds of content, and how it is constrained. Important and diverse suggestions for hybrid theories have been put forward by various authors; see for instance Campbell(2007), Copp(2001), and Ridge(2006). Further discussion of those views is beyond the scope of this paper. 9 radical moral disagreements only ever involve "peripheral" moral claims. (Perhaps they show, as it were, their lack of breeding, by getting involved in such disorderly disputes.) When it comes to defining, or evidencing grasp of the meaning of moral terms, the commoners are simply discounted. (Naturally these claims are not usually made in quite these terms.) Neither step of this procedure seems credible to me, when it is used in an attempt to rebut arguments from radical moral disagreements. Both steps seem egregiously ad hoc and incongruent with the nature of such disagreements. The case is very different from one where predicates are vague. If Ned takes offence at Don walking on his hill, Don might assert that the slightly sloping region around the foot of the hill, where the slope of the ground is 15° or less, does not count as "on" the hill, and Ned may disagree. Merely relying on a mutual grasp of the ordinary word "hill" will not settle the issue. Here it is clear that a resolution must be, if not entirely arbitrary, at least based on some suitably agreed or imposed convention not plausibly deriving solely from the standard meaning of that word. Each party to a radical moral disagreement, on the other hand, is likely to insist that their assertions are based, precisely, on a correct understanding of basic moral terms like "right" and "wrong", and there is no comparable sense in which adopting a precisifying convention could be taken as "resolving" what is at issue between them. As Solomon taught us, moral disagreements do not always allow us to "split the difference". The basic issue here is whether the disputants in radical moral disagreements can reasonably be held by absolutist cognitivists not to be using key moral terms with different senses, or at least relativized to different parameters.10 The essential feature of a radical moral dispute is that nothing crucial is hidden from the disputants. Both know the large man was on the bridge, and was pushed to his death in front of the runaway trolley by a small but strong bystander, in order to save - only just - the lives of the seventeen deaf children standing on the track and admiring the view in the opposite direction. Let us set aside the possibility that the disputants disagree because they make different estimates of the probability that the large man would have gone on to find a cure for cancer, or that one of the children will do so. We know enough to know that disagreement in a case like this might persist even if they agree on all such matters. If an absolutist cognitivist view is 10 In the Appendix I point out the broad range of views I am counting as "relativist". 10 correct, and if properties predicated by predicates of moral evaluation do indeed supervene on uncontroversially descriptive properties, then in such cases the disputants, in agreement about the uncontroversially descriptive, display different understandings of the relevant supervenience relations.11 But unless moral predicates have a causal-referential semantics involving possibly unknown real essences, are Twin Earthable, and so on, in the way Putnam has taught us to see natural kind terms, the relevant supervenience relations are necessarily and analytically correlated with the meanings of the relevant terms. To understand moral terms we need to know more than, merely, that the moral supervenes on the descriptive: we need a suitable grasp of the form of the supervenience relation - and once causal-referential semantics is set aside, that grasp is not only necessary but sufficient to know the meanings. If we have differing understandings of the relevant supervenience relations we simply differ in our understandings of those terms - we attach different meanings to them. Modeling this situation in a way which is both consistent with absolutist cognitivism and which treats the disagreement as betraying a local and minor mistake, by one or both parties, in the use or import of moral terminology, rather than revealing a basic meaning-difference, seems far-fetched and, as I have said, ad hoc. Here's one way to cling to absolutism while accepting the diagnosis that the disputants are not giving the same meaning or content to their moral terminology. Absolutists might hold that at least one party's claims are not moral claims at all, but "schmoral" claims - claims put forward as moral, or playing a similar role to moral claims, but which employ what purport to be 11 What of "thick" terms of moral evaluation, like "courageous" and "heartless"? I shall rely on the assumptions a) that such terms are not themselves "uncontroversially purely descriptive", meaning that claims employing them, made by either party in a moral disagreement, "could reasonably be called questionbegging in the context"; and b) that insofar as such a term has non-evaluative descriptive content, that part of its content is equivalent to that of a possible predicate whose application supervenes on the applicability of uncontroversially purely descriptive terms. If those assumptions are right, I believe, it does not affect my discussion whether parties to a radical moral disagreement are or are not using such "thick" evaluative terms in expressing their disagreement. Compare Jackson(1998), pp.135-6, on "centralism" vs. "non-centralism". 11 moral terms with what are actually distorted meanings.12 At least one disputant is not expressing genuine moral judgments, but merely schmoral judgments. But this claim, if it is not backed by viable analyses of the ontology, semantics, and epistemology of moral judgment which are capable in principle of distinguishing, in any given radical moral disagreement, the moral from the schmoral, strikes me as unattractively reminiscent of a "pie in the sky" or act of faith rebuttal to the challenge such disagreements pose. Someone who accepts this view, and is themselves party to a radical moral disagreement, must either lay claim hubristically to an epistemically mysterious ability to distinguish the moral from the schmoral, not shared by their opponent, or agree that they themselves are completely in the dark as to the morality of a disputed action - despite all the effort they have put into making a judgment based on a knowledge of all seemingly relevant non-moral facts, and long and earnest reflection and debate, and even despite having been convinced by these exercises of the correctness of their judgment. The "pie in the sky" in the case of the large man and the runaway trolley might be thought of as a Platonic lexicon, spelling out canonically the true meanings of moral terms, sufficiently clearly to demonstrate whose judgment, if anyone's, is correct in this case. But it is no more plausible, based on how people enmeshed in stubborn moral disagreements behave, that the disputants are trying to judge, or dimly perceive through some spiritual exercise, how to apply to the case in hand semantic information to be found in the contents of a Platonic lexicon, than that they are debating the evidence for one or another hidden real essence to which their utterances of moral terms are causally linked. And if we don't believe in some such symmetry-breaker we will remain confronted by what appears, from a cognitivist standpoint, to 12 Milo(1986) provides an interesting example. Milo uses both a "moral/schmoral" distinction, and a distinct "core/periphery" distinction, in a slightly unusual way. He classifies what I would call radical moral disagreements into several categories: "moral deadlock", "partial radical moral disagreement", and "total radical moral disagreement". These groups differ according to whether the disputants accept all, some, or none of the same basic moral criteria for rightness or wrongness. Milo argues by use of a core/periphery strategy that moral deadlocks are benign because they are "in-house", since they occur between people with the same basic moral values. That's his "core/periphery" strategy. He argues that the term "radical moral disagreements" is an oxymoron: candidates are merely mock-disagreements between moral and schmoral claims. That's his moral/schmoral strategy. 12 be evidence in favour of a relativist account of the meanings being expressed by moral terms, or of the contents of moral judgments, in such cases - pushing us, by way of the "secondary puzzle" about radical disagreement, towards the further consequences, including a sizeable concession to noncognitivism, noted above. RFMM, as a version of a core/periphery strategy, thus faces serious difficulties from the outset. Nevertheless I believe it is illuminating to explore possible details of such a position, and thus see how certain of its weaknesses emerge. The view may appear to have some prima facie strengths. It makes a concrete claim about the transmission of moral knowledge, including knowledge of the meanings of terms of moral evaluation; it represents morality - or at least, the language of moral evaluation - as a human institution maintained and transmitted throughout a community by way of a distinct vocabulary whose use is benchmarked to a finite set of claims. It offers to simplify the task of moral translation: identify the basic moral principles, and concentrate on finding apt translations of those into principles, hopefully already current, expressed in other languages. Note that the "principles" envisaged here are quite different from the "master principles" in terms of which one might formulate some of the great "isms" of moral theory: Utilitarianism, Kantianism, Intuitionism, Rationalism, etc. Such accounts tend to throw up just one or two basic principles, and though they are often defended in a priori terms, they are not really candidates for uncontroversial commonplaces of folk ethics, whereas that is precisely how an RFMM kind of view would wish to see the principles - whether they number ten or a dozen, several dozen, or a few hundred - which such a view sees as canonical. 1.4 More holistic versions of core/periphery strategies? RFMM contrasts with more holistic approaches to the fixing of moral meanings, where so far as consistently possible, the whole totality of moral claims (including claims of "folk" meta-ethics) - or a very large majority of them - are treated as implicitly term-defining for the distinctively moral terminology. Jackson's "moral functionalism" and the "analytic descriptivism" he bases on it, together provide an instance of such a "holistic" strategy, with an added twist of idealization: the totality of claims in question is drawn not from current "folk morality" but from an ideally improved and corrected, future or hypothetical version of the latter, called "mature folk 13 morality".13 Many difficulties attend such an approach. One difficulty, in navigating the path to mature folk morality, is settling the issue of how to allocate weight to different claims of folk morality - a more nuanced relative of the problem of how to demarcate the core from the periphery.14 Another - highlighted by such issues - is the need to presume that radical moral disagreements, containing claims in danger of being relegated to the periphery, can all be eliminated in the "maturing" process - the need, in other words, for a presumption of convergence. This presumption may itself be, as some have claimed, a part of folk morality, indeed the very part which justifies Jackson's account of the intended referents of moral terms: but it might be false, for all that. Jackson himself admits the possibility in principle of a failure of ideal convergence, and that something like relativism would be the consequence of that failure.15 1.5 A trace of RFMM in Jackson We could describe the unwelcome fall-back outcome Jackson envisages, if moral "convergence" turns out to be a will-o-the-wisp, as one viewing moral discourse as divided into a family of dialects. In that case Jackson might think the proper goal of moral debate would be to arrive at "mature" versions of each of these "folk moral dialects". But Jackson expresses optimism about convergence, seeing belief in convergence as itself a presumption of folk morality.16 So he prefers to frame the agenda in ethics - including folk ethics! - as moving towards a single, unified "mature folk morality". However this view cannot give a credible account of current folk moral discourse unless there is more commonality in 13 See Jackson(1998), Robinson(2009). 14 Jackson says "It is no part of moral functionalism that all parts of the network that is folk morality are equal" - Jackson(1998), p. 134. See Papineau(1996) for a useful discussion of this issue and some of its implications, as it arises in the functionalist definition of theoretical terms in the sciences. 15 For a critique of Jackson's discussion see Robinson(2009). 16 Richard Joyce(2011) astutely points out that this puts Jackson in danger of being "an accidental error theorist": if the concept of morality essentially incorporates the idea of convergence, but in fact convergence cannot be guaranteed, morality in Jackson's sense is at risk of not existing. 14 current folk use of moral terms than simply an implicit meta-ethical standpoint which involves faith in ultimate convergence. Unless we view the folk as univocal in their use of moral terms merely in virtue of sharing implicit common knowledge of and commitment to Jacksonian meta-ethics, the problem of securing common meanings has not been dodged if current moral discourse at the normative level splits into a multiplicity of "folk moral dialects". This I think is a good standpoint from which to view the following remarks about the role of "good enough" commonality in fixing shared meanings, from Jackson (1998), pp. 131-32: "The principles of folk morality are what we appeal to when we debate moral questions. They are the tenets we regard as settling our moral debates. '... It would be a betrayal of friendship not to testify on Jones's behalf, so I'll testify.' ... The dispute-settling nature of such a tenet shows that at the time in question and relative to the audience with whom we are debating, the tenet is part of our folk morality. If there were not such benchmarks we could not hold a sensible moral discussion with our fellows. Nevertheless these benchmark tenets are far from immutable ... "What is, though, true is that there is a considerable measure of agreement about the general principles broadly stated."... "We can think of the rather general principles that we share as the commonplaces or platitudes or constitutive principles that make up the core we need to share in order to count as speaking a common moral language...." Although these brief remarks from Jackson are simply addressing what he sees as being - or at least hopes to be - the merely temporary lack of complete convergence in moral opinions, their relevance to the puzzles associated (from an absolutist cognitivist standpoint) with radical moral disagreements, should be evident. The remarks about "benchmarks" required in order for us to engage in "a sensible moral discussion", and "speaking a common moral language" appear made to order to address the problem of "failing to disagree" raised by such disagreements (namely, the problem that insofar as they provide evidence that the disputants are using moral terms with different cognitive contents, they provide evidence that the supposed disagreement is merely a case of talking past one another). 15 Notable points in what Jackson says include the following. Firstly, the principles are represented as "dispute-settling", suggesting they have some canonical status equipping them to over-ride particular judgments. Secondly, although Jackson, given his assumptions, says they are "mutable", he nevertheless – as if to correct any mistaken impression this may give – says that "what is though true is that there is a considerable measure of agreement about the general principles broadly stated". The overall picture is one according to which there is enough agreement to secure a common language, and to provide the wherewithal to settle moral disputes, by appeal to agreed "benchmarks". These are the remarks from Jackson which are reminiscent, arguably, of the position I call "Rules Fix Moral Meanings". To briefly sum up the essential core of Part 1, I have claimed that a straightforward construal of cases of radical moral disagreement, consistent with cognitivism, is that there is variability in the cognitive content (i.e., in the truth conditions) assigned by the disputants to moral claims about which they disagree. If so, yet the disputants are making bona fide moral claims, then absolutism is in trouble. Since a consequence of retaining cognitivism under those circumstances is that people do not have a genuine disagreement, cognitivism is also in trouble. A common diagnosis is that the judgment that one party has and which the other party opposes is not, or not only, a belief, but is at least in part another kind of judgment containing expressivist or imperativist elements such as non-cognitivists invoke. The RFMM proposal for avoiding these consequences is to hold that the cognitive contents of the disputants' opposing claims do render them genuinely in contradiction with one another, because the meanings of all such claims are governed by a finite set of moral principles which canonically determine the meaning of moral terms they contain. Thus those terms have common meanings in the disputants' mouths regardless of how they actually view the truth or falsity, in the relevant circumstances, of the disputed claims. Part 2 Putting Moral Principles in their Place 2.1 Arguing against RFMM In what follows I shall present three arguments against RFMM, two of them brief, and one of them more extended. These arguments will in turn be followed up with some concluding remarks expressing skepticism about the special status of moral rules or principles generally. 16 The general implication of all these arguments will be that moral understanding and commitment are not well represented as grasp of and commitment to a set of rules or principles. This point is highlighted by illustrating some different ways in which members of a group might reasonably be said to be mutually committed to a common set of moral principles, yet be capable of radical moral disagreement. These disagreements might arise between members of such a group, simply because of differences in how they respond to cases in which distinct individual rules apply, and clash. Only by dismissing those differences as reflecting someone's misuse of moral terms by their own lights, thus not bona fide manifestations of moral understanding, could we retain the view that two people's commitment to the same moral principles suffices to demonstrate that their moral concepts, or the meanings they give their moral terms, are identical. But I shall argue that in such cases the differences clearly reflect differences in moral standpoint and are thus not well-represented as products of confusion. The deeper message here is that on any realistic account, even those who are committed to particular moral rules need to make moral judgments in the process of applying them to particular circumstances, so that the content of morality cannot realistically be encapsulated in a set of rules. Perhaps RFMM itself is consistent with relativism. Speakers of different moral dialects might be committed to different sets of moral principles, governing the meanings of the moral terms in those dialects. But here we are considering the possibility of employing RFMM to defend absolutist cognitivism against threats posed by the possibility of radical moral disagreements. If RFMM cannot stand up as a doctrine it can render no such service. 2.2 Two brief arguments against RFMM 2.2a Argument 1: Rules can be challenged without incoherence The first argument against such a use of RFMM is a very simple one. It is a near relative of the Open Question argument. The premise is that someone might coherently (even if mistakenly) raise a moral objection to the absolutist's chosen set of moral principles. If an absolutist version of RFMM were true, this would involve some sort of self-contradiction, similar to claiming the standard metre (by a current definition) not to be 1 metre in length. This quick argument seems good to me, but might not impress those who dislike the Open Question argument. For argument's sake let's set it aside and move on to further objections. 17 2.2b Argument 2: Axiomatic systems as an inept model for RFMM So secondly, let's consider a model for moral error which, cast in this role, RFMM might seem to require of us. At least in the case of radical moral disagreements, absolutists must assert that at least one of the parties is somehow in error. We assume that they share a commitment to the same termdefining moral principles, so by the standards of RFMM they are equally competent in use of the same moral terms. By definition of radical moral disagreements, the disagreement cannot be consequent on a purely descriptive factual error. It must be a cognitive error in which moral terms are applied in a manner inconsistent with their actual meaning (a performance error, not a competence error, if you like). One available model, or metaphor, which might be applied here, is provided by a formally axiomatized theory taken as term-defining for a set of theoretical terms figuring in the axioms. Given that the axioms define the meanings of the terms, one who grasps and accepts the axioms may be said to know the meanings of the terms. Nevertheless it may not always be clear – indeed it may not even be logically decidable – what exactly is entailed by those axioms, making it easy enough for different parties to a dispute to have a common commitment to the meanings of the relevant terms, yet differ in their judgments as to what that entails vis a vis particular cases. Thus we have a proposed explanation for moral disagreement, and we have some kind of reason for thinking that further thought and deliberation might in principle lead to agreement, since that would seem to be the right way to overcome confusions about what entails what. Indeed insofar as we find evidence that we subscribe to common axioms, we will seem to have evidence for some optimism of that kind. It seems to me that the implausibility of this model becomes evident as soon as we start to scrutinize it seriously. We are not generally taught an axiomatized theory of this kind in the course of our moral upbringing, nor do I believe our efforts to resolve moral disagreement typically take the form of running over complex patterns of deduction looking for new proofs, or slips in our logic. Nor should they. Such exercises would draw our attention away from the disputed cases and their evident morally relevant features. If someone who has seriously reflected on what is involved in a disputed and morally problematic case were to be shown that a contrary opinion to theirs could be deduced, by complicated and far from obvious logical reasoning, from some alleged set of moral axioms, an obvious candidate response for 18 them would be to apply modus tollens and reject or qualify one or more of those axioms. It doesn't take exceptional logical acumen to appreciate what is at stake in cases like that of the large man on the bridge: radical moral disagreements do not generally hinge on unusual complexity or subtle deductive fallacies. 2.3 Argument 3: A Spectrum of Diverse Roles for Sets of Rules, and its implications The slightly more elaborate argument to which I now turn, will, I hope, bring out more fully why this highly idealized, but perhaps initially tempting, axiomatic-system model, does not really give a credible account of radical moral disagreement. I want to highlight how much can be left unsettled by acceptance of, or conformity to, a set of moral principles. I shall suggest that spelling out the ambiguity in such ideas of "acceptance" or "conformity", highlights the extent to which making moral judgments cannot realistically be portrayed as essentially consisting of applications of rules to cases. The argument begins by listing some options on a spectrum. Each item on the spectrum (which by no means claims to be exhaustive) provides a different sketch of how one might understand what is involved in commitment to a set of moral principles, in relation to determining permissible and obligatory actions. I deliberately give very abstract formulations. I hope the list is of some interest in its own right. What follows revolves centrally around the following claim. Commitment to rules underdetermines moral judgment: shared commitment to rules underdetermines moral agreement. 2.31 A spectrum of options 2.31A Spectrum, Category A: Rules without Degrees In these cases a set of rules is taken as absolute in the sense of admitting no degree. A rule either applies to a case or it does not. Any action is either in violation of this set of rules, or not. But in all but one of the following options, individual rules may be "trumped" or "disabled" by others in the set, based on an ordering which is either fixed, or which undergoes variation according to the situation. Ai: Strict Absolute Rules with Moral Traps There are absolute moral principles, each saying either that a certain type of action is wrong without exception – impermissible – or saying that a certain 19 type of action is (in specified circumstances) obligatory. Let's think of the rules as numbered 1, 2, etc., and the corresponding action-types as numbered A1, A2, etc. Suppose it is possible to find oneself in circumstances such that one is obliged to perform an action of type A1, but the only available way of doing so is to perform an action which is also of type A2, which is impermissible. Then it would be possible to find oneself faced with no alternative but to do wrong – either by failing to perform an obligatory act, or by performing an impermissible act. This view accepts that consequence: sometimes one can only do wrong. Avoiding wrongdoing may require substantial care and anticipation in steering clear of these moral traps! Aii: Moral rules with fixed ranking The next, perhaps more humane, point on our spectrum is one in which principles are absolute in only a slightly weaker sense. The enumeration of principles now represents a priority ranking. Actions must be rigidly in accord with all principles except that no principle is to be followed if doing so would violate a higher-ranking principle - unless the higher-ranking principle is already outranked by one still higher-ranking, which mandates the action. One never acts wrongly if one acts in accordance with the ranking of principles in this sense. Where rules conflict, lesser-ranked rules are, so to speak, "switched off". Aiii: Moral rules with contextually variable rankings: The next possibility is exactly like the previous except that the ranking of principles is not fixed, but varies in a specific, pre-determined way according to context. (To take a silly illustrative example: perhaps "never consort with murderers" usually overrides "do not spurn offers of hospitality", but the order is reversed when the hospitality is offered by a murderer who happens to be one's father-in-law.) Aiv: Moral rules with contextual-feature and action-feature-dependent variable rankings: This is like the previous case, with an added, perhaps artificial, degree of complexity. But I believe it deserves notice as a possibility. For brevity I combine two variations on the previous case. The first is simple. Rather than a finite set of context-types, each of which induces a different priority-ranking for the moral principles, we imagine a number of contextual features which can be present in varying degrees. It is the combination of such features which determines the appropriate ranking of moral rules in a given situation. 20 Perhaps this could be crudely modeled by imagining an algorithm which takes the degrees to which various features are present, yielding a priorityranking, but it would be more realistic to imagine that actual moral agents weigh up and judge the relevance of different features in a manner which is not overtly quantitative. Illustrative example: "This occasion is in part a religious function, it has political significance and public interest, but it is also to an important degree a celebratory social gathering. Am I required to observe the rule - prioritized at religious functions and public political events - forbidding the telling of risqué jokes in the presence of clergy, or is it in this context trumped by the rule requiring one to share in the fun on social occasions?". The second variation on the previous case is slightly more complicated and more conjectural. There are features of actions themselves which strike me as somewhat like action "contexts", in that, plausibly, they are not reasonably thought of as essential to action types as such. Thus a chosen action may have morally relevant features, capable of being present in varying degrees, over and above what is minimally required if no applicable rule is to be broken. There are, as one says, many ways to skin a cat, and since purely generic actions are impossible, any action actually performed will have many features, intended or not, inessential to the primary description under which it is intended. Even after context has been taken into account, the degree to which these features are present in a chosen action may affect the ranking of principles governing retrospective moral evaluation of that action. Illustrative example: "The doctor was morally obliged to calm down the elderly lady in the church who was having a panic attack - knowing it would be putting her weak heart at risk. He could have done this without telling a risqué joke (so as to break the tension), so he was under no rulegoverned obligation to break the prohibition on telling such jokes in church. Nevertheless, he should not be counted as acting wrongly given that by doing so he drew attention away from the old lady and onto himself, thereby sparing her the further embarrassment which, had he taken more orthodox action, would otherwise have ensued. 'Minimize embarrassment to others' would not normally override 'do not tell risqué jokes in church', but given how mortified she would have been to have him make her breathe into a brown-paper bag in public, the considerate manner in which he carried out an action of a type which was in any case obligatory is morally permissible (as it would not have been had he muffed it and merely exacerbated her panic)." 21 That completes my short list of Category A options. Two features of them should be specially noted. Firstly, it is likely that in a great majority of cases the differences between these options would be of no account - invisible, in effect - because in those cases no applicable moral principles clash. So a population of people each of whom occupies some place on this spectrum with respect to the same set of rules might often present an appearance of strong moral consensus. Secondly, with the exception of the first ("moral traps") option, they all resolve clashes between principles, should they arise, by employing rankings, fixed or variable, to disable some of the clashing principles. They are all in that sense consistent with the view that moral principles, when not disabled, are absolute: they brook no exceptions and involve no relativity and no watering-down. A person adhering to any of these patterns might reasonably be said to be committed to, or at least to conform to, the rules in the relevant set. 2.31B Spectrum, Category B: Moral rules with weights and degrees Morally relevant component features: Another kind of possibility arises if, instead of taking it that, in a given case, a rule either applies totally or not at all, we think of moral principles as rules to which an action might conform in varying degrees. Instead of options like the above, one might see the moral merit of an action as determined by reference both to the context of action and the particular degree to which a given action (taking into account the manner of performing it) instantiates distinct morally relevant features corresponding to different principles. Evaluation would be based, roughly speaking, on whether an action, given its context, maximizes overall conformity to those principles. Once again, rankings of principles might be relevant, and once again they might be regarded as fixed or as variable for a range of quantifiable or unquantifiable reasons. But rather than determining which rules can "switch off" others they outrank, the rankings will affect how much weight the various moral principles carry, in judging an action's overall moral merit. On this view, one could say, correct evaluation of an action - its moral goodness - is determined by the contextually appropriate weight assigned to the morally relevant features, and the degree to which they are instantiated by the action. Once again, there is no reason to think there is any absolute correct way of quantifying diverse kinds of morally relevant features ("the action was unkind, but how unkind was it?"), nor to think that if there were, any particular way of aggregating such numbers would be uncontroversially mandatory. 22 Further uncertainties arise as soon as we contemplate evaluating choice of action by asking which available action had the highest moral value. "Choose the best available action" (where "best" is evaluated in this manner) is a dubious rule, since at any given moment, skill and ingenuity are not entirely under voluntary control (as professional sportspeople are well aware, since an "off day" can be very costly for them). But ingenuity may be required to perceive a possible action, and skill to carry it off - for instance, in saving a life. This makes it in various respects a vague rule - for instance, it does not say how to incorporate perceived risk of failure, in deciding which action is "available". (It may useful here to reflect on the question of whether it is sometimes a vice to be a "klutz". Someone who frequently rushes to help but most often muffs it – not merely failing to catch the falling sugar, but spilling the milk as well – needs to learn that the moral credit accruing to "helpful" people may not really be theirs to claim.) For present purposes there is no special point in trying to enumerate variations of Category B approaches. It's evident, I think, that there are countless ways in which people who respond similarly to similar morally relevant features, and who even mostly give them similar priority rankings, might respond differently to complex combinations of those features in various degrees. It's also evident, surely, that the range of morally relevant features is quite large, so that one aspect of the prima facie appeal of RFMM - the simplicity of the picture it presents of moral evaluation - is considerably lessened once we start equating conforming to moral principles with responding to morally relevant features.17 2.32 Notable points As will perhaps be obvious, the above list of options is designed to have certain features. Firstly, every option is meant to represent a way in which correct moral evaluation of someone's actions might be understood as governed by that action's conformity to some set of principles. Secondly, as we go down the list, an account of how the moral status of an action relates to the relevant set of moral principles must increasingly refer to other matters not captured in the principles themselves. Furthermore, those "other matters" – such things as the context of action, the fine-detailed 17 Milo(1986) comes close to such an identification, seeming to equate criteria of moral relevance with moral standards. 23 description of the concrete action itself, and/or the degree to which the various principles apply to the action – appear to me, more or less increasingly as we go down the list, to have three related features. The first is that it is not generally plausible that they are all matters susceptible of being precisely measured or quantified. The second is that it is even less plausible that insofar as we take such matters into account in dealing with recalcitrant moral matters, we actually do measure or quantify them. The third is that the options seem to me to become increasingly similar (or decreasingly dissimilar) to how things work in real life - though this is an empirical claim which some might dispute, and I cannot speak for the experience of others. Thirdly, if two people agree that such and such is a correct list of moral principles – or generally both seem to show conformity to such a list in their actions - we have as yet little reason to predict that they will never disagree about difficult cases. Neither we nor they themselves may know how, when the chips are down, they will resolve conflicts between the principles. Even on an option as simple as A(ii), all it will take to leave people who mostly seem to conform to exactly the same principles, potentially in disagreement over certain difficult cases will be a difference in their ranking of the same moral principles. The number of possible variations increases enormously as the number of rules increases. (Consider: "Yes, I accept that violent criminals should be apprehended and that we should help the police to do so. Yes, I accept that the criminal was also wrong to steal food from the store. Under most circumstances I would have called the police. But I also believe children should be kept well-fed. You believe that too. But I gave it top priority and I knew the food was destined for the criminal's hungry children. You don't think that overrides the other considerations; I do.") Fourthly, if it's true that as we go down the list the options become more lifelike, then it seems to me we also move closer to a particularist vision of moral evaluation. According to most Category A positions on our spectrum, and with Category B positions even more so, what is required beyond simple matters of fact on the one hand, and moral principles on the other, in order not to leave indeterminate the moral evaluation appropriate to some particular action, is determination of a number of issues which themselves involve various kinds of evaluation. These issues may include the relative priority of principles, the degree to which various aspects of a situation or context affect that priority, the extent to which the particular details of a particular chosen action constitute it as an act falling under one or another principle, and to what degree or extent the act considered fully in its details 24 and in its context, counts as maximizing the suitably weighted and combined overall satisfaction of the relevant principles. It would be idle to pretend that these further matters of evaluation may themselves be settled in general by appeal to further principles. But what would be still more idle would be to pretend that we can optimistically hope that our typical community of moral agents agrees in their even implicit acceptance and application of a sufficient set of such second-order principles. Our ordinary ways of managing involve making summary evaluative judgments which at best only implicitly incorporate judgments about these second-order matters. Thus we reach the conclusion of this third argument. By now the cat of moral meaning has got out of the bag of moral principles. Any realistic criterion of assent or conformity to a set of moral rules or principles will leave far too much undetermined when it comes to how people will evaluate particular actions or situations, and what is left undetermined is clearly part and parcel of what evinces, in agents' choices or evaluations of actions, their understanding of the content of, and the requirements imposed by, moral notions. If there is any such thing as the constitutive "core" of moral understanding, it cannot be characterized in terms of adherence to a small set of principles. Hence, to repeat a central contention of this paper, it is not very plausible that arguments for relativism from moral disagreement may be rebutted by pointing to large numbers of general moral principles on which there is agreement. Insofar as we can see in this a demotion in the status of general moral principles, perhaps we can see it as at least a step also in the direction of particularism, whether or not that destination, strictly speaking, is reached. 2.4 Reflective equilibrium, particular judgments, and a demotion of rules Before trying to sum up an attitude to moral rules I think is consistent with the above discussion, I need to touch on a couple of other matters. The first of these is the notion of reflective equilibrium - both because, ever since its introduction by Rawls18, it has become a mainstay of discussion about moral disagreement and moral deliberation, and because, since moral rules figure in its characterization, it provides a useful context in which to raise further skeptical questions about moral rules which carry over to prevailing ideas of the nature and role of reflective equilibrium itself. I've argued that moral 18 Rawls(1951). 25 rules or principles are not alone sufficient to fix the meanings of moral terms or capture the core of moral understanding. We can now ask whether, and in what sense, moral rules or principles are even necessary to moral understanding. The notion of reflective equilibrium in part pictures a struggle in which particular moral evaluations are sometimes pitted against moral principles, adjustments being made on one side or the other (with whatever help moral theory has to lend) until equilibrium - signifying coherence - is achieved. If these two kinds of judgment may be pitted against one another, then one might wonder whether they have different origins or are grounded in different ways. Are particular moral judgments more or less firmly grounded than judgments about moral rules, and is the grounding of the same kind, or different, in the two kinds of case? Is accepting a moral rule itself a kind of moral judgment? Or is it just accepting a summary of actual or possible moral judgments? Is a moral rule a tool for producing moral judgments? Or is it, as is very commonly suggested (for instance by Michael Smith19, who makes the idea of reflective equilibrium central to his notion of "normative rationality") a tool for justifying moral judgments? If someone was reliably capable of making particular moral judgments without invoking rules, what value would be added to their moral understanding were they to come in addition to accept various moral principles? Is unity of values truly a virtue? Smith's view is that the value added is indeed the value of unity, providing a kind of coherentist justification which he sees as important to normative rationality. Others may think that the very abstractness and generality of moral rules makes judgments about them more error-prone. After all, it is implicit in the above discussion of ways in which rules may figure in moral evaluation, that the complexity of particular real life situations is always likely to outrun what can be contained in a rule or even a set of rules. The devil is in the details. Therefore, if rules extrapolate from known to further particular situations which they help to evaluate, there is a real risk that they will lead us astray, due to a mistaken application of the human penchant for simplifying things in order to make them neat and orderly. If on the other hand rules merely summarize what we already know, it may be thought, they cannot "add value". These are large and important questions, which probably have as many 19 In Smith(1992). See for instance pp. 159-160. 26 answers as there are kinds of moral theory. Shortly, I will simply express my own attitude, which is hinted at in the last sentence of the preceding paragraph - namely that rules are best thought of as mere summaries which do not explain, justify, or "add value" - and try, not so much to defend it as to merely make it somewhat comprehensible, by the use of a couple of philosophical analogies. But in order that my view should not seem altogether far-fetched, I need to make an important caveat. Naturally I accept that social life, with even a few basic shared goals, and particularly given any remotely egalitarian ideal, imposes heavy demands on people to conform, more or less, and to expect others to conform, more or less, to some mutually known set of rules. This is an important reason for putting up with much of what governments do, and in particular, for accepting the necessity for a legal system and for an apparatus of police, lawyers, judges and so forth, to operate it. That system, specially in societies which consider themselves not to be very corrupt, is often called "the Justice System". Such a system is usually imperfect in that, much like many an economic system, it does not always produce outcomes of which we are prone to morally approve. "The law is an ass", and "there is a moral as well as a legal code" are proverbial reminders of that fact. "The Justice System" is in fact not always just. Nevertheless, it might happen that, all things considered, it's possible that there should be a legal code, and ways of arriving at and administering it, which might seem to be reasonably fair (particularly if embedded in a fair economic system, relieving the "Justice System" of the task of defending material inequities). It is a consequence of what I am suggesting that even the best such legal code and justice system, given the simple necessity of operating according to rules and principles which are, pretty much, common knowledge, may need to enforce legal judgments which have, by ordinary standards, ethically regrettable consequences (or at the very least, consequences which could only be viewed as not ethically regrettable after factoring in the desirability of having such a justice system at all). In short, it is likely that even the best system of law - even despite the human elements interpolated by judges and juries - will inevitably, at times, be "an ass". But all that, surely, does not apply to "the moral code" itself? I think perhaps to some extent it does, and inevitably so, if we take the phrase "the moral 27 code" too literally.20 It is a frequent suggestion that "morality" is something shared which exists for the common good, rather like a more subtle and (insofar as not legally enforced) a more voluntaristic legal code. But if I am right about moral principles, there will be an inevitable possibility for internal tensions between the requirements of a shared and commonly known "moral code", conceived as encapsulated in a set of moral principles. Thus it might seem inevitable, given what I have said about moral principles, that even "the moral code" will at times also be "an ass". But how could what is morally prescribed be morally wrong? Does this line of thought lead to a quick reductio? There is a wrong way and a right way to respond to this challenge. Only the wrong way, which rests with the idea of a legal-system-like moral code, leads to a reductio. The right way, is to see that ideally what we would like to see in a shared social morality is a tendency to agree in moral judgments even where there is no deductive path from shared moral principles to a particular judgment. We should not think of morality, viewed communally, as literally a "code" similar to the legal code. A shared capacity for particularized and contextually appropriate moral judgment should be seen as part, ideally, of what morally binds a community. Still and all, the message to be drawn from the possibility of radical moral disagreements is that we cannot reasonably hope to have a social morality which is so perfectly shared that like telepaths, or a certain stereotype of identical twins, we all always concur in our moral judgments, with or without the aid of rules. This is in part good news. One of the functions of moral language is to enable us to express our moral differences. We do not wish to have a blanket permission to rule moral critics out of court on the grounds that, tautologously, they are misusing moral language and making merely schmoral objections.21 This is something we should not only learn, but welcome, from 20 It seems to me that some do. Compare for instance the reference to "a set of principles" in this contractualist statement from Scanlon: "An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of behaviour that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced, general agreement." (Scanlon 1998, p. 153). 21 A view which Milo(1986) seems to flirt with. I should emphasize that it is consistent with my view that sometimes it can be right to dismiss a proposed alternative moral view as a "merely schmoral" claim. I believe that is implicit in what 28 the perennial relevance of the Open Question argument. Losing the permanent possibility of moral disagreement would mean losing one of the central functions of moral language in expressing some of our most important differences. Let me finish, then with a couple of metaphors and analogies, in which I shall attempt to bring to life the kind of view I am urging, of moral rules. First, a metaphor. Let's consider a sort of distant analogy with the Euthyphro issue. Suppose the gods say that we ought to do X. We might decide that it is true that we ought to do X, but not because the gods say we ought to do it, rather the reverse: the gods say we ought to do X, because we ought to do X. If the gods always get this right, it will be true for any X, that if the gods say that we ought to do X then we ought to do X. Yet this makes them moral authorities only in a demoted sense: they do not make moral truth, merely report it. Suppose we have some alternative account of what does make moral truth, which implies that we are in principle (if we work at it) well-placed to judge such matters for ourselves. Someone might say "I was confused about what to do and I sat down to make a considered judgment – but I was so tired: in the end I just took the gods' advice – they usually get it right". This would be to demote the gods to the status of something like a personal database or GPS system. For an idea of the view I am suggesting, substitute "moral principles" for "the gods", in the above. A similar point can be made by reference to David Lewis's account of laws of nature, which goes roughly as follows. Given all the truths there are, expressed in a suitably naturalistic language, there might be a deductivelyclosed system containing only a subset of the truths, but which by suitable standards combines strength and simplicity better than any true rival system. The laws of nature are all the contingent generalizations belonging to that deductive system. On such a view, a law of nature is part of a neat summary of a large and highly patterned portion of the truth. But neither such a law, nor any of its consequences, is true in any different sense, or on any other grounds, from other contingent truths. Logically, all facts are on a par. If some fact conflicts with what would otherwise be a law, there is simply no contest: there is no such law. Lewis's view is quite compatible with the existence of laws of nature: they simply do no work in making anything true. I have said about the ineliminable cognitive element in moral claims. But we don't want a view which makes this response regularly available. 29 Similarly, there may be true moral principles. Yet it may be the case that they provide no independent source of motivation or moral justification, and are best regarded as simply useful (and perhaps only roughly accurate) summaries of, or guides to, the truth of groups of particular moral judgments or evaluations. In this case, if a particular moral judgment comes into conflict with acceptance of a moral rule, the rule is what should always be discarded. Finally, an example directed towards those who believe that moral principles must play an indispensible role if people are to make moral judgments, be taught how to make them, understand moral concepts, and generally to make communicative use of moral vocabulary, without being at cross-purposes. Consider beauty. We make judgments of beauty, learn to employ the concept, learn to communicate about beauty, agree about some instances, disagree about others, and so on. Manifestly, none of this requires any of us to formulate "rules of beauty". Nor would we be likely to feel tempted to revise our judgments of beauty merely because someone pointed out that they were in breach of some supposed rule. Even if rules were devised by careful observation of the causal regularities governing our prior judgments of beauty and their relationship to (for instance) patterns of visual stimuli, we would feel under no particular compulsion to make further judgments in conformity with them. It's important to note that when we judge an art-work, a person, or a scene to be beautiful, we may point out features which we take to make an important contribution to the beauty we see. Obviously we often do this. But it would be mistaken to infer that we thereby justify our judgment by appeal to some principle to the effect that such and such a kind of feature contributes to beauty. It is not like that at all, and it is our knowledge of this which explains why (if we do) we find the idea of rules of beauty ludicrous. I don't suggest that there is a complete analogy between the concept of the beautiful, and central moral concepts. Moral judgments have a practical importance which judgments of beauty mostly do not. Perhaps that difference is crucial – perhaps the practical importance of moral judgments requires us to try to formulate and act in accordance with moral principles. But that would need to be argued. It is true that a presumption of objectivity seems to be an element of much folk moral discourse, whereas it is proverbial that "beauty is in the eye of the beholder". Nevertheless I think the point stands that there can be no quick and easy argument from the learnability of an evaluative concept and our capacity to communicate by use of a term 30 expressing it, to the claim that we must at some level know and appeal to general principles stating necessary or sufficient conditions for its application. The crucial claim the analogy is meant to support is that not only are rules, contrary to RFMM, insufficient to fix agreement in principle about the extensions (and hence, to fix agreement about the meanings) of terms of moral evaluation: even in those many cases where agreement about the extension of those terms is to be found, rules have no essential role in bringing this about. So, I conclude, there may be true and useful moral generalizations. Perhaps there are fundamental component determinants of goodness and badness, or of rightness and wrongness, which, contra some versions of particularism, never change their valency, so that for each of them, there is a kind of moral generalization one might formulate, to that effect. For all that, I say, we should not think of moral principles as having some sort of special and distinctive warrant, ground, or authority, which makes it appropriate for them to act as a corrective to particular moral judgments.22 Terminological Appendix. I see arguments from radical moral disagreement as challenging in the first instance a conjunction of interwoven doctrines, including moral cognitivism, realism, descriptivism, and absolutism, where the latter is taken to exclude both relativism and subjectivism. But because it highlights the doctrines I most wish to challenge, I use the short phrase "absolutist cognitivism" to refer to this complex conjunction of doctrines, though other conjuncts (specially realism!) should not be forgotten. 22 This paper began life (in a very different form) as a contribution to a Workshop on Normativity and Mentality in a World of Causality, at the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study, Uppsala, September 25-26, 2008. I am grateful to Folke Tersman and to the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study, for making it possible for me to visit Uppsala for the Workshop. I am also indebted to the Philosophy Department at Victoria University (Wellington) for an invitation to deliver a version of this paper to their Departmental Research seminar in June, 2009. Philosophically I am indebted to the participants in the Uppsala Workshop and at the Victoria University seminar, and I am specially indebted for philosophical input and support to John Bishop, Bronwyn Finnigan, Fred Kroon, and Folke Tersman. Thanks to John Davis for helpful comments on a penultimate draft. 31 My use of some of the terminology in the above paragraph needs briefly clarifying. "Realism" here includes both the denial of semantic anti-realism for moral statements, and the denial of an "error-theoretic" assignment of falsehood to all substantial moral claims. I follow Jackson (1998) in using the term "descriptivism" as a substitute for Moore's "naturalism" (the latter term is currently over-worked and has inappropriate contemporary connotations relating to the role of natural science, and the like). The crucial claim for present purposes is that cognitivists should accept as a priori that moral properties necessarily supervene on "purely descriptive" properties. Jackson concludes - and rightly so, on an appropriate conception of properties - that given this supervenience, moral properties must be identified with purely descriptive properties. Whether "response-dependent" accounts of the meanings of moral terms are consistent with "absolutism" will hinge on their success in articulating a viable notion of "ideal rationality", "counterfactually ideal selves", or some such, adequate to sustain the doctrine that those making moral claims may be viewed as committed to understanding their truth-conditions as jointly tracking a hypothetical consensus of idealized responses, rather than merely individual responses. I'm pessimistic about this idea of a hypothetical "factoring out" of the subjectivity inherent in the idea of responsedependence. Throughout, I am supposing that according to subjectivism, the truth (or propriety) of people's moral judgments supervenes on their mental states, and that according to relativism people's moral judgments are true (or appropriate) only relative to some parameter, or some index (some element of indexicality) which might or might not be individual, mental, or reflexive. (Thus I am using it in a far more inclusive sense than, for instance, "cultural relativism".) I shall not try to give more finely-tuned accounts of these meta-ethical doctrines. A useful discussion of their complex relationships is to be found in Chapter One of Tersman(2006). Denis Robinson 32 University of Auckland Revised February 4, 2012. 33 References: Campbell, R. 2007. "What is Moral Judgment?". The Journal of Philosophy 104: pp. 321-349. Copp, David. 2001. "Realist Expressivism - A Neglected Option for Moral Realism". Social Philosophy and Policy, 18: pp. 1–43. Jackson, Frank. 1998. From Metaphysics to Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Joyce, Richard. 2011. "The Accidental Error Theorist", in Shafer-Landau, R. Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 6, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Milo, Ronald D. 1986. "Moral Deadlock." Philosophy, vol. 61 no. 238, pp. 453471. Papineau, David. 1996. "Theory-Dependent Terms." Philosophy of Science, Vol. 63, no. 1, pp. 1-20. Rawls, John. 1951. "Outline for a Decision Procedure for Ethics." Philosophical Review, vol. 60, no. 2, pp. 177-197. Ridge, Michael. 2006. "Ecumenical Expressivism: The Best of Both Worlds?" in Shafer-Landau, R. Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 2, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Robinson, Denis. 2004. "Failing to Agree or Failing to Disagree? - Personal Identity Quasi-Relativism", The Monist, vol. 87, no. 4, pp. 512-536. Robinson, Denis. 2009. "Moral Functionalism, Ethical Quasi-Relativism, and the Canberra Plan." In Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism, ed. David Braddon-Mitchell and Robert Nola, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009. Scanlon, Tim. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Smith, Michael. 1994. The Moral Problem. Oxford: Blackwell. Tersman, Folke. 2006. Moral Disagreement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Luara Ferracioli (UvA) Forthcoming Economics & Philosophy Born Free and Equal?: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature of Discrimination, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Oxford University Press, 2014, 317 pages. In a time of strained racial relations in the United States and continued inequality between men and women in the social domain, a careful and systematic philosophical understanding of the nature of discrimination is an important step toward imagining a more just world. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen's book makes a significant contribution to such understanding. His book consists of three parts. The first provides a conceptual analysis of discrimination. The second makes a case for a desert-prioritarian account of what makes certain forms of discrimination prima facie morally wrong. And the third identifies some strategies for eliminating or neutralizing the bad effects of discrimination. I will discuss each part in turn. 1. The Concept of Discrimination The aim of the first part of the book is to "seek to formulate explicit criteria for discrimination" (p. 13). Lippert-Rasmussen begins with the idea that discrimination against someone in its most generic sense is simply "disadvantageous differential treatment" (p. 15). As he points out, in this sense "there is not even a presumption that someone who engages in generic discrimination acts wrongly" (p. 15). This is a good starting place, but as Lippert-Rasmussen notes, it is not the concept of discrimination we are interested in. It is far too broad for that. It might be thought that we can go from this generic sense of discrimination to the sense we are interested in by claiming that discrimination is morally objectionable disadvantageous differential treatment (p. 24). This brings us to something like the dictionary definition of discrimination as "unjust or prejudicial treatment of different categories of people" (OED). But Lippert-Rasmussen rejects this idea because "it implies that nepotistic decisions are discriminatory" and "it implies that wrongful, idiosyncratic differential treatment constitutes discrimination" (p. 24). Here is his example: Yvonne and Zack both apply for admission to a graduate program at an Ivy League university. Xavier, the admissions officer, has an idiosyncratic liking for people from Omaha, especially those who did well in sports at high school and who live in a country the name of which contains at least one "s." Yvonne, but not Zack, happens to be distinguished in all these regards and, accordingly, Xavier unjustly admits her rather than Zack. (p. 25) Lippert-Rasmussen claims that this is not a case of discrimination in the relevant sense, although it is a case of objectionable disadvantageous differential treatment. He therefore claims that what is needed for discrimination in the relevant sense is that those who receive objectionable disadvantageous differential treatment are members of some socially salient group. He says: "Of course, it would have been a case of discrimination if Yvonne had been white (...), and Zach had been black (...) and if Xavier admitted Yvonne because he prefers whites" (pp. 25-26). His preferred definition of discrimination is therefore what he calls group discrimination, which is, 2 roughly, disadvantageous differential treatment on the basis of membership of a socially salient group. And, as he points out, "group discrimination is not wrong by definition" (p. 28). This means that there might be cases of discrimination in the relevant sense that are not morally problematic. It is at this point that I wonder whether Lippert-Rasmussen has really located the relevant concept of discrimination. On the one hand, there seem to be cases of discrimination in the relevant sense where the social salience condition is not met. On the other hand, it does seem to be an essential part of our concept of discrimination that it is morally problematic. Consider, for example, the following case. Yvonne and Zack both apply for jobs at an Ivy League university. Xavier, the chair of the search committee, has an idiosyncratic disliking for people with attached ear lobes. Zack, but not Yvonne, has attached ear lobes. Xavier judges Zack's CV as slightly better than Yvonne's but hires Yvonne instead for fear of feeling uncomfortable around Zack. It is clear that Zach is not a member of a socially salient group. And still, it seems like he was discriminated against in the relevant sense. So the social salience condition does not seem to be necessary for picking out the correct instances of discrimination. How about the claim that the concept of discrimination need not carry any condemnatory force? Recall how the dictionary definition of discrimination offers us a moralized reading of the term. This seems much closer to common usage of the term than Lippert-Rasmussen's definition. In particular, if we focus on public discourse around inequalities in the workplace, racial profiling, and so on, we can see that interlocutors typically use the concept of discrimination to pick out a practice that is prima facie morally wrong. Practices that seem prima facie benign are typically described as differential treatment, as when we describe the practice of reserving a bus seat for people with a disability. In fact, it would sound quite strange for an ablebodied person to observe that this involved a form of discrimination against him. Yet, Lippert-Rasmussen's account would qualify this practice as discrimination, without yet saying anything about whether this particular act is of the kind that is morally problematic. My worry is simply that Lippert-Rasmussen's account can come across as an unnatural way of carrying out an inquiry into the nature of a practice that is so politically salient. It is tantamount to carrying out a treatment of the nature of sexism, by first providing a morally neutral definition of sexism, and then asking what makes certain kinds of sexism morally wrong. After all, we cannot escape the fact that common usage of sexism in public discourse has the sort of condemnatory force that does a lot of moral work. This is why the best way to proceed with an analysis of the nature of sexism would be to first acknowledge that there is such a thing as differential treatment of the sexes (i.e., separate toilets in public spaces), and then proceed to ask what kinds of differential treatments amount to sexism and why (by, say, providing a set of necessary and sufficient conditions that render differential treatment between the sexes prima facie morally wrong). The exact same strategy should be employed when analyzing the concept of discrimination. To be sure, we know that when such verbal disagreements arise, we can make a stipulation about our use of the term, and then get into the more pressing business of either identifying what kinds of actions are discriminatory (if we stay close to a common usage of the term), or by asking what makes certain kinds of discrimination morally problematic (if we follow Lippert-Rasmussen strategy). Either way we get 3 the normative work done. The problem, though, is that outside the philosophical profession, interlocutors are unlikely to embrace terms that depart a great deal from their everyday usage. So the extent to which the point raised in this section should concern Lippert-Rasmussen depends on whether or not he would like nonphilosophers to engage with his work. 2. What Makes Discrimination Wrong? The second part of the book is the strongest. Lippert-Rasmussen does an excellent job of showing why the two dominant accounts of what makes certain kinds of discrimination wrong are unsatisfactory. On the first, discrimination is wrong because it is a result of false beliefs or objectionable intentions on the part of the discriminator. On the second, discrimination is wrong because it expresses some problematic objective meaning. Lippert-Rasmussen provides a number of convincing arguments against both accounts. For instance, with regards to the first, he shows that we are typically disposed to judge the outcome of different acts of discrimination the same way irrespective of the beliefs of the discriminator. With regard to the latter, he notes that members of society do not see many discriminatory acts as involving any kind of objectionable objective meaning. He then moves on to offer a harm-based account that locates the harm of certain discriminatory acts in the fact that they contravene the demands of desert-prioritariansm of the kind defended by Richard Arneson. According to desert-prioritarianism, "a given amount of well-being has greater moral value when it accrues to a badly off, deserving person than it does when it accrues to a well-off, underserving person" (p. 166). The upshot is that discrimination becomes more morally problematic the more harm it imposes on members of socially salient groups, the more vulnerable they are, and the more deserving they are of receiving benefits as opposed to harms. Though I am sympathetic to desert-prioritarianism, it is concerning that, as Lippert-Rasmussen acknowledges, discrimination may be morally required in cases where it maximizes moral value (p. 174). Here is a case that seems particularly troubling. Suppose we could bring about a world where women worked only parttime. Suppose further that in such a world, people with a disability, the elderly and children would receive better care and would lead better lives as a result. Now, this is not such a far-fetched scenario, in the sense that widespread sexism could motivate enough citizens to bar women from full-time employment if the benefits were indeed significant. Lippert-Rasmussen's consequentialism would say that doing so is required if this arrangement would do the best job of maximizing moral value. Yet, it seems that morality cannot condone a world where half of the population are barred from full-time employment, no matter the benefits to vulnerable members of society. Instead of demanding second-class citizenship for women, morality would require a world that does a worse job of maximizing value, but where everyone is treated equally. This sort of case, I think, shows that Lippert-Rasmussen's account needs to be supplemented by constraints against members of society ever being treated as second-class citizens. 3. Discrimination and Public Policy In the last part of the book, Lippert-Rasmussen asks what can be done to neutralize the negative effects of discrimination. In particular, he discusses the more salient 4 issues of proportional representation, discrimination in punishment, discrimination in the private sphere, racial profiling and reaction qualifications (i.e., characteristics that contribute to a person's success in the workplace by causing a positive reaction in customers). I will focus on Lippert-Rasmussen's treatment of discrimination in the private sphere. In particular, I want to put pressure on his contention that private discrimination is morally on a par with public discrimination. Lippert-Rasmussen starts his discussion of private discrimination by raising the following puzzle: "why should it not be morally wrong for private individuals to do what it would be morally wrong for the state to do?" (p. 263) That is, he is interested in the question of why members of society should get away with not marrying, befriending etc., other individuals on the basis of socially salient features. He then looks at some potential explanations as to why acts of private discrimination are more likely to be tolerated by members of society-such as the fact that often the harmful effects are negligible, or that toleration is required to protect privacy-and concludes that they all fail to justify such an asymmetry. He then moves on to apply desert-prioritarianism to different legal arrangements affecting the private sphere, thereby concluding that the consequences of legal regulation must dictate whether or not discrimination in the private sphere ought to be legally regulated. I certainly agree with Lippert-Rasmussen that there is a puzzle to grapple with here. However, I think that the first step in his argument is too quick. There might indeed be a moral difference between differential treatment in the public and private spheres that explains the asymmetry mentioned earlier and justifies more cautious use of law in the private sphere, even in cases where legal regulation could maximize moral value. That is, there might be something special about differential treatment in the areas of marriage, friendship and other intimate relationships that make them prima facie morally permissible. Here is a suggestion. When it comes to individuals' choice of romantic partners and friends, there is no moral requirement that they assess potential candidates on the basis of non-arbitrary properties. Indeed, what makes these sorts of relationships distinct from other non-intimate relationships is precisely the fact that people are attracted to one another for all sorts of arbitrary features, including socially salient features such as race, sex, and sexual orientation. Now, it is important to emphasize that the point here is not only that we are psychologically incapable of being guided by principles of justice when it comes to choosing who we would like to date or be friends with. The point here is also normative: that the ability to indulge in one's "arbitrary" preferences in intimate relationships is partly what makes them valuable. Think of sexual fetishes. One such fetish is the sexual attraction towards persons without a limb. If I lacked a limb, I would much rather be in a romantic relationship with someone who had such a fetish than with someone who thought it appropriate to apply the principles of prioritarianism to his choice of romantic partner. In fact, I would think that such a prioritarian suitor has simply failed to grasp the distinct aspects of romantic relationships that make them valuable. Now, Lippert-Rasmussen could respond to this point by arguing that many people would feel offended if it were pointed out to them that they their romantic advances where rejected on the grounds of race. He could say that this counts as evidence that in fact principles of justice must apply to our choices of intimate partners as well. To this, I would respond by arguing that, while understandable, such responses are inappropriate. The same way that as a heterosexual female, I should not feel offended by a homosexual male who refuses my advances, a black person should 5 not feel offended if a white person does not reciprocate her attraction. Given widespread racism at the societal level, it may be tempting to interpret the lack of attraction to someone of another race as an instance of racism, but such mere lack of attraction does not qualify as such. And the opposite is also true, since the mere fact that a white person is attracted to people of other races does not show that she is not in fact a racist. She might find non-whites sexually attractive but still think of them as socially inferior and not deserving of equal moral concern. But what about friendship? Here things get messier, but it still seems morally permissible for people to indulge in all sorts of arbitrary features when it comes to their choice of friends. It might well be that Mary needs Bec's friendship more than Anna, or that Mary is more fun than Anna, but that Bec simply feels more confortable around Anna than she does around Mary. But what if this is because Anna is white and Mary is black? Don't we think that Bec acts wrongly here? As I see it, our tendency to condemn Bec is a result of an implicit suspicion that she has racist dispositions that will inevitably lead to harm in other domains. But suppose that Bec is not so disposed and takes on a lot of personal costs when it comes to advancing the position of black people in society (i.e., she goes on anti-racist rallies, convinces co-workers that they ought to engage in affirmative action, etc.). It is just that when it comes to her choice of friends, she prefers to develop intimate relationships with people of the same race. It seems to me that Bec conforms to the principles of justice even though she holds arbitrary preferences in matters of friendship. I want to finish by putting some pressure on Lippert-Rasmussen's treatment of discrimination as carried out by religious associations. Recall that he believes we ought to enact legal arrangements that maximize moral value as dictated by desert prioritarianism. So the question of whether we should ban a religious association from (say) barring women from employment depends on whether such legislation would lead to chaos or would in fact improve the condition of the worse-off. But there is a crucial question here, which is whether or not such religious associations provide important public goods and/or are partly funded by the state (Cordelli 2011; Brettschneider 2012). If they do, then it seems like justice requires that they not be allowed to discriminate against women, irrespective of whether this arrangement would maximize moral value. If, on the other hand, the group only offers religious services and is self-funded, then they should be allowed to set their membership and leadership criteria as they like, including barring women from joining and/or taking leadership roles. Despite these criticisms, Born Free and Equal? is obligatory reading for anyone interested in the nature of discrimination and its relation to social inequality and oppression. I would also recommend the book to readers who enjoy philosophical work that is based on careful engagement with the literature, creative thinking, and well-crafted arguments. Luara Ferracioli* REFERENCES Brettschneider, C. 2012. When the State Speaks, What Should It Say?: How Democracies Can Protect Expression and Promote Equality. Princeton University Press. 6 Cordelli, C. 2011. The Institutional Division of Labor and the Egalitarian Obligations of Nonprofits. Journal of Political Philosophy 20:131-155. Luara Ferracioli is an assistant professor in Political Theory at the University of Amsterdam, and works primarily on philosophical issues relating to immigration, gender and procreation. She has published in The Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, the Journal of Moral Philosophy and Review of International Studies. * Department of Political Science, University of Amsterdam, Postbus 15578 1001 NB Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Email: [email protected]. URL: http://www.uva.nl/en/about-the-uva/organisation/staffmembers/content/f/e/l.l.ferracioli/l.l.ferracioli.html.

Self-referential theories Samuel A. Alexander∗ Department of Mathematics, the Ohio State University August 11, 2020 Abstract We study the structure of families of theories in the language of arithmetic extended to allow these families to refer to one another and to themselves. If a theory contains schemata expressing its own truth and expressing a specific Turing index for itself, and contains some other mild axioms, then that theory is untrue. We exhibit some families of true self-referential theories that barely avoid this forbidden pattern. 1 Introduction This is a paper about families of r.e. theories, each capable of referring to itself and the others. Many of this paper's results first appeared in the author's dissertation [1]. There, they were stated in terms of families of interacting mechanical knowing agents. Here, we will speak instead of families of self-referential r.e. theories. We hope this will more directly expose the underlying mathematics. In epistemology, it is well-known that a (suitably idealized) truthful knowing machine capable of arithmetic, logic, and self-reflection, cannot know its own truth and its own code. This is due, in various guises, to authors such as Lucas [8], Benacerraf [3], Reinhardt [11], Penrose [9], and Putnam [10]. In terms of selfreferential theories, a true theory satisfying certain assumptions cannot contain schemata stating its own truth and its own Gödel number (if such a theory did exist, we could program a machine knower that knows precisely its consequences). Reinhardt conjectured, and Carlson proved [5], a truthful machine knower can know (in a local sense, i.e., expressed by infinite schemata rather than a single axiom) that it is truthful and has some code, without knowing which. A true self-referential theory can (in a local sense) state its own truth and recursive enumerability. We showed [2] that, alternatively, a truthful machine can (in a local sense) exactly know its own code, if not required to know its own truth. A true theory can state (in a local sense) its own Gödel number. Our goal is to generalize the above consistency results to multiple theories. The paper contains four main findings. In the following list of promises, except where otherwise stated, ≺ is an r.e. well-founded partial-order on ω, and expresses is meant in the local (infinite schema) sense. 1. There are true theories (Ti)i∈ω such that Ti expresses a Gödel number of Tj (all i, j) and Ti expresses the truth of Tj (all j ≺ i). 2. There are true theories (Ti)i∈ω such that Ti expresses a Gödel number of Tj (j ≺ i), the truth of Tj (j  i), and the fact that Tj has some Gödel number (all i, j). 3. If ≺ is ill-founded, and if we extend the base language to include a predicate for computable ordinals and require the theories to include rudimentary facts about them, then 1 and 2 fail. 4. Finally, if we do not extend the base language as in 3, then there do exist ill-founded r.e. partial orders ≺ such that 1 and 2 hold. Our proofs of 1 and 2 are constructive, but the proof of 4 is nonconstructive. In short, if 4 were false, either of 1 or 2 could be used to define the set WF of r.e. well-founded partial orders of ω using nothing but arithmetic and a truth predicate Tr for arithmetic. This is impossible since WF is Π11-complete and Tr is ∆11. ∗Email: [email protected] 1 2 Preliminaries To us, theory and schema mean set of sentences (a sentence is a formula with no free variables). Definition 1. (Standard Definitions) 1. When a first-order structure is clear from context, an assignment is a function s mapping first-order variables into the universe of that structure. If x is a variable and u is an element of the universe, s(x|u) is the assignment that agrees with s except that it maps x to u. 2. We write M |= φ[s] to indicate that the first-order structure M satisfies the formula φ relative to the assignment s. We write M |= φ just in case M |= φ[s] for every assignment s. If T is a theory, M |= T means that M |= φ for every φ ∈ T . 3. We write FV(φ) for the set of free variables of φ. 4. We write φ(x|t) for the result of substituting term t for variable x in φ. 5. LPA is the language of Peano arithmetic, with constant symbol 0 and function symbols S, +, * with the usual arities. If L extends LPA, an L -structure has standard first-order part if it has universe N and interprets 0, S, + and * as intended. 6. We define LPA-terms n (n ∈ N), called numerals, so that 0 ≡ 0 and n+ 1 ≡ S(n). 7. We fix a computable bijection 〈•, •, •〉 : N3 → N. Being computable, this is LPA-definable, so we may freely act as if LPA contained a function symbol for this bijection. Similarly we may act as if LPA contained a binary predicate symbol • ∈W• for membership in the nth r.e. set Wn. 8. Whenever a computable language is clear from context, φ 7→ pφq denotes Gödel numbering. 9. A valid formula is one that is true in every structure. 10. A universal closure of φ is a sentence ∀x1 * * * ∀xnφ where FV(φ) ⊆ {x1, . . . , xn}. We write ucl(φ) to denote a generic universal closure of φ. Note that if M is a structure and ψ is a universal closure of φ, in order to prove M |= ψ it suffices to let s be an arbitrary assignment and show M |= φ[s]. To formalize self-referential theories, we employ an extension of first-order logic where languages may contain new unary connective symbols. This logic is borrowed from [5]. Definition 2. (The Base Logic) A language L of the base logic is a first-order language L0 together with a class of symbols called operators. Formulas of L are defined as usual, with the clause that Tiφ is a formula whenever φ is a formula and Ti is an operator. Syntactic parts of Definition 1 extend to the base logic in obvious ways (we define FV(Tiφ) = FV(φ)). An L -structure M is a first-order L0-structure M0 together with a function that takes one operator Ti, one L -formula φ, and one assignment s, and outputs either True or False-in which case we write M |= Tiφ[s] or M 6|= Tiφ[s], respectively-satisfying the following three requirements. 1. Whether or not M |= Tiφ[s] does not depend on s(x) if x 6∈ FV(φ). 2. If φ and ψ are alphabetic variants (meaning that one is obtained from the other by renaming bound variables so as to respect the binding of the quantifiers), then M |= Tiφ[s] if and only if M |= Tiψ[s]. 3. For variables x and y such that y is substitutable for x in Tiφ, M |= Tiφ(x|y)[s] if and only if M |= Tiφ[s(x|s(y))]. The definition of M |= φ[s] for arbitrary L -formulas is obtained from this by induction. Semantic parts of Definition 1 extend to the base logic in obvious ways. Traditionally the operator Ti would be written Ki, and the formula Kiφ would be read like "agent i knows φ". For the present paper, the added intuition would not be worth the philosophical distraction. 2 Theorem 3. (Completeness and compactness) Suppose L is an r.e. language in the base logic. 1. The set of valid L -formulas is r.e. 2. For any r.e. L -theory Σ, {φ : Σ |= φ} is r.e. 3. There is an effective procedure, given (a Gödel number of) an r.e. L -theory Σ, to find (a Gödel number of) {φ : Σ |= φ}. 4. If Σ is an L -theory and Σ |= φ, there are σ1, . . . , σn ∈ Σ such that1 σ1 → * * * → σn → φ is valid. Proof. By interpreting the base logic within first-order logic (for details see [1]). Definition 4. If L is a first-order language and I is an index set, let L (I) be the language (in the base logic) consisting of L along with operators Ti for all i ∈ I. In case I is a singleton, LPA(I) is a form of Shapiro's [12] language of Epistemic Arithmetic. Definition 5. • For any LPA(I)-formula φ with FV(φ) = {x1, . . . , xn}, and for assignment s (into N), let φs be the sentence φs ≡ φ(x1|s(x1)) * * * (xn|s(xn)) obtained by replacing all free variables in φ by numerals for their s-values. • For any language L extending LPA, if M is an L -structure, then M is said to interpret formulas by substitution if M has standard first-order part and the following property holds: for every L -formula φ and assignment s, M |= φ[s] if and only if M |= φs. For example, if s(x) = 0 and s(y) = 2 then (∀z(x = y + z))s ≡ ∀z(0 = S(S(0)) + z). Definition 6. If T = (Ti)i∈I is an I-indexed family of LPA(I)-theories and N is an LPA(I)-structure, we say N |= T if N |= Ti for all i ∈ I. Definition 7. Suppose T = (Ti)i∈I is an I-indexed family of LPA(I)-theories. The intended structure for T is the LPA(I)-structure MT with standard first-order part, interpreting the operators Ti (i ∈ I) as follows: MT |= Tiφ[s] if and only if Ti |= φs. If MT |= T, we say T is true. Lemma 8. For any family T = (Ti)i∈I of LPA(I)-theories, MT interprets formulas by substitution. Proof. In other words, we must show that for every LPA(I)-formula φ and assignment s, MT |= φ[s] if and only if MT |= φs. The proof is a straightforward induction. Definition 9. By the axioms of Peano arithmetic for LPA(I) we mean the axioms of Peano arithmetic, with induction extended to LPA(I). Lemma 10. For any LPA(I)-structure M , if M interprets formulas by substitution, then M satisfies the axioms of Peano arithmetic for LPA(I). Proof. Let M be any LPA(I)-structure which interprets formulas by substitution. This means M has standard-first order part and for every formula φ and assignment s, M |= φ[s] if and only if M |= φs. Let σ be an axiom of Peano arithmetic for LPA(I). If σ is not an instance of induction, then M |= σ since M has standard first-order part. But suppose σ is ucl(φ(x|0)→ ∀x(φ→ φ(x|S(x)))→ ∀xφ). To see M |= σ, let s be an arbitrary assignment and assume M |= φ(x|0)[s] and M |= ∀x(φ→ φ(x|S(x)))[s]. By assumption, M |= φs(x|0) and ∀m ∈ N, if M |= φs(x|m) then M |= φ(x|S(x))s(x|m). Evidently φ(x|S(x))s(x|m) ≡ φs(x|m+1). By mathematical induction, ∀m ∈ N, M |= φs(x|m). By assumption, M |= ∀xφ[s]. 1We write A→ B → C for A→ (B → C), and likewise for longer chains. 3 Definition 11. Suppose T = (Ti)i∈I is a family LPA(I)-theories. If T+ = (T + i )i∈I is another such family, we say T ⊆ T+ if Ti ⊆ T+i for every i ∈ I. If T is a single LPA(I)-theory, we say T ⊆ T if T ⊆ Ti for all i ∈ I. If T1 = (T 1i )i∈I and T2 = (T 2i )i∈I are families of LPA(I)-theories, T1 ∪T2 is the family T′ = (T ′i )i∈I where each T ′i = T 1 i ∪ T 2i . Arbitrary unions ⋃ n∈X T n are defined similarly. Definition 12. Suppose T = (Ti)i∈I is a family of LPA(I)-theories. For each i ∈ I, we say Ti is Ti-closed if Tiφ ∈ Ti whenever φ ∈ Ti. We say T is closed if each Ti is Ti-closed. Definition 13. If I is an r.e. index set, a family T = (Ti)i∈I is r.e. just in case {(φ, i) : φ ∈ Ti} is r.e. 3 Generic Axioms If T is a family of theories whose truth was in doubt, and if we state a theorem removing that doubt, we often state more: that T∪S is true, where S is some background theory of provability, including non-controversial things like Peano arithmetic or the schema ucl(Ti(φ→ ψ)→ Tiφ→ Tiψ). The choice of S is somewhat arbitrary, or at best based on tradition. We will avoid this arbitrary choice by stating results in the form: "T is true together with any background theory of provability such that. . . " Definition 14. A family T of LPA(ω)-theories is closed-r.e.-generic if T is r.e. and MU |= T for every closed r.e. family U ⊇ T of LPA(ω)-theories. Lemma 15. If T is a union of closed-r.e.-generic families and T is r.e., then T is closed-r.e.-generic. Proof. Straightforward. Definition 16. For i ∈ I and for T an LPA(I)-theory, we write [T ]i for the family T = (Tk)k∈I where Ti = T and Tk = ∅ for all k 6= i. 3.1 Closed-r.e.-generic Building Blocks In this subsection, we will exhibit some examples of closed-r.e.-generic families. They can be combined in diverse ways, via Lemma 15, to form background theories of provability. This will allow us to state Theorem 24 below in a generalized way, essentially saying that a certain doubted theory is consistent with any background theory of provability made up of closed-r.e.-generic building blocks. The alternative would be for us to arbitrarily choose one such background theory and build it directly into Theorem 24, which would cause the core details in the proof of Theorem 24 to get jumbled up with unimportant distractions. It is common for a theory to state its own closure under modus ponens. When there are multiple theories, it is less clear whether each individual theory should only state its own closure thereunder, or the closure of all the other theories, or of some subset thereof. With the following lemma, we avoid arbitrarily imposing a decision along these lines. Lemma 17. For any i, j ∈ ω, the following family is closed-r.e.-generic: • [S]i where S is: (j-Deduction) the schema ucl(Tj(φ→ ψ)→ Tjφ→ Tjψ). Proof. Let U = (Uk)k∈ω be any closed r.e. family of LPA(ω)-theories such that U ⊇ [S]i where S is jDeduction. We must show MU |= [S]i. In other words we must show MU |= ucl(Tj(φ → ψ) → Tjφ → Tjψ) for any φ, ψ. Let s be an assignment and assume MU |= Tj(φ→ ψ)[s] and MU |= Tjφ[s], we must show MU |= Tjψ[s]. By Definition of MU, Uj |= (φ→ ψ)s and Uj |= φs. Clearly (φ→ ψ)s ≡ φs → ψs so by modus ponens Uj |= ψs, that is, MU |= Tjψ[s]. It might not be controversial to require that a theory express its own ability to prove valid sentences, but in a multi-theory context, should we require each theory to express that much about all its fellow theories? The following lemma allows us to avoid arbitrarily declaring the right answer to that question. Part 2 of this lemma illustrates an interesting combinatorial property of closed-r.e.-generic building blocks. Some schemas would not be suitable building blocks by themselves, but when paired with other schemas, the combination can become a suitable building block. 4 Lemma 18. For any i, j ∈ ω, the following families are closed-r.e.-generic: 1. [S]i where S is: (Assigned Validity) the schema φ s (φ valid, s an assignment). 2. [Assigned Validity]i ∪ [S]j where S is: (i-Validity) ucl(Tiφ) for φ valid. Proof. Both (1) and (2) are r.e. by Theorem 3. (1) Let U = (Uk)k∈ω be a closed r.e. superset of [S]i where S is Assigned Validity. We must show MU |= [S]i. If φ ∈ [S]i then φ is φs0 for some valid φ0 and some assignment s. Since φ0 is valid, MU |= φ0[s]. By Lemma 8, MU |= φs0. (2) Let U = (Uk)k∈ω be any closed r.e. family of LPA(ω)-theories such that Ui contains Assigned Validity and Uj contains i-Validity. By (1), MU satisfies Assigned Validity. It remains to show MU satisfies i-Validity. Let φ be valid and s an assignment. Since Ui contains Assigned Validity, Ui |= φs, so by definition of MU, MU |= Tiφ[s]. In modal logic, some papers treat the so-called positive introspection axiom (also known as the KK axiom) as one of the fundamental axioms of knowledge, and some do not. Rather than join either side, we prefer instead to study the combinatorial structure of the axiom, asking: are there other schemas we can add to it to make the combination closed-r.e.-generic? Lemma 19. For any i, j ∈ ω, the following family is closed-r.e.-generic: • [Assigned Validity]i ∪ [i-Validity]i ∪ [i-Deduction]i ∪ [S]j where S is: (i-Introspection) the schema ucl(Tiφ→ TiTiφ). Proof. Recursive enumerability is by Theorem 3. Let U = (Uk)k∈ω be any closed r.e. family of LPA(ω)theories such that Ui contains Assigned Validity, i-Validity and i-Deduction, and Uj contains i-Introspection. Then MU satisfies Assigned Validity and i-Validity by Lemma 18. By Lemma 17, MU satisfies i-Deduction. For i-Introspection, let s be an assignment and assume MU |= Tiφ[s], we will show MU |= TiTiφ[s]. Since MU |= Tiφ[s], Ui |= φs. By Theorem 3, there are σ1, . . . , σn ∈ Ui such that σ1 → * * * → σn → φs is valid. Since Ui contains i-Validity, Ui |= Ti(σ1 → * * * → σn → φs). By repeated applications of i-Deduction contained in Ui, Ui |= Tiσ1 → * * * → Tiσn → Tiφs. Since U is closed, Ui is Ti-closed and so contains Tiσ1, . . . ,Tiσn. So Ui |= (Tiφ)s and MU |= TiTiφ[s]. The following lemma shows that arithmetic is generic, which will enable us to state a later result (Theorem 24) in such a way that it is clear that the result is neither contingent on the presence, nor the absense, of arithmetic in the theories in question. Lemma 20. For any i ∈ ω, [S]i is closed-r.e.-generic, where S is the set of axioms of Peano arithmetic for LPA(ω). Proof. By Lemmas 8 and 10. Carlson proved [5] that it is consistent for an idealized knowing machine to know "I am a machine" (without knowing which specific machine it is). The following lemma sheds additional light: not only is it consistent for a knowing machine to know "I am a machine", in fact that knowledge is generic: it does not depend heavily on specific arbitrary decisions about the background theory of provability. Lemma 21. For any i, j ∈ ω, the following family is closed-r.e.-generic. • [S]i where S is: (j-SMT) (See [5] and [11]) ucl(∃e∀x(Tjφ↔ x ∈We)), e 6∈ FV(φ). Proof. Suppose U = (Ui)i∈ω is a closed r.e. family of LPA(ω)-theories and U ⊇ [S]i where S is j-SMT. We must show MU |= [S]i. That is, given φ with e 6∈ FV(φ), we must show MU |= ucl(∃e∀x(Tjφ↔ x ∈We)). Let s be an assignment and let x1, . . . , xk = FV(φ)\{x}. Since Uj is r.e., by the S-m-n theorem there is some n such that Wn = {m : Uj |= φ(x|m)(x1|s(x1)) * * * (xk|s(xk))}. Since e 6∈ FV(φ), and MU has standard first-order part, it follows that MU |= ∀x(Tjφ↔ x ∈We)[s(e|n)]. 5 Finally, the following lemma offers a way to obtain new building blocks from old. This can be combined with Lemma 21 to advance from "I am a machine" to "I know I am a machine". Lemma 22. For any i, j ∈ ω and any closed-r.e.-generic family T = (Tk)k∈ω, T ∪ [S]i is closed-r.e.-generic, where S is the schema: Tjφ (φ ∈ Tj). Proof. Suppose U = (Ui)i∈ω ⊇ T ∪ [S]i is closed and r.e. Right away MU |= T because T is closedr.e.-generic. It remains to show that MU |= [S]i, i.e., that MU |= S. Fix φ ∈ Tj and let s be any assignment. Since φ is a sentence, φ ≡ φs and thus Tj |= φs. Since Uj ⊇ Tj , Uj |= φs. By definition of MU, MU |= Tjφ[s]. We gather Lemmas 17–22 together into the following summary. Corollary 23. For any i, j ∈ ω, each of the following families is closed-r.e.-generic. 1. [j-Deduction]i. 2. [Assigned Validity]i. 3. [Assigned Validity]i ∪ [i-Validity]j . 4. [Assigned Validity]i ∪ [i-Validity]i ∪ [i-Deduction]i ∪ [i-Introspection]j . 5. [S]i where S is the set of axioms of Peano arithmetic for LPA(ω). 6. [j-SMT]i. 7. T ∪ [S]i, for any closed-r.e.-generic T, where S is the schema: Tjφ (φ ∈ Tj). The above building blocks are not exhaustive. In choosing building blocks, a primary concern was to facilitate creation of background provability theories strong enough to make our consistency result (Theorem 24) generalize Carlson's consistency result [5]. If that were our lone motivation, we could restrict Corollary 23 to only those families where i = j, but a secondary motivation was to provide inter-theory versions of those restricted building blocks. It would be interesting to investigate questions about whether the above building-blocks are minimal. For example, in Lemma 19, is it really necessary to bundle j-Introspection with all three other schemas? For now, we will leave those questions open. 4 First Consistency Result: Prioritizing Exact Codes The following theorem fulfills the first promise from the introduction. Theorem 24. Suppose ≺ is an r.e. well-founded partial order on ω and T0 = (T 0i )i∈ω is closed-r.e.-generic. For each n ∈ N, let T(n) = (Ti(n))i∈ω where each Ti(n) is the smallest Ti-closed theory containing the following: 1. The axioms in T 0i . 2. ∀x(Tjφ↔ 〈pφq, j, x〉 ∈Wn) whenever j ∈ ω, FV(φ) ⊆ {x}. 3. ucl(Tjφ→ φ) whenever j ≺ i. There is some n ∈ N such that T(n) is true. Proof. By the S-m-n Theorem, there is a total computable f : N→ N such that ∀n ∈ N, Wf(n) = {〈pφq, i,m〉 : FV(φ) ⊆ {x} and Ti(n) |= φ(x|m)}. Using the Recursion Theorem, fix n ∈ N such that Wf(n) = Wn. For brevity write T for T(n) and Ti for Ti(n). We will show MT |= T. This is a self-referential statement: to show Ti is true includes showing MT |= ucl(Tjφ→ φ), which is essentially the statement that Tj is true. Hence the restriction j ≺ i, which allows induction since ≺ is well founded. We will show, by ≺-induction on i, that MT |= Ti for every i ∈ ω. Fix i ∈ ω and assume MT |= Tj for all j ≺ i. Suppose σ ∈ Ti, we will show MT |= σ. 6 Case 1: σ ∈ T 0i . Then MT |= σ because T0 is closed-r.e.-generic and T ⊇ T0 is closed r.e. Case 2: σ is ∀x(Tjφ ↔ 〈pφq, j, x〉 ∈ Wn) for some j ∈ ω, FV(φ) ⊆ {x}. Let s be an assignment, m ∈ N. The following are equivalent. MT |= Tjφ[s(x|m)] Tj |= φs(x|m) (Definition of MT) Tj |= φ(x|m) (Since FV(φ) ⊆ {x}) 〈pφq, j,m〉 ∈Wn (By definition of n) MT |= 〈pφq, j,m〉 ∈Wn (MT has standard first-order part) MT |= 〈pφq, j, x〉 ∈Wn[s(x|m)]. (Lemma 8) Case 3: σ is ucl(Tjφ → φ) for some j ≺ i. Let s be an assignment and assume MT |= Tjφ[s]. This means Tj |= φs. By our ≺-induction hypothesis, MT |= Tj , so MT |= φs. By Lemma 8, MT |= φ[s]. Case 4: σ is only present in Ti because of the clause that Ti is Ti-closed. Then σ is Tiσ0 for some σ0 ∈ Ti. Being in Ti, σ0 is a sentence, so for any assignment s, σ0 ≡ σs0, Ti |= σs0, and finally MT |= Tiσ0[s]. By ≺-induction, MT |= Ti for all i ∈ ω. This shows MT |= T, that is, T is true. The first promise from the introduction is met: for any r.e. well-founded partial order ≺ on ω, there are theories (Tn)n∈ω such that ∀i, j, k ∈ ω with j ≺ i, Ti expresses the truth of Tj , and Ti expresses a Gödel number of Tk. In order to fulfill the second promise we will extend Carlson's notion of stratification to the case of multiple operators, and introduce stratifiers, a tool used to deal with subtleties that arise when multiple self-referential theories refer to one another. In [2] the technique behind Theorem 24 was used to exhibit a machine that knows its own code. 5 Stratification For the second promise from the introduction, we need to prove a result like Theorem 24 where Ti includes ucl(Tjφ → φ) for all j  i, not just j ≺ i. This rules out the direct ≺-induction of the type used above. Induction on formula complexity will not work either: we would need to show all of Ti consistent just to show MT |= Ti(1 = 0) → (1 = 0). Instead, we will use ordinal induction. But there are no ordinals anywhere in sight. To obtain ordinals to induct on, we will modify the theories we care about, in a process called stratification. We will start with some informal motivational remarks. Readers who would like to advance directly to the formal definitions can safely skip Subsection 5.1. 5.1 Motivation for Stratification As explained above, we would like to invoke ordinal induction, but there are no ordinals in sight. In order to make ordinal induction relevant, we will do the following. We will extend the background language to contain not only the operators Ti (i ∈ ω), but also operators Tαi  (i ∈ ω, α ∈ ε0 * ω). And instead of focusing directly on Ti, we will focus on a theory Ui such that the result U − i of erasing superscripts from Ui is U−i = Ti. The intended interpretation of T α i φ[s] will be Ui ∩α |= φs, where Ui ∩α is the set of axioms of Ui whose superscripts are < α. Thus, we may think of Ui as a version of Ti with extra information about the structure of Ti. We will show (Theorem 50), for certain formulas φ whose superscripts are positive multiples of ε0, that φ holds (in the intended interpretation) if and only if φ − holds. We will use this, after proving that Ui holds, to conclude that Ti also holds. Suppose we would like Ti to contain the axiom Ti(1 + 1 = 2). Then, as we carry out the procedure in the above paragraph, we would ensure that Ui contain all sentences of the form T α i (1 + 1 = 2). This would have the side effect that for any β > α, Ui ∩ β |= Tαi (1 + 1 = 2), so that T β i T α i (1 + 1 = 2) would hold in structures with the intended interpretation. Next, suppose that for every arithmetical sentence φ, we would like Ti to include Tiφ→ TiTiφ. 7 Then we would arrange that Ui contain Tαi φ→ T β i T α i φ (whenever β > α). The reason for the β is as follows. The intended interpretation of Tαi φ shall be Ui ∩ α |= φ. Thus, it would make no sense to put the axiom Tαi φ → Tαi Tαi φ into Ui: the fact that Ui ∩ α |= φ does not generally imply that Ui ∩ α |= Tαi φ, since Ui ∩ α is limited to formulas in which all superscripts are < α. At least Tαi φ→ T β i T α i φ is plausible. Again, suppose that for some j ≺ i, we would like for Ti to include Ti(Tj(1 = 0)→ (1 = 0)). We would arrange that Ui contain (for all α): Tαi (Tj(1 = 0)→ (1 = 0)). Note the lack of superscript on Tj. The intuition is that Ui is a version of Ti with extra information about the structure of Ti (namely, that said structure arises from an increasing family of theories), but without any additional information about the structure of Tj . Similarly, suppose we would like Ti to include Tj(Ti(1 = 0))→ Ti(1 = 0). We would arrange that Ui contain (for each α): Tj(Ti(1 = 0))→ Tαi (1 = 0). Note the lack of superscript on the Ti within the scope of Tj. As above, the intuition is that Ui is a version of Ti with extra information about the structure of Ti. It does not have any extra information about the structure of Tj-not even about what Tj says about Ti. This is important because, when j ≺ i, we would like Ti to contain axioms declaring, essentially, the Gödel number of Tj . This Gödel number would be hardcoded into such axioms, and thus there would be no hope of such axioms remaining true if Tj were changed. 5.2 Stratification Formal Details To get a foothold for induction, instead of considering a particular theory Ti, we will be considering copies of Ti with ordinal-number superscripts added. To recover information about the original Ti from these modified theories, we will need to use sophisticated results from [4] about the structure of the ordinals. Definition 25. We define a binary relation ≤1 on Ord by transfinite recursion so that for all α, β ∈ Ord, α ≤1 β if and only if α ≤ β and (α,≤,≤1) is a Σ1-elementary substructure of (β,≤,≤1). The following theorem is based on calculations from [4]. It was used by Carlson to prove Reinhardt's conjecture [5]. We state it here without proof. Theorem 26. 1. The binary relation ≤1 is a recursive partial ordering on ε0 * ω. 2. For all positive integers m ≤ n, ε0 *m ≤1 ε0 * n. 3. For any α ≤ β ∈ Ord, α ≤1 β if and only if the following statement is true. For every finite set X ⊆ α and every finite set Y ⊆ [α, β), there is a set X < Ỹ < α such that X ∪ Ỹ ∼=(≤,≤1) X ∪ Y . The usefulness of Theorem 26 will appear in Theorem 38, but first we need some machinery. Definition 27. Let I = ((ε0 * ω)× ω)t ω. Thus LPA(I) contains operators T(α,i) for all α ∈ ε0 * ω, i ∈ ω, along with operators Ti for all i ∈ ω. As abbreviation, we write Tαi  for T(α,i), and refer to α as its superscript. 8 Definition 28. For any LPA(I)-formula φ, On(φ) ⊆ ε0 * ω denotes the set of superscripts appearing in φ. Definition 29. Suppose i ∈ ω. The i-stratified formulas of LPA(I) are defined as follows (where φ ranges over LPA(I)-formulas). 1. If φ is Tjφ0 for some j 6= i, then φ is i-stratified if and only if φ is an LPA(ω)-formula. 2. If φ is Tαj φ0 for some j 6= i, then φ is not i-stratified. 3. If φ is Tiφ0, then φ is not i-stratified. 4. If φ is Tαi φ0, then φ is i-stratified if and only if φ0 is i-stratified and α > On(φ0). 5. If φ is ¬φ0, φ1 → φ2, or ∀xφ0, then φ is i-stratified if and only if its immediate subformula(s) are. 6. If φ is atomic, then φ is i-stratified. An LPA(I)-theory T is i-stratified if φ is i-stratified whenever φ ∈ T . An LPA(I)-formula φ is very i-stratified if φ is i-stratified and On(φ) ⊆ {ε0 * 1, ε0 * 2, . . .}. For example: • Tω7 T57(1 = 0)→ T8(1 = 0) is 7-stratified but not 6or 8-stratified. • T57Tω7 (1 = 0) is not 7-stratified, nor is T57T7(1 = 0). • T57T8T7(1 = 0) is 7-stratified but T57T8T47(1 = 0) is not. We will not make use of the following lemma, but we state it to further illuminate Definition 29. Lemma 30. Suppose φ is an LPA(I)-formula, i ∈ ω. Then φ is i-stratified if and only if all of the following conditions hold. 1. For all j ∈ ω and α ∈ ε0 * ω, if Tαj  occurs in φ, then j = i. 2. Every occurrence of Ti in φ is inside the scope of Tj for some j 6= i. 3. Tαi  never occurs in φ inside the scope of Tj, for any α ∈ ε0 * ω or any j ∈ ω. 4. For all α, β ∈ ε0 * ω, if Tαi  occurs in φ inside the scope of T β i , then β > α. Proof. Straightforward. Definition 31. Suppose X ⊆ ε0 * ω and h : X → ε0 * ω is order preserving. For each LPA(I)-formula φ, define an LPA(I)-formula h(φ) inductively as follows: 1. If φ is ¬φ0, φ1 → φ2, or ∀xφ0, then h(φ) is ¬h(φ0), h(φ1)→ h(φ2), or ∀xh(φ0), respectively. 2. If φ is atomic or Tiφ0, then h(φ) ≡ φ. 3. If φ is Tαi φ0 where α ∈ X, then h(φ) ≡ T h(α) i h(φ0). 4. If φ is Tαi φ0 where α 6∈ X, then h(φ) ≡ Tαi h(φ0). In practice, we will mainly be interested in φ when φ is i-stratified for some i, in which case Tαj  cannot occur within the scope of Tk in φ for any k, j. For such φ, h(φ) is simply the result of applying h to every superscript in φ that is in X. For example if X = {1, ω}, h(1) = 0, and h(ω) = ω * 2 + 1, then h ( T0i (1 = 0)→ T1i (1 = 0)→ Tωi (1 = 0) ) ≡ T0i (1 = 0)→ T0i (1 = 0)→ Tω*2+1i (1 = 0). In practice, we will primarily be interested in applying Definition 31 in the case where On(φ) ⊆ X. 9 Definition 32. Suppose X ⊆ ε0 * ω and h : X → ε0 * ω is order preserving. For any LPA(I)-structure N , we define an LPA(I)-structure h(N ) that has the same universe as N , agrees with N on LPA(ω), and interprets LPA(I)\LPA(ω) so that h(N ) |= Tαi φ[s] if and only if N |= h(Tαi φ)[s]. Lemma 33. Suppose X ⊆ ε0 * ω, h : X → ε0 * ω is order preserving, and N is an LPA(I)-structure. For any LPA(I)-formula φ and assignment s, h(N ) |= φ[s] if and only if N |= h(φ)[s]. Proof. By induction. Corollary 34. Suppose X ⊆ ε0 *ω and h : X → ε0 *ω is order preserving. For any valid LPA(I)-formula φ, h(φ) is valid. Proof. For any LPA(I)-structure N and assignment s, h(N ) |= φ[s] by validity, so N |= h(φ)[s] by Lemma 33. Definition 35. If X ⊆ Ord and h : X → Ord, we call h a covering if h is order preserving and whenever x, y ∈ X and x ≤1 y, h(x) ≤1 h(y). Definition 36. Suppose i ∈ ω. An LPA(I)-theory T is i-unistratified if the following conditions hold: 1. T is i-stratified. 2. (Uniformity) Whenever φ ∈ T , X ⊆ ε0 *ω, On(φ) ⊆ X, and h : X → ε0 *ω is a covering, then h(φ) ∈ T . Definition 37. If T is an LPA(I)-theory and α ∈ ε0 * ω, let T ∩ α be the set {φ ∈ T : On(φ) ⊆ α} of sentences in T that do not contain any superscripts ≥ α. Theorem 38. (The Collapse Theorem) Suppose T is an i-unistratified LPA(I)-theory. 1. If n is a positive integer and On(φ) ⊆ ε0 * n, then T |= φ if and only if T ∩ (ε0 * n) |= φ. 2. If α ≤1 β and On(φ) ⊆ α, then T ∩ α |= φ if and only if T ∩ β |= φ. Proof. Note that since T is i-unistratified, in particular T is i-stratified. We will prove (1), the proof of (2) is similar. (⇐) Immediate since T ∩ (ε0 * n) ⊆ T . (⇒) Assume T |= φ. By Theorem 3 there are σ1, . . . , σk ∈ T such that Φ ≡ σ1 → * * * → σk → φ is valid. Let X = On(Φ) ∩ (ε0 * n), Y = On(Φ) ∩ [ε0 * n,∞), note |X|, |Y | <∞. Since Y is finite, there is some integer n′ > n such that Y ⊆ ε0 *n′. By Theorem 26 part 2, ε0 *n ≤1 ε0 *n′. By Theorem 26 part 3, there is some X < Ỹ < ε0 * n such that X ∪ Ỹ ∼=(≤,≤1) X ∪ Y . Let h : X ∪ Y → X ∪ Ỹ be a (≤,≤1)-isomorphism. Since On(φ) ⊆ ε0 * n, h(φ) = φ. By Corollary 34, h(Φ) ≡ h(σ1)→ * * * → h(σk)→ φ is valid. Since T is i-unistratified, h(σ1), . . . , h(σk) ∈ T . Finally since range(h) < ε0 * n, h(σ1), . . . , h(σk) ∈ T ∩ (ε0 * n), showing T ∩ (ε0 * n) |= φ. Loosely speaking, what we have done in Theorem 38 is we have taken a proof of φ and we have collapsed the proof, shrinking its ordinals by using Theorem 26 part 3. Definition 39. For every i ∈ ω we define the following LPA(I)-schema: • (i-Collapse) ucl(Tαi φ↔ T β i φ) whenever T α i φ is i-stratified and α ≤1 β. Definition 40. For any LPA(I)-formula φ, φ− is the result of erasing all superscripts from φ. If T is an LPA(I)-theory, T− = {σ− : σ ∈ T}. 10 For example, if φ is Tω5 (1 = 0)→ Tω+15 Tω5 (1 = 0), then φ− is T5(1 = 0)→ T5T5(1 = 0). Lemma 41. If T is i-unistratified then for every φ ∈ T there is some ψ ∈ T such that ψ is very i-stratified and ψ− ≡ φ−. Proof. Let X = On(φ) = {α1 < * * * < αn}, Y = {ε0 * 1, . . . , ε0 * n}, and define h : X → Y by h(αj) = ε0 * j. Clearly h is order preserving; by Theorem 26 part 2, h is a covering. Since T is i-unistratified, T contains ψ ≡ h(φ). Clearly ψ is very i-stratified and ψ− ≡ φ−. Definition 42. For any LPA(ω)-structure N , we define an LPA(I)-structure N − that has the same universe as N , agrees with N on LPA(ω), and interprets LPA(I)\LPA(ω) as follows. For any LPA(I)formula φ, α ∈ ε0 * ω, i ∈ N, and assignment s, N − |= Tαi φ[s] if and only if N |= (Tαi φ)−[s]. Lemma 43. Suppose N is an LPA(ω)-structure. For every LPA(I)-formula φ and assignment s, N − |= φ[s] if and only if N |= φ−[s]. Proof. By induction. Corollary 44. If φ is a valid LPA(I)-formula, then φ− is a valid LPA(ω)-formula. Proof. Similar to the proof of Corollary 34. A converse-like statement holds for Corollary 44 as well. Lemma 45. For any valid LPA(ω)-sentence φ and i ∈ ω, there is a valid very i-stratified LPA(I)-sentence ψ such that ψ− ≡ φ. Proof. Let ψ 7→ ψ+ be the function taking LPA(ω)-formulas to LPA(I)-formulas defined as follows. 1. If ψ is atomic, or of the form Tjψ0 with j 6= i, then ψ+ ≡ ψ. 2. If ψ is Tiψ0, then ψ + ≡ Tε0*ni ψ + 0 , where n = min{m ∈ N : ε0 *m > On(ψ + 0 )}. 3. If ψ is ¬ψ0, ψ0 → ψ1, or ∀xψ0, then ψ+ is ¬ψ+0 , ψ + 1 → ψ + 2 , or ∀xψ + 0 , respectively. It is straightforward to show φ+ is very i-stratified. We claim φ+ is valid. Let M be any LPA(I)-structure, we will show M |= φ+. Let M+ be the LPA(ω)-structure with the same universe as M , which agrees with M on the interpretation of arithmetic and of Tj for j 6= i, and which interprets Ti as follows: M+ |= Tiψ[s] if and only if M |= (Tiψ)+[s]. Since φ is valid, M+ |= φ. It follows that M |= φ+. Definition 46. Let i ∈ ω. We define the following LPA(I)-schemas. • (i-Strativalidity) ucl(Tαi φ) whenever φ is a valid LPA(I)-formula and Tαi φ is i-stratified. • (i-Stratideduction) ucl(Tαi (φ→ ψ)→ Tαi φ→ Tαi ψ) whenever this formula is i-stratified. Definition 47. An LPA(I)-theory T is i-straticlosed if the following conditions hold: 1. T is i-unistratified. 2. T includes i-Strativalidity, i-Stratideduction and i-Collapse. 3. For every φ ∈ T , if Tαi φ is i-stratified then Tαi φ ∈ T . A family T = (Ti)i∈ω is straticlosed if each Ti is i-straticlosed. The following theorem serves as an omnibus of results from Section 5 of [5]. 11 Theorem 48. (Proof Stratification) Suppose T is an i-straticlosed LPA(I)-theory. Then: 1. Whenever T ∩ α |= φ, Tαi φ is an i-stratified sentence, and β > α, then T ∩ β |= Tαi φ. 2. For any very i-stratified LPA(I)-sentences ρ and σ, if ρ− ≡ σ− then T |= ρ↔ σ. 3. For any very i-stratified LPA(I)-sentence φ, T |= φ if and only if T− |= φ−. Proof. Note that since T is i-straticlosed, in particular T is i-unistratified and hence, i-stratified. Claim 0: Any time T |= Tαi (ρ↔ σ) and this is i-stratified, T |= Tαi ρ↔ Tαi σ. Assume the hypotheses. By i-Strativalidity, T |= Tαi ((ρ↔ σ)→ (ρ→ σ)). By i-Stratideduction, T |= Tαi ((ρ↔ σ)→ (ρ→ σ))→ Tαi (ρ↔ σ)→ Tαi (ρ→ σ) and T |= Tαi (ρ→ σ)→ Tαi ρ→ Tαi σ. It follows that T |= Tαi ρ→ Tαi σ. The reverse implication is similar. Claim 1: If T ∩ α |= φ, Tαi φ is an i-stratified sentence, and β > α, then T ∩ β |= Tαi φ. Given T ∩ α |= φ, there are σ1, . . . , σn ∈ T ∩ α such that σ1 → * * * → σn → φ is valid. By instances of i-Strativalidity and i-Stratideduction contained in T ∩ β, T ∩ β |= Tαi φ. Claim 2: If ρ and σ are very i-stratified LPA(I)-sentences and ρ− ≡ σ−, then T |= ρ↔ σ. By induction on ρ. Note that ρ is not of the form Tαj ρ0 (with j 6= i), as that is not i-stratified. If ρ is Tjρ0 then ρ ≡ ρ− ≡ σ− ≡ σ and the claim is immediate. The only nontrivial remaining case is when ρ is Tαi ρ0. Since ρ is very i-stratified, this implies α = ε0 *n (some positive integer n) and ρ0 is very i-stratified. Since σ − ≡ ρ− and σ is very stratified, this implies σ ≡ Tε0*mi σ0 for some positive integer m and very i-stratified σ0 with σ − 0 ≡ ρ − 0 . Assume m ≤ n, the other case is similar. By induction, T |= ρ0 ↔ σ0. By compactness, there is a natural ` ≥ n such that T ∩ (ε0 * `) |= ρ0 ↔ σ0. By Claim 1, T |= Tε0*`i (ρ0 ↔ σ0); Claim 0 then gives T |= T ε0*` i ρ0 ↔ T ε0*` i σ0. The claim now follows since T contains i-Collapse and ε0 *m ≤1 ε0 * n ≤1 ε0 * ` (Theorem 26 part 2). Claim 3: If φ is an i-stratified LPA(I)-sentence and T |= φ, then T− |= φ−. By compactness, find σ1, . . . , σn ∈ T such that σ1 → * * * → σn → φ is valid. By Corollary 44, so is σ−1 → * * * → σ−n → φ−, witnessing T− |= φ−. Claim 4: If φ is a very i-stratified LPA(I)-sentence and T− |= φ−, then T |= φ. By compactness, there is a valid sentence Φ ≡ σ−1 → * * * → σ−n → φ− where each σj ∈ T . By Lemma 45, there is a valid very i-stratified LPA(I)-sentence Ψ such that Ψ− ≡ Φ. And because Ψ− ≡ Φ, this implies Ψ ≡ σ∗1 → * * * → σ∗n → φ∗ where each (σ∗j ) − ≡ σ−j , (φ∗)− ≡ φ−, and σ∗1 , . . . , σ∗n, φ∗ are very i-stratified. By Lemma 41, there are very i-stratified σ∗∗1 , . . . , σ ∗∗ n ∈ T with each (σ∗∗j )− ≡ σ − j ≡ (σ∗j )−. By Claim 2, T |= φ∗ ↔ φ, and for j = 1, . . . , n, T |= σ∗∗j ↔ σ∗j . Thus T |= (σ∗∗1 → * * * → σ∗∗n → φ)↔ Ψ, and since Ψ is valid and the σ∗∗j ∈ T , this shows T |= φ. Definition 49. If T = (Ti)i∈ω is a straticlosed family of LPA(I)-theories, its stratification, written Str(T), is the family Str(T) = (Si)i∈I , where for every i ∈ ω, Si = T−i and ∀α ∈ ε0 * ω, S(α,i) = Ti ∩ α. Theorem 50. (The Stratification Theorem) Suppose T = (Ti)i∈ω is a straticlosed family of LPA(I)-theories. For any i ∈ ω, any very i-stratified LPA(I)-formula φ, and any assignment s, MStr(T) |= φ[s] if and only if MStr(T) |= φ−[s]. 12 Proof. By induction on φ. The only nontrivial case is when φ is Tαi ψ. Since φ is very i-stratified, ψ is very i-stratified and we may write α = ε0 * n for some positive integer n, On(ψ) ⊆ ε0 * n. The following are equivalent. MStr(T) |= Tε0*ni ψ[s] Ti ∩ (ε0 * n) |= ψs (Definition of MStr(T)) Ti |= ψs (Theorem 38) T−i |= (ψ s)− (Theorem 48) T−i |= (ψ −)s (Clearly (ψs)− ≡ (ψ−)s) MStr(T) |= Tiψ−[s]. (Definition of MStr(T)) 6 Stratifiers In order to apply theorems from the previous section, it is necessary to work with families T = (Ti)i∈ω where each Ti is i-stratified. If we want T − i to (locally) express the truthfulness of T − j , we cannot simply add a schema like ucl(Tjφ → φ) to Ti, because this is not necessarily i-stratified: for example, the particular instance TjTi(1 = 0)→ Ti(1 = 0) is not i-stratified. But neither is, say, TjTαi (1 = 0)→ Tαi (1 = 0), where Tαi  occurs within the scope of Tj. We will use a schema ucl(Tjφ → φ+), where •+ varies over what we call i-stratifiers. Definition 51. Suppose X ⊆ ε0 *ω, |X| =∞, and i ∈ ω. The i-stratifier given by X is the function φ 7→ φ+ taking LPA(ω)-formulas to LPA(I)-formulas as follows. 1. If φ is atomic or of the form Tjφ0 with j 6= i, then φ+ ≡ φ. 2. If φ is Tiφ0 then φ + ≡ Tαi φ + 0 where α = min{x ∈ X : x > On(φ + 0 )}. 3. If φ is ¬ψ, ψ → ρ, or ∀xψ, then φ+ is ¬ψ+, ψ+ → ρ+ or ∀xψ+, respectively. By an i-stratifier we mean an i-stratifier given by some X. By the i-veristratifier we mean the i-stratifier given by X = {ε0 * 1, ε0 * 2, . . .}. For example, if •+ is the i-veristratifier and j 6= i then (TjTi(1 = 0)→ TiTi(1 = 0))+ ≡ TjTi(1 = 0)→ Tε0*2i T ε0 i (1 = 0). Lemma 52. Suppose Z ⊆ ε0 * ω, h : Z → ε0 * ω is order preserving, i ∈ ω, and •+ is an i-stratifier. For any LPA(ω)-formula θ with On(θ+) ⊆ Z, there is a computable i-stratifier •∗ with θ∗ ≡ h(θ+). Proof. Let X0 = {h(α) : α ∈ On(θ+)}, let X = X0 ∪ {α ∈ ε0 * ω : α > X0}, and let •∗ be the i-stratifier given by X. By induction, for every subformula θ0 of θ, θ ∗ 0 ≡ h(θ+0 ). Definition 53. By a stratifier-set, we mean a finite set I = {•+1 , . . . , •+k} where each •+p is an ip-stratifier for some ip ∈ ω, and i1, . . . , ik are distinct. With I as above, we write Indices(I) for {i1, . . . , ik}. We say I is computable if each •+p is computable. For example, if •+1 is a 1-stratifier, •+2 is a 5-stratifier, and •+3 is a 2-stratifier, then I = {•+1 , •+2 , •+3} is a stratifier-set and Indices(I) = {1, 5, 2}. For a non-example, if •∗1 and •∗2 are distinct 1-stratifiers, then {•∗1 , •∗2} is not a stratifier-set, because it fails the distinctness condition. 13 Definition 54. 1. Suppose N is an LPA(I)-structure and I is a stratifier-set. We define an LPA(I)structure N I as follows. The universe and interpretation of arithmetic of N I agree with those of N , as do the interpretations of Ti (i 6∈ Indices(I)) and Tαi  (any α, i). For each i ∈ Indices(I), let •+ ∈ I be the corresponding i-stratifier, and let N I interpret Ti as follows. For any LPA(I)-formula φ and assignment s, we consider two cases. (a) If φ is an LPA(ω)-formula, then N I |= Tiφ[s] if and only if N |= (Tiφ)+[s]. (b) If φ is not an LPA(ω)-formula, then N I |= Tiφ[s] if and only if N |= Tiφ[s]. 2. For any i ∈ ω, any i-stratifier •+, and any LPA(I)-structure N , let N + = N I where I = {•+} is the stratifier-set containing only •+. Case 1b in Definition 54 is somewhat arbitrary. We will only ever really care about whether N I |= Tiφ[s] when Tiφ is j-stratified for some j. If φ is not an LPA(ω)-formula then Tiφ is not j-stratified for any j. Lemma 55. (Compare Lemma 43) Suppose N is an LPA(I)-structure, i ∈ ω, and •+ is an i-stratifier. For every LPA(ω)-formula φ and assignment s, N + |= φ[s] if and only if N |= φ+[s]. Proof. By induction. Lemma 56. For any LPA(ω)-formula φ, any i ∈ ω, and any i-stratifier •+, φ is valid if and only if φ+ is valid. Proof. (⇒) Assume φ is valid. For any LPA(I)-structure N and assignment s, N + |= φ[s] by validity, so N |= φ+[s] by Lemma 55. (⇐) By Corollary 44. Lemma 57. Suppose M is an LPA(I)-structure, I0 is a stratifier-set, i ∈ ω, i 6∈ Indices(I0), and •+ is an i-stratifier. Let I = I0∪{•+}. Then M I = (M I0)+. Furthermore, M+ and M I agree on the interpretation of Ti. Proof. Straightforward. Lemma 58. Suppose i ∈ ω and suppose M is an LPA(I)-structure with the property that for every very i-stratified LPA(I)-formula φ and assignment s, M |= φ[s] if and only if M |= φ−[s]. Suppose I is a stratifier-set such that i 6∈ Indices(I). Then for every very i-stratified LPA(I)-formula φ and assignment s, M I |= φ[s] if and only if M I |= φ−[s]. Proof. By induction on φ. Let s be an assignment. The only interesting cases are the following. Case 1: φ is Tjψ for some j. Then φ − ≡ φ and the claim is trivial. Case 2: φ has the form Tαj ψ for some j 6= i. Impossible, this is not i-stratified. Case 3: φ has the form Tαi ψ. The following are equivalent: M I |= Tαi ψ[s] M |= Tαi ψ[s] (M and M I agree on Tαi ) M |= (Tαi ψ)−[s] (By hypothesis) M I |= (Tαi ψ)−[s]. (Since i 6∈ Indices(I), M and M I agree on Ti) Lemma 59. Suppose LPA(I)-structure M is an instance of Definition 7, and suppose I is a stratifier-set. Then M I interprets formulas by substitution. 14 Proof. By induction on |I|. If |I| = 0, we are done by Lemma 8. Otherwise, we may decompose I as I = I0 ∪ {•+} where •+ is an i-stratifier. By induction, M I0 interprets formulas by substitution (∗). By Lemma 57, M I = (M I0)+. By definition of interpreting formulas by substitution, for every LPA(I)-formula φ and assignment s, M I0 |= φ[s] if and only if M I0 |= φs. We must show that for every such φ and s, (M I0)+ |= φ[s] if and only if (M I0)+ |= φs. We induct on φ. By Definition 54, (M I0) and (M I0)+ agree on all symbols except Ti, and they agree on Tiφ0 if φ0 is not an LPA(ω)-formula. Thus the only nontrivial case is when φ is of the form Tiφ0 for some LPA(ω)-formula φ0. Any such φ is itself an LPA(ω)-formula and thus susceptible to Lemma 55. The following are equivalent. (M I0)+ |= φ[s] M I0 |= φ+[s] (Lemma 55) M I0 |= (φ+)s (By (∗)) M I0 |= (φs)+ (Clearly (φ+)s ≡ (φs)+) (M I0)+ |= φs. (Lemma 55) 7 Generic Stratified Axioms We now have enough technical machinery to fulfill the second promise from the Introduction. We will fulfill it in a general way, essentially saying: "The theories in question, whose truth were in doubt, are true together with any background theory of provability such that..." Just like in Section 3, we do this by introducing a notion of genericness. Throughout this section, ≺ is an r.e. well-founded partial-order of ω. Definition 60. If i ∈ ω, we say that a stratifier-set I is above i if ∀j ∈ Indices(I), i ≺ j. We adopt the following convention: if I is above i then we will write I as I(i) in order to remind ourselves that I is above i. Definition 61. (Compare Definition 14) Suppose T = (Ti)i∈ω is an r.e. family of LPA(I)-theories and each Ti is i-unistratified. We say T is ≺-straticlosed-r.e.-generic (or straticlosed-r.e.-generic, if ≺ is clear from context) if for every straticlosed r.e. family U ⊇ T, every i ∈ ω, and every computable stratifier-set I(i) above i, M I(i) Str(U) |= Ti. Lemma 62. If the family T = (Ti)i∈ω of LPA(I)-sets is r.e. and is a union of straticlosed-r.e.-generic families, then T is straticlosed-r.e.-generic. Proof. Straightforward. 7.1 Straticlosed-r.e.-generic Building Blocks As in Section 3.1, we exhibit some examples of straticlosed-r.e.-generic families, which can be combined (via Lemma 62) to form background theories of provability. This will allow us to state Theorem 72 below in a generalized way, essentially saying that certain doubted theories are consistent with any background theory of provability built up from such blocks. This saves us from having to arbitrarily impose any particular background theory of provability. In the following lemma, for part 3, the intuition is that for the purpose of straticlosed-r.e.-genericness, what things Ti says about Tj need not merely be true, but must even remain true when a j-stratifier is applied to them. Tj(φ → ψ) → Tjφ → Tjψ lacks this property, because it could be that (Tjφ)+ ≡ Tαj φ+, (Tjψ) + ≡ Tβj ψ+, where β < α. For parts 1–2, the reason we cannot merge these parts into [j-Deduction]i (j  i) is because [i-Deduction]i is not i-stratified. Lemma 63. (Compare Lemma 17) For any i, j ∈ ω, each of the following families is straticlosed-r.e.-generic. 15 1. [i-Stratideduction]i. 2. [j-Deduction]i (if j ≺ i). 3. [S]i (if i ≺ j) where S is the following schema (φ, ψ range over LPA(ω)-formulas): (Modified j-Deduction) ucl(Tj(φ→ ψ)→ Tjφ→ Tj(ψ ∧ φ)). Proof. Clearly these families are unistratified. Recursive enumerability follows from the fact that ≺ is r.e. In each case below, let U = (Uk)k∈ω be a straticlosed r.e. family extending the family in question. For brevity, let M = MStr(U). (1) Let I(i) be any computable stratifier-set above i, we must show M I(i) |= ucl(Tαi (φ → ψ) → Tαi φ → Tαi ψ) assuming this formula is i-stratified. Let s be an assignment and assume M I(i) |= Tαi (φ → ψ)[s] and M I(i) |= Tαi φ[s]. By Definition 54, M I(i) and M agree on Tαi , so M |= Tαi (φ→ ψ)[s]. By definition of M = MStr(U), this means Ui ∩ α |= (φ → ψ)s. Clearly (φ → ψ)s ≡ φs → ψs, so Ui ∩ α |= φs → ψs. By similar reasoning, Ui ∩ α |= φs. By modus ponens, Ui ∩ α |= ψs, which means M |= Tαi ψ[s]. Since M and M I(i) agree on Tαi , M I(i) |= Tαi ψ[s], as desired. (2) Let I(i) be any computable stratifier-set above i, we must show M I(i) |= ucl(Tj(φ → ψ) → Tjφ → Tjψ). Let s be an assignment and assume M I(i) |= Tj(φ → ψ)[s] and M I(i) |= Tjφ[s]. Since I(i) is above i and j ≺ i, M I(i) and M agree on Tj, so M |= Tj(φ → ψ)[s] and M |= Tjφ[s]. By definition of M , U−j |= φs → ψs and U − j |= φs, thus U − j |= ψs, so M |= Tjψ[s] and thus so does M I(i). (3) Let I(i) be any computable stratifier-set above i, we must show M I(i) |= ucl(Tj(φ → ψ) → Tjφ → Tj(ψ ∧ φ)). Let s be an assignment and assume M I(i) |= Tj(φ → ψ)[s] and M I(i) |= Tjφ[s]. If j 6∈ Indices(I(i)), then M I(i) and M agree on Tj, so reason as in (2) above. If not, we can write I(i) = I0 ∪ {•+} where •+ is a computable j-stratifier, and Lemma 57 ensures that M I(i) and M+ agree on Tj. By definition of M+, M |= (Tj(φ → ψ))+[s] and M |= (Tjφ)+[s]. Let α, β ∈ ε0 * ω be such that (Tj(φ → ψ))+ ≡ Tαj (φ+ → ψ+) and (Tjφ)+ ≡ T β j φ +. Then M |= Tαj (φ+ → ψ+)[s] and M |= Tβj φ+[s]. This means Uj ∩ α |= (φ+ → ψ+)s and Uj ∩ β |= (φ+)s. Since φ is a subformula of φ→ ψ, it follows β ≤ α, thus Uj ∩ α |= (ψ+ ∧ φ+)s. So M |= Tαj (ψ+ ∧ φ+)[s]. By Definition 51, Tαj (ψ + ∧ φ+) ≡ (Tj(ψ ∧ φ))+ (this is the reason for the ψ ∧ φ clause) and finally M+ |= Tj(ψ ∧ φ)[s]. In Lemma 18, we introduced Assigned Validity as a single schema for inclusion in Ti for any i. In the following lemma, we need to break the stratified version of Assigned Validity into different ω-indexed families because the stratified version of Assigned Validity intended for inclusion in Ti (for any particular i) needs to be i-stratified. Lemma 64. (Compare Lemma 18) For any i, j ∈ ω, each of the following families is straticlosed-r.e.-generic. 1. [S]i where S is: (i-Assigned Strativalidity) the schema φ s (φ valid and i-stratified, s an assignment). 2. [i-Assigned Strativalidity]i ∪ [i-Strativalidity]i. 3. [i-Assigned Strativalidity]i ∪ [i-Validity]j (if j 6= i). Proof. For unistratifiedness, use Corollary 34. Recursive enumerability follows from the fact that ≺ is r.e. In each case below, let U = (Uk)k∈ω be a straticlosed r.e. family extending the family in question. For brevity, let M = MStr(U). (1) Let I(i) be any computable stratifier-set above i, let φ be any valid i-stratified formula, and let s be any assignment. Since φ is valid, M I(i) |= φ[s]. By Lemma 59, M I(i) |= φs, as desired. 16 (2) Let I(i) be any computable stratifier-set above i. By (1), M I(i) |= i-Assigned Strativalidity. We must show M I(i) |= ucl(Tαi φ), where φ is any valid LPA(I)-formula and α < ε0 *ω is any ordinal such that Tαi φ is i-stratified. Let s be any assignment. Since Ui contains i-Assigned Strativalidity, in particular Ui contains φs. Since Tαi φ is i-stratified, α exceeds all the superscripts in φ (hence in φ s), so Ui∩α |= φs. By definition of M , this means M |= Tαi φ[s]. By Definition 54, M and M I(i) agree on Tαi , so M I(i) |= Tαi φ[s], as desired. (3) By (1), M I(i) |= i-Assigned Strativalidity for every computable stratifier-set I(i) above i. Let J(j) be a computable stratifier-set above j, we must show M J(j) |= i-Validity. Let φ be a valid LPA(ω)-formula, s an assignment. Case 1: i 6∈ Indices(J(j)). Then M J(j) and M agree on Ti. Let •+ be an i-stratifier. Since φ is valid, so is φ+ (by Lemma 56), so (φ+)s ∈ Ui (since [i-Assigned Strativalidity]i is part of line 3). Clearly ((φ+)s)− ≡ φs, so φs ∈ U−i , thus M |= Tiφ[s], and so does M J(j). Case 2: i ∈ Indices(J(j)). Thus j ≺ i and we can write J(j) = J0 ∪ {•+} for some computable i-stratifier •+. By Lemma 57, M J(j) and M+ agree on Ti. Let α ∈ ε0 * ω be such that (Tiφ)+ ≡ Tαi φ+. As in Case 1, (φ+)s is an instance of i-Assigned Strativalidity, so (φ+)s ∈ Ui (since [i-Assigned Strativalidity]i is part of line 3). In fact by choice of α, (φ+)s ∈ Ui ∩ α, so M |= Tαi φ+[s], that is, M |= (Tiφ)+[s]. By Lemma 55, M+ |= Tiφ[s]. Since M J(j) and M+ agree on Ti, M J(j) |= Tiφ[s]. In Lemma 63 above, we had to modify what Ti says about j-Deduction for i ≺ j. No such modification is needed in the following lemma. This is interesting because in modal logic, positive introspection is generally considered much more controversial and demanding than basic deduction. Lemma 65. (Compare Lemma 19) For any i, j ∈ ω, each of the following families is straticlosed-r.e.-generic. 1. [i-Assigned Strativalidity]i ∪ [i-Strativalidity]i ∪ [i-Stratideduction]i ∪ [i-Introspection]j (j 6= i). 2. [i-Assigned Strativalidity]i ∪ [i-Strativalidity]i ∪ [i-Stratideduction]i ∪ [S]i where S is: (i-Stratrospection) ucl(Tαi φ→ T β i T α i φ) whenever this is i-stratified. Proof. For unistratifiedness, use Corollary 34. Recursive enumerability follows from the fact that ≺ is r.e. In each case below, let U = (Uk)k∈ω be a straticlosed r.e. family extending the family in question. For brevity, let M = MStr(U). (1) By Lemma 63 (part 1) and Lemma 64 (part 2), M I(i) |= (i-Assigned Strativalidity)∪ (i-Strativalidity)∪ (i-Stratideduction) for every computable stratifier-set I(i) above i. Let J(j) be a computable stratifier-set above j, we must show M J(j) |= i-Introspection. In other words, we must show M J(j) |= ucl(Tiφ → TiTiφ) for any LPA(ω)-formula φ. Let s be any assignment and assume M J(j) |= Tiφ[s]. Case 1: i 6∈ Indices(J(j)). Then M J(j) and M agree on Ti. Thus M |= Tiφ[s]. Let •+ be the iveristratifier. By Theorem 50, M |= (Tiφ)+[s]. Let α be such that (Tiφ)+ ≡ Tαi φ+, so M |= Tαi φ+[s]. By definition, this means Ui∩α |= (φ+)s. Let β be such that (TiTiφ)+ ≡ Tβi Tαi φ+, so β > α. By Part 1 of Theorem 48, Ui ∩ β |= Tαi (φ+)s. Thus M |= T β i T α i φ +[s]. By Theorem 50, M |= (Tβi Tαi φ+)−[s], that is, M |= TiTiφ[s]. Since M and M J(j) agree on Ti, M J(j) |= TiTiφ[s], as desired. Case 2: i ∈ Indices(J(j)). Thus j ≺ i and we can write J(j) = J0 ∪ {•+} for some computable i-stratifier •+. By Lemma 57, M J(j) and M+ agree on Ti. Thus M+ |= Tiφ[s]. By Lemma 55, M |= (Tiφ)+[s]. Let α be such that (Tiφ) + ≡ Tαi φ+, so M |= Tαi φ+[s]. By definition of M , this means Ui ∩ α |= (φ+)s. Let β be such that (TiTiφ) + ≡ Tβi Tαi φ+, so β > α. By Part 1 of Theorem 48, Ui ∩ β |= Tαi (φ+)s. Thus M |= Tβi Tαi φ+[s]. In other words, M |= (TiTiφ)+[s]. By Lemma 55, M+ |= TiTiφ[s]. Since M+ and M J(j) agree on Ti, M J(j) |= TiTiφ[s], as desired. (2) Let I(i) be any computable stratifier-set above i, we must show M I(i) |= ucl(Tαi φ → T β i T α i φ) assuming this is i-stratified (so β > α). Let s be any assignment and assume M I(i) |= Tαi φ[s]. By Definition 54, M I(i) and M agree on Tαi , so M |= Tαi φ[s]. By definition of M , this means Ui ∩ α |= φs. By Part 1 of Theorem 48, Ui∩β |= Tαi φs. Thus, M |= T β i T α i φ[s], and thus so does M I(i) since it agrees with M on Tβi . 17 For the next lemma, note that the proof shows more than is necessary, namely that the structures in question satisfy all the axioms of Peano arithmetic for LPA(I), not just the i-stratified ones. But of course, the full set of Peano axioms for LPA(I) is not i-stratified. Lemma 66. (Compare Lemma 20) For any i ∈ ω, [S]i is straticlosed-r.e.-generic, where S is the set of those axioms of Peano arithmetic for LPA(I) that are i-stratified. Proof. Unistratifiedness and recursive enumerability are clear. Let U = (Uk)k∈ω be a straticlosed r.e. family extending [S]i. By Lemma 59, M I(i) Str(U) interprets formulas by substitution. By Lemma 10, M I(i) Str(U) satisfies the axioms of Peano Arithmetic for LPA(I), as desired. Lemma 67. (Compare Lemma 21) For any i, j ∈ ω, each of the following families is straticlosed-r.e.-generic. 1. [j-SMT]i (j 6= i). 2. [S]i, where S is: (i-Strati-SMT) ucl(∃e∀x(Tαi φ↔ x ∈We)) when this is i-stratified, e 6∈ FV(φ). Proof. Unistratifiedness and recursive enumerability are clear. In each case below, let U = (Uk)k∈ω be a straticlosed r.e. family extending the family in question. For brevity, let M = MStr(U). (1) Let I(i) be any computable stratifier-set above i. We must show M I(i) |= ucl(∃e∀x(Tjφ ↔ x ∈ We)) for every LPA(ω)-formula φ with e 6∈ FV(φ). Let s be an assignment and let {x1, . . . , xk} = FV(φ)\{x}. Case 1: j 6∈ Indices(I(i)). Then M I(i) and M agree on Tj. Since U−j is r.e., by the S-m-n theorem there is some n such that Wn = {m : U−j |= φ(x|m)(x1|s(x1)) * * * (xk|s(xk))}. Since e 6∈ FV(φ) and M has standard first-order part, it follows that M |= ∀x(Tjφ ↔ x ∈ We)[s(e|n)]. By first-order semantics, M |= ∃e∀x(Tjφ ↔ x ∈ We)[s]. Since M and M I(i) agree on Tj, M I(i) |= ∃e∀x(Tjφ ↔ x ∈ We)[s], as desired. Case 2: j ∈ Indices(I(i)). Thus i ≺ j and we can write I(i) = I0∪{•+} for some computable j-stratifier •+. By Lemma 57, M I(i) and M+ agree on Tj. Let α be such that (Tjφ)+ ≡ Tαj φ+. Since Uj ∩ α is r.e., by the S-m-n theorem there is some n such that Wn = {m : Uj ∩ α |= φ+(x|m)(x1|s(x1)) * * * (xk|s(xk))}. Since e 6∈ FV(φ) (thus e 6∈ FV(φ+)), and since M has standard first-order part, it follows that M |= ∀x(Tαj φ+ ↔ x ∈ We)[s(e|n)]. By first-order semantics, M |= ∃e∀x(Tαj φ+ ↔ x ∈ We)[s]. In other words, M |= (∃e∀x(Tjφ↔ x ∈We))+[s]. By Lemma 55, M+ |= ∃e∀x(Tjφ↔ x ∈We)[s]. Since M+ and M I(i) agree on Tj, M I(i) |= ∃e∀x(Tjφ↔ x ∈We)[s], as desired. (2) Let I(i) be any computable stratifier-set above i, we must show M I(i) |= ucl(∃e∀x(Tαi φ ↔ x ∈ We)) for every LPA(I)-formula φ such that this is i-stratified and e 6∈ FV(φ). Let s be any assignment and let {x1, . . . , xk} = FV(φ)\{x}. Since Ui ∩ α is r.e., by the S-m-n theorem there is some n such that Wn = {m : Ui ∩ α |= φ(x|m)(x1|s(x1)) * * * (xk|s(xk))}. Since e 6∈ FV(φ), and since M has standard firstorder part, it follows that M |= ∃e∀x(Tαi φ ↔ x ∈ We)[s]. By Definition 54, M and M I(i) agree on Tαi , so M I(i) |= ∃e∀x(Tαi φ↔ x ∈We)[s], as desired. If T = (Tk)k∈ω is straticlosed-r.e.-generic, we cannot simply take an axiom φ from Tj and insert Tjφ into Ti without violating straticlosed-r.e.-genericness, because such a φ is not necessarily i-stratified. Thus, the following lemma has a somewhat more complicated structure than Lemma 22. Lemma 68. (Compare Lemma 22) Let i, j ∈ ω and suppose T = (Tk)k∈ω is straticlosed-r.e.-generic. Then each of the following families is straticlosed-r.e.-generic. 1. T ∪ [S]i where S is the schema Tαi φ (φ ∈ Ti such that this is i-stratified). 2. T ∪ [S]i where S is the schema Tjφ− (φ ∈ Tj , j ≺ i). Proof. Unistratifiedness and recursive enumerability are clear. In each case below, let U = (Uk)k∈ω be a straticlosed r.e. family extending the family in question. For brevity, let M = MStr(U). 18 (1) Since T is straticlosed-r.e.-generic and U ⊇ T is straticlosed and r.e., immediately M J(j) |= T (by Definition 61) for all j ∈ ω and any computable stratifier-set J(j) above j. Let I(i) be any computable stratifier-set above i. Suppose φ ∈ Ti and α ∈ ε0 * ω are such that Tαi φ is i-stratified, and let s be any assignment. Since Ui ⊇ Ti, φ ∈ Ui, in fact since Tαi φ is i-stratified, it follows that φ ∈ Ui ∩ α. Since φ is a sentence, φ ≡ φs, and so Ui ∩ α |= φs, and so M |= Tαi φ[s]. By Definition 54, M I(i) agrees with M on Tαi , so M I(i) |= Tαi φ[s], as desired. (2) Since T is straticlosed-r.e.-generic and U ⊇ T is straticlosed and r.e., immediately MK(k) |= T (by Definition 61) for all k ∈ ω and any computable stratifier-set K(k) above k. Let I(i) be any computable stratifier-set above i. Suppose φ ∈ Tj where j ≺ i. Let s be any assignment. Since Uj ⊇ Tj , φ ∈ Uj . By Lemma 41, there is some very j-stratified ψ ∈ Uj such that ψ− ≡ φ−. Clearly since φ is a sentence, so is ψ. By compactness, there is some positive integer multiple α of ε0 such that Uj ∩α |= ψ. Since ψ is a sentence, ψ ≡ ψs and thus Uj ∩ α |= ψs. Thus, M |= Tαj ψ[s]. By Theorem 50, M |= Tjψ−[s], so by choice of ψ, M |= Tjφ−[s]. Since I(i) is above i and j 6 i, M and M I(i) agree on Tj, so M I(i) |= Tjφ−[s], as desired. 7.2 Stratifiable-r.e.-generic Building Blocks We have established some straticlosed-r.e.-generic building blocks, but the goal of this paper is to better understand the structure of non-stratified theories-stratification is only a means to an end. Therefore, we introduce a corresponding non-stratified building-block notion. Definition 69. If T0 = (T 0i )i∈ω where each T 0 i is an LPA(ω)-theory, we say T 0 is ≺-stratifiable-r.e.-generic (or stratifiable-r.e.-generic if ≺ is clear from context) if there is some ≺-straticlosed-r.e.-generic family T = (Ti)i∈ω of LPA(I)-theories such that each T−i = T 0i . Lemma 70. If T = (Ti)i∈ω is any straticlosed-r.e.-generic family of LPA(I)-theories, then T− = (T−i )i∈ω is a stratifiable-r.e.-generic family of LPA(ω)-theories. Proof. Straightforward. Corollary 71. (Compare Corollary 23) For all i, j ∈ ω, each of the following families of LPA(ω)-theories is stratifiable-r.e.-generic. 1. [j-Deduction]i (if j  i). 2. [Modified j-Deduction]i (if i ≺ j). 3. [Assigned Validity]i. 4. [Assigned Validity]i ∪ [i-Validity]j . 5. [Assigned Validity]i ∪ [i-Validity]i ∪ [i-Deduction]i ∪ [i-Introspection]j . 6. [S]i where S is the axioms of Peano Arithmetic for LPA(ω). 7. [j-SMT]i. 8. (If j  i) T∪ [S]i, for any stratifiable-r.e.-generic T = (Tk)k∈ω, where S is the schema: Tjφ (φ ∈ Tj). Proof. By combining Lemma 70 with Lemmas 63–68. For parts involving validity, Lemma 56 can be used to provide valid stratified counterparts of valid non-stratified formulas. Comparing the stratifiable-r.e.-generic families we exhibited (Corollary 71) with the closed-r.e.-generic families we exhibited (Corollary 23), we see that the stratifiable-r.e.-generic families are weaker in exactly two ways: 1. They do not allow Ti to state j-Deduction for Tj when i ≺ j, instead allowing what we called Modified j-Deduction. 19 2. Their closure property is more restricted: if T1 = (T 1k )k∈ω is closed-r.e.-generic and T 2 = (T 2k )k∈ω is stratifible-r.e.-generic, and if S1 is the schema Tjφ (φ ∈ T 1j ), and if S2 is the schema Tjφ (φ ∈ T 2j ), then Corollary 23 says T1 ∪ [S1]i is closed-r.e.-generic with no restrictions on j, whereas Corollary 71 only says that T2 ∪ [S2]i is stratifiable-r.e.-generic if j ≺ i. We leave it an open question to what extent Corollary 71 could be further strengthened. Our primary motivation in choosing building blocks was to facilitate creation of background provability theories at least strong enough to make our own consistency result (Theorem 72 below) generalize Carlson's consistency result [5]. If that were our lone motivation, we could restrict Corollary 71 to only those families where i = j, but a secondary motivation was to provide inter-theory versions of those restricted building blocks. 8 Second Consistency Result: Prioritizing Self-Truth In this section, we continue to fix an r.e. well-founded partial-order ≺ of ω. The following theorem will satisfy the second promise from the introduction: it will exhibit true theories (Ti)i∈ω such that Ti expresses a Gödel number of Tj (j ≺ i) and the truth of Tj (j  i). These theories can further be taken so that Ti expresses the fact that Tj has some Gödel number (all i, j), by Lemma 67. Theorem 72. Let T0 = (T 0i )i∈ω be any stratifiable-r.e.-generic family of LPA(ω)-theories. For every i ∈ ω and n ∈ N, let Ti(n) be the smallest Ti-closed LPA(ω)-theory containing the following axioms. 1. The axioms contained in T 0i . 2. Assigned Validity, i-Validity and i-Deduction. 3. ucl(Tjφ→ φ) whenever j  i. 4. ∀x(Tjφ↔ 〈pφq, j, x〉 ∈Wn) whenever j ≺ i, FV(φ) ⊆ {x}. Let each T(n) = (Ti(n))i∈ω. There is some n ∈ N such that T(n) is true. Proof. By the S-m-n Theorem, there is a total computable f : N→ N such that ∀n ∈ N, Wf(n) = {〈pφq, j,m〉 ∈ N : φ is an LPA(ω)-formula, FV(φ) ⊆ {x}, and Tj(n) |= φ(x|m)}. By the Recursion Theorem, there is an n ∈ N such that Wn = Wf(n). We will show T(n) is true. For the rest of the proof, we write T for T(n), Ti for Ti(n). The structure of the proof is as follows. • ("Definition of U" below) First, we will define a certain carefully-chosen family U = (Ui)i∈ω of LPA(I)theories (with each U−i = Ti) and the LPA(I)-structure M = MStr(U). • ("Preliminary Result" below) Next, we will show that ∀i ∈ ω, M |= Ui ∪ Ti. In order to deal with the difficulty mentioned at the beginning of Section 6, we will prove more than necessary, to obtain a strong ≺-induction hypothesis. Namely, we will prove, by ≺-induction, that ∀i ∈ ω, for every computable stratifier-set I(i) above i, M I(i) |= Ui ∪ Ti. – (Claim 1 below) In order to prove M I(i) |= Ui, we will use induction on α to show that M I(i) |= Ui ∩ α for all α ∈ ε0 * ω. – (Case 3 below) Part of proving M I(i) |= Ui∩α will be proving M I(i) |= ucl(Tα0i φ→ φ) whenever this is i-stratified, α0 < α. This is where we will use the α-induction hypothesis. – (Case 4 below) Part of proving M I(i) |= Ui∩α will be proving M I(i) |= ucl(Tjφ→ φ+) whenever j ≺ i, φ is an LPA(ω)-formula, and •+ is an i-stratifier. This is where we will take advantage of our strong ≺-induction hypothesis. • (Claims 2–3 below) Once we've established M I(i) |= Ui, we will essentially be able to conclude M I(i) |= Ti using the Stratification Theorem (Theorem 50). 20 • At the very end of the proof, having established that ∀i ∈ ω, M |= Ui ∪ Ti, we will use that to prove that MT |= T, i.e., that T is true. Definition of U. Since T0 is stratifiable-r.e.-generic, there is a straticlosed-r.e-generic family V = (Vi)i∈ω of LPA(I)-theories such that each V −i = T 0i . For every i ∈ N, let Ui be the smallest i-stratified LPA(I)-theory such that the following hold. 1. Ui contains Vi. 2. Ui contains i-Assigned Strativalidity, i-Strativalidity, i-Stratideduction and i-Collapse. 3. Ui contains ucl(T α i φ→ φ) whenever Tαi φ is i-stratified. 4. Ui contains ucl(Tjφ→ φ+) for every LPA(ω)-formula φ, j ≺ i, and i-stratifier •+. 5. Ui contains ∀x(Tjφ↔ 〈pφq, j, x〉 ∈Wn) whenever j ≺ i, FV(φ) ⊆ {x} and φ is an LPA(ω)-formula. 6. Whenever φ ∈ Ui and Tαi φ is i-stratified, Tαi φ ∈ Ui. Let U = (Ui)i∈ω. Observe that U is straticlosed and r.e. (to see Ui is i-unistratified, use Lemma 52; to see U is r.e., use Theorem 26 part 1); U ⊇ V; and for each i ∈ ω, U−i = Ti. Let M = MStr(U). Recall that Str(U) is the LPA(I)-family (Si)i∈I where ∀i ∈ ω and α ∈ ε0 * ω, Si = U − i = Ti and S(α,i) = Ui ∩ α. For the reader's convenience, here is how (by definition) M interprets Ti and T α i  for all i ∈ ω, α ∈ ε0 * ω: M |= Tiφ[s] iff Ti |= φs, M |= Tαi φ[s] iff Ui ∩ α |= φs. Preliminary Result. We would like to prove the following preliminary result: ∀i ∈ ω, M |= Ui ∪ Ti. For the sake of a stronger induction hypothesis, we will prove that ∀i ∈ ω, for every computable stratifier-set I(i) above i, M I(i) |= Ui ∪ Ti. This is more than enough because M I(i) = M when I(i) = ∅. Fix i ∈ ω. By ≺-induction, we have the following: (∗) For every j ≺ i, for every computable stratifier-set J(j) above j, M J(j) |= Uj ∪ Tj . Let I(i) be any computable stratifier-set above i. We must show M I(i) |= Ui ∪ Ti. Claim 1: ∀α ∈ ε0 * ω, M I(i) |= Ui ∩ α. By induction on α. Let σ ∈ Ui ∩ α. Case 1: σ ∈ Vi. Then M I(i) |= σ because V is straticlosed-r.e.-generic and U ⊇ V is straticlosed and r.e. Case 2: σ is an instance of i-Assigned Strativalidity, i-Strativalidity, or i-Stratideduction. Then M I(i) |= σ by Lemma 63 or Lemma 64. Case 3: σ is ucl(Tα0i φ→ φ) for some i-stratified LPA(I)-formula φ such that T α0 i φ is i-stratified. Since σ ∈ Ui ∩ α, this forces α0 < α. Let s be an assignment and assume M I(i) |= Tα0i φ[s], then: M I(i) |= Tα0i φ[s] (Assumption) M |= Tα0i φ[s] (M and M I(i) agree on T α0 i  by Def. 54) Ui ∩ α0 |= φs (Definition of M ) M I(i) |= φs (By α-induction, M I(i) |= Ui ∩ α0) M I(i) |= φ[s]. (Lemma 59) Case 4: σ is ucl(Tjφ→ φ+) for some LPA(ω)-formula φ, j ≺ i, and i-stratifier •+. By Lemma 52 we may assume •+ is computable. Let J(j) be the computable stratifier-set J(j) = I(i) ∪ {•+}, which is above j 21 since I(i) is above i and j ≺ i. Let s be an assignment and assume M I(i) |= Tjφ[s], then: M I(i) |= Tjφ[s] (Assumption) M |= Tjφ[s] (Since j ≺ i and I(i) is above i, M I(i) and M agree on Tj) Tj |= φs (Definition of M ) M J(j) |= φs (Since M J(j) |= Tj by (∗)) (M I(i))+ |= φs (Lemma 57) M I(i) |= (φs)+ (Lemma 55) M I(i) |= (φ+)s (Clearly (φs)+ ≡ (φ+)s) M I(i) |= φ+[s]. (Lemma 59) Case 5: σ is ∀x(Tjφ↔ 〈pφq, j, x〉 ∈Wn) for some LPA(ω)-formula φ with FV(φ) ⊆ {x} and j ≺ i. Let s be any assignment, say s(x) = m. The following biconditionals are equivalent: M I(i) |= Tjφ↔ 〈pφq, j, x〉 ∈Wn[s] M |= Tjφ↔ 〈pφq, j, x〉 ∈Wn[s] (M I(i) and M agree on the symbols in question) M |= Tjφ[s] iff M |= 〈pφq, j,m〉 ∈Wn (Lemma 59) M |= Tjφ[s] iff 〈pφq, j,m〉 ∈Wn (M has standard first-order part) Tj |= φs iff 〈pφq, j,m〉 ∈Wn (Definition of M ) Tj |= φ(x|m) iff 〈pφq, j,m〉 ∈Wn. (Since FV(φ) ⊆ {x}) The latter is true by definition of n. Case 6: σ is an instance Tβi φ↔ T γ i φ of i-Collapse (so β ≤1 γ and T β i φ↔ T γ i φ is i-stratified). Let s be an assignment, since M I(i) and M agree on Tβi  and T γ i , we need only show M |= T β i φ↔ T γ i φ[s]. In other words we must show Ui ∩ β |= φs if and only if Ui ∩ γ |= φs. This is by Theorem 38. Case 7: σ is Tα0i φ for some LPA(I)-formula φ such that T α0 i φ is i-stratified and φ ∈ Ui. Since T α0 i φ is i-stratified, On(φ) ⊆ α0, so φ ∈ Ui ∩ α0. Thus M |= Tα0i φ, so M I(i) |= T α0 i φ since M I(i) and M agree on Tα0i . Cases 1–7 establish M I(i) |= Ui ∩ α. By arbitrariness of α, Claim 1 is proved. Claim 2: For any assignment s and any very i-stratified LPA(I)-formula φ, M I(i) |= φ[s] if and only if M I(i) |= φ−[s]. By Theorem 50, for all such s and φ, M |= φ[s] if and only if M |= φ−[s]. The claim now follows from Lemma 58 (i 6∈ Indices(I(i)) because I(i) is above i). Claim 3: M I(i) |= Ti. For any σ ∈ Ti, there is some τ ∈ Ui such that τ− ≡ σ; since Ui is i-unistratified, we may take τ to be very i-stratified (Lemma 41). By Claim 1, M I(i) |= Ui, so M I(i) |= τ . By Claim 2, M I(i) |= σ. For each i ∈ ω, letting I(i) = ∅, Claims 1–3 show that M |= Ui ∪Ti. It follows that M |= T. Now, for every i ∈ ω, MT interprets Ti as follows: MT |= Tiφ[s] iff Ti |= φs. This is exactly the same way that M interprets Ti. It follows that M and MT agree on LPA(ω)-formulas. Thus, since M |= T, MT |= T, i.e., T is true. 9 Well-Foundation and Ill-Foundation The following is a variation on Kleene's O. 22 Definition 73. Simultaneously define O ⊆ N and | • | : O → Ord so that O ⊆ N is the smallest set such that: 1. 0 ∈ O (it represents the ordinal |0| = 0). 2. ∀n ∈ O, 2n ∈ O (it represents the ordinal |2n| = |n|+ 1). 3. If φe (the eth partial recursive function) is total and range(φe) ⊆ O, then 3 * 5e ∈ O (it represents the ordinal |3 * 5e| = sup{|φe(0)|, |φe(1)|, . . .}). To avoid technical complications, we have differed from the usual Kleene's O in the following way: in the usual definition, in order for 3 * 5e to lie in O, it is also required that |φe(0)| < |φe(1)| < * * * . Definition 74. L OPA is the language of Peano arithmetic extended by a unary predicate O. The following notions are defined by analogy with Section 2: 1. For any assignment s and L OPA(I)-formula φ with FV(φ)={x1, . . . , xn}, φs ≡ φ(x1|s(x1)) * * * (xn|s(xn)). 2. If T = (Ti)i∈I is an I-indexed family of L OPA(I)-theories, the intended structure for T is the L O PA(I)structure MT with universe N, interpreting symbols of PA as usual and interpreting O as O, and interpreting Ti (i ∈ I) as in Definition 7. For any L OPA(I)-structure N , we write N |= T if ∀i ∈ I, N |= Ti. We say T is true if MT |= T. Definition 75. If I is an index set and T = (Ti)i∈I is a family of L OPA(I)-theories, then for any i ∈ I such that MT |= Ti, we define the ordinal ‖Ti‖ = sup{|m|+ 1 : Ti |= O(m)}. The above definition makes sense: since MT |= Ti and OMT = O, the supremands are defined. Definition 76. The basic axioms of O are the following L OPA-axioms. 1. O(0). 2. O(n)→ O(2n), for every n ∈ N. 3. ∀x(φn(x)↓ & O(φn(x)))→ O(3 * 5n), for every n ∈ N. We have written the last two lines using infinite schemata to strengthen the following result. Theorem 77. Let I be an index set, ≺ a binary relation on I. Suppose T = (Ti)i∈I is a family of L OPA(I)theories with the following properties: 1. ∀i ∈ I, Ti contains the axioms of Peano arithmetic. 2. ∀i ∈ I, Ti contains the basic axioms of O. 3. ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ≺ i, ∃n ∈ N such that Ti |= ∀x(TjO(x)↔ x ∈Wn). 4. ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ≺ i, Ti |= ∀x(TjO(x)→ O(x)). If MT |= Ti ∪ Tj (in particular if T is true) and j ≺ i, then ‖Tj‖ < ‖Ti‖. Proof. Assume MT |= Ti ∪ Tj and j ≺ i. By hypothesis there is some n ∈ N such that Ti |= ∀x(TjO(x)↔ x ∈Wn) and Ti |= ∀x(TjO(x)→ O(x)). From these, Ti |= ∀x(x ∈Wn → O(x)). Since MT |= Ti, in particular MT |= ∀x(TjO(x)↔ x ∈Wn). This meansWn = {m ∈ N : Tj |= O(m)}. Since Tj includes the axiom O(0), Wn 6= ∅. Since Wn 6= ∅, by computability theory there is some k ∈ N such that PA |= (domain(φk) = N) ∧ (range(φk) = Wn). Since Ti includes PA, Ti also implies as much. Combined with Ti |= ∀x(x ∈ Wn → O(x)), it follows that Ti |= ∀x(φk(x)↓ & O(φk(x))). Since Ti contains the basic axiom ∀x(φk(x)↓ & O(φk(x))) → O(3 * 5k), Ti |= O(3 * 5k). 23 To finish the proof, calculate ‖Tj‖ = sup{|m|+ 1 : Tj |= O(m)} = sup{|m| : Tj |= O(m)} (Since Tj contains O(n)→ O(2n) for all n ∈ N) = sup{|m| : m ∈Wn} (Since Wn = {m ∈ N : Tj |= O(m)}) = sup{|φk(0)|, |φk(1)|, . . .} (By choice of k) = |3 * 5k| (Definition 73) < sup{|m|+ 1 : Ti |= O(m)} (Since Ti |= O(3 * 5k)) = ‖Ti‖. Corollary 78. (Well-Foundedness of True Self-Referential Theories) Let I, T, ≺ be as in Theorem 77. If T is true then ≺ is well founded, by which we mean there is no infinite descending sequence i0 i1 * * * . In particular Corollary 78 says that if I, T, ≺ are as in Theorem 77 and T is true then ≺ is strict: there is no i with i ≺ i. This gives a new form (under the additional new assumption of containing/knowing basic rudiments of computable ordinals) of the Lucas–Penrose–Reinhardt argument that a truthful theory (or machine) cannot state (or know) its own truth and its own Gödel number. We could remove Peano arithmetic from Theorem 77 if we further departed from Kleene and changed line 3 of Definition 73 to read: 3. If We ⊆ O, then 3 * 5e ∈ O (and |3 * 5e| = sup{|n| : n ∈We}, or |3 * 5e| = 0 if We = ∅) (and altered Definition 76 accordingly). The previous paragraph would still stand, in fact giving a version of the Lucas–Penrose–Reinhardt argument in which the theory (machine) is not required to contain (know) arithmetic. We close the paper by showing that Corollary 78 fails without O. Let WF be the set of all r.e. wellfounded partial orders on ω and let Tr be the set of all true LPA-sentences. It is well-known that WF is computability theoretically Π11-complete and Tr is ∆ 1 1, so WF cannot be defined in LPA ∪ {Tr}. Theorem 79. (Ill-Foundedness of True Self-Referential Theories) 1. There exists an r.e., ill-founded partial order ≺ on ω such that for every closed-r.e.-generic T0 = (T 0i )i∈ω there is an n ∈ N such that T(n) is true, where T(n) is as in Theorem 24. 2. There exists an r.e., ill-founded partial order ≺ on ω such that for every ≺-stratifiable-r.e.-generic T0 = (T 0i )i∈ω there is an n ∈ N such that T(n) is true, where T(n) is as in Theorem 72. Proof. We prove (1), (2) is similar. Assume ¬(1). For each r.e. partial order≺ on ω, let S(≺) be the statement of Theorem 24 for ≺, minus the requirement that ≺ be well founded. Combining ¬(1) with Theorem 24, ≺ is well founded if and only if S(≺) is true. We will argue that S(≺) is expressible in LPA ∪ {Tr}, which is absurd because that would mean it is possible to define WF in LPA ∪ {Tr}. S(≺) is equivalent to the following: • For any (Gödel number of an) r.e. family T0 = (T 0i )i∈ω of LPA(ω)-theories, if T0 is closed-r.e.-generic (i.e., if MU |= T0 for every closed r.e. family U ⊇ T0 of LPA(ω)-theories), then there is some n ∈ N such that T(n) is true (i.e., such that MT(n) |= T(n)), where T(n) = (Ti(n))i∈ω, where each Ti(n) is the smallest Ti-closed theory containing the following: 1. The axioms in T 0i . 2. ∀x(Tjφ↔ 〈pφq, j, x〉 ∈Wn) whenever j ∈ ω, FV(φ) ⊆ {x}. 3. ucl(Tjφ→ φ) whenever j ≺ i. This is manifestly expressible in LPA except for the clauses MU |= T0 and MT(n) |= T(n). We will show that MU |= T0 is expressible in LPA ∪ {Tr}; the expressibility of MT(n) |= T(n) is similar. Define an operator FU which takes an LPA(ω)-formula φ and outputs an LPA-formula FU(φ) as follows: 24 • If φ is atomic, let FU(φ) ≡ φ. • If φ is ¬φ0, φ1 → φ2, or ∀xφ0, let FU(φ) be ¬FU(φ0), FU(φ1)→ FU(φ2), or ∀xFU(φ0), respectively. • Suppose φ is Tiψ and FV(ψ) = {x1, . . . , xk}. Let f : Nk → N be the computable function such that for all m1, . . . ,mk ∈ N, f(m1, . . . ,mk) = pψ(x1|m1) * * * (xk|mk)q. Let FU(φ) be: "Ui proves the sentence with Gödel number f(x1, . . . , xk)" (so FV(FU(φ)) = {x1, . . . , xk}). It is easy to check that for every LPA(ω)-formula φ and assignment s, MU |= φ[s] if and only if N |= FU(φ)[s]. In particular, for every LPA(ω)-sentence φ, MU |= φ if and only if N |= FU(φ). Thus, the clause MU |= T0 can be expressed in LPA ∪ {Tr} as follows: ∀i∀x(x ∈ T 0i → Tr(pFU(x)q)). The way we prove Theorem 79 by referring to the computability theoretical complexity of WF is similar to a recent argument by Kripke [7]. References [1] Alexander, S. (2013). The Theory of Several Knowing Machines. Doctoral dissertation, the Ohio State University. [2] Alexander, S. (2014). A machine that knows its own code. Studia Logica, 102, 567–576. [3] Benacerraf, P. (1967). God, the Devil, and Gödel. The Monist, 51, 9–32. [4] Carlson, T.J. (1999). Ordinal arithmetic and Σ1-elementarity. Archive for Mathematical Logic, 38, 449– 460. [5] Carlson, T.J. (2000). Knowledge, machines, and the consistency of Reinhardt's strong mechanistic thesis. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 105, 51–82. [6] Carlson, T.J. (2001). Elementary patterns of resemblance. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 108, 19–77. [7] Kripke, S.A. (2019). Ungroundedness in Tarskian Languages. The Journal of Philosophical Logic, 48, 603–609. [8] Lucas, J.R. (1961). Minds, machines, and Gödel. Philosophy, 36, 112–127. [9] Penrose, R. (1989). The Emperor's New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds, and the Laws of Physics. Oxford University Press. [10] Putnam, H. (2006). After Gödel. Logic Journal of the IGPL, 14, 745–754. [11] Reinhardt, W. (1985). Absolute versions of incompleteness theorems. Nous, 19, 317–346. [12] Shapiro, S. (1985). Epistemic and Intuitionistic Arithmetic. In: S. Shapiro (ed.), Intensional Mathematics (North-Holland, Amsterdam), pp. 11–46.

International Journal of Academic Information Systems Research (IJAISR) ISSN: 2643-9026 Vol. 3 Issue 9, September – 2019, Pages: 7-22 www.ijeais.org/ijaisr 7 Computerized Management Information Systems and Their Impact on the Job Performance of Employees at Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal) Husam R. Ahmad 1 , Nader H. Abusharekh 2 , Mazen J. Al Shobaki 3 , Samy S. Abu Naser 4 1Bait Al-Mqds College for technical Science, GazaPalestine 2Faculty of Business and Management, University Of Palestine 3Dean of Bait Al-Mqds College for technical Science, GazaPalestine 4Department of Information Technology, Al-Azhar University, Gaza, Palestine [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] Abstract: This study aimed to identify the impact of computerized management information systems on the performance of the employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal). The SPSS statistical package was adopted. The study reached several results, the most important of which are the presence of statistically significant impact of the requirements of operation and management of computerized management information systems (hardware, software, human, organizational) on the performance of the employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal), and the presence of statistically significant differences between the perceptions of the respondents on the "impact Computerized Management Information Systems (MIS) on the performance of the employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal), attributed to the demographic variables (scientific level, years of experience, workplace, job level). The study concluded with a set of recommendations, the most important of which are the following: 1. The need to keep abreast of technological developments in the field of management information systems and to ensure the use of modern hardware, and sophisticated software. 2. Attention to the availability of modern networks and work to solve network problems such as problems of interruptions and slow communication that came within the results of the study. 3. Conduct user and IT courses for operational and application software to increase users' awareness of the capabilities of the hardware and software used and not to focus on how to use it only. Keywords: Computerized Management Information Systems (MIS), Staff Performance, Palestine Cellular Communications Company, Jawwal, Palestine. 1. INTRODUCTION As a result of technological and economic developments and globalization, information systems have become a prominent place in all areas, especially in the administrative fields, where information systems have developed at a rapid pace and multiple applications in all administrative levels, these systems as mentioned (El-Maghraby, 2002) It is one of the most successful ways organizations face the challenges of the day as they represent integrated activities aimed at obtaining information and knowledge by means of technology for managers to make decisions in different locations. Information is a wealth, and its importance lies not only in the decision-making process, but also in other administrative processes, such as planning, policy-making, monitoring, and evaluating performance (Madi et al., 2018). Information is a major source of the organization's resources and one of its most important sources of success (Al-Bashabsha, 2005). Public and private organizations have witnessed a major shift in information systems, represented by the use of computers, databases and communication networks, in addition to other technological means that contributed to the existence of an information system based mainly on the use of computers (Abu Amuna et al., 2017), (Zaqout et al., 2018) and (FarajAllah et al., 2018) However, despite the technical progress of these systems, they still need to be accepted and satisfied by the user, in order to accept the use and benefit from them, hence the interest of users of computerized information systems, and organizations to walk in two parallel lines when developing and applying computerized information is the interest in technology And interest in IT users (Al Shobaki & Abu Naser, 2016) and (Abu Naser & Al Shobaki, 2016). Thus, the culture of information systems suggests that there is a need for an understanding of information systems, which includes the behavioral understanding of the organization and the individuals who use the systems, as well as the knowledge and understanding of computer technology, associated with information systems. Information is a wealth, and its importance lies not only in the decision-making process, but also in other administrative processes, such as planning, policy-making, oversight, and evaluation of opinions, but after the use of information and systems in the performance evaluation of the most attractive International Journal of Academic Information Systems Research (IJAISR) ISSN: 2643-9026 Vol. 3 Issue 9, September – 2019, Pages: 7-22 www.ijeais.org/ijaisr 8 and important uses, without information becomes a process Performance evaluation is arbitrary. Performance evaluation is seen as one of the basic management processes, and sensitive topics that are necessary when thinking and planning the development processes in any organization, through which senior management can design and prepare development programs commensurate with the circumstances of the founder. Without an assessment of their situation, it will be difficult for the institution to develop appropriate plans and programs. Jawwal aspires to be the leading institution in the telecommunications and information technology sector in Palestine by providing an advanced infrastructure capable of keeping abreast of the latest developments in this sector, and providing all the services of terrestrial, cellular, information, internet services and added services. It relies on information systems and regards it as the technical base for starting. Jawwal is constantly working to improve its image among its subscribers and increase their satisfaction with its services and prices by improving the quality of its services and raising the efficiency of its employees, which will only be based on computerized information systems, which are the backbone of administrative development. It monitors the performance of the employee and improves his / her functional capacity, and has influences on the behavior of individuals and groups to make the performance results consistent with the objectives of the organization, and gives the worker the ability to accomplish the tasks and duties assigned to him and develop his capacity to assume additional responsibilities to achieve a high degree of Career satisfaction, and give it the ability to adapt to the work environment, and can thus explore the elements of the human performance in terms of efficiency and productivity, which reflected its impact on the overall effectiveness of the organization. 2. PROBLEM STATEMENT This research seeks to identify the suitability of the main requirements for the management and operation of the computerized information system (physical, software, human and organizational) to the business needs of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal), as well as the effectiveness of its information system in meeting the needs of its users of information appropriate for the performance of business. By knowing the impact, the telecommunications company can identify the defects in the computerized information system and thus try to remedy it and then be able to develop and raise the efficiency of the functional performance of its employees, the problem can be formulated in the following question: What is the impact of computerized management information systems on the performance of the employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal)? The study seeks to answer the following questions: Q1-: What are the perceptions of the respondents towards the computerized management information systems in Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal)? Q2-: What is the level of job performance of the employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal) from the perspective of the employees? Q3-: Is there an impact of computerized management information systems on the performance of the employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal) from the perspective of employees? Q4-: Do the opinions of respondents in Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal) differ on the impact of computerized management information systems on the performance of employees according to their personal characteristics? 3. RESEARCH IMPORTANCE 1. The study is expected to contribute to the evaluation of the computerized management information systems in Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal), and its problems and difficulties, and to determine the suitability of these systems to the needs of employees and raise the level of performance. 2. The study of management information systems in Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal) is of particular importance, as the company relies mainly on modern information systems. 3. The study is expected to improve the quality of services provided to subscribers, which will benefit both Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal) and the community. 4. This study is useful in devising some useful lessons for researchers, which can be relied upon in the development of research in the field of management information systems and to identify the various aspects. 5. This study is the first of its kind to study the impact of computerized management information systems on the job performance of workers in the Palestinian business environment. 4. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES This study aims to: 1. The impact of computerized management information systems on the performance of the employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal). 2. Identify the level of job performance of the employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal). 3. Determine the nature of the relationship between the requirements of management and operation of computerized management information systems and the performance of the employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal) 4. To know the significance of the differences between the respondents on the impact of computerized management International Journal of Academic Information Systems Research (IJAISR) ISSN: 2643-9026 Vol. 3 Issue 9, September – 2019, Pages: 7-22 www.ijeais.org/ijaisr 9 information systems on the performance of the employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal). 5. Explanation of proposals to help improve the performance of employees by enhancing the role of management information systems in Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal). 5. RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS The study seeks to test the validity of the following hypotheses: Ho 1: There is a statistically significant effect at the significance level (α ≤0.05) between the requirements of the management and operation of computerized management information systems (physical, software, human and organizational requirements) and the performance of the employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal). The following sub-hypotheses are derived: 1. There is a statistically significant effect at the level of significance (α ≤0.05) between the material requirements and the performance of the employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal) 2. There is a statistically significant effect at the level of significance (α ≤0.05) between the software requirements and the performance of the employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal). 3. There is a statistically significant effect at the level of significance (α ≤0.05) between the human requirements and the performance of the employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal). 4. There is a statistically significant effect at the level of significance (α ≤0.05) between the organizational requirements and the performance of the employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal). Ho 2: There are statistically significant differences at the level of significance (5 0.05 بين) between the average of the respondents opinions on the impact of computerized management information systems on the performance of the employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal) due to the following variables (age, educational qualification, field of work, Number of years of service). The following sub-hypotheses are derived: 1. There are statistically significant differences at the level of significance (α ≤0.05) between the average respondents' opinions on the impact of computerized management information systems on the performance of the employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal) due to age. 2. There are statistically significant differences at the level of (α ≤0.05) among the average respondents' opinions on the impact of computerized management information systems on the performance of the employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal) attributed to the educational qualification. 3. There are statistically significant differences at the level (α ≤0.05) between the average respondents' opinions on the impact of computerized management information systems on the performance of the employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal) due to the field of work. 4. There are statistically significant differences at the level of (α ≤0.05) between the average respondents' opinions on the impact of computerized management information systems on the performance of the employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal) attributable to years of service. 6. RESEARCH LIMITS AND SCOPE 1. Human Limit: This study is limited to the responses of administrative staff. 2. Institutional limitation: The study was conducted at Al-Azhar University. 3. Time Limits: This study was implemented in 2018 and therefore represents the reality at this time. 7. RESEARCH TERMINOLOGY  Computerized Information Systems: A component of the administrative system; it collects, classifies, processes, analyzes and communicates physical and quantitative information for decision making to internal and external parties (AlDahrawi, 1998).  Job Performance: A set of administrative behaviors expressing the knowledge of the employee, which includes the quality of performance and good implementation and technical expertise required in the job, as well as communication and interaction with the rest of the organization and abide by the administrative regulations governing his work and strive to respond with care (Al-Bashabsha, 2005).  Employee Performance Appraisal: The process that includes procedures for evaluating the job performance of workers in their current work and exploring their future development (Al Shobaki & Abu Naser, 2016). 8. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FirstlyComputerized Information Systems: The complexity of the contemporary business environment has widened the circle of decisions to be taken under uncertainty conditions. Hence, computer and computer-based IT systems are seen as frameworks to support the integration of science with the manager's personal appreciation for adapting, developing, adapting, examining and testing alternatives to act and make decisions. The efficiency of the work of the Organization as a whole, therefore, computerized information systems in the current era is considered as the main artery responsible for the International Journal of Academic Information Systems Research (IJAISR) ISSN: 2643-9026 Vol. 3 Issue 9, September – 2019, Pages: 7-22 www.ijeais.org/ijaisr 10 management and other parties with physical and quantitative information. The Director needs communication and access to relevant data and information, in addition to possessing the ability to analyze such data and information. Here, computer-based information systems can provide means of making communication accessible, This is an economically feasible and easier analysis for the decision maker (FarajAllah et al., 2018), (Sultan et al., 2018), and (El Talla et al., 2018). Contribution of computerized information systems in achieving the objectives of the establishment The computerized information system provides a number of contributions or returns to the entity. These contributions are measurable and some other contributions must be measured. Contributions that can be measured are a reduction in the costs incurred by the enterprise. Contributions that must be measured have a positive effect on the market value of the business, reputation, improved profitability and competitive advantage, and can be summarized as follows (Al-Kurdi, 2003): 1. Reduce errors. 2. Increased flexibility. 3. Increased activity speed. 4. Improve planning and management control and the ability to reduce uncertainty. 5. Open new markets and increase sales. 6. Increase organizational flexibility. SecondJob performance: Job performance is the net effect of an individual's efforts beginning with abilities, realizing the role or tasks, this means that performance in a given situation can be seen as a product of the interrelationship between: 1. Effort. 2. Capacity. 3. Recognize the role (s). The effort that results from an individual gaining support (incentives) refers to the physical and mental energy, which is exerted by the individual to perform his task. The individual believes that it is necessary to direct his efforts to work through him, and the activities and behavior that the individual believes are important in the performance of his or her duties, define the perception of role (Mohammed, 2001). ThirdEvaluating the employees' performance: The process of assessing the job performance of employees, although the designations differ, but it is a means to make an objective judgment on the ability of the employee in the performance of duties and responsibilities of the job, and thus verified his behavior and behavior in the performance of work, and the improvement in the manner in which his performance It also extends to verifying the employee's abilities to assume additional duties and responsibilities, to ensure the organization's effectiveness in the present, and its continued survival and effectiveness in the future as well (Al Shobaki & Abu Naser, 2016). The role of computerized management information systems in improving job performance: The importance of management information systems lies in their ability to achieve many of the benefits of the organization such as flexibility and speed, inventory control and production control and market research as well as help improve performance by increasing the speed and accuracy of transactions, and provide customer services in accordance with their needs and desires and help through reports provided by To support the decision-making process and thereby improve the quality, value and productivity of decisions based on information provided and associated with the productivity of the organization (Abu Naser et al., 2017), (Ahmad et al., 2018). The use of these systems is not limited to one area but another, but used in organizations at the level of senior management taking the strategic and competitive dimension, and used at the level of middle management, where they are useful in the implementation processes and described here as a tactical predominantly repetitive nature, and used at the level of minimum management Strengthens the process of monitoring and direct supervision of the progress of repetitive operations (Al-Salem, and Mekawi, 2004). 9. LITERATURE REVIEW  Study of (Msallam et al., 2019) aimed of the study was to identify computerized Management Information Systems and their relationship to improving the job performance of the employees of the Palestinian cellular communications company Jawwal. To achieve the objectives of the study, a questionnaire was designed and developed for the purpose of collecting data and measuring the study variables. SPSS was used. The study reached several results, the most important of which is the existence of a statistically significant role for the requirements of operation and management of computerized Management Information Systems (physical, software, human, organizational) in improving the performance of the employees of the Palestinian Cellular Telecommunications Company Jawwal . There are statistically significant differences between the respondents' Computerized Management Information Systems and their relationship to improving the job performance of the employees of the Palestinian Cellular Telecommunications Company Jawwal, due to the demographic variables (scientific level, years of experience, place of work, job level. The study concluded with a number of recommendations, the most important of which is the need to keep abreast of technological developments in the field of Management Information Systems and to ensure the use of modern equipment and advanced software. To take care of the availability of modern networks and work to solve network problems such as problems of interruptions and slow communication that came within the results of the study. Hold courses for users related to information International Journal of Academic Information Systems Research (IJAISR) ISSN: 2643-9026 Vol. 3 Issue 9, September – 2019, Pages: 7-22 www.ijeais.org/ijaisr 11 technology and operational software and application to increase users' awareness of the capabilities of the hardware and software used and not focus on how to use only.  Study of (Abu Amuna et al., 2017) aimed to identify the role of Knowledge-Based computerized management information systems in the administrative decisionmaking process and that can lead to a reduction or limitation of potential problems, especially those related to unintended bias and ambiguous, these problems controls the collection of information for the primary knowledge base, and given that the knowledge based systems, computer information systems constitute a dynamic, constructed and programmed throughout specialized knowledge based systems programming languages. That is, they learn from the experience and knowledge gained. They can be used to build intelligent business decision making systems. The research found a set of recommendations, including: the need to use knowledge-based computerized information systems in the administrative decision-making process. And the configuration of tires capable of using modern applications of information technology in various administrative levels. As well as benefit from the advantages offered by the knowledge-based with respect to the effort, time and money and to be able to respond to environmental conditions and changes.  Study of (Abdulla et al., 2017) the objective of the research is to identify the reality of integrating the dimensions of computerized health information systems in Dar Al-Shifa Medical Complex. The researchers used the questionnaire method to collect data. The researchers used the random stratified sample method, where 30 samples were distributed to test the internal consistency, structural validity and consistency of the questionnaire. After verifying the validity and reliability of the questionnaire for the test, (220) questionnaires were distributed to the study community. A total of 197 responses were retrieved with a return rate equal to (89.5%). The results showed that there were no statistically significant differences between the averages of the sample of the study on these areas and the domains combined due to the variables of (gender), (qualification), (place of work), (years of service), (Job title). The results showed that there were statistically significant differences between the mean of the sample of the study on these areas due to age for the benefit of those aged 40 years and over. The results confirmed that there are statistically significant differences between the averages of the sample estimates of the study on this field due to the nature of the work in favor of those whose nature is administrative. The results showed that there are statistically significant differences between the average of the sample of the study sample on these two fields due to the years of service in favor of those who have served for 10 years or more. The study reached a number of recommendations including: The need to establish a specialized department of computerized health information systems, with clear responsibilities, and includes technical and administrative specialists and health personnel in the number and efficiency required, working as a team to implement mechanisms of work in computerized health information systems and have direct contact with staff in clinics and divisions to provide services and technical support as soon as possible with the best quality. Increase the support provided by senior management to users by encouraging them to use computerized health information systems and understanding their different needs. Interest in providing the material resources of the equipment and equipment used in the computerized health information system. The need to use database systems in the administrative and medical decisions in clinics and sections that have an impact in raising the effectiveness of decisions by improving the quality.  Study of (Al-Otaibi, 2007) aimed to identify the role of automation in improving the performance of human resources departments using descriptive approach, by applying the social survey approach to workers who directly practice the functions and activities of human resources departments in the central security agencies in Riyadh. In general, it was weak, automation could contribute to the planning and recruitment of human resources and the identification of training needs significantly. The performance of human resources departments significantly, and the study proved that there are obstacles that limit the application of automation.  Study of (Supattra, 2002) aimed to measure the impact of management information systems and information technology on the efficiency of management of the company. The study has reached several results, the most important of which is that the administrative information systems and information technology increase the effectiveness of the organization, the efficiency of its performance and the improvement of its strategic work. The more efficient the organization, the more effective it is, and the better the culture of employees in the organization towards the efficiency and effectiveness of performance.  Study of (Al-Buheisi, 2006) discussed the advantages that can be achieved by business organizations as a result of their use of modern information technology, especially Internet technology and communication networks. The study included an exploratory study of the reality of the use of these modern technologies in the Palestinian reality. Information transfer technology has access to information for internal users and for decisionmaking. The researcher has reached the most important results that most of the Palestinian companies do not use these techniques and that the lack of knowledge of the managers of the importance of the Internet and their International Journal of Academic Information Systems Research (IJAISR) ISSN: 2643-9026 Vol. 3 Issue 9, September – 2019, Pages: 7-22 www.ijeais.org/ijaisr 12 weak ability in English are the most important factors that lead to the failure of Palestinian companies to use these techniques, while the qualifications of those managers and the quality of training courses that They received and the size of the companies is an important factor in determining their use of these technologies.  Study of (Al-Muasher and AL-khasbah, 2006) aimed at demonstrating the impact of regulatory and technical factors on the applications of management information systems in the banking sector. The study found that there was a statistically significant effect of the technical factors and organizational variables in the MIS applications. The study concluded that employees and employees should be involved in the design and development of management information.  Study of (Abu Sabt, 2005) aimed at evaluating the role of these systems in the decision-making in the Palestinian universities in Gaza Strip, the study is based on exploring the existence of differences between the components of management information systems in the universities Management Information Systems the efficiency of individuals working in the system) The study also focused on measuring the role of information quality and the use of management information systems in the decision-making process. The study concluded that there are differences in the components of management information systems for the Islamic University, and that there is a very strong relationship between the organizational level of the Department of Information Systems and the quality and use of information in the decision-making process.  Study of (Chang & King, 2005) developed a model to measure the performance of information systems based on the input and output models of information systems functions used to support the efficiency of functional processes and improve the performance of institutions. The model or management proposed in this research contains three outputs and trends to evaluate, namely, the efficiency of the system, the effectiveness of information, the effectiveness of information, the efficiency of the service, the efficiency of the system in terms of ease of use, rapid response, etc., as well as its impact on the functional performance of employees, and the effectiveness of information represented The quality of information in the design, use and value as well as its impact on the performance of staff and service efficiency in all activities ranging from the development of the system to its use in support and consultation. The effectiveness of the model and its positive impact on the effectiveness of the organizations and the improvement of the efficiency of operations in them. Comment on Previous Studies: The review of previous studies shows the different environments in which they were conducted, the different nature of the activity of the organizations to which they were applied, the variety of variables addressed and the variety of statistical methods used to obtain and analyze data. These studies have revealed the importance of management information systems and their key role in achieving the mission and goals of the Organization if used properly, provide the required support from the management of the organization, and provide the appropriate environment for application. This study agreed with previous studies on the importance of information systems and their significant impact on performance, and on the importance of the technological dimension of information systems. This study is distinct from all previous studies in its focus and analysis of two variables are independent variable of computerized management information systems in all its dimensions on the other hand, and not on one factor alone. 10. THE PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY: FirstStudy Methodology: The researchers used the descriptive analytical approach, which attempts to study the impact of computerized management information systems on the performance of the employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal). An analytical descriptive approach tries to compare, interpret and evaluate in the hope of reaching meaningful generalizations that increase the balance of knowledge on the subject. The researchers used two main sources of information: 1. Secondary sources: Where researchers have dealt with the theoretical framework of the study to the sources of secondary data, which is the books and references of Arabic and foreign related, periodicals, articles, reports, researches and previous studies that dealt with the subject of study, research and reading in various Internet sites. 2. Primary sources: To address the analytical aspects, researchers have resorted to the collection of primary data through the questionnaire as a main tool of the study, designed specifically for this purpose. SecondSociety and Sample of Study: The study population consists of approximately 60 employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal) in the Central Region. The researchers used the method of random sample, where 70 questionnaires were distributed to the study population and 60 questionnaires were obtained, with a recovery rate of 85.7%. ThirdStudy Tool: A questionnaire was prepared on "The Impact of Computerized Management Information Systems on the Functional Performance of the Employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal)". Likert scale was used to measure the respondents' responses to the questionnaire paragraphs according to table (1): Table 1: Likert scale scores Response Strongly Disagree Not Agree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree International Journal of Academic Information Systems Research (IJAISR) ISSN: 2643-9026 Vol. 3 Issue 9, September – 2019, Pages: 7-22 www.ijeais.org/ijaisr 13 Class 1 2 3 4 5 The researchers chose Grade 1 for the "strongly disagree" response, so the relative weight in this case is 20% and is proportional to this response. FourthThe questionnaire is valid The honesty of the questionnaire is intended to measure the questions of the questionnaire what was developed to measure, and the researchers have verified the validity of the questionnaire through the sincerity of the scale. FifthValidity of the scale: 1. Results of internal consistency: Internal consistency refers to the consistency of each paragraph of the questionnaire with the field to which this paragraph belongs. Researchers have calculated the internal consistency of the questionnaire by calculating the correlation coefficients between each paragraph of the questionnaire fields and the overall score of the same field. 2. Structure Validity: Structural validity is a measure of instrument validity, which measures the extent to which the objectives you want to achieve, and shows how each area of study relates to the overall score of the questionnaire. Table (2) shows that all correlation coefficients in all resolution fields are statistically significant at α = 0.05. Thus, all areas of the questionnaire are true to what has been measured. Table 2: Correlation coefficient between the degree of each field and the total questionnaire Scope Pearson Coefficient Of Correlation Probability Value (Sig.) Physical Supplies .900 *0.000 Software supplies. .886 *0.000 Human Supplies. .753 *0.000 Organizational requirements .861 *0.000 Requirements for the management and operation of computerized information system .967 *0.000 Computerized Management Information Systems .749 *0.000 *The correlation is statistically significant at α = 0.05. SixthReliability Stability of the questionnaire is intended to give this questionnaire the same result if the questionnaire was redistributed more than once under the same conditions and conditions, or in other words that the stability of the questionnaire means stability in the results of the questionnaire and not to change significantly if it was redistributed to the sample members several times over time periods Certain. The value of the Alpha-Cronbach coefficient was found to be high (0.930), so the final resolution was usable. Thus, the researchers have confirmed the validity and reliability of the questionnaire of the study, which makes him fully confident in the validity and validity of the questionnaire to analyze the results and answer the questions of the study and test hypotheses. 11. ANALYZING AND DISCUSSING THE RESULTS OF THE STUDY: The results of the study will be presented and discussed as follows: FirstlyCharacteristics of the study sample according to personal information: Table 3: Distribution of the study sample according to personal information Personal Information The Number Relative Weight% Age Less than 30 years 16 26.7 From 30 40 years 28 46.7 From 41 50 years 14 23.3 More than 50 years 2 3.3 Total 60 100.0 Qualification Diploma 20 33.3 Ba 36 60.0 Postgraduate 4 6.7 Total 60 100.0 Field of Work Senior management 20 33.3 Middle management 25 41.7 Minor management 15 25.0 Total 60 100.0 International Journal of Academic Information Systems Research (IJAISR) ISSN: 2643-9026 Vol. 3 Issue 9, September – 2019, Pages: 7-22 www.ijeais.org/ijaisr 14 Years of Service Less than 5 years 14 23.3 5-10 years 33 55.0 More than 10 years 13 21.7 Total 60 100.0 Table (3) shows the following: 26.7% of the sample were under 30 years old, 46.7% were aged 30-40 years, 23.3% were aged 41-50 years, while 3.3% were over 50 years old. 33.3% of the sample hold a diploma, 60.0% hold a bachelor's degree, while 6.7% hold a graduate degree. 33.3% of the study sample had their work in senior management, 41.7% in middle management, and 25.0% in lower management. 23.3% of the sample study years of service have less than 5 years, 55.0% have years of service ranging from 5 to 10 years, while 21.7% have years of service over 10 years. SecondAnalysis of the questionnaire: 1. Analysis of the paragraphs "Requirements for the management and operation of computerized information system"  Analysis of paragraphs of the field of " material supplies" The T test was used to find out whether the average response rate reached neutrality of 3. The results are as follows: Table 4: Arithmetic mean and probability value (Sig.) for each paragraph of the "Material Requirements" field No. Item SMA Relative Arithmetic Mean Test Value Probability Value (Sig.) Ranking 1. There are suitable computers to get the job done. 4.58 91.67 20.76 *0.000 1 2. The system provides enough space for the process of storing information. 4.07 81.33 11.64 *0.000 2 3. The company provides data entry methods suitable for business need. 3.35 67.00 2.39 *0.010 4 4. The speed of the devices is proportional to the workload required in the company. 3.25 65.00 1.65 0.052 6 5. The company's network has a fast connection. 3.35 67.00 2.36 *0.011 4 6. The information network used in the company provides sufficient capabilities to achieve the objectives of the information system. 4.00 80.00 12.68 *0.000 3 All paragraphs 3.77 75.33 9.14 *0.000 *The correlation is statistically significant at α=0.05. Table (4) shows that the arithmetic mean of all paragraphs is 3.77, ie the relative arithmetic mean of all paragraphs of the field is 75.33%, the probability value (.sig) is equal to 0.000. Therefore, the field is statistically significant at the level of significance (α = 0.05), which indicates that the average degree of response to this field has exceeded the degree of neutrality of 3, which means that there is approval by the respondents on this field.  Paragraph analysis of the "software requirements" field The T test was used to find out whether the average response rate reached neutrality of 3. The results are as follows: Table 5: Arithmetic mean and probability value (.sig) for each paragraph of the "Software Requirements" field No. Item SMA Relative Arithmetic Mean Test Value Probability Value (Sig.) Ranking 1. The software used meets the business requirements of the company. 3.98 79.67 11.26 *0.000 2 2. The software is updated to suit the company's business need. 3.97 79.33 10.88 *0.000 3 3. The software used covers all the activities of the company. 3.40 68.00 2.84 *0.003 6 4. Computer programs and applications are easy to use. 3.75 74.92 5.77 *0.000 4 5. I have all the necessary instructions to run the programs I need to perform my work. 3.48 69.67 3.68 *0.000 5 6. There is control over the programs used to ensure the safety of electronic data processing. 4.25 85.00 17.91 *0.000 1 All paragraphs 3.80 76.07 10.60 *0.000 *The correlation is statistically significant at α=0.05. International Journal of Academic Information Systems Research (IJAISR) ISSN: 2643-9026 Vol. 3 Issue 9, September – 2019, Pages: 7-22 www.ijeais.org/ijaisr 15 Table (5) shows that the arithmetic mean of all paragraphs is 3.80, ie the relative arithmetic mean of all paragraphs of the field is 76.07%, the probability value (.sig) is equal to 0.000. Therefore, the field is statistically significant at the level of significance (α ≤0.05), which indicates that the average degree of response to this field has exceeded the degree of neutrality of 3, which means that there is approval by the respondents on this field.  Analysis of paragraphs of the field of "human supplies" The T test was used to find out whether the average response rate reached neutrality of 3. The results are as follows: Table 6: Arithmetic mean and probability value (Sig.) For each paragraph of the "Human input" field No. Item SMA Relative Arithmetic Mean Test Value Probability Value (Sig.) Ranking 1. Contact with the department responsible for the information system directly. 3.77 75.33 7.33 *0.000 2 2. The technical department of the computerized system quickly answers my queries. 3.40 68.00 2.97 *0.002 5 3. The section on the computerized system addresses problems with the workflow. 3.55 71.00 4.34 *0.000 4 4. I have good relations with the staff in the department responsible for the information system. 3.72 74.33 6.90 *0.000 3 5. The computerized system section provides the same level of services at all times. 3.20 64.00 1.47 0.074 6 6. Employees of the computerized system department shall have sufficient qualifications and skills for the work need. 3.92 78.33 10.58 *0.000 1 All paragraphs 3.59 71.83 7.94 *0.000 *The correlation is statistically significant at α=0.05. Table (6) shows that the arithmetic mean of all paragraphs is 3.59, ie the relative arithmetic mean of all paragraphs of the field is 71.83%, the probability value (.Sig) is equal to 0.000. Therefore, the field is statistically significant at the level of significance (α ≤0.05), which indicates that the average response rate for this field is greater than the degree of neutrality of 3, this means that there is approval by the respondents to this area.  Analysis of paragraphs of the field of "regulatory requirements" The T test was used to find out whether the average response rate reached neutrality of 3. The results are as follows: Table 7: Arithmetic mean and probability value (Sig.) for each paragraph of the "Regulatory Requirements" field No. Item SMA Relative Arithmetic Mean Test Value Probability Value (Sig.) Ranking 1. The information available in the system is suited to the job needs. 4.00 80.00 11.24 *0.000 1 2. There is no exaggeration in the confidentiality of information between different administrative levels. 3.42 68.33 2.60 *0.006 3 3. Senior management provides financial support to use the computerized information system 2.90 58.00 -0.62 0.268 6 4. Encourages senior management to use computerized information system. 3.88 77.67 8.74 *0.000 2 5. Top management provides training programs related to the use of computerized information system 3.25 65.00 1.84 *0.035 5 6. Senior management is interested in his views and suggestions on the use of the computerized information system 3.35 67.00 2.70 *0.005 4 All paragraphs 3.47 69.33 5.04 *0.000 *The correlation is statistically significant at α=0.05. From Table (7) it was found that the arithmetic mean of all paragraphs is 3.47, that is, the relative arithmetic mean of all paragraphs of the field is 69.33%, and that the probability value (.Sig) is 0.000. Therefore, field D is statistically significant at the level of significance (α ≤0.05).This indicates that the average degree of response to this field has exceeded the degree of neutrality of 3, which means that there is approval by the respondents on this area. Analyze all the paragraphs of "Requirements for the management and operation of computerized information system The T test was used to find out whether the average response rate reached neutrality of 3. The results are shown in Table (8). International Journal of Academic Information Systems Research (IJAISR) ISSN: 2643-9026 Vol. 3 Issue 9, September – 2019, Pages: 7-22 www.ijeais.org/ijaisr 16 Table 8: Arithmetic mean and probability value (Sig.) for all "Computerized Information System Management and Operation Requirements" clauses The Field SMA Relative Arithmetic Mean Test Value Probability Value (Sig.) Requirements for the management and operation of computerized information system 3.66 73.14 9.44 *0.000 *The correlation is statistically significant at α=0.05. Table (8) shows that the mean of all paragraphs of the "requirements of the management and operation of the computerized information system" is 3.66 (the total score of 5), ie the relative average of 73.14%, and that the probability value (.Sig) is 0.000. At the level of significance(α ≤0.05), which indicates that the average degree of response to this field is fundamentally different from the degree of average approval and this means that there is approval by the respondents on the "requirements for the management and operation of computerized information system" in general. 2. Paragraph analysis of the "Job performance" field The T test was used to find out whether the average response rate reached neutrality of 3. The results are as follows: Table 9: Arithmetic mean and probability value (.sig) for each paragraph of the Job performance field No. Item SMA Relative Arithmetic Mean Test Value Probability Value (Sig.) Ranking 1. Increase the efficiency of the job performance of the employees. 4.20 84.00 17.02 *0.000 3 2. Contribute to increased decision-making capacity. 4.08 81.67 14.95 *0.000 4 3. Contribute to reduce the effort to accomplish the daily work. 3.83 76.67 6.49 *0.000 12 4. Helps employees participate and be interested in new ideas. 4.07 81.33 12.51 *0.000 6 5. Lead to speedy completion of work efficiently. 4.24 84.75 14.57 *0.000 2 6. Lead to increased ability to solve business problems. 4.03 80.69 10.87 *0.000 8 7. Contributes to increased ability and willingness to collaborate with co-workers. 4.02 80.33 13.88 *0.000 9 8. Provide sufficient information on the work. 4.07 81.36 14.06 *0.000 5 9. Contribute to the completion of work in accordance with the required quality standards. 4.37 87.33 12.56 *0.000 1 10. Assists in adhering to business rules and procedures. 4.00 80.00 12.14 *0.000 10 11. Improves overall performance. 3.97 79.33 11.76 *0.000 11 12. Increases competition in performance among colleagues in the same work. 4.07 81.33 13.03 *0.000 6 All paragraphs 4.08 81.56 20.01 *0.000 *The correlation is statistically significant at α=0.05. Table (9) shows that the arithmetic mean of all paragraphs is 4.08, ie the relative arithmetic mean of all paragraphs of the field is equal to 81.56%, the probability value (.Sig) is equal to 0.000. Therefore, field is statistically significant at the level of significance (α ≤0.05), which indicates that the average response rate for this field is greater than the degree of neutrality of 3, this means that there is approval by the respondents to this area. ThirdTest hypotheses of the study: Ho 1: There is a statistically significant effect at the significance level (α ≤0.05) between the requirements of the management and operation of computerized management information systems (physical, software, human and organizational requirements) and the performance of the employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal). Table (10) shows that the correlation coefficient is equal to .556 , the probability value (Sig.) is 0.000 and is less than α = 0.05 this indicates a statistically significant relationship between computerized information system management and operation requirements and job performance at a statistical level (α = 0.05). Table 10: Correlation coefficient between computerized information system management and operation requirements and job performance Hypothesis Pearson Coefficient Of Correlation Probability Value (Sig.) There is a statistically significant relationship at the level of significance (α ≤0.05) between the requirements of management and operation of the .556 *0.000 International Journal of Academic Information Systems Research (IJAISR) ISSN: 2643-9026 Vol. 3 Issue 9, September – 2019, Pages: 7-22 www.ijeais.org/ijaisr 17 computerized information system and job performance. *The correlation is statistically significant at α=0.05. The following sub-hypotheses are derived: 1. There is a statistically significant effect at the level of significance (α ≤0.05) between the material requirements and the performance of the employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal) Table (11) shows that the correlation coefficient is .386, and that the probability value (Sig.) Is 0.000 which is less than α = 0.05. This indicates a statistically significant relationship between material inputs and job performance at a statistical level (α = 0.05). Table 11: Correlation coefficient between material requirements and job performance Hypothesis Pearson Coefficient Of Correlation Probability Value (Sig.) There is a statistically significant relationship at the level of (α ≤0.05) between material inputs and job performance. .386 *0.000 *The correlation is statistically significant at α=0.05. 2. There is a statistically significant effect at the level of significance (α ≤0.05) between the software requirements and the performance of the employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal). Table (12) shows that the correlation coefficient is .383, and the probability value (Sig.) is 0.000 which is less than the indication level α = 0.05 this indicates a statistically significant relationship between software requirements and job performance at a statistical level (α = 0.05). Table 12: Correlation coefficient between software requirements and job performance Hypothesis Pearson Coefficient Of Correlation Probability Value (Sig.) There is a statistically significant relationship at the level of (α ≤0.05) between material inputs and job performance. .383 *0.000 *The correlation is statistically significant at α=0.05. 3. There is a statistically significant effect at the level of significance (α ≤0.05) between the human requirements and the performance of the employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal). Table (13) shows that the correlation coefficient is .576, and the probability value (Sig.) is 0.000 which is less than the indication level α = 0.05 this indicates a statistically significant relationship between human inputs and functional performance at a statistical level (α = 0.05). Table 13: Correlation coefficient between human requirements and job performance Hypothesis Pearson Coefficient Of Correlation Probability Value (Sig.) There is a statistically significant relationship at the level of (α ≤0.05) between human inputs and job performance. .576 *0.000 *The correlation is statistically significant at α=0.05. 4. There is a statistically significant effect at the level of significance (α ≤0.05) between the organizational requirements and the performance of the employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal). Table (14) shows that the correlation coefficient is .546, and the probability value (Sig.) is 0.000 which is less than the indication level α = 0.05 this indicates a statistically significant relationship between organizational inputs and job performance at a statistical level (α = 0.05). Table 14: Correlation coefficient between organizational requirements and job performance Hypothesis Pearson Coefficient Of Correlation Probability Value (Sig.) There is a statistically significant relationship at (α ≤0.05) between organizational inputs and job performance. .546 *0.000 *The correlation is statistically significant at α=0.05. Ho 2: There are statistically significant differences at the level of significance (α ≤0.05) between the average of the respondent's opinions on the impact of computerized management information systems on the performance of the employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal) due to the following variables (age, educational qualification, field of work, Number of years of service). A "mono-variance" test was used to determine whether there were statistically significant differences, this parameter test is suitable for comparing 3 or more averages. 1. There are statistically significant differences at the level of significance (α ≤0.05) between the average respondents' opinions on the impact of computerized management information systems on the performance of the employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal) due to age. International Journal of Academic Information Systems Research (IJAISR) ISSN: 2643-9026 Vol. 3 Issue 9, September – 2019, Pages: 7-22 www.ijeais.org/ijaisr 18 The results shown in Table (15) show that the probability value (Sig.) Corresponding to the test "mono-variance" is greater than the level of significance (α ≤0.05) for all fields and fields combined together, so it can be concluded that there are no significant differences between the mean estimates of the study sample About these areas and areas combined together attributed to age. Table 15: Single Variance Test Results Age The Field Averages Test Value Probability Value (Sig.) Less Than 30 Years 30-40 Years 41-50 Years More Than 50 Years Physical Supplies 3.88 3.77 3.65 3.58 0.329 0.804 Software supplies. 3.98 3.76 3.68 3.92 0.763 0.520 Human Supplies. 3.66 3.58 3.57 3.42 0.134 0.940 Organizational requirements 3.66 3.50 3.29 2.75 1.380 0.258 Requirements for the management and operation of computerized information system 3.79 3.65 3.55 3.42 0.646 0.589 Computerized Management Information Systems 4.16 4.13 3.93 3.71 1.506 0.223 All areas together 3.91 3.81 3.67 3.51 0.972 0.413 2. There are statistically significant differences at the level of (α ≤0.05) among the average respondents' opinions on the impact of computerized management information systems on the performance of the employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal) attributed to the educational qualification. The results shown in Table (16) show that the probability value (Sig.) Corresponding to the test of "single variance" is greater than the significance level (α ≤0.05) for all fields and fields combined together, so it can be concluded that there are no statistically significant differences between the mean estimates of the study sample About these areas and areas combined together attributed to scientific qualification. Table 16: Results of Single Contrast Test Educational Qualification The Field Averages Test Value Probability Value (Sig.) Diploma BA Postgraduate Physical Supplies 3.80 3.75 3.79 0.047 0.954 Software supplies. 3.83 3.79 3.83 0.030 0.970 Human Supplies. 3.51 3.68 3.21 1.547 0.222 Organizational requirements 3.48 3.49 3.25 0.192 0.826 Requirements for the management and operation of computerized information system 3.65 3.67 3.52 0.144 0.866 Computerized Management Information Systems 3.92 4.19 3.81 0.047 0.954 All areas together 3.74 3.85 3.62 0.684 0.509 3. There are statistically significant differences at the level (α ≤0.05) between the average respondents' opinions on the impact of computerized management information systems on the performance of the employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal) due to the field of work. From the results shown in Table (17), it can be concluded that: It was found that the probability value (Sig.) Corresponding to the single variance test "is less than the level of significance (α ≤0.05) for the fields" physical inputs, software inputs, information system management and operation requirements ". The fields are attributed to the field of work and for the benefit of those whose field of management is minimal. For the rest of the fields, the potential value has been shown that the (Sig.) is greater than the significance level of (α ≤0.05) so it can be concluded that there are no statistically significant differences between the mean estimates of the study sample on these fields and the fields combined together due to the field of work. Table 17: Single Variance Test Results Field of Work The Field Averages Test Value Probability Value (Sig.) Senior Management Middle Management Minor Management Physical Supplies 3.48 3.81 4.07 3.919 *0.025 Software supplies. 3.48 3.94 4.00 5.139 *0.009 International Journal of Academic Information Systems Research (IJAISR) ISSN: 2643-9026 Vol. 3 Issue 9, September – 2019, Pages: 7-22 www.ijeais.org/ijaisr 19 Human Supplies. 3.42 3.68 3.68 1.399 0.255 Organizational requirements 3.24 3.53 3.66 1.646 0.202 Requirements for the management and operation of computerized information system 3.41 3.74 3.85 3.756 *0.029 Computerized Management Information Systems 4.09 4.09 4.04 0.066 0.936 All areas together 3.63 3.86 3.91 2.070 0.136 * Difference between averages is statistically significant at α=0.05. 4. There are statistically significant differences at the level (α ≤0.05) between the average respondents' opinions on the impact of computerized management information systems on the performance of the employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal) attributable to years of service. From the results shown in Table (18) it was found that the probability value (Sig.) Corresponding to the test of "monovariance" is greater than the level of significance (α ≤0.05) for all fields and fields combined together, so it can be concluded that there are no statistically significant differences between the mean of the study sample estimates About these areas and areas combined together attributed to years of service. Table 18: Single Contrast Test Results Years of Service The Field Averages Test Value Probability Value (Sig.) Less Than 5 Years 5-10 Years More Than 10 Years Physical Supplies 4.00 3.70 3.69 1.186 0.313 Software supplies. 4.04 3.73 3.73 1.454 0.242 Human Supplies. 3.65 3.60 3.51 0.200 0.819 Organizational requirements 3.64 3.46 3.28 0.848 0.434 Requirements for the management and operation of computerized information system 3.83 3.62 3.55 1.053 0.356 Computerized Management Information Systems 4.18 4.05 4.03 0.605 0.550 All Areas Together 3.95 3.77 3.71 1.132 0.329 12. RESULTS Through statistical analysis, several results are shown: The degree of approval of the material requirements in Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal) reached 75.33%. The degree of approval of the software requirements in Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal) was 76.07%. The degree of approval of human supplies in Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal) reached 71.83%. Approval of the regulatory requirements in Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal) reached 69.33%. The degree of approval of the requirements for the management and operation of the computerized information system in Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal) in general reached 73.14%. The degree of approval of the performance of the employees working in Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal) reached 81.56%. The results showed that there was a statistically significant relationship at the level of significance (α ≤0.05) between the requirements of management and operation of the computerized information system and job performance. The results showed a statistically significant relationship at (α ≤0.05) between physical inputs and functional performance. The results showed a statistically significant relationship at (α ≤0.05) between software requirements and job performance. The results showed that there was a statistically significant relationship at the level of (α ≤0.05) between human inputs and functional performance. The results showed a statistically significant relationship at (α ≤0.05) between organizational inputs and functional performance. The results showed that there were no statistically significant differences at the level of (α ≤0.05) between the average of the respondents' opinions on the impact of computerized management information systems on the performance of the employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal) due to the following variables (age, educational qualification, field of work, number of years of service). International Journal of Academic Information Systems Research (IJAISR) ISSN: 2643-9026 Vol. 3 Issue 9, September – 2019, Pages: 7-22 www.ijeais.org/ijaisr 20 13. RECOMMENDATIONS Through statistical analysis and the results of the study shows several recommendations, the most important of which are: Jawwal should provide data entry methods that are appropriate to the work needs of the employees. The speed of the devices should be commensurate with the workload required by the employees of Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal). The need to increase the speed of the network in Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal) to suit the employees' work. The software used by Palestinian Cellular Communications Company (Jawwal) should cover all its activities. All employees must have the necessary instructions to run the programs they need to do their job. The computerized system department should provide the same level of services at all times. The technical department of the PCS-JAWWAL system should respond quickly to the employees' inquiries. Senior management should provide financial support to use the computerized information system. Senior management should provide training programs related to the use of computerized information system. REFERENCES [1] Abdulla, A., et al. (2017). 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Uwe Steinhoff When May Soldiers Participate in War? • Abstract: I shall argue that in some wars both sides are (as a collective) justified, that is, they can both satisfy valid jus ad bellum requirements. Moreover, in some wars – but not in all – the individual soldiers on the unjustified side (that is, on the side without jus ad bellum) may nevertheless kill soldiers (and also civilians as a side-effect) on the justified side, even if the enemy soldiers always abide by jus in bello constraints. The reason for this is that with regard to some forms of inflicting harm on others one may give special weight to one's own interests and the interests of those to whom one has special responsibilities when assessing the proportionality of those acts. That is, the proportionality calculation may be agent-relative. This is in particular so in the case of foreseeably preventing innocent and non-threatening people from being saved (for instance, by shooting down a tactical bomber who would have saved them by destroying an ammunitions factory) but less so in the case of the intentional or foreseeable direct harming of innocent and nonthreatening people (dropping bombs on people standing near an ammunitions factory). In the light of these considerations, I will then answer the question as to when soldiers may justifiably participate in war (and when not). Key words: agent-relativity; moral equality; necessity justification; proportionality; self-defense; special responsibilities; soldiers; war Introduction On the traditional view in just war theory, there cannot be a (morally) just cause for war on both sides (Grotius 2005, 1130 [II.XXIII.XIII]; Reichberg, Syse and Begby, 316-17 and 322 for Vitoria, 335 for Molina, 348 for Suárez, 374 for von Wolff). Call this the "jus ad bellum inequality doctrine."1 Moreover, on the traditional view combatants participating in a justified war may kill their enemy combatants participating in an unjustified war – but not vice versa (at least not as long as the combatants on the justified side always abide by jus in bello requirements and the unjustified combatants know their war to be unjustified). Call this "the jus in bello inequality doctrine."2 The opposing view, • This is the preprint version of an article forthcoming in International Theory. The article on FirstView is currently available at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=10291565&f ulltextType=RA&fileId=S1752971916000051; and the final version will be available at http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1017/S1752971916000051. © Cambridge University Press, 2016. 1 Just war theory distinguishes between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. The former gives the conditions under which resort to or the continuation of a war is justified, the latter spells out the conditions for justified conduct within war, that is, the moral rules of engagement. 2 The claim that this view is the traditional one might surprise many readers who have become accustomed to associating Michael Walzer's doctrine of the moral equality of combatants with "the orthodox view" and who think that Jeff McMahan's account is 2 in contrast, claims that as long as the combatants on the unjustified side abide by the jus in bello requirements, they may kill the combatants on the justified side (and, of course, vice versa). Call this "the jus in bello equality doctrine."3 I think that all three doctrines are wrong – the reality is more complicated and differentiated. In some wars both sides are (as a collective) justified, that is, they can both satisfy valid jus ad bellum requirements. Moreover, in some wars – but not in all – the individual soldiers on the (as a collective) unjustified side (that is, on the side without jus ad bellum) may nevertheless kill soldiers on the justified side, even if the latter always abide by jus in bello constraints. In the present paper I will focus on the two inequality doctrines, but my conclusions will also contradict the jus in bello equality doctrine.4 However, I will also argue that there can be justified wars in which soldiers participate unjustifiably, even if they abide by jus in bello requirements. While the moral inequality thesis is indeed, as I pointed out, the traditional view, and authors like McMahan do therefore not "revise" the tradition in this respect,5 there is certainly a shift of attention as far as the paradigmatic justification for war and for harming and killing in war is concerned. To wit, the tradition largely relied on the punishment and authorized law enforcement justification,6 while current-day writers, including the "revisionists," largely rely on the self-defense justification. Interestingly, however, both foci – the recent one on self-defense, and the traditional one on punishment or authorized law-enforcement – are prone to lead, and have lead, to the same mistake, namely to the rather premature endorsement of the inequality theses. This is so because both self-defense and law-enforcement are intrinsically asymmetrical justifications: there is no justified self-defense against justified self-defense,7 neither in law nor in morality, nor is there justified law-enforcement against justified law-enforcement. More precisely: if Albert has a self-defense justification for using force against Berta, then Berta cannot have a self-defense justification for using force to counter Albert's defensive force; likewise, if Albert has a law-enforcement justification to use force against Berta, then Berta cannot "revisionary." However, for a defense of this claim, and for an overview of its history and pertinent references, see Steinhoff (2012a, section 2). For further corroboration of this interpretation of the tradition see also Ryan (2011, 13-18) and Reichberg (2013a). 3 Its most prominent proponent is of course Walzer (2000, 34-41). 4 I have argued against the latter at length elsewhere, see Steinhoff (2007, ch. 4). 5 "Revisionists" could perhaps point out that they at least revise Walzer and that one becomes revisionist by revising something. This claim has in fact been made by Seth Lazar, see http://peasoup.typepad.com/peasoup/2015/05/ethics-discussions-at-pea-soupcecile-fabres-war-exit-with-critical-precis-by-helen-frowe.html. Yet, by the same logic, Walzer would also be a revisionist (he revised a lot), and virtually all present-day just war theorists deviate from Walzer in one way or the other. 6 For the importance of punishment and the administration of justice in traditional just war theory, see in particular Reichberg (2013b) Biggar (2013, esp. 160-75, and 190-1). 7 This is an established principle in criminal law, see for example Hallet (1999, 29). The reason for this principle is precisely that there is a "moral asymmetry" between aggressor and defender, so that the former forfeits his right to life if killing him is necessary and proportionate under the circumstances. This view has a long tradition in natural law thinking and the just war tradition. For a clear and early statement (1688), see Pufendorf (1934, 323 [219, III.I.7]). Overlooking this asymmetry is the mistake made by Walzer. For a critique of Walzer (and others who make the same mistake), see for example McMahan (2009, 11-15). 3 have a law-enforcement justification to use force against Albert's law enforcement.8 However, there can, as we will see below, be justified self-defense against force that is justified by a necessity justification,9 and there can be force justified by a necessity justification being used against force that is also justified by a necessity justification. The necessity justification is not intrinsically asymmetrical. To explain both the mistake and the way to avoid it in more detail, I will first, in section 1, consider the main argument that has been offered for the two inequality doctrines and argue that it is unconvincing. The main problem with the argument is that it proceeds by giving certain clear examples of conflicts where only one side may justifiably kill the other, and by then assuming the applicability of these examples to all wars in which there is a justified side. The two main examples are – not surprisingly in the light of what has been said above – paradigmatic self-defense examples (one isolated culpable aggressor vs. one isolated innocent defender) and typical law-enforcement examples (a police officer trying to stop a murderer in a surgical way, that is, without endangering innocent bystanders). However, there are, as we will see, also clear examples – examples involving the unduly marginalized necessity justification on at least one side – where both sides in a conflict may justifiably kill each other; and while some wars indeed correspond to the first group of examples, there are also wars that correspond to the second group of examples. They do so in two ways: there are some wars where both sides, as collectives, are justified; and there are some wars in which one side is justified and the other is not but where nevertheless the soldiers on the unjustified side may justifiably kill those on the justified side. Moreover, one common and mostly unspoken assumption underlying the two inequality doctrines is that an agent contemplating the use of force against an attacker or threat must not give special weight in his proportionality calculations to himself, to those near and dear to him, or to those towards whom he has special obligations. Once this assumption is dropped, the two doctrines in question become untenable. Accordingly, in section 2, I will provide (additional) examples that strongly suggest that the proportionality of the use of force is, indeed, partly dependent on agent-relative considerations. For instance, a person may do things to save one's own child that he or she would not be allowed to do in order to save an unknown child. Applying this idea to wars 8 The "more precisely" is important: the point is, as I said, that both parties in a conflict cannot have a self-defense justification (understood as a particular type of moral or legal justification) to kill the other. Yet, they might nevertheless have another kind of justification for defending themselves against the other. Having a justification to defend oneself without having a self-defense justification might sound paradoxical but it is not. For instance, if I am unjustly hitting B, and B can only stop me by knocking me out, but I suddenly hear the super villain credibly telling me through my earphones that he will destroy Earth if I do not defend myself against B, then I am justified to defend myself against B's justified self-defense. But my justification to defend myself is not a selfdefense justification (which is only triggered by an unjust attack, and which A indeed has), but rather the lesser evil or necessity justification. McMahan himself (2014a, 113 and 118) also draws this distinction, while simultaneously firmly and quite rightly upholding the idea that the self-defense justification itself is asymmetrical. Authors who claim that there can be symmetrical self-defense justifications are in fact lumping different kinds of justifications together, which is a problem endemic among moral philosophers as opposed to legal scholars. 9 See also the simple example offered in the last note. 4 further helps to rebut the moral inequality doctrines. In section 3, I will try to give an (admittedly general, but nevertheless practically meaningful and applicable) answer to the question of which wars soldiers may justifiably participate in. I will also address there the issue of the soldier's personal responsibility. Not only the rejection of the equality thesis, but also the focus on the individual's responsibility is most certainly not an innovation of "revisionary" just war theory but a stock in trade of the tradition. Traditional just war theorists from Augustine to Elizabeth Anscombe have argued that it is impermissible for a soldier to take part in a war if he knows the war to be "unjust," that is, unjustified. Anscombe flatly states: "Nor, if we know that a war is wrong, may we take part in it without sin, however grievous it may seem to stand apart from our fellow countrymen." (Anscombe 1981, 73) Walzer, who himself subscribes to the moral equality thesis, confirms this view of the tradition: "Catholic writers have long argued that [men] ought not to volunteer, ought not to serve at all, if they know the war to be unjust." (Walzer 2000, 39) As already indicated, I will argue that this view is wrong. However, this does not amount to an endorsement of the moral equality thesis. Instead, I will argue that whether or not an individual may justifiably participate in a war is not already decided by the war's justifiability or unjustifiability; rather, the concrete circumstances of the individual have to be taken into account too. Thus, a conscientious soldier might not only be one who deliberately serves in a justified war or deliberately refuses to serve in an unjustified war, but also one who deliberately refuses to serve in a justified war or who deliberately does serve in an unjustified one. However, it is the soldier himself who has to come to an understanding of whether the objective circumstances that would make his participation in the war justified obtain or not. Without such an understanding, the soldier's participation would still be unjustified. Thus, morally, there is neither an a priori reason to condemn soldiers for their participation in unjustified wars, nor a reason to let soldiers simply "off the hook." 1. The Dubious Argument for the Two Inequality Doctrines The clearly most popular and most widely discussed argument for inequality in war proceeds on the assumption that killing in war must be justified as a form of law enforcement or as a form of selfor other-defensive killing, emphasizing the asymmetry between law enforcer and criminal or between culpable aggressor and innocent defender, respectively, and from there drawing conclusions for the ethics of war.10 Hugo Grotius, for example, states that "no Man [has] a Right to oppose Force to a just Attack, no more than a Criminal can plea a Right of defending himself against the publick Officers of Justice, who would apprehend him, by Order of the Magistrate" (2015, 417 [II.1.XVIII.1]). And Jeff McMahan states (more than 400 years later): "If a murderer is in the process of killing a number of innocent people and the only way to stop him is to kill him, the police officer who takes aim to shoot him does not thereby make herself morally liable to defensive 10 Another, more recent argument basically deducts the two inequality doctrines from an alleged more general principle or claim, namely that it is always (or at least in situations where a conflict is not valuable in itself) impermissible to use lethal force against a permissible or justified act. Such arguments have been advanced by Shalom (2011) and Tadros (2011, 202-216). Since the principle or claim in question is refuted by the many counter-examples provided below anyway and I have dealt with it at length elsewhere, I will not further consider it here. See instead Uwe Steinhoff, "Shalom on the Impermissibility of Self-Defense against the Tactical Bomber," unpublished ms., available at http://philpapers.org/rec/STESOT-9, and Steinhoff (2014a). 5 action, and if the murderer kills her in self-defense, he adds one more murder to the list of his offenses." (McMahan 2009, 14) The underlying assumption here is that if the murderer in the domestic context may not defend himself against a justified law-enforcer or defender, soldiers in the international context are not allowed to defend themselves against soldiers justifiably defending their nation or enforcing natural law either. The problem, however, with Grotius's and McMahan's examples are that they abstract from certain realities of many wars. To wit, there are at least two important disanalogies between the examples and many wars. First, domestic police officers can, at least in some states, be regarded as having been in some sense authorized (through democratic and constitutional procedures, for example) by the majority of the population of the very state on whose territory they are operating, while, in contrast, the soldiers justifiably invading another state in order to stop the majority from killing a certain minority group there often cannot be regarded as having been authorized by the majority of the population of the invaded state on whose territory they are now operating. Second (and more importantly for the line of reasoning in this paper), in many wars justified soldiers kill not only culpable aggressors and criminals but also innocent people ("collaterally"). If one reintroduces these realities (that is, lack of authorization by the majority of the population of the very state on whose territory the agent is operating and presence of "collateral damage") into one's examples, the picture changes. Consider, for instance, this example: Bob and Juanita: Vigilante Bob plans to kill the drug cartel's hitman Carlos on Thursday because he knows that otherwise Carlos will kill 15 innocent witnesses on Friday. Juanita knows that. As it so happens, Juanita, her two young daughters, Carlos, and Bob all run into each other. Unfortunately, Bob could only procure a shotgun, and he is about to use it to kill Carlos (this is his only opportunity). However, if he shoots, Bob will, due to the dispersion of the pellets, also kill Juanita and her two daughters. Juanita shoots Bob in defense of herself and her daughters. Was Juanita morally justified in killing Bob? Intuitively it seems so. She would also have been justified under the law of practically all Western jurisdictions (as far as I can see), and this would even be the case if she had not been with her daughters. The selfdefense justification gives defenders a prerogative to defend themselves against an aggressor even if, from an impartial, consequentialist point of view, the evils produced by the self-defensive act outweigh the goods.11 11 Moore (2010, 39) talks in this context (self-defense) of "strong, agent-relative permissions" that "permit one to do some action A even if A does not maximize good consequences." See also Steinhoff (2008, 224-5; and 2016a, esp. section VII). An anonymous reviewer suggested that Juanita might be justified in shooting not because she can give extra weight to her own interests and the interests of her daughters, but because she can give less weight to those foreseen consequences of her actions which come about via the voluntary decisions and actions of another agent. In other words, consequences caused by intervening action do not count or could at least be discounted. However, this is still agent-relative: an impartial agent would not be permitted to help Juanita instead of Bob. Moreover, intervening action has nothing to do with the lenient proportionality requirements of self-defense. To wit, Juanita would also be legally and morally justified in killing Bob in self-defense if Bob were a surgeon about to save 20 other people in the evening who could not be saved without him. Here no voluntary decisions and actions of another agent come into play. The 20 people do not die because somebody else kills them (there is no hitman, as in the original example), but they die because there is no 6 One might object here that Bob was not justified in attacking Carlos in the first place and claim that therefore the example cannot show that there is justified self-defense against justified attackers. Yet, as far as proportionality considerations are concerned, Bob's act does seem to be justified. Another way of denying that Bob's act was justified is to claim that his attack was preventive (while Juanita reacts to an imminent or ongoing attack, and thus in self-defense). However, while its preventive nature rules out that Bob's act can be justified by a self-defense justification – which only applies to force used against ongoing or imminent attacks (see for example Ferzan 2004)12 – it can still be justified by a necessity justification. (Incidentally, even if one allowed for "preventive self-defense," the self-defense justification applies only to inflicting harm on an aggressor, not to inflicting harm on an innocent bystander like Juanita [see Sangero 2006, 117-21; Tadros 2011, 179-181]; therefore Bob's act cannot be justified by the self-defense justification anyway. If it is to be justified at all, a necessity justification must come in.) After all, it is extremely implausible to claim that all use of preventive force is impermissible, as, for instance, real examples of battered women and a swathe of hypothetical examples demonstrate. An absolute prohibition of preventive force amounts in certain situations to condemning innocent people to death – as it does in the example of Bob. It is difficult to see how this could be justified.13 Moreover, most killings in war are of course also preventive: soldiers do not, nor are they morally required to, restrict their use of force to situations where they are facing an ongoing or imminent attack. Rather, they engage in "seek and destroy" tactics and prefer to surprise the enemy. They are preventively pro-active, not merely defensively reactive. If such preventive killing were unjustified, it would be difficult to see how wars could ever be justified (see Norman 1995, 134-5; Cochran 1996). Intuitively, however, preventive killing, both in and outside of war, is sometimes justified. Incidentally, it does not do to claim that in war soldiers are already faced with an imminent or ongoing attack, namely by the attack of the other state. First, this is not true if the war waged is itself preventive; and second, that the other state has already attacked does not mean that the individual soldiers have attacked – yet, it is killing them that needs to be justified. Moreover, if one declares (for no good reason, it seems) the individual soldiers imminent or ongoing attackers only because they belong to an organization (the state) that has already attacked, then the same is true of Carlos, since his organization, the cartel, has also already attacked. To avoid confusions and unwarranted suspicions, it might also be worth emphasizing again that while it is indeed an established principle in criminal law that there cannot be justified self-defense against justified self-defense,14 law in many jurisdictions does allow self-defense against other kinds of justified acts (Robinson 1975-1976, 278), for example against acts that are justified by a necessity justification.15 And as far as morality is concerned, McMahan himself once explicitly stated that "people are permitted a necessary and proportionate defense of their rights against both violation and infringement," and intervening action at all (no intervener to kill them, and no intervener to save them). What she does is, as in the original example, to prevent them from being saved, and I distinguish this from directly killing them ("collateral damage"). See also the main text below. 12 See also Uwe Steinhoff, "Self-Defense and Imminence," unpublished ms., available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2653669. 13 See on this and for further references, Steinhoff, "Self-Defense and Imminence" (see last note). 14 See n. 7 above. 15 See also below for further discussion. 7 with "infringement" McMahan means a justified transgression against a right (McMahan 2005, 400).16 If, however, one wanted to object that Bob's act is not justified precisely because he had no legal authority, then let us modify the example: Bob and Juanita in Mexico: FBI agent Bob goes to Mexico to kill the drug cartel's hitman Carlos on Thursday because he knows that otherwise Carlos will kill 15 innocent witnesses on Friday. Mexico and the USA had entered into a contract that gives their law enforcement officers a legal liberty-right (in analogy to the legal liberty-right to kill enemy soldiers that international law grants soldiers in an international conflict) to attack armed Cartel hitmen if such attacks are necessary and proportionate under the circumstances. Juanita, a Mexican, knows that. As it so happens, Juanita, her two young daughters, Carlos, and Bob all run into each other. Unfortunately, Bob could only procure a shotgun, and he is about to use it to kill Carlos (this is his only opportunity). However, if he shoots, Bob will, due to the dispersion of the pellets, also kill Juanita and her two daughters. Juanita shoots Bob in defense of herself and her daughters. It does not seem that the existence of the contract and thus of Bob's legal authorization undermines Juanita's moral justification of defending herself and her children. 2. Proportionality and Special Responsibilities or Prerogatives If Juanita's defense against Bob is justified, a reasonable explanation seems to be that there is a special prerogative about killing in self-defense,17 so that normal proportionality considerations do not apply and Juanita can give special weight to the survival of herself and her children.18 This permission to give special weight to one's own interests also applies, as we will see, to the necessity justification. That people may give greater weight to their own interests and must give greater weight to the interests of their close relatives and friends than to the interests of strangers in deciding what to do is a common sense assumption. If people were not allowed to give greater weight to their own interests, they would become slaves to the common good; and if they did not have to give more weight to the interests of friends or their own children, friendship would cease to exist and the parent-child relation would be diminished to a purely biological one. Note that this position is entirely compatible with the well-known tenet that all persons have "equal moral worth."19 Parents who deem themselves justified in caring more for their children than for the children of others need not think that their children are intrinsically or from an impartial point of view more valuable than the children of other parents. They can (and mostly will) simply think that they have an agent-relative prerogative – and probably even obligation – to care more for their children than for those of others. To wit, even someone who as emphatically endorses the equal moral worth of all persons as the "social justice cosmopolitan" Thomas Pogge concedes that human 16 Meanwhile, of course, McMahan (2014a) has changed his mind and thinks that the civilians are not allowed to fight back. Few just war theorists are willing to follow him here, though. For further discussion of this issue, see Steinhoff (2012a, section 4.3; 2014a; and 2016b). 17 See n. 11. 18 Alexander (1999, 1495) contemplates this possibility under the heading "personal justification." 19 For both explorations and doubts about this tenet, see Steinhoff (2014c). 8 beings "need to have the option, at least, to have special relationships with friends and family that cause their conduct to be at variance with the cosmopolitan requirement of impartiality" (Pogge 2012, 328). McMahan himself even expands this idea to the relation between a government and its citizens, stating that a "government ought to give greater weight to economic benefits to its own citizens than it should give to equivalent benefits to foreigners" (and it stands to reason that then the government should also give greater weight to the lives of its own citizens) (McMahan 2014b, 437). Likewise, Cécile Fabre (who embraces the moral inequality thesis) endorses a "principle of fundamental equality whereby individuals have equal moral worth" (Fabre 2012, 20); yet she also permits "patriotic partiality" (2012, section 1.3.2) and admits that "individuals are permitted to confer greater weight on their own goals, projects, and attachments" (2012, 21).20 Thus, this latter principle or permission is intuitive and widely accepted, and it stands unrefuted.21 Accordingly, a defender is not obliged to sacrifice herself or others for the lives of any larger number of people. In self-defense or the defense of others, proportionality simply is not a utilitarian or consequentialist calculus. Even if one accepted that there might be some number high enough to make self-sacrifice obligatory – maybe in a case where one is attacked by a culpable attacker whom one knows is developing a cure for a disease that otherwise would cost thousands or even millions of lives – there is still much room below this threshold, room enough to allow a defender like Juanita to kill a justified attacker like Bob even if she knows that due to her defense someone else will later kill a larger number of people than she has saved now. In a certain sense, one might say, her selfand other-defense was "disproportionate" – by saving only three innocents she contributed to the death of 15 innocents at the hands of someone else in the near future (and killed one justified attacker now). However, as far as the moral and legal selfand other-defense justification is concerned, it was not disproportionate in the relevant sense.22 (For that to be the case, the harm inflicted on Bob would have to have been disproportionate. Of course, Juanita might herself "collaterally" and directly harm innocent bystanders – maybe she also only has a shotgun. Such harm might be covered by a necessity justification, but it could not be covered by the selfdefense justification, which only deals with the harm inflicted on an attacker. However, in the example Juanita simply does not, herself, directly harm any bystanders.) Of course, the claim that an agent may prevent someone from saving a certain number of innocent people in order to save a smaller number of innocent people – maybe simply herself, or those towards whom she has special responsibilities – might be flat-out rejected. That is, one might simply reject the idea that in contemplating the permissibility of interference with justified agents one may give special weight to one's own interests or the interests of those with whom one has special ties. Yet, such a flat-out rejection appears to be rather implausible. Consider the following three further examples: 20 For a criticism of Fabre's view, see Steinhoff (2013). Fabre (2014, 405, n. 12) has called my criticism of her quite contradictory "egalitarianism" "entirely misconceived." It would appear, however, that it is rather her completely uncritical reliance on Stephen Darwall's notion of "recognition respect" that is entirely misconceived. For reasons why, see Steinhoff (2014d, 156-158). 21 Of course, people could flatly deny that principle, but it seems the burden of proof would then be on them. 22 McMahan (2009, 41-2, and note 3) now concedes this point, which I had already made in Steinhoff (2008, 224-5). 9 Boat: Carl hates children and has thrown the children of Anna and the children of Betty into different parts of the lake to see them drown. Anna can only save her three children by stealing Bill's boat from his property at 2:50 PM and rushing out to the lake; and Betty can save her eleven children only by stealing Bill's boat from his property at 3:00 PM. Thus, if Anna steals the boat at 2:50 in order to save her children, she would thereby prevent Betty from saving her greater number of children. Lions: Carl hates children and lets a pride of lions loose on Betty's children. Betty has only her grenade-launcher to kill the rapidly approaching pride of lions that would kill all her eleven children. The grenade would, however, kill Anna's three children, who are in a security cage (safe from the lions) near the point where the grenade will hit the ground. Anna could only keep Betty from killing Anna's children by shooting her dead. Clan: As in Lions, with some differences: Betty asked to use the stun gun of Anna's family clan, but the clan, through its leaders, denied the request, and there is nothing Anna can do about it. When the clan realizes that Betty has a grenade-launcher, is about to use it, and would thereby kill Anna's children, they open fire at Betty. They are all terrible shots, apart from Anna. Anna could only keep Betty from killing Anna's children by shooting her dead. It seems to me quite clear that intuitively Anna is justified in Boat to give precedence to the lives of her own children and go ahead and steal the boat,23 although she would thereby not advance the greater good (considered from an impartial perspective) and, moreover, would advance someone's unjust cause or aim, namely Carlos's aim to see Betty's children drown (and given that B has more children, he prefers, if he cannot have both, to see Betty's children drown rather than Anna's children). Moreover, it also seems that intuitively Anna is justified to kill Betty in Lions and Clan. This view can be corroborated by a look at law. This is also important since, of course, part of the force that some might attribute to Grotius's (and McMahan's) example is that it is clear that the criminals in that example would not have a legal defense (that is, a legal justification) for killing the agent of the magistrate or the police officer. Thus, the example need not merely rely on moral intuitions, but can also enlist the authority of the law. What does law saw in the three cases just described? The first example, Boat, would be covered by a necessity justification (also called, depending on jurisdiction, "choice of evils justification" or "justifying emergency justification"). The reason is that Anna is infringing Bill's property rights as well as laws against theft or unauthorized use of other people's property. Section 3.02 of the American Model Penal Code – which is not law, but has influenced actual jurisdictions (see Hoffheimer 2007-2008) – provides a so-called "Choice of Evils" justification for such cases: (1) Conduct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided that: (a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged; and (b) neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved; and (c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not 23 This is also the case in German law. I thank Prof. Volker Erb for an email-discussion of this topic. 10 otherwise plainly appear.24 Now, the harm or evil Anna seeks to avoid is the death of her three children, and the harm sought to be prevented by the law she breaks is the harm that befalls Bill if someone takes away his boat. It is the case, however, that the first harm by far outweighs the second harm, and thus Anna clearly has a Choice of Evils justification. Thus, a crucial feature of this justification is that not all resulting harms or consequences enter the proportionality considerations, but only the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the infringed law and the harm or evil that the infringement of the law sought to prevent.25 But, one might wonder, is there not a law that prohibits doing something (like stealing a boat) if the moral benefits (like the survival of three) of doing it are significantly less than the moral costs (like the deaths of eleven children) of doing it? And would not breaking that law then be what needed to be justified, and not merely the theft of Bill's boat? The answer is that there simply is no such law. If there were, a defender would be legally obliged to desist from defending herself against someone whom she knows would, but for her defensive action, do a good that would be greater than the harm he would inflict on her if she did not defend herself. Yet, again, there is no such legal obligation. Section 35.05 of the New York Penal Law also only compares the "desirability and urgency of avoiding such injury [the one the agent seeks to avoid]" with the "desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by the statute defining the offense in issue," hence leading to the same result in Boat as does the Model Penal Code. Several other American jurisdictions have followed the Model Penal Code and the New York example in this respect (Hoffheimer 2007-2008, esp. 234-240). As regards common law, one sometimes hears that "the evil inflicted must not be disproportionate to the evil avoided" (Card 2010, 758), but the term "infliction" is narrower than "but-for-causing" (that is, than "causing" something in the sense that it would not have happened but for one's own act) – one inflicts death by shooting someone dead, but not by merely not helping him, nor by shooting his surgeon (without whom he will die) in self-defense, let alone by taking something somebody else might otherwise have taken to save him (unless, perhaps, one does these things because one wants him to die). As regards German law, it does not allow (according to majority opinion) weighing lives against lives anyway; so from the German legal perspective, strange as it may sound, eleven children drowning is no greater evil than 3 children drowning, which leads to Anna's clearly being justified in Boat under the German justifying emergency statute (Erb 2003, 1387-1390). What about Lions and Clan? Betty, to act justifiably, needs a necessity or choice of evils justification here – after all, she is about to throw a grenade in the direction of 3 children, risking (or even foreseeing) their death. (If you think collaterally killing three children to save eleven is disproportionate and therefore unjustified, you can modify the example accordingly.) She thereby is about to infringe laws against negligent homicide or manslaughter or even murder. Anna, on the other hand, depending on jurisdiction, might 24 American Law Institute (1962, 42). There is a further condition referring to the special case where the dangerous situation was created or provoked by the agent himself. This proviso is not relevant for the present discussion. 25 This also clearly shows that such a necessity justification is not utilitarian or consequentialist. Rather, it is a threshold deontological justification. See on this concept Alexander and Moore (2015). Such a justification takes rights seriously (without absolutizing them). To wit, the necessity justifications in, for example, Germany, the United States, or Israel work against the backdrop of jurisdictions that come with "bills of rights." 11 well have both a necessity and an other-defense justification to use force against Betty. (I will ignore here the fact that some jurisdictions and the Model Penal Code, clearly for purely pragmatic as opposed to principled reasons, allow a choice of evils justification only for acts that are not already covered by other justifications.) She clearly could avail herself of the choice of evils justification of the Model Penal Code and the jurisdictions that follow it: the evil she seeks to avoid – the death of her three children at the hands of an attacker – is greater than the evil that a law against killing Betty seeks to avoid (namely Betty's death). In addition, she also can have a self-defense justification if the jurisdiction in question does not demand that justifiable self-defense be directed against unlawful attacks but only at what the defender reasonably believes to be an unlawful attack. Many American jurisdictions do exactly that. Furthermore, one must consider not only written law and its statutes, but also its interpretation in case law. As George C. Christie (1999, 1039) notes: "If any of the parties would be free from tort liability, it would be the [innocent potential victim of an attack justified by a necessity or choice of evils justification]. I cannot conceive of any American court holding an innocent person liable in tort for shooting another person to prevent that other person from killing him." But, in the same vein, is it really (realistically) conceivable that an American criminal court would deny the justification of other-defense to Anna, who tries to defend her innocent children against an attacker? I doubt it. Anna, moreover, also has the common law defense of selfand other-defense. Again, while there cannot be justified self-defense against justified self-defense,26 there is no evidence that common law prohibits self-defense against certain other kinds of justified acts (Robinson 1975-1976, 278).27 Thus, we see that both the moral and the legal situation as far as relevant domestic cases are concerned is more complex and complicated than Grotius's and McMahan's simple example, and the simplistic conclusion drawn from it, suggest. To avoid misunderstandings, however, let me clarify that I am certainly not arguing here that Anna may directly kill – whether intentionally or as a side-effect – Betty's children. For example, if Betty has a head start and would take the boat before Anna, and the only way Anna could prevent this from happening is by shooting all of Betty's children in the lake (thereby removing Betty's motive for taking the boat), Anna would most certainly not be allowed to do this. Thus, I merely argue that Anna may prevent, as a side-effect of her attempt to save her children, greater numbers of innocent people from being saved by Betty. Thus, one may probably not in all circumstances give special weight to the interests of oneself and those near and dear to one, and not in all circumstances where one may do so may one do so to the same degree. There is (all else being equal: there are exceptions) a difference between intentional killing and letting die and also between intentional killing and foreseeably preventing someone from being saved. The constraints on killing are much stronger, including the proportionality constraints. Again, some people, in particular defenders of the inequality doctrines, might think that the proportionality constraints on foreseeably preventing someone from being saved are stronger than I make them out to be: they might simply not share my intuitions in Boat, 26 See note 7 above. 27 As regards German law, it does not allow a necessity justification for homicide in the first place. However, if it were allowed, German law would seem to be compelled to allow defense against such a form of justified homicide, since it firmly holds that innocent people do not have a duty to sacrifice their lives or bodily integrity for the benefit of strangers. 12 Lions, and Clan. But many will. And while Grotius's and McMahan's examples, especially due to their abstraction from "collateral damage," are not applicable to all wars which have a justified side – which, however, they would have to be in order to constitute positive arguments for the inequality doctrines – the Bob and Juanita example is applicable to at least some wars, which is, if Juanita is permitted in killing Bob, sufficient to refute the moral inequality doctrines (remember that I am not defending the moral equality doctrine: I reject both generalizations). Bob and Juanita is, for instance, analogous to the following example of a war: Resisted Intervention: In state X, there are four different ethnic groups, the A, the B, the C, and the D. The national army is practically exclusively made up of members of A (the B and the C do not want to join ranks with the A, whom they deem racially inferior). The B hate the C, have their own very strong militia, and suddenly start a genocide against the C. The A refuse to intervene, since they do not want to risk their lives for the C (or perhaps even because they are not militarily strong enough – the B's militia might be stronger than the A's army). Y, another state, intervenes to save the C. Y could send its troops via two different routes to the location where the genocide takes place. On both routes it would face fierce resistance by B, but on the first route 50,000 civilian As would die as collateral damage and on the second route 60,000 civilian Ds. Y tries to take the first route. The As resist Y's army in order to save their own civilians. In the face of the combined resistance by the A and the B, Y decides to take the second route instead. It seems that this war of the A against Y can be justified from an ad bellum perspective. This is so particularly since the A will hardly inflict any harms on the innocents of Y. After all, the conflict is taking place on A's territory (that is, in X). Nevertheless, one might object that the duties and prerogatives of citizenship cannot be as weighty as one's duties towards once family members and friends. One might muse, for instance, that if a British person can either save 50,000 British people or 60,000 Germans, he should rather save the Germans. In reply, I doubt that this is the case if among the 50,000 British are members of his own family. Moreover, if 500 British people who all have family members among the 50,000 are to cooperate to either save the British or the Germans, I find it hard to accept that they are under a duty to save the Germans. The British rescuers will now have 1,000 or even 2,000 or more of their friends and relatives among the British who are in need of rescue, and this, it seems, should be quite able to tip the scales (just remember the Anna and Betty examples from above). In other words, the objection overlooks that Y's war will threaten all the A in the theater of war, and thereby the family and friends of a large number of soldiers (who might be friends with other soldiers willing and perhaps feeling obliged to help them in their defense of their families). In other words, if 500 soldiers can either save a group of 60,000 containing none of their friends or relatives or a group of 50,000 containing 2000 of their children or spouses, then they are justified in saving the latter group, just as a mother is justified in saving her own child instead of saving ten others. A final objection might be that the doing/allowing distinction has some weight, and by attacking the soldiers of Y, the A are not only letting them die but they are actively killing them. Yet, one should note that the soldiers of Y are not non-threatening people, but attackers, they are about to kill many innocent A collaterally. This should severely reduce the restraints against killing them.28 After all, Anna in Lions seems to be clearly allowed to 28 I have argued elsewhere (Steinhoff 2012a and 2016b) that justified soldiers who engage in "collateral killing" forfeit their right not to be attacked. 13 kill Betty. Thus, the claim that the war of the A against Y can be justified from an ad bellum perspective is indeed plausible. However, we get to a war that would not be justified from an ad bellum perspective if we modify the example in such a way (call it Resisted Intervention Revised) that parts of ethnic group A itself started the genocide against the C. It would not be justified from an ad bellum perspective since A, as a collective, could simply stop the genocide – then Y would not attack and endanger A's civilians. However, those individual soldiers of Y who do not take part in the genocide themselves (and could not stop it) but instead fight to divert Y onto the second route can still be justified in participating in the war and in attacking Y's soldiers. They are analogous to Anna in Clan. The Clan, as a collective, was under an obligation not to fight Betty but to give her the stun gun instead; but Anna, in an attempt to save her children, is nevertheless justified in her individual participation in the unjustified collective use of force against Betty. 3. In Which Wars May Soldiers Participate The above analysis and further considerations to be provided suggest that the answer to the question as to when soldiers may justifiably participate and kill in war is more complex than assumed by either the in bello inequality doctrine or the in bello equality doctrine. As already noted in the introduction, traditional just war theorists from Augustine to Elizabeth Anscombe have argued that it is impermissible to take part in a war one knows to be "unjust," that is, unjustified. It is clear, however, that this traditional view must be wrong. Consider, for example, John, who is drafted to serve in an unjust war of aggression (which, however, will without doubt be victorious). He knows that his participation in the war will make only a minuscule contribution to the war effort (in fact, he will see to that), but he also knows that his non-participation would have some terrible consequences: his country's dictator swore (and he is known to keep his oaths) that for every drafted citizen who refuses to participate he will kill 100 innocent civilians on the other side. It seems that here John would actually save lives by his participation in an unjust war of aggression. It is therefore difficult to see how his participation could not be justified. He not only has a necessity justification, but he actually seems to have a full-blown lesser evil justification to participate in the unjustified war. Moreover, if Bob could only save large numbers of civilians from his dictator if he actually killed some enemy combatants (thereby demonstrating that he "seriously participates," as the dictator demands), he still seems to have a lesser evil justification to do so.29 Of course, one might object that the situation described here is highly unlikely to occur. However, that does not change the theoretical point that in principle a soldier can have a lesser evil justification for his participation in an unjustified war. Nor does it undermine the fact that the argument is even strengthened by envisioning a situation where the dictator threatens to kill family and friends of a soldier who does not participate.30 Now the soldier might still have the lesser evil justification, but in addition he has also an agent-relative necessity justification for participating in the war. Consider another example. Evil A tries to murder innocent B. There is C, who cannot 29 Incidentally, it is easy to come up with hypotheticals where the stakes are even higher. 30 This seems to have happened in Iraq, see Voice of America, "Report from Iraq: More Iraqi Troops Would Surrender if They Could, says Iraqi Defector – 2003 – 03 – 31," available at http://m.voanews.com/a/a-13-a-2003-03-31-32-report-66845687/375516.html, accessed on 1 Sept. 2015. My guess is that this is not an isolated historical occurrence. 14 stop A alone but can instigate D, E, and F, who are known for their brutality, to stop A. C knows that if she does so instigate D, E, and F, A will become the victim of an impermissible collective act, namely of excessively brutal selfor other-defense. Nevertheless, if the damage done to A is still sufficiently less bad than B's death would have been, and C has no other means to interfere, then C is clearly allowed to support D's, E's, and F's attack against A. She is also allowed to join them in their attack against A if this heightens the chances of the defensive collective (comprising D, E, F, and now also C) of succeeding in their rescue of B, and does so without making the collective action even more excessive.31 (You can imagine, if you wish, a group of martial artists known for their excessive force in bar brawls willing to join C in her attempt to stop a muscular racist from beating his victim to death.)32 According to the same logic, and all else being equal, soldiers can be justified in joining a humanitarian intervention even if they know that the intervention will be unjustified since the force used will be somewhat excessive. At least as long as by joining the unjustified collective intervention the soldier helps, on the collective level, to avert a decisively greater evil than he helps to produce, and also personally averts decisively more evil than he personally produces, the soldier is justified in his participation. In short, individual participation in unjustified collective acts is not always unjustified, and this is also true for participation in unjustified wars. The previous examples and the analysis above thus suggest the following more general and pleasantly commonsensical assertions: One may participate in an unjustified war if the moral costs of one's participation are outweighed by the moral gains. (By "moral costs" I simply mean "whatever goes into the proportionality considerations on the negative side," and by "moral gains" I simply mean "whatever goes into the proportionality considerations on the positive side.") Moreover, this is the case not only when the weighing uses an impartial scale, but also when it is done with a scale that is in a morally proper way adjusted to valid agent-relative considerations. If, however, the moral costs are not outweighed by the moral gains on either of the two scales (that is: if participation is disproportionate both from an impartial and an agent-relative view), participation in an unjustified war appears to be impermissible. This is a very general, but nevertheless meaningful principle with practical implications. For instance, while the British war waged against Germany from 1939 to 1945 was unjustified due to an often disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force (terror bombing),33 a British soldier could nevertheless justifiably participate in this 31 Sometimes, by the way, such participation can be justified even if it does make the collective action more excessive. 32 I take this example from Steinhoff (2012b, 40). 33 This was also the verdict of Anscombe (1981, 72-81, originally published as a pamphlet in 1939), a British scholar. A number of people pointed out to me that the British war against Germany might not be a good example since many people consider this war to be justified. Let me point out, in turn, that the justice of wars is not decided by opinion polls (not even among philosophers) but by the valid criteria of just war theory. I do not deny that the British had a just cause nor that a war against Germany would have been justified, I simply deny that the war the British actually waged was justified. And while Anscombe has given a detailed argument for her assessment (which I share), I have yet to come across a detailed argument that would bother to address Anscombe's line of reasoning, let alone one that would show it to be wrong. Therefore, I take the liberty of sticking with this example, however politically incorrect that might be. Incidentally, that there was no terror bombing in the first stages of the war might mean that those first stages were justified. 15 unjustified war (see also Steinhoff 2012b, 40). On the other hand, German soldiers could not justifiably participate in the German invasion of Poland. Yet, in my view they could, towards the end of the war, participate in the attempt to stave Soviet troops off as long as possible, given the behavior (widespread rape, see Beevor 2003) of these troops and the imperialist intentions of the Soviet Union. To be sure, how exactly such proportionality considerations will have to proceed is a contentious issue, and even people who do agree on which considerations apply in theory (for example, is the relevant proportionality consideration one that an omniscient observer would subscribe to, or is the relevant perspective that of "the reasonable person," etc.) might still disagree on the empirical facts pertaining to a concrete case. However, my intention here was to show that there can in principle be circumstances where the participation in an unjustified war is justified. In some circumstances one might only be able to justify it under an appeal to agent-relative considerations, but this is still a justification. In other circumstances, however, one will even be able to justify it under an appeal to agent-neutral considerations and with the help of a genuine lesser evil justification. In still other, probably in most, circumstances, however, one will not be able to justify one's participation in an unjustified war. Consider, for example, a variation of Resisted Intervention, namely Counterproductively Resisted Intervention. In this variation, the A's resisting Y's army will lead to more A being killed, not less, and no overriding benefits (like, for example, certain gains in freedom for the rest of the A) will be achieved to overcompensate these losses. Such a war would be unjustified, since it would be disproportionate even from an agent-relative perspective. If a soldier actually knows this, and does not have a necessity justification to participate in the war (like, for example, the justification that the dictator would kill his family if he would not participate), then he cannot be justified in participating in the war.34 However, since the whole war included not only the (perhaps) justified first stages but also the unjustified latter ones, the whole war (the collective action as a whole) was unjustified. This is no different with self-defense: a complex act of self-defense comprising the following sequence: pushing, stabbing, pushing again will be morally and legally unjustified if the stabbing was unjustified, even if the two acts of pushing were justified. 34 Some authors claim that soldiers of a democratic state have – on the grounds of a combination of certain institutional arrangements with certain further circumstances – a duty to wage an unjustified war even if they know the war to be unjustified. For one of the most nuanced formulations of this view, see Estlund (2007), pp. 213-234. (For a critique of Estlund, see Renzo [2013]). If there is such an institution-based duty, however, there are two possibilities. Either the duty is "deontological," like a promise or a contract or some obligation of fairness. However, if is difficult to see how any promise (or mere fairness considerations) could be so weighty as to override the countervailing pro tanto duty not to participate in unjustified wars and the deontological duty (which is not only pro tanto) not to kill innocent people. (If some other kind of deontological duty is in play, one would like to know what duty that is.) Or the duty is "consequentialist," referring to the bad things that would happen if one does not abide by it. Maybe the democratic state's just institutions would crumble. (This possibility is more clearly entertained by Cheyney Ryan [2011, esp. 30-2] than by Estlund. Ryan, however, in the end draws pacifist conclusions instead of endorsing obedience.) But this is simply entirely implausible: democratic institutions won't crumble only because private Bob stays at home. The reply might be: "What if everybody stayed at home?" But the response to this is that the mere 16 Moreover, and obviously, agent-relative considerations work differently in different circumstances: they interact with other normative principles in different ways. For instance, while in cases where you foreseeably prevent someone from being saved, as in Boat, Lions, and Clan, you may give considerably more weight to your own interests and to the interests of those near and dear to you than to the interests of strangers, it seems that you are not allowed to do that in cases where you intentionally or foreseeably directly harm innocent and non-threatening people.35 To wit, a mother must not kill the neighbor's child in order to harvest her organs for the benefit of her own child, nor must states invade other countries to harvest its resources for the benefit of their own country, let alone to harvest their citizens as slaves for their own population. Persons must not participate in such wars – unless, again, there are other factors in play that provide them with a countervailing and overriding necessity justification to participate anyway. That might sometimes be the case. More often, it clearly won't. While, as I showed, individual participation in unjustified collective acts is sometimes justified, the converse is also true: individual participation in justified collective acts can under certain circumstances be unjustified. Consider Sartre's famous example of the son who is torn between his felt duties towards his mother and his felt duty to join the French Free Forces in their fight against Nazi Germany (Sartre 2005, 212-13). It is clearly possible that under certain circumstances a person's duties towards his family and friends would make abandoning them to fight in a war that simply does not need him or her unjustified. In fact, a person might even serve the wider community better by serving it as a scientist or doctor, for example, than by joining a justified war effort, and if his service to the wider community is of sufficient moral importance and he has promised and is relied upon to not simply abandon his post, as it were, then doing so anyway in order to join the war would be unjustified. Finally, it should be noted that a soldier is not already justified in participating in a war if the objective justifying conditions are fulfilled. Rather, he has to know or be aware or perhaps even reasonably believe that they are fulfilled: that is, his justification would comprise a subjective or mental element, namely (at least) awareness of the objective justifying conditions. After all, there is a presumption against killing and maiming people, and it is the moral responsibility of the very individual who is about to engage in an activity where he or she is supposed to kill and maim people to make sure that the fact that something will have terrible consequences if everybody does it (like all New Yorkers going to the MOMA on the same hour on the same day) does not mean that it is immoral for Bob or Kate to do it. Again, in the case of war, it might be "unfair" to stay at home if the others go, but to kill innocent foreigners out of fairness to one's fellow citizens seems to ascribe far too much weight to fairness considerations and far too little weight to the rights of innocent people. Obviously, more could be said on these issues, but they are beyond the scope of the present paper. 35 There are exceptions. Consider this example: You are driving down a road. Through no fault of yours you are losing (full) control of the car. You will, whatever you do now, kill one of the two children playing on the street by running him or her over. One child is a stranger, the other your daughter. You need not to be impartial in this case of the foreseeable infliction of harm because you already have a necessity justification to harm one of them. It is not that partiality gives you the justification to start with. Incidentally, you are even allowed to prefer your own child if the accident is your fault (perhaps you are driving under the influence). 17 presumption is indeed overcome and the objective justifying conditions satisfied.36 To wit, in Anglo-Saxon law there is the Dadson principle (so named after a court case), according to which "justified force requires belief in, or knowledge of, the presence of justificatory circumstances" (Christopher 1995, 229). One author even argues that the rejection of this principle leads to a logical contradiction in certain cases and must therefore be accepted on grounds of logical necessity (Christopher 1995; 1998).37 Moreover, Anglo-Saxon law is not alone in accepting this requirement: "The consensus of Western legal systems is that actors may avail themselves of justifications only if they act with justificatory intent." (Fletcher 1978, 557)38 Thus, given this Western consensus, which, moreover, might be backed up by logical necessity, there is no reason to apply more lenient standards to soldiers. "They don't know what they are doing" is no excuse if they should know. And if they are about to kill people, they indeed should know. This result, incidentally, cannot be avoided by simply making a distinction between subjective and objective justification here. One cannot answer substantive legal or moral questions simply by making distinctions. To wit, if the question is whether the legal selfdefense justification requires a subjective element or not, one cannot answer this question by saying: "Let's distinguish between subjective and objective justification." What we want to know is under which conditions a certain act is actually legally or morally justified, and either actual justification (instead of only believed or imagined justification, which is no justification at all) does require a subjective element or it does not. Derek Parfit, for instance, who makes such distinctions, states that some "act of ours would be wrong in the fact-relative sense just when this act would be wrong in the ordinary sense if we knew all of the morally relevant facts" (Parfit 2011, 150).39 This definition, however, does not answer any important substantive questions about when someone is, in fact, justified. One reason for this is that Parfit does not give a clear definition of the "ordinary sense" of justification in the first place (compare Bazargan 2014, 115, n. 2). Another and 36 This seems to be also the opinion of Estlund (2007, 213): "the soldier will need to think for himself about whether they [certain justifying conditions] are met." 37 Rivera-López (2006) shows that some accounts of justified self-defense that include an subjective element also run into a logical contradiction, but he does not show that all of them do. In contrast, Christopher's argument, if correct, undermines all purely objectivist accounts of justified self-defense. Admittedly, I am myself not entirely convinced that this logical error is indeed inescapable, but nevertheless, it is certainly a suggestive point against objectivist accounts that virtually all objectivists seem to maintain an embarrassed silence on the issue. 38 This is not to say that there are not (very few) dissenting voices. Most notable amongst them, as far as legal scholarship is concerned, are Robinson (for instance 1996, esp. 47-8) and Hurd (2008). Note, however, that Robinson concedes that unknowingly justified defenders could still be guilty and thus punishable on grounds of attempt liability, while Hurd (2008, 263-5) not only concedes that but in fact insists on it. That is, even defenders of objective justification seem not to be particularly inclined to let the unknowingly justified defender morally and legally off the hook. Likewise, there is no reason to let unknowingly "justified" soldiers off the hook. 39 Parfit is not the first to make distinctions of this kind. See, for example, Graham (2010, 89, n. 3). Yet, Parfit has popularized this distinction among those who call themselves "revisionary just war theorists," with the pernicious result to be expected: the substantive question whether moral justification requires a subjective element or not is mostly ignored by these theorists. 18 in the present context more important reason is that this definition of "wrong in the factrelative sense" does not answer the question whether someone's subjective state of mind also belongs to the "morally relevant facts" or not. This, however, is precisely what we would like to know if we are interested in substantive answers as opposed to conceptual fragmentation. Thus, the result remains: soldiers cannot just blindly stumble into a war and hope to be "accidentally" justified. Only if they are at least aware of there being an objective justification for their participation in the war can they be morally justified. This, in effect, is the "right intention" (or, more precisely: mental state) requirement as applied to soldiers.40 Conversely, if the objective justifying conditions are not satisfied, then the soldier's participation in the war will be unjustified, however much the soldier believes it to be justified. To conclude, both the traditional view (from Aquinas through Vitoria and Grotius to Anscombe and McMahan) and the "legalist" Walzerian view on the moral (in)equality of combatants are wrong. To recall, the traditional view states that there cannot be a (morally) just cause for war on both sides, and it also states that combatants participating in a justified war may kill their enemy combatants participating in an unjustified war – but not vice versa (at least not as long as the combatants on the justified side always abide by jus in bello requirements and the unjustified combatants know their war to be unjustified). The opposing Walzerian view, in contrast, claims that as long as the combatants on the unjustified side abide by the jus in bello requirements, they may kill the combatants on the justified side (and, of course, vice versa). Thus, the reality is more complicated and differentiated. First, the justifiability of a collective actor A's war against B does not yet imply that B's war against A is unjustified. Moreover, whether an individual may justifiably participate in a war or not is likewise not already decided by the war's justifiability or unjustifiability; rather, the concrete circumstances of the individual have to be taken into account too.41 Thus, a conscientious soldier might not only be one who deliberately serves in a justified war or deliberately refuses to serve in an unjustified war, but also one who deliberately refuses to serve in a justified war or who deliberately does serve in an unjustified one. Acknowledgements The research presented in this paper was supported by a grant from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project No. HKU 17610315). I am very grateful for this support. I presented a first draft of this paper at the Philosophy Department of Lingnan University and thank the audience for valuable feedback. I owe particular thanks to James Pattison, David Whetham, three anonymous reviewers, and the editors of International Theory for very helpful written comments. 40 While present day just war theorists often list the right intention condition only under jus ad bellum, traditionally it is also a jus in bello condition, applying not only to state leaders but to individual soldiers as well. The traditional Christian just war theorists were also addressing the question whether, and under what circumstances, individuals may participate in war, and they made it clear that when they do participate in war, these individuals must have a right intention. For more on this and the relation of the traditional right intention requirement to the legal and moral mental state requirement of the justification to use force, see Steinhoff (2014b, esp. section II). 41 For a different argument to the same effect, see also Pattison (2013). 19 References Alexander, Larry. 1999. "Unified Excuse of Preemptive Self-Protection." Notre Dame Law Review 74: 1475-1505. Alexander, Larry, and Michael S. Moore. 2015. "Deontological Ethics." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, electronic resource available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/ethicsdeontological/. American Law Institute. 1962. Model Penal Code. Official Draft and Explanatory Notes. 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G Bruya-Effortless Attention Introduction: Toward a Theory of Attention That Includes Effortless Attention and Action Brian Bruya Attention and action require effort, and, under normal circumstances, the higher the demands of a course of action, the greater the effort required to sustain a level of efficacy (Grier et al. 2003; Kahneman 1973). Although a clear distinction is rarely made, effort is generally presumed to be both objective (as calories consumed) and subjective (as experienced effortfulness). There are times, however, when attention and action seem to flow effortlessly,1 allowing a person to meet an increase in demand with a sustained level of efficacy but without an increase in felt effort-even, at the best of times, with a decrease (Csikszentmihalyi 1975; Csikszentmihalyi and Csikszentmihalyi 1988; Dobrynin 1966). Under normal circumstances, the expectation is that expenditure of effort increases with the level of demands until effort reaches a maximum point at which no more increase is possible (Kahneman 1973; see figure I.1). Sometimes, however, when the level of demand reaches a point at which one is fully engaged, one is given over to the activity so thoroughly that action and attention seem effortless (see figure I.2). That subjective effort can follow this path of unexpected decrease without a decrement in performance is clearly supported by the literature (Csikszentmihalyi, this volume; 1975; Dormashev, this volume; Ullén, this volume; Csikszentmihalyi and Csikszentmihalyi 1988; Dobrynin 1966; Jackson and Csikszentmihalyi 1999). Whether objective effort follows the same path is less clear, but there is evidence to suggest that it is possible (Wulf and Lewthwaite, this volume). Either way, because the objective– subjective distinction is rarely made in regard to discussions about effort, evidence shows that the accepted theoretical framework of increased effort to meet increased demand falters. This failure of our accepted framework to accommodate effortlessness has likely been the reason for its long neglect as a subject of serious investigation and for artists and philosophers to attribute its causes to the mystical, the divine, or the Freudian unconscious. Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (1975) identified the phenomenon of effortlessness as autotelic experience-when a person's full engagement in an activity provides ongoing Bruya_01_Intro.indd 1 10/30/2009 1:55:18 PM In Brian Bruya (ed.), Effortless Attention: A New Perspective in the Cognitive Science of Attention and Action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010. G Bruya-Effortless Attention  Brian Bruya impetus for attention and action-and found it across a wide variety of activity domains, from rock climbing to chess, from factory line working to intimate conversation.2 Using a novel data collection procedure (Hektner, Schmidt, and Csikszentmihalyi 2007) that allowed for better monitoring of naturalistic activities, Csikszentmihalyi achieved a great deal on the descriptive level, isolating the phenomenon and detailing the manner of its occurrence, its duration, its depth, its phenomenal characteristics, its variability, its breadth across populations, its parameters of occurrence, and its psychological value. Through his work, autotelic experience (commonly known as "flow") has entered both the scientific and the vernacular vocabularies (see box I.1 for Demands E ff o rt Figure I.1 Effort versus demands in effective action-normal experience. E ff o rt Demands Figure I. Effort versus demands in effective action-effortless experience. Bruya_01_Intro.indd 2 10/30/2009 1:55:18 PM G Bruya-Effortless Attention Introduction  Box I.1 Example A professor who has given the same classroom lecture 10 times over the past five years gives it again on two occasions over two semesters. Effortful Experience Outside of class, the professor is struggling with a particularly trying bit of research, a student he failed for cheating has taken the matter to the administration, a recent faculty meeting exploded in accusations and acrimony, and a close family member is ill. Inside of class, he is in an unfamiliar room, his new shoes are hurting his feet, the temperature is unusually warm, and students are lethargic. Under these conditions,* the professor experiences a frustrating lecture. Examples fall flat, insightful points come haltingly, if at all, and conclusions feel awkward and indecisive. Unexpected questions from students are met with hems and haws. There is a feeling of self-consciousness-that the lecture is not going well. There is a feeling of interminability during the lecture and of relief and fatigue after the lecture. Effortless Experience Outside of class, the professor just sent off a revised manuscript for publication, he recently won an award for teaching excellence, and his new research assistant is buoyant and eager. Inside of class, conditions are familiar, and students are responsive. The lecture goes smoothly, punctuated at appropriate moments by examples and insightful asides that meet bright eyes and nods of understanding. Unexpected questions are deftly assimilated to the material with humor and aplomb. Conclusions neatly wrap up sections and lead naturally to subsequent sections. There is no feeling of self-consciousness during the lecture but a retrospective feeling of diminished sense of time and that the lecture came off automatically and with ease. There is a feeling after the lecture of zest and that it could have been continued indefinitely without fatigue. * There are many possible obstacles to effortlessness; others could be extreme demands, low demands, lack of interest, unexpected interruptions, lethargy, negative affect, and so on. (The effect of unfavorable conditions is not a necessary one. Conceivably, in the first experience the professor could have overcome the obstacles and experienced an effortless lecture.) Bruya_01_Intro.indd 3 10/30/2009 1:55:18 PM G Bruya-Effortless Attention  Brian Bruya an illustration of how the same activity can be carried out with and without a feeling of flow). Because of its occurrence largely in naturalistic settings, however, and perhaps due to its vestigial mysteriousness, autotelic experience has been resistant to explanatory analysis. Therefore, fundamental questions regarding the cognitive science of effortlessness have, until now, been neither asked nor answered. In a separate program in the Soviet Union, descriptive research was conducted by N. F. Dobrynin, D. I. Gatkevich, and N. V. Lavrova (Dobrynin 1966; Dormashev, this volume) under the rubric of postvoluntary attention-attention that was neither voluntary (effortful) nor involuntary (automatic). Postvoluntary attention is characterized in the literature as attention that has been captured by an absorbing, interesting, and meaningful activity and that can be sustained willingly and productively for a long period of time. Unfortunately, the bulk of this literature remains untranslated. Despite the difficult questions remaining, research into effortless attention and action should be viewed not as an esoteric discipline but instead as a welcome challenge to test, refine, and even alter current models of attention and action. In order for any model of behavior to be considered comprehensive, it must be able to account for all types of human action. As Daniel Kahneman and Anne Treisman have said, "While we continue to work within the old framework [of attention], we should remain alert to the possibility that it could soon become obsolete" (Kahneman and Treisman 1984, p. 57). Bernhard Hommel recommends that in order to make future advances in developing a full model of human action, our most basic concepts must be clarified (Hommel 2007). The present volume submits the concept of effortless attention for such consideration. In this introduction, I isolate seven topics concerning which scholars have produced theories and results pertinent to a nascent theory of effortlessness. I offer a summary of these ("Overview"), show how the topic of effortlessness may reveal gaps in the current literature and challenge current theoretical models ("Challenges–Gaps"), delineate potential aspects of a future theory of effortless attention and action ("Theory"), and discuss how the chapters in this volume mark advances in that direction ("Advances"). The categories do not necessarily reflect the intentions of the contributors or fully encompass current paradigms in cognitive science, and they are best considered one possible attempt at a heuristic for approaching this unwieldy topic. Further, the "Advances" discussions are necessarily brief and discuss how each chapter contributes to our understanding of only one issue in particular. Readers will find that the chapters are usually broader than that, often speaking importantly on several of these issues. Bruya_01_Intro.indd 4 10/30/2009 1:55:18 PM G Bruya-Effortless Attention Introduction  Topic 1: Effort Overview Two general kinds of effort have been distinguished in the literature-mental effort and physical effort (Smit, Eling, Hopman, and Coenen 2005), which are conceptually dissociable. For instance, in the development of overlearned action, the same level of physical effort is subject to decreasing amounts of mental effort. Nevertheless, mental effort must also have a physiological basis and has been approached by researchers and theorists under two general headings: attention and self-regulation (see box I.2 for terminology relevant to this field of inquiry). William James defined attention as the effortful holding of something before one's mind (James 1983). Daniel Kahneman (1973) identified attention as mental effort, postulating that maintenance of attention can be under voluntary control but intensity of attention cannot. William Sarter has delineated a neuronal model of "attentional effort" that describes the mechanisms for initiation of top–down control of attention (Sarter, Gehring, and Kozak 2006). According to Sarter, when attention is threatened, performance monitoring (prefrontal–anterior cingulate) and motivational (mesolimbic) systems are recruited and integrated, manifesting as attentional effort. Philosophers have long used "will" as a term that indicates subjective effort (Schulkin 2007). Research psychologists have preferred "self-regulation" or "selfcontrol" (Baumeister and Vohs 2005; Rothbart 2005; Vohs and Baumeister 2004)-the Box I. Working Definitions Objective effort (exertion) an increase in the metabolic or physiological processes of movement (physical effort) or thought (mental effort). Subjective effort the feeling of exertion. Effortful description of attention or action in which there is subjective effort under normal conditions. Autotelic description of an experience in which one feels that the activity provides the impetus for action, involving a challenging activity that requires skill, the merging of action and awareness, clear goals and immediate feedback, concentration on the task at hand, a feeling of being in control, a loss of self-consciousness, and an altered sense of time. Effortless description of attention or action that (1) is not experienced as effortful or (2) involves exertion and, due to the autotelicity of experience, subjective effort is lower than in normal conditions, with effectiveness maintained at a normal or elevated level. Postvoluntary effortless (2). Bruya_01_Intro.indd 5 10/30/2009 1:55:18 PM G Bruya-Effortless Attention  Brian Bruya ability to accomplish one's goals and to refrain from actions that contravene one's goals. Studies have shown that self-regulation is a limited resource, that this resource can be depleted through prior effort (e.g., choices), and that its maintenance can be affected by cognitive states such as bias or a feeling of autonomy (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, and Tice 1998; Inzlicht 2006; Moller, Deci, and Ryan 2006; Muraven, Tice, and Baumeister 1998; Schmeichel and Baumeister, this volume). Challenges–Gaps Current theories of attention identify attention with effort and rarely distinguish between objective and subjective effort. Such theories are unable to account for attention that is high in intensity but low in subjective effort. Is a synchronic decrease in objective effort also possible without a performance decrement? If so, is it akin to, or dependent on, the efficiency of overlearned action achieved diachronically? How can the two be distinguished on functional and physiological levels? Further, the phenomenon of effortlessness complicates the notion of executive control. In autotelic experience, subjects report that they are able to exert exceptional control over the subtlest responses in an activity but without a feeling of executive control. They report that they can be completely focused on a task but feel as if only a slight effort is expended (Csikszentmihalyi 1975; Csikszentmihalyi and Csikszentmihalyi 1988). Lionel Naccache and colleagues report that executive control and the feeling of effort are dissociable (Naccache et al. 2005; see also Lafargue, Paillard, Lamarre, and Sirigu 2003). These two challenges to current models raise many fundamental questions about the relationship between attention and effort and even about the nature of mental effort, itself. Theory Nearly five decades ago Gunnar Borg (1962) demonstrated a reliable correlation between objective and subjective physical effort that is still the basis of psychophysiological instruments today. A similar correlation between objective and subjective mental effort has been presumed but not verified. Several scales of subjective workload are used in human factors research, but none of the major scales distinguish clearly between mental and physical subjective effort (Rubio, Díaz, Martín, and Puente 2004). Any presumption of an outright correlation between objective and subjective mental effort appears to have been contradicted by Csikszentmihalyi's and Dobrynin's findings.3 A theory of effortlessness will have to clearly define objective and subjective mental effort by delineating their functional and physiological features. Advances 1. Shared resources of self-regulation and attention In their chapter for this volume, Brandon Schmeichel and Roy Baumeister demonstrate that under normal circumBruya_01_Intro.indd 6 10/30/2009 1:55:19 PM G Bruya-Effortless Attention Introduction  stances attention and self-regulation draw from a shared limited resource. Research with colleague Gailliot (Gailliot et al. 2007) suggests that this resource is glucose. Thus, under normal circumstances, objective mental effort (in the form of attention and self-regulation), like objective physical effort, appears to have a measurable and manipulable physiology. 2. Decrease in objective effort during attention Gabriele Wulf and Rebecca Lewthwaite show in this volume that the normal reduction in physical and mental objective effort (coupled with an increase in efficacy) that is achieved through typical diachronic practice can be enhanced synchronically. Through a slight shift in the focus of attention-from internal to external-subjects have consistently decreased their objective effort while increasing their efficacy. In other words, there is a direct correspondence between attention and effort such that both physical and mental effort can be reduced while one's prior level of attention is maintained. Topic : Decision Making Overview The study of decision making is now a mainstay of economics research (Tomlin et al. 2006) and moral psychology (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, and Cohen 2004). Less attention has been focused on the fact that every action a person makes involves a choice of some kind, whether fully conscious or not. Jeffrey Schall has shown that choice (selection from among alternatives) is conceptually dissociable from both decision making (deliberation about selection) and action (overt indication of selection; Schall 2001). Working within a more traditional framework, Mariano Sigman and Stanislaus Dehaene have reported that of the three stages of an action (perceptual, central, and motor), the first and third can work in parallel on different stages of different tasks, and only the central must work serially, hence accounting for time delay in deliberative action (Sigman and Dehaene 2005). A link between the autonomic nervous system and automatic action was rarely considered until Antonio Damasio and colleagues demonstrated that the autonomic nervous system plays a crucial role in some forms of decision making that lead to action (Damasio 1996, 1994). In essence, the autonomic nervous system sets the body and mind in proper form for reacting to uncertain but familiar circumstances. A key component of automaticity is an individual's level of response inhibition. Antoine Bechara, working with Damasio, has conducted seminal research into the role of response inhibition in decision making (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, and Damasio 1997; Bechara, Damasio, and Damasio 2000, 2003; Bechara 2004). In impulsive behavior, according to Bechara, response inhibition fails, the decision-making process never engages, and a response based on previous success is initiated automatically. Different areas of the brain, he says, may be active, depending on which of three types of Bruya_01_Intro.indd 7 10/30/2009 1:55:19 PM G Bruya-Effortless Attention  Brian Bruya decision (under certainty, under risk, and under ambiguity) is being made. If decisions under ambiguity are more likely, they will involve the orbitofrontal region and thereby engage the autonomic nervous system, which would slow processing down considerably. Arne Dietrich has postulated that autotelic experience involves a decrease of neural activity in executive regions of the brain, specifically the anterior cingulate cortex (Dietrich 2004), which has been confirmed to be directly associated with the feeling of effort (Mulert, Menzinger, Leicht, Pogarell, and Hegerl 2005). Challenges–Gaps The above findings suggest that a complete theory of choice and decision making in human behavior would do well to include the actual neurophysiology of such processes. Effortless attention complicates any such model because the distinction between executive control and decision making vanishes. Decision making in flow is fast and precise, implicating automatic action, but also creative and flexible, implicating processes that are normally associated with executive control-though executive control processes are generally considered slow. Actually monitoring activation of brain areas in effortless attention may shed some light. Theory Recognizing Schall's distinction between choice, decision making, and action and then identifying the neural mechanisms underlying each may be important in accounting for the precision of effortless action and the rapid choices that precede it. Under Sigman and Dehaene's model, does effortless action (where rapid and accurate responses are characteristic) leave out the middle-deliberative-step, is it somehow integrated in a parallel fashion, or is there another way to account for it? Damasio and Bechara's work may point to an important role for something like confidence in effortlessness-familiarity with an activity and confidence in one's ability may (artificially?) push the subjective level of engagement from ambiguity toward certainty. Advances 1. Response conflict, effort, and decision making In their contribution to this volume, Joseph McGuire and Matthew Botvinick show that an integral part of the decisionmaking process involves evaluating the demand for cognition in a prospective task. Drawing on numerous studies, they postulate that the anterior cingulate cortex and nearby medial frontal cortex monitor the current output of cognitive resources and compare that to expected demand, resulting in a projected increase or decrease in needed cognition. This projected amount of control is then balanced against projected reward (nucleus accumbens), resulting in either an adjustment in cognitive resources Bruya_01_Intro.indd 8 10/30/2009 1:55:19 PM G Bruya-Effortless Attention Introduction  to meet expected demand or in avoidance. McGuire and Botvinick demonstrate, therefore, that mental effort is dissociable from cognitive control. Cognitive control is an ongoing process, and subjective mental effort is associated with the change in that process rather than with the process, itself. This shows us how it is possible that there can be a high level of cognitive control but a low level of subjective effort. 2. Effort in deliberative problem solving It is natural to think that the greater the effort applied to a task, especially one that is exclusively cognitive, the better the outcome will be. Marci DeCaro and Sian Beilock demonstrate that although effortful (i.e., linear, rule-based) problem-solving strategies often result in better performance, under realworld conditions they can lose out to less effortful (i.e., associative, heuristic) strategies. Such results provide another avenue for demonstrating that effortful attention and performance are dissociable. 3. Executive control is not necessarily conscious The status of executive control as a defining feature of the explicit processing system is called into question by Chris Blais. Blais shows through his research and studies by others that an instance of executive control that is generally taken as a paradigm case of executive control by researchers actually occurs outside of conscious awareness. Blais, therefore, calls into question the need for a distinction between explicit and implicit systems of control. The very phenomenon of effortless attention, as explained above, seems to lead in the same direction, and Blais's work may help in resolving this conundrum. Topic : Action Syntax Overview Joaquín Fuster has examined the temporal role of executive function in attention and action, in which the automated behavior that is integrated into lower neural stages (premotor cortex, basal ganglia, hypothalamus, or other subcortical structures) is activated and modulated by the anterior cingulate cortex (high motivation, resolution of conflict), areas of lateral prefrontal convexity (set, integration of information across time), and orbital areas (inhibitory control). Temporal integration of behavior, Fuster says, is closely related to negotiating a syntax. Although syntax is most commonly associated with language, Fuster says that "linguistic syntax and motoric syntax seem to have a common phyletic origin" (Fuster 2003, p. 180). If the perception–action cycle involves the same, or functionally similar, neural mechanisms as those that allow us to negotiate grammar, it would go a long way in explaining certain elements of effortless action. Matthew Botvinick (Botvinick and Plaut 2004; Botvinick 2007) has developed a recurrent connectionist network model that accounts for decision-making behavior in everyday routine tasks through transient, flexible hierarchies that rely on concurrent representation rather than enduring schemas. The resulting hierarchies are context Bruya_01_Intro.indd 9 10/30/2009 1:55:19 PM G Bruya-Effortless Attention 10 Brian Bruya dependent and, as such, are appropriately vulnerable to distraction errors common in everyday behavior. Among other things, Botvinick's computational model may help elucidate the role of attention in complex sequential actions. Among other things (Ivry and Helmuth 2003), sequential actions involve neural timing mechanisms, particularly in the cerebellum (Ivry 1997; Ivry and Richardson 2002; Ivry, Spencer, Zelaznik, and Diedrichsen 2002; Ivry and Spencer 2004a; Ivry and Spencer 2004b; Spencer, Ivry, and Zelaznik 2005), neural systems for force control and special trajectory planning (Diedrichsen, Verstynen, Hon, Zhang, and Ivry 2007; Spencer et al. 2005), and response selection (Bischoff-Grethe, Ivry, and Grafton 2002; Diedrichsen, Verstynen, Hon, Lehman, and Ivry 2003). Challenges–Gaps Syntax consists in a set of goals arranged in a hierarchy (within a circumscribed domain) that is constituted by defeasible rules temporally executed. Since effortless action is most often achieved in a well-demarcated activity, with constitutive rules, effortlessness (of attention and action) may be closely related to the process of negotiating syntax. The notion of action syntax is still a novel one and must be integrated into any comprehensive model of action (Costanzo 2002). One important issue that it brings to the fore is the distinction between explicit rule following and optimal action within constraints (Langlois 1998). When adding cream and sugar to a cup of coffee (Botvinick and Plaut 2004), how does one decide which to add first? When playing a sequence of notes on the piano, how does one decide on the particular dynamics? Assimilating explicit rules (Bunge 2004) is only one step in executing action. Another step is applying the rules appropriately according to context, which can never be completely identical from one instance to the next. Theory A theory of effortlessness should embrace action syntax and explain at functional and physiological levels what it means to negotiate a syntax. It should distinguish between explicit rule syntax and constraint–parameter syntax and thereby account for the role of appropriateness in effective action (how quickly to stir, how much arc to put on the basketball, how to express a chord, whether to bluff or not, etc.). Such a theory should also elucidate the role of attention in complex, sequential actions. Where, when, and how is attention directed to relevant cues, and how is that relevance determined? Further, determining these aspects of attention will have important implications for training and education. Advances 1. Action representation drives attention Where is one's attention in downhill skiing? The pace of the activity is too fast for deliberation in conscious processing, and yet we Bruya_01_Intro.indd 10 10/30/2009 1:55:19 PM G Bruya-Effortless Attention Introduction 11 do attend fleetingly to this curve and that bump. Bernhard Hommel offers a theory for conceiving of attention not as necessarily consciousness driven and not as a system for managing scarce cognitive resources but as a "by-product of action control in a distributed processing system" (chapter 5, this volume). Hommel demonstrates that at its most fundamental level, attention is the process of perceptual systems filling parameters in preestablished action programs as those action programs successively come online. A skier (on a good day) attends effortlessly to curves and bumps as needed to maintain success. Attention, according to Hommel, is normally experienced as effortless, and it is only when something comes between endogenous motivation and relevant external cues (as in artificial laboratory tasks) that it is experienced as effortful. The apparent integration of perception and action in a single representational system appears to allow for immediate action-driven processing of syntactic cues. 2. Effortlessness as domain specific Through their unique methods of measuring dimensions of activities under normal circumstances, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi and Jeanne Nakamura in their contribution to this volume demonstrate that effortless attention is most likely to be achieved under domain-specific conditions: clear, sequential, short-term goals; immediate feedback; and a balance between opportunities for action and the individual's ability to act. When these conditions are met under conducive circumstances, effortless attention is most likely to ensue. Further, they show that in circumstances of high attention experienced as effortless (as opposed to high attention experienced as effortful), subjects feel more involved, in control, unselfconscious, relaxed, and as if they are putting their skills to more use. 3. Effortless attention in the lab Can these conditions be replicated in the laboratory? While Hommel suggests that the limitations of the laboratory setting are problematic in understanding effortless attention, and while Csikszentmihalyi and Nakamura have overcome those limitations by taking their research outside the lab, there is still something to be said for the prospect of introducing a naturalistic activity into the lab such that effortless attention can be induced in a setting that would allow for more systematic study and more intense monitoring. In their contribution to this volume, Arlen Moller, Brian Meier, and Robert Wall examine the attempts of several laboratories, including their own, to induce flow by manipulating the balance between challenge and skills for subjects playing video games. While these teams have been successful in inducing many of the features of flow, the laboratory setting, itself, still presents a number of challenges. Moller, Meier, and Wall go on to examine such challenges and formulate suggestions for future research. 4. Syntax and the draw of attention In his contribution, Brian Bruya offers a new model of attention. Rather than a spotlight, or a filter, and so on, this model posits that attention may be profitably conceived of as a mechanism of sensitization that draws information relevant to dynamic contextual structures of reference through dynamic processing pathways. Contextual structures of reference compete spontaneously for Bruya_01_Intro.indd 11 10/30/2009 1:55:19 PM G Bruya-Effortless Attention 1 Brian Bruya predominance in processing pathways, with predominance shifting rapidly and constantly over time, accounting for transient selective attention. A semblance of sustained, focused attention may be precariously achieved by inhibiting the intrusions of competing structures of reference, usually experienced as effortful to some degree. Occasionally, activity domains stabilize as temporary, predominant structures, inhibiting competing structures of reference by virtue of the activity's autotelicity, thereby allowing for sustained, focused attention that feels effortless. Topic : Agency Overview David LaBerge's triangular circuit theory of attention (LaBerge 1995, 1998, 2000) postulates an important role for the thalamus in attentional processing. According to the triangular circuit theory, attention just is conscious attention, or what LaBerge more precisely calls awareness. This theory postulates an internal representation of the self directly associated with the thalamus that provides the motivation or interest that amplifies preattentively selected stimuli for sustained attention. Walter Freeman views the brain as a fundamentally intentional system (in the tradition of John Dewey) that essentially creates itself through goal-directed activity. Freeman views brain waves as the multiple manifestations of self-organizing nonlinear dynamic systems rooted in the electrochemical activity of neuron populations. Freeman's data (Freeman 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2006), he says, support a view that neuron populations are self-organizing systems in which transient activity arises spontaneously, spreads across populations following basins of attraction, and then subsides, to be replaced by the next wave of activity. These basins of attraction represent confluences of meaning. One of the characteristics of effortless attention and action is heightened sensitivity to stimuli. Freeman's theory of nonlinear dynamic systems in neuron populations provides a model for this kind of readiness, or preafference, as he calls it (Freeman 1999, 2000). Transient selfhood has been a central concern of the philosopher Thomas Metzinger, who has developed a theory of the self that coheres with the latest results of neuroscientific research, especially research related to the broad functionality of the motor system (Metzinger and Gallese 2003; Metzinger 2003). According to his work, we can consider the self a unitary entity only in a phenomenal sense. In a functional sense, it is constructed and continuously remade (determined at the physiological level by particular neural processes). Susan Hurley created a model of intentional action that links action, imitation, and simulation, and she speculated widely on the implications for this research with regard to social philosophy and ethics (e.g., Hurley and Chater 2005; Hurley 2005). Bruya_01_Intro.indd 12 10/30/2009 1:55:19 PM G Bruya-Effortless Attention Introduction 1 A decision to act is not isolated but arises as a response to past events and in expectation of future events. Marc Jeannerod, working closely with philosophical theory on the one hand and neuroscientific studies on the other, has contributed significantly to the transformation of our understanding of the motor functions of the brain from noncognitive action deployment to full-blown centers of planning, perception, prediction, and complex social behavior (Jacob and Jeannerod 2003; Jeannerod 1988, 1997, 2006). How the sense of agency is constructed and maintained is one of Jeannerod's primary concerns because it appears to be at the heart of motor cognition. Without agency, there is no goal setting or subject of simulation or prediction. Challenges–Gaps A core challenge that effortlessness research poses to current models of attention and action is to answer the following question: When a decision to act is made, who is doing the deciding? Effortlessness brings to the foreground two issues fundamental to action: (1) When an act is attributed to a self, what exactly is a self, and (2) as mentioned above, is there really a clear demarcation between executive control and automaticity? There are obviously distinct neuronal systems handling overlearned actions on the one hand and executive control on the other; effortless action highlights the need to study their integration because in this highly achieved form of action, a person seems to draw from them both with exquisite mastery. Freeman's dynamic systems framework may help close these gaps by supplying to current models a kind of spontaneous sensitivity (see Alicia Juarrero 1999 for an insightful examination of dynamic systems theory, agency, and action). LaBerge points out that awareness involving a self-representation is distinct from self-awareness. Nonetheless, the same question asked above may be asked here (applicable also to Jeannerod): How can such a theory account for the commonly reported phenomenon of a dropping away of a distinct sense of self in effortless attention and action? Also, is a self-representation solely a function of the thalamus, or are there important contributions from other specific areas of the brain, such as the medial cingulate where attributions to self and other are formed (Tomlin et al. 2006)? When attention is invested in an activity, it can be perceived as purely voluntary or carry a sense of compulsion. According to Csikszentmihalyi (1978) and Dobrynin (1966), effortless action is more likely achieved when attention is not only highly focused but also entirely voluntary-in pursuits that a person finds intrinsically worthwhile. Because effortlessness is often reported as a desirable state for both the enjoyment and the efficacy of action that it affords (Csikszentmihalyi 1975), it exposes a gap in current literature with regard to the optimal structuring of an individual's life. How can the achievement of effortless attention, on personal, pedagogical, and Bruya_01_Intro.indd 13 10/30/2009 1:55:19 PM G Bruya-Effortless Attention 1 Brian Bruya managerial levels (Dobrynin 1966) be cultivated and encouraged for the sake of the acting agent? Moving from the individual agent to the social agent, social behavior involves executing appropriate actions according to complex circumstances-evaluating subtle cues and responding without time for deliberation. Insofar as mirror neurons have been implicated in social action, as Hurley (among others) has done, many questions can be asked with regard to how much of social behavior is automatic and how much is voluntary and with how much robustness this distinction can even be maintained. Are the same mechanisms of effortless action also at work in social action (see also under "Automaticity" below)? If so, given that effortless attention and action are often cultivated in a practice regime, what are the implications for the possibility of achieving expertise in social action? Could such knowledge be applied at a personal or even a pedagogical level? What are the ethical implications? Theory Effortless attention and action may simply be the free running of Freeman's intentional system, but what does that mean for a persistent sense of self, especially if such a sense of self falls away during effortless activity? Because reports of effortlessness often involve the loss of coherence of a phenomenal sense of self (Csikszentmihalyi 1975; Csikszentmihalyi and Csikszentmihalyi 1988; the feeling that the piano is playing itself or one is on "autopilot"), some aspects of functional selfhood seem to dissociate also. A comprehensive theory of perception and action would account not only for the role of the self in motivation but for the dissolution of the self in effortless attention and action. Further, it would explore the implications of "nonagentive" action in ethics, education, law, and public policy. Advances 1. Self and the thalamus An important repository of anecdotal and speculative literature regarding effortless attention and action lies in the Asian philosophical traditions. In Zen Buddhism, for example, there are countless stories of acolytes who have practiced meditation for long periods and then, on encountering an unexpected, nondescript stimulus, suddenly experience a number of the hallmarks of effortless attention. In his contribution to this volume, neurologist James Austin considers how the sudden experience of a dropping away of a sense of self may have direct neurophysiological correlates. Drawing on research that distinguishes two attentional systems, he shows that distinct pathways between thalamic nuclei and the two attentional systems are likely implicated in the experience of a loss of a sense of self. He suggests that the blinking out of self-consciousness in a Zen enlightenment experience, and in effortless attention and action more broadly, may be due to deafferented cortical areas of the dorsal (egocentric) attentional system, traceable to deactivated thalamic nuclei. The Bruya_01_Intro.indd 14 10/30/2009 1:55:19 PM G Bruya-Effortless Attention Introduction 1 entire process is achieved, he suggests, through long practice regimens and their resulting neurophysiological effects. 2. Ethics and agency The findings in cognitive science that call into question the traditional conception of a unitary rational agent have profound implications for contemporary ethical theory. In his contribution to this volume, Edward Slingerland integrates results from the cognitive science of action with an ethical theory that takes effortless action to be the epitome of virtuous action. Through a detailed examination of philosophical and cognitive scientific accounts of human action, Slingerland concludes that ethical human action is best characterized on a descriptive level in terms of a virtue ethics broadly construed. In other words, he says, humans generally act not from active cognitive control but from self-activating effortless dispositions that can be cultivated through introspection and education. 3. The person level in activity Researchers in twentieth-century Russian psychology recognized the primary importance of syntax in attention and action, adopting the rubric activity theory to describe their overall psychological framework. Yuri Dormashev, in addition to giving an extraordinary introduction to activity theory in general and postvoluntary attention in particular, explains in his contribution to this volume that attention is best understood in terms of activity, functioning as a gestalt and focused on a limited range of objects. In postvoluntary attention, activity is organized at the person level, or personality (understood as the focal point of the driving hierarchy of motives in the cultural sphere). On this basis, Dormashev suggests that an important element missing from accounts of autotelic experience is that of personal taste-the interest, or broad aesthetic sense, that acts as a motivating force outside of organic and social motivations. The sense of transactional, embedded attention and action inherent in this view serves to unify the autonomous individual with the social and organic milieus in which-and through which-the individual develops. Topic : Automaticity Overview Kahneman and Treisman point out that there has been a running debate among researchers of attention as to the role of automaticity in attention, with some researchers emphasizing early onset attention (selective processing–filtering) and some late onset (mental set/efficiency of action), and suggest that research into automaticity may help us bring the two closer together and away from mutual exclusivity (Kahneman and Treisman 1984; see also Pashler 1998). In his analysis of available data, Marc Jeannerod (2006) suggests that the automated steps of an action come in for conscious access when there is discord between intention and actuality-when the perceptual representation does not match the action representation. Bruya_01_Intro.indd 15 10/30/2009 1:55:19 PM G Bruya-Effortless Attention 1 Brian Bruya John Bargh, researching the automaticity of social behavior, has concluded that much more of behavior than previously thought is outside of voluntary consciousness (Bargh 2000; Bargh and Chartrand 1999). He has recently proposed that a cascade model of language be applied to behavior (Bargh 2006; Ackerman and Bargh, this volume), explaining how actions proceed spontaneously from parallel processed goal activation, just as conversation occurs spontaneously while also being goal directed and falling within strict syntactic and semantic parameters. Related to the cascade model is the theory of event coding put forward by Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, and Prinz (2001; Hommel, this volume). Working in the tradition of Dewey (1896) and Gibson (1979), they suggest, as discussed briefly above, that perception and action are encoded in the brain in unitary fashion, accounting for the functional linking of the two as one. One result of this model is the postulate that actions are encoded in terms of their effects rather than in terms of explicitly understood movements. The practical result of this is that attention in learning an action must be focused not on the intentional, voluntary aspect of a movement but on the effects of the movement (Wulf 2001, this volume). Challenges–Gaps These theories and findings, coupled with those under "Agency" and "Action Syntax" above, highlight a shift in research models from stimulus–response to what one might call sensitivity–responsiveness. Whereas the behaviorist model cut out intentional agency completely, the new models replace it with a multimodal agent, which, while not exactly being metaphysically free, is a bundle of preafference and readiness potentials created in a complex array of self-organized neuronal populations, with their representational (or other) associations constantly arranged and rearranged through phylogenetic and historical factors. In many circumstances, the responsiveness of the agent appears to be a function of these associations. Theory If Jeannerod is correct that actions come into consciousness when perception does not match intention, it would help explain why effortless action, which reportedly occurs when expectations are consistently met, often seems outside of conscious awareness. On the other hand, it would also seem to leave high-level effortless action as purely automated, thereby seeming to preclude credit to a subject for creativity, insight, emotional expression, and so forth. A cascade model of behavior may work well for effortless action; in fact, effortless action, being generally domain dependent, may prove to be the best testing ground for establishing the basis for such a theory. The theory of event coding may help explain why the precision of effortless action can appear "nonintentional" while attention is intensely focused on rapidly arising cues. Bruya_01_Intro.indd 16 10/30/2009 1:55:19 PM G Bruya-Effortless Attention Introduction 1 Advances 1. Social automaticity In their contribution to this volume, Joshua Ackerman and John Bargh review the extensive literature on the automaticity of social coordination, suggesting three general mechanisms that may account for it: simple dynamical systems at the level of mechanics (e.g. synchronized rocking in rocking chairs), shared perception–action representations (e.g., priming), and active motivations. They conclude that the automaticity of social coordination has several qualities that may be relevant to corollary qualities in flow: reduced experience of effort, transcendence of the negative aspects of the self, positive affect, and interpersonal fluency. Ackerman and Bargh go on to make a case for flow's being a special case of automaticity, explaining that the conscious awareness does not, itself, drive the experience of flow and is, instead, a passive spectator. Topic : Expertise Overview Attention and its relation to performance have been an intense topic of research, exemplified by the conference and volume Attention and Performance's appearing biennially since 1966. There appears to be a very close link between expert performance and effortlessness. Although the learning of a highly refined skill involves intense effort over extended periods (Ericsson and Lehmann 1996), its execution at the highest level is often characterized from a first-person perspective as feeling effortless and from a third-person perspective as appearing effortless. How to build this level of expertise and how it is executed have been the object of a number of interesting lines of research. For instance, Sian Beilock and colleagues (Beilock, Bertenthal, McCoy, and Carr 2004; Beilock, Carr, MacMahon, and Starkes 2002) have found, when comparing sport performance of novices and experts, that experts perform better at full attentional capacity, even if their attention is occupied by irrelevant details, such as distractors or an artificial speed requirement. Focused attention is attention that is voluntarily concentrated on a single domain of stimuli. The limited attention of lower animals can be understood as involuntarily focused attention. Ethologist Reuven Dukas (2002) has suggested that limited attention in lower animals may have an adaptive advantage, and Csikszentmihalyi (1978) has noted the advantages of focused attention in autotelic experience. Drawing from a series of studies involving computer simulations, Dehaene and Changeux (2005) have postulated that when human attention is captured in high-level cortical activity, the processing of domain-specific stimuli is facilitated while that of other stimuli is inhibited, perhaps accounting for the phenomenon of inattentional blindness. Bruya_01_Intro.indd 17 10/30/2009 1:55:19 PM G Bruya-Effortless Attention 1 Brian Bruya Challenges–Gaps Effortlessness is often characterized by an experience of completely focused attention. It is a mystery, however, as to why attempting to give full attention to an activity at which one is completely competent and which does not require full attention should result in a performance decrement. It may be that sustaining full attention in a task that does not demand it is simply not possible for any length of time (but why?) and that free cognitive resources will be involuntarily drawn to competing targets of attention, drawing with them some of the cognitive resources required for the original task. Theory The Dehaene and Changeux model (2005) seems to most easily match autotelic experience-as opposed to normal experience-because full attention that inhibits nondomain stimuli is difficult to maintain outside of autotelic experience. A theory of effortlessness should include the mechanisms for the capture and release of full attention in autotelicity and seek to answer the question of whether the capturing can be facilitated or the releasing can be inhibited through training. Advances 1. The explicit system and perfectionism Related to the chapters by Austin, DeCaro and Beilock, and Wulf and Lewthwaite mentioned above, the contribution to this volume from Arne Dietrich and Oliver Stoll considers evidence, first, for the downregulation of specific brain areas during effortless attention and, second, for the important relationship between attention and performance. Dietrich and Stoll begin by explaining the explicit–implicit distinction in cognitive processing and suggest that some activities can facilitate a neurophysiological process that shuts down modules of the explicit system. They then weigh in on the long-standing issue of the value of perfectionism by distinguishing two kinds, one of which draws processing through the explicit system and the other through the implicit system-the former being deleterious in attempts to achieve flow. 2. The physiology of flow Related to the work of Moller, Meier, and Wall described above, Fredrik Ullén, Örjan de Manzano, Töres Theorell, and László Harmat have successfully induced flow in the lab and examined its physiological correlates. Through these studies, they have found that the physiological correlates (measured in skin conductance, electromyography of facial muscles, and respiratory and cardiovascular dimensions) of effortless attention are, indeed, unique, sharing some features with the state of joyous arousal and importantly distinct from the state of effortful attention. Through further measurements of personality traits, including flow proneness, they found that flow proneness is not correlated with the capacity for sustained effortful attention, nor with general intelligence in leisure activities, and is negatively correlated with general intelligence in maintenance and professional activities. Bruya_01_Intro.indd 18 10/30/2009 1:55:19 PM G Bruya-Effortless Attention Introduction 1 Topic : Mental Training Overview In the West, expertise has traditionally been viewed as a combination of inborn ability and effortful practice. While some valuable attempts have been made on a descriptive level (Jackson and Csikszentmihalyi 1999; Kremer and Scully 1994; Moran 1996) and while there have been calls for a program of research in this area (Moran 1996)-and while popular psychology has been flooded with speculation and anecdotal evidence of the efficacy of mental training (Grout and Perrin 2004; Kauss 2001; Kuehl, Kuehl, and Tefertiller 2005; Millman 1999)-just as with the topic of effortlessness, comparatively little progress has been made in explaining scientifically the processes and effectiveness of mental training. In the East, we find a situation in which effortlessness and mental training have been topics of philosophical speculation for millennia. Edward Slingerland (2003) has documented a direct concern with effortless action across numerous schools of thought in ancient China, Brian Bruya (2010) has taxonomized effortlessness as spontaneity in early China and identified allied notions in the history of Western philosophy, and volumes too numerous to mention have been written on the methods of meditation and mindfulness in Hindu and Buddhist philosophy. Over the past few decades, these methods and concerns have gradually been trickling into the cognitive science literature-for example, in Maturana and Varela's concept of autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela 1980), Ellen Langer's work on mindfulness (Langer 1989), and James Austin's neurological analysis of meditation (Austin 1998, 2006, this volume). Effortlessness involves two important characteristics: (1) full attention and (2) a dropping away of a salient sense of self. Meditation practices involve the cultivation of these two mental states, and recent research has shown that neural plasticity in adult humans is more extensive than previously believed. Bengtsson and Ullén have shown that piano practice can influence white matter structure well into adulthood (Bengtsson et al. 2005). In separate studies, Lutz and colleagues (Lutz, Greischar, Rawlings, Ricard, and Davidson 2004) and Davidson and colleagues (Davidson et al. 2003) have shown that long-term meditators can alter neuronal structures that are implicated in high-attention states. Their results show that their subjects are able to voluntarily induce not only high-amplitude gamma oscillations but also long-distance gamma synchrony. Equally important is that these subjects' baseline EEG spectral profiles differed significantly from those of the control subjects, demonstrating the possibility of long-term neural changes through meditative practice. B. Rael Cahn and John Polich undertook a comprehensive review of neurological studies of meditation (Cahn and Polich 2006) that confirms the positive effects of meditation on attention. B. Alan Wallace, a former Tibetan Buddhist monk and now an active scholar, has produced a series of books that explain the elements of Bruya_01_Intro.indd 19 10/30/2009 1:55:19 PM G Bruya-Effortless Attention 0 Brian Bruya attentional training in the Buddhist idiom (Wallace and Houshmand 1992; Wallace and Houshmand 1999) and has more recently attempted to interpret these in relation to advances in cognitive science (Wallace 2003; Wallace and Tsoçn-kha-pa Blo-bzaçngrags-pa 2005; Wallace 2007). According to Wallace, Buddhists view meditation as a metaskill, a skill that is applicable to multiple domains. This skill, he says, can be cultivated by anyone and begins with a concerted effort to diminish self-centeredness. The result of the training, he says, is extensive cognitive–affective control, positive affect, and a robust prosocial attitude. John Kabat-Zinn reports that an 8to 10-week group program in mindfulness meditation training can produce shortand long-term positive results in reducing anxiety and pain (Kabat-Zinn et al. 1992; Miller, Fletcher, and Kabat-Zinn 1995). Wallace claims that it takes six months to a year of full-time meditation practice, under conducive conditions and with appropriate preparation and instruction, for a person to achieve a state of sustainable effortless attention (Wallace and Houshmand 1999). Challenges–Gaps While researchers have had significant success in examining the neural correlates of attention on the one hand and the parameters for improving performance within a domain of activity on the other, the neural confluence of these two topics has been relatively neglected. According to Marc Jeannerod (2006), evidence supports the hypothesis that representing an action and executing it are distinct but functionally equivalent. If representing an action is essentially practicing an action, then visualization, observation, and any steps that support or promote these will have an impact on cultivating skills that contribute to high-level effortless action. In the East, many claims have been made regarding taxonomies of higher levels of focused attention/concentration/absorption, but there is little agreement on particular terminology or functional demarcations. It is unclear with how much precision we can conceptualize any natural neurological and developmental boundaries of different kinds of attention and of levels of focused attention for objective study. Theory A question that a theory of effortlessness must attempt to answer is to what extant mental training conducted in one domain is transferable to other domains. Further, is there such a thing as metamental training-mental training that is conducted outside of a specific domain but which is applicable across domains? Anecdotal evidence from Buddhist publications suggests that meditation and mindfulness training could offer such a metamethod. If such a claim turns out to be supported by empirical evidence, it could have broad implications for clinical application, formal education, and other kinds of training. Bruya_01_Intro.indd 20 10/30/2009 1:55:19 PM G Bruya-Effortless Attention Introduction 1 A complete theory of effortless attention and action would include not only precise definitions of basic terms of attention but also a taxonomy of stages of attentional training. Advances 1. Evidence for improved attention through general training In their contribution, Michael Posner, Mary Rothbart, M. R. Rueda, and Yiyuan Tang trace measurements of temperamental effortful control in parents and children to specific brain networks and the brain networks to specific gene alleles, demonstrating natural individual differences in attentional capacity. They go on to demonstrate that these differences can be significantly influenced through environmental factors. Testing the potential of attentional training, Posner and colleagues found that five days of computerized task training in young children can result in increased activity in the anterior cingulate cortex, a general and persistent increase in IQ, and an increase in affective regulation. In adults, in a double-blind study in which subjects were trained for only 20 minutes per day over five days in a systematic method of mind–body attention, subjects showed improvement in executive attention, lower negative affect, lower fatigue, and lower stress compared to both controls and subjects who underwent generic relaxation training. 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The execution of action in autotelic experience typically depends on overlearned action, whereas overlearned action does not necessarily entail the achievement of autotelic experience. Also, overlearned action seems to reduce effort by bringing action out of attention, freeing up cognitive resources for other things, whereas autotelicity is marked by the paradox of minutely sensitized attention coupled with a diminution of subjective will. 3. If objective effort in autotelic experience is found to decrease along with subjective effort, while efficacy is maintained, the standard models would be challenged even more radically. Bruya_01_Intro.indd 28 10/30/2009 1:55:20 PM

Granular Spatio-Temporal Ontologies Thomas Bittner and Barry Smith Institute for Formal Ontology and Medical Information Science University of Leipzig [email protected], [email protected] Abstract We propose an ontological theory that is powerful enough to describe both complex spatio-temporal processes (occurrents) and the enduring entities (continuants) that participate therein. The theory is divided into two major categories of sub-theories: (sub-) theories of type SPAN and (sub-)theories of type SNAP. These theories represent two complementary perspectives on reality and result in distinct though compatible systems of categories. In SNAP we have enduring entities such as substances, qualities, roles, functions; in SPAN we have perduring entities such as processes and their parts and aggregates. We argue that both kinds of ontological theory are required in order to give a non-reductionism account of complex domains of reality. Introduction We propose a realist ontological theory that is powerful enough to contain the resources to describe both complex spatio-temporal processes and the enduring entities which participate therein. The theory we have in mind is formal in the sense that it is designed to serve as a re-usable module that can be applied in a variety of material domains. It comprehends two major categories of sub-theories: (sub- )theories of type SNAP and (sub-)theories of type SPAN. As we shall see, these theories represent orthogonal inventories of reality, comparable to the division familiar in the discipline of accounting between stocks and flows. SNAP and SPAN reflect two distinct perspectives on reality and result in distinct though compatible systems of categories (Figures 1 and 2). In SNAP we have enduring entities such as substances, qualities, roles, functions; in SPAN we have perduring entities such as processes and their parts and aggregates. We consider three example domains and we seek to show that the ontological structure manifested in these domains can be understood only in a framework that has the resources of both SNAP and SPAN. Our example domains are medicine, military actions, and natural language understanding. We claim that critical to any adequate ontology of these and related classes of applications is the understanding of the interplay of processes, enduring entities, and changes in enduring entities which are related to their participation in Copyright c 2003, American Association for Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved. processes. In the course of this paper we will provide an ontological theory which will allow us to understand this kind of interplay. Concrete Entit [Exists in space and time, unfolds in time phase by phase] Processual Entit [normally dependent on substances and thus ±Relational] Process Exercise of role, function, power Aggregate of Processes* Instantaneous Temporal Boundary of Process (= Ingarden's ' Event')* Quasi-Process Increase in the interest rate Spatio-Temporal Region of Dimension T, T+0, T+1, T+2, T+3 Region occupied by a process such as a chess match Fiat Part of Process* Figure 1: Upper level categories in SPAN. Enduring Entity [Exists in space and time, has no temporal parts] Spatial Region of Dimension 0,1,2,3 Dependent Entity [±Relational] Independent Entities and Their Parts and Aggregates Quality, State, Power [Sometimes form Quality Regions or Scales] The ball's redness, The cat's being on the mat, The iron bar's magnetism, Substance [maximally connected causal unity] Human being, Cat, Lump of cheese Boundary of Substance * Fiat or Bona Fide or Mixed Aggregate of Substances * Family, Portion of rice, Bikini Fiat Part of Substance * Handle, tail, mountai Quasi-Quality, Quasi-State, Quasi-Power Plan, Algorithm, Price, Debt, Contract, State of being married, Role of vicar, Functions of the President Quasi-Substance Chess club, College, Corporation Figure 2: Upper level categories in SNAP. The limits of four-dimensionalism One popular position in contemporary analytic metaphysics is that of four-dimensionalism. This holds that all entities in reality (including clinical trials, military actions, the entities of our common-sense ontology) are four-dimensional worms extended in space and time ala Minkowski. (See (Sid01) for further discussion.) The four-dimensionalist takes a view of the world as consisting exclusively of variously demarcated and variously qualitatively filled spatiotemporal worms. Prominent four-dimensionalists are: Amstrong (Ams80), Carnap (Car67), Cartwright (Car75), and Lewis (Lew). An important aspect of four-dimensionalism is the thesis that time is just another dimension, in addition to and analogous to the three spatial dimensions. We can think of the four-dimensionalist ontology as what results when reality is described from the perspective of a god-like observer spanning the whole of reality from beginning to end and from one spatial extremity to the other. Human beings take this stance, for example, when they view the world through the lenses of the theory of relativity. We call the resulting ontological theories SPAN ontologies. SPAN ontologies span the entire four-dimensional plenum; hence reality in such ontologies is described atemporally. The acceptance of this atemporal description of reality does not mean that the existence of the temporal dimension of spatio-temporal entities is denied. Rather, it means that certain aspects of this temporal dimension – above all its subdivision into past, present, and future – are traced over. Also traced over in a view of the world as consisting exclusively of spatio-temporal worms is the existence of enduring entities, such as people whose identity survives changes such as the gain or loss of molecules and cells, or plans whose identity survives through the different stages of their fulfillment. Taken alone, a four-dimensionalist ontology is too weak for the purposes of giving an account of the ontology of clinical trails, of military actions or of the world as described by the simple sentences of natural language. This is because an ontology adequate to these purposes needs to have the resources to deal not only with processes but also with enduring entities and with the change and preservation of identity over time that is associated therewith. Enduring entities are not spread out in time in the way in which they are spread out in space and in the way processes are spread out in time. Rather they exist in toto at every instant at which they exist at all. This is true not only of substances such as you and me, but also of our qualities, roles and functions, of the plans and intentions we form, and of the diseases from which we suffer. Medical treatment. An ontology of medical treatment must provide a framework for a systematic account of processes inside and outside the human body – the domain of physiology – and of the corresponding effects on the side of patients (enduring entities) – the domain of anatomy. From this perspective it is clear that enduring entities need to be recognized by any adequate ontology of medical treatment. To see that enduring entities are as important as the processes in which they are involved one also needs to consider the fact that doctors may interact with patients (for examination or treatment) over long periods of time and this means that they interact with the same patients at different times, or in other word with enduring entities. In order to monitor a course of treatment they need to track the processes taking place within some given human being. Such tracking presupposes the enduring existence not only of doctor and patient but also of the doctor's enduring intention (plan) to carry out the tracking. The given processes, too, are two-fold: processes of tracking on the one hand, and the tracked processes themselves on the other. Some of the latter can be detected only indirectly. When your family doctor examines you, then she may initiate new processes in order to gauge from your responses the underlying processes taking place in the interior of your body. Also she may detect the occurrence of processes in the interior of your body via the measurement of qualities at its exterior. The military domain Similar observations can be made in relation to the military domain. Focusing only on processes and thereby tracing over the involvement of substance-like enduring entities such as human beings, platoons, armies, as well as plans, powers, functions and roles, misses important aspects of military reality. The efficient structuring of military units and their co-ordination on the battlefield presupposes relations of authority – persons with specific roles and powers in virtue of which armies become organized in nested hierarchies of larger and smaller units. It presupposes an opposition between friendly and enemy forces, an opposition which obtains even when fighting is at a standstill. All these aspects can be recognized by an ontology only if the corresponding enduring entities are recognized also. The psychological aspect, too, plays an important role. The evaluation of the morale of the troops is an important aspect of the evaluation of the overall power of military units. Again, processes do not have low of high morale. Morale is a quality of enduring entities. Ontology for Natural Language Processing. A third class of applications is the ontology of common sense. Consider the sentence A 'John is kissing Mary' The entities denoted by 'John' and 'Mary' here are substances or enduring entities. The sentence as a whole, on the other hand, refers to a certain process of kissing and it asserts that this process is occurring over a time interval including the time of utterance. At the same time it presupposes that there is some spatial environment within which the process unfolds itself through time. An ontology describing the entities referred to by this sentence needs to have the resources to describe both complex spatio-temporal processes (the kissing event) and the enduring entities which participate therein (John and Mary). We claim that critical to an adequate ontology of all three application domains is the understanding of the interplay of processes and enduring entities. The four-dimensionalist ontology fails to do justice to this kind of interplay. We shall thus offer a view which differs from four-dimensionalism in holding that the SPAN ontology does not exhaust the totality of what exists. The limits of Three-Dimensionalism In order to take account of the existence of enduring entities we need to develop a second type of ontological view, in addition to the SPAN ontology of the four-dimensionalists. We can think of this second type of view as being analogous to the taking of an instantaneous snapshot of reality, thereby apprehending all enduring entities existing at a given time (Gea66; Zem70). We call the resulting view a SNAP ontology. The SNAP view gives us access to enduring entities such as John, his house, his car, etc., as well as the relations between them, their qualities, roles, functions, and so forth – but not to processes such as John's life or John's digestion of his lunch or his drive to work. This is because the SNAP view apprehends only those entities which exist in full at a given instant of time and processes exist only in such a way as to unfold themselves through time. On the other hand, what one gets when slicing fourdimensional entities within a SPAN ontology at a certain point in time are not enduring entities but (threedimensional) slices of processes. Whereas gluing together an arbitrary number of SNAP ontologies does not yield a SPAN ontology. No slicing and gluing operations can allow the translation from SNAP into SPAN or vice versa. In order to establish a relationship between SNAP and SPAN ontologies one needs rather to analyze SNAP and SPAN ontologies on some meta-level. The entities recognized in a SNAP ontology are enduring entities and the different sorts of enduring relations between them such as spatial relations, relations of authority, family relations, and so forth. The entities in a SPAN ontology are processes and the (timeless) relations between them (e.g. the spatio-temporal overlap of the process of the spreading of an infection through your body and the rising of your body temperature). When describing reality in terms of a SNAP ontology we take a perspective which is modeled on the everyday experiences of reality which we enjoy in successive present moments. We can also call this perspective the human perspective, as opposed to the god's eye perspective which we adopt when using the SPAN ontology. Spatial change occurs whenever enduring entities have different qualities (of color, temperature and so on), parts, locations, roles, etc., at different moments in time. It is important to note that the succession of times is itself outside the scope of each SNAP ontology. From the SNAP perspective time is an index which we assign to the inventories of the world we take at different moments – one index per ontology. This indexing – which we can make explicit by writing SNAP
 , SNAP
 , . . . – occurs not within the ontology itself but on a meta-level. For this reason there is no representation of the flow of time in SNAP. Within each SNAP
 ontology processes are invisible, just as enduring entities are invisible within the SPAN ontology. Thus, however many SNAP
 ontologies we have at our disposal, they will always be insufficient to constitute a complete inventory of reality. Kinds of ontologies and cross categorical relations The underlying idea in all of the above is that the we can associate ontologies with ways we humans project onto reality, i.e., with the different perspectives we take when describing or perceiving reality. We can indeed define an ontology as an inventory of those entities existing in reality which are visible from a certain perspective. We concentrate here on the SPAN/SPAN perspectives, but we do not rule out the possibility that other ontology-generating perspectives might be distinguished. Since ontologies reflect certain views or ways of projecting onto reality we consider an ontology not as a collection of terms or sentences but rather as a collection of judgments bound by a certain context. The context hereby may be more or less general in its scope and it can be specified (1) according to the kind of ontology at hand, which means according to the view of reality that is adopted; (2) according to the scope of the ontology (e.g., the medical domain vs. the domain of warfare); and also (3) according to the level of granularity at which an inventory of the domain is taken. Factors (2) and (3) ensure selectivity. Thus in the medical domain the selectivity feature is responsible for the fact that the target domain is the human body, which is made up of different kinds of enduring entities at different levels of granularity: body parts such as organs, limbs, torso, etc. at a very coarse level of granularity, cells at a finer level of granularity, molecules at a still finer level of granularity, and so on. On the other side there are also processes taking places within the human body at different levels of granularity. At the most granular level there is the process which is John's life (with its constituent processes such as John's youth, John's adulthood, and so on); at lower levels of granularity there are processes of digestion, breathing, and so on. Obviously, there are relationships between SNAP entities at successive levels of granularity, and the same is true for SPAN entities. Of critical importance is that there are also crossontological or cross-categorical relationships between SNAP entities and SPAN entities in the sense that every process depends on its carrier-substances. For example, the process which is John's live depends on the substance John, a kissing process depends on those who perform the kissing, the process of John's digestion depends on John's digestive organs, and so on. A classification of those crosscategorical dependence relations can be found in (Gre03a; Gre03b). For the purposes of this paper it is above all the the granularity issue that is involved in such dependence relations that is of interest. For example it is the enduring SNAP-entity John John as a whole which is the bearer of that coarsegrained SPAN-entity which is John's life-process. On the other hand John's digestive tract is the bearer of his digestion process, rather than John as a whole. The process of oxygen exchange in the lungs depends on tiny blood vessels in the lung and on the blood cells transported through them. Cross-categorical dependence relations thus hold between SNAP and SPAN entities which are of compatible granularity. This is the motivation for our definition of granular ontologies below. In the remainder of the paper we assume that every ontology is characterized at a meta-level by three independent axes: the underlying view (SNAP vs. SPAN), the target domain (selectivity), and the level of granularity. Granular partitions and granular ontologies In our papers (SB02; BS02) we introduced the notion of a granular partition in order to capture formally the ways in which human cognition selectively targets entities in reality above all in light of the granular structure of the latter. Consider for example, the human body, which can be subdivided into head, torso, limbs. Limbs are subdivided into: arms, legs, and so on. Such subdivisions reflect acts of human cognition whereby boundaries are imposed by fiat upon targeted objects at different levels of granularity (Smi01). Examples of fiat boundaries are: the boundary between your hand and your lower arm, between your torso and your neck, etc. (Compare the hierarchies in Figure 3.) Such boundaries do not correspond to any discontinuities in the underlying reality. However, they are in the given example, not imposed arbitrarily but rather in a manner that is consistent with constraints of form and function. Left leg Right legLeft arm Right arm l. Hand l. upper arm l. lower arm Person Torso LimbsHead Figure 3: Hierarchical subdivision of the human body. Other examples of granular partitions are political subdivisions such as the subdivision of Europe into countries, regions, towns; the subdivision of the animal kingdom into genus and species; the subdivision of an army into divisions, battalions, and platoons, and so on. Definition: A granular partition is a triple,   ! " Here #$ is a cell structure with a partial ordering defined by  which forms a finite tree.  is the target domain which is a partial ordering which satisfies the axioms of general extensional mereology (GEM) (Sim87). The projection mapping &%')(* is an order-homomorphism from  into  such that for all +-,  +/.10  and for all 23,  24.10  we have:1 +5,  +6.7 8 +5, 9: +6.  + , ':8 + .  7;+ ,  + . " 1The notion of granular partitions introduced in (BS02) is more general. Here we focus on granular partitions which are mereologically monotonic. Since we are only interested in those entities in  which are targeted by cells in  it will be sufficient to refer to the cell structure as a proxy for the granular partition as a whole. Consequently we will write #$ as an abbreviation for< = . We hereby assume that the cells in are labeled with the names of the corresponding targeted portions of reality. Consider the following examples: (E1) A spatial granular partition formed by the cells Hyde Park, Soho, Buckingham Palace, Congestion Zone, London, York, Edinburgh, Glasgow, England, Scotland, Great Britain, Germany, Europe with the corresponding nesting (Figure 4); (E2) The partition of a human body into head, torso, limbs, left arm, left upper arm, left lower arm, left hand, etc., again with the corresponding nesting (Figure 3). Hyde Park Soho Buckingham Palace Europe Great Britain Germany Scotland York London England Edinburgh Glasgow SuburbsCongestion Zone Figure 4: Hierarchical structure of places Let   >#@?BAC be a granular partition and let DFE be the corresponding tree representation. A level of granularityG?HA in   is then a cut in the tree-structure in the sense of (RS95): (1) Let I be the root of DFE , then J/IK is a cut; (2) sons  I  is a cut, where sons LM is the set of immediate descendants of L ; (3) Let N be a cut and O=0N such that sons  O QP )R then NTS U N<VWO YX sons  O  is a cut. This definition ensures that: (i) the elements forming a level of granularity are pair-wise disjoint, i.e., Z@[\O\,  O5.]0^N % O3, _O5.`aO5.T_=O3, ; and (ii) levels of granularity are exhaustive in the sense that bcO!0  ?BA % if O P0WN then [\O\S90WN % O OdSèfO\S  O . Following (RS95) we define a partial order on cuts N andN1S of a given tree as: NhgiNTS if and only if bkjl0mNTS % [\na0N such that n  j . Consider Figures 3 and 4. Levels of granularity are for example:oqp J Fred Ko , J head  torso  limbs Ko . J head  torso  l. arm  r. arm  l. leg  r. leg Kosr J head  torso  l. leg  r. leg  r. arm  l. hand  l. lower arm  l. upper arm Kt p J Europe Kt ,uJ Great Britain  Germany Kt . J York  London  Scotland  Germany Kt r J York  Hyde Park  Soho  Buckingham Palace  Suburbs  Edinburgh  Glasgow  Germany K (1) We can now define the notion of a granular ontology: (G) A granular ontology is an inventory of entities existing in reality all of which belong to the same level of some granular partition. It follows from the constraints laid on levels of granularities that the entities recognized by a given granular ontology have the property that they do not have parts recognized by the ontology in question. Such parts, if they exist at all, are not visible in the ontology in question in the same sense in which enduring entities are not visible in SPAN ontologies. The entities recognized by a granular ontology are marked by what we might call relative atomicity. They have this property, however, only relative to whatever is in the underlying level of granularity. Granular spatio-temporal ontologies Consider the sentence (B) 'John was in Hyde Park from 6am to 7am on Monday morning'. Here we have a process which is recognized by the corresponding SPAN ontology. We can call it Johnbeing-in-Hyde-Park-on-Monday-morning. The level of granularity underlying this particular granular ontology we call SPAN vqwxy{zs| . At a finer level of granularity, e.g., that of SPAN }~€-| , the same entity might be recognized as the mereological sum of John-enteringthe-park, John-walking-to-his-favorite-bench, John-sittingdown-on-his-favorite-bench, John-walking-to-the-exit, and John-exiting-the-park, and so on. The important point is that in SPAN vqwxyz‚| the particular mereological structure visible in SPAN }/~ƒ3| is traced over. Of course, in SPAN }~€-| even finer mereological structures such as John's-first-stepin-the-park, John's-second-step-in-the-park, and so on, are traced over. Consequently, there is no single granular SPAN ontology of a given domain, but rather a system of such ontologies, which form a granularity lattice. Each granular ontology within this lattice is an inventory of the same domain but at a different level of granularity. Corresponding to granular SPAN ontologies there are granular SNAP ontologies. For example, we have on the one hand a granular ontology SNAP vqwxy{zs| with entities like Hyde Park and on the other hand a granular ontology SNAP }/~ƒ-| with entities like Entrance-of-Hyde-Park, the-path-from-the-entrance-to-the-bench, and so on. Consider once again our sentence (B) and the granular ontologies SPAN vqwxyzs| and SPAN vqwxy{zs| . The whole family of SNAP
 ontologies for 6am „ 7am represents a series of coarse-grained SNAP-shots, each of which involves the SNAP entity John standing in a certain relation to another SNAP entity Hyde Park, which we might express by in(John, Hyde Park).2 This relation holds no matter whether 2Notice that having both John and Hyde Park in our granular SNAP ontology does not violate the no-overlap-principle. This is because John is located in Hyde Park but no part of John is also a part of Hyde Park and vise versa. For more about objects that occupy the same space without overlapping each other see (CV99) or (Don03). John is near the entrance of the park or sitting on his favorite bench in the center of the park. This corresponds to the John-being-in-Hyde-Park-on-Monday-morning process in the SPAN vqwxy{zs| ontology. This indicates that there is a rather complex interrelationship between granular SPAN ontologies and granular SNAP ontologies, which goes beyond the already mentioned dependence relationships. We accordingly define the notion of matching SPAN–SNAP pairs in order to specify aspects of this interrelationship in a more formal manner. Let SPAN † be a granular SPAN ontology at granularity level t , let SNAP } be a set of granular SNAP
 ontologies at granularity level ‡ , and let a slice of a SPAN entity be its projection on the spatial domain at a certain point in time at which it exists. We then say that (SPAN †  SNAP } ) is a matching SPAN–SNAP pair if and only if for each SNAP }
0 SNAP } there is a corresponding slice of SPAN † such that: 1. the time indexes of the SPAN † -slice and the SNAP }
ontology are identical; 2. for every entity ˆ recognized in SNAP }
there exists a slice of a life-process ‰ recognized in the corresponding SPAN † -slice such that ˆ and ‰ occupy the same spatial region; 3. for every SNAP }
relation there is a corresponding SPAN † -slice-entity with the appropriate time index; and 4. for every SPAN † -entity there is an Š -ary SNAP }
relation ‹ ranging over SNAP }
-entities Œ5, """ Œ6 such that‹  Œ5, """ Œ6  holds in SNAP }
; (this is the identity relation for lives of SNAP entities, kissing relations for kissing events, and so on). Note that this kind of correspondence can only hold if the granular ontologies SPAN † and SNAP }
0 SNAP } inventarize entities which are recognized by granular SNAP and SPAN ontologies with compatible levels of granularity. If the granularity of the one ontology is too fine compared to the granularity of the other, then there are either lives of entities in SPAN without the corresponding entities in SNAP or vice versa; or there are SPAN-entities for which there is no corresponding SNAP relation; or there are SNAP-relations without corresponding SPAN-entities. Consider, for example the pair (SPAN }/~ƒ-| , SNAP vqwxyzs| ) with SPAN }/~ƒ-| recognizing atomic entities like Johnentering-the-park and John-walking-to-his-favorite-bench, and SNAP vqwxy{zs| 0 SNAP vqwxy{zs| on the other hand recognizing atomic entities like John, Hyde Park, etc. and relations like in(John, Hyde Park). For (SPAN }/~ƒ-| ,SNAP vqwxyzs| ) to be a matching SPAN–SNAP pair there would have to be SNAP
 , SNAP
 , etc. in SNAP vqwxy{zs| such that (1) SNAP vqwxy{zs|
 recognizes the atomic entities John, the-entrance-of-the-park, and the relation in(John, theentrance-of-the-park) and (2) SNAP vqwxy{zs|
 recognizes the atomic entities John, the-path-from-the-entrance-to-thebench, and the relation in(John, the-path-from-the-entranceto-the-bench), and so on. Entities like the-entrance-ofthe-park are however of a granularity which is different from that of Hyde Park. Therefore such entities are not recognized by the ontologies in SNAP vqwxy{zs| , and that is why (SPAN }~€-| ,SNAP vqwxy{zs| ) is not a matching SPAN– SNAP pair. Conclusions We have proposed a realist ontological theory that is powerful enough to contain the resources to describe both complex spatio-temporal processes and the enduring entities which participate therein. This theory is divided into two major categories of sub-theories: (sub-)theories of type SPAN and (sub-)theories of type SNAP. These theories represent orthogonal inventories of reality; they presuppose different perspectives on reality and result in distinct though compatible systems of categories. In SNAP we have enduring entities such as substances, qualities, roles, functions; in SPAN we have perduring entities such as processes and their parts and aggregates. We argued that ontologies reflect views or ways of projecting onto reality that one needs to consider an ontology not as a collection of terms or sentences but rather as a collection of judgments bound by a certain context. We then argued that ontologies can be classified according to: (a) the underlying view of reality; (b) The scope or domain; and (c) the level of granularity at which an inventory of this domain is compiled. Acknowledgements Our thanks go to Jonathan Simon and Pierre Grenon for helpful comments. Support from the the Wolfgang Paul Program of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. References D.M. Amstrong. Time and cause: Essays presented to Richard Taylor, chapter Identity through time. Dortrecht: D. Reidel, 1980. T. Bittner and B. Smith. A theory of granular partitions. In M. Worboys and M. Duckham, editors, Foundations of Geographic Information Science. 2002. R. Carnap. The logical structure of the world. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967. R. Cartwreight. Scattered objects. In Keith Leherer, editor, Analysis and Metaphysics, pages 153–71. D. Reidel, 1975. R. Casati and A. C. Varzi. Parts and Places. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press., 1999. M. Donnelly. Layered mereotopology. In Technical report, IFOMIS, University of Leipzig, 2003. P. Geach. Some problems about time. Proceedings of the British Academy, 11, 1966. P. Grenon. The spatio-temporal ontology of reality and its formalization. In AAAI Spring Symposium on Foundations and Applications of Spatio-Temporal Reasoning (FASTR)., 2003. P. Grenon. Spatio-temporality in basic formal ontology (bfo), draft. Technical report, IFOMIS, University of Leipzig, 2003. D. Lewis. Survival and identity. In Philosopical Papers. P. Rigaux and M. Scholl. Multi-scale partitions: Application to spatial and statistical databases. In M. Egenhofer and J. Herrings, editors, Advances in Spatial Databases (SSD'95), number 951 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1995. B. Smith and B. Brogaard. Quantum mereotopology. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 35(1–2), 2002. T. Sider. Four–Dimensionalism. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2001. P. Simons. Parts, A Study in Ontology. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987. B. Smith. Fiat objects. Topoi, 20(2), 2001. E. Zemach. Four ontologies. Journal of Philosophy, 1970.

TEORIE VĚDY / THEORY OF SCIENCE / XXXII / 2010 / 3 ////// tematické studie / thematic articles ////////////////////// DISCUSSION OF EVOLUTION BETWEEN NEO-LAMARCKISM AND NEO-DARWINISM IN THE CZECH LANDS, 1900–1915 Abstract: Th e study focuses on the impact of the changes in biology of the late 19th and early 20th century in the Czech Lands. Until WWI, there existed several distinct theories of evolution of organisms. In the Czech Lands, this multitude of explanations was complemented by a multi-layered cultural and scientifi c environment, where Czech and German biology infl uenced each other and met at various autonomous institutions. Th ere were also diff erences between Prague and Brno, centres with their own scientifi c traditions and independent links to Vienna and other European universities. Th e main subject of this paper are the theoretical biologists who had long-term impact on Czech biological thought or infl uenced it directly by working here. In about 1900–1915, we witness the fi rst clear and recognised peak in the Czech reception of evolutionism. Keywords: history of biology; Neo-Darwinism; Neo-Lamarckism; theory of evolution; Czech Lands 1900–1915; Charles University TOMÁŠ HERMANN Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR Puškinovo nám. 9, 160 00 Praha 6 email / [email protected] Diskuse o evoluci mezi neolamarckismem a neodarwinismem v českých zemích (1900–1915) Abstrakt: Studie se zabývá odrazem změn v biologickém myšlení v českých zemích od přelomu 19. a 20. století do první světové války, kdy vedle sebe existovaly různé názory na evoluci. Mnohovrstevnatost teoretickou přitom doplňuje i kulturní a vědecká mnohovrstevnatost českých zemí, kde se mísila německé a české biologie na autonomních institucích. Projevovaly se i rozdíly mezi centry v Praze a Brně s jejich badatelskými tradicemi a nezávislými vazbami na Vídeň a jiné evropské univerzity. Ústředním zájmem jsou teoretičtí biologové, kteří dlouhodobě profi lovali české biologické myšlení či na něj měli přímý vliv skrze své zdejší působení. V letech 1900–1915 došlo k prvnímu otevřenému a diskutovanému vrcholu v české recepci evolucionismu. Klíčová slova: dějiny biologie; neodarwinismus; neolamarckismus; teorie evoluce; české země 1900–1915; Univerzita Karlova MICHAL ŠIMŮNEK Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR Puškinovo nám. 9, 160 00 Praha 6 email / [email protected] 284 Th e process of reception of Darwinism in the Czech Lands off ers, through the medium of a particular historical example, a fascinating insight into a broad range of general questions concerning the theory and sociology of science, brings up various important issues of contemporary intellectual history, namely questions regarding the place of science in modern society and within diff erent political regimes, and fi nally, it sheds some new light on the relation between science, philosophy, politics, and ideology in general. Until today, Darwin's teaching provides the most important and infl uential framework for a scientifi c explanation of the origin and evolution of organisms. Yet, in the Czech Lands (Bohemia and Moravia), its legacy and discussions surrounding its reception were oft en infl uenced by a broad framework of philosophical, ethical, religious, political, and ideological issues. We have described the fi rst hundred years of reception of Darwin's work in the Czech Lands, starting with Darwin's arrival in the scientifi c community in 1859 and ending with a centenary in 1959, in a volume on Th e Reception of Charles Darwin in Europe.1 Th ere, we tried to present a broad and comprehensive outline of the infl uence Darwinism exerted in this region. We took into account the variety of possible applications of the theory of evolution, the many scientifi c disciplines where it found use, and a number of important people who were connected with Darwinism in some way. In our view, all these aspect, jointly taken, form a remarkable network of scientifi c, philosophical, ideological, and political issues. Th rough this prism we can then better understand this one specifi c region of Central Europe and the events which shaped its history in the 19th and 20th century. Th e scope of the present study, however, is too limited to go into these particulars. Given that both of the main totalitarian ideologies of the 20th century, Nazism and Communism, which in fast sequence exerted large infl uence on the Czech scientifi c thinking, extensively used and misused Darwinism, it is the beginning of the 20th century that deserves close attention. In the following study we therefore intend to follow in some detail various aspects of the debate and the multitude of positions from which Darwinism was discussed. At the centre of our attention are biologists with theoretical inclinations who either had a large impact on Czech biological thinking or worked here 1 Tomáš HERMANN – Michal ŠIMŮNEK, "Between Science and Ideology: Th e Reception of Darwin and Darwinism in the Czech Lands, 1859–1959." In: ENGELS, E.-M. – GLICK, T. F. (eds.), Th e Reception of Charles Darwin in Europe. Vol. 1. London – New York: Continuum 2008, p. 199–216. Tomáš Hermann / Michal Šimůnek Th is paper is published as part of the Czech Science Foundation P410/10/P550 research project, and MSM0021620845 research project. 285 and infl uenced it directly. And then, there is another aspect which needs proper consideration: A confrontation and comparison between the situation in Prague and in Brno may not only help us understand some of the complexity attendant upon the reception of Darwinism in the Czech Lands but also off er an interesting insight into the complexities of intellectual and scientifi c networks in Central Europe. Th e beginning of the 20th century witnessed an abundance of debates about an "eclipse of Darwinism". For the most part, these discussions focused on a reinterpretation of the foundations of the Darwinian view of evolution, at the centre of which stood the theory of natural selection, issues of origins of variability, preservation of variations, their heritability etc. Th eoretical discussions of this period feature a vast number of "isms", oft en accompanied by the prefi x "neo". Various version of "neo-vitalism" emerged and were becoming dominant. Th ey were oft en defi ned by contrast to Darwinism of the second half of the 19th century and opposition to a mechanistic explanation of living nature. Th e need to complete and extend the Darwinian view of evolution led on the one hand to a renaissance of various versions of "neoLamarckisms", and to a more extreme formulation of "neo-Darwinism" based on Weismann's original formulations on the other hand. At the centre of these discussions stood the new results of studies in heredity, which aft er 1900 united the methodology and scientifi c results of several fi elds of biology (hybridism, cytology, variation statistics, etc.). Th e aim of many scientists was to capture the complexity of evolution of living organisms within the fast developing framework of heredity/genetics. In accordance with the prevailing mood of that time, many of these subtle, inherently biological problems were incorporated into philosophical frameworks, and eventually came to play an important role in the development of positions on social issues and social policies.2 2 On the situation in biology in early 20th century see in contemporary account esp. Emanuel RÁDL, Th e History of Biological Th eories. London: Oxford University Press 1930. (German original Emanuel RÁDL, Geschichte der biologischen Th eorien. Teil II, Entwicklungstheorien in der Biologie des XIX. Jahrhunderts. Leipzig: Engelmann 1909; for more on the author see below.) From newer literature, see esp. Peter J. BOWLER, Evolution: Th e History of an Idea. Berkeley – Los Angeles – London: University of California Press 2003, p. 224–324 (contains further references to various problems and disciplines), also Garland ALLEN, Th e Life Sciences in the Twentieth Century. New York – London: Cambridge University Press 1975. For genetics especially, see Leslie C. DUNN, A Short History of Genetics. New York: McGraw-Hill 1965; Hans STUBBE, History of Genetics: From Prehistoric Times to the Rediscovery of Mendel's Laws. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1972; and Raphael FALK, Genetic Analysis: A History of Discussion of Evolution Between Neo-Lamarckism and Neo-Darwinism 286 Just as the impact of Darwin's thoughts varied in diff erent sciences, so too its infl uence and the ways in which it was asserted diff ered in life sciences across various countries and their intellectual centres. We can make a very rough division of four "scientifi c cultures" in Europe of this period, centring them around the Anglo-Saxon, French, German, and Russian linguistic and cultural sphere. Since the mid-19th century, however, other national communities of various sizes began to rise and gain infl uence. Not surprisingly, one of their main aims was an emancipation of national science. Such enterprises usually included a creation of an independent scientifi c infrastructure and a formation of new intellectual elites. Th e Czech Lands of this period represent not an exception but rather a historically typical example of local traditions, regionalism, and cultural interfaces of modern European science.3 It was a multi-national region situated in the middle of the European continent, historically integrated in a larger supranational state unit (the Hapsburg monarchy), whose two nascent modern cities, Prague and Brno, were the home of two cohabiting linguistic communities, the Czech and the German one. Nevertheless, an exclusively linguistic/national point of view can be in the case of these regional capitals misleading since some traditional and largely independent ties to the capital of the monarchy, that is, Vienna and its scientifi c institutions existed at least until 1918. In the Czech Lands in the period between 1900 and the outbreak of the WWI, we can distinguish in contemporary discussions of Darwin's legacy and evolutionism two diff erent but inherently closely related centres and their viewpoints. One was the bilingual environment of Prague, the only university town and the most important intellectual centre of the Czech Lands, the other was found in Brno with its specifi c research tradition, in which aft er 1900 genetics also played a key role. In the context of discussions in early 20th century, the contribution of Moravia's capital, Brno, was no less important than that of Prague. At that time, it still probably had closer ties to Vienna than to Prague. Its position had much to do with the beginnings and development of modern research of heredity. Aft er 1900, the question of a mutual relation between a Mendelian explanation of heredity based on hybridisation experiments and Darwin's approach to evolution surfaced as one Genetic Th inking. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009. For cytology, see Arthur HUGHES, A History of Cytology. London – New York: Abelard-Schuman 1959. 3 For more on this topic, see Otto URBAN, Die tschechische Gesellschaft 1848 bis 1918. Vienna – Cologne –Weimar: Böhlau 1994; and František KAFKA – Josef PETRÁŇ (eds.), A History of Charles University. Vol. II. Prague: Karolinum 2001. Tomáš Hermann / Michal Šimůnek 287 of the important topics to be dealt with. Already the fi rst Mendelians, such as William Bateson (1861–1926), speculated about possible consequences of connecting existing results of Mendel's and Darwin's work.4 Th is provoked a discussion which remained part of Mendelian biographical research for the entire fi rst half of the 20th century. Another issue that appeared at this time was the question whether Mendel's own attitude to Darwin was one of approval or rejection, and whether his work in any way aimed at fi lling in the gaps in his theory of evolution of living organisms.5 At the beginning of the 20th century, we witness not only various attempts to publicise Mendel's own work – these were undertaken mainly by one of the "re-discoverers" of his work, Erich von Tschermak-Seysenegg, who, inspired by his older brother Armin (1870–1952), directly followed in Darwin's footsteps – but also the fi rst attempt to present Mendel's biography, which was the work of the botanist Hugo Iltis (1882–1952). Iltis presented his interpretation of Mendel's attitude to the theory of evolution in a comprehensive biography Gregor Johann Mendel, Leben, Werk und Wirkung, which was published fi rst in 1924 in German, and in 1932 also in English.6 In addition to presenting Mendel's own documents, Hugo Iltis also tried to ascertain which parts of Darwin's work Mendel had at his disposal. He concluded that the library of the convent contained not only Darwin's main works but also all important publications of 1860s and 1870s. Th e celebration of Mendel in 1910 then provided the opportunity to present also the views of scientists such as Richard Semon (1859–1918) and Paul Kammerer (1880–1926) who tried to unite the principle of "somatic induction", i.e., an alternative view of heredity which relied on so-called "mendeling" (mendeln) with evolution.7 4 William BATESON, Mendel's Principles of Heredity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1909. 5 See Vítězslav OREL, "Rozdílné výklady postoje G. Mendela k evoluci a darwinismu." [Diff erent Interpretations of G. Mendel's Attitude to Evolution and Darwinism]. Dějiny věd a techniky, vol. 2, 1969, no. 1, p. 9–17; and see also Gavin de BEER, "Mendel, Darwin, and Fisher 1865–1965." Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London, vol. 19, 1964, no. 2, p. 192–226. 6 Hugo ILTIS, Gregor Johann Mendel, Leben, Werk und Wirkung. Berlin: J. Springer 1924. Hugo ILTIS, Life of Mendel. New York: W. W. Norton & Co. 1932. 7 See Richard SEMON, "Die somatogene Vererbung im Lichte der Bastardund Variationsforschung." Verhandlungen des Naturforschenden Vereines in Brünn, vol. 49, 1910, p. 241–266; Paul KAMMERER, "Mendelsche Regeln und Vererbung erworbener Eigenschaft en." Verhandlungen des Naturforschenden Vereines in Brünn, vol. 49, 1910, p. 72–111; and see also Sander GLIBOFF, "Th e Case of Paul Kammerer: Evolution and Experimentation in the Early 20th Century." Journal of the History of Biology, vol. 39, 2006, no. 3, p. 525–563. Discussion of Evolution Between Neo-Lamarckism and Neo-Darwinism 288 Th e dominant academic institution in Prague was the Prague University, which in 1882 split in two largely independent parts, a Czech and a German one.8 Until the mid-20th century, the German science in Czech Lands was more or less smoothly incorporated in the large body of research produced in German speaking countries, and was generally considered part of the German scientifi c environment. Let us just mention, for example, the stay in Prague of such important representatives of modern science as Ernst Mach, Albert Einstein, Christian von Ehrenfels, Berthold Hatschek, Carl Rabl, Richard von Wettstein, Alfred Weber, Felix Weltsch, Hans Kohn, Oskar Kraus, Philipp Frank, and later also Rudolf Carnap. Some of these men of science were born in Prague or lived here for a long time, while others left their mark here by their scientifi c work. It was Max Brod, the PragueGerman writer, who introduced the expression "Prague Circle" (der Prager Kreis) as a name for the rather unique phenomenon of Prague German literature. It would be hard, though, to speak of a "Prague Circle" in science since any such thing would include scientists from a variety of fi elds, many of whom worked here only for a brief period of time.9 At the beginning of the 20th century, intense discussions about the importance and implications of Darwin's theory went on also among the German-speaking intellectuals. Th e fi rst widely reported debate took place in Vienna but a number of scholars working in Prague joined it as well. Th is discussion took the form of a series of articles inspired by lectures of Professor Dr. Max Kassowitz (1842–1913), a paediatrician, in winter 1901. Th e lectures were presented at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Vienna under the title "Th e Crisis of Darwinism".10 Alongside biologists such 8 Universitas Carolina, in the 19th century called Charles-Ferdinand University, was created by Ferdinand III in a decree on union of February 23, 1624, which united Charles's school with the Jesuit college in Klementinum. Aft er 1918, its Czech part was once again called Charles University, while the German part of the university was to be known as Th e German University in Prague (this separation was however instituted only on February 19, 1920, by "Lex Mareš"). Other institutions such as societies for science and various clubs played had their place but their importance was secondary. For more see HERMANN –ŠIMŮNEK, "Between Science and Ideology." 9 Max BROD, Streitbares Leben. Munich: Kindler 1960. Max BROD, Der Prager Kreis, Stuttgart: Suhrkamp 1966. 10 See Max KASSOWITZ, "Die Krisis des Darwinismus." In: Vorträge und Besprechungen. Wissenschaft liche Beilage zum fünfzehnten Jahresbericht (1902) der Philosophischen Gesellschaft an der Universität zu Wien. Leipzig: J. A. Barth 1902, p. 7–64 (including the discussion of R. v. Wettstein, B. Hatschek, Ch. v. Ehrenfels and J. Breuera). For more on Ehrenfels see also Fabian REINHARD, "Christian von Ehrenfels: Leben und Werk." In: Studien zur österreichischen Philosophie. Vol. 8. Amsterdam: Rodopi 1986. Tomáš Hermann / Michal Šimůnek 289 as Richard von Wettstein and Berthold Hatschek, who worked in 1880s and 1890s in Prague, Christian von Ehrenfels (1859–1932), the founder of Gestalt psychology who in 1896–1929 lectured at the Faculty of Philosophy of the German part of the Prague University, also took part. Von Ehrenfels focused on the principle of selection and its implications for the social sphere and ethics. Later, he even considered this principle to constitute an irrefutable basis of his cosmological hypothesis.11 Emphasis on social applications led him to contacts with the founders of German hereditary (racial) hygiene. As an enthusiastic Wagnerian, von Ehrenfels had especially good relations with the physician Dr. Wilhelm Schallmayer (1857–1919). He also took longlasting interest in the issue of a "sexual reform" based on "organic necessities". Von Ehrenfels saw systematic selection based on scientifi c grounds as one of so-called "generative tasks" (generative Aufgaben). In this context, he became known to broader public in 1907 by his work on the "constitutive malignancy" (konstitutive Verderblichkeit) of monogamy.12 At about the same time, Alfred Weber (1868–1958), younger brother of Max Weber, devoted in 1904–1907 much of his lectures in sociology, which he presented at the faculty of law of the German part of the Prague University, also to refl ection and discussion of Darwin's theory of evolution. Th e close connection between local discussions in philosophy (Prague followers of Brentano), theoretical physics, biology, and sociology, as well as interdisciplinary discussions of the theory of evolution is illustrated in the well-known memoirs of Max Brod who regularly attended Weber's seminars.13 As in many other countries, the German-speaking biologists of Prague, too, espoused Darwin's legacy. Th is was marked in February 1909 by a keynote address speech called "Commemorating Charles Darwin" on the relevance of Darwinism was presented at a meeting of the German-speaking "Lotus" Society in Prague.14 Th e author was at the then newly appointed 11 Christian von EHRENFELS, Kosmogenie. Jena: Eugen Diderichs Verlag 1916, p. 74–75. 12 See Christian von EHRENFELS, "Die sexuale Reform." Politisch-Anthropologische Revue, vol. 2, 1903–4, p. 970–94. Christian von EHRENFELS, "Das Mütterheim." PolitischAnthropologische Revue, vol. 5, 1906–7, p. 221–239. Christian von EHRENFELS, "Die konstitutive Verderblichkeit der Monogamie." Archiv für Rassenund Gesellschaft sbiologie, vol. 3, 1907, p. 615–51, 803–30. Christian von EHRENFELS, Sexualethik. Wiesbaden: J. F. Bergmann 1907. Christian von EHRENFELS, "Leitziele zur Rassenbewertung." Archiv für Rassenund Gesellschaft sbiologie, vol. 8, 1911, p. 59–71. 13 BROD, Streitbares Leben; see also Josef KEPESZCZUK, Alfred Weber: Schrift en und Aufsätze 1897–1955. Munich: Piper 1956. 14 "Verein Lotos"; see Friedrich CZAPEK, "Zum Gedächtnisse von Charles Darwin." Lotos, vol. 57, 1909, no. 9, p. 265–280; for more on Darwin Anniversary 1909 see Marsha Discussion of Evolution Between Neo-Lamarckism and Neo-Darwinism 290 head of the German Institute of Plant Physiology, Professor Friedrich Czapek (1868–1921).15 As he had just moved to Prague from the University in Czernowitz, Galicia, his speech on Darwin may be regarded as a sort of starting point of his work in Prague. Czapek's paper was originally written during his visit of England, where he attended an international botanical conference in Cambridge. Th e main arguments of his 1909 lecture may be summarised as follows: 1) From a historical perspective, Darwin, alongside Kepler and Copernicus, belongs to the most important scientists ever. 2) Th e defence, discussions of Darwinism, and attacks on it have been going on for over fi ft y years, which is mainly a refl ection of the fact that Darwinism is an ongoing, still unfi nished process. 3) Th e validity of the principle of selection both in the manifestation of adaptations, and in the process of formation of new animal and plant forms, must be seen as certain: "Without the use of the principle of selection within the teaching of the origin of species we can not get by."16 Th ere exist processes which directly infl uence the form of an organism through external stimuli (here, surprisingly, F. Czapek explicitly overemphasised the Lamarckian explanation of inheritance). 4) Darwinian thinking had an enormous impact on the development of the several disciplines in the preceding fi ft y years (anatomy, physiology) that can not be neglected. Another fi gure who played a very important role in contemporary discussions on development, ontogeny, and phylogeny was the anatomist and embryologist Professor Carl Rabl (1853–1917), who held a chair at the German Faculty of Medicine in Prague in 1885–1904. He became well known in the scientifi c community thanks to his work on the structure and functioning of cells, where he focused on the description and detailed representation of the poles of cell nuclei, and investigation of the number of chromosomes. In his 1880 study "On Cell Division" (Über Zellteilung), he formulated, for example, a hypothesis about a continuity of chromosomes through cell division. L. RICHMOND, "Th e 1909 Darwin Celebration. Reexamining Evolution in the Light of Mendel, Mutation, and Meiosis." Isis, vol. 97, 2006, p. 447–484; and Eduard I. KOLCHINSKY, "Charles Darwin's Anniversaries in Socio-Cultural and Cognitive Contexts." Studies in the History of Biology, vol. 1, 2009, no. 1, p. 15–49. 15 Interestingly, Czapek's career was infl uenced by Darwin's work from the very beginning. He studied in Vienna with the well-known German botanist Professor Wilhelm Pfeff er (1845–1920). He was interested especially in the physiology of impulses ("Reizphysiologie"). Later on he graduated from botany dealing with the geotropism. 16 CZAPEK, "Zum Gedächtnisse von Charles Darwin," p. 280. Tomáš Hermann / Michal Šimůnek 291 Unlike the German part of the Prague University, its Czech part was the top central institution of modern Czech science. Th is was apparent especially in social sciences, and played a practical role also in medicine. Academics working in natural and technical sciences, however, had to deal with an important and at that time oft en discussed paradox: on the one hand, they played an important role in the system of national education and in the popularisation of science, and on the other hand, they were supposed to fi nd their independent place within international scientifi c research. Due to the relative parochialism of the Czech scientifi c environment, the main representatives of biological sciences were connected to a limited number of leading academics. In botany, this was Ladislav Čelakovský (1834–1902) and his student Josef Velenovský (1858–1949).17 Čelakovský's main achievement was a formulation of typological morphology of plants in terms of a theory of evolution. His view of Darwin's thoughts, however, was rather critical. He disagreed with argumentation based on probability, and replaced such arguments by ten laws of evolution, of which only the last included a mechanism of natural selection. In international science, his position was close to Karl von Nägeli. His popularisation of Darwinism as a modern theory was formulated mainly in the second half of the 19th century, and a later edition of his collected Darwinian articles failed to signifi cantly infl uence the contemporary debate.18 J. Velenovský, a great systematizer of comparative morphology of plants, contrasted the theory of evolution with other principles, such as the so-called principle of organic harmony. He was a proponent of traditional vitalism, and his interest in spiritualism and occultism inspired his evolution-minded students to adopt various fashionable versions of psycho-Lamarckism. Another important fi gure among the students of Čelakovský and Velenovský was Karel Domin (1882–1953), professor of systematic botany, organiser of Czech academic life, and an internationally respected advocate of phytogeography and ethnobotany as well as taxonomy and morphology. Domin studied and organised in the Kew Gardens (England) extensive material from western and south-western Australia. In his experimental work, he collaborated mainly with Nils Heribert Nilsson of Sweden with whom he 17 For more on Čelakovský and Velenovský, see "Short Biographies" in Ilse JAHN (ed.), Geschichte der Biologie. Th eorien, Methoden, Institutionen, Kurzbiographien. Heidelberg – Berlin: Spektrum Akademischer Verlag 2002. Of other Czech biologists, more here as well: J. E. Purkinje, F. Vejdovský, E. Rádl, B. Němec, and F. Mrázek. 18 Ladislav ČELAKOVSKÝ, Rozpravy o Darwinově theorii a o vývoji rostlinstva [Discussions on Darwin's Th eory and on the Evolution of Plants]. Prague: F. Bačkovský 1895. Discussion of Evolution Between Neo-Lamarckism and Neo-Darwinism 292 worked on methods of cultivation of agricultural plants. Under the guidance of Hugo de Vries in Amsterdam, he carried out experiments with mutations, and later continued this research in Prague. Domin presented the results of his experimental work in a monograph Introduction to Newer Th eories of Evolution.19 In this work, he presented a theory of mutation as well as an outline of his own theory of "purposeful mutations". He adopted a clearly Lamarckian position and presented Lamarck as the creator of the theory of evolution, an interpretation which was at that time actually not uncommon. He also appealed to the work of a number of vitalists (Pauly, Francé, Wettstein, Henslow, and Velenovský). His work, however, also refl ected some of the drawbacks of contemporary academic environment: due to limited peer criticism, authors of Czech publications oft en presented much more radical and self-confi dent views than authors of parallel publications abroad, and they oft en took recourse to excessive quotations. In the case of Karel Domin, this led in 1911 to a charge of plagiarism (concerning the work of Johannes Paulus Lotsy). Among physiologists at the Czech medical faculty we fi nd a similar connection between teachers and students, and vitalism and neo-Lamarckism, as in the case of botanists. Here, the leading fi gure was Professor František Mareš (1857–1942), who studied philosophy and medicine in Prague (with, e.g., Ernst Mach, who taught here medical physics), and continued his studies in Leipzig (with Karl Ludwig), Berlin (with Emil Dubois-Reymond), and Utrecht. In experimental work, he built his reputation with a study of metabolic processes and energy metabolism in organisms, research of nervous systems, and work in physiologic psychology. On a theoretical level, he was an advocate of vitalism and intuitivism as opposed to mechanistic materialism. His main philosophical work, Idealism and Realism in Natural Science provoked among Czech philosophers a long discussion about the interpretation of Kant's work.20 Mareš saw in the Kantian a priori a noetic support against naïve realism but favoured a biological-vitalistic explanation, whereby he anticipated methods of evolutionary epistemology. In key issues of the dispute between vitalism and mechanicism in the area of physiological psychology, however, Mareš saw Darwin's theory of evolution as playing just a role of an ancillary hypothesis understood in Kantian terms as 19 Karel DOMIN, Úvod k novějším theoriím vývojovým [Introduction to Recent Th eories of Evolution]. Prague: Dědictví Komenského 1909. 20 František MAREŠ, Idealism a realism v přírodní vědě [Idealism and Realism in Natural Science]. Prague: Fr. Řivnáč 1901. Tomáš Hermann / Michal Šimůnek 293 a regulative principle. In the chapter on controversies surrounding Darwin's work, Mareš put emphasis on the failure of mechanistic explanation of adaptation, and elaborated on the problem of "primary vital properties", which Darwinism – as he saw it through the prism of a vitalistic framework – failed to adequately address. Mareš's most important student, Edward Babák (1873–1926), at fi rst also favoured Lamarckian conclusions. Mareš's and Velenovský's late-Romanticist, spiritualist, and religious tendencies accompanied by systematic scientifi c work and conservative national stance found wide acceptance among like-minded Czech philosophers and writers.21 Babák, however, focused on the experimental work of his teacher, and extended it in the direction of research of breathing movements, thermal regulation, ontogenesis, etc. He extensively edited and contributed to Hans Winterstein's famous Handbuch der vergleichende Physiologie (e.g. 1910). In connection with the relative position of Prague and Brno, it is worth noting that aft er 1918, Babák played a key role in the founding of Brno's universities (in particular, he was active in the establishment of the medical school of the newly founded Masaryk University and of the University of Veterinary Sciences), and in the further development of Mendelism. He importantly contributed to the Czech discussion of evolutionism by his monograph On the Th eory of Evolution: A Review of the Th inking About Evolution.22 When it appeared, it was the most objective and coherent Czech presentation of the origin and contemporary state of thinking about evolution. In this work, Babák was not just repeating the views of other scientists,23 he managed to present an original theoretical work. Th ough a large part of the work still contains a comparative summary of evidence in support of an evolutionary explanation, aft er introducing of the concept of a theory of evolution and clarifying the relation between it and systematics, Babák in several chapters summarises evidence for a theory of evolution in comparative anatomy, embryology, palaeontology, zoogeography, and general morphology and physiology. He goes on to discuss the current state of research of variability, and devotes two chapters to the origin of mankind and the origin of life. In those chapters, he indicates that these issues go somewhat beyond the scope of evolution theory proper. In his discussion of current theoretical issues, Babák in the end reveals an inclination 21 In a way, their infl uence could compared to that of Ernst Haeckel in Germany. 22 Edward BABÁK, O theorii vývojové: Přehled myšlení o vývoji [On the Evolutionary Th eory: An Overview of Th inking About Evolution]. Brno: Příroda a škola 1904. 23 As did e.g. Eduard OPOLECKÝ, O vývoji tvorstva dle Darwina [On the Evolution of Creatures According to Darwin]. Prague: Dělnická akademie 1899. Discussion of Evolution Between Neo-Lamarckism and Neo-Darwinism 294 to Lamarckist solutions but leaves the issue of further research and evidence open. Th is work constituted a sort of culmination of a discussion which continued on the pages of the main Czech journal for natural sciences, Živa, since 1901. It also infl uenced all subsequent research dedicated to these issues (including the already mentioned work of Karel Domin). All biologists then involved in the discussion argued against the then new and rather radical stance which Albert Fleischmann took against the theory of evolution. It would seem that they thereby manifested a certain independence of Czech natural sciences vis-à-vis the conservative attitude of Austrian clericalism, which at that time still exerted large infl uence and dominated the primary and secondary education. Sophisticated Catholic Aristotelian-Th omistic views were presented by Eugen Kadeřávek (1840–1922), philosopher and theologian at the faculty of divinity. Kadeřávek, earlier an advocate of dogmatic Austrian Herbartism, belonged to a generation which under the direct infl uence of Leo XIII's encyclical letter Aeterni patris (1879) systematically adopted Th omism. His comprehensive work On Darwinism,24 which, pace Babák, summarised arguments against evolution, became – perhaps thanks to its almost offi cial correctness – a standard work among biologists. On the delicate issue of religion, however, most scientists adopted Eric Wasmann's position, which incorporated humans as organisms into the process of evolution, and left issues of mental qualities open and outside the scope of biology proper. Th is kind of position was also well compatible with various versions of Lamarckism. By the beginning of the 20th century, evolution was among Czech biologists accepted as a matter of course but the mechanism was still seen, cautiously and with some reservations, as awaiting further explanation in the near future, probably in connection with ongoing research in mutations, variability, and heredity. One can trace here a strong tendency to downplay the importance of natural selection. Lamarckism functioned in this context rather as a modern, specialised supplement to classical Darwinism and a correction of neo-Darwinism as presented by August Weismann. Even though we do not fi nd among Czech biologists any explicit advocates of Weismann's strict line, some zoologists came close to his position. In this context, one should mention another leading fi gure: František Vejdovský (1849–1939), professor of comparative anatomy, embryology and zoology at the Czech university. He was perhaps the most important 24 Eugen KADEŘÁVEK, O Darwinismu [On Darwinism]. Prague: Cyrillo-Methodějská knihtiskárna 1906. Tomáš Hermann / Michal Šimůnek 295 representative of Czech biology aft er Jan E. Purkyně, and one of the founders of modern biology in international context. He was famous especially for his discoveries in cytology, works on the maturation, fertilisation, and segmentation of the egg, and was the fi rst to discover the centrosome in animal cells. Vejdovský saw Darwin's theories not so much as a "grand theory" but rather as an accepted part of an empirical approach in modern biology. His textbook General and Systematic Zoology,25 which was used by several generations of students, concludes with an presentation called A Basic Outline of a Th eory of Evolution. In its structure, Vejdovský anticipates Babák's way of presenting the issue (outline of the theory, comparative evidence in individual fi elds, discussion of Lamarck's and Darwin's approach, current issues) but concludes by expressing a measure of cautious sympathy with neo-Darwinian solutions: Th e importance of neo-Darwinism is in the simplicity of explanation of repetition in heredity, as well as in explaining many adaptations which no other theory (not even Lamarck's) can off er.26 Vejdovský's infl uence was further strengthened by the fact that in his laboratory, he brought up several generations of biologists, many of whom went on to become leading fi gures in their fi elds (that is why we speak of "Vejdovský's school"). It was he who drew the attention of his students away from local issues to up-to-date experimental problems important in international context. In general, representatives of Vejdovský's school tended to unite experimental work with theoretical refl ection. Of his many students, we shall mention in the context of evolutionism two: Alois Mrázek (1868–1923) and Emanuel Rádl (1873–1942).27 Mrázek, professor of zoology at the Czech university, under Vejdovský's guidance studied a variety of problems of general and experimental zoology, and published important articles on cytology with Vejdovský as a co-author. Since 1900, he also lectured on issues of heredity and theories of evolution. 25 František VEJDOVSKÝ, Zoologie všeobecná i soustavná [General and Systematic Zoology]. Prague: J. Otto 1898. 26 Ibid, p. 503. 27 For more on Vejdovský's school see Jan JANKO, Vznik experimentální biologie v Čechách, 1882–1918 [Th e Origins of Experimental Biology in Bohemia]. Studie ČSAV, vol. 8, Prague: Academia 1982 (with English summary); for more on this discussion, see ass well Jan JANKO, "Die allgemeinen theoretischen Konzeptionen in den Wissenschaft en vom Leben an der Wende des 19. und 20. Jahrhundert." In: Acta historiae rerum naturalium necnon technicarum. Special Issue. Vol. 16. Prague 1981, p. 209–274. Discussion of Evolution Between Neo-Lamarckism and Neo-Darwinism 296 He presented the results of this lectures in a contribution to the current discussion in his On the Th eory of Evolution, Th eory of Descent.28 Th ere, his aim was not just a presentation of evidence in support of evolution – he took evolution to be a proven fact. Instead, he focused on rectifying various contemporary opinions which spoke of a crisis and decline of Darwinism. Mrázek saw this "crisis" rather as an important and fruitful move away from attempts to reconstruct the historical development of organisms (construction of family lines), which dominated Darwinism in the 19th century. He saw this development as a process precipitated by pressures of new experimental research in variability and heredity. Mrázek objectively discussed the origins of theories of evolution and presented contemporary theoretical conceptions, methods, and experiments (orthogenesis, theory of mutation, variation statistics, etc.). He viewed Lamarck as a historical and rather antiquated fi gure, and contrasted his work with Darwin's theory, which actuated a seminal change in biology as a historical science. Th e basic elements of this change persisted despite the fact that current experimental work corrected some historical bias. Mrázek was in this connection the fi rst scientist to inform his academic colleagues of the recent "re-discovery" of Mendel's work. He also had the perspicacity to realise that further development and interpretation of Mendel's results will have a decisive impact on the future form of the theory of evolution. Even though he summarised and understood the partial objections of evolution theorists of Lamarckian leanings, he clearly favoured – perhaps under Vejdovský's infl uence – neo-Darwinian solutions. Regarding Emanuel Rádl, we can view his history of biological theories not only as a culmination of the entire discussion about evolution in the Czech Lands at the beginning of the 20th century but also as an attempt to place the issues of evolution theory in the context of history of biology, which at that time started to form. In Vejdovský's laboratory, Rádl started with experimental and anatomical research of sensory organs, especially sight, in lower organisms. A series of articles published in leading scientifi c journals (Biologisches Zentralblatt, Anatomischer Anzeiger, etc.), was followed by work in the then progressive area of research of sensory reactions (taxis and tropisms).29 Here, Rádl proved that light plays in the orientation of organisms as important a role as gravitation (phototropism and geotropism). Yet, from early on, he was attracted to issues of philosophy and history of science. 28 Alois MRÁZEK, O nauce vývojové [On the Th eory of Evolution]. Prague: J. Otto 1907. 29 Presented in Emanuel RÁDL, Untersuchungen über den Phototropismus der Tiere. Leipzig: Engelmann 1903. Tomáš Hermann / Michal Šimůnek 297 In 1905, this led to the fi rst outline of his foundational work, Geschichte der biologischen Th eorien.30 In the context of the then still developing concept of "general biology", Rádl turned his attention directly to a historical investigation of biological issues, which he saw not as a preliminary summary of "ancestors" of modern biology but rather as an autonomous fi eld of study. He thereby became one of the founders of the history of investigation of life (prior to this point, there existed only isolated fi elds of history of zoology, history of botany or history of medicine). Th e fi rst volume of this work focused on the confl ict of mechanistic and vitalistic, and physiologyor morphology-based approaches, which he followed from the time of neo-Aristotelians in Renaissance until the beginning of the 19th century. Th e second volume caused an even bigger sensation. It deals with theories of evolution in biology of the 19th century, and was published both in German and in Czech (in 1909; unlike the classical German edition, the Czech one was somewhat simplifi ed).31 Here, Rádl analyses classical Darwinism and its far-reaching cultural and scientifi c impact on European rationality of the second half of the 19th century. In many ways, this was the fi rst systematic overview of Darwin's work from this point of view. Two elements of this multi-layered work are especially worth noting in this context: Firstly, Rádl – uniquely at this time – fully deconstructed the importance of Lamarck as the creator of the theory of evolution, which put him is direct opposition to all fashionable forms of neo-Lamarckism and its ahistoric projections. On the other hand, he rehabilitated the oft en neglected work of Cuvier whose diachronic and synchronic structural approaches had far greater importance in preparing the ground for evolutionary thinking at various times. Secondly, he put the crucial importance of Darwin's work in perspective when he concluded that Darwinism is facing crisis and decline. On this issue, he concurred with Hans Driesch. In this context, he recalled both the still infl uential results of older morphological tradition of the pre-Darwinian era, and the current experimental work in biology, which went beyond pure phylogenetic reconstruction, and used evolution as but one of many supporting hypotheses (in this respect, his views resembled Mrázek's). Not only the mechanics of development but also Weismann's neo-Darwinism, theory of mutation, rediscovery of Mendel's legacy, and many other current theories and events 30 Emanuel RÁDL, Geschichte der biologischen Th eorien. Teil I, Seit dem Ende des 17. Jahrhundersts. Leipzig: Engelmann 1905. 31 Emanuel RÁDL, Geschichte der biologischen Th eorien. Teil II. Emanuel RÁDL, Dějiny vývojových theorií v biologii XIX. Století [Th e History of Evolutionary Th eories in Biology of the 19th Century]. Prague: J. Laichter 1909. Discussion of Evolution Between Neo-Lamarckism and Neo-Darwinism 298 were grouped together by Rádl and presented as aff ected by this "decline" of Darwinism. He saw these developments as a new rationalisation of the original historical and evolutionary scenario which, in his view, constituted an attack on European rationality. An analysis of the reception of and refl ection on Rádl's work, or a discussion thereof, would go beyond the scope of this contribution. Let us therefore just note that he infl uenced many philosophers and historians of biology (such as Ernst Cassirer, Max Scheler, Georges Canguilhelm, and many others). A later, abridged English edition (starting only with Darwin's work) was published thanks to Julian Huxley's initiative in 1930, and a full Spanish translation in 1931 inspired the foundation of history of biology in Spanish-speaking countries.32 Rádl still had time to edit and extend the fi rst volume (1913) which started with Renaissance, and put even more emphasis on the subjective elements in the history of science. Rádl's last comprehensive presentation of the concept of history of Darwinian biology is found in the introductory chapter of Allgemeine Biologie, which was published by Carl Chun and Wilhelm Johannsen as part of the encyclopaedic series Die Kultur der Gegenwart.33 Th e outbreak of the World War then redirected Rádl's attention to activist philosophy in the Czech society.34 As we already noted, Rádl's work constitutes one of the internationally famous achievements of Czech thinking in biology prior to WWI, one closely connected with issues of Darwinism and theory of evolution. Th e varied cultural environments and multitude of intellectual infl uences that met in Prague may help explain why it was here that such an original work of history of cultural positions on biological issues was written. Aft er all, in the Czech environment Rádl's work was oft en seen as a destructive infl uence on positive research, and its publication aff ected his position among academic biologists rather negatively. It prompted his sharp confl ict with Karel Domin who published in the same year (1909) the above-mentioned work on theories of evolution and whom Rádl accused of unacceptable plagiarism. 32 Emanuel RÁDL, Th e History of Biological Th eories. Emanuel RÁDL, Historia de las teorías biológicas. 2 vols. [Th e History of Biological Th eories]. Madrid: Revista de Occidente 1931. 33 Emanuel RÁDL, "Zur Geschichte der Biologie von Linné bis Darwin." In: HINNEBERG, P. (ed.), Die Kultur der Gegenwart. Vol. 1. Leipzig – Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1915, p. 1–29. 34 More on Rádl and his History of Biological Th eories see Tomáš HERMANN – Anton MARKOŠ (eds.), Emanuel Rádl – vědec a fi losof / Emanuel Rádl – Scientist and Philosopher. Prague: Oikoymenh 2005 (contributions of U. Hossfeld, O. Breidbach, T. Hermann, N. Bizzo, J. Beaty, and others); as well as Th omas JUNKER, "Th e Eclipse and Renaissance of Darwinism in German Biology (1900–1950)." In: ENGELS, E.-M. – GLICK, T. F. (eds.), Th e Reception of Charles Darwin in Europe. Vol. 2. London – New York: Continuum 2008, p. 480–501. Tomáš Hermann / Michal Šimůnek 299 Th ere were other important biologists who contributed to discussions of Darwinism and evolutionism both in journals and in books. Let us just mention Bohumil Němec (1873–1966), also Vejdovský's student and later an important experimental botanist and cytologist, or another botanist, Ludvík Tereba, who in his Neo-Darwinism or Neo-Lamarckism presented perhaps the most objective overview of contemporary positions.35 In the broader context of sociology, philosophy and medicine, Czech translations of the works of Charles Darwin, Th omas Huxley, Herbert Spencer, John B. Haycraft , George J. Romanes, and others exerted an increasing infl uence especially aft er 1900. Scientists working in medicine, genetics or anthropology (A. Brožek, V. Růžička, J. Matiegka, etc.) at this time gradually advocated a Czech version of the eugenic movement.36 In any case, one can conclude that approximately between 1900 and 1915, the Czech reception of evolutionism witnessed a clear and open culmination. Th e confl ict between mechanicism and vitalism gradually shift ed in the direction of a discussion between neo-Lamarckism and neo-Darwinism, and clear-cut positions and "grand theories" were by degrees transformed by a detailed discussions abroad, inspiration from experimental work, and cautious expectations based on results of new studies of variability and heredity. Generally speaking, at the beginning of the 20th century, Darwinism and Lamarckism were not perceived as contradictory. Most Czech biologists, especially zoologists from the Prague circle around Vejdovský, preferred Darwinism, where natural selection played a key role as the main mover of evolution (Vejdovský, Mrázek, but also Němec). Among botanists (Velenovský, Domin) and physiologists (Mareš, Babák) prevailed sympathies to neo-Lamarckism, which they understood not as an opposite of Darwinism but rather a development of those Darwinian concepts, which opposed and relativised some radical claims of neo-Darwinism as represented by Weisman. In this sense, they understood their position as authentically Darwinian since except for the issue of heredity, which is left open, neo-Darwinian views oft en come close to vitalistic positions. Th e fast development of genetics, discussions surrounding the role of natural selection in evolution, the question of heredity of acquired properties coupled with a Lamarckist tradition clearly defi ned the character of many works on evolution from the 35 Ludvík TEREBA, Neodarwinismus či neolamarckismus [Neo-Darwinism or NeoLamarckism]. Prague: Otokar Šrámek 1912. 36 For more, see Michal ŠIMŮNEK, "Between 'Eugenics', 'Social Genetics' and 'Racial Hygiene'." In: WEINDLING, P. – TURDA, M. (eds.), Blood and Homeland. Budapest: CEU Press, 2006, p. 168–191. Discussion of Evolution Between Neo-Lamarckism and Neo-Darwinism 300 viewpoint of biologists and philosophers. Th is signifi ed a sharp departure form previous positions, and meant that the beginning of the 20th century left far behind the somewhat stagnant views which prevailed since 1860s, thus laying foundations of modern biology in the Czech Lands. Tomáš Hermann / Michal Šimůnek

Eugen Huzum În afara eticii? Filosofia politică și principiile morale În memoria bunicilor mei, Sterian și Steriana, care mi-au insuflat dragostea pentru cunoaștere și mi-au determinat cele mai frumoase amintiri ale copilăriei Cuprins: Cuvânt înainte Precizări și justificări terminologice Despre moralismul realismului radical Despre realismul moderat Despre justificarea moralismului Despre obiecțiile realiste împotriva moralismului Cuvânt de încheiere Referințe bibliografice Indice de autori și concepte fundamentale Abstract Résumé Cuvânt înainte Cartea de față este rezultatul examinării principalelor teze metodologice sprijinite de susținătorii realismului în filosofia politică (sau, dacă preferați, în teoria politică normativă1) și a dezbaterilor pe care ele le-au declanșat. Această examinare m-a condus la 1 Deși mă număr printre cei care consideră că ar trebui să distingem între „filosofia politică" și „teoria politică normativă" (așa cum o face, spre exemplu, David Runciman, care caracterizează – recunosc, nu neapărat foarte lămuritor – distincția între cele două drept distincția între „ceea ce faci atunci când studiezi ideile politice într-un departament de filosofie" și „ceea ce faci atunci când studiezi ideile politice oriunde altundeva, dar mai ales într-un departament de științe politice" (David Runciman, „What Is Realistic Political Philosophy?" Metaphilosophy 43, 1-2 (2012): 58)) și că politica definițională uneori diferită a acestor termeni (i.e., tratarea lor ca termeni echivalenți versus tratarea lor ca termeni ce se referă la realități diferite) este, de fapt, sursa multor neînțelegeri și dialoguri ale surzilor între moraliști și realiști, pe întreg parcursul cărții voi urma totuși politica dominantă în acest sens – mai ales printre realiști – și voi utiliza termenii „filosofie politică" și „teorie politică normativă" ca sinonimi. (sau/și mi-a reconfirmat) patru mari concluzii. Prima este aceea că realiștii radicali au pierdut fără drept de apel dezbaterea pe tema moralismului poziției lor, că realismul radical nu este decât un moralism deghizat și că exigența sa metodologică – renunțarea la principiile și valorile morale în argumentarea din filosofia politică – este „nerealistă" (imposibil de realizat în practică). A doua este concluzia că filosofia politică nu este caracterizată întru totul corect atunci când este prezentată doar ca o ramură a eticii, așa cum o fac de obicei filosofii politici moraliști2, însă aceasta nu din temeiurile oferite de obicei de realiștii moderați. A treia concluzie este aceea că moralismul reprezintă o metodologie pe care filosofia politică este pe deplin justificată să o utilizeze și că niciun contra-argument realist (radical) nu reușește să atingă teza validității și necesității acestei metodologii. În sfârșit, potrivit celei de a patra concluzii, toate obiecțiile avansate în cruciada realiștilor, radicali sau moderați, împotriva „moralismului" sunt nesustenabile (de cele mai multe ori, ele fiind rodul unor neînțelegeri sau deformări grave ale poziției filosofilor acuzați de acest „viciu" metodologic: Isaiah Berlin, John Rawls, Robert Nozick, Ronald Dworkin, G. A. Cohen, Will Kymlicka, Adam Swift etc.). În esență, cartea prezintă principalele observații, intuiții și argumente ce sprijină, în opinia mea, aceste concluzii. După cum se poate observa din cuprins, ea este organizată în cinci capitole, cărora li se adaugă un scurt cuvânt de încheiere. În primul capitol precizez principalele concepte – „moralism", „realism moderat" și „realism radical" – pe care se bazează cele patru concluzii și întreaga mea argumentare pentru ele și – totodată – argumentez pentru politica terminologică și definițională pentru care am optat. În celelalte capitole pledez, pe rând, pentru fiecare dintre cele patru concluzii. În cuvântul de încheiere reamintesc, însumez și resintetizez punctele cheie ale argumentării de pe parcursul lucrării. Cele patru concluzii menționate pot fi sintetizate în concluzia generală că realiștii – radicali sau moderați – greșesc atunci când argumentează (și consideră că au bune argumente pentru teza) că filosofia politică nu este (doar) o diviziune a eticii sau pentru teza că ea ar trebui „scoasă în afara eticii"3, în sensul că nu ar mai trebui să utilizeze argumente bazate pe principii sau valori morale – sau, așa cum este exprimată uneori această idee, argumente bazate pe principii sau valori morale „pre-politice". Recursul la 2 Dintre multele referințe ce ar putea fi invocate aici, am ales să trimit la Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 120 (trad. rom. Patru eseuri despre libertate (București: Humanitas, 1996), 203) sau Isaiah Berlin, Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 168, Ramin Jahanbegloo, Conversations with Isaiah Berlin (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1991), 46-47, Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Blackwell: Basic Books, 1974), 4-6 (trad. rom, Anarhie, stat și utopie (București: Humanitas, 1997), 45-48), Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 6, Daniel McDermott, „Analytical Political Philosophy", în Political Theory: Methods and Approaches, ed. David Leopold și Marc Stears (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 11-28, Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge & London: Belknap Press, 2011), 5 și Adam Swift, Political Philosophy: A Beginner's Guide for Students and Politicians (Cambridge: Polity, 2014), 1-9. 3 Așa cum s-a exprimat unul dintre principalii maeștri spirituali ai realismului radical, Raymond Geuss, în cartea sa cu același nume – Outside Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) – și în mai toate lucrările sale recente, precum Philosophy and Real Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009) sau Politics and the Imagination (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). astfel de principii și valori este imperativ și inevitabil pentru filosofia politică. Ca atare, împotriva a ceea ce susțin realiștii, ea nu are altă opțiune decât aceea de a rămâne, în linii mari, ceea ce a fost dintotdeauna: un sector al filosofiei morale, o disciplină ale cărei interese de cercetare se află în continuitate cu cele ale eticii. Așa cum o sugerează și titlul ei, cartea de față poate fi descrisă și ca o (nouă) pledoarie pentru această concluzie generală cu privire la specificul și calea de urmat a filosofiei politice4. Nu pot încheia acest cuvânt introductiv fără să le mulțumesc soției mele, Loredana Huzum, și colegei și prietenei Cătălina-Daniela Răducu, pentru atenția și răbdarea pe care au arătat-o în corectarea manuscrisului cărții. Ca și în alte ocazii, eforturile lor au dus la îmbunătățirea semnificativă a multora dintre formulările ei. Se înțelege de la sine, desigur, că vina pentru orice greșeli vor fi rămas între paginile ei îmi aparține în exclusivitate mie. Mulţumirile mele se îndreaptă şi către reprezentanţii Editurii Institutul European care au intermediat şi au făcut posibilă apariţia cărţii în cele mai bune condiţii: în special coordonatorul Departamentului Drepturi de autor, Elena Uzier, şi tehnoredactorul Sonia Rusu. Disponibilitatea, răbdarea şi profesionalismul lor au condus la o colaborare excelentă – şi, cel puţin pentru mine, foarte agreabilă – în editarea ei. Nu pot decât să sper că această opinie referitoare la colaborarea noastră este, în ciuda cantităţii de muncă depuse împreună pentru realizarea rezultatului final, una reciprocă. 4 Pledoarie ce continuă și dezvoltă (chiar dacă uneori se distanțează de) destul de puținele încercări sistematice de până acum de a apăra moralismul de obiecțiile realiste, precum cele ale lui Adam Swift, „Political Philosophy and Politics", în What Is Politics? The Activity and Its Study, ed. Adrian Leftwich (Oxford: Polity Press, 2004), 135-146, Paul Kelly (Liberalism, Cambridge: Polity, 2005, 92-111), Charles Larmore („What Is Political Philosophy?", Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (2013): 276-306), Alice Baderin („Two Forms of Realism in Political Theory", European Journal of Political Theory 13, 2 (2013): 132-153), Eva Erman și Niklas Möller („Political Legitimacy in the Real Normative World: The Priority of Morality and the Autonomy of the Political", British Journal of Political Science 45, 1 (2015): 215-233 sau „Why Political Realists Should Not Be Afraid of Moral Values", Journal of Philosophical Research 40 (2015): 459-464), Christopher Bertram („Realism, Moralism, Models and Institutions", Journal of International Political Theory (2016). DOI: 10.1177/1755088215626939), Mathias Risse („What Difference Can It Make: Why Write Books on Global Justice in the First Place?", Journal of International Political Theory (2016): DOI: 10.1177/175508821562 6738) și Jonathan Leader Maynard și Alex Worsnip („The Realist Narrative about 'Ethics-First' Political Philosophy", Draft, 2016. <http://www.alexworsnip.com/downloads/ RNAEFPP.pdf>).

Juarez de Queiroz Campos Jr Parmênides, o poeta do Logos Dissertação de Mestrado Dissertação apresentada como requisito parcial para obtenção do grau de Mestre pelo Programa de Pósgraduação em Filosofia do Departamento de Filosofia da PUC-Rio. Orientadora: Profa. Maura Iglésias Rio de Janeiro Setembro de 2015 Juarez de Queiroz Campos Jr Parmênides, o poeta do Logos Dissertação apresentada como requisito parcial para obtenção do grau de Mestre pelo Programa de Pósgraduação em Filosofia do Departamento de Filosofia do Centro de Teologia e Ciências Humanas da PUCRio. Aprovada pela Comissão Examinadora abaixo assinada: Profa. Maura Iglésias Orientadora Departamento de Filosofia PUC-Rio Profa. Luisa Severo Buarque de Holanda Departamento de Filosofia PUC-Rio Prof. Fernando Augusto da Rocha Rodrigues UFRJ Profa. Denise Berruezo Portinari Coordenadora Setorial do Centro de Teologia E Ciências Humanas PUC-Rio Rio de Janeiro, 02 de setembro de 2015 Todos os direitos reservados. É proibida a reprodução total ou parcial do trabalho sem autorização da universidade, do autor e do orientador. Juarez de Queiroz Campos Jr Ficha Catalográfica CDD: 100 Campos Jr., Juarez de Queiroz Parmênides, o poeta do Logos / Juarez de Queiroz Campos Jr. ; orientador: Maura Iglésias. – 2015. v.,122 f. ; 30 cm Dissertação (mestrado)–Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, Departamento de Filosofia, 2015. Inclui referências bibliograficas 1. Parmênides. 2. Melisso 3. Górgias. 4. Platão. 5. Kahn, verbo ser. Iglésias, Maura. Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, Departamento de Filosofia. III. Título. 1. Filosofia – Teses. 2. Parmênides. 3. Melisso. 4. Górgias. 5. Platão. 6. Kahn. I. Iglésias, Maura. II. Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro. Departamento de Filosofia. III. Título. A Denise. Agradecimentos Meu especial reconhecimento à Professora Maura Iglésias pelo estímulo, gentileza e pelas suas aulas maravilhosas sobre Platão. Agradeço também aos professores do departamento de filosofia, em particular a Professora Luísa Severo pela inestimável ajuda, e aos colegas do NUFA. Ao Professor Antônio Mattoso meus profundos agradecimentos pelas sugestões, paciência e amizade nesses anos todos de estudo de grego. Ao querido primo Antônio José pelo ânimo e generosidade na discussão dos temas de filosofia antiga. Resumo Campos Jr., Juarez de Queiroz; Iglésias, Maura. Parmênides, o poeta do Logos. Rio de Janeiro, 2015. 122p. Dissertação de Mestrado – Departamento de Filosofia, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro. A interpretação do Poema de Parmênides tradicionalmente tem como fontes Platão, Aristóteles e os neoplatônicos. Recentemente as questões lógicas e filológicas relacionadas ao verbo ser vem atraindo atenção não só de comentadores da filosofia antiga como Charles Kahn, mas também da filosofia analítica a partir dos críticas de Frege e Russell. Nesta dissertação, utiliza-se como eixo interpretativo os textos de Gorgias e Melisso sobre o ser, considerando a hipótese de que como estes pensadores desenvolveram os seus trabalhos em uma época mais próxima a Parmênides do que Platão e Aristóteles as suas interpretações nos fornecem uma leitura mais aproximada do sentido "inicial" do Poema. A partir da apresentação dos diversos sentidos do verbo ser pela filologia e das formulações de Kahn, será investigado o ser nas formulações de Melisso, Górgias comparando-o com o ser de Parmênides. Palavras-chave Parmênides; Melisso; Górgias; Platão; Kahn, verbo ser. Abstract Campos Jr., Juarez de Queiroz; Iglésias, Maura (Advisor). Parmênides the logos' poet. Rio de Janeiro, 2015. 122p. MSc. Dissertation – Departamento de Filosofia, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro. Plato, Aristotle and the Neo-Platonists have traditionally been considered to be the main sources for interpreting Parmenidesâ€TM â€oeThe Poemâ€. However, in the last century, the logical and filological dilemmas regarding the concept of â€oebeing― have begun to draw the attention of other scholars seeking more precise interpretations of â€oeThe Poem―, such as ancient philosophy commentator Charles Kahn and analytical philosophers Frege and Russell. In this paper I will argue that philosophers Gorgias and Melisso offer a more accurate interpretation of the concept of â€oebeing― discussed in Parmenidesâ€TM original text. Consequently, it will also be shown that in order to understand precisely â€oeThe Poem―, it is necessary to focus on the interpretations drawn by the two pre-Socratic philosophers supra-cited regarding the â€oePoemâ€, rather than to emphasize on the analysis made by Plato and Aristotle. The main reason supporting this argument that will be presented is that the works of such preSocratic philosophers were written in a time period much closer to the one of Parmenides than the works of Plato and Aristotle were. In order to build my argument I will first analyze the filological meanings of the concept of â€oebeing―. Then I will scrutinize the formulations of this concept as Kahn presents them. After that, I will examine the formulations of the concept of â€oebeing― in the works of both Melisso and Gorgias. Finally, I will compare and apply all of these formulations and meanings to Parmenides original text, and therefore conclude my argument. Keywords Parmenides; Melissus; Gorgias; Plato; Kahn, verb to be. Sumário 1. Introdução 10 2. O verbo ser: tradição filológica 15 3. Os diversos sentidos do ser: a resposta de Kahn 22 4. Melisso 30 4.1. Vida e Obra 30 4.2. O Ser de Melisso 33 4.2.1. Não gerado, eterno e indestrutível 34 4.2.2. Extensão Ilimitada 39 4.2.3. Uno e homogêneo 42 4.2.4. imóvel 44 4.2.5. Incorpóreo e Indivisível 45 4.2.6. Refutação do senso comum 49 4.3. Conclusão 52 5. Górgias 56 5.1. Vida e Obra 56 5.2. As Teses de Górgias 62 5.2.1. Oὐδὲν ἔστιν 63 5.2.2. τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔστιν 64 5.2.3. τὸ ὂν ἔστιν 66 5.2.4. Não pode ser pensado 72 5.2.5. Não pode ser transmitido 75 5.3. Conclusão 78 6. Parmênides 81 6.1. Vida e Obra 81 6.2. Proêmio 82 6.3. Via da Verdade 90 6.3.1. A tensão: ἔστινοὐκ ἔστιν 90 6.3.2. Ser, pensar e dizer 95 6.3.3. Uma terceira Via? 99 6.3.4. As qualidades do ser 102 7. Conclusão 115 8. Referências bibliográficas 116 1 Introdução O pensar acerca da filosofia antiga dá-se, atualmente, através de conjeturas. Diversas são as razões para isso: a complexidade semântica do idioma grego antigo, a indisponibilidade da maior parte dos textos produzidos e a ausência de informações históricas suficientes. Além dessas variáveis, há que se considerar, ao analisar um determinado texto, além da perspectiva do autor, as diversas interpretações disponíveis dos comentadores históricos. Essas conjeturas estruturam-se de duas formas: por um lado, as grandes conjeturas que são as interpretações sistêmicas da filosofia antiga, a saber, o sistema de schleimacheriano da leitura de Platão, o sistema hegeliano, a ἀλήθεια heideggeriana, a escola de Tübingen e, por outro lado, as pequenas ou micro conjeturas, que são as interpretações de passagens dos textos apoiadas por hipóteses sobre as questões semânticas, históricas, filosóficas, dentre outras. A transposição para o campo da filosofia antiga de mecanismos de incentivo e controle da produtividade acadêmica aplicados às outras ciências como a física, a química, a biologia, em que a pesquisa empírica tem um peso relevante, gerou, na filosofia antiga, uma gigantesca produção de micro conjeturas. Essas conjeturas estão sempre "em aberto" já que não há possibilidade de comprovação devido às limitações das fontes existentes e inexistência de novas descobertas. A leitura de um diálogo platônico, por exemplo, deve ser acompanhada pela leitura de mais de uma centena de artigos e livros relevantes dentre os milhares já produzidos. Assim a produção do conhecimento na filosofia antiga é direcionada, cada vez mais, para as pequenas ou micro conjeturas. A consequência direta é, por um lado, o abandono da visão sistêmica da filosofia antiga e, por outro, a excessiva especialização da produção acadêmica. E nos textos produzidos, o conhecimento se transfere do corpo do texto para as notas de rodapé, cada vez maiores, em que são apresentadas as diversas hipóteses relacionadas a uma determinada afirmação. Isto obriga à redução de escopo, pois é quase impossível tratar de forma adequada, apoiada na crescente bibliografia existente, de temas mais generalistas 11 como "a teoria das ideias em Platão", e pode-se imaginar que o livro clássico de Ross, se fosse escrito hoje teria, pelo menos, o quíntuplo das páginas. Esta dissertação está inserida neste contexto, trata-se de uma micro conjetura. O propósito inicial era de comparar o ser de Parmênides conforme apresentado no Sofista com a versão "original" apresentada no Poema, buscando encontrar as semelhanças e as diferenças entre os dois para delimitar a questão do parricídio dentro da argumentação platônica. O ser de Parmênides, apresentado no Sofista e no Teeteto é uma construção platônica, influenciada pelo eleatismo posterior e pelo debate sofístico. A afirmação 1 de "que tudo é uno", por exemplo, não se encontra nem em Parmênides, nem tampouco em Melisso, e a de "não tendo lugar para mover-se" é uma formulação de Melisso. A ausência de fontes de informação autônomas acerca do Poema cria o que se pode chamar do duplo platônico, a utilização dos diálogos tanto como fonte da filosofia platônica quanto fonte da história da filosofia anterior ou contemporânea a Platão. E ao se considerar a liberdade criativa que o diálogo oferece não é de se estranhar que os sofistas sejam personagens inertes e mudos, animados tão somente pela ventriloquência platônica e o ser parmenídico moldado segundo a necessidade do teatro platônico. E o mesmo pode-se concluir quanto ao tratamento dado a Parmênides nas obras aristotélicas. A tentativa de encontrar um Parmênides mais original a partir da leitura direta do Poema mostrou-se infrutífera. Há uma bibliografia imensa produzida sobre o referido texto em que são apresentadas inúmeras possibilidades interpretativas. Pode-se agrupar a interpretação do Poema na antiguidade a partir de três paradigmas: platônico, aristotélico e neoplatônico. Os comentadores modernos adicionaram novas variáveis: o contexto pitagórico de Parmênides, os sofistas, um possível debate com Heráclito e com outros pré-socráticos. E, mais recentemente, a discussão se deslocou para as questões filológicas e lógicas, atraindo o interesse da filosofia analítica, principalmente centrada na interpretação dos diversos sentidos do verbo ser. 1 (Platão, Teeteto), 180e. 12 Optou-se, então, por dividir o projeto inicial em duas etapas. A primeira, objeto desta dissertação, é estabelecer o que vamos chamar de "Parmênides préplatônico", uma leitura que se aproxime o máximo possível do "sentido inicial" do Poema, deixando para um segundo momento a análise do Parmênides de Platão e a questão do parricídio desenvolvida no Sofista. Para tal, três são as premissas adotadas, a primeira é a utilização das leituras do Poema oferecidas por Melisso e Górgias como eixo analítico fundamental. Partindo-se da hipótese de que, como esses pensadores desenvolveram os seus trabalhos em uma época mais próxima à de Parmênides do que Platão e Aristóteles, é razoável supor que essas interpretações nos forneçam uma leitura mais aproximada do "sentido inicial" do Poema, ou pelo menos, distanciadas do filtro platônico aristotélico. A segunda premissa diz respeito à tradução dos textos. O filósofo pensa o seu tempo, cabendo ao intérprete o resgate no texto, do pensado pelo autor e, conforme Heidegger, quem é um pensador "determina-se unicamente pelo que ele pensou 2 ". O texto de Parmênides, "o que deve ser pensado", no entanto, encontra-se em outro plano, em que a língua desaparecida deve ser reconstruída em seu sentido originário. Segundo Heidegger, a morada original da filosofia é a língua e o povo grego, e ele indica que este é o caminho da reflexão; a filosofia e o seu perguntar são gregos na sua ἀρχή e a língua grega, e apenas ela, é λόγος. Heidegger alerta que não apenas o perguntar tem que ser grego, mas principalmente o ouvir, e o escutar da palavra grega nos revela o seu λέγειν "e nos coloca em presença da coisa mesma". E a "atitude autêntica não pode ser de questionar, ela deve ouvir a voz [Zusage] daquilo que todo o questionar deve primeiramente consultar quando indaga sobre a essência 3 ". Assim o caminho trilhado neste trabalho é o que Nietzsche chama "freunde des lento" 4 , os amigos da leitura lenta, que começa com o cuidadoso trabalho de traduzir não para o presente, mas sim para o passado, em busca dos significados 2 Heidegger, M. Introdução à Metafísica. Tempo Brasileiro, 1999, p. 32. 3 Idem. p. 35. 4 "A filologia é a venerável arte que exige dos seus praticantes uma coisa acima de tudo: ir além, ter tempo, "to become still, to become slow". 13 iniciais. Assim decidiu-se traduzir 5 o Poema, os fragmentos de Melisso e Górgias incluindo as paráfrases apresentadas no MXG , e os fragmentos de Zenão. Não significa, no entanto, que a proposta desta dissertação seja apresentar uma nova versão de tradução para os textos, mas sim garantir uma homogeneidade e consistência nos critérios de tradução de todos os textos acima mencionados, buscando principalmente evitar as traduções do verbo ser nos diversos sentidos (existencial, locativo, etc.). Optou-se, também, por manter a tradução do verbo ser nos tempos e modos verbais correspondentes aos da língua portuguesa, sem que isso signifique que haja alguma diferença semântica. Entende-se, também, que a escolha de Parmênides das diversas formas do verbo ser é, em muito, influenciada pelas questões da metrificação imposta pelo hexâmetro, ou seja há no texto uma tensão constante entre a necessidade da forma poética e as necessidades da argumentação lógica. Outro ponto que vale a pena salientar é que uma língua e a suas regras gramaticais refletem uma estrutura ontológica e assim o pensamento já é influenciado em parte por uma determinada ontologia. Nessa segunda premissa, o verbo ser é mantido na sua δύναμις original em que não se separam os diversos sentidos, em que as formas verbais são indiferentes e considera-se que substantivo e verbo são o mesmo, ou seja, não há um ente parmenídico, o τὸ ἐόν é um verbo, ou seja é um ser verbal, um verbosubstantivo. Diversos comentadores associam a estrutura do discurso dedutivo de Parmênides à influência do raciocínio matemático desenvolvido no pitagorismo. A terceira premissa deste trabalho é a consideração da hipótese de que se pode encontrar, também, indícios de um tipo de discurso que já vem sendo praticado na pólis: a argumentação judicial ou política. Essa última premissa justifica o título escolhido para esta dissertação, Parmênides enquanto poeta do lógos, na qual se vai oferecer uma leitura em que o aspecto epistemológico do Poema tenha uma relevância tão importante quanto o ontológico, elaborado pelo eleatismo posterior, e que foi privilegiado pela tradição a partir das leituras de Platão, Aristóteles e neoplatônicas. 5 Com a inestimável direção, supervisão e acompanhamento do Prof. Antônio Mattoso. 14 Inicialmente, serão discutidas as diversas compreensões do verbo ser adotadas pelos comentadores. Assim no primeiro capítulo, será analisada a questão sob a perspectiva filológica, seguindo o mesmo percurso que foi adotado por Heidegger 6 . No segundo capítulo, serão abordadas as críticas de Mill, as questões levantadas por Frege-Russell e o trabalho desenvolvido por Kahn, obra fundamental para entender a interpretação contemporânea da questão do verbo ser. No terceiro capítulo será apresentado o ser de Melisso, no quarto, o de Górgias e no quinto capítulo será analisado o Poema de Parmênides, considerando a análise de diversos comentadores, em que se pretende discernir "por meio da razão o argumento muito controverso" falado pela deusa. 6 (M. Heidegger, Introdução à Metafísica), p. 61. 15 2 Verbo ser: a tradição filológica A questão do ser nos remete inicialmente a uma reflexão sobre a etimologia, sintaxe e a semântica deste vocábulo como caminho necessário na busca pelo significado empregado pelos gregos antes da utilização no Poema de Parmênides e da sua posterior apropriação pela filosofia. No protoindo-europeu, para indicar 7 "le fait pur e simple de l'existence, sans modalité accessoire, l'être en soi et tant qu'opposé au non-être, qu'une seule racine qui s'est d'ailleurs conservée dans tous les idiomes de ce groupe...c'est la racine *as". Esta raiz está presente em onze das famílias que compõem o indoeuropeu. Mas, além dessa, outras duas raízes podem ser encontradas em alguns idiomas da família do indo-europeu na composição da conjugação do verbo ser: *bhu, tornar-se, devir, crescer e *vas, habitar, viver. É o processo que em linguística se denomina supletivismo verbal. Na língua grega, no entanto, a conjugação do verbo εἶναι é pura, sendo em todos os tempos e modos realizada somente a partir da raiz *as (que transformouse em ἐσ-) e não foram utilizadas as formas *bhu e *vas na composição dos tempos ausentes. No presente do indicativo encontramos a forma εἰμί ao invés de ἐσμι onde a queda do sigma foi compensada pelo alongamento da vogal precedente. A forma de futuro é ἔσομαι, médio passivo derivado de uma forma ativa, desaparecida, ἔσο. A necessidade dos demais tempos, no grego, tanto do perfeito quanto do aoristo foi suprida pelos tempos correspondentes do verbo γίγνομαι (nascer, devir), médio passivo de γίγνω (gerar).Γίγνω é a duplicação da raiz γεν, derivada de *gan (gerar, conhecer). A raiz *bhu pode ser encontrada na raiz grega φυ, (nascer, crescer, devir, fazer), e "jamais celle de la simple existence". Α raiz *vas, por sua vez, não está presente na língua grega. 7 (Henry, Les Trois Racines du Verbe <<Être>> dans Les Langues Indo-Européennes), p. 27. 16 Diferentemente do grego, no latim, na composição do verbo ser estão presentes tanto a raiz *as quanto a raiz *bhu. *As torna-se es e serve de tema para o presente e futuro: sum deriva de es-sum (há a perda da vogal radical), ero por sua vez deriva de eso, o infinitivo é esse. O perfeito é formado a partir do radical *bhu, fui por fûvi. Diverso do alemão, não se registra no latim a presença do radical *vas na composição do verbo ser. Há uma palavra latina, verus, verdade que significa "o que é", e que pode ser uma derivação de ve-sus, por uma permutação de r por s (regra das duas vogais). Heidegger 8 identifica, nas línguas germânicas, três raízes diferentes na composição do verbo ser. A mais antiga é *es, em sânscrito asus que significa "a vida, o vivente, aquilo que a partir de si próprio está e anda e repousa em si mesmo: o que tem consistência própria". Correspondem, no grego, a εἰμί e εἶναι e no latim a sum e esse. No alemão está relacionada com sind e sein. A segunda é *bhû, bheu, que corresponde ao grego φύω, "surgir, vigorar, chegar à consistência a partir de si mesmo e permanecer nela". Heidegger aponta não apenas a associação com φύσις, natureza e φύειν, crescer, surgir, como também "em uma interpretação mais originária" com a raiz φύcom φάde φαίνεσθαι. A φύσις seria assim o que surge para a luz, φύειν, luzir brilhar e por isso aparecer. O perfeito latino é fui, φύω tem origem na mesma raiz, assim como o alemão bin, bist. A terceira raiz, wes, presente apenas no verbo ser do alemão: wesan que significa habitar, ficar, deter-se. Assim o presente do indicativo, em alemão, é composto tanto por *bhu como por *as que se transformou em is: bind, bist, ist, sind, seind, sind. No pretérito temos a conjugação a partir de *vas: war, waret, war, waren, waret, waren. Mesmo considerando o fato de o verbo ser incorporar as estruturas dos outros radicais isto não significa que haja uma alteração no seu sentido original. Segundo Schoebel 9 : "Le mot *as, esse, avant d'être un mot abstrait, est un mot concret, ni plus ni moins que les autres mots. *As est, par aphérèse, le radical *vas, dont l'acception première présente un idée analogue a celle de couvrir, de 8 (Heidegger, Introdução à Metafísica), p. 81. 9 (Schoebel, Etude sur le verbe être), p. 109. 17 l`demeurer, rester, et qui, en sanskrit même, passe déjà dans ses dérivés au sens d'être, para exemple dans vasu, « substantia », 'res' ". A partir dessas raízes, Heidegger 10 encontra três significações presentes no verbo ser alemão: viver, surgir e permanecer e conclui: "O Ser é, relativamente ao seu significado, uma mistura niveladora de três significações de raízes diversas. Nenhuma delas se encontra de modo próprio e determinante no significado do nome. Esta mistura e aquela diluição convergem. No entrelaçamento destes dois processos encontramos uma explicação suficiente para o fato do qual partimos, nomeadamente o de que a palavra Ser é vazia e de uma significação volátil". Há que se observar que na interpretação heideggeriana as significações do verbo ser a partir das três raízes presentes na língua alemã não são encontradas, como vimos, na língua grega, que manteve unicamente a raiz *es, não havendo em grego esta "polissemia" das raízes encontrada por Heidegger no alemão. Ou seja a relação entre a φύσις e o ser, tão cara a Heidegger pode se justificar apenas do ponto de vista filosófico, mas não do ponto de vista morfológico semântico. Para Tanaka 11 , o verbo ser pode ter tido um sentido mais concreto anterior ao 'ser' ou 'existir': "sit and occupy (a place)". Pode-se notar o sentido existencial de ser nas sentenças em inglês: "Her house sits at the foot of the hill"; "The statue stands in the middle of the hill", "Los Angeles lies on the west coast of the United States". Assim a raiz *es teria sofrido um processo de "semantic bleaching" de três estágios: aStage 1: (voluntary) sit and occupy (a place) bStage 2: (actually) exists cStage 3: 'be' (copula, auxiliary) O sentido da raiz *wes que significava 'stay', 'dwell', 'pass the night', segundo o referido autor, teria evoluído de 'momentarily exist' para 'existed' e posteriormente para 'was' (copula, auxiliary). 10 (Heidegger, Introdução à Metafísica), p. 84. 11 (Tanaka, Verb to Be), p. 11. 18 Essa busca por um sentido anterior mais concreto, sensível das palavras abstratas que tem caracterizado a maioria dos estudos filológicos encontra a sua origem em Locke 12 : "Se remetêssemos os nomes às suas respectivas nascentes, constataríamos que em todas as línguas, todos os nomes que representam as coisas que não estão diante dos sentidos surgem primeiro das ideias sensíveis". E exemplifica: "o significado primordial de espírito é respiração e de anjo é mensageiro". Segundo Müller 13 , *as, mesmo em sânscrito, perdeu totalmente o caráter sensível, significando "être, et rien de plus". Mas há um derivado dessa raiz em sânscrito, asu que significa 'o sopro vital', "pour donner naissance à un nom comme asu, la racine *as a dû signifier «respirer» puis «vivre» et ensuite «exister»". Dentre os trabalhos mais recentes, Rix 14 traduz a raiz *h1escomo 'dasein, sein' ; a raiz *bhueh2, como 'wachsen, entstehen, werden' (crescer, desenvolver e ser) ; e a raiz *h2ues como '(ver)weilen, die Nacht verbringen'. MeierBrügger 15 , por sua vez, afirma que " to the given meaning of the PIE *h1es- 'to exist' to be there' may be added that this verb must have had this strong meaning in the Proto-Indo-European period". Benveniste 16 aponta a impossibilidade de uma definição satisfatória da natureza e funções do verbo ser. Há, segundo o autor, "dois termos distintos que se confundem: a cópula, marca gramatical da identidade e um verbo de sentido pleno", tendo havido a coexistência de ambos, inclusive no protoindo-europeu. E insiste na diferença entre a noção lexical e a noção gramatical: duas construções e duas funções diferentes. O uso predicativo, o verbo na forma incompleta, pode ser representado por 'X é Y', 'X não é Y' e o uso existencial, o verbo na forma completa, por 'X é', 'X não é'. 12 (Locke, Ensaio sobre o entendimento humano), Livro III, capítulo I, parágrafo V, p. 435. 13 (Müller, Nouvelles leçons sur la science de la langage), p. 68. 14 (Hermut, Kümmel, Zehnder, Lipp, & Schirmer, Lexikon Der Indogermanischen Verben), p. 241 e p. 98. 15 (Meier-Brügger, The Indo-European Linguistics), p. 238. 16 (Benveniste, Problemas de Línguistica Geral), Capítulo XVI, "Être" et "avoir" dans leurs fonctions linguistiques, p. 187 ss. 19 Quanto à noção lexical, segundo o autor, a raiz mais antiga é a do indoeuropeu *es que significa 17 "ter existência, ser em realidade e essa existência, essa realidade se define pelo que é autêntico, consistente, é verdadeiro". A noção copulativa, por sua vez, está presente em um tipo de sentença que estabelece a identidade de dois termos pronominais. Não há qualquer relação de natureza ou de necessidade entre as duas noções: cópula ou existencial. O infinitivo (ἀπαρέμφατον) caracteriza-se por desinências próprias apostas ao radical nos quatro sistemas verbais (aoristo, futuro, perfeito e imperfeito), nas vozes ativa, média e passiva. As desinências infinitivas não têm flexão de gênero, número, caso ou de pessoa do discurso. O infinitivo é o conceito verbal abstrato, tanto em português quanto em alemão, ele é a forma designativa do verbo, mas é uma ἔνγκλισις limitada no potencial de aparecimento de todas as manifestações de um verbo. As formas nominais do verbo são ditas formas infinitas porque não definem as pessoas dos discursos 18 . O infinitivo é uma evolução posterior da língua grega, e foi inclusive o critério utilizado para o agrupamento dos dialetos gregos. Ou seja, não pertenceu originalmente à estrutura comum da língua, como podemos observar nas diversas formas do infinitivo: ἢμεν (dórico), ἒμμεν, ἒμμεναι (eólico) e εἶναι (jônio e ático), diferentemente das formas finitas 19 . "O ser", τὸ εἶναι, é um substantivo verbal, que faz uso da forma infinitiva do verbo. O infinitivo, assim como o particípio e os adjetivos verbais na língua grega, são "palavras verbais", isto é, formas verbais que possuem certas propriedades do substantivo 20 . A utilização do *es tanto na função de cópula quanto na função de verbo de existência generalizou-se na maioria das línguas de origem indo-europeia. É possível, segundo Benveniste, inferir que a cópula é derivada de um verbo existencial. 17 Idem, p. 173 "já não é possível atingir diretamente esse sentido mas o fato de que *bhu- "estender, crescer", forneceu uma parte das formas de *espermite entrevê-lo. 18 O infinitivo na língua portuguesa, diferentemente do grego e do latim apresenta uma forma flexionada: andar eu, andares tu, andar ele... 19 (Chantraine, Dictionaire Étymologique de la Langue Grecque). 20 (Smyth, Greek Grammar), p. 107. 20 Pode-se predicar algo de diversas formas: tanto utilizando a frase nominal, sem verbo nem qualquer elemento de cópula, como também utilizando o verbo ser como elemento de junção, ou através de outros operadores. Há diversos exemplos da utilização dessas diferentes estruturas de predicação: no semítico é suficiente a justaposição de termos nominais para obter a frase nominal, no russo e no húngaro um morfema zero (pausa) cumpre este papel, em outros idiomas esta função é realizada por um pronome. Pode-se encontrar a forma nominal em diversas línguas: sumérias, caucasiana, altaica, dravidiana, indonésia, siberiana, e etc. A frase nominal no indo-europeu 21 "constitui um enunciado assertivo, finito...não sendo susceptível das determinações que a forma verbal tem em si: modalidades temporais, pessoais, etc.", ou seja deve ser intemporal, impessoal, não modal, afirmando "uma certa "qualidade" (no sentido mais geral) como própria do sujeito do enunciado, mas fora de qualquer determinação temporal, ou outra, fora de qualquer relação com o interlocutor". Não é correto dizer que nas frases nominais o verbo está elíptico. Diz Meier-Brügger "In fact the 'ellipsis' is not exact, since the copula is not essential. Contrarily, the use of the copula should rather be seen as an adaption to the common patterns of verbal phrases, which always feature a finite verb phrase". Acrescenta Benveniste 22 "Devemos insistir fortemente sobre a necessidade de rejeitar toda a implicação de 'ser' lexical na análise da frase nominal". No grego e no latim, como vimos, as duas estruturas estão presentes: a forma nominal e o ἐστί. Benveniste 23 faz uma análise do emprego dessas duas formas na poesia de Píndaro e na prosa narrativa de Heródoto. Nas Píticas, a frase nominal é utilizada como expressão de "verdade geral" ligando-se sempre ao discurso direto 24 , "a felicidade é sempre o primeiro bem a conquistar, a boa fama vem em segundo lugar" (τὸ δὲ παθεῖν εὖ πρῶτον ἀέθλων·εὖ δ ἀκούειν δευτέρα μοῖρ , I, 99), "os ventos que sopram nas alturas mudam incessantemente", (ἄλλοτε δ ἀλλοῖαι πνοαὶὑψιπετᾶν ἀνέμων, III, 104), "as grandes virtudes são sempre eloquentes", (Δ ἀρεταὶ δ αἰεὶ μεγάλαι 21 (Benveniste, Problemas de Línguistica Geral), p. 171. 22 Idem, p. 172. 23 Ib., p. 174. 24 O autor ressalta que tal constação já havia sido registrada por outros filológos dentre eles, Meillet. 21 πολύμυθοι, IX, 76), "o destino permanece inevitável", (τὸ δὲ μόρσιμον οὐ παρφυκτόν, XII, 30). O mesmo tipo de emprego é encontrado nos Trabalhos de Hesíodo, "o trabalho não é um opróbrio, não fazer nada que é um opróbrio", (ἔργον δ οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, ἀεργίη δέ τ ὄνειδος, 310), e também "a riqueza não se deve arrebatar; dada pelo céu é bem preferível", (χρήματα δ οὐχ ἁρπακτά· θεόσδοτα πολλὸν ἀμείνω, 320). Em sua pesquisa na História de Heródoto, onde há descrições de lugares, fatos, costumes, países, afirma Benveniste 25 que a utilização do ἐστι é preponderante: "Paniônio é um local sagrado ao norte de Mícale Τὸ δὲ Πανιώνιόν ἐστι τῆς Μυκάλης χῶρος ἱρός) e "Mícale é um promontório na terra firme" (ἡ δὲ Μυκάλη ἐστὶ τῆς ἠπείρου ἄκρη; I, 48) e o uso da estrutura nominal é bem menor, e sempre no contexto da verdade geral. A conclusão de Benveniste é que a frase nominal é a do discurso, e a do verbo ser como partícula de ligação é a da narração. Este mesmo emprego pode ser encontrado tanto no latim quanto no sânscrito. A tradição filológica, como vimos, nos indica o sentido existencial do verbo ser como originário e essencial, mas vale a pena ouvir Heidegger 26 , "Por mais valiosas que sejam as constatações da filologia elas não podem bastar. Pois é depois delas que começa a investigação". 25 Ib., p.176 e afirma que no dicionário de Powell são registradas mais de 307 exemplos de nessa função. 26 (Heidegger, Introdução à Metafísica), p. 110. 22 3 Os diversos sentidos do ser: a resposta de Kahn Mill 27 , ao analisar a cópula em uma proposição, identificou o caráter "ambíguo" do verbo ser: tanto como "sinal de predicação" quanto com o significado de existência. E no exemplo "Sócrates é justo" demonstra que podem ser atribuídos a Sócrates tanto a qualidade de justo como também a da existência, havendo assim um duplo sentido no verbo ser. No entanto, segundo ele, a qualidade de existência não deve ser considerada nesse tipo de predicação, quando se diz, por exemplo, "O centauro é uma ficção dos poetas" não podendo ser imputada ao centauro a afirmação da existência. E acrescenta: "Many volumes might be filled with the frivolous speculation concerning the nature of being (τό ὄν, οὐσία, Ens, Entitas, Essentia and the like) which has arisen from overlooking the double meaning of the words to be", e continua, "yes it become us not to triumph over the great intellects of Plato and Aristotle, because we are now able to preserve ourselves from many errors in which they, perhaps inevitably, fell". Segundo Mill, como os gregos falavam poucos idiomas tinham uma maior dificuldade em perceber essas "ambiguidades". Será a partir de Frege, no entanto, que a questão dos diversos significados do verbo ser será elaborada de forma mais completa. As reflexões sobre a ambiguidade e os diversos sentidos desse verbo encontram-se distribuídas em suas diversas obras. Pode-se listar quatro diferentes sentidos do verbo ser: o da identidade (a=b), o da predicação (a é alto), o da existência, e o da inclusão de classe (o filósofo é um homem). Para Frege são diferentes o "é" da predicação e o "é" da identidade; considerando as expressões "a estrela matutina é Vênus" e "a estrela matutina é um planeta", no primeiro exemplo são dois nomes próprios que se referem ao mesmo objeto, no segundo, um nome próprio (estrela matutina) refere-se a um 27 (Mill, A System of Logic, Raciocinative and Inductive), chapter IV, §1 , p. 199. 23 conceito (planeta). Diz Frege 28 "Uma identidade é reversível; mas ao cair um objeto sob um conceito não é uma relação reversível. O 'é', na sentença "a estrela matutina é Vênus não é, obviamente, a simples cópula, conteudisticamente o 'é' é aqui uma parte essencial do predicado...". A identidade é uma proposição a priori e analítica, não existe necessidade de verificação, enquanto a predicação é sintética, informando algo de novo sobre o universo e, nesse sentido, fundamental para o pensamento científico. A predicação é uma relação entre um objeto e um conceito e o "é" da inclusão de classe é uma relação de subordinação entre conceitos de mesma ordem. Em Frege a existência não é uma propriedade de um objeto, mas de um conceito, é um conceito de segunda ordem, "existence is in fact nothing but denial of the number naught. Because existence is a property of concepts the ontological argument for the existence of God breaks down" 29 . Anteriormente, Frege 30 já havia tratado do tema, "Por fim chamei a existência de um predicado de um conceito" e exemplifica "Na sentença 'Há pelo menos uma raiz quadrada de 4' estritamente nada se predica do número dois nem do número -2". Pode-se perceber em Frege a influência do pensamento de Kant, para quem existência não é um predicado, um conceito de algo que se pode adicionar ao conceito de alguma coisa, "A proposição Deus é onipotente contém dois conceitos que tem seus objetos: Deus e onipotente" tendo o "é" o papel de cópula e quando se diz "Deus é ou há um Deus, não se coloca nenhum predicado novo ao conceito de Deus" 31 . Contra a visão tradicional do sentido originário do verbo ser como existência, ou mais concretamente como presença, e que posteriormente teria passado a ser utilizado como cópula, e em resposta aos críticos da ambiguidade do verbo ser, Charles Kahn elabora uma nova conjetura, afastando-se do mainstream interpretativo do existencial ou da cópula como os sentidos fundamentais, e apresentando um novo sentido: o veritativo. Desde o artigo 32 publicado em 1966, além de diversos papers posteriores, incluindo um livro 33 em 1973, o autor tem-se dedicado ao estudo do verbo ser e 28 (Frege, Lógica e Filosofia da Linguagem), p. 116. 29 (Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic), p. 65. 30 (Frege, Lógica e Filosofia da Linguagem), p. 119. 31 (Kant, Crítica da Razão Pura), p. 549. 32 (Kahn, Cadernos de Tradução I), O verbo grego "ser"e o conceito de ser . 24 das suas diversas possibilidades interpretativas. Vale a pena salientar que o seu pensamento tem evoluído bastante durante esse período, razão pela qual é necessário analisar o seu pensamento considerando as diversas contribuições no tempo. Segundo Kahn 34 , não há evidências que suportem essa visão da linguística comparativa onde "the primitive meaning of verbs and other basic lexemes must have been an idea with sensorial content, carrying a concrete spatial or bodily connotation", nem a visão de que através de metáforas, os sentidos concretos vão sendo transferidos para sentidos mais abstratos. Diversos exemplos, além do verbo ser, podem ser considerados, como a evolução da raiz *weidque gerou ἰδεῖν, ver e οἶδα, saber por ter visto e posteriormente saber, ou a raiz *gende γίγνομαι inicialmente nascer em referência ao parto e posteriormente emergir, vir à luz, vir a ser, tornar-se. E "to live, be alive is surely the most definite and vivid of all senses attested for εἰμί" 35 tendo sido esse o sentido primitivo de *es-. Kahn questiona também outros pontos: primeiro que o sentido de "viver" tenha sido o sentido mais antigo do verbo ser em grego e que os demais sentidos sejam dele derivados. Para ele é mais provável que esse sentido primordial seja locativo-existencial, construído dentro de uma estrutura de cópula e tendo alguma dimensão existencial: está presente, está à mão, está efetivamente ali. O segundo ponto é que esse sentido possa ter sido o único significado original. A hipótese considerada pelo autor é que os sentidos geral e especial, concreto e abstrato tenham-se desenvolvido simultaneamente. E observa 36 "in intuitive or psychological terms we may thus recognize the locative and localexistential uses of eimί as the center of the whole system. In more strictly linguistic terms, however it is the copula as such, not merely the locative copula - that imposes itself as the fundamental fact". Além disso, a dicotomia entre cópula e o significado existencial é falha porque confunde a noção sintática da primeira com a noção semântica do segundo. 33 (Kahn, The Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek ). 34 (Kahn, Cadernos de Tradução I), p. 373. 35 Idem, p. 374. 36 Ib., p. 388. 25 Para o autor 37 , os diversos usos do verbo eînai formam "a unified conceptual system, a network of interdependent concepts clustering around the notion of predication, and these concepts provide a proper subject for ontology, both ancient and modern". Há, para Kahn, uma interdependência entre o uso predicativo e o uso existencial: a cópula é implicitamente existencial e o uso existencial é potencialmente predicativo. Isto significa, no primeiro caso, dizer que em uma sentença 'S is P' há duas afirmações: 'S existe' e 'S é um P'. Quanto ao segundo caso, Kahn 38 afirma que: "both in the Sophist an in Republic, then, we can say that Plato has only one concept of Being, expressed by eίnai, ousίa and όn, a concept that will cover the notions of existence, predication, identity, truth, and perhaps more". Segundo Kahn, a grande maioria se não todos os empregos to verbo ser, são potencialmente predicativos: "'X is' can be derived from 'X is Y' by zeroing the predicative". Esta proposta é o que autor denomina a revolução copernicana no estudo do verbo ser: "replacing existence by predication at the center of the system of uses for einai... 'to be' is to be something or other' ". Três são os argumentos apresentados que justificam a primazia da predicação: o uso copulativo é predominante, é sintaticamente elementar e é conceitualmente anterior. Para Kahn, a função sintática da predicação é mais básica para a compreensão dos usos do verbo ser como um sistema unificado e do seu papel para a filosofia. Assim, utilizando o método da gramática transformacional desenvolvida por Zellig Harris, em que sentenças complexas podem ser decompostas em kernels ou estruturas elementares e aquelas podem ser formadas a partir destas últimas, o autor faz uma análise dos usos do verbo ser presentes na Ilíada e na Odisseia, encontrando três usos predominantes: cópula, existencial e veritativo. Ele se propõe a responder a questão 39 "como foram os filósofos gregos guiados ou influenciados em sua formulação das doutrinas do Ser pelo uso préfilosófico desse verbo?". 37 (Kahn, Essays on Being): Chapter 5 "A return to Theory of the Verb Be and The concept of Being, p. 112. 38 Idem, p. 115. 39 (C. Kahn, Cadernos de Tradução I), O verbo grego "ser" e o conceito de ser. 26 Para ele não há evidências de que a distinção entre a interpretação existencial ou copulativa possa ser encontrada no uso dos autores clássicos, e há uma confusão entre a distinção sintática (construção absoluta ou predicativa) e a semântica (existencial ou outro significado) mas a distinção semântica, "é pior do que inútil porque nos leva a tomar certa a ideia de existência como um sentido básico do verbo grego" 40 . Kahn nos apresenta então duas evidências que comprovariam que os gregos não utilizaram a noção de existência: os quatro sentidos do verbo ser apresentados por Aristóteles no livro delta da Metafísica, são predicativos, não sendo registrada nenhuma ocorrência do verbo ser no sentido existencial. E um dos sentidos apontados por Aristóteles é a construção copulativa com o uso veritativo. E também na frase de abertura da obra de Protágoras, apresentada por Platão no Teeteto, Kahn afasta a interpretação existencial. Esses dois exemplos são também utilizados para justificar a interpretação mais fundamental de εἶναι proposta por Kahn, quando utilizado sem predicados a veritativa: "ser assim", "ser o caso" ou "ser verdade". O sentido veritativo é um dos mais antigos usos do indo-europeu, e em grego aparece no particípio no dativo "τῷ ὄντι", com o significado de "realmente, verdadeiramente", na forma adverbial "ὄντως", e pelo uso absoluto do verbo finito em "ἔστι ταῦτα", significando "essas coisas são assim". É esse sentido que Kahn propõe utilizar como caminho interpretativo para o ser parmenídico: "se entendermos o verbo e o particípio aqui como em Heródoto e Protágoras, a doutrina de Ser de Parmênides é antes de mais nada uma doutrina relativa à realidade como aquilo que é o caso". Além do uso veritativo o autor destaca o sentido locativo do verbo ser, pouco discutido pelos comentadores. Em 1972 41 ele apresentou uma nova formulação para sua teoria: admitindo que os filósofos gregos abordaram ocasionalmente o conceito de existência, e que o conceito de Ser em Parmênides e em Platão "é primariamente compreendido por referência à noção de verdade e à noção correspondente de realidade". E a questão fundamental dos filósofos gregos seria: "como deve ser o mundo estruturado para que a investigação, o conhecimento, a ciência e o discurso 40 Idem, p. 13. 41 (C. Kahn, Cadernos de Tradução I), Sobre a Terminologia para cópula e existência. p. 67. 27 verdadeiro (ou se for o caso, o discurso falso) sejam possíveis? Em termos linguísticos isso significa que o uso decisivo do verbo na criação da ontologia grega é o que nós chamamos de uso veritativo, no qual o verbo estί significa é verdade ou é o caso". Segundo Kahn, o pensamento condutor no início do Poema é a verdade como meta da investigação, e o ser que deverá ser conhecido é a realidade, a noção veritativa conduz ao conceito de realidade em oposição à aparência, verdade em oposição à δόξα. Em 1986 42 além de apresentar a sua crítica à explicação tradicional do sentido existencial do verbo ser apresentada pelos filólogos, expõe o que ele denomina de "modesta revolução copernicana: reinstalar a cópula no centro do sistema de uso de εἶναι" baseada em três pontos: é estatisticamente predominante, é sintaticamente elementar, e é anterior e central em todo o sistema de usos do verbo. A função da semântica da cópula seria, para Kahn 43 , "a de carregar a marca de pretensão de verdade da sentença, para servir de foco para a pretensão da sentença inteira", e assim o sentido veritativo, quando o verbo exprime as noções de verdade e realidade, torna-se ainda mais evidente. O autor ressalta que apenas a partir da cópula é que se pode compreender tanto o sentido veritativo quanto o existencial e que os dois últimos não podem explicar um ao outro. E apresenta os aspectos sintáticos da construção veritativa: o sujeito gramatical de ἐστί não é uma forma nominal, mas uma estrutura sentencial, a construção do verbo é absoluta, uma oração que exprime um pensar, expresso ou implícito. Os dois usos, veritativo e copulativo, "estão lógica e naturalmente ligados desde que mantenhamos em vista a função semântica da cópula como marca de pretensão de verdade" 44 . Os usos existenciais de εἶναι, a partir de uma detalhada pesquisa realizada em Homero podem ser agrupados em três categorias: cópula que é o mais comum, o operador da frase existencial, mais raro do que o anterior, encontrado apenas quatro vezes dentre os quinhentos e sessenta e dois usos de εἶναι na Ilíada, e o 42 (Knuuttilla and Hintikka The Logic of Being: Historical Studies), Retrospect on the Verb 'To Be' and the Concept of Being. 43 Idem, cit, p. 6. 44 Ib., cit, p. 8. 28 predicado existencial (sentenças tipo "há deuses") que não ocorreu nenhuma vez em Homero, nem antes do séc. V, tendo sido encontrados inicialmente em Melisso, Protágoras e Aristófanes. Kahn então sugere 45 que "para compreender o uso filosófico antigo, tanto em Parmênides como em Platão, a noção veritativa (se é ou não o caso que p) torna-se mais importante do que a ideia de existência (se há ou não uma tal coisa como X) embora ambas as noções estejam presentes". Kahn se volta então para a interpretação do Poema. Antes de iniciar a argumentação reforça a sua posição de que "em um desafio deliberado ao que parece ser a interpretação prevalecente, quero defender a tese de que em Parmênides assim como em Platão e Aristóteles, e também no uso pré-filosófico do verbo, a existência é um componente subordinado e não primário do conceito de Ser 46 ". Admitindo a necessidade do uso existencial no contraste de o que é com o nada, ele defende que na apresentação inicial do poema, fragmento 2.2, o ἐστι possa ser adequadamente compreendido pelo sentido existencial. Para o autor a interpretação do fragmento 2.2 ("que é e não pode não ser") deve ser efetuada em conjunto com o Proêmio (onde a deusa pretende instruí-lo no "imperturbável coração da Verdade persuasiva") e o fragmento 2.4, ("é o caminho da Persuasão que segue a Verdade"). Assim o caminho do "é" deve conduzir à verdade. Associado então a um sentido veritativo este ἐστι deve ser interpretado como sendo a realidade conforme conhecida: "o que é conhecido ou conhecível deve ser necessariamente o caso e não pode não ser assim 47 ". Kahn, em 1988 48 , divide as tentativas de interpretação da noção de Ser em Parmênides em dois grupos: os que priorizam a função existencial, como Owen, Barnes, Gomez-Lobo e Tarán, e os que preferem uma linha predicativa, como Mourelatos e Calogero e inclui a sua interpretação veritativa no segundo grupo. E insiste que a interpretação existencial do verbo ser é 49 "linguisticamente implausível para o tempo de Parmênides, e insatisfatório tanto para interpretação do poema quanto para a compreensão do impacto de Parmênides sobre Platão". 45 Ib., cit. p. 12. 46 Ib., p. 13. 47 Ib., p. 14. 48 (C. Kahn, Cadernos de Tradução I), Ser em Parmênides e Platão, p. 172 49 Idem, p. 169. 29 O ponto da controvérsia está, para Kahn, na ocorrência de ἐστί em B2. A interpretação veritativa proposta pelo autor deve ser aplicada apenas a este fragmento, aceitando que Parmênides prossegue 50 "para além da noção veritativa", abordando então o aspecto existencial. Em um artigo publicado em 2002 51 , Kahn reafirma a noção veritativa como fundamental na leitura do fragmento B2, mas acrescenta que o conceito de ser em Parmênides 52 deve ser visto como uma complexa mistura e unificação de pelo menos seis diferentes funções do verbo einai em Grego": a veritativa, a existencial, a cópula, o estado de duração, a locativa e a da identidade. Em seu mais recente livro Kahn, retorna novamente ao tema afirmando que, para Parmênides, o conceito de ser utiliza a predicação como base mas inclui três valores para εἶναι: existencial (S é), instanciação do predicado, onde P é ou ocorre, e o veritativo. Ou seja "an occurrence of is (estí) or being (eón) in Parmenides presupposes a predication of the form S is P, and asserts (1) the existence of a subject; (2) the instantiation of a predicate; and (3) the combination of the two in a state-of-affairs" 53 . Kahn, na catalogação dos usos do verbo ser, contribui de forma expressiva para o entendimento dos diversos sentidos desse verbo, mas essa ambiguidade apresentada originalmente por Mill, e que vem sendo debatida pelos diversos comentadores, parece ser uma leitura moderna e contemporânea do Poema, amplificada pelas questões levantadas pela filosofia analítica. Como veremos nas interpretações de Górgias e de Melisso, essa vertente interpretativa parece não ter relevância para os pensadores gregos. O verbo ser para os gregos é uno. 50 Ib. p.171. 51 (C. Kahn, Essays on Being), Parmenides and Plato Once More. 52 Idem, p. 200 53 (Kahn, Plato and the Post-Socratic Dialogue), p. 97 30 4 Melisso 4.1 Vida e obra Melisso 54 , filho de Itágenes, era pupilo de Parmênides. Jônio, dele, nos diz Plutarco 55 , que foi um filósofo e que teria atuado como στρατεγός em Samos e que "Aristotle disse que Péricles foi também derrotado por Melisso na batalha naval". Essa intervenção ateniense foi devida à mediação da disputa entre Mileto e Samos por Priene, decidida em favor dos milésios por Atenas. A batalha foi travada em 441 a.C., e provavelmente baseado nesse fato, Apolodoro 56 fixou o floruit de Melisso na octogésima quarta Olimpíada, isto é, 444-441a.C. Para Reale 57 , a indicação de Melisso para um cargo de tanta importância na referida batalha permite a hipótese de que ele fosse mais velho e que teria nascido em torno de 500 a.C. Isto torna viável a informação dada por Laertius 58 de que ele teria debatido com Heráclito. De acordo com Simplício, Melisso teria escrito o tratado Περὶ φύσεως ἤ περὶ ὄντος, e acredita-se ter sido a sua única obra. O costume de dar nomes às obras dos físicos teria ocorrido a partir dos sofistas, e o título Περὶ φύσεως é utilizado para nomear quase todas as obras de física dos pré-socráticos 59 . Um dos argumentos utilizados para confirmar o título da obra de Melisso é o fato de Górgias ter chamado o seu tratado de "Περὶ φύσεως, Περί τοῦ μὴ ὄντος", e que este título teria sido escolhido como paródia do título da obra de Melisso. Kirk 60 , no entanto, afirma que "the most we could with any safety conjecture is that Melissus' work was known to Górgias by the title recorded". 54 (Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers), IX, 24. 55 (Plutarco), p. 75. 56 (Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers), IX, 24. 57 (Reale Melisso, Testimonianze e Frammenti), p. 17. 58 (Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers), IX, 24. 59 Segundo Galeno, in Hippocratis de natura hominis 15.5.10-12: "You will find that all the books of his sort entitled On Nature belong to the ancient philosophers, such as Empedocles, Parmenides, Melissus, Alcmaeon, and Heraclitus". 60 (Kirk, Raven and Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers), p. 392. 31 Se utilizarmos a datação de Apolodoro, o floruit de Zenão teria ocorrido em 464-461 a.C., sendo assim uns vinte anos mais velho do que Melisso. Mesmo se utilizarmos a fixação da data obtida a partir do relato do diálogo Parmênides 61 , o floruit de Zenão teria ocorrido em 450-445 a.C., reduzindo, assim, a diferença de idade para uns cinco anos. Como Platão informa que a obra de Zenão teria sido composta na juventude, pode-se considerar que Melisso tenha tido acesso à obra deste. As informações sobre as relações entre Melisso, Empédocles e Anaxágoras são muito escassas, não permitindo uma conclusão objetiva. Sabemos que Anaxágoras era um pouco mais velho do que Empédocles, mas as suas obras seriam tardias 62 , tendo vivido de 500-497 a.C. a 428 a.C. e o seu trabalho ter-se-ia tornado público em torno de 440 a.C., a partir desses dados é improvável que Melisso tenha tido acesso à obra de Anaxágoras. Quanto a Empédocles, teria tido o seu floruit na octogésima quarta olimpíada (444-441 a.C.), e segundo D. L. 63 , teria vivido entre 484 a.C. e 424. A.C. Com base nessa datação seria muito difícil que Melisso tivesse sido exposto aos trabalhos de Empédocles, apesar de alguns comentadores encontrarem indícios do pensamento dele na obra de Melisso. Na hipótese da data considerada por Reale, essa possibilidade não existiria. Melisso teria influenciado as obras dos atomistas, notadamente Leucipo. Quanto às referências de Platão a Melisso, no Teeteto 64 , após citar um trecho do Poema, refere-se aos Melissos e aos Parmênides (Μέλισσοί τε καὶ Παρμενίδαι) que expuseram a doutrina segundo a qual "ὡς ἕν τε πάντα ἐστὶ" e "ἕστηκεν αὐτὸ ἐν αὑτῷ" e "οὐκ ἔχον χώραν ἐν ᾗ κινεῖται". Vale ressaltar que a formulação todas as coisas são um é uma leitura platônica do eleatismo 65 e a menção ao movimento é baseada em Melisso e não de Parmênides. Mais adiante no diálogo 66 , após desistir de examinar as doutrinas desses filósofos, justifica assim a Teodoro, a sua decisão: "envergonhando-me de examinar vulgarmente", Melisso e os demais que ensinaram que o todo é um e imóvel e "ἧττον αἰσχύνομαι ἢ ἕνα ὄντα Παρμενίδην. Παρμενίδης δέ μοι φαίνεται, 61 (Platão, Parmenides), 127b. 62 (Aristóteles, Metafísica), 984, a11. 63 (D. Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers), 8.74. 64 (Platão, Teeteto), 180e. 65 Parmênides e Melisso dizem que "o que é" é um. 66 (Platão, Teeteto), 183e. 32 τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου, "αἰδοῖός τέ μοι" εἶναι ἅμα "δεινός τε". É digno de nota o jogo de linguagem de Platão: Parmênides, "sendo único" e "parecendo um verso de Homero". Essas são as únicas menções de Platão a Melisso. É também importante ressaltar que Platão não estabeleceu nenhuma relação entre esses dois filósofos além da temática, diferentemente do que disse de Zenão 67 , "que tinha sido o favorito de Parmênides". No Sofista 68 , o estrangeiro faz menção a um " Ἐλεατικὸν ἔθνος" que teria começado a partir de Xenófanes, ou até mesmo antes, que afirma "ὡς ἑνὸς ὄντος τῶν πάντων καλουμένων". A tradição filosófica associa, a partir de Platão, os quatro filósofos, Parmênides, Zenão, Xenófanes e Melisso ao eleatismo, mas a participação de Xenófanes nesse grupo é controversa e o eleatismo não deve ser visto como um bloco conceitual homogêneo, havendo importantes diferenças entre os seus pensadores como veremos adiante. Aristóteles discute as teses de Melisso em diversos livros. Na Metafísica o eleatismo de Melisso é debatido a partir da teoria das quatro causas, na Física, é analisado dentro do contexto das categorias e da ontologia aristotélica. Nas Refutações Sofísticas e nos Segundo Analíticos é analisada a estrutura argumentativa do eleata. A Melisso é reservado um papel secundário na história da filosofia, em grande parte, devido ao juízo de Aristóteles. Diz, na Física 69 , "De fato ambos raciocinam de forma erística, tanto Melisso como Parmênides... Mas o raciocínio de Melisso é mais vulgar e desprovido de dificuldade" e na Metafísica 70 , "Para a pesquisa que estamos desenvolvendo, como dissemos, podemos deixar de lado dois desses filósofos, Xenófanes e Melisso, por serem as suas concepções um tanto grosseiras". A reconstrução do pensamento de Melisso será feita a partir de dois autores, Simplício, que em seus Comentários à Física e ao De Caelo de Aristóteles nos fornece uma paráfrase e dez fragmentos, e de um autor anônimo que escreveu 67 (Platão, Parmênides), 127b. 68 (Platão, Sofista), 242d. 69 (Aristóteles, Física I-II), 186 a4. 70 (Aristóteles, Metafísica), 986b25. 33 uma segunda paráfrase, MXG, originalmente atribuída a Aristóteles. Não há consenso entre os comentadores quanto a data 71 e autoria do MXG. Simplício, um neoplatônico, é a referência mais importante ao pensamento de Melisso. Ao procurar aproximar o pensamento dos pré-socráticos ao de Platão e Aristóteles e também ao neoplatônico, faz diversas citações dos textos originais dos primeiros, preservando assim uma quantidade importante dos fragmentos. É a mais importante fonte de pensadores como Parmênides, Empédocles, Anaxágoras e Zenão e também referência para Eudemo, Adrasto, Alexandre de Afrodísias e para os estoicos. Simplício estudou com Amônio e posteriormente com Damásio tendo esse sido o último chefe da escola neoplatônica de Atenas. Pagão, seus comentários se opõem ao de Filoponos, neoplatônico cristão. Após o seu retorno da Pérsia em 432 d.C., Simplício escreveu comentários de algumas obras de Aristóteles: De Caelo, Física e Categorias, nessa ordem. Seus comentários à Física, não só por ser fonte dos pensamentos dos présocráticos, mas também por fornecer um panorama dos debates entre Aristóteles, Teofrasto, Eudemo e dos demais neoplatônicos, é considerada de melhor qualidade 72 quando comparada com os outros dois comentários antigos à Física que sobreviveram, os de Temístos e de Filoponos. É importante considerar que em sua argumentação são utilizados elementos tanto da lógica aristotélica como da estoica 73 . 4.2 O Ser de Melisso As características do ser de Melisso serão apresentadas a partir de um agrupamento temático dos fragmentos disponíveis, da paráfrase de Simplício, e complementadas, quando necessário, com o MXG. Cada propriedade resultante, por sua vez, será contrastada com as características principais do ser de 71 Em um estudo detalhado Mansfeld acredita que o autor anônimo foi influenciado pelo NeoPirronismo, mas não exclui a possibilidade de que tenha sido por um dos seguidores tardios de Aristóteles, (Mansfeld, De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia: Pyrrhonizing Aristotelianism), p.268. 72 Tarán, L in (Hadot, Simplicus, sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie), p. 247. 73 (Simplicío, On Aristotle Physics 1.3-4), p. 1. 34 Parmênides, como formuladas no Poema, e as semelhanças e diferenças entre os dois serão assinaladas e comentadas. São as propriedades do ser, segundo Melisso: 1. Não gerado, eterno e indestrutível, 2. Extensão ilimitada 3. Uno e homogêneo 4. Imóvel 5. Incorpóreo e indivisível Após formular as características do ser, obtidas a partir de um rigor dedutivo, Melisso apresentará as suas críticas aos sentidos como instrumento de conhecimento do ente. Será a partir da Física 74 , 186 a4, em que Aristóteles inicia a sua exposição crítica da impossibilidade, apresentada pelos eleáticos, particularmente Parmênides e Melisso, de se conceber o múltiplo que, em seus Comentários, Simplício nos apresentará a sua paráfrase bem como os fragmentos essenciais do Περὶ φύσεως ἢ περὶ ὅντος de Melisso. Aristóteles, como já vimos anteriormente, inicia as suas refutações criticando severamente os dois pensadores, particularmente Melisso, dedicando-se a questionar mais detalhadamente o paralogismo que este teria cometido. 4.2.1 Não gerado, eterno e indestrutível No primeiro 75 fragmento lê-se: "καὶ Μ. δὲ τὸ ἀγένητον τοῦ ὄντος ἔδειξε τῶι κοινῶι τούτωι χρησάμενος ἀξιώματι* γράφει δὲ οὕτως* 'ἀεὶ ἦν ὅ τι ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται. εἰ γὰρ ἐγένετο, ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι πρὶν γενέσθαι εἶναι μηδέν* εἰ τοίνυν μηδὲν ἦν, οὐδαμὰ ἂν γένοιτο οὐδὲν ἐκ μηδενός." "E Melisso demonstrou o ser ingênito próprio do ente, tendo usado esse axioma comum. E escreve assim, sempre era o que era e sempre será. Se, pois, foi gerado, é necessário antes de ser gerado nada ser, se certamente nada era, de modo nenhum, nada poderia ter sido gerado a partir do nada." 74 Idem, p. 15. 75 Ib., 162, 24. 35 Vamos analisar duas questões: a da temporalidade e da geração. Quanto à primeira, Melisso insere o ser na temporalidade: "ἀεὶ ἦν ὅ τι ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται"; Parmênides, aparentemente, o exclui da temporalidade: οὐδέ ποτ' ἦν οὐδ' ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν, ἕν, συνεχές, se entendermos a temporalidade 76 a partir dos balizadores de passado e futuro. Melisso utilizou uma estrutura semelhante ao fragmento de Heráclito 77 , "Esse cosmos o mesmo para todos, nem algum dentre os deuses nem dentre os homens o fez, mas foi sempre, e é, e será, sempre vivo acendendo-se na medida e segundo a medida extinguindo-se". O ente de Melisso encontra-se no tempo, possuindo uma clara infinitude temporal, ele é hoje, mas foi e será (o mesmo). As implicações dessa construção diferem, e em muito, da formulação de Parmênides. Pode-se levantar a hipótese de que Parmênides teria proposto o conceito de eternidade atemporal, já que teria afastado o passado e o futuro, que são as medições tradicionais do tempo. Não parece ser, no entanto, o caso em questão, porque a utilização do ἔστιν reforça ao menos a temporalidade dada pelo verbo no presente. Owen 78 denomina de timeless present a solução criada por Parmênides. Em reflexão sobre o tempo, no Timeu 79 é dito: "Even as 'was' and 'shall be' are generated forms of Time, although we apply them wrongly, without noticing to Eternal Being. For we say that 'is' or 'was' or 'will be', whereas, in truth of speech,'is' alone is the appropriate term; 'was' and 'will be' on the other hand, are terms properly applicable to becoming which proceeds in Time, since both of these are motions". Segundo Platão, provavelmente tendo como referência Parmênides, apenas a palavra "é" descreve o ser eterno verdadeiramente, "foi" e "será" estão relacionados com o tempo e com o movimento e referir-se-ão ao mundo 76 (Kant, Crítica da Razão Pura), "o tempo é uma representação necessária que serve de fundamento a todas as intuições. Nãose pode suprimir o tempo no que diz respeito aos fênomenos em geral, ainda que se possa perfeitamente retirar os fenômenos do tempo. O tempo é, portanto, dado a priori", B46. 77 (Diels and Kranz, Die Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker, Heráclito), fragmento 30, κόσμον τόνδε, τὸν αὐτὸν ἁπάντων, οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ' ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται πῦρ ἀείζωον, ἁπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα. 78 (Owen, Logic, Science and Dialetic), p. 27. 79 (Platão, Timeu), 37e. 36 fenomênico produzido pelo demiurgo, onde o tempo criado é a imagem móvel da eternidade. A questão, no entanto, tem provocado uma série de discussões entre os comentadores. Para Mondolfo 80 , em Parmênides, "l'essere ingenerato e indistruttibile è, nella sua immutabilità eterna, tutto fuori del tempo e della successione: non ammette né un tempo passato, né un tempo futuro; ma solo l'eterno immutabile presente". Segundo Tarán 81 , "they (the lines) mean only that Being is without beginning or end in time, but do not express the concept of atemporality". Para Calogero 82 , "In Parmenide l'eternità è superiorità al tempo, presente senza passato e senza futuro; in Melisso l'eternità è totale estensione del tempo, somma del passato del presente e del futuro". No entanto, em Parmênides como também em Melisso, a referência à questão temporal pode ter tido como objetivo tão somente a exclusão da possibilidade de mudança do ente (neste caso um ἔστιν qualitativo, copular), ou da sua gênese ou da sua destruição (um ἔστιν existencial), e a sua imutabilidade e existência se projetariam tanto em relação ao passado, quanto ao futuro. A fórmula parmenídica, no entanto, é mais complexa e permite uma elaboração conceitual com maiores possibilidades do que a encontrada em Melisso. Melisso, como Parmênides, exclui a possibilidade da geração. Parmênides 83 apresenta a questão no fragmento oitavo da seguinte forma: "pois que origem dele investigarias? Como e de onde tendo crescido? nem a partir do não ente permitirei tu dizeres nem pensares, pois não é dizível nem pensável: que não é. E que necessidade o teria incitado a surgir (crescido), antes ou depois, tendo começado do nada? Assim é necessário ou completamente ser ou não ser. 80 (Mondolfo, L'infinito nel pensiero dell'antichità classica), p. 92. 81 (Tarán, Parmenides), p. 95. 82 (Calogero, Studi Sull'eleatismo), p. 73. 83 (Diels and Kranz, Die Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker, Parmênides), fragmento oitavo: "τίνα γὰρ γένναν διζήσεαι αὐτοῦ; πῆι πόθεν αὐξηθέν; οὐδ' ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος ἐάσσω φάσθαι σ' οὐδὲ νοεῖν* οὐ γὰρ φατὸν οὐδὲ νοητόν ἔστιν ὅπως οὐκ ἔστι. τί δ' ἄν μιν καὶ χρέος ὦρσεν ὕστερον ἢ πρόσθεν, τοῦ μηδενὸς ἀρξάμενον, φῦν; οὕτως ἢ πάμπαν πελέναι χρεών ἐστιν ἢ οὐχί". 37 pois que gênese dele investigarias?" A impossibilidade da geração a partir do nada (ex nihilo nihil), em Parmênides, dá-se por duas razões: a primeira é que sendo proibido falar ou pensar o que não é exclui-se a possibilidade da geração a partir do nada, e a segunda razão está relacionada ao fato de que não está identificada uma necessidade para fazê-lo crescer a partir do nada e, conforme notou Aristóteles 84 , o único monista que identificou a causa eficiente foi Parmênides. Na argumentação de Melisso, a geração a partir do nada (οὐδὲν ἐκ μηδενός) é tomada como premissa, valendo ressaltar que na tradição jônia desde Tales, Anaxímenes e Anaximandro sempre existiu um substrato eterno em permanente transformação: água, ápeiron, dentre outros. Reale 85 argumenta que o início do Περὶ φύσεως ἣ περὶ ὂντος que a formulação da impossibilidade da geração a partir do nada não seria o primeiro fragmento da obra de Melisso, como apresentado por Diels a partir dos estudos de Pabst 86 . No início da paráfrase de Simplício, estaria o fragmento de abertura do tratado de Melisso: E agora o argumento de Melisso ao qual Aristóteles antes se opõe, tendo pois empregado os axiomas dos físicos, Melisso, sobre a gênese e a corrupção, começa o seu tratado assim, "Se certamente nada é, o que poderia ser dito sobre isso como se alguma coisa ou algo fosse" (Kirk continua) E se é algo, ou vindo a ser, é, ou sempre sendo, é (εἱ μὲν μηδὲν ἔστι, περὶ τούτο τί ἂν λέγοιτο ὡς ὅντος τινός)." A proposta de Reale, é totalmente consistente com a formulação de Parmênides, (οὐδ' ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος ἐάσσω φάσθαι σ' οὐδὲ νοεῖν* οὐ γὰρ φατὸν οὐδὲ νοητόν ἔστιν ὅπως οὐκ ἔστι). Ou seja, a impossibilidade da geração a partir do nada encontraria a sua justificativa a partir da impossibilidade de se dizer o não ser. É importante considerar, no entanto, que essa introdução não se encontra presente nos fragmentos, nem tampouco no MXG, que afirma textualmente, 84 (Aristóteles, Metafísica). 85 (Reale, Melisso, Testimonianze e Frammenti), p. 35. 86 (Pabst, De Melissi Sammii fragmentis), a citação não está no dialeto jônico diferentemente das demais. 38 depois de se estabelecer o primeiro (premissa) o qual primeiramente admite, i.e., nada poderia ser gerado a partir do que não é. Burnet 87 , por sua vez, acredita que o fragmento é autêntico porque possui um caráter eleático. Outro ponto digno de nota é que a vedação de Melisso para a geração é expressamente dupla: do não ser, nada pode ser gerado, nem tampouco do ser, como está formulado na Paráfrase: "Mas se foi gerado, ou certamente a partir do ente ou a partir do não ente. Mas nem a partir do não ente, é possível algo ser gerado (nem, outra coisa, por um lado, que nada é, muito mais o que é absolutamente), nem a partir do ente". No MXG, o Anônimo busca refutar aos argumentos de Melisso e apresenta na sua crítica à hipótese da impossibilidade da geração a partir do não ser, um verso de Hesíodo 88 : "Πάντων μὲν πρῶτον, φησί,χάος ἐγένετο, αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα γαῖα εὐρύστερνος, πάντων ἕδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεὶ ἠδ' Ἔρος, ὃς πάντεσσι μεταπρέπει ἀθανάτοισι." Assim traduzido, "Dentre todos primeiro κάος foi gerado, mas em seguida Gaia, seios amplos, de todos sede sólida sempre, e Eros que se distingue entre todos os imortais". Outra diferença entre as formulações de Parmênides e Melisso é que não se encontra, nos fragmentos de Melisso, nenhuma menção à possibilidade de destruição do ser, como está presente no primeiro, encontrando-se tão somente na paráfrase de Simplício, nem então foi gerado ente, nem será corrompido. 87 (Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy), p. 336. 88 (Hesíodo, Theogonia), 115. 39 4.2.2 Extensão Ilimitada Vamos analisar a primeira inovação de Melisso no pensamento eleático: da eternidade do ser deduz-se a sua infinitude temporal. É essa afirmação que vai provocar a crítica aristotélica como veremos adiante. Lê-se no segundo fragmento: "ὅτε τοίνυν οὐκ ἐγένετο, ἔστι τε καὶ ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται καὶ ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἔχει οὐδὲ τελευτήν, ἀλλ' ἄπειρόν ἐστιν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο, ἀρχὴν ἂν εἶχεν (ἤρξατο γὰρ ἄν ποτε γενόμενον) καὶ τελευτήν (ἐτελεύτησε γὰρ ἄν ποτε γενόμενον)* ὅτε δὲ μήτε ἤρξατο μήτε ἐτελεύτησεν, ἀεί τε ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται <καὶ> οὐκ ἔχει ἀρχὴν οὐδὲ τελευτήν* οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνυστόν, ὅ τι μὴ πᾶν ἔστι". "Porque certamente não foi gerado, é e sempre era, e sempre será, e princípio não tem, nem fim, mas ilimitado é. Se de fato fosse gerado, princípio teria (teria pois principiado em algum momento a sua geração) e fim (teria pois findado em algum momento a sua geração). E porque nem principiou nem findou, sempre era e sempre será (e) não tem princípio nem fim. Pois não é possível ser sempre o que não é tudo." Lê-se no terceiro fragmento: "ὅτι δὲ ὥσπερ τὸ 'ποτὲ γενόμενον' [B 2] πεπερασμένον τῆι οὐσίαι φησίν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ 'ἀεὶ ὂν' ἄπειρον λέγει τῆι οὐσίαι, σαφὲς πεποίηκεν εἰπών* 'ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἔστιν ἀεί, οὕτω καὶ τὸ μέγεθος ἄπειρον ἀεὶ χρὴ εἶναι'. μέγεθος δὲ οὐ τὸ διάστατόν φησι". "E afirma que exatamente como o que em algum momento foi gerado, limitado quanto à substância, assim também, diz, o que é sempre, ilimitado quanto à substância, demonstrou claramente dizendo "mas como é sempre, assim também é necessário ser sempre ilimitado quanto à grandeza". Grandeza e não extensão, afirma." 40 Lê-se no quarto fragmento: "καὶ ἐφεξῆς δὲ τῶι ἀιδίωι τὸ ἄπειρον κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν συνέταξεν εἰπών* 'ἀρχήν τε καὶ τέλος ἔχονοὐδὲν οὔτε ἀίδιον οὔτε ἄπειρόν ἐστιν', ὥστε τὸ μὴ ἔχονἄπειρόν ἐστιν." "E sucessivamente ao eterno, o ilimitado segundo à substância, dispôs dizendo: nada que tem princípio e fim, nem eterno nem ilimitado é 89 , como o que não tem limite é". Há duas questões importantes: a conclusão de que o que não foi gerado é ilimitado, e a passagem da eternidade temporal para o infinito espacial, que será também explorada em Górgias. De acordo com o segundo fragmento, algo que foi gerado tem princípio e fim, e a partir disso, Melisso deduz que algo que não foi gerado então não teria nem princípio nem fim (ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἔχει οὐδὲ τελευτήν). Vamos dividir o raciocínio de Melisso em três etapas: Passo 1: tudo que foi gerado tem princípio e fim (princípio + fim = limite) Passo 2: então tudo que tem princípio e fim foi gerado (falácia de conversão) Passo 3: como tudo não tem princípio nem fim não foi gerado (sendo ilimitado) Assim, Aristóteles 90 acusa Melisso de cometer um paralogismo, uma falácia de conversão 91 , "se tudo que nasceu tem começo, também o que não nasceu não tem começo". Nas Refutações, Aristóteles explica melhor a questão, argumentando que a hipótese de um universo infinito supõe que o universo não veio a ser, e que tudo o que veio a ser teve um princípio; se portanto o universo não veio a ser, não tem princípio, sendo assim infinito, a conclusão não é necessária: se o que veio a ser possui um princípio não se segue que aquilo que possui um princípio tem de vir a ser. E mais adiante 92 , aponta também a tentativa de construir uma identidade entre nascer, ter um começo e ser finito: "Ou ainda como no argumento de Melisso, alguém considera 'ter vindo a ser' e "ter um começo", como a mesma coisa, e "tornar-se igual", como a mesma coisa 89 Dupla dimensão tempo e espaço, eterno sempre existente, como o que tem limite é. 90 (Aristóteles, Física I-II), 186 a 10. 91 (Aristóteles, Réfutations sophistiques), 167 b "a refutação que ocorre devido ao consequente porque assumimos a relação de conseqüência recíproca". 92 Idem,168b 35. 41 que "assumir a mesma magnitude"." Pois do que tendo vindo a ser tem um começo, ele afirma também que o que tem um começo veio a ser, pelo fato de "ter vindo a ser" e "sendo finito" serem ambos a mesma coisa, porque ambos têm um começo." É interessante notar que Aristóteles nesse momento não está questionando a infinitude espacial, mas sim a premissa do argumento, inviabilizando assim toda a conclusão de Melisso. Pode-se objetar à falácia do consequente que, para Melisso, é uma característica essencial do que é gerado ter um princípio, não se configurando em um mero acidente, valendo recordar que para Aristóteles as falácias ligadas ao consequente dependem de que o consequente seja um acidente. Mas nesse caso sujeito e predicado seriam iguais inutilizando dessa forma o silogismo. Interessa-nos especialmente a passagem do segundo fragmento, ao falar do que é Melisso afirma, "princípio teria (teria pois principiado em algum momento a sua geração) e fim (teria pois findado em algum momento a sua geração) ", que permite uma dupla interpretação, tanto temporal quanto espacial: o "teria principiado em algum momento a sua geração" tanto pode se referir a um momento no tempo, como no espaço, ou a ambos, o que aparenta ser a opção de Melisso. Assim a geração seria tanto temporal quanto espacial como se percebe pela leitura do terceiro fragmento. A paráfrase do MXG nos aproxima ainda mais de uma leitura de infinito espacial, "se eterno for, ilimitado ser, porque não tem princípio de onde foi gerado nem fim no qual, sendo gerado, uma vez findou". Vale salientar que ao se inserir dentro do tempo e espaço tende-se a estabelecer a materialidade do ser. A afirmação de que por ser eterno, é também ilimitado quanto à extensão, difere da proposição de Parmênides 93 que estabelecia claramente o limite do que é: "E assim firme nesse lugar mesmo permanece, pois a poderosa Necessidade nos grilhões do limite o retém, que todo entorno prende porque não está permitido por Themis ser inacabado o ente". E mais adiante, "mas porque <há> um limite extremo, completo é em todas as direções, semelhante a corpo de uma esfera bem circular do centro, equidistante, por todas as direções". E, "pois em todas as direções igual, semelhante em seus limites fica." 93 (Diels and Kranz, Die Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker, Parmênides), fragmento oitavo. 42 A concepção do ser de Parmênides limitado e como uma esfera finita pode ser pensada dentro de um contexto de oposição ao pitagorismo, onde convivem o limitado e o ilimitado, e também consistente com a concepção grega de que a perfeição esteja relacionada com o limite e o círculo. Melisso, de influência jônica, notou que a esfera teria que ter algum limite exterior, que não poderia ser o nada, porque este não poderia existir dentro da concepção eleática e assim a finitude teria que conviver com o espaço vazio (enquanto não ser) o que seria impossível. Aristóteles 94 , a partir da premissa de que o ente se diz de muitas maneiras, critica o conceito de ilimitado: "Melisso diz que o ente é ilimitado. Então o ente é um quanto, pois o ilimitado está no quanto, e não é possível que a substância ou qualidade ou afecção sejam ilimitadas a não ser por concomitância, se forem ao mesmo tempo de certa quantidade. De fato, a definição do ilimitado utiliza do quanto mas não se utiliza da substância, nem do qual. Assim, se houver tanto substância como quanto, o ente será dois e não um; mas se houver apenas substância, o ente não será ilimitado, nem poderá ter grandeza alguma, caso contrário, seria certo tanto". 4.2.3 Uno e homogêneo Melisso, a partir do ilimitado espacial deduzido nos fragmentos anteriores, apresenta a prova da unicidade do ser: se fossem dois limitar-se-iam. Lê-se no quinto fragmento, "ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἀπείρου τὸ ἓν συνελογίσατο ἐκ τοῦ 'εἰ μὴ ἓν εἴη, περανεῖ πρὸς ἄλλο'. τοῦτο δὲ αἰτιᾶται Εὔδημος ὡς ἀδιορίστως λεγόμενον γράφων οὕτως 'εἰ δὲ δὴ συγχωρήσειέ τις ἄπειρον εἶναι τὸ ὄν, διὰ τί καὶ ἕν ἐστιν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ διότι πλείονα, περανεῖ πηι πρὸς ἄλληλα. δοκεῖ γὰρ ὁ παρεληλυθὼς χρόνος ἄπειρος εἶναι περαίνων πρὸς τὸν παρόντα. πάντηι μὲν οὖν ἄπειρα τὰ πλείω τάχα οὐκ ἂν εἴη,ἐπὶ θάτερα δὲ φανεῖται ἐνδέχεσθαι. χρὴ οὖν διορίσαι, πῶς ἄπειρα οὐκ ἂν εἴη, εἰ πλείω". "E do ilimitado, o uno deduziu a partir disto, se não uno fosse, limitar-se-ia com outro. Eudemo, porém, acusa o que é dito <ser> desarticulado escrevendo assim, "mas se nesse momento, alguém concordasse ser ilimitado o ente, por que também é um? A partir disso, certamente não, porque muitos limitar-se-ão uns em relação aos outros. De fato, o tempo passado parece ser ilimitado (embora) 94 (Aristóteles, Física I-II), 185 a 32. 43 limitando-se com o presente. Então de todo modo ilimitado talvez não pudesse ser o múltiplo mas quanto às outras coisas parece ser possível. É necessário, então, determinar que como ilimitado não poderia ser, se múltiplo." Continua no sexto fragmento: "τοῦ γὰρ αἰσθητοῦ ἐναργῶς εἶναι δοκοῦντος, εἰ ἓν τὸ ὄν ἐστιν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄλλο παρὰ τοῦτο. λέγει δὲ Μ. μὲν 'εἰ γὰρ <ἄπειρον> εἴη, ἓν εἴη ἄν* εἰ γὰρ δύο εἴη, οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο ἄπειρα εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἔχοι ἂν πείρατα πρὸς ἄλληλα', Παρμενίδης δὲ 'οὖλον ... ἀγένητον". "Parecendo de fato claramente o sensível ser, se uno é o ente não poderia ser outro exceto esse. E diz Melisso se de fato ilimitado fosse, uno seria; se de fato dois fossem, não poderiam ser ilimitados, mas limitar-se-iam uns em relação aos outros, Parmênides, por outro lado, inteiro, ingênito". Melisso raciocina por absurdo, semelhante a Zenão: se fossem dois não poderiam ser ilimitados, excluindo, totalmente a possibilidade do múltiplo. Parmênides 95 se refere ao ser como uno, "porque agora é um todo homogêneo, uno, contínuo", mas tal propriedade não tem um destaque especial na sua argumentação. Para Teofrasto 96 , "Parmenides does not appear to prove that being is one". Segundo Kirk 97 , "he did not make it his central preoccupation. So when Plato and Aristotle represent monism as the principal thesis of Eleatics, they must be reading Parmenides through Melissan spectacles". Com a adição da infinitude espacial e ο reforço da unicidade o ser eleata vai, aos poucos, sendo reelaborado por Melisso afastando-se da formulação de Parmênides. Não temos os fragmentos originais referentes à homogeneidade do ente. Simplício se refere a ela na paráfrase "pois o uno sempre semelhante a si mesmo" e temos também a versão do MXG "e se uno for, inteiramente semelhante ser, se pois dessemelhantes, muitos seriam, e não mais uno seria, mas muitos". Em Parmênides como veremos a homogeneidade é apresentada como prova da unicidade do ser. 95 (Diels and Kranz, Die Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker, Parmênides), fragmento oitavo, "ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν, ἕν, συνεχές". 96 (Simplicius, On Aristotle Physics 1.3-4), 115,18. 97 (Kirk, Raven, & Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers), p. 395. 44 4.2.4 Imóvel A imobilidade do ser de Melisso é dada a partir do sétimo fragmento, ressaltando-se que a imobilidade se refere tanto à mudança qualitativa quanto ao deslocamento, "λέγει δ' οὖν Μ. οὕτως τὰ πρότερον εἰρημένα συμπεραινόμενος καὶ οὕτως τὰ περὶ τῆς κινήσεως ἐπάγων* 1) 'οὕτως οὖν ἀίδιόν ἐστι καὶ ἄπειρον καὶ ἓν καὶ ὅμοιον πᾶν. (2) καὶ οὔτ' ἂν ἀπόλοιτο οὔτε μεῖζονγίνοιτο οὔτε μετακοσμέοιτο οὔτε ἀλγεῖ οὔτε ἀνιᾶται*εἰ γάρ τι τούτων πάσχοι, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ἓν εἴη. εἰ γὰρ ἑτεροιοῦται, ἀνάγκη τὸ ἐὸν μὴ ὁμοῖον εἶναι, ἀλλὰἀ πόλλυσθαι τὸ πρόσθεν ἐόν, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐὸν γίνεσθαι. εἰ τοίνυν τριχὶ μιῆι μυρίοις ἔτεσιν ἑτεροῖον γίνοιτο, ὀλεῖται πᾶν ἐν τῶι παντὶ χρόνωι. (3) ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μετακοσμηθῆναι ἀνυστόν* ὁ γὰρ κόσμος ὁ πρόσθενἐὼν οὐκ ἀπόλλυται οὔτε ὁ μὴ ἐὼν γίνεται. ὅτε δὲμήτε προσγίνεται μηδὲν μήτε ἀπόλλυται μήτε ἑτεροιοῦται, πῶς ἂν μετακοσμηθὲν τῶν ἐόντων εἴη; εἰ μὲνμὲν γάρ τι ἐγίνετο ἑτεροῖον, ἤδη ἂν καὶ μετακοσμηθείη. (4) οὐδὲ ἀλγεῖ* οὐ γὰρ ἂν πᾶν εἴη ἀλγέον*οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτο ἀεὶ εἶναι χρῆμα ἀλγέον* οὐδὲ ἔχει ἴσην δύναμιν τῶι ὑγιεῖ* οὐδ' ἂν ὁμοῖον εἴη, εἰ ἀλγέοι*ἀπογινομένου γάρ τευ ἂν ἀλγέοι ἢ προσγινομένου, κοὐκ ἂν ἔτι ὁμοῖον εἴη. (5) οὐδ' ἂν τὸ ὑγιὲς ἀλγῆσαι δύναιτο* ἀπὸ γὰρ ἂν ὄλοιτο τὸ ὑγιὲς καὶ τὸ ἐόν, τὸδὲ οὐκ ἐὸν γένοιτο. (6) καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀνιᾶσθαι ὡυτὸς λόγος τῶι ἀλγέοντι. (7) οὐδὲ κενεόν ἐστιν οὐδέν* τὸ γὰρ κενεὸν οὐδέν ἐστιν* οὐκ ἂν οὖν εἴη τό γε μηδέν. οὐδὲ κινεῖται* ὑποχωρῆσαι γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει οὐδαμῆι, ἀλλὰ πλέων ἐστίν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ κενεὸν ἦν, ὑπεχώρει ἂν εἰς τὸ κενόν* κενοῦ δὲ μὴ ἐόντος οὐκ ἔχει ὅκηι ὑποχωρήσει. (8) πυκνὸν δὲ καὶ ἀραιὸν οὐκ ἂν εἴη. τὸ γὰρ ἀραιὸν οὐκ ἀνυστὸν πλέων εἶναι ὁμοίως τῶι πυκνῶι, ἀλλ' ἤδη τὸ ἀραιόν γε κενεώτερον γίνεται τοῦ πυκνοῦ. (9) κρίσιν δὲ ταύτην χρὴ ποιήσασθαι τοῦ πλέω καὶ τοῦ μὴ πλέω* εἰ μὲν οὖν χωρεῖ τι ἢ εἰσδέχεται, οὐ πλέων* εἰ δὲ μήτε χωρεῖ μήτε εἰσδέχεται, πλέων. (10) ἀνάγκη τοίνυν πλέων εἶναι, εἰ κενὸν μὴ ἔστιν. εἰ τοίνυν πλέων ἐστίν, οὐ κινεῖται." "Diz então Melisso assim concluindo as coisas ditas primeiramente e assim raciocinando acerca do movimento (1) assim então eterno é, e ilimitado e uno e todo igual (2) e nem poderia perecer, nem maior tornar-se, nem reordenar-se, nem experimentar dor nem pena; se de fato fosse afetado por alguma dessas coisas não mais uno poderia ser. Se pois se altera, é necessário o ente não igual ser, mas perecer o que era primeiro e o não ente vir a ser. Se, então, por um único fio de cabelo, em dez mil anos, outro se tornasse, perecerá totalmente na totalidade do tempo. (3) Mas nem é possível ser reordenado, pois a ordem que 45 era antes não perece, nem (a ordem) que não é vem a ser. Uma vez que nem acrescenta nada, nem perece, nem se altera, como seria próprio dos entes terem sido reordenados? Se certamente algo se tornasse outro, imediatamente seria reordenado. (4) Nem sofre dor, certamente não seria todo se sofresse dores, certamente algo não poderia ser sempre sofrendo dor, nem possui poder igual ao são; se algo fosse retirado sofreria dor, ou se algo acrescentado, e não mais todo igual seria. (5) Nem o são poderia sofrer dor pois pereceria o são e o ente, e o não ente seria gerado. (6) E acerca do experimentar pena, o mesmo argumento para quem que sofre dor. (7) Nem vazio nenhum é, pois o vazio nada é; pois certamente não poderia ser o nada. Nem se move. Deslocar-se, com efeito, não pode para lugar nenhum, mas pleno é. Se certamente, o vazio fosse, deslocar-seia para o vazio. Vazio, no entanto, não sendo, não tem para onde deslocar-se. (8) Denso e rarefeito não poderia ser. Pois o rarefeito não é possível pleno ser de modo semelhante ao denso, mas certamente o rarefeito vem a ser mais vazio que o denso. (9) Esta distinção é necessário fazer do pleno e do não pleno: se então dá espaço ou acolhe algo não pleno (é), mas se nem espaço dá nem acolhe (algo), pleno (é). (10) É necessário então pleno ser, se vazio não é. Se então pleno é, não se move." No Poema 98 , a possibilidade de nascer e perecer já havia sido afastada, "como poderia perecer o que é, como poderia ter nascido?", Melisso adiciona a ela sofrer dor ou pena, dois elementos estranhos à argumentação de Parmênides. A imobilidade do ser é justificada por Melisso com o argumento de que se ele perecesse, apresentasse alteração, se reordenasse, ou sofresse dor ou pena não seria mais uno, é a unicidade do ser que o mantém imóvel. No entanto, na argumentação apresentada no fragmento, a razão para a imobilidade está relacionada à impossibilidade do não ser, para que haja alteração é necessário "perecer o que era primeiro e o que não é vir a ser", e no caso de reordenação, "pois a ordem que era antes não perece, nem (a ordem) que não é vem a ser"; ou a sua homogeneidade, "ou se algo acrescentado, e não mais todo igual seria". Parmênides 99 também menciona a impossibilidade de aumentar ou diminuir "Nem algo maior que impediria a sua continuidade, nem algo menor". 98 (Diels and Kranz, Die Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker, Parmênides), fragmento oitavo. 99 Idem. 46 Ao abordar a questão do movimento, Melisso apresenta uma das maiores contribuições ao eleatismo e à evolução do pensamento grego em direção ao atomismo, que é a inexistência do vazio (τὸ κένον), já que ele nada é, vazio é não ser. É importante ressaltar que para que haja movimento é condição sine quae non que haja um espaço vazio que permita o deslocamento. Em Parmênides a inexistência do movimento é apresentada de maneira metafórica "além disso, imóvel, nos limites dos grandes grilhões é", e justificada por elementos mitológicos, "já que a Moira o forçou a ser totalmente imóvel". A justificativa lógica dada no Poema é que por ser inteiro, homogêneo, e contido em um limite, não é possível o movimento (enquanto deslocamento). É interessante comparar o vazio de Melisso com a inexistência de espaço proposta por Zenão, "se existe o espaçο, em algo será, todo ente, com efeito, em algo (é), o "em algo" também em um espaço (é), pois também estará o espaço em um espaço e isso ao infinito, então não existe o espaço". Melisso dá assim a forma final ao argumento do imobilismo eleático. Aristóteles 100 questiona a dedução da imobilidade a partir da unicidade, "Por que o todo não pode ter um movimento rotatório como a água, e por que não deveria ser objeto de mudança qualitativa? Ross 101 refuta os questionamentos de Aristóteles, primeiro argumentando que Melisso já havia excluído a possibilidade de que o ente tivesse partes, e segundo com base na hipótese de que se houvesse uma mudança qualitativa o ente perderia a sua identidade. Aristóteles 102 questiona também o argumento de que o movimento exige a existência do vazio: "alterar , em geral, não envolve o vazio , pela razão que escapou a Melisso, pois o pleno pode alterar-se qualitativamente". A descrição apresentada aproxima o ente de Melisso a um ser vivo ao dizer que se algo fosse retirado, sofreria dor e pena, e não mais todo seria, nem tampouco possuiria o poder do são. Segundo Guthrie 103 , "the normal belief of early Greek thought the ultimately real is alive and divine. It was so for the Milesians, the Pythagoreans and Heraclitus. And it was so for Xenophanes". 100 (Aristóteles, Física I-II), 186a16. 101 Idem, p. 472. 102 Ib., 213 b 26. 103 (Guthrie, The Presocratic tradition from Parmenides to Democritus), p.96. 47 Também se pode notar a referência à impossibilidade do raro e do denso, que pode ser lido como uma referência ao modelo proposto por Anaxímenes. Por fim, Melisso afirma, como Parmênides 104 já havia feito anteriormente, ("mas todo pleno do que é, é"), que o ser não é denso nem rarefeito: é pleno. E se é pleno é imóvel. 4.2.5 Incorpóreo e Indivisível No nono fragmento, Melisso justifica a incorporeidade do ser: "ὅτι γὰρ ἀσώματον εἶναι βούλεται τὸ ὄν [Mel.], ἐδήλωσεν εἰπών*'εἰ μὲν οὖν εἴη, δεῖ αὐτὸ ἓν εἶναι* ἓν δ' ἐὸν δεῖ αὐτὸ σῶμα μὴ ἔχειν. εἰ δὲ ἔχοι πάχος, ἔχοι ἂν μόρια, καὶ οὐκέτι ἓν εἴη". "Que incorpóreo Melisso quer dizer ser o ente, mostrou dizendo, se então é, é preciso ele uno ser, e uno sendo é preciso corpo não ter, e se tivesse espessura, teria partes e não mais uno seria". É difícil conceber algo simultaneamente pleno (πλέον), infinito espacialmente (οὕτω καὶ τὸ μέγεθος ἄπειρον ἀεὶ χρὴ εἶναι), e incorpóreo (ἀσώματον). Alguns comentadores chegaram a questionar a autenticidade deste fragmento baseando-se na afirmação de Aristóteles 105 , de que o uno de Melisso é material (em contraposição à formulação de Parmênides que teria pensado o uno enquanto logos). Também não há referência à imaterialidade e à indivisibilidade do ente na paráfrase de Simplício, nem tampouco no Tratado do Não Ser de Górgias, que o toma corporeamente, podendo tratar-se de um erro de interpretação de Simplício. Há que se considerar, no entanto, que a "ἀσώματον" não possui o mesmo sentido que a ὕλη" aristotélica. São conceitos diferentes a incorporeidade i.e, ausência de corpo, e imaterialidade como algo não sendo composto por matéria. Além disso, a palavra σῶμα teve um sentido evolutivo na língua grega, de corpo 104 (Diels and Kranz, Die Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker, Parmênides), fragmento oitavo. 105 (Aristóteles, Metafísica), A5, 986b20: "Μέλισσοςδὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην". 48 sem vida, para um corpo vivo, um sentido material em oposição a alma. Em um estudo sobre o tema Renehan 106 observa que, "In the fifth century σῶμα still bore a predominantly literal meaning-human or animal figure; at the same time the nature of matter was imperfectly understood. There was as yet not even a word for it. The consequence of this state of things was that it was possible to conceive of Body and Matter as two distinct entities. So long as σῶμα had a rather restricted meaning and matter was both vaguely conceived and nameless, no thinker was in a position, either linguistically or conceptually, to perceive clearly that a denial of Body necessarily involved a denial of properties which Body had not qua Body, but qua Matter". Deve-se também afastar a hipótese de que incorpóreo signifique uma concepção espiritual do ente para não cair no erro discutido por Reale 107 "commettono il grave errore de proiettare, su un Presocratico, delle categorie che solo da Platone in poi risultano guadagnate ed acquisite dal pensiero occidentale", e o mundo do inteligível separado do sensível ainda não está presente entre os pré-socráticos, nem em uma forma embrionária. A incorporeidade pode ser pensada a partir do conceito de infinitude, onde a corporeidade significa uma limitação tanto interna quanto externa do ente. Guthrie 108 apresenta um argumento semelhante, "The eleatic conception was still monistic; their arguments had deprived reality of sensible qualities without lifting it out of the spatial order". A argumentação de Melisso relaciona-se com as pesquisas de Zenão sobre o múltiplo, onde o objeto córporeo deveria apresentar magnitude e espessura, e dentro de um contexto de questionamento ao eleatismo, onde a questão da corporeidade do ente parmenídico 109 , "é completo por todos os lados, semelhante a massa de uma esfera bem circular, o centro, equidistante, de todas as partes", o deixou vulnerável à multiplicidade a partir da divisão. Tanto o argumento de Melisso da incorporeidade quanto o da indivisibilidade devem ser pensados dentro desse contexto e dentro de um quadro 106 (Renehan, On The Greek Origins of the Concepts Incorporeality and Immateriality), p. 119. 107 (Reale, Melisso, Testimonianze e Frammenti), p. 197. 108 (Guthrie, The Presocratic tradition from Parmenides to Democritus), p. 112. 109 (Diels and Kranz, Die Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker, Parmênides), fragmento oitavo. 49 onde a estrutura semântica da língua grega se expandia para acompanhar a evolução do pensamento filosófico. A indivisibilidade do ente é apresentada por Melisso no décimo fragmento, concordando com Parmênides 110 , que afirmou que "nem divisível é, porque é todo homogêneo. É interessante notar que a restrição à divisibilidade está relacionada ao movimento, ao dividir-se, desloca-se: "μέγεθος δὲ οὐ τὸ διαστατόν φησιν*αὐτὸς γὰρ ἀδιαίρετον τὸ ὂν δείκνυσιν* 'εἰ γὰρ διήιρηται, φησί, τὸ ἐόν, κινεῖται* κινούμενον δὲ οὐκ ἂν εἴη'. ἀλλὰ μέγεθος τὸ δίαρμα αὐτὸ λέγει τῆς ὑποστάσεως." "Grandeza e não a extensão, afirma. Ele mesmo, pois, demonstra indivisível o ente. Se pois foi dividido, afirma, o ente move-se, e movendo-se não seria, mas grandeza, ele chama a elevação da hipóstase". 4.2.6 Refutação do senso comum Melisso pretende provar a existência do ser uno demonstrando o engano que pode ser produzido pelos nossos sentidos. Assim, em um belíssimo fragmento, ele reduz ao absurdo a hipótese da existência de uma pluralidade associada a um mundo em eterna mudança afirmando que apenas o ser existe descartando totalmente a percepção sensível. Segundo o fragmento, "εἰπὼν γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ὅτι ἕν ἐστι καὶ ἀγένητον καὶ ἀκίνητον καὶ μηδενὶ κενῶι διειλημμένον, ἀλλ' ὅλον ἑαυτοῦ πλῆρες, ἐπάγει* (1) 'μέγιστον μὲν οὖν σημεῖον οὗτος ὁ λόγος, ὅτι ἓν μόνον ἔστιν* ἀτὰρ καὶ τάδε σημεῖα. (2) εἰ γὰρ ἦν πολλά, τοιαῦτα χρὴ αὐτὰ εἶναι, οἷόν περ ἐγώ φημι τὸ ἓν εἶναι. εἰ γὰρἔστι γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ πῦρ καὶ σίδηρος καὶ χρυσός, καὶ τὸ μὲν ζῶον τὸ δὲ τεθνηκός, καὶ μέλαν καὶ καὶ λευκὸν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα φασὶν οἱ ἄνθρωποι εἶναι ἀληθῆ, εἰ δὴ ταῦτα ἔστι, καὶ ἡμεῖς ὀρθῶς ὁρῶμεν καὶ ἀκούομεν, εἶναι χρὴ ἕκαστον τοιοῦτον, οἷόν περ τὸ πρῶτον ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν, καὶ μὴ μεταπίπτειν μηδὲ γίνεσθαιἑτεροῖον, ἀλλὰ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἕκαστον, οἷόν πέρ ἐστιν. νῦν δέ φαμεν ὀρθῶς ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ συνιέναι* (3) δοκεῖ δὲ ἡμῖν τό τε θερμὸν ψυχρὸν γίνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν θερμὸν καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν μαλθακὸν καὶ τὸ μαλθακὸν σκληρὸν καὶ τὸ ζῶον ἀποθνήισκειν καὶ ἐκ μὴ ζῶντος 110 Idem. 50 γίνεσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα πάντα ἑτεροιοῦσθαι, καὶ ὅ τι ἦν τε καὶ ὃ νῦν οὐδὲν ὁμοῖον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅ τε σίδηρος σκληρὸς ἐὼν τῶι δακτύλωι κατατρίβεσθαι ὁμουρέων, καὶ χρυσὸς καὶ λίθος καὶ ἄλλο ὅ τι ἰσχυρὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι πᾶν, ἐξ ὕδατός τε γῆ καὶ λίθος γίνεσθαι* ὥστε συμβαίνει μήτε ὁρᾶν μήτε τὰ ὄντα γινώσκειν. (4) οὐ τοίνυν ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις ὁμολογεῖ. φαμένοις γὰρ εἶναι πολλὰ καὶ ἀίδια (?) καὶ εἴδη τε καὶ ἰσχὺν ἔχοντα, πάντα ἑτεροιοῦσθαι ἡμῖν δοκεῖ καὶ μεταπίπτειν ἐκ τοῦ ἑκάστοτε ὁρωμένου. (5) δῆλον τοίνυν, ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἑωρῶμεν οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα πολλὰ ὀρθῶς δοκεῖ εἶναι*οὐ γὰρ ἂν μετέπιπτεν, εἰ ἀληθῆ ἦν* ἀλλ' ἦν οἷόν περ. ἐδόκει ἕκαστον τοιοῦτον. τοῦ γὰρ ἐόντος ἀληθινοῦ κρεῖσσον οὐδέν. (6) ἢν δὲ μεταπέσηι, τὸ μὲν ἐὸν ἀπώλετο, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐὸν γέγονεν. οὕτως οὖν, εἰ πολλὰ εἴη, τοιαῦτα χρὴ εἶναι, οἷόν περ τὸ ἕν". "Dizendo, de fato, (Melisso) sobre o ente que uno é, e ingênito e imóvel e não distinto em si mesmo de algum vazio, mas inteiramente pleno de si mesmo, acrescenta: (1) A maior prova, então, (é) esse argumento que apenas o uno é, mas também estas provas (2). Se, de fato, fossem muitos, seria necessário tais coisas serem tais quais precisamente eu afirmo o uno ser, se de fato é (existe) a terra e a água e o ar e o fogo e ouro e por um lado o vivente e por outro, o morto, e o negro e o branco e as outras coisas, quantas afirmam os homens verdadeiras serem, se então essas coisas são (existem) e nós corretamente tanto vemos quanto ouvimos é necessário cada coisa ser tal qual precisamente por primeiro pareceu-nos, e não se transformar nem se tornar outro, mas sempre ser cada coisa qual precisamente é. E, nessas condições, dizemos ver e ouvir e compreender corretamente. (3) Mas parece-nos o quente, frio tornar-se; e o frio, quente, e o duro, mole, e o mole, duro e o vivente, morrer e a partir do não vivente ser gerado, e tudo isso se alterar e o que era e o que agora (é) em nada semelhante ser. O ferro, mesmo duro, ao ser tocado pelo dedo, gasta-se, e também o ouro e a pedra e tudo que parece ser sólido, e a partir da água, a terra e a pedra serem geradas; de modo que ocorre nem vermos nem conhecermos os entes. (4) então essas coisas umas com as outras não concordam. Para nós que afirmamos de fato existirem muitas coisas e eternas (?) tendo tanto forma quanto força, pareceu-nos todas as coisas alterarem-se e transformarem-se a partir do que a cada vez que são vistas. (5) Evidente então que não corretamente víamos, nem aquelas coisas corretamente parecem ser muitas, pois certamente não se transformariam, se reais fossem. Mas seria cada uma tal qual precisamente nos parecia. Pois do que é real nada mais forte. (6) Mas caso se transformasse, por um lado o ente pereceu, e por outro o não ente foi gerado. Assim então se muitos fossem é necessário ser tal qual precisamente o uno.". 51 No poema 111 a deusa afirma, Pois jamais se imponha isto: os não entes, serem; Mas tu, dessa via de inquirição, afasta o pensamento, nem a ti, o hábito muito experimentado por essa via constranja mover olhos sem escopo, e ecoante ouvido e língua, mas discerne por meio da razão o argumento muito controverso por mim falado. e também então, dessa que os mortais que nada sabem forjam, bicéfalos; pois a impotência em seu peito dirige o pensamento errante; e eles são levados aqui e ali, surdos e igualmente cegos, estupefatos, tribo incapaz de discernir, para os quais o ser e o não ser como o mesmo são considerados e não o mesmo, de todos é o caminho que retorna a si mesmo. Há uma sutil diferença entre a argumentação da deusa de Parmênides e de Melisso. Para a primeira, é mantida a razão, o critério ser-não ser para a escolha do caminho, e os mortais são cegos e surdos, estupefatos, são δίκρανοι. Mas mesmo assim Parmênides oferece uma versão para o mundo, uma δόξα de inspiração pitagórica. Em Melisso, os sentidos nos enganam, "não corretamente víamos", nem aquelas coisas parecem ser. A posição do sâmio é radical: não há o mundo das aparências, é apenas uma ilusão. Em Górgias, como veremos, apenas os sentidos nos permitem o acesso ao ser. Conforme observado por Kirk 112 , esse fragmento traz duas possibilidades interessantes: a citação de terra, água e fogo pode indicar que Melisso tenha tido acesso à obra de Empédocles e também à de Anaxágoras, quando se refere ao negro, branco, substâncias e seus contrários. No entanto, como vimos, a datação proposta por Reale torna essa hipótese pouco provável. 111 (Diels and Kranz, Die Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker, Parmênides), fragmentos sexto e sétimo. 112 (Kirk, Raven, & Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers), p. 400. 52 4.3 Conclusão Diferentemente de Parmênides, que escreveu em versos mantendo-se próximo à tradição homérica, Melisso apresenta o seu tratado em prosa jônica e não apresenta uma cosmologia. As diferenças entre os dois autores, no entanto, não se restringem ao estilo; se no Poema cada predicado do ser era apresentado justificado por um argumento independente, temos no Περὶ φύσεως ἣ περὶ ὅητος uma estrutura expositiva ordenada em uma cadeia lógica, onde cada predicado é inferido a partir do anterior. O ser de Parmênides é construído a partir da oposição, estín-ouk estín, onde as suas características serão estabelecidas a partir da impossibilidade de se pensar ou dizer o não ser. Em Melisso, no entanto, temos duas possibilidades: se considerarmos que a introdução da paráfrase de Simplício tenha sido as palavras iniciais do Περὶ φύσεος, "se certamente nada é, sobre isso o que poderia ser dito como se fosse algo?", teremos a estrutura ser-pensar semelhante à encontrada em Parmênides. Se, no entanto, não consideramos a abertura da paráfrase, toda a argumentação de Melisso estará centrada no nihil ex nihilo. Em Parmênides a preocupação da deusa é também epistemológica, em Melisso e Zenão é tão somente lógica/ontológica. Vamos agora analisar as características do ser eleático de Melisso considerando os fragmentos e a paráfrase de Simplício, a paráfrase do MXG e compará-las com a do Poema. Segundo a paráfrase do MXG: se algo é e nada pode ser gerado a partir do nada, logo é eterno. Se é eterno, logo é ilimitado. Se é ilimitado, logo é uno. Se é uno, logo é semelhante. Se é semelhante, é imóvel (porque senão muitos se tornaria) a) quanto ao deslocamento, e se tal for o Uno, b) isento de sofrimento e dor, saudável e sem doenças e b) nem mudando de posição, nem alterando a forma c) nem se misturando, caso contrário o Uno muitos se tornaria. E por fim é apresentada a crítica à percepção sensorial: não é possível as coisas serem muitas, e elas não corretamente parece-nos e se mostram ilusoriamente. Segundo a paráfrase de Simplício, se nada é como poderia ser dito como se fosse algo? Se é ou foi gerado ou sempre existiu. Se foi gerado então foi gerado a 53 partir do que é ou a partir do que não é, mas estas duas alternativas são impossíveis porque nada pode ser gerado a partir do que não é nem a partir do que é. Assim é sempre. Nem é corrompido, nem poderia mudar, nem tampouco perecer. Como não foi gerado, não tem princípio, e como é incorruptível não tem fim, sendo assim ilimitado. E se ilimitado, logo uno. E se uno, logo imóvel. E uno sempre semelhante a si mesmo. E como semelhante, não pereceria, nem maior se tornaria, nem se reordenaria, nem sofreria dor nem pena, pois se sofresse alguma dessas coisas não seria uno. E como o vazio nada é, não poderia se deslocar, nem contrair em si mesmo, porque mais rarefeito e denso seria, logo é pleno porque nem acolhe nem é acolhido. Logo uno, ilimitado e imóvel é. Segundo os fragmentos apresentados por Simplício, o ente é ingênito, porque nada pode ser gerado a partir do nada, então é eterno. Se eterno, não tem princípio nem fim, sendo ilimitado. Se ilimitado, logo ilimitado quanto a magnitude. Se ilimitado quando a magnitude, uno. Se uno, homogêneo. Como homogêneo, não pereceria, nem se tornaria maior nem se reordenaria, nem sofreria dor nem pena. Como não existe vazio, não se moveria. É pleno. Se tivesse partes, uno não seria, logo é incorpóreo. E se fosse divido se moveria, então é indivisível. Assim, pode-se concluir que o ser de Melisso é ingênito, imperecível, eterno, ilimitado temporalmente e espacialmente, uno, homogêneo, pleno, não se altera, não sofre dor nem pena, imóvel (quanto à qualidade e quanto ao movimento), não é vazio, é pleno não é denso nem raro, indivisível e incorpóreo se aceitarmos os dois últimos fragmentos como autênticos. Comparando 113 -o com a ser de Parmênides temos: 113 Baseado em (Merril, B. L., Melissus of Samos, a Commetary on the Sources and Fragments), p.321. 54 Melisso Parmênides Ingênito οὐκ ἐγένετο ἀγένετον Imperecível οὐτ' ἂν ἀπόλοιτο ἀνώλεθρον; οὐτ' ὄλλυσθαι Eterno ἕστι τε καί ἀει ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται/ἀίδιον οὐδε ποτ' ἦν οὐδ' ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἐστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν ἕν συνεχές Espacialmente infinito ἄπειρον ἐν πείρασι δεσμῶν, πείρατος ἐν δεσμοῖσιν, ἐπεὶ πεῖρας πύματον, ἐν πείρασι κύρει Uno ἕν ὁμοῦ πᾶν, ἕν Homogêneo ὅμοιον πᾶν πᾶν ἐστιν ὁμοῖον Não se altera εἰ γὰρ ἑτεροιοῦται ἀκίνητον Não muda οὐδὲ μετακοσμήναι ἀνυστόν ἀκίνητον, τετελεσμένον ἐστί Não sofre dor οὐδὲ ἀλγεῖ Não sofre angústia περὶ τοῠ ἀνιᾶσται ὡυτὸς λόγος Pleno πλέων πᾶν δ' ἔμπλεόν Não se move οὐδὲ κινεῖται ἀκίνητον, ἀτρεμές Nem denso, nem raro Πυκνὸν και ἀραιὸν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τῆι μᾶλλον, χειρότερον Indivisível εἰ γὰρ διῄρηται οὐδε διαρετόν Incorpóreo dεῖ αὐτὸ σῶμα μὴ ἔχειν Quanto à relevância do uno em Melisso, tanto nos fragmentos, quanto na paráfrase de Simplício e do MXG, a unicidade do ente é derivada do ilimitado, que por sua vez foi produzida a partir da eternidade. Da unicidade decorre a homogeneidade e a imobilidade. Melisso, como vimos, apresentou a prova da unicidade do ente no quinto e sextos fragmentos, "se não fosse uno, limitar-se-ia com outro", e no nono 55 fragmento desenvolveu uma argumentação onde contrapôs o uno ao múltiplo, sendo este último uma ilusão dos sentidos. À exceção do nono fragmento, em que se refere ao ser como uno não se encontra em Melisso uma proeminência do uno sobre as demais qualidades do ente. Vamos analisar o uno em Parmênides com mais rigor adiante, mas pode-se dizer antecipadamente que também não há uma posição privilegiada para esta qualidade no Poema. Melisso sistematizou a doutrina desenvolvida por Parmênides e Zenão, distanciando-se do misticismo do mestre e produzindo, assim, uma versão mais acessível da teoria eleata. Inovou através da reelaboração de alguns atributos do ente, como o ilimitado, apresentou novas argumentações, e explorou alguns conceitos como o vazio, denso, raro, pleno e o movimento, que foram posteriormente utilizados pelo atomismo. Assim levou o eleatismo ao seu limite e conforme Guthrie 114 "the Eleatics were trying to give to reality the intelligibility and eternal changelessness of a Platonic or Aristotelian pure form without transcendence". Não se justifica a crítica aristotélica que minimizou a contribuição de Melisso para o pensamento grego. Desde o século passado alguns comentadores têm realizado um grande esforço para recuperar o papel de Melisso no desenvolvimento do eleatismo, destacando-se Zafiropulo 115 , Reale 116 , e mais recentemente Barnes 117 que afirmou "his fragments are, to my mind, as interesting as those of Parmenides, and equally deserving of sympathetic study". Para Reale 118 , "Melisso è un pensatore acuto e rigoroso; non ha la genialità creativa de Parmenide, che ha fondato la Scuola; tuttavia, sa portare l'eleatismo ad una perfezione e ad una purificazione teoretica, che invano si cerca nel suo fondatore". 114 (Guthrie, The Presocratic tradition from Parmenides to Democritus), p. 112. 115 (Zafiropulo, L'École ÉLÉATE), p. 210. 116 (Reale, Melisso, Testimonianze e Frammenti), p. 253. 117 (Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers), p.180. 118 (Reale, Melisso, Testimonianze e Frammenti), p. 266. 56 5 Górgias 5.1 Vida e obra Inicialmente, é necessário definir como será interpretado o Tratado do Não Ser de Górgias: como um texto filosófico ou como um texto retórico. Não serão abordadas, no entanto, as diferenças entre filosofia e retórica, sofista e filósofo tão caras a Platão, mas somente estabelecer alguns parâmetros para a leitura do Tratado. Para tanto faz-se necessário percorrer a tradição das fontes sobre Górgias. Natural de Leontinos, Górgias, segundo Porfírio, teria nascido em torno de 485-480 a.C., e falecido em 380-370 a.C. O irmão do médico Herodes teria vivido mais de cem anos. Cícero 119 afirma que, segundo Aristóteles, foram Córax e Tísias, após a expulsão dos tiranos na Sicília, que desenvolveram os primeiros preceitos teóricos para lidar com os conflitos referentes à restituição da propriedade privada, e que antes deles, ninguém havia seguido um método ou arte. E que foi na Grécia 120 , particularmente em Atenas, onde surgiu pela primeira vez a figura do orador e a oratória passou a ser registrada por escrito, "And when it was recognized what power lay in speech carefully prepared and elaborated as work of art, then suddenly a whole host of teachers of oratory arose: Gorgias of Leontini, Trasymachus of Calchedon, Protagoras of Abdera, Prodicus of Ceos, Hippias of Elis, all of whom enjoyed a great honor in their day. They and many others of the same time professed, not without arrogance to be sure, to teach how by the force of eloquence the worse (as they call it) could be made the better cause". Segundo DL 121 , Aristóteles afirmou em seu Sofista que Empédocles, de Agrigento, teria sido o pai da retórica e Zenão da dialética. E afirma, também, que 119 (Cícero, Brutus), XI, 46 – 48 120 (Cícero, Brutus), VI, 25 121 (Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers 2005), VIII, 56-59 57 Górgias foi aluno de Empédocles. Segundo Diodoro 122 da Sicília, Górgias teria sido o chefe dos embaixadores de Leontinos enviada a Atenas, para solicitar apoio contra Siracusa e, "He was the first man to devise rules of the rhetoric and so far excelled all other men in the instruction offered by the sophists that he received from his pupils a fee of one hundred mines". E "When Gorgias had arrived in Athens and been introduced to the people in Assembly, he discoursed to them upon the subject of the alliance, and by the novelty of his speech he filled the Athenians who are by nature clever and fond of dialectic, with wonder". Conforme Cícero 123 , Górgias escrevia o elogio e a condenação de cada assunto proposto pois "ele julgava ser da competência específica do orador a capacidade de enaltecer uma causa, louvando-a, e em seguida de a destruir, atribuindo-lhe defeitos". Aristófanes 124 faz referência aos "englotogastros" (γλωττογαστόρων γένος), que viviam junto da Clepsidra, e incluiu Górgias entre eles, "que com as línguas ceifam, semeiam e vindimam e também colhem figos", referindo-se às práticas de oratória em uso no tribunal, estritamente marcado pelo tempo da ampulheta. Platão se refere a Górgias em diversas passagens em seis diálogos. Sócrates, no Górgias 125 , depois de ouvir que o sofista poderia responder a qualquer questão, pergunta qual arte ele professava, obtendo como resposta, "retórica, Sócrates" e acrescenta, "ser capaz de persuadir mediante o discurso os juízes do tribunal, os conselheiros no Conselho, os membros da Assembleia na Assembleia e em toda e qualquer reunião que seja uma reunião política" E Sócrates conclui que a retórica gera a crença e não o saber sobre o justo e injusto não sendo, assim, uma τέχη. Apesar de Platão ter se referido a Górgias como o "sofista de Leontino", Dodds 126 informa que "it is in a passage where the word clearly retains its original unspecialized meaning of 'wise man' and in the Congress of Sophists in Protagoras, Gorgias is not present". 122 (Siculus, Library of History), XII, 53-54 123 (Cícero, Brutus), VI, 26. 124 (Aristófanes, As aves), 1694. 125 (Platão, Górgias), 449a, 452e. 126 (Platão, Górgias), p. 7. 58 Mênon 127 , ao ser perguntado se os sofistas são os professores da virtude, respondeu, "Bem Sócrates, de Górgias o que eu mais admiro é que jamais o ouvirias professando isso, mas ri-se mesmo dos outros quando os ouve professando <isso>. Antes, sim, acredita que é em falar que é preciso fazer hábeis os homens". E quanto à questão da verdade, no Fedro, Platão afirma 128 , "Deixemos que Tísias e Górgias continuem a dormir; descobriram que a probabilidade deve ser tida em maior apreço que a verdade, pois só com os recursos da palavra fazem o pequeno parecer grande e o inverso: o grande parecer pequeno; falam das coisas novas em linguagem arcaica, e o contrário disso: das velhas em estilo fluente, além de haverem inventado o discurso condensado ao extremo e o esparramado ao infinito, sobre todos os assuntos". Pode-se notar pelas referências a Górgias que Platão dispensa ao leontino um tratamento até respeitoso, diferentemente do concedido aos demais sofistas. É possível que a não-pretensão do ensino da virtude o exclua da crítica mais acirrada de Platão. Aristóteles, segundo D.L., teria escrito um tratado, Πρὸς τὰ Γοργίου, mas não há informações sobre o seu conteúdo. Ao invés de analisar a questão sob a ótica filosofia versus retórica, vamos concentrar os nossos esforços em refletir sobre dois tipos de discursos, o poético e o argumentativo. O discurso poético na Grécia é a forma de manifestação do sagrado e da verdade legitimada pela tradição, e que foi cedendo lugar para o discurso argumentativo, onde a persuasão era o elemento fundamental. Esse último teve a sua origem na apreciação das questões judiciais pelos tribunais democráticos, tendo evoluído a partir das necessidades da vida política dos cidadãos, dentro de um contexto da transferência do poder antes retido pela aristocracia. Dele, posteriormente, derivou-se o discurso filosófico ou científico, cujo objetivo final seria a verdade absoluta, para o qual foram estabelecidas novas regras de argumentação, notadamente em Platão e Aristóteles. Assim, pode-se pensar em um processo de dessacralização da verdade que passa inicialmente a ser objeto de deliberação por persuasão, o que pode-se chamar de verdade discursiva, e posteriormente se transformou no raciocínio filosófico-científico. 127 (Platão, Mênon), 95c. 128 (Platão, Fedro), 267a. 59 Segundo Detienne 129 , "é nas práticas institucionais do tipo político e jurídico que, ao longo dos séculos VII e VI, ocorre um processo de laicização das formas do pensamento". Das diversas obras de Górgias duas restaram em sua forma original, e que nos revelam o estilo do autor: Elogio a Helena e a Defesa de Palamedes e uma terceira, Περὶ φύσεως, Περί τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, cujo original se perdeu mas da qual temos duas paráfrases. A tradição nos apresenta Górgias como um rhétor e o Tratado do Não ser ou Sobre a Natureza como um exercício retórico, uma demonstração da potência do raciocínio argumentativo, que procurou desconstruir a tese de Parmênides da mesma forma que buscou provar a inocência de Helena, ou de Palamedes. Não haveria, no texto em questão, uma pretensão filosófica, no sentido da construção de uma ontologia ou metafísica específicas, é tão somente um παίγνιον de Górgias, uma paródia do Poema. Nessa leitura aceita-se apenas a aplicação do método dialético dos eleátas, é essa a posição de Gomperz e mais recentemente Dodds. Essa questão, no entanto, faz parte de uma discussão mais abrangente, em que têm sido propostas novas abordagens e interpretações para a sofística. Diversos comentadores, dentre eles, mais recentemente Kerferd, Cassin e Schiappa, desde Calogero e Untersteiner, têm procurado modificar a visão tradicional sobre os sofistas elaborada por Platão e consolidada por Gomperz. A partir de Zeller, Nestle, Gigon e Reinhardt, a leitura do Tratado vem sendo revista, e diversos autores veem, no Tratado, um papel importante na discussão da questão eleática: Calógero, Loenen, Cherniss e mais recentemente Curd e Cassin. Esse debate sobre a sofística não está dentro do escopo deste trabalho. Dois pontos, no entanto devem ser considerados, o primeiro é que a ausência de uma pretensão filosófica não exclui a profundidade da análise de Górgias das teses eleáticas no Tratado nem tampouco a sofisticação lógica da argumentação apresentada. É indiscutível tanto o conhecimento de Górgias sobre as questões ontológicas formuladas pelo eleatismo quanto o seu domínio da argumentação lógica a partir do desenvolvimento das antíteses elaboradas pelos eleátas. 129 (Detienne, Mestres da Verdade da Grécia Arcaica), p. 108. 60 O segundo é que a leitura do Tratado nos permite perceber que as teses gorgianas vão muito além de quebrar a estrutura ser-pensar-dizer do Poema, e na eventual proposição de uma "meontologia", ceticismo, ou até de um niilismo absoluto. A distinção entre sofística e filosofia, originalmente proposta por Platão e absorvida quase unanimimente pelo pensamento posterior restringe a compreensão da sofística. Um paradigma diferente a ser abordado em trabalho posterior é de que a sofística seja a expressão filosófica da democracia, ou seja, o pensamento grego foi mais influenciado pela sofística do que pelo pensamento de Platão e Aristóteles. Além do exposto acima, pode-se encontrar outras contribuições do Tratado: afirmação da autonomia do discurso em relação aos πράγρματα, o estabelecimento da verdade discursiva 130 , e a discussão sobre os limites da linguagem. É com todas essas contribuições que será analisado o Tratado: não apenas como uma antítese ao Poema mas, ao lado de Melisso, como eixo interpretativo para o pensamento de Parmênides e partícipe da formulação da "escola eleata" base para a elaboração platônica. Restou-nos do Tratado apenas duas paráfrases: a de Sextus, no Adversus Mathematicus, e a do pseudo-aristotélico, MXG. Na versão de Sextus, o Tratado é apresentado ao lado dos pensadores que aboliram o critério da verdade, utilizando uma certa estrutura lógica e o vocabulário estranhos às formulações originais de Górgias, mas que não nos impede de compreender os seus argumentos, tendo sido escrita em uma época mais próxima ao Tratado. A versão do MXG, apesar das suas lacunas e do estilo do anônimo, tem sido, mais recentemente, preferida pelos comentadores 131 . Nesta dissertação as duas versões serão utilizadas de forma complementar. Há muita controvérsia quanto à datação do texto. Olimpiodoro considera que foi escrito na 84a Olimpíada (444-441 a.C.). Apesar de não termos o original do texto, Isócrates 132 pode dirimir a dúvida quanto à existência do Tratado porque, em duas passagens diferentes, faz referência às teses do rhétor: 130 (Coelho, Retórica, filosofia e lógica: verdade como construção discursiva), p. 45. 131 (Kerferd, O Movimento Sofista), p. 164. 132 (Isócrates, Helen), X, 3 e (Isocrates, Antidosis), XV, 268. 61 "Como, pois, alguém poderia superar Górgias, que ousou dizer que nenhum dos entes é, ou Zenão, que tentou mostrar que o mesmo como possível e impossível, ou Melisso que, as coisas sendo por natureza ilimitadas quanto a grandeza ou magnitude, empreender descobrir provas de que tudo é um!" e também, "Sobre as especulações (lógos) dos antigos sofistas dentre os quais um disse ser ilimitada a multidão dos entes, Empédocles, quatro guerra e amor entre eles; Íon, não mais do que três; Alcméon, dois apenas; Parmênides e Melisso, um; Górgias, absolutamente nenhum". Uma outra questão a ser esclarecida relaciona-se ao texto base contra o qual Górgias escreveu o seu tratado: O Poema ou o Περὶ φύσεως ἣ περὶ ὅητος de Melisso? O suposto título do texto de Górgias Περὶ φύσεως, Περί τοῦ μὴ ὄντος parece ser uma paródia ao título da obra de Melisso, mas conhecemos a dificuldade existente em se estabelecer a existência de títulos para as obras dos físicos do século V. Outro ponto é que μὴ ὄντος não é a tese de Górgias, mas sim οὐδὲν ἔστιν. No entanto, as referências ao longo do texto ao Περὶ φύσεως são muito relevantes e a hipótese de que o texto base utilizado por Górgias tenha sido o de Melisso é muito provável. Segundo Loenen 133 , "from a chronological point of view is too much likely that Górgias was turning against Melissus than that he was attacking Parmenides", e conclui: "is even highly probable that Górgias directed his criticism against Melissus". As referências ao Tratado não são explícitas em Platão, mas há uma passagem em que Parmênides 134 afirma, "De tal modo que aquele que está ouvindo fica em aporia e contesta <dizendo> que não há essas coisas e que, se de fato houver, elas são, com toda a necessidade, incognoscíveis (ἄγνωστα) para a natureza humana". Na Carta Sétima 135 diz, "Por causa disso ninguém que tenha 133 (Loenen, Parmenides, Melissus, Gorgias), p. 183. 134 (Platão, Parmênides), 135a. 135 (Platão, Carta Sétima), 343a. 62 juízo ousará expor pela linguagem o seu pensamento, por causa de sua fragilidade". 5.2 As Teses de Górgias (65) "Γοργίας δὲ ὁ Λεοντῖνος ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μὲν τάγματος ὑπῆρχε τοῖς ἀνῃρηκόσι τὸ κριτήριον, οὐ κατὰ τὴν ὁμοίαν δὲ ἐπιβολὴν τοῖς περὶ τὸν Πρωταγόραν. ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἢ Περὶ φύσεως τρία κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς κεφάλαια κατασκευάζει, ἓν μὲν καὶ πρῶτον ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔστιν, δεύτερον ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἔστιν, ἀκατάληπτον ἀνθρώπῳ, τρίτον ὅτι εἰ καὶ καταληπτόν, ἀλλὰ τοί γε ἀνέξοιστον καὶ ἀνερμή νευτον τῷ πέλας." (65) "Górgias de Leontinos, por um lado, originário do mesmo grupo, era um dos que aboliram o critério, mas não segundo a concepção semelhante aos seguidores de Protágoras. Com efeito, em seu tratado Sobre o não ente, ou Sobre a natureza, sucessivamente, três pontos capitais postula: um e primeiro que nada é, segundo que mesmo se é, inapreensível para o homem e, terceiro, mesmo se apreensível, certamente é inexprimível e inexplicável para alguém." Sextus apresenta-nos as três teses do Tratado: nada é, se é, é inapreensível para o homem, e se é apreensível, é inexprimível e inexplicável. A versão do fragmento apresentada no MXG é semelhante "(Górgias) afirma nada ser, mas se é, incognoscível ser, se certamente é e cognoscível, não é, porém, passível de ser mostrado aos outros". Górgias apresenta a impossibilidade de uma estrutura ontológica, epistemológica e do discurso. Alguns pontos são dignos de nota. Primeiro é que essas teses se opõem diretamente à identidade entre ser, pensar e dizer que foi apresentada diversas vezes no Poema e que no terceiro fragmento afirma "o mesmo é para pensar e ser", no sexto, "é necessário dizer e pensar o ente ser", no oitavo, "pois o mesmo é pensar e aquilo por quê o pensamento é". Górgias ao questionar a identidade entre ser, pensar e dizer fragiliza o core da formulação de Parmênides. Em segundo lugar Górgias opõe o οὐδὲν ἔστιν ao ἔστιν e οὐκ ἔστιν de Parmênides, há tanto a negação do ser quanto a do não ser. Não é a apenas a negação da existência do não-ente, mas sim do οὐδὲν. 63 Terceiro, a "estrutura judicial retórica" de como são apresentadas as teses, onde se pede inicialmente que conceda I, se não, II, e se também não II, III. É uma estrutura semelhante à apresentada na Defesa de Palamedes 136 , onde afirma "nem que eu quisesse eu teria possibilidade, nem, que tendo possibilidade, eu quereria empreender tais acções". 5.2.1 Oὐδὲν ἔστιν 66) "ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ἐπιλογίζεται τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον* εἰ γὰρ ἔστι <τι>, ἤτοι τὸ ὂν ἔστιν ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἢ καὶ τὸ ὂν ἔστι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν. οὔτε δὲ τὸ ὂν ἔστιν, ὡς παραστήσει, οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὡς παραμυθήσεται, οὔτε τὸ ὂν καὶ <τὸ> μὴ ὄν, ὡς καὶ τοῦτο διδάξει. οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι." (66) "Que certamente nada é, conclui deste modo: se pois é <algo>, certamente o ente é, ou o não ente (é), ou não só o ente é mas também o não ente (é). Mas nem o ente é, como mostrará, nem o não ente, como demonstrará, nem o ente nem o não ente (são) como também ensinará, logo, não é algo." A afirmação que nada é, a primeira das teses, nega a existência tanto do ente quanto do não-ente parmenídico. Para provar que nada é, Górgias, faz uma inversão e raciocinando por absurdo analisa a possibilidade de algo ser dividindo o argumento em três hipóteses: ou o ente é, ou o não-ente é ou o ente e o não-ente são e como as três não serão possíveis conclui: οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι. É interessante notar que Górgias, não utilizará a argumentação dialética semelhante à utilizada por Parmênides ou Zenão, ocorre o que Colli 137 chama de excesso de demonstração, "Gorgias refuerza la demonstración con las sucesivas demonstraciones por el absurdo", em que elementos de retórica são adicionados ao argumento lógico buscando persuasão. Lógica e retórica, dessa forma, aparecem juntas no discurso de Górgias. 136 (Górgias, Testemunhos e Fragmentos), p. 51. 137 (Colli, Gorgias e Parménides), p. 45. 64 E quanto à impossibilidade do ente ser e não ser simultaneamente (οὔτε τὸ ὂν καὶ <τὸ> μὴ ὄν), isso não se dá pela aplicação da regra do terceiro excluído, como nota Colli 138 , A implica B ou A implica não-B, excluindo uma terceira opção, onde o sujeito da oração é fixado mantendo variável os seus predicados, mas na formulação do Górgias "se mantiene fija la predicación del ser (ἔστι) e cambia el sujeto: en este caso el sujeto τί poder ser tres sujetos posibles: lo que es, lo que no es, y, lo que es e a la vez no es". Colli também nota que o rhétor ao contrapor ao οὐδὲν ἔστιν o τὸ ὂν ἔστι, está operando com os juízos contraditórios da lógica aristotélica, onde o nada é funciona como um universal negativo cujo contraditório é algo é uma particular afirmativa sendo essa a primeira ocorrência documentada desse tipo de raciocínio. 5.2.2 τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔστιν (67) καὶ δὴ τὸ μὲν μὴ ὂν οὐκ ἔστιν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔστιν, ἔσται τε ἅμα καὶ οὐκ ἔσται* ᾗ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ὂν νοεῖται, οὐκ ἔσται, ᾗ δὲ ἔστι μὴ ὄν, πάλιν ἔσται. παντελῶς δὲ ἄτοπον τὸ εἶναί τι ἅμα καὶ μὴ εἶναι* οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὄν. καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔστι, τὸ ὂν οὐκ ἔσται* ἐναντία γάρ ἐστι ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις, καὶ εἰ τῷ μὴ ὄντι συμβέβηκε τὸ εἶναι, τῷ ὄντι συμβήσεται τὸ μὴ εἶναι. οὐχὶ δέ γε τὸ ὂν οὐκ ἔστιν* (67) E também, certamente, o não ente não é, se, de fato, o não ente é, será e simultaneamente não será; pois, enquanto por um lado, <o não ente> como não sendo é pensado, não será, enquanto por outro, é não ente, novamente será. Mas completamente atópico (é) o ser algo e simultaneamente não ser; logo o não ente não é. E de outro modo, se o não ente é, o ente não será; contrárias pois, são essas coisas umas em relação às outras, e se ao não ente é atribuído o ser, ao ente será atribuído o não ser. Mas, sem dúvida, o ente não é, <portanto> nem o não ente será. Górgias inicia a sua argumentação a partir do não-ente: se o não-ente é, simultaneamente é e não é: (1) como não-ente é pensado ou seja não é (2) mas é 138 Idem, p. 48. 65 não-ente ou seja é. O sofista viola aqui a regra do fragmento 8 do Poema, "nem a partir do não-ente permitirei tu dizeres nem pensares, pois não é dizível nem pensável". Explora-se o conflito entre a regra da identidade, o não-ente é não-ente e a possibilidade de se pensar o conceito de não-ente, ou seja o não-ente como algo que não é. Assim ao simplesmente pensarmos o não-ente, mesmo como uma mera possibilidade, necessariamente o princípio de identidade terá de ser aplicado. Dessa maneira, somos levados ao absurdo pelo princípio da contradição de termos algo simultaneamente sendo e não sendo o que permite a Górgias concluir que o não-ente não é. E a partir da hipótese levantada de que o não-ente é (nãoente), o ente não poderá ser, pois ente e não-ente são contrários. É importante ressaltar que Górgias não confunde cópula com identidade como em uma primeira leitura pode-se pensar. A mesma tese pode, no entanto, é encontrada na formulação do MXG, onde diz, (4) "Se, certamente, o não seré não ser em nada menos do que o ente seria o não ente; pois certamente o não ente é o não ente e o ente (é) ente, de modo as coisas serem em nada mais do que não serem." (5) "Se, contudo, o não ser é; o ser, diz ele, o seu oposto, não é; se, pois, o não ser é, convém ao ser não ser." Cassin 139 assinala a diferença entre os sujeitos das orações, no versão de Sextus utiliza-se o particípio ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὄν, como sujeito e no caso do Anônimo, utiliza-se τὸ μὴ εἶναι o que pode ter implicações importantes. Segundo Lopes 140 , "a interpretação de Cassin nos leva a interpretar o οὐκ εἶναι οὐδεν (nada é) como uma dupla negação, uma recaindo sobre o verbo e outra sobre o sujeito. Nega-se simultaneamente, o verbo e o sujeito da proposição. Na versão de Sexto, por sua vez, encontramos simplesmente οὐδὲν ἔστιν (nada é): nesse caso a negação recairia apenas no sujeito". 139 (Cassin, O Efeito Sofístico), p. 32. 140 (Lopes, Parmênides vs. Górgias: Uma Polêmica Sobre a Linguagem), p. 38. 66 5.2.3 τὸ ὂν ἔστιν Górgias, à semelhança do fragmento oitavo do Poema, apresenta em seguida alguns argumentos decorrentes da predicação para provar que tampouco o ente é: primeiro, que não é nem eterno, nem gerado, nem simultaneamente eterno e gerado, segundo, que não é uno nem múltiplo, e por fim, que não é nem móvel nem imóvel. Pode-se perceber que estes três predicados do ser tornar-se-ão alvos para crítica ao eleatismo em Platão e em Aristóteles. O Anônimo nos apresenta a estratégia no MXG (3.2 e 3.3), "E que certamente não é, tendo reunido as coisas ditas por outros quantos dizendo sobre os entes coisas contrárias, como lhe parece, uns declaram que um e não muitos, outros, por sua vez, que muitos e não um; e uns que ingênitos, outros demonstrando essas coisas como geradas, deduz (Gorgias) contra uns e outros." "Pois (é) necessário, diz, se algo é, nem um nem muitos serem, nem ingênito nem gerado; nada seria; se, certamente, fosse algo, uma ou outra dentre essas coisas seria. Que não é nem um, nem muitos, nem ingênito, nem gerado, em parte como Melisso, em parte como Zenão, <Górgias> tenta demonstrar depois da sua própria primeira demonstração, em que afirma que não é nem o ser nem o não ser." De forma semelhante aos eleatas que demonstraram as contradições geradas a partir da aplicação da predicação ao múltiplo, Górgias fará o mesmo com o ente. O sofista deverá seguir a ordem da argumentação apresentada por Melisso, e irá utilizar teses de Zenão para contestar alguns dos argumentos de Melisso. Pode-se notar que o eleatismo é tratado por Górgias como um grupo homogêneo, composto por Parmênides, Melisso e Zenão (Ἐλεατικὸν ἕθος) como Platão fez notar no Sofista 141 . O ente não é eterno, nem gerado, nem simultaneamente eterno e gerado. A argumentação, nesse caso, não é baseada no ser de Parmênides, que é limitado, mas sim no de Melisso que, como já foi discutido, é ilimitado tanto espacialmente quanto temporalmente. É interessante notar que a relação entre o ilimitado 141 (Platão, Sofista), 242 d. 67 temporal e o ilimitado espacial é colocada explicitamente por Górgias: ὥστ' εἰ ἀίδιόν ἐστι τὸ ὄν, ἄπειρόν ἐστιν. Assim da hipótese de eternidade deriva-se o ilimitado, mas surge uma impossibilidade física: o ilimitado não pode estar em algum lugar (porque neste caso o continente seria maior do que o conteúdo), assim exclui-se a possibilidade de que o ente, sendo infinito, esteja em algum lugar, o que leva à conclusão de que o ente não é. Nem tampouco pode estar contido em si mesmo, porque seriam dois, lugar e corpo, e assim múltiplo. Ou seja, o ilimitado exclui a possibilidade do ente ser. Górgias, também, exclui a possibilidade de geração do ente alinhando-se dessa maneira com a argumentação eleática, exposta em Parmênides e Melisso. É impossível que seja gerado a partir do ente, nem tampouco do não-ente, logo o ente não foi gerado. E também não pode ser eterno e simultaneamente gerado por uma questão lógica, valendo ressaltar que essa estrutura dupla em que dois predicados opostos são atribuídos ao mesmo sujeito é a mesma utilizada nas antilogias de Zenão. E assim conclui o argumento: como o ente não foi gerado nem tampouco é eterno logo o ente não é. (68) "καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ὂν ἔστιν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὂν ἔστιν, ἤτοι ἀίδιόν ἐστιν ἢ γενητὸν ἢ ἀίδιον ἅμα καὶ γενητόν* οὔτε δὲ ἀίδιόν ἐστιν οὔτε γενητὸν οὔτε ἀμφότερα, ὡς δείξομεν* οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τὸ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ ἀίδιόν ἐστι τὸ ὄν (ἀρκτέον γὰρ ἐντεῦθεν), οὐκ ἔχει τινὰ ἀρχήν* (68) "E, ademais, nem o ente é. Se, de fato, o ente é, ou certamente eterno é, ou gerado ou eterno e simultaneamente gerado. Mas nem eterno é, nem gerado, nem um e nem outro como mostraremos: logo o ente não é. Se, pois, eterno é o ser (deve-se começar por aqui), não tem um princípio." (69) "τὸ γὰρ γινόμενον πᾶν ἔχει τιν' ἀρχήν, τὸ δὲ ἀίδιον ἀγένητον καθεστὼς οὐκ εἶχεν ἀρχήν. μὴ ἔχον δὲ ἀρχὴν ἄπειρόν ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ ἄπειρόν ἐστιν, οὐδαμοῦ ἐστιν. εἰ γάρ πού ἐστιν, ἕτερον αὐτοῦ ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἐν ᾧ ἐστιν, καὶ οὕτως οὐκέτ' ἄπειρον ἔσται τὸ ὂν ἐμπεριεχόμενόν τινι* μεῖζον γάρ ἐστι τοῦ ἐμπεριεχομένου τὸ ἐμπεριέχον, τοῦ δὲ ἀπείρου οὐδέν ἐστι μεῖζον, ὥστε οὐκ ἔστι που τὸ ἄπειρον." 68 69. "Com efeito, tudo que nasce tem um princípio, mas o eterno, instituído como ingênito, não teve princípio. Mas não tendo princípio, ilimitado é. Mas, se ilimitado é, em nenhum lugar é. Se, com efeito, em algum lugar é, outro dele é, aquilo no onde é, e assim não mais ilimitado será o ente contido nele; maior, com efeito, do que é contido é o continente, do que o ilimitado nada é maior, de modo que é em nenhum lugar o ilimitado." (70) "καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ἐν αὑτῷ περιέχεται. ταὐτὸν γὰρ ἔσται τὸ ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ δύο γενήσεται τὸ ὄν, τόπος τε καὶ σῶμα* (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ᾧ τόπος ἐστίν, τὸ δ' ἐν αὐτῷ σῶμα). τοῦτο δέ γε ἄτοπον* τοίνυν οὐδὲ ἐν αὑτῷ ἐστι τὸ ὄν. ὥστ' εἰ ἀίδιόν ἐστι τὸ ὄν, ἄπειρόν ἐστιν, εἰ δὲ ἄπειρόν ἐστιν, οὐδαμοῦ ἐστιν, εἰ δὲ μηδαμοῦ ἐστιν, οὐκ ἔστιν. τοίνυν εἰ ἀίδιόν ἐστι τὸ ὄν, οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὄν ἐστιν." 70. "E ademais, nem em si mesmo está contido. De fato o mesmo será, o onde (continente) e o nele (conteúdo), e dois se tornará o ente: lugar e corpo, {por um lado o onde, lugar é, por outro o nele, corpo(é)}. Mas isto certamente atópico (é). Portanto, nem em si mesmo é o ente. De modo que se eterno é o ente, ilimitado é, e se ilimitado é, em nenhum lugar é, e se em nenhum lugar é, não é. Portanto se eterno é o ente, de modo algum o ente é." (71) "καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ γενητὸν εἶναι δύναται τὸ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ γέγονεν, ἤτοι ἐξ ὄντος ἢ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος γέγονεν. ἀλλ' οὔτε ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος γέγονεν* εἰ γὰρ ὄν ἐστιν, οὐ γέγονεν ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἤδη* οὔτε ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος* τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὂν οὐδὲ γεννῆσαί τι δύναται διὰ τὸ) ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὀφείλειν ὑπάρξεως μετέχειν τὸ γεννητικόν τινος. οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ γενητόν ἐστι τὸ ὄν." (71) "Ademais nem gerado pode ser o ente. Se, com efeito, foi gerado, certamente a partir do ente ou do não ente foi gerado. Mas nem a partir do ente foi gerado; se, pois, o ente é, não foi gerado, mas já é, nem a partir do não ente, pois o não ente não pode gerar algo, pelo fato de que o que gera dever participar, por necessidade, da existência de algo. Logo nem gerado é o ente." (72) "κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ συναμφότερον, ἀίδιον ἅμα καὶ γενητόν* ταῦτα γὰρ ἀναιρετικά ἐστιν ἀλλήλων, καὶ εἰ ἀίδιόν ἐστι τὸ ὄν, οὐ γέγονεν, καὶ εἰ γέγονεν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀίδιον. τοίνυν εἰ μήτε ἀίδιόν ἐστι τὸ ὂν μήτε γενητὸν μήτε τὸ συναμφότερον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ ὄν." 69 (72) "Do mesmo modo, nem um nem outro conjuntamente, (nem) eterno e gerado simultaneamente; essas coisas, com efeito são destruídas umas pelas outras, e se eterno é o ente, não foi gerado e se foi gerado não é eterno. Portanto se nem eterno é o ente, nem gerado, nem um nem outro conjuntamente, não seria o ente." Na versão do MXG, (6.9), pode-se notar mais claramente como Górgias contrapõe os argumentos Zenão ao de Melisso. O argumento desse último sobre o espaço é apresentado por Aristóteles 142 , "Se o lugar é real, ele vai estar em algum lugar. O problema de Zenão exige uma resposta; se tudo o que é está em um lugar, o lugar deve estar em algum lugar, e assim ad infinitum". "Depois desse argumento, afirma, se é ou ingênito ou gerado é. E se certamente ingênito, compreende-o mediante os axiomas de Melisso; o ilimitado não pode ser em algum lugar. Nem, com efeito, em si mesmo, nem em outro poderia ser, pois dois ilimitados assim não poderiam ser, não só o "o que está em", mas também "o aquilo em que está". E em nenhum lugar sendo, nada poderia ser, segundo o argumento de Zenão sobre o espaço". Vejamos o restante da argumentação no MXG, (6.10) "Ingênito, certamente por isso, não poderia ser, nem todavia gerado. De fato, nada poderia ser gerado nem a partir do ente, nem a partir do não ente. Se, com efeito, o ente se transformasse, não mais poderia ser o próprio ente, exatamente como se também o não ente fosse gerado, não mais seria o não ente." (6.11) "Nem certamente não a partir do ente poderia ser gerado. Se, de fato, o não ente não é, nada a partir do nada poderia ser gerado; mas se o próprio não ente é, precisamente por causa daqueles argumentos que nem a partir do ente, pelos mesmos (argumentos), nem a partir do não ente poderia ser gerado." (6.12) "Se, então, (é) necessário que se precisamente algo é ou ingênito ou gerado ser, essas coisas (são) impossíveis, [impossível] algo também ser. " 142 (Aristóteles, Física), 209a 23. 70 E quanto à questão da unidade ou multiplicidade do ente discorre Górgias, (73) "καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ ἔστιν, ἤτοι ἕν ἐστιν ἢ πολλά* οὔτε δὲ ἕν ἐστιν οὔτε πολλά, ὡς παρασταθήσεται* οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τὸ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ ἕν ἐστιν, ἤτοι ποσόν ἐστιν ἢ συνεχές ἐστιν ἢ μέγεθός ἐστιν ἢ σῶμά ἐστιν. ὅ τι δὲ ἂν ᾖ τούτων, οὐχ ἕν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ ποσὸν μὲν καθεστὼς διαιρεθήσεται, συνεχὲς δὲ ὂν τμηθήσεται* ὁμοίως δὲ μέγεθος νοούμενον οὐκ ἔσται ἀδιαίρετον, σῶμα δὲ τυγχάνον τριπλοῦν ἔσται* καὶ γὰρ μῆκος καὶ πλάτος καὶ βάθος ἕξει. ἄτοπον δέ γε τὸ μηδὲν τούτων εἶναι λέ γειν τὸ ὄν* οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἓν τὸ ὄν." (73) "E, de outro modo, se é, certamente uno é ou múltiplo, mas nem uno é, nem múltiplo, como será provado, logo o ente não é. Se pois uno é, ou certamente um quantum é, ou continuum é, ou grandeza é ou corpo é. Se qualquer dessas coisas for, não uno é, mas como quantum constituído será dividido e continuum sendo será cortado. E semelhantemente pensado como grandeza não será indivisível. E sendo por acaso corpo, triplo será, pois comprimento e largura e profundidade terá. Mas atópico dizer nenhuma dessas coisas ser o ente, logo o ente não é uno." (74) "καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ πολλά ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ μή ἐστιν ἕν, οὐδὲ πολλά ἐστιν* σύνθεσις ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ μή ἐστιν ἕν, οὐδὲ πολλά ἐστιν* σύνθεσις γὰρ τῶν καθ' ἓν ἐστὶ τὰ πολλά, διόπερ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀναιρουμένου συναναιρεῖται καὶ τὰ πολλά. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὅτι μὲν οὔτε τὸ ὂν ἔστιν οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔστιν, ἐκ τούτων συμφανές*" (74) "Ademais nem múltiplo é. Se com efeito não uno é, não múltiplo é, uma adição de coisas uma a uma é o múltiplo. Porque destruído o uno destrói-se junto também o múltiplo, mas certamente que nem o ente é nem o não ente é, a partir disso, (é) evidente." (75) "ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ ἀμφότερα ἔστιν, τό τε ὂν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, εὐεπιλόγιστον. εἴπερ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔστι καὶ τὸ ὂν ἔστι, ταὐτὸν ἔσται τῷ ὄντι τὸ μὴ ὂν ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ εἶναι* καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐδέτερον αὐτῶν ἔστιν. ὅτι γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὂν οὐκ ἔστιν, ὁμόλογον* δέδεικται δὲ ταὐτὸ τούτῳ καθεστὼς τὸ ὄν* καὶ αὐτὸ τοίνυν οὐκ ἔσται." (75) "E que nem um nem outro é, o ente e o não ente, é fácil demonstrar. Pois se precisamente o não ente é, e o ente é, o mesmo será do ente o não ente em relação ao fato de ser, e por causa disto nem um nem outro deles é. Que pois o 71 não ente não é está acordado. Mas ficou demonstrado, o mesmo que esse (não ente) o ente ser constituído, e ele mesmo, portanto, não será." (76) οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' εἴπερ ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ μὴ ὄντι τὸ ὄν, οὐ δύναται ἀμφότερα εἶναι* εἰ γὰρ ἀμφότερα, οὐ ταὐτόν, καὶ εἰ ταὐτόν, οὐκ ἀμφότερα. οἷς ἕπεται τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι* εἰ γὰρ μήτε τὸ ὂν ἔστι μήτε τὸ μὴ ὂν μήτε ἀμφότερα, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν νοεῖται, οὐδὲν ἔστιν. (76 ) "Certamente não, se precisamente o mesmo do que o não ente é o ente, não é possível um e outro serem, se pois, um e outro (são) não (são) o mesmo, e se <são> o mesmo, não <são> um e outro. A essas coisas segue nada ser, se pois nem o ente é, nem o não ente, nem um nem outro, pois além disso nada é pensado, nada é." Górgias analisa se o ente é ou uno, ou muitos, ou simultaneamente uno e muitos, com uma argumentação em que se pode encontrar novamente a influência de Zenão 143 , "mas se é, (é) necessário ter cada coisa alguma grandeza e espessura e dela, uma parte estar distante da outra". A impossibilidade do uno está, no entanto, associada a um outro elemento discutido em Melisso: a corporeidade do ente. Para Górgias, o uno ou seria um quantum, ou um quantum contínuo, ou uma grandeza, ou um corpo, mas em todos os casos ele estaria sujeito à multiplicidade: como quantum poderia ser dividido, como quantum contínuo, cortado, como grandeza, dividido e se fosse corpo teria comprimento, largura e profundidade, logo o ente não é uno. Vale notar a referência em Aristóteles 144 , "se o Uno é indivisível, segundo o princípio de Zenão não é nada". O argumento contrário à multiplicidade é obtido a partir do fato de que não sendo uno, não poderia ser muitos, porque a multiplicidade é derivada da unidade, da adição do uno. E se fosse uno, segundo Zenão, deveria ser incorpóreo e não teria magnitude e então não existiria. Assim o ente não é uno nem múltiplo, nem ambos simultaneamente, logo o ente não é. 143 (Diels and Kranz, Die Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker), Zenão, fragmento primeiro. 144 (Aristóteles, Metafísica A), 1001, b7. 72 A versão de Sextus não inclui a questão do movimento que é apresentada no MXG, onde é clara a impossibilidade do movimento, tomado inicialmente no sentido de alteração, mudança, onde o ente se tornaria não-ente e vice e versa e depois no sentido de deslocamento. (6.14) "Nem nada, poderia mover-se, afirma. Se de fato se movesse, <ou> não mais seria tal como é, mas por um lado <o ente> seria o não ente, e por outro, o não ente seria gerado." (6.15) "E se, ademais, move-se, e como uno é deslocado, não contínuo sendo, foi dividido, e o ente nem é neste local; de modo que se em cada parte se move, em cada parte está dividido." (6.16) "Se assim, em cada parte não é. Afirma, de fato eclipsado do ente neste local onde foi dividido, dizendo o ter sido dividido ao invés de vazio, como nos chamados discursos de Leucipo foi escrito." Por fim Górgias finaliza este segmento afirmando que se ente e o não-ente são, eles seriam o mesmo quanto ao fato de serem, logo eles não são, concluindo "A essas coisas se segue nada ser, se pois nem o ente é, nem o não-ente, nem ambos, pois além disso nada é pensado, nada é". A referência ao sexto fragmento de Parmênides é clara, "χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ' ἐὸν ἔμμεναι* ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι, μηδὲν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν". (É necessário dizer e pensar o ente ser; de fato o ser é, mas nada não é). Ao provar que o ente não é, Górgias inverte a tese de Parmênides de μηδὲν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, transformando-a em μηδὲν ἔστιν , não havendo, assim, sujeito possível para ἔστιν. 5.2.4 Não pode ser pensado (77) "Ὅτι δὲ κἂν ᾖ τι, τοῦτο ἄγνωστόν τε καὶ ἀνεπινόητόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπῳ, παρακειμένως ὑποδεικτέον. εἰ γὰρ τὰ φρονούμενα, φησὶν ὁ Γοργίας, οὐκ ἔστιν ὄντα, τὸ ὂν οὐ φρονεῖται. καὶ κατὰ λόγον* ὥσπερ γὰρ εἰ τοῖς φρονουμένοις συμβέβηκεν εἶναι λευκοῖς, κἂν συμβεβήκει τοῖς λευκοῖς φρονεῖσθαι, 73 οὕτως εἰ τοῖς φρονουμένοις συμβέβηκε μὴ εἶναι οὖσι, κατ' ἀνάγκην συμβήσεται τοῖς οὖσι μὴ φρονεῖσθαι." (77) "E que mesmo se algo seja, isso incognoscível e inconcebível é para o homem, doravante deve-se demonstrar. Se, com efeito, as coisas pensadas, diz Górgias, não são entes, o ente não é pensado. E eis a razão: assim como, com efeito, se às coisas pensadas predicou-se serem brancas, e se tenha predicado às coisas brancas serem pensadas, do mesmo modo se as coisas pensadas predicouse não serem entes, necessariamente predicar-se-á aos entes não serem pensados." (78) "διόπερ ὑγιὲς καὶ σῷζον τὴν ἀκολουθίαν ἐστὶ τὸ "εἰ τὰ φρονούμενα οὐκ ἔστιν ὄντα, τὸ ὂν οὐ φρονεῖται." τὰ δέ γε φρονούμενα (προληπτέον γάρ) οὐκ ἔστιν ὄντα, ὡς παραστήσομεν* οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ὂν φρονεῖται. καὶ <μὴν> ὅτι τὰ φρονούμενα οὐκ ἔστιν ὄντα, συμφανές*" (78) "Por isto, sensato e seguro, quanto a consequência é "se as coisas pensadas <pois deve-se antecipar> não são entes, como provaremos, logo o ente não é pensado. E <ademais> que as coisas pensadas não são entes é claro." (79) "εἰ γὰρ τὰ φρονούμενά ἐστιν ὄντα, πάντα τὰ φρονούμενα ἔστιν, καὶ ὅπῃ ἄν τις αὐτὰ φρονήσῃ. ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀπεμφαῖνον*[εἰ δέ ἐστι, φαῦλον.] οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν φρονῇ τις ἄνθρωπον ἱπτάμενον ἢ ἅρματα ἐν πελάγει τρέχοντα, εὐθέως ἄνθρωπος ἵπταται ἢ ἅρματα ἐν πελάγει τρέχει. ὥστε οὐ τὰ φρονούμενά ἐστιν ὄντα." (79) "Se, com efeito, as coisas pensadas são entes, todas as coisas pensadas são, também de qualquer modo que alguém venha a pensar. O que precisamente é absurdo <e se o é, simplório>. Nem se, com efeito, alguém pensar um homem voando ou um carro correndo sobre o mar, de repente o homem voa ou o carro sobre o mar corre. Por consequência as coisas pensadas, não são entes." (80) "πρὸς τούτοις εἰ τὰ φρονούμενά ἐστιν ὄντα, τὰ μὴ ὄντα οὐ φρονηθήσεται. τοῖς γὰρ ἐναντίοις τὰ ἐναντία συμβέβηκεν, ἐναντίον δέ ἐστι τῷ ὄντι τὸ μὴ ὄν* καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντως εἰ τῷ ὄντι συμβέβηκε τὸ φρονεῖσθαι, τῷ μὴ ὄντι συμβήσεται τὸ μὴ φρονεῖσθαι. ἄτοπον δ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο* καὶ γὰρ Σκύλλα καὶ Χίμαιρα καὶ πολλὰ τῶν μὴ ὄντων φρονεῖται. οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ὂν φρονεῖται." 74 (80)"Além disso, se as coisas pensadas são entes, os não entes não serão pensados. Com efeito, às coisas contrárias o contrário foi predicado, e o contrário ao ente é o não ente. E por isso, de todo modo, se ao ente predicou-se o fato de ser pensado, ao não ente predicar-se-á o não ser pensado. Mas atópico é isso e pois Cila e Quimera e muitos dos não entes são pensados. Logo o ente não é pensado." (81) "ὥσπερ τε τὰ ὁρώμενα διὰ τοῦτο ὁρατὰ λέγεται ὅτι ὁρᾶται, καὶ τὰ ἀκουστὰ διὰ τοῦτο ἀκουστὰ ὅτι ἀκούεται, καὶται, καὶ τὰ ἀκουστὰ διὰ τοῦτο ἀκουστὰ ὅτι ἀκούεται, καὶοὐ τὰ μὲν ὁρατὰ ἐκβάλλομεν ὅτι οὐκ ἀκούεται, τὰ δὲ ἀκουστὰ παραπέμπομεν ὅτι οὐχ ὁρᾶται (ἕκαστον γὰρ ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας αἰσθήσεως ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπ' ἄλλης ὀφείλει κρίνεσθαι), οὕτω καὶ τὰ φρονούμενα καὶ εἰ μὴ βλέποιτο τῇ ὄψει μηδὲ ἀκούοιτο τῇ ἀκοῇ ἔσται, ὅτι πρὸς τοῦ οἰκείου λαμβάνεται κριτηρίου." (81) "Assim como as coisas vistas, por isto visíveis são ditas, porque são vistas e as coisas ouvidas, por isto audíveis, porque são ouvidas, e por um lado as visíveis não rejeitamos por não serem ouvidas, por outro lado as audíveis não descartamos por não serem vistas (pois cada coisa por sua própria percepção, mas não por outra, deve ser julgada); do mesmo modo também as coisas pensadas, mesmo se não pudessem ser vistas pela visão nem ouvidas pela audição, serão, por meio do seu próprio critério, apreendidas." (82) "κριτηρίου. εἰ οὖν φρονεῖ τις ἐν πελάγει ἅρματα τρέχειν, καὶ εἰ μὴ βλέπει ταῦτα, ὀφείλει πιστεύειν, ὅτι ἅρματα ἔστιν ἐν πελάγει τρέχοντα. ἄτοπον δὲ τοῦτο* οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ὂν φρονεῖται καὶ καταλαμβάνεται." (82) "Se então, alguém pensa, no mar, carros correrem, mesmo se não os vê, deve acreditar que carros correndo no mar são. Mas atópico (é) isso; logo o ente não é pensado, nem apreendido." Górgias examina, então, a segunda tese: mesmo se é, é incognoscível e inconcebível para o homem, apresentando dois argumentos para justificá-la. Ele toma πράγματα em um sentido abrangente, que segundo Untersteiner 145 "correspondem a tudo que pode ser objeto de uma experiência humana qualquer, sensível, fantástica, especulativa". 145 (Untersteiner, A obra dos sofistas, uma interpretação filosófica), p. 238. 75 O primeiro é que a suposição de que as coisas pensadas são entes (ὄντα, πράγματα) nos leva a admitir a existência de entes correspondentes a pensamentos do tipo "homem voa", ou "carros correm sobre o mar", assim as coisas pensadas não são entes. Górgias teria, no entanto, cometido um paralogismo ao passar de uma afirmativa particular para uma afirmativa universal (coisas pensadas/todas as coisas pensadas), isto é o fato de que algumas coisas pensadas não existem não implica em que todas as coisas pensadas não existam. O outro argumento é que se as coisas pensadas são entes, as coisas que não são não serão pensadas o que também é um absurdo porque Cila e Quimera, apesar de não serem, são pensadas. O modelo da argumentação é A implica não B, logo B implica não A, assim conclui-se que os entes não são pensados, e se não são pensados, não podem ser conhecidos, i.e. a tese da incognoscibilidade das coisas. Logo se algo é ele não pode ser pensado. O segundo argumento apresentado por Górgias está relacionado com a teoria de Empédocles (e talvez tenha sido essa a origem de apresentar Górgias como aluno filósofo de Agrigento). Segundo Sócrates 146 , "Não é verdade que falais de certas emanações dos seres, Segundo <a teoria de> Empédocles?...E também poros, para os quais e através dos quais correm as emanações?...Algo que dás o nome de visão? Cada órgão dos sentidos percebe os entes de uma maneira e forma independentes. O fato de se ver algo e não o ouvir não implica que este algo não 5.2.5 Não pode ser transmitido (83) "Καὶ εἰ καταλαμβάνοιτο δέ, ἀνέξοιστον ἑτέρῳ. εἰ γὰρ τὰ ὄντα ὁρατά ἐστι καὶ ἀκουστὰ καὶ κοινῶς αἰσθητά, ἅπερ ἐκτὸς ὑπόκειται, τούτων τε τὰ μὲν ὁρατὰ ὁράσει καταληπτά ἐστι τὰ δὲ ἀκουστὰ ἀκοῇ καὶ οὐκ ἐναλλάξ, πῶς οὖν δύναται ταῦτα ἑτέρῳ μηνύεσθαι;" 146 (Platão, Mênon), 76d. 76 (83) "E mesmo se pudesse ser apreendido, inexprimível a outrem. E se, pois, os entes são visíveis e audíveis e geralmente perceptíveis, os quais precisamente se encontram exteriormente, dentre esses, por um lado, os visíveis pela visão são apreendidos, por outro, os audíveis pela audição e não de modo inverso, como podem essas coisas à outrem ser reveladas?" (84) "ᾧ γὰρ μηνύομεν ἔστι λόγος, λόγος δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τὰ ὑποκείμενα καὶ ὄντα* οὐκ ἄρα τὰ ὄντα μηνύομεν τοῖς πέλας ἀλλὰ λόγον, ὃς ἕτερός ἐστι τῶν ὑποκειμένων. καθάπερ οὖν τὸ ὁρατὸν οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀκουστὸν καὶ ἀνάπαλιν, οὕτως ἐπεὶ ὑπόκειται τὸ ὂν ἐκτός, οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο λόγος ὁ ἡμέτερος*" (84) "Pois aquilo com que revelamos é a palavra, mas a palavra não são as coisas subjacentes e que são, logo não revelamos os entes aos outros, mas palavra, que é outra das coisas subjacentes. Precisamente como, então, o visível não poderia se tornar audível e vice e versa, assim uma vez que o ente subjaz exteriormente, não poderia tornar-se a nossa palavra." (85) "μὴ ὢν δὲ λόγος οὐκ ἂν δηλωθείη ἑτέρῳ. ὅ γε μὴν λόγος, φησίν, ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν προσπιπτόντων ἡμῖν πραγμάτων συνίσταται, τουτέστι τῶν αἰσθητῶν* ἐκ γὰρ τῆς τοῦ χυλοῦ ἐγκυρήσεως ἐγγίνεται ἡμῖν ὁ κατὰ ταύτης τῆς ποιότητος ἐκφερόμενος λόγος, καὶ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ χρώματος ὑποπτώσεως ὁ κατὰ τοῦ χρώματος. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐχ ὁ λόγος τοῦ ἐκτὸς παραστατικός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκτὸς τοῦ λόγου μηνυτικὸν γίνεται." (85) "E não sendo palavra, não poderia ser manifesta a outrem. A palavra, certamente, diz ele, a partir das coisas exteriores que nos atingem, é constituída, isto é, das coisas perceptíveis. A partir do encontro do sabor, se origina em nós, a palavra que é dita segundo essa qualidade, e a partir da incidência de cor; segundo a cor. E se isso é, a palavra não é indicativa da coisa exterior, mas a (coisa) exterior torna-se reveladora da palavra." (86) "καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἔνεστι λέγειν, ὅτι ὃν τρόπον τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ ἀκουστὰ ὑπόκειται, οὕτως καὶ ὁ λόγος, ὥστε δύνασθαι ἐξ ὑποκειμένου αὐτοῦ καὶ ὄντος τὰ ὑποκείμενα καὶ ὄντα μηνύεσθαι. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὑπόκειται, φησίν, ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῶν λοιπῶν ὑποκειμένων, καὶ πλείστῳ διενήνοχε τὰ ὁρατὰ σώματα τῶν λόγων* δι' ἑτέρου γὰρ ὀργάνου ληπτόν ἐστι τὸ ὁρατὸν καὶ δι' ἄλλου ὁ λόγος. οὐκ ἄρα 77 ἐνδείκνυται τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ὁ λόγος, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα τὴν ἀλλήλων διαδηλοῖ φύσιν." (86) "Ademais não é possível dizer que do mesmo modo que as coisas visíveis e audíveis subjazem assim também (subjaz) a palavra, de modo a ser possível a partir do próprio subjacente e ente serem reveladas as coisas subjacentes e os entes. Se, com efeito, também, subjaz, diz ele, a palavra, mas difere dos subjacentes restantes e em muitíssimo os corpos visíveis diferem das palavras; por um órgão é apreendido o visível e por outro a palavra. Logo não indica muitas coisas subjacentes a palavra, exatamente como nem aquelas evidenciam a natureza umas das outras." (87) "τοιούτων οὖν παρὰ τῷ Γοργίᾳ ἠπορημένων οἴχεται ὅσον ἐπ' αὐτοῖς τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας κριτήριον* τοῦ γὰρ μήτε ὄντος μήτε γνωρίζεσθαι δυναμένου μήτε ἄλλῳ παρασταθῆναι πεφυκότος οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη κριτήριον." (87) "Então tendo ficado em aporia tais coisas em Górgias, desaparece, no quanto se fundamenta sobre elas, o critério da verdade. Pois nem sendo, nem podendo ser conhecido, nem por sua natureza se exposto a outro, em nada seria o critério." O argumento anterior fornecerá a base para a discussão da terceira tese, onde o cognoscível não pode ser comunicado. As coisas vistas ou ouvidas são percebidas pelos seus respectivos órgãos e não podem ser transmitidas, porque nos comunicamos com sons vocais e as palavras são diferentes (e de outra natureza) das coisas que vemos ou ouvimos. Para Górgias apenas os órgãos perceptivos podem se relacionar com o mundo exterior, não o pensamento, que não teria relação autônoma com o mundo. Assim o que comunicamos não são as coisas (τὰ ὄντα, τὰ πράγματα), mas tão somente as palavras. E além disso, não são as palavras que revelam os entes mas sim os entes que são indicadores das palavras. A leitura do MXG é mais completa porque adiciona uma segunda parte à argumentação apresentada por Sextus. 78 6(21) Mesmo se cognoscíveis, como poderia alguém, afirma, mostrar a outrem? Aquilo que, com efeito, alguém vê, como poderia, afirma, dizê-lo pela palavra? Como poderia tornar aquilo visível ao ouvinte não o vendo? Assim como, de fato, nem a visão conhece os sons do mesmo modo nem a audição ouve as cores, mas sons; e o falante diz, mas não (diz) a cor nem (diz) a coisa. 6(22) "Aquilo que, então, alguém não pensa, como pensará mediante a palavra de outrem ou um sinal outro da coisa, exceto se, por uma lado, uma cor tendo visto, por outro se um som, <tendo ouvido>? Primeiramente, com efeito, não um <som> nem a cor, diz o falante, mas a palavra. De modo que nem é possível pensar a cor, mas vê-la, nem o som, mas ouvi-lo." 6(23) "Mesmo se é possível conhecer e dizer o que se vier a conhecer, mas como o ouvinte pensará o mesmo? Pois como o mesmo, simultaneamente, não poderia ser em muitos que também são separados, dois, pois, seriam uno." 6(24) "Mesmo se o mesmo estivesse em muitos, afirma, nada impede de não se mostrar semelhante para eles, muitos não sendo inteiramente semelhantes e no mesmo. Se, pois, estivessem no mesmo, <uno> mas não dois seriam." 6(25) "Mas nem o próprio parece a si mesmo percebendo coisas semelhantes ao mesmo tempo, mas diferentes pela audição e pela visão, e agora e diferentemente de outrora. De modo que, dificilmente, alguém poderia perceber o mesmo que outrem." Assim para Górgias o conhecimento seria incomunicável. Primeiro, porque é impossível que a mesma coisa pensada esteja simultaneamente em diversos sujeitos porque seria mais de uma. Segundo, porque a mesma coisa é percebida diferentemente pelo mesmo sujeito não só pelos diversos órgãos mas também variando no tempo. Se nem o sujeito é capaz de perceber a mesma coisa mais improvável é alguém perceber o mesmo que o outro. 5.3 Conclusão A leitura do Tratado nos fornece importantes elementos que nos auxiliarão na leitura do Poema. Ao τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι contrapõe ἄγνωστόν 79 τε καὶ ἀνεπινόητον, e o conhecimento é ἀνέξοιστον καὶ ἀνερμήυτον. Para Górgias a coluna dorsal do Poema dá-se no eixo ser-pensar-dizer. E essa estrutura é sustentada pela inicial oposição parmenídica entre ser e não ser, e a partir da vedação da via do não ser é apenas sobre o ser que se pode predicar. É sobre esse ser que se constrói o edifício de Parmênides. Apesar de a deusa ter excluído o não ser como via a ser pesquisada, Górgias explora tanto a via do ser quanto o não ser, concluindo que nada é. A δύναμις do verbo ser é então anulada em todas as dimensões relevantes: existência, identidade e predicação: nada é. Não há sujeito possível de que se possa predicar. Haveria uma "castração" do verbo ser, e do é exclui-se inclusive a possibilidade de ser ente. E será a partir das teses de Melisso e Zenão que Górgias irá demonstrar não apenas a impossibilidade de qualquer dos predicados do ser de Parmênides, como também dos seus opostos: eterno/gerado, uno/múltiplo, e móvel/imóvel. Concluindo mas uma vez que o ente não é. Cordero 147 afirma que "L'École d'Élée devenue un cliché, est une généralisation didactique utile, profitable. Mais ellle possède autant de réalité historique que la très belle 'Ecole d'Athènes' de Raphaël'", mas se esta hipótese está correta esta construção não é platônica, já aparecendo em Górgias, que trata o eleatismo como um bloco único. Diferentemente de Parmênides ou de Melisso, em Górgias apenas os sentidos podem acessar o ser, estabelecendo com o mundo uma relação estética, e anulando toda a nossa aspiração ao conhecer. O discurso, em Górgias, é autônomo em relação ao mundo, nem falso nem verdadeiro, o discurso não diz o mundo, diz palavras. Encontra-se em Górgias o que Coelho 148 chamou de verdade como construção discursiva. Quanto à competência lógica de Górgias, Colli 149 afirma que "es más que lícita la hipótesis de que la excelencia lógica de Górgias fue assombrosa...se nos aprésenta como fundador de la teoría de la deducción, es decir, de la estructura del juicio, de la conversión...". 147 (Cordero, L'Invention de L'Ecole Eleatique), p.124. 148 (Coelho, Retórica, filosofia e lógica: verdade como construção discursiva). p. 45. 149 (Colli, Gorgias e Parménides), p. 217. 80 A pretensão da deusa foi de fornecer um caminho possível para o conhecimento do ser, indicando apenas uma via da verdade. Para Górgias não há, no entanto, caminho possível. 81 6 Parmênides 6.1 Vida e Obra Parmênides 150 é o "αἰδιός" e "δεινός", Heráclito é "ὁ Σκοτεινός" e segundo Tímon 151 o "αἰνιχτές", o que se expressa por enigmas. São, para Heidegger, os pensadores originários 152 , os que pensaram o verdadeiro. DL 153 diz que Parmênides teria tido o seu floruit na 69a Olimpíada tendo sido aluno de Xenófanes, mas que não teria seguido a doutrina dele, mas sim de Aminias, o pitagórico, e que também teria redigido leis para a sua cidade Eleia. De Eleia restam ruínas. Há vestígios de um templo mas não se sabe hoje, ao certo, a quem era dedicado. O templo não é agora apenas inominado, como a deusa do Poema, mas está vazio de deuses, não é mais o lugar do sagrado. A forma do pensamento de Parmênides é o hexâmetro dactílico. O hexâmetro, é composto por seis pés dactílicos, cada pé contém três sílabas poéticas, sendo a primeira longa e as subsequentes breves. O quinto pé é sempre dáctilo, o sexto pode ser longa-breve (troqueu) ou longa-longa (espondeu). O pensamento de Parmênides abriga-se em seu "Poema". Dele, restaram fragmentos. Fragmento, do latim fragmentum, é um substantivo derivado do verbo frango, quebrar, que também deu origem a fragium. Diz-se do frágil: sensível, que se quebra facilmente, efêmero, sem solidez, pouco resistente. A ambiguidade da palavra poética, no entanto, protegeu o Poema da sua fragilidade. A palavra poética é flexível e nela encontra-se a sua resistência. Para alguns a poesia afasta a verdade. Frege 154 , discorrendo sobre a distinção entre ciência e arte afirma: "ao ouvir um poema épico, além da eufonia da linguagem, estamos interessados apenas no sentido das sentenças e nas 150 (Platão, Teeteto), 183e6. 151 (D. Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers), IX, 6. 152 (M. Heidegger, Parmênides), p. 14. 153 (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers) p. 429. 154 (Frege, Lógica e Filosofia da Linguagem), p. 138. 82 imagens e sentimentos que este sentido evoca, a questão da verdade nos faria abandonar um encanto estético por uma atitude de investigação científica". Mas, paradoxalmente, em Parmênides, a linguagem poética abriga a verdade. A qualidade estética do Poema tem sido questionada desde a antiguidade e mais recentemente baseada nas opiniões de Diels e Wilamowitz. Mourelatos 155 , em detalhada análise sobre o tema, afirma que esse julgamento é "unduly harsh and is based on a superficial and dated (romantic) conception of the distinction between argument and poetry". Cornford 156 divide o Poema em três partes: o Proem, Way of Truth and Way of Seeming. Nesta dissertação, vamos analisar o Proêmio e a Via da Verdade. A Via da Aparência, da qual restam poucos fragmentos, relata uma cosmogonia de influência pitagórica e Parmênides não utiliza uma argumentação dedutiva para apresentá-la, razões pelas quais o seu conteúdo não será analisado nesta dissertação. 6.2 Proêmio É de Sextus 157 a versão do proêmio que chegou até nós, nele lê-se: «ἵπποι ταί με φέρουσιν, ὅσον τ' ἐπὶ θυμὸς ἱκάνοι, πέμπον, ἐπεί μ' ἐς ὁδὸν βῆσαν πολύφημον ἄγουσαι δαίμονος 158 , ἣ κατὰ πάντ' ἄστη φέρει εἰδότα φῶτα* τῆι φερόμην* τῆι γάρ με πολύφραστοι φέρον ἵπποι ἅρμα τιταίνουσαι, κοῦραι δ' ὁδὸν ἡγεμόνευον. ἄξων δ' ἐν χνοίηισιν ἵει σύριγγος ἀυτήν αἰθόμενος (δοιοῖς γὰρ ἐπείγετο δινωτοῖσιν κύκλοις ἀμφοτέρωθεν), ὅτε σπερχοίατο πέμπειν Ἡλιάδες κοῦραι, προλιποῦσαι δώματα Νυκτός, εἰς φάος, ὠσάμεναι κράτων ἄπο χερσὶ καλύπτρας. ἔνθα πύλαι Νυκτός τε καὶ Ἤματός εἰσι κελεύθων, καί σφας ὑπέρθυρον ἀμφὶς ἔχει καὶ λάινος οὐδός* αὐταὶ δ' αἰθέριαι πλῆνται μεγάλοισι θυρέτροις* τῶν δὲ Δίκη πολύποινος ἔχει κληῖδας ἀμοιβούς. τὴν δὴ παρφάμεναι κοῦραι μαλακοῖσι λόγοισιν. πεῖσαν ἐπιφραδέως, ὥς σφιν βαλανωτὸν ὀχῆα ἀπτερέως ὤσειε πυλέων ἄπο* ταὶ δὲ θυρέτρων χάσμ' ἀχανὲς ποίησαν ἀναπτάμεναι πολυχάλκους ἄξονας ἐν σύριγξιν ἀμοιβαδὸν εἰλίξασαι 155 (Mourelatos 2008), p. 36. 156 (Cornford, Plato and Parmenides 2001), p. 29. 157 (Empiricus, Against Logicians), I. 111117. 158 Correção de Cordero. 83 γόμφοις καὶ περόνηισιν ἀρηρότε* τῆι ῥα δι' αὐτέων ἰθὺς ἔχον κοῦραι κατ' ἀμαξιτὸν ἅρμα καὶ ἵππους. καί με θεὰ πρόφρων ὑπεδέξατο, χεῖρα δὲ χειρί δεξιτερὴν ἕλεν, ὧδε δ' ἔπος φάτο καί με προσηύδα* ὦ κοῦρ' ἀθανάτοισι συνάορος ἡνιόχοισιν, ἵπποις ταί σε φέρουσιν ἱκάνων ἡμέτερον δῶ, χαῖρ', ἐπεὶ οὔτι σε μοῖρα κακὴ προὔπεμπε νέεσθαι τήνδ' ὁδόν (ἦ γὰρ ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων ἐκτὸς πάτου ἐστίν), ἀλλὰ θέμις τε δίκη τε. χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι ἠμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής. ἀλλ' ἔμπης καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσεαι, ὡς τὰ δοκοῦντα χρῆν δοκίμως εἶναι διὰ παντὸς πάντα περῶντα." Assim traduzido: "As éguas que me conduzem tão longe quanto a mente 159 pode alcançar, guiam-me, depois de trazerem-me, trazendo-me até a via de muitas vozes 160 , da divindade que, com relação a tudo 161 , conduz o mortal que sabe. aí era conduzido, aí de fato me conduziam éguas muito sábias éguas puxando o carro, e as virgens a via mostravam. o eixo em suas extremidades emitia um som de uma seringe incandescente (pois era pressionado por duas rodas girando rapidamente de ambos os lados) quando se apressavam a conduzir (me) as virgens Helíades, depois de abandonarem a morada da Noite em direção à luz retirando com as mãos, da cabeça, os véus. Lá, as portas dos caminhos da Noite e do Dia estão, e um dintel encima e um umbral de pedra embaixo mantém-nas; elas próprias, etéreas, foram emolduradas por grandes batentes; cujas chaves alternadas, δίκη, de muitas penas, as possui. a ela, virgens sedutoras, com discursos suaves, persuadiram-na sabiamente para soltar-lhes rápido, o ferrolho preso das portas; essas, dos batentes, uma abertura imensa, produziram ao se abrirem, fazendo girar os eixos, de muito bronze, em suas cavidades um após o outro, fixados com gonzos e cavilhas; aí então, através delas, retamente, mantinham as virgens, na grande via, o carro e as éguas. E a mim, θεὰ com grande hospitalidade acolheu, <a minha> mão direita tomou, e assim disse estas palavras a mim dirigindo-se: Ó jovem, acompanhante de imortais aurigas, as quais com éguas te conduzem alcançando a nossa morada salve ! Pois a ti não uma Moira má te enviou a vir por esta via (com efeito está fora do caminho usual dos homens) mas θέμις e Δίκη. (É) necessário tu seres instruído, por um lado, do coração sem tremor da verdade persuasiva por outro, das opiniões dos mortais, em que não há convicção verdadeira. Mas contudo também isto aprenderás: como teria sido necessário as aparências fossem realmente, através de tudo, tudo atravessando." 159 Coração, mente em Homero. 160 Muitos signos, muito falada, que muito diz, de muitos cantos. 161 Correção de Cordero. 84 O proêmio narra o caminho percorrido pelo mortal que sabe e é dividido em duas partes, a primeira até as portas dos caminhos da Noite e do Dia, guardado por Δίκη, que, persuadida pelas virgens sedutoras, as abrem para a passagem do carro. A segunda parte, até a deusa inominada, onde é apresentado o discurso. Segundo Sextus, Parmênides teria rejeitado a opinião e a crença nos sentidos e teria assumido como critério a razão. E nos apresenta uma interpretação alegórica do Poema: os cavalos como impulsos irracionais e apetites da alma, a via da deusa como a investigação, a viagem segundo a razão filosófica, a razão como divino condutor, as jovens helíades como os sentidos, as rodas como os ouvidos e Δίκη como inteligência. É possível perceber na interpretação proposta por Sextus a influência do Fedro 162 , onde Sócrates decide não apresentar uma exposição sobre a natureza da alma, mas se propõe a dizer ao que ela se assemelha, comparando-a com a força inata que une a biga alada ao seu cocheiro, e que o piloto da alma (ψυχῆς κυβερήτης) é a inteligência. Bowra 163 acredita que Parmênides está claramente fazendo uma alegoria, apesar de considerar que possa haver uma experiência mística no Proêmio. Identifica dois sentidos, um referencial e outro implícito: a passagem da noite para o dia como transição da ignorância para o conhecimento, o caminho que ele percorre como a via da investigação, as jovens helíades como a força interna que o conduz à luz, dentre outras. É uma linguagem figurativa, metafórica. Há um duplo na alegoria: a superfície aparente da metáfora e a verdade velada do simbolismo. Na alegoria do Proêmio estaria a essência do poema, os binômios ser/aparência, ou verdade/opinião: os dois caminhos apresentados pela deusa e que serão fundamentais para a filosofia de Platão. E da mesma forma que as jovens helíades retiram os véus quando abandonam a morada da noite, há necessidade do desvelamento da alegoria, da busca do sentido subtendido. E não se pode deixar de fazer um paralelo com o conceito de verdade enquanto desvelamento de Heidegger. 162 (Platão, Fedro), 265 a. 163 (Bowra, The Proem of Parmenides), p.98, "o uso da analogia em tal escala é extremamente raro no início da poesia grega". 85 A leitura mais atenta da alegoria revela, também, a presença de uma analogia. Há uma relação matemática do tipo a:b :: c:d, noite/dia e ignorância/conhecimento. Aristóteles 164 define analogia como "quando o segundo (termo) está para o primeiro como o quarto está para o terceiro...e às vezes apõe em lugar daquilo que se designa aquilo que está relacionado" e nos dá alguns exemplos, a taça para Dionísio como o escudo para Ares, ou a velhice para vida como o entardecer para o dia. Segundo Perelman 165 , analogia permite a aproximação de dois domínios heterogêneos, o místico e o racional, o Proêmio e a Via da Verdade. A utilização por Parmênides de uma alegoria estruturada como analogia tão complexa revela um tipo de raciocínio que pode indicar a influência pitagórica da prática do estudo das relações numéricas e geométricas. Para Bowra, as imagens utilizadas por Parmênides transfere a força simbólica da noite e dia existente no imaginário mítico grego para o binômio ignorância e conhecimento. Os comentadores modernos divergem quanto ao significado do Proêmio. Jaeger 166 apresenta a Teogonia de Hesíodo como role model para o Parmênides, "is the first work to use the form of epic poem for rational and didactic exposition of the world of gods". Enquanto Hesíodo 167 pastoreava ovelhas no divino Hélicon, as musas filhas de Mémoria, que dizem "as coisas que são e as que hão de ser e as que eram antes" (τά τ' ἐόντα τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα), o escolheram e o inspiraram com a missão de proclamar os deuses eternos e cantar as suas origens. Mas elas alertam "sabemos como dizer coisas falsas (ψεύδεα) semelhantes às genuínas, mas sabemos, quando desejamos, como proclamar as verdadeiras (ἀληθέα)." Diferentemente do beócio, a quem as deusas escolheram, Parmênides não é um pastor ou um poeta, ele é o mortal que sabe, que percorreu um caminho, a via muito celebrada da divindade, até a deusa. Os dois receberam suas revelações diretamente das divindades, os dois falam o verdadeiro. O verdadeiro do dito é 164 Aristóteles na Poética 1457 b, 10-30 "e metáfora é a imposição de um nome que pertence a outra coisa, ou do gênero à espécie, da espécie à espécie ou segundo o análogo". 165 Analogia e Metáfora, Chaim Perelman, p. 207: "ninguém nunca contestou o papel heurístico das analogias, quando se trata de explorar um domínio desconhecido, de sugerir a ideia daquilo que não é cognoscível, um modelo extraído de um domínio conhecido fornece um instrumento indispensável para guiar a investigação e a imaginação". 166 (Jaeger, The Teology of Early Greek Philosophers), p. 121. 167 (Hesíodo, Teogonia), 38 86 divino, distante das opiniões dos mortais, porém enquanto Hesíodo recebeu a verdade das musas, Parmênides foi em busca dela. Mas em ambos os casos a verdade foi revelada. Será muito tempo depois, em Platão, que o prisioneiro se libertará sozinho e buscará, longe dos deuses, a verdade. Para Jaeger 168 , "no one who studies this supernatural overture could ever suppose that the philosopher's aim in this passage is merely to provide an effective stage setting. His mysterious vision in the realm of light is a genuine religious experience". Guthrie 169 afirma que "the general character of the prologue points rather to the 'shamanistic' strain in early Greek religious thought", e cita diversas experiências semelhantes atribuídas a Aitalides, Aristeias, Abaris, Epimênides e Hermortimus. Cornford 170 , ressalta o aspecto de revelação feito pela deusa e "que a viagem pelos céus recorda a representação ritual do xamã", e, "and this traditional attitude of the poet is not a mere artifice of a bloodless allegory" 171 . Ειδότα φῶτα também pode significar iniciado 172 , e as jovens helíades retirando o véu simbolizam um ritual religioso. "Diels 173 encontra paralelo com o modelo órfico e xâmanico. O xamanismo, do tungsi 174 "šamán", é uma técnica de êxtase religioso, onde o xamã atua como um intermediário entre o mundo dos espíritos e o mundo humano. Segundo Dodds 175 , o xamanismo teria entrado em contato com a cultura grega a partir da colonização da região do Mar Negro, trazendo uma nova concepção da relação entre alma e corpo. Platão 176 , no Fedro, distingue os tipos de loucura divina, "distinguimos quatro espécies, referentes a quatro divindades: a Apolo atribuímos a inspiração mântica; a Dioniso, a teléstica ou de iniciação nos mistérios; às Musas, a poética; e a quarta, a erótica, considerada a melhor de todas, a Afrodite e a Eros". 168 (Jaeger ,The Teology of Early Greek Philosophers), p. 35. 169 (Guthrie, The Presocratic tradition from Parmenides to Democritus), p. 172. 170 (Cornford, Principium Sapientae), p. 147. 171 (Cornford, Plato and Parmenides), p. 29. 172 (Diels H. Parmenides Lehrgedicht), p. 49. 173 Idem p. 12-21. 174 Língua da Sibéria. 175 (Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational), p. 144. 176 (Platão, Fedro), 265b. 87 A possessão xamanística apresenta uma natureza diversa das descritas por Platão. Diferentemente da possessão espiritual da Pítia por Apolo ou das sacerdotisas de Zeus em Dodona, é a alma do Xamã que é transportada para fora de si e do mundo sensível, conectando-se com espíritos e deuses, viajando a outros mundos, curando doenças, reestabelecendo o equilíbrio entre corpo e a alma e possuindo inclusive o dom da ubiquidade. O xamã é um mediador entre os homens e os deuses e também um poeta e cantor, narrando, em primeira pessoa, as suas jornadas e experiências. A possessão das Musas é quanto ao conteúdo e não quanto à forma, como esclarece Dodds 177 , "o poeta pergunta às musas o que deve dizer e não como dizêlo" e ele busca a verdade do passado e não do presente, apesar de se atribuir às musas o conhecimento de coisas passadas, presentes e futuras, "portanto o dom das musas é o poder da fala verdadeira". O poeta não é possuído, ele é o intérprete da musa. Enquanto a possessão de Dionísio é coletiva, a do xamã é individual, de ordem catártica, com vinho e dança, o Xamã não raramente recorre ao jejum e ao isolamento. Há registro de outros de exemplos de uma "literatura xâmanica" em dois fragmentos citados por Diels 178 , "Chegou uma vez a Atenas um homem cretense de nome Epimênides, trazendo um relato difícil de confiar, narrado assim... (com efeito ao meio dia) na gruta de Zeus Dícteo 179 deitado em sono profundo por anos contínuos ele mesmo dizia ter-se ocupado em sonhos com os deuses, com discussões com Ἁλήθεια και Δική". Segundo Vlastos 180 , não apenas o proêmio como também a lógica e a física apresentadas por Parmênides mostram uma afinidade com a religião mística, "the goal of this religion was to build a bridge across the traditionally impassable gulf that separates the human to the divine", uma combinação de lógica e misticismo. Para Verdenius 181 , "Not every detail is true, should it be taken literally, but there is every reason to believe that Parmenides felt these thoughts to be a religious experience at the same time". Segundo Fränkel 182 , "al reflexionar 177 (Dodds, 2002), p. 86. 178 (Diels & Kranz, 2004), Epimenides, 1, Pherecides, 8. 179 Diz dícteo em alusão à caverna de Dícte em Creta onde teria nascido Zeus. 180 (Vlastos, 1996), p. 161. 181 (Verdemius 1942), p.67 182 (Fränkel 2004), p.331 88 Parménides se siente arrastrado a un reino de luz, más allá de las cosas terrenas". As metáforas utilizadas no Poema fazem parte da linguagem poética tradicional, presentes por exemplo em Píndaro 183 , "O Pítia, venha e prepare de uma vez as fortes mulas para mim, o mais rapidamente possível, para que possam conduzir nosso carro em um caminho claro, porque essas mulas mais do que todas as outras, sabem como liderar o caminho na estrada, para que elas ganhem as coroas em Olímpia." E também no Hino a Deméter, "para depois de convencer Hades com palavras suaves, a sagrada Perséfone da nebulosa escuridão trouxesse à luz". Há também outras semelhanças, as jovens helíades, por exemplo, que apontam o caminho, são as filhas de Ηλιος 184 , o incansável (ἀκάματος), que brilha (φαίνει) para os mortais e imortais, montado em seu carro, e dele emanam brilhantes raios. No Timeu 185 , é narrado o mito de Φαέθων, filho de Ηλιος, " que tendo juntado as montarias no carro de seu pai, e como ele não foi capaz de conduzi-las no caminho certo, queimou tudo o que havia sobre a terra, e foi ele próprio destruído por um raio". Higino 186 complementa a narração: Zeus o fulminou com um raio e caiu no rio Eridan e quanto às jovens helíades, ou por terem atado os cavalos sem conhecimento do pai, ou por lamentarem a morte do irmão, foram transformadas em árvores (álamo) e as suas lágrimas solidificaram-se transformando-se em âmbar. Φαέθων não conhecia o caminho, no Poema, ao contrário do mito, o mortal que sabe está acompanhado pelas jovens helíades, que indicam o caminho. Os caminhos do Dia e da Noite são semelhantes aos descritos na Teogonia 187 , " Defronte, o filho de Jápeto sustem o Céu amplo de pé, com a cabeça 183 (Pindar 1997), 6, 20 184 (Homero, Homeric Hymns), 31. 185 (Platão, Timeu), 22c. 186 (Hygin, Fables), CLII e CLIV. 187 (Hesiodo, Teogonia), 746. 89 e infatigáveis braços, inabalável, onde Noite e Dia se aproximam e saúdam-se cruzando o grande umbral de bronze." Bernabé 188 observa que Δίκη πολύποινος está presente em um fragmento órfico, "Ela o seguiu de perto, de todos a protetora". E pode-se apontar alguns paralelos entre a viagem de Parmênides e a de Odisseu". Ὁδός e κέλευθος são as palavras gregas para caminho, e, segundo Mourelatos 189 , para Homero, diferentemente do sentido corrente, "is definitely one way". Odisseu 190 , da mesma forma que Parmênides, ouve da deusa dois caminhos possíveis, "But when your comrades shall have rowed past these maidens, at that point I shall no longer tell you fully on which side your course should lie, but you must yourself decide in your own heart, and I will tell you of both ways". Alguns comentadores, no entanto, afastam uma leitura mística do Proêmio. Para Táran 191 , a intenção de Parmênides não era de narrar uma viagem real, nem tampouco se tratava de uma revelação excluindo a possibilidade da existência de qualquer simbolismo, Parmênides apresenta argumentos que devem ser julgados apenas pela razão, "The fact that the goddess remains anonymous shows that she represents no religious figure at all and only stands as a literary device" 192 , e a tese final do ser parmenídico exclui a existência da deusa. Tanto a narração da viagem como a simbologia apresentada estão, para Tarán, relacionados ao "poetical medium" presentes na literatura grega da época. E segundo Barnes 193 , o Poema começa com uma alegoria, mas a sua interpretação "is for the most part of little philosophical importance". Os comentadores dividem-se quanto à identidade da deusa inominada. Para Heidegger 194 a deusa é ἀλήθεια. Para Fränkel 195 ela é a musa do Poema, a potência de verdade, conhecimento e intuição, e segundo Bernabé 196 , Parmênides "segue os hábitos da poesia religiosa mistérica, na medida em que renuncia apresentar caraterísticas, pistas da deusa". 188 (A. Bernabé, Filosofia e Mistérios: Leitura do Proêmio de Parmênides), p. 48. 189 (Mourelatos, The Route of Parmenides), p. 24. 190 (Homero, Odisseia), 12,52. 191 (Tarán, Parmenides) p. 30. 192 Idem, e conclui " But once Parmenides had decide do text express his truth as divine revelation, the natural thing to do was to use the language and meter of didactic epic" 193 (Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers), p. 156. 194 (Heidegger, Parmênides), p. 32. 195 (Fränkel, Poesía e Filosofía de la Grecia Arcaica), p. 332. 196 (Bernabé, Filosofia e Mistérios: Leitura do Proêmio de Parmênides), p. 50. 90 A total dessacralização do mundo ainda não está presente no Poema, Parmênides ainda não está preparado para conduzir sozinho esta tarefa, e será da boca da deusa inominada que o discurso será apresentado. Serão necessários muitos anos ainda para que o prisioneiro, só, sem o auxílio dos deuses, se liberte dos grilhões da caverna para ir em busca do conhecimento. Para Parmênides a verdade é uma revelação, não como um mandamento, uma ordem divina, mas para ser discernida pela razão de forma semelhante à de Heráclito 197 , "If you have heard not me but the Logos, it is wise to agree that all things are one". E o ἀγών parmenídico será uma τιτανομαχία: o κόσμος deve-se conformar com o rigor do λόγος. Vale recordar as palavras da deusa no final do Proêmio onde são apresentadas as estruturas fundamentais da epistemologia e ontologia de Parmênides: verdade e opinião, aparência e ser e que irão influenciar profundamente a filosofia; "É necessário tu tudo ouvires, por um lado da Verdade perfeitamente circular, de outro o coração intrépido dos mortais, as opiniões, para as quais não há convicção verdadeira. Mas contudo também isto aprenderás: como era necessário as coisas que aparecem realmente serem, através de tudo, tudo atravessando." 6.3 Via da Verdade 6.3.1 A tensão: ἔστινοὐκ ἔστιν Lê-se no segundo fragmento: "εἰ δ' ἄγ' ἐγὼν ἐρέω, κόμισαι δὲ σὺ μῦθον ἀκούσας, αἵπερ ὁδοὶ μοῦναι διζήσιός εἰσι νοῆσαι* ἡ μὲν ὅπως ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι, Πειθοῦς ἐστι κέλευθος (Ἀληθείηι γὰρ ὀπηδεῖ), ἡ δ' ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς χρεών ἐστι μὴ εἶναι, τὴν δή τοι φράζω παναπευθέα ἔμμεν ἀταρπόν* 197 (Diels and Kranz, Die Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker, Heraclitus), f. 50. 91 οὔτε γὰρ ἂν γνοίης τό γε μὴ ἐὸν (οὐ γὰρ ἀνυστόν) οὔτε φράσαις". Assim traduzido: "Vem, eu direi, acolhe tu a narrativa, ouvindo quais são as únicas vias de inquirição possíveis de serem pensadas, uma (afirma) que é, e que não é possível não ser, da persuasão é o caminho [à Aletheia pois acompanha]. outra (afirma) que não é, e que é necessário não ser, essa indico ser totalmente inescrutável. nem pois conheceria o não ente [pois não é atravessável] nem o expressarias." A questão fundamental do fragmento está relacionada com a interpretação de 2.3 e 2.5, onde são apresentadas as duas possibilidades de inquirição, ἡ μὲν ὅπως ἔστιν e ἡ δ' ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. Os comentadores dividem-se quanto a dois problemas: o primeiro, se há um sujeito para ἔστιν e οὐκ ἔστιν e o segundo é qual, dentre os diversos possíveis sentidos desse verbo: cópula, existencial, locativo ou veritativo, deve ser o sentido pretendido por Parmênides para ἔστιν. A maioria concorda com a existência de um sujeito não expresso para ἔστιν. Para Zeller 198 e Diels o sujeito é das Seinde, e na mesma direção, Zafiropulo 199 encontra um sujeito semelhante: l'Être. Albertelli 200 considera o sujeito como "è l'esistente, l'essere, il reale, τὸ ὄν". Cornford 201 vai além, e propõe uma emenda ao texto, introduzindo um ἐόν, traduzindo desta forma a linha, "one, that <that which is> is, and it is impossible for it not to be". Burnet 202 , traduz assim o fragmento, "the first, namely, that It is...", onde o It is se refere ao universo como um plenum. Para Verdenius 203 , Parmênides não propõe uma tese lógica, mas sim metafísica, propondo como sujeito de ἔστιν, 'Realidade', entendida no sentido de "all that exists, the total of things". Posteriormente, Verdenius 204 propôs ἀλήθεια, como sujeito da frase, não como uma categoria lógica, mas sim metafísica devendo ἀλήθεια "to be understood as the true nature of things". 198 (Zeller, Mondolfo, & Reale, Gli Eleati), p. 178; "l'essere è, il non-essere non può essere". 199 (Zafiropulo, L'École ÉLÉATE), p.132 ; "L'une selon laquelle l'Être est et le Non-êtres n'est pas". 200 (Albertelli, Gli Eelati), p. 131. 201 (Cornford, Plato and Parmenides), p. 30. 202 (Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy), p. 190. 203 (Verdemius, Parmenides B 2,3), p. 32. 204 Idem, p. 237. 92 Na tradução de Kirk, Raven e Schofield 205 , e também na versão de Gallop 206 é proposto um sujeito gramatical, "the one, that [it] is and is impossible for [it] not be". Os autores argumentam que é necessário que todo objeto de inquirição deva considerar que o objeto é ou não é. Untersteiner 207 propõe um outro sujeito, a partir da interpretação interrogativa de ὅπως, considerada por todos os comentadores anteriores em seu sentido declarativo. Nesse último caso, o sujeito de ἔστιν seria caminho, "um caminho que é" e "outro caminho que não é". Essa interpretação permite uma leitura mais integrada do Poema, onde a questão dos caminhos como metáfora é essencial para a verdade. Loenen 208 também propõe um sujeito alternativo a Das Seinde, τι, baseado em argumentos filológicos e na leitura de Górgias. Para Kahn 209 , parece não haver um sujeito gramatical, "is legitimate to suppose that Parmenides' thesis does have a logical subject", sugerindo "the object of knowing, what can be known". Outro grupo de comentadores, no entanto, opta ou por um sentido impessoal para ἔστιν, ou por uma total ausência de sujeito, ou ainda por um sentido ainda não presente e que será apresentado posteriormente. Segundo Fränkel 210 , "La afirmación 'es', en tanto que enunciado nuclear de la doctrina parmenídea, no tiene sujeto; es impersonal como 'llueve' ", justificando que ao colocar um sujeito como o ser, o ente, ou o todo, o enunciado se transforma em uma tautologia. Hölscher, em obra citada por Bernabé 211 , não admite que o grego conheça essa forma de impessoal. Calógero 212 afirma, "Ma considerar qui soggetto di tutti gli ἔστιν l'ἐόν significa aggiungere nel testo una parola qui assolutamente non vi si trova", e que ἔστιν não possui um sujeito determinado, e mantém a "indeterminação de um elemento puramente lógico e verbal de afirmação", sendo o ser de Parmênides o ser da cópula verbal. Mourelatos 213 vai além, e propõe considerar o "Parmenides' 205 (Kirk, Raven, & Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers), p. 245. 206 (Gallop, Parmenides of Elea), p. 55. 207 (Untersteiner e Reale, Eleati), p. 137. 208 (Loenen, Parmenides, Melissus, Gorgias), p. 12. 209 (Kahn, The Thesis of Parmenides), p. 710. 210 (Fränkel, Poesía e Filosofía de la Grecia Arcaica), p. 333. 211 (Bernabé, Poema, Fragmentos y tradición textual), p. 144. 212 (Calogero, Studi Sull'eleatismo), p. 21. 213 (Mourelatos, The Route of Parmenides), p. 47. 93 ἐστι as a copula, but with both the subject and the predicate-complement left blank". Barbara Cassin 214 traduz o fragmento da seguinte forma: "l'une que est et que n'est pas ne pas être" e afirma 215 "je crois essentiel de ne pas supposer d' un sujet à ce premier esti: tout un fil du poème consiste à la construire". Cordero 216 opta por traduzir εἰσι νοῆσαι em um sentido infinitivo e não como particípio passivo como a maioria dos comentadores, obtendo assim "caminhos de investigação que há para pensar" apresentando então a seguinte tradução para 2.3, "um, por um lado, <para pensar> que 'é', e que não é possível não ser", ou seja cada caminho é um caminho para pensar, sendo desnecessária a inclusão de verbos como dizer no fragmento 2.3. E afirma 217 : "não nego que exista um sujeito, mas não creio que este sujeito deva ir além das passagens em que se encontra". E quanto à significação conclui 218 , "Nas passagens do Poema nas quais o verbo aparece isolado, ou no máximo acompanhado por um sujeito, é a significação de 'estar presente', 'de existir', de 'possuir realidade efetiva' que se impõe". Na interpretação de Owen 219 , não há um sujeito expresso no fragmento, mas ele concorda, no entanto, que "no one will deny that, as the argument goes, τὸ ἐον is a correct description of the subject", e o sujeito vai aos poucos sendo revelado por Parmênides 220 , "What is declared to exist in B2 is simply what can be talked or thought about; for the proof of its existence is that, if it did not exist, it could not be talked our thought about". Frère 221 propõe, "La première voie <énonçant>: est" e O'Brien "The one <way wich tell us> that 'is'". E o sujeito, "n'est exprimé que plus tard dans le poème". E propõe também uma construção impessoal, <il est>/<il n'est pas> au sens de <il y a> e <il n'y a pas>, e considera o ἔστιν em seu sentido existencial. 214 (Cassin, Sur la nature ou sur l'etant), p. 77 . 215 Idem, p. 33. 216 (Cordero, Sendo, se é), p. 51. 217 Idem, p. 63. 218 Ib. p. 72. 219 (Owen, Logic, Science and Dialetic), p. 90. 220 Idem, p. 95. 221 (Aubenque, Études sur Parmenides), p. 16. 94 Tarán 222 concorda com Calógero e afirma que o verbo ser no fragmento deve ser entendido de forma impessoal, sem sujeito, mas o sentido é o existencial e não copulativo. Alguns autores, dentre eles Reinhardt, e Kahn 223 dentre outros, afirmam encontrar nos fragmentos 2.3 e 2.5 a formulação dos princípios fundamentais da lógica, a lei da identidade e a lei da contradição o que é questionado por Verdenius 224 , para quem isso foi alcançado a partir da tradução de "that which is is, and it is impossible for it no to be", mas a noção de "that which is is not present in the text". Melisso não aborda a questão. Em Górgias, a refutação a Parmênides é construída tanto a partir do sentido existencial do ser quanto copular: não há uma separação dessas instâncias: "E também, certamente, o não-ente não é, se, com efeito, o não-ente é, será e simultaneamente não será, pois, enquanto por um lado, como não sendo é pensado, não será, enquanto por outro, é não-ente, novamente será. Completamente absurdo o ser algo e simultaneamente não ser." Não nos parece a partir da leitura do Tratado de Górgias ou de Melisso que a questão existência-cópula tenha sido um debate relevante. Pode-se no máximo concluir que do ponto de vista ontológico, a potência predicativa do verbo ser dáse concomitantemente à existência, e que do ponto de vista lógico a existência preceda a predicação, pelo menos para efeito de argumentação. E o anúncio solene da Deusa: ἔστιν e οὐκ ἔστιν nesse estágio do argumento afasta a necessidade do sujeito: apenas a existência e a não-existência são os elementos, do ponto de vista lógico, essenciais para a formulação inaugural de Poema. E a argumentação de Parmênides dá-se de forma, dedutiva e todo o poema é a busca deste ser. Essa é a interpretação de Iglesias 225 , com a qual concordamos nesta dissertação. E acordamos também com a interpretação de Kahn 226 que identifica que a questão fundamental de Parmênides refere-se a um problema da teoria do 222 (Tarán, Parmenides), p. 36. 223 (Kahn, The Thesis of Parmenides), p. 123. 224 (Verdemius, Parmenides), p. 31. 225 (Iglésias, M.), Conversas no Bar do Planetário. 226 (Kahn, The Thesis of Parmenides), p. 706. 95 conhecimento. Será a partir dos desenvolvimentos de Melisso e Zenão que a dimensão ontológica do Poema ganhará uma maior relevância para a filosofia. E a reflexão sobre o sentido copular do verbo ser construirá o seu caminho até a formulação das categorias em Aristóteles, construindo as bases da epistemologia posterior. Em Melisso, como vimos, é da impossibilidade de geração a partir do não ser é que se deriva que o ser é eterno, e se eterno, ilimitado e se ilimitado, uno. Mas Parmênides não é o filósofo do uno 227 , mas sim do duplo, o ἐόν de Parmênides, vai se construir a partir da tensão ἔστιν e οὐκ ἔστιν, mas não é uma antinomia como as apresentadas por Heráclito, mas como um enigma que encanta os pensadores desde Platão até a contemporaneidade. 6.3.2 Ser, pensar e dizer No terceiro fragmento lê-se, "τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι" Assim traduzido, "O mesmo é para pensar e ser." Segundo Tarán 228 , essa é considerada, pela maioria dos intérpretes, a essência da filosofia de Parmênides. A questão que divide os comentadores está relacionada com as diversas possibilidades interpretativas resultantes da estrutura gramatical do fragmento: se νοεῖν e εἶναι podem ser considerados infinitivos dativos, o que permite a construção o mesmo é para pensar e ser além da tradicional tradução pensar e ser são o mesmo. No primeiro caso o mesmo é o sujeito da frase e, no outro, os verbos pensar e ser são os sujeitos da oração, e as consequências dessas escolhas têm um impacto relevante na interpretação do Poema. Segundo Verdenius 229 , "to think is the same thing as to be", onde "knowing is the same as being", concluindo assim, "I have pointed out that Parmenide's 227 Que é um atributo de Xenófanes. 228 (Tarán, Parmenides), p. 41. 229 (Verdemius, Parmenides), p. 40. 96 doctrine of knowing and being is, indeed, based on identity of reality with its faculty of knowing and with the knowledge of itself". Para Zeller, deve-se considerar os infinitivos com o valor de dativo, e o significado do fragmento seria "only that which exist, can be thought". Segundo Burnet 230 , "for it is the same thing that can be thought and that can be", e traduzindo de forma semelhante, Cornford 231 , "it is the same thing that can be thought and that can be" seguindo Zeller e lendo ἐστίν como é possível. Tarán 232 traduz da seguinte maneira: "for the same thing can be thought and can exist". Para Vlastos 233 o fragmento deve ser lido como "for to think and to be is one and the same thing", e considera que o "eleatic been is mind", apoiado nessa tradução de b3 levando também em consideração b8, 34-36. Zafiropulo 234 traduz como "car c'est la même chose qu'on peut penser e qui peut être". Em Beaufret 235 , "La même, lui, est à la fois penser et être" e Cassin 236 , "un même est en effet à la fois, penser et être". Pode-se considerar que esta seja uma leitura "idealista" do pemsamento de Parmênides, onde o real seria o pensamento. Cornford discorda da identificação entre ser e pensar, e afirma que é "nonsense in the statement that 'A exists' means the same thing as 'A thinks' e que esse conceito é totalmente estranho ao pensamento grego. Para Tarán 237 , a doutrina da identificação do ser com o pensar teria origem na filosofia de Plotino. Para Frère 238 , o fragmento deve ser lido como "C'est un seule e même chose que l'on pense et qui est", e O'Brien "For there is the same thing for being thought and for being", explicando asssim, "cet emploi <complétif> de l'infinitif (νοεῖν) admet pourtant que l'on traduise par un passif ou son équivalent <que l'on pense>, <for being thought>". O sexto fragmento é crucial para a interpretação dessa passagem, "χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ' ἐὸν ἔμμεναι* ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι, μηδὲν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν* τά σ' ἐγὼ φράζεσθαι ἄνωγα." "É necessário dizer e pensar 239 o ente ser; de fato o ser é, 230 (Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy), p. 185. 231 (Cornford, Plato and Parmenides), p. 34. 232 (Tarán, Parmenides), p. 41. 233 (Vlastos, Zafiropulo, l"école éléate), p. 168. 234 (Zafiropulo, L'École ÉLÉATE), p. 132. 235 (Beaufret, Parménide, Le Poem), p. 79. 236 (Cassin, Sur la nature ou sur l'etant), p. 79. 237 (Tarán, Parmenides), p. 198. 238 (Aubenque, Études sur Parmenides), p. 19. 239 Pensamento como continente. 97 mas nada não é; isto eu te ordeno refletir." Segundo Cordero 240 , há que se fazer uma correção no texto grego, a partícula demonstrativa τε em τε νοεῖν, substituiu a original, o artigo τὸ, a partir da leitura de Karsten e Brandis, apesar ter sido transmitida como τὸ de forma unânime pelos manuscritos de Simplício. Diels, considerando o τε demonstrativo 241 traduziu, "é necessário dizer e pensar que só existe o Ente"; e de forma semelhante Zafiropulo 242 , "Il convient de dire e de penser que l"Être toujours existe". Beaufret "nécessaire est ceci: dire e penser de l'étant l'être; il est en effet l'être, l'néant au contraire n'est pas". Para um outro grupo de comentadores o que pode ser pensado e dito deve existir, precisa ser um objeto real. Cornford 243 , traduz como "What can be spoken of and thought must be", Burnet 244 , "It needs must be that what can thought and spoken of is", Kirk and Raven 245 , "What is there to be said and thought must needs be: for it is there for being, but nothing is not". Owen 246 adota mesma tradução de Burnet. Para Verdenius 247 , a construção τὸ λέγειν ἐὸν traduzida como "o que pode ser dito" não estaria correta do ponto de vista gramatical. Albertelli 248 assim lê o fragmento, "Bisogna che il dire e il pensare sia l'essere: è dato infatti essere, mentre nulla non è". Loenen 249 traduz "speak and ηοεῐν must be something that is; for it can be but what is not cannot". Frankel 250 "Es necesario se afirmar y pensar lo que es; pues hay ser, pero nada, no es". "Untersteiner 251 , "di necessità segue che esiste el dire (logicamente) e l'intuire l'essere". Táran considera τὸ λέγειν e τε νοεῖν infinivos e ἔμμεναι como complemento, traduzindo assim: "Its necessary to say and to think Being, for there is Being". E 240 (Cordero, Sendo, se é), p. 107. 241 (Diels, Parmenides Lehrgedicht), "dies ist nötig zu sagen und denken dass nur das Seinde existiert". 242 (Zafiropulo, L'École ÉLÉATE), p. 132. 243 (Cornford, Plato and Parmenides), p. 31. 244 (Burnet, Early Greek Philosphy), p. 185. 245 (Kirk, Raven, & Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers), p. 247. 246 (Owen, Logic, Science and Dialetic), p. 94. 247 (Verdemius, Parmenides), p. 36. 248 (Albertelli, Gli Eleati), p. 135. 249 (Loenen, Parmenides, Melissus, Gorgias), p. 38. 250 (Fränkel, Poesía e Filosofía de la Grecia Arcaica), p. 334. 251 (Untersteiner e Reale, Eleati), p. 185. 98 Cassin 252 assim traduz, "voici ce qu'il est besoin de dire et penser: est en étant, car est être, mais rien n'est pas". Alguns comentadores como Calogero, Zafiropulo, Kirk, Raven e Schofield, dentre outros, em 6.2, atribuem para ἔστι um sentido potencial, é possível, não é possível. Mas essa hipótese da tradução tem o inconveniente de considerar que em Parmênides o ser pode ser uma possibilidade. Frère 253 , traduz como "Il faut dire e penser ceci: l'être est; car il est possible d'être, e il n'est pas possible que <soit> ce que n'est rien", considerando os dois infinitos, τὸ λέγειν e τε νοεῖν, e a partícula demonstrativa τ', anunciando a proposição, ἐὸν (particípio) e ἔμμεναι (infinitivo), onde o partícipio é "le sujet d'un emploi existential du verbe, l'être est", devendo essa construção, segundo o autor, ser considerada como um emprego impessoal do verbo pessoal. Outro ponto digno de nota nesse fragmento é a apresentação do sujeito parmenídico: τ' ἐὸν ἔμμεναι, interpretado pela maioria dos comentadores em seu sentido existencial. Há que se considerar que o poema é um hexâmetro dactílico, que apresenta a seguinte estrutura: χρὴ τὸ λέ/γειν τε νο/εῖν// τ' ἐὸν/ ἔμμεναι/* ἔστι γὰρ/ εἶναι; dois dátilos, um espondeu, dois dátilos finalizando com um troqueu, na forma uu|-uu|-- |-uu|-uu|-x. Assim a forma poética do texto de Parmênides é um elemento importante na escolha das formas utilizadas do verbo ser, particípio e infinitivo e indicativo, e dos dialetos (ἔμμεναι), fragilizando ainda mais as hipóteses baseadas em escolhas semânticas. Considerando a paráfrase de Simplício, atribuída a Melisso conforme hipótese de Reale, "se certamente nada é, o que poderia ser dito sobre isso como se algo fosse?", e inferindo-se a sua construção a partir do fragmento 6.1, onde nada pode ser dito do que não é, nos leva a leitura onde é a partir da existência do ser que existe o pensar e o dizer. Na formulação de Melisso não se confundem ser e pensar. E na argumentação de Górgias há uma clara separação entre ser, pensar e dizer, "Três pontos principais dispõem: de fato e primeiro que nada é, segundo que mesmo se é, inapreensível para o homem, terceiro, 252 (Cassin, Sur la nature ou sur l'etant), p.81. 253 (Aubenque, Études sur Parmenides), p.24. 99 mesmo se apreensível, sem dúvida é incomunicável e inexplicável para alguém." 6.3.3 Uma terceira Via? No sexto e sétimo fragmentos, Parmênides trata da terceira via, "πρώτης γάρ σ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ ταύτης διζήσιος <εἴργω>, αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ' ἀπὸ τῆς, ἣν δὴ βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδὲν πλάττονται, δίκρανοι* ἀμηχανίη γὰρ ἐν αὐτῶν στήθεσιν ἰθύνει πλακτὸν νόον* οἱ δὲ φοροῦνται κωφοὶ ὁμῶς τυφλοί τε, τεθηπότες, ἄκριτα φῦλα, οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταὐτὸν νενόμισται κοὐ ταὐτόν, πάντων δὲ παλίντροπός ἐστι κέλευθος." "οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῆι εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα* ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα μηδέ σ' ἔθος πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω, νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουήν καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγωι πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα." Assim traduzidos: "pois dessa primeira via de inquirição, <impeço-te>, e também então, dessa que os mortais que nada sabem forjam bicéfalos; pois a impotência em seu peito dirige o pensamento errante; e eles são levados aqui e ali, surdos e igualmente cegos, estupefatos, tribo incapaz de discernir para os quais o ser e o não ser como o mesmo são considerados, e não o mesmo, de todos é o caminho que retorna a si mesmo." "Pois jamais se imponha isto: os não-entes, serem. Mas tu, dessa via de inquirição, afasta o pensamento, nem a ti, o hábito muito experimentado por essa via constranja mover olhos sem escopo, e ecoante ouvido e língua, mas discerne por meio da razão o argumento muito controverso 254 . por mim falado." Optou-se por agrupar, apenas para efeitos de análise, o restante do sexto com o sétimo fragmento, como proposto por Diels e Verdenius 255 , dentre outros, porque há uma importante conexão temática. A principal questão que surge entre os comentadores está relacionada à qual via se refere o fragmento 6.3: se é à via 254 Refutado. 255 (Verdemius, Parmenides), p. 32. 100 do não ser ou se existe uma terceira via, que Cornford 256 denomina de Way of Seeming. Diels faz uma emenda ao texto, devido a uma lacuna, propondo acrescentar <εἴργω>, impeço-te, o que é aceito pela maior parte dos intérpretes. Assim, a partir da exclusão das vias do ser (6.1) e do não ser (6.2), a leitura do restante do fragmento pode conduzir à interpretação de que Parmênides propõe uma terceira via. Essa leitura é reforçada pela tradução de πλάττονται, por erram: "e também então, a partir daquela que os mortais que nada sabem erram...". A maioria dos intérpretes concorda com essa interpretação, Cornford 257 propõe "But secondly (I hold you back) from the way whereon mortals who know nothing wander, two-headed", Tarán 258 sugere "but also from this, on which mortals who know nothing wander, double-headed", Cassin 259 traduz como "et puis après, c'est de celle où errent sans rien savoir les mortels à deux têtes", Conche 260 traduz, "mais ensuite de cette autre aussi sur laquelle errent les mortels, qui ne savent rien, têtes-doubles". Segundo Fränkel 261 "Pero también del que vagabundean los mortales ignorantes, de cabeza doble", e Albertelli 262 "eppoi inoltre da quella per la quale mortali che nulla sanno vanno errando, gente dalla doppia testa", segundo Untersteiner 263 "ma poi anche da quella ove uomini che nulla sanno si sbandano: uomini com due teste!", a tradução de Burnet é "and from this other also, upon which mortals knowing naught wander two-faced". Para Zafiropulo 264 , esta terceria via é a da δόξα, independente da via do ser e do não ser e que será explorada na parte final do Poema. Tarán 265 , no entanto, afirma que "is not a construction of Parmenides himself, nor is the way of the δόξα". Alguns intérpretes encontram no fragmento uma alusão ao heraclitismo, "para os quais o ser e o não ser como o mesmo são considerados, e não o 256 (Cornford, Plato and Parmenides), as demais ele denomina de Way of Truth and Way of NotBeing, p. 31. 257 Idem, p. 32 258 (Tarán, Parmenides), p. 54. 259 (Cassin, Sur la nature ou sur l'etant), p. 81. 260 (Conche, Parménide), p. 101. 261 (Fränkel, Poesía e Filosofía de la Grecia Arcaica), p. 334. 262 (Albertelli, Gli Eelati), p. 135. 263 (Untersteiner and Reale, Eleati), p. 357. 264 (Zafiropulo, L'École ÉLÉATE), p. 103. 265 (Tarán, Parmenides), p. 65. 101 mesmo". Burnet 266 sugere que πάντων δὲ παλίντροπος deva ser entendido como o equivalente ao ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω de Heráclito. Frère traduz como "je t'écarte, ensuite de cette autre aussi, celle que façonnent les mortels, qui ne savent rien, créatures à deux têtes", optando por traduzir πλάττονται por façonnent. Na tradução proposta nesta dissertação, de forma semelhante a Frère, optou-se por forjar ao invés de errar. A Deusa impede o acesso à via de inquirição do não ser: é impensável e inominável. Mas também proíbe o acesso à via forjada pelos mortais que nada sabem (βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδεν), Parmênides, no entanto, é o mortal que sabe. Essa oposição entre iniciado e não iniciado acredita Cornford 267 que tenha alguma referência à literatura de revelação mística. O que eles não sabem é claramente expresso: "para os quais o ser e o não ser como o mesmo são considerados, e não o mesmo". São assim apenas duas vias propostas pela deusa, a do ser e a do não ser, são os mortais que criam a "terceira via", pois são cegos e surdos, pois confundem πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι, confundem "nascer e perecer, ser e também não, e de lugar mudar, a cor luminosa trocar" 268 . São incapazes de discernir, ἄκριτα φῦλα, mas Parmênides é instado a discernir com a razão, κρῖναι δὲ λόγωι. Os βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδεν não apenas confundem ser e não ser como também movem os olhos sem escopo, e o ouvido a língua são ecoantes. E se seguirmos os sentidos seremos obrigados a admitir a existência das coisas que não existem, do mundo fenomênico. Há que discernir apenas com a razão. Para Melisso, conforme discutido, os sentidos nos enganam, "não corretamente víamos", nem "aquelas coisas parecem ser". Para Górgias, no entanto, é apenas através dos sentidos que podemos ter acesso ao ser. 266 (Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy), p. 174. 267 (Cornford, Plato and Parmenides), p. 32. 268 (Diels and Kranz, Die Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker, Parmênides), fragmento oitavo. 102 6.3.4 As qualidades do ser "μόνος δ' ἔτι μῦθος ὁδοῖο λείπεται ὡς ἔστιν* ταύτηι δ' ἐπὶ σήματ' ἔασι πολλὰ μάλ', ὡς ἀγένητον ἐὸν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν, ἐστι γὰρ οὐλομελές τε καὶ ἀτρεμὲς ἠδ' ἀτέλεστον* οὐδέ ποτ' ἦν οὐδ' ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν, ἕν, συνεχές." Assim traduzido: "ademais resta uma única palavra da via, (afirma) que é; e sobre (ela) os sinais são muitos que sendo 269 ingênito e imperecível é, é agora pois inteiro, único, imóvel e sem fim, nem uma vez foi nem será, pois é agora todo junto, uno, contínuo." Tarán 270 traduz o 8.1 e 8.2 como "There is a solitary word still left to say of a way: exists", e também Frère 271 , consistente com a formulação impessoal discutida em 2.3, apresenta "Il ne reste plus qu'une seule parole, celle de la voie <énnonçant>: est", e Cassin 272 "Seul reste donc le récit de voie <est>". No entanto, construindo de forma diferente, Cornford 273 : "There is only one Way left to be spoken of, namely 'It is'", e Burnet 274 : "One path is left to us to speak of, namely, that It is". A diferença da tradução encontrada entre os principais comentadores está relacionada com aplicação de μόνος ou se referindo a μῦθος ou a ὁδοῖο, ou seja se o caminho é único ou a palavra é solitária. No entanto, em ambos os casos, as interpretações do fragmento apresentadas pelos especialistas é consistente com o que foi discutido anteriormente em 2.3. 269 Optou-se pela forma de gerúndio do verbo ao invés do habitual ente 270 (Tarán, Parmenides), p. 89. 271 (Aubenque, 1987), p. 32. 272 (Cassin, Sur la nature ou sur l'etant), p. 85. 273 (Cornford, Plato and Parmenides), p. 35. 274 (Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy), p. 174. 103 A tradução de ἐὸν dentro do fragmento ὡς ἀγένητον ἐὸν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν, no entanto, merece algumas considerações. Tarán 275 traduz por Being, Burnet 276 e Cornford 277 , what is, Zafiropulo 278 l'Être, Cordeiro 279 o que está sendo. Cassin 280 , no entanto, preferiu tratar ἐὸν não como o sujeito parmênidico mas em sua função verbal "en étant sans naissance et sans trépas", de forma semelhante, Frère 281 "étant inengendré, il est aussi impérissable". Adotou-se, na tradução proposta, a opção pela função verbal e não como sujeito para ἐὸν, consistente com a hipótese de que o tema principal de Parmênides não é um ser, mas as consequências do caminho do ἔστιν. Outro ponto digno de nota é a apresentação no Poema da estrutura ἀγένητον-ἀνώλεθρόν (afastando, dessa maneira, princípio e fim) e que foi a base para toda a dedução apresentada por Melisso, diferentemente do ἔστιν e οὐκ ἔστιν que é o ponto central do argumento de Parmênides. Lê-se então, a partir de Melisso, que a qualidade da imperecibilidade é consequência direta do fato de não ter sido gerado. Da não geração advém também as demais propriedades, infinito (no tempo e no espaço), inteiro, único, imóvel e sem fim. Quanto a ἠδ' ἀτέλεστον, tendo como fonte Simplício, que é o texto base escolhido pela maioria dos comentadores, adota-se o significado de sem fim (sentido temporal). Cassin 282 , segue Brandis que propôs emendar o texto, οὐδ ἀτέλεστον, e traduzindo como "et non déporvu de fin". Tarán entende que a infinitude está expressa, em ἀγένητον e ἀνώλεθρον, emendando o texto: ἠδὲ τέλεστον, traduzindo por complete. Para Melisso, como vimos, é ἀτέλεστον é ἄπειρον, ilimitado, temporal e espacialmente. Parmênides apresenta neste fragmento os sinais da via, havendo que se considerar, inicialmente, que não há consenso entre os comentadores quanto ao 275 (Tarán, Parmenides), p. 85. 276 (Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy), p. 174. 277 (Cornford, Plato and Parmenides), p. 35. 278 (Zafiropulo, L'École ÉLÉATE), p. 134. 279 (Cordero, Sendo, se é), p. 232. 280 (Cassin, Sur la nature ou sur l'etant), p. 85. 281 (Aubenque, Études sur Parmenides), p. 34. 282 (Cassin, Sur la nature ou sur l'etant), p. 85. 104 texto base: a utilização de οὖλον μουνογενές da versão de Simplício ou μοῦνόν <τ'> οὐλομελές da versão de Proclus ou ἔστι γὰρ οὐλομελές da versão de Plutarco. Há três vertentes interpretativas que devem ser consideradas, dentro do primeiro grupo temos Tarán 283 , "that Being is ungenerated and imperishable, whole, unique, immovable, and complete", e Cornford 284 ,dentre outros, "that what is is unborn and imperishable, whole, unique, and immovable, and without end (in time)". Compondo o segundo grupo temos Frère "étant inengendré, il est aussi impérissable, unique et entier en sa membrure, ainsi que sans frémissement et sans terme". Cassin 285 , "en étant sans naissance et sans trépas il est, entier, seul de sa race, sans tremblement et non dépourvu de fin". Kirk and Raven 286 , "that being uncreated and imperishable it is, whole and of a single kind and unshaken and perfect". Para Frankel 287 "no nace, tampouco perece, pues es entero, inmóvil e infinito(?)". No terceiro grupo, Burnet 288 traduz, na tradição de Plutarco, como "is uncreated and indestructible, alone, complete, imovable and without end" preferindo a forma ἔστι γὰρ οὐλομελές, afirmando que a forma μουνογενές seria um anacronismo e teria sido uma confusão do copista com o Timeu 289 . Diels preferiu οὖλον μουνογενές até a quarta edição e a partir de Kranz a quinta edição do Vorskratiker passou a adotar a versão ἐστι γὰρ οὐλομελές. Untersteiner 290 também adota essa versão, "è, infatti, un tutto nella sua strutura, immobile, prive de fine temporale". Considerando que Simplício é a fonte mais importante para esta dissertação e cita οὖλον μουνογενές em três passagens diferentes nos seus Comentários à Física optou-se por traduzir como inteiro e único, que afasta a implicação de οὐλομελές que compreende partes, e a sua consequente propriedade de ser divisível. 283 (Tarán, Parmenides), p. 85. 284 (Cornford Plato and Parmenides), p. 36. 285 (Cassin, Sur la nature ou sur l'etant), p. 85. 286 (Kirk, Raven, & Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers), p. 248. 287 (Fränkel, Poesía e Filosofía de la Grecia Arcaica), p. 335. 288 (Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy), p.185. 289 "ἀλλ εἷς ὅδε μονογενὴς οὐρανὸς γεγονὼς ἔστι τε καὶ ἔτ ἔσται"; "but there is and will continue to be this one generated Heaven, unique of its kind", (Platão, Timeu), b31. 290 (Untersteiner & Reale, Eleati), p. 367. 105 O último fragmento deste bloco, "οὐδέ ποτ' ἦν οὐδ' ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν, ἕν, συνεχές", já foi objeto de discussão quando foi apresentado o fragmento correspondente em Melisso. Vale lembrar, no entanto, que a leitura deve ser feita agrupando ἕν, συνεχές ao verso anterior: "nem uma vez foi, nem será, pois é todo junto, uno, contínuo", e é a primeira vez em que a qualidade ἕν é apresentada no Poema. É a partir do uno que Platão condensou todo o bloco do eleatismo 291 , buscando inclusive o apoio em Xenófanes. Cordero 292 argumenta que tal possibilidade só existe se pensarmos que a existência em Parmênides fosse pensada como uma característica comum a todos os seres, "o singular substitui o plural: a reflexão sobre τὸ ὄν substitui a questão clássica acerca de τὰ ὅντα ". O Poema prossegue: "τίνα γὰρ γένναν διζήσεαι αὐτοῦ; πῆι πόθεν αὐξηθέν; οὐδ' ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος ἐάσσω φάσθαι σ' οὐδὲ νοεῖν* οὐ γὰρ φατὸν οὐδὲ νοητόν ἔστιν ὅπως οὐκ ἔστι. τί δ' ἄν μιν καὶ χρέος ὦρσεν ὕστερον ἢ πρόσθεν, τοῦ μηδενὸς ἀρξάμενον, φῦν; οὕτως ἢ πάμπαν πελέναι χρεών ἐστιν ἢ οὐχί. οὐδέ ποτ' ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος ἐφήσει πίστιος ἰσχύς γίγνεσθαί τι παρ' αὐτό* τοῦ εἵνεκεν οὔτε γενέσθαι οὔτ' ὄλλυσθαι ἀνῆκε Δίκη χαλάσασα πέδηισιν, ἀλλ' ἔχει* ἡ δὲ κρίσις περὶ τούτων ἐν τῶιδ' ἔστιν* ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν* κέκριται δ' οὖν, ὥσπερ ἀνάγκη, τὴν μὲν ἐᾶν ἀνόητον ἀνώνυμον (οὐ γὰρ ἀληθής ἔστιν ὁδός), τὴν δ' ὥστε πέλειν καὶ ἐτήτυμον εἶναι. πῶς δ' ἂν ἔπειτ' ἀπόλοιτο ἐόν; πῶς δ' ἄν κε γένοιτο; εἰ γὰρ ἔγεντ', οὐκ ἔστ(ι), οὐδ' εἴ ποτε μέλλει ἔσεσθαι. τὼς γένεσις μὲν ἀπέσβεσται καὶ ἄπυστος ὄλεθρος." "pois que origem dele investigarias? Como e de onde tendo crescido? nem a partir do não ente permitirei tu dizeres nem pensares, pois não é dizível nem pensável: que não é. E que necessidade o teria incitado a surgir (crescido), antes ou depois, tendo começado do nada? Assim é necessário ou completamente ser ou não ser. Tampouco do não-ente, a força da convicção permitirá nascer algo próximo a ele, pois, nem nascer nem perecer permite Dike, relaxando os grilhões mas o retém. A decisão sobre estas coisas está nisto: ou é ou não é, e já esta decidido, como é necessário, deixar uma, impensável e inominável (pois não verdadeira é a via) E a outra de modo a ser, certa ser. Como em seguida poderia perecer, o que é? Como poderia ter nascido? Pois, se nasceu não é, nem se alguma vez há de ser, não é. 291 (Platão, Sofista), 242d. 292 (Cordero, Sendo, se é ), p. 209. 106 Deste modo a gênesis fica extinta e inaudita sua destruição." Parmênides, após afirmar que o ser é ingênito e imperecível, e sem fim (no tempo) examina agora a questão da geração a partir de duas questões: como e de onde teria crescido e que necessidade o teria incitado a crescer. A impossibilidade da geração a partir do μὴ ἐόντος é definitiva, já que este não pode ser pensado nem tampouco dito, e que é a base da argumentação de Melisso discutida na Paráfrase de Simplício. Parmênides diz que "é necessário ou completamente ser ou não ser", Melisso diz "pois não é possível ser sempre o que não é tudo". Tarán 293 aponta uma incongruência no texto: οὐδέ ποτ' ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος ἐφήσει πίστιος ἰσχύς, γίγνεσθαί τι παρ' αὐτό, que pode ser interpretado que a partir do μὴ ἐόντος não pode ser gerado algo que o não ser, o que seria um absurdo. A questão está relacionada com a tradução de τι παρ' αὐτό, que pode ter um sentido comparativo ou um sentido local. Temos em Burnet 294 um sentido comparativo, onde παρ' αὐτό significa outra coisa que ele mesmo, "nor will the force of truth suffer aught to arise besides itself from that which is not" e de forma semelhante é a proposta de Cassin 295 , "jamais non plus à partir d'un non-étant la force de la cryoance ne fera provenir quelque chose de plus que lui". Na leitura de Cornford 296 temos "nor will the force of belief suffer to arise out of what is not something over and above it (viz. What is)", onde παρ' αὐτό significa alongside of what is, e de maneira semelhante é proposto em Kirk e Raven 297 , "now will the force of conviction allow anything besides it to come to be ever from not being", onde παρ' αὐτό é traduzido por besides it. Zafiropulo 298 propõe "jamais non plus la puissance des règles ne permettra que du Non-étre quelque chose naisse à ses côtés". Nos três casos apresentados temos um sentido local para τι παρ' αὐτό. Conche 299 propõe uma correção no texto, retirando o μὴ de ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος, assim traduzindo o fragmento, "jamais non plus la force de la conviction n'admettra que, de l'être, puisse naître quelque chose à côté de lui". A solução 293 (Tarán, Parmenides), p. 94. 294 (Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy), p. 175 295 (Cassin, Sur la nature ou sur l'etant), p. 87. 296 (Cornford, Plato and Parmenides), p. 37. 297 (Kirk, Raven, & Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers), p. 250. 298 (Zafiropulo, L'École ÉLÉATE), p. 136. 299 (Conche, Parménide), p. 143. 107 proposta por Tarán 300 é semelhante "nor will the force of conviction permit anything to come to be beyond itself" e da mesma maneira procede Frère 301 "la force de la conviction n'admettra pas non plus qu'à aucun moment, de l'être vienne au jour quelque chose à côté de lui". É Díke, no entanto, que impede que algo nasça ou pereça a partir do não ser. E a decisão, krísis, está em ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, e segundo Parmênides a decisão já está tomada: deixar uma via impensável e inominável, ἀνόητον e ἀνώνυμον e esta via não é verdadeira e vale destacar que Parmênides repete duas vezes a palavra decisão. Díke 302 é a "personification of human law made concrete in legal pronouncements", e "in Lower Italy vase imagery she is depicted with a sword among the punishing powers of the Underworld". Sófocles 303 diz "nem foi a Justiça que vive com os deuses de abaixo que estabeleceu tais leis entre os homens". Segundo Hesíodo, é filha de Zeus e Thémis, estando sempre associada à figura de Zeus garantidor da ordem cósmica. E continua o Poema: "οὐδὲ διαιρετόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἐστιν ὁμοῖον* οὐδέ τι τῆι μᾶλλον, τό κεν εἴργοι μιν συνέχεσθαι, οὐδέ τι χειρότερον, πᾶν δ' ἔμπλεόν ἐστιν ἐόντος. τῶι ξυνεχὲς πᾶν ἐστιν* ἐὸν γὰρ ἐόντι πελάζει. αὐτὰρ ἀκίνητον μεγάλων ἐν πείρασι δεσμῶν ἔστιν ἄναρχον ἄπαυστον, ἐπεὶ γένεσις καὶ ὄλεθρος τῆλε μάλ' ἐπλάχθησαν, ἀπῶσε δὲ πίστις ἀληθής. ταὐτόν τ' ἐν ταὐτῶι τε μένον καθ' ἑαυτό τε κεῖται χοὔτως ἔμπεδον αὖθι μένει* κρατερὴ γὰρ Ἀνάγκη πείρατος ἐν δεσμοῖσιν ἔχει, τό μιν ἀμφὶς ἐέργει, οὕνεκεν οὐκ ἀτελεύτητον τὸ ἐὸν θέμις εἶναι* ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιδευές* [μὴ] ἐὸν δ' ἂν παντὸς ἐδεῖτο." "Nem divisível é, porque é inteiramente semelhante; Nem algo maior aqui que impediria de manter-se unido, nem algo menor, mas inteiramente pleno de ente é. Por isso inteiramente contínuo é, pois o ente toca no ente. ademais, imóvel, nos limites dos poderosos grilhões é sem começo e sem fim, porque a gênese e a destruição muito longe erram, e [as] rechaça a convicção verdadeira. permanecendo o mesmo no mesmo, por si mesmo repousa, E assim firme neste lugar mesmo permanece; pois a poderosa Necessidade nos grilhões do limite o retém, que todo entorno o prende. Porque não está permitido ser inacabado o ente; é pois não carente; sendo, de tudo careceria." 300 (Tarán, Parmenides), p. 85. 301 (Aubenque, Études sur Parmenides), p. 36. 302 (H. & Schneider, 2004), p. 415. 303 (Sófocles, Antigona), 451 108 Parmênides deduz logicamente as qualidades do ser anteriormente apresentadas, a partir do binômio ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν. Por ser homogêneo é indivisível. Para Owen 304 , são a indivisibilidade e a homogeneidade que provam a unicidade do ser de Parmênides. Cornford 305 , por sua vez, acredita que a unicidade é uma premissa para a qual não há prova no Poema. Em Melisso, do infinito derivou-se a unicidade e dela a homogeneidade. Kirk 306 questiona se não se pode concluir que toda a realidade em Parmênides seja una? Esta seria a leitura platônica como exposta no Sofista? Mas a homogeneidade afasta totalmente a possibilidade de que exista a multiplicidade, é um uno homogêneo e contínuo. Não sendo maior nem menor o que impediria a continuidade é pleno. E como o que é toca no que é tem que ser contínuo, o que, para Cornford 307 , é uma resposta à doutrina pitagórica segundo a qual o ar separa os corpos sólidos. A leitura do fragmento parece indicar que Parmênides esteja se referindo às características, físicas, materiais e espaciais do ser. Para Tarán, no entanto, "does not refer to material division but is an ontological predicate of what exists", a indivisibilidade está relacionada com o fato de que não há diferença "in what exists, so nothing can be distinguished inside Being". E da mesma maneira a continuidade deve ser entendida não como uma característica física "but only as the equal intensity of Being is always and everywhere". Segundo Cherniss 308 , Aristóteles construiu a sua crítica ao ser de Parmênides e de Melisso a partir das suas propriedades físicas, enquanto que Platão estruturou a sua desconstrução a partir de um plano lógico. Isso não significa para Cherniss que Aristóteles não tenha desconsiderado a dimensão lógica da questão, "Metaphysics 986 B 18 ff. shows that Aristotle felt Parmenides may have had something more than a pure logical theory in mind". A plenitude do ser rechaça também a possibilidade do movimento pelo menos na dimensão espacial. Não há espaço para onde o ser possa se mover, já que o vazio é não ser. 304 (Owen, Logic, Science and Dialetic), p. 92. 305 (Cornford, Plato and Parmenides), p. 35. 306 (Kirk, Raven and Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers), p. 261. 307 (Cornford, Plato and Parmenides), p. 40. 308 (Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy), p. 65-66. 109 Vale lembrar que a questão da plenitude pode ser uma referência à tese de Anaxímenes onde os seres são compostos por diversos degraus de concentração de ar (rarefação e condensação). Por estar contido nos grilhões é limitado, a convicção rechaça o que não tenha começo nem fim, θέμις obriga que ele seja acabado, não pode ser carente porque de tudo careceria e a Ἀνάγκη o mantém nos grilhões do limite. Hesíodo 309 em sua descrição do Tártaro apresenta a mesma noção de limite, "that is where the sources and limits of dark earth are and the murky Tartarus". E como não é inacabado, afasta-se também a mudança qualitativa. Assim o ser de Parmênides é imóvel tanto quanto ao deslocamento, como vimos, quanto a mudança qualitativa. Segundo Tarán 310 , "for Parmenides and his contemporaries, instead, change implied motion and vice versa, therefore κίνησις for Parmenides covers what we call locomotion and change". A inexistência da mudança qualitativa encontra o seu suporte na impossibilidade de ser gerado e perecer, e a impossibilidade do movimento está referendada na plenitude do ser. A inexistência do vazio, como vimos, foi uma inovação de Melisso. A imobilidade do ser de Parmênides é mantida nos limites por grilhões controlados pela Ἀνάγκη da mesma maneira que a Δίκη o mantém nos grilhões impedindo a geração e o perecer. Heidel 311 aponta que a expressão πίστις ἀληθής refere-se a"an action at law in which the issue is sharply drawn and judgment is redered", e que Parmênides teria empregado a terminologia da retórica forense"sending γένεσις καὶ ὄλεθρος into banishment". Percebe-se que a estrutura argumentativa de Parmênides pode ter sofrido a influência não apenas do pitagorismo como também da prática forense. E o fragmento oitavo continua. "ταὐτὸν δ' ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὕνεκεν ἔστι νόημα. οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ ἐόντος, ἐν ὧι πεφατισμένον ἐστιν, εὑρήσεις τὸ νοεῖν* οὐδὲν γὰρ <ἢ> ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται ἄλλο πάρεξ τοῦ ἐόντος, ἐπεὶ τό γε Μοῖρ' ἐπέδησεν οὖλον ἀκίνητόν τ' ἔμεναι*τῶι πάντ' ὄνομ(α) ἔσται, ὅσσα βροτοὶ κατέθεντο πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ, γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ ὄλλυσθαι, εἶναί τε καὶ οὐχί, 309 (Hesíodo, Teogonia), 736. 310 (Tarán, Parmenides), p. 110. 311 (Heidel, On Certain Fragments of Pre-Socratics), p. 717-719. 110 καὶ τόπον ἀλλάσσειν διά τε χρόα φανὸν ἀμείβειν." "Pois o mesmo é pensar e aquilo por que o pensamento é. Certamente sem o ente, no qual está expresso, não encontrarás o pensar; nada outro, de fato, (ou) é ou será fora do ente, porque a Moira o forçou inteiro, imóvel ser; por isto tudo nome será quanto os mortais instituíram, convictos de ser verdadeiro, ser gerado e perecer, ser e também não (ser), e de lugar mudar, cor luminosa trocar." Parmênides reforça a relação entre o pensamento e o ser como já visto nos fragmentos analisados anteriormente. Não existe o pensamento sem o objeto do pensamento, i.e., o ser. Este tema, vale lembrar foi objeto dos questionamentos de Górgias, onde o pensamento é outro do ser. Mais uma vez é afirmada a impossibilidade de existência fora do ser, já que ele é οὖλον, ἀκίνητόν e foi a Μοῖρα que o forçou a ser assim. Se ele é inteiro, e imóvel nada pode ser fora dele. E quanto à imobilidade vale a referência a Xenófanes 312 que afirma da divindade, "He always abide in the same place not moving at all". Nesta passagem para Tarán 313 , encontra-se não apenas a prova da unicidade do ser de Parmênides como também o argumento que rechaça a identidade entre ser e pensar proposta por alguns comentadores "on the assumption that nothing can be differentiated in what exists it would have been impossible for Parmenides to assert that Being is thought, since thought would imply difference". O nomear seria realizado pelos mortais a partir da convicção de que seriam verdadeiros, o gerar/perecer, o ser e o não ser, o trocar de lugar, o mudar de cor, ou seja os nomes seriam apenas convenções de um mundo com aparência de realidade, seriam na expressão de Tarán 314 "empty names". São convictos de que seja verdadeiro "ser e também não (ser)", que é uma referência ao caminho anteriormente discutido forjado pelos mortais. A questão dos nomes também foi abordada por Górgias, mas dentro da argumentação de que o nome é outro do ser. E será no Sofista que a relação entre discurso falso e verdadeiro e o ser e não ser será ainda mais bem elaborada. 312 (Diels and Kranz, Die Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker, Parmênides), fragmento 26. 313 (Tarán, Parmenides), p. 140. 314 ídem p. 141 111 Cornford 315 , considera um sujeito implícito, τὸ ἐόν, como sujeito para nomes, "Therefore all those things will be a mere word--all the things that mortals have laid down believing that they are true, namely, that it [ἐόν] becomes and perishes, both is and is not, and changes place, and interchanges bright colour". Em Melisso a questão da mudança de lugar foi mais aprofundada, tornando-se o padrão do eleatismo, onde ele aponta a necessidade da existência do vazio (não ser) para viabilizar o movimento enquanto deslocamento e criando as bases para o atomismo posterior. Em Parmênides o único discurso possível é sobre o ser. Será Platão, no Sofista, que desenvolverá a questão da relação entre o discurso falso e verdadeiro, e a questão do ser e do não ser, já a partir da influência da sofística, e é razoável supor de Górgias. Melisso, nos fragmentos sétimo e oitavo, faz referência a esta passagem quando fala da existência da terra, água, ar e fogo, o negro e o branco, da mudança de lugar, "e outras coisas que afirma o homem serem verdadeiras" e conclui "de modo que ocorre nem vermos nem conhecermos as coisas que são". E o fragmento prossegue, "αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πεῖρας πύματον, τετελεσμένον ἐστί πάντοθεν, εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκωι, μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλὲς πάντηι* τὸ γὰρ οὔτε τι μεῖζον οὔτε τι βαιότερον πελέναι χρεόν ἐστι τῆι ἢ τῆι. οὔτε γὰρ οὐκ ἐὸν ἔστι, τό κεν παύοι μιν ἱκνεῖσθαι εἰς ὁμόν, οὔτ' ἐὸν ἔστιν ὅπως εἴη κεν ἐόντος τῆι μᾶλλον τῆι δ' ἧσσον, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἐστιν ἄσυλον* οἷ γὰρ πάντοθεν ἶσον, ὁμῶς ἐν πείρασι κύρει." "mas porque (há) um limite extremo, completo é em todas as direções, semelhante a um corpo de uma esfera bem circular do centro, equidistante, por todas as direções, pois nem algo maior nem algo menor é necessário ser aqui ou ali. Pois nem o não-ente é, de modo que o impediria de alcançar à semelhança, nem o ente é, de modo que seria aqui mais, ali menos do que o ente, porque é todo inviolável. 315 (Corford, Parmenides's Two Ways), p. 100. 112 Pois em todas as direções, igual, semelhante em seus limites encontra-se." É a existência de um limite externo que justifica a completude do ser que é esférico, e observa Burnet 316 , "it's equally real in every direction, and the sphere is the only form that meets this condition". Foi também a forma esférica escolhida pelo demiurgo no Timeu 317 "Portanto modelou-o na forma de uma esfera, equidistante em todos as direções a partir de centro para as extremidades, que todas as formas é a mais perfeita e a mais semelhante. E o fragmento oitavo se encerra, "ἐν τῶι σοι παύω πιστὸν λόγον ἠδὲ νόημα ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης* δόξας δ' ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείας μάνθανε κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων. μορφὰς γὰρ κατέθεντο δύο γνώμας ὀνομάζειν* τῶν μίαν οὐ χρεών ἐστιν-ἐν ὧι πεπλανημένοι εἰσίν- τἀντία δ' ἐκρίναντο δέμας καὶ σήματ' ἔθεντο χωρὶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τῆι μὲν φλογὸς αἰθέριον πῦρ, ἤπιον ὄν, μέγ' [ἀραιὸν] ἐλαφρόν, ἑωυτῶι πάντοσε τωὐτόν, τῶι δ' ἑτέρωι μὴ τωὐτόν* ἀτὰρ κἀκεῖνο κατ' αὐτό τἀντία νύκτ' ἀδαῆ, πυκινὸν δέμας ἐμβριθές τε. τόν σοι ἐγὼ διάκοσμον ἐοικότα πάντα φατίζω, ὡς οὐ μή ποτέ τίς σε βροτῶν γνώμη παρελάσσηι." "Aqui, para ti, cesso o discurso confiável e o pensamento sobre a verdade: a partir daqui as opiniões dos mortais aprende tu, a ordem enganosa das minhas palavras ouvindo. Pois propuseram opiniões para nomear duas formas, uma das quais não é necessária -aqui estão enganados-e separaram, de modo contrário, corpo, e sinais colocaram separadamente de um e outro, por um lado o eterno fogo da chama suave sendo, muito ágil, em si mesmo em tudo o mesmo, não o mesmo do que o outro; mas aquele outro, por si mesmo de modo contrário, noite negra, denso corpo e pesado. A ti, eu, a divisão e ordem totalmente verossímil, declaro, de modo que, jamais, alguma opinião dos mortais te supere." A deusa termina então o discurso referente à Via da Verdade e inicia a apresentação da Via da Opinião, encerrando a dedução lógica dos atributos do ser, 316 (Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy), p. 181. 317 (Platão, Timeu), 33b. 113 e que para Cornford 318 , "it's a geometrical solid, occupying the whole space, having the perfect shape of the sphere, and filled with continuous, uniform and homogeneous being". Segundo o referido autor é equivocado "to describe Parmenide's theory as corporeal monism", já que ele não se refere ao ser como σῶμα diferentemente de Platão 319 no Timeu. É interessante ressaltar que as qualidades do ser apresentado por Parmênides "belong to the categories of extension and quantity, the mathematical categories", não sendo visível nem tangível. É a posição semelhante à adotada por Tarán como vimos anteriormente. A Via da Opinião é apresentada com o claro disclaimer da deusa: "aprende tu a ordem enganosa das minhas palavras", cuja tradução, sem comentários é apresentada a seguir. Fragmento 9 "Mas já que todas as coisas, Luz e Noite foram nomeadas e conforme as suas potências, para essas e aquelas, tudo é pleno ao mesmo tempo de Luz e Noite sem luz uma e outra iguais, porque ambas separadas, nada." Fragmento 10 "Saberás do éter a φύσις e no éter todos os sinais e da pura chama do sol brilhante as obras destruidoras e de onde foram gerados, serás instruído das obras da rotação da lua, olho redondo, e sua φύσις, e também conhecerás o céu que contém tudo em torno, de onde surgiu e também como guiando-o, Ananké o forçou a conter os limites dos astros." Fragmento 11 "...............como terra e sol e lua e o éter comum, e a urânea láctea, e o Olimpo extremo e a força ardente dos astros lançaram-se à gênese." Fragmento 12 "as mais estreitas estão plenas de fogo sem mistura, e as seguintes, de noite, depois lança um lote de chama no meio dessas, a deusa, que tudo governa; em todos os lugares o terrível parto e a união comanda conduzindo o macho à fêmea unir-se, e ao contrário de novo o macho à fêmea." 318 (Cornford, Plato and Parmenides), p. 45. 319 (Platão, Timeu), 31b, 36e 114 Fragmento 13 "Por primeiro, Eros, dentre os deuses, concebeu." Fragmento 14 "Brilhante à noite, errante em torno da Terra, luz de outrem." Fragmento 15 "Sempre mirando em direção aos raios do Sol." Fragmento 15a "A Terra enraizada na água. Fragmento 16 "Assim, pois, a cada vez é uma mistura de corpos moventes, do mesmo modo o pensamento nos homens está presente. Pois o mesmo é o que precisamente como a φύσις de corpos, pensa nos homens, não só em todos mas em cada um, pois pleno é o pensamento." Fragmento 17 "À direita, por um lado os jovens, à esquerda por outro, as jovens." Fragmento 18 "Quando em conjunto a mulher e o homem as sementes de Vênus misturam, nas veias, a partir de sangues diversos, a força que forma observando a proporção, corpos bem formados molda. Mas caso as forças combatam enquanto as sementes foram misturadas e não tornem una em corpo misturado, cruéis, Corromperão o sexo nascente com dupla semente." Fragmento 19 "Assim, segundo a opinião, surgiram estas coisas e agora são, E depois disso, tendo crescidas, findarão As essas, um nome os homens estabeleceram como signo para cada uma." 115 7 Conclusão A interpretação do Poema a partir das leituras de Melisso e Górgias afasta a hipótese dos diversos sentidos do verbo ser como questão fundamental para a interpretação do texto. O verbo ser deve ser considerado em toda a sua δύναμις. A questão epistemológica tão cara a Parmênides perde relevância nas formulações do eleatismo posterior, notadamente em Melisso e Zenão, em que há um maior interesse no desenvolvimento das questões ontológicas, dentre elas a proeminência do uno, que não tem uma importância maior do que as demais qualidades do ser no Poema. Segundo Burnet 320 , "the great novelty in the poem of Parmenides is the method of argument", possivelmente derivado tanto da tradição pitagórica quanto das argumentações jurídica e política. Vale também ressaltar a potência do pensamento de Górgias, principlamente pela sua dimensão epistemológica apresentada no Περὶ φύσεος, Περί τοῦ μή ὄντος, e é uma pena que a Sofística ainda não tenha recebido a atenção devida apesar dos esforços recentes. É notável a forma poética como forma de apresentação do pensamento de Parmênides, porque reflete magistralmente a transição do divino para o racional dentro da cultura grega, deuses e razão convivem juntos pela primeira e talvez pela última vez. Para finalizar, vale uma reflexão de Heidegger 321 sobre o tema: "A conversa com Parmênides nunca chega a um fim; não apenas porque muito se mantém obscuro nos fragmentos preservados de seu poema, mas porque o que neles se disse é sempre um digno a se pensar. Um diálogo sem fim não é falta. É sinal do ilimitado que resguarda, em si e para o pensamento, a possibilidade da transformação de destino." 320 (Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy), p. 180. 321 (Heidegger, Ensaios e Conferências), p. 226. 116 8 Referências bibliográficas ALBERTELLI, P. Gli Eleati. Milano: Mimesis Edizioni, 2014. ARISTOTE. Réfutations sophistiques. Paris: Vrin, 2007. ARISTOTLE. Metaphysics . Translated by W. D. Ross. Vol. I. Norton: Oxoford, 1997. -. Metaphysics. Translated by D. Ross. Vol. I. Norton: Oxford Press, 1997. -. Physics. Translated by D. Ross. Midsomer: Oxford, 1998. Aristóteles. Física I-II. Edited by Editora Unicamp. Translated by Lucas Angioni. Campinas, 2010. -. Metafísica,. Translated by Giovanni Reale. Vol. II. São Paulo: Edições Loyola, 2005. AUBENQUE, P. Études sur Parmenides. Vol. I. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1987. BARNES, J. The Presocratic Philosophers. Oxon: Routledge, 2006. -. The Presocratic Philosophers. Abingdon: Routledge, 1982. BEAUFRET, J. Parménide, Le Poem. Paris: PUF, 2009. BENVENISTE, E. Problèmes de linguistique générale. Vol. I. Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1966. BERNABÉ. Poema, Fragmentos y tradición textual. Madrid: Istmo, 2007. BERNABÉ, A. "Filosofia e Mistérios: Leitura do Proêmio de Parmênides." Archai, 2013: 37-58. BOWRA, C. M. The Proem of Parmenides. Vol. 2. Chicago: Classical Philology, 1937. BURKERT, Walter. Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism. Translated by Edwin L. Minar Jr. Cambridge, 1972. BURNET, J. Early Greek Philosophy. London: Adam and Charles Black, 1892. -. Early Greek Philosophy. Fourth Edition. London: Adam & Charles Black, 1930. 117 CALOGERO, G. Studi Sull'eleatismo. firenze: La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1977. CASSIN, B. O Efeito Sofístico. São Paulo: Editora 34, 2005. CASSIN, B. Sur la nature ou sur l'etant. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1998. CHANTRAINE, Pierre. Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque. Paris: Klincksieck, 2009. CHERNISS, H. Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy. New York: Octagon Books, 1971. COELHO, M. C. M. N. "Retórica, filosofia e lógica: verdade como construção discursiva." In Ensaios de Retórica Antiga, by T. Assunção, O. Flores-Júnior and M. Martinho, 210. Belo Horizonte: Tessitura, 2010. COLLI, G. Gorgias e Parménides. Madri: Ediciones Siruela, 2010. CONCHE, M. Parménide. Paris: Press Universitaire de France, 2011. CORDERO, N. L. "L'Invention de L'Ecole Eleatique." In Études Sur Parmenides, by P. Aubenque, 94-124. Paris: Librairie Philosophique Vrin, 1987. -. Sendo, se é. São Paulo: Odysseus, 2011. CORFORD, F. M. "Parmenides' Two Ways." The Classical Quarterly (Cambridge University Press), 1933: 100. CORNFORD, F. M. Plato and Parmenides. Oxon: Routledge, 2001. -. Plato and Parmenides. Routledge, 2001. -. Platos' Cosmology. Indianopolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997. -. Principium Sapientae. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952. DETIENNE, M. Mestres da Verdade da Grécia Arcaica. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2013. DIELS, H. Parmenides Lehrgedicht. Saint Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2003. DIELS, Hermann, and Walther Kranz. Die Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker. Zürich: Weidmann, 2004. DODDS, E. R. Plato: Gorgias. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 118 -. The Greeks and the Irrational. Berckley: University of California Press, 2002. EMPIRICUS, Sextus. Against Logicians. Translated by R. G. Bury. Vol. II. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935. FRÄNKEL, H. Poesía e Filosofía de la Grecia Arcaica. Madrid: A. Machado Libros, 2004. FREGE, G. Lógica e Filosofia da Linguagem. Translated by Paulo Alcoforado. São Paulo: Edusp, 2009. -. The Foundations of Arithmetic. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980. GALLOP, D. Parmenides of Elea. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000. GÓRGIAS. Testemunhos e Fragmentos. Lisboa: Edições Colibri, 1993. GUTHRIE, and W. K. C. The Presocratic tradition from Parmenides to Democritus. Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 1996. H., Cancik, and H. Schneider. Brill's New Pauly. Vol. 4. 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Núcleo de Estudos de Filosofia Antiga, Departamento de Filosofia, PUC-Rio, 1997. KANT, I. Crítica de la razón pura. Mexico: Fundo de Cultura Económica, 2009. KERFERD, G. B. O Movimento Sofista. São Paulo: Edições Loyola, 2003. KIRK, G.S., J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield. The Presocratic Philosophers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. KNUUTTILLA, S., and J. Hintikka. The Logic of Being: Historical Studies. D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1986. 120 LAERTIUS, D. Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Vol. I. Cambridge: Harvard Univesity Press, 2006. -. Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Vol. II. Cambridge: Harvard Univesity Press, 2005. LEVI, A. Storia della Sofistica. Napoli: Morano Editore, 1966. LOENEN, J. H. M. m. Parmenides, Melissus, Gorgias. Assen: Royal VanGorcum Ltd., 1959. LOPES, D. R. N. "Parmênides vs. Górgias: Uma Polêmica Sobre a Linguagem." Phaos, 2006: 21-50. MERRIL, L. B. "Melissus of Samos, a Commentary on the Sources and Fragments. Dissertation, University of Texas, 1998. 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Streamlining Ethical Review Joseph Millum, PhD, and Jerry Menikoff, MD, JD The review system for human subjects research in the United States has been widely criticized in recent years for requirements that delay research without improving human subject protections. Any major reformulation of regulations may take some time to implement. However, current regulations often allow for streamlined ethics review that does not jeopardize-and may improve- protections for research participants. The authors discuss underutilized options, including research that need not be classified as human subjects research, categories of studies that can be exempt from ethical review, studies that need only undergo expedited review by 1 institutional review board (IRB) member, and simplifying reviews of multicenter research by using the IRB of 1 institution. The authors speculate on multiple reasons for the underuse of these mechanisms and exhort IRBs and researchers to take advantage of these important opportunities to improve the review process. Ann Intern Med. 2010;153:655-657. www.annals.org For author affiliations, see end of text. The review system for human subjects research in theUnited States has been widely criticized in recent years. Many commentators, particularly within the research community, complain of pointless bookkeeping requirements that sap the morale of institutional review board (IRB) members (1) and delay and obstruct lifesaving research (2). Various diagnoses have been offered and corresponding regulatory changes proposed to deal with what Fost and Levine (3) call the "dysregulation of human subjects research." However, even if the regulations were to be substantially reformed, such change would take time to implement. In the meantime, ethics review could be streamlined under the current regulations if institutions, IRBs, and researchers adhered strictly to the definition of human subjects research and used the available options for exemptions, expedited review, and centralized review (4)- options that remain underused in biomedical research. According to Marjorie Speers, President of the Association for the Accreditation of Human Research Protection Programs, many institutions label activities as "human subjects research" that do not fall under the federal definition (5). Although much low-risk human subjects research is exempt from review, some institutions insist on having all their research reviewed by IRBs (6). A 1998 report (7) found that for each category of exempt or expedited research, 25% to 77% of U.S. IRBs "practice some form of review that was more rigorous than specified by the regulations." There appear to be no data that contradict this picture today. These options may be underused for several reasons. One key reason is probably lack of awareness, but another is the fear of the consequences if the regulations are deemed to be violated, which can include the complete suspension of an institution's federally funded research. Our purpose here is to both inform and reassure. HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH Institutional board review is legally required for research conducted or funded by certain U.S. federal agencies (8), regulated by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, or carried out at institutions that have elected to subject all their research to the Common Rule requirements. The regulations apply only to "human subjects research," in which investigators obtain data through some "intervention or interaction" with living people or obtain identifiable private information about them (9). Data from people whose identities the investigator cannot "readily ascertain" are not identifiable private information (10). For much medical research, particularly that which uses clinical data, researchers do not need to know the identity of the participants and therefore need not conduct human subjects research. For example, research that uses data from medical records can be conducted in such a way that the researchers cannot identify the person from whom the data comes. Someone not involved in the research could remove the identifiers from the data (such as the 18 specified Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act identifiers) (11) and agree never to disclose the code that links those data to specific individuals. Researchers could even set up a mechanism for receiving and removing the identifiers from future data without the regulations applying. EXEMPTIONS AND EXPEDITED REVIEW Even if a proposed research study is human subjects research, it may fall into 1 of the 6 categories that are exempt from ethical review. Two categories are of particular interest to biomedical researchers. Category 2 exempts research that uses only educational tests, survey procedures, interviews, or observation of public behavior, unless the data recorded are both identifiable and potentially harmful if disclosed. For example, the work of a researcher who interviewed patients with HIV/AIDS about their medications and recorded their names would not be exempt under category 2, because disclosure of the patients' HIV/AIDS status could harm them. However, if the researcher conducted the interviews anonymously and never recorded the patients' names or other identifying information, the study would probably be exempt. Category 4 exempts research "involving the collection or study of existing data, documents, records, pathological Annals of Internal Medicine Research and Reporting Methods www.annals.org 16 November 2010 Annals of Internal Medicine Volume 153 • Number 10 655 Downloaded From: http://annals.org/ by a National Institutes of Health User on 08/25/2016 specimens, or diagnostic specimens," if either the data sources are publicly available or the recorded data do not allow patient identification (9). For example, a retrospective chart review that examined the medications administered to the most recent 50 patients seen at a hospital emergency department for suspected cardiac infarction would be exempt, provided the data were recorded without patient identifiers. Decision charts for these exemptions are available on the Web site of the Office for Human Research Protections (www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects /guidance/decisioncharts.htm). If a protocol for conducting human subjects research is not exempt, it may still be possible to expedite its review. Initial and continuing review of certain categories of minimal-risk research, such as that which involves only the collection of blood samples or the noninvasive collection of other biological specimens, can be expedited (12). Expedited review is also permitted for minor changes in already approved research. The same standards are followed as for a full IRB review, but the review is done by just the chairperson or by designated experienced IRB members. Because expedited review can be conducted on an ongoing basis, its use should speed up the review process and reduce the time that the convened IRB spends reviewing minimalrisk research. The sparse data available indicate that for some institutions, expedited reviews save little money (13) and no time (14), which suggests that some IRB procedures also need streamlining. MULTICENTER RESEARCH Since the regulations were established, the number of collaborative studies that take place at multiple institutions has greatly increased. Because responsibility for ethical review rests with institutions, multicenter research frequently results in the IRB of each institution reviewing the same protocol (15). This both duplicates work and increases the time and resources spent getting research projects approved, as different IRBs mandate different (often minor) changes to consent documents and researchers go back and forth between them. Again, regulatory resources for addressing this problem already exist. According to the Common Rule (9), when a research project involves more than 1 institution, "an institution participating in a cooperative project may enter into a joint review arrangement, rely upon the review of another qualified IRB, or make similar arrangements for avoiding duplication of effort." This arrangement is underused mainly because of institutional reluctance to cede control and underlying liability concerns. The Office for Human Research Protections recently published a request for public comments on an amendment to the regulations that would allow it to hold IRBs and the organizations that operate them directly responsible for meeting some regulatory requirements, rather than always enforcing compliance through the institutions engaged in the research (16). For example, if an independent IRB reviewed a particular study and incorrectly approved it by using expedited review when the study should have undergone review by the convened IRB, any compliance action would fault the IRB-not the institution that hired it to review the study. The amendment's goal is to encourage more institutions to rely on review by an external IRB by reducing their liability concerns. One existing "joint review" arrangement is the Central Institutional Review Board (CIRB) Initiative (www.ncicirb .org), sponsored by the National Cancer Institute, which covers certain National Cancer Institute–sponsored multicenter adult and pediatric cancer studies. For studies in the initiative, the CIRB performs a single review of the protocol. Local IRBs may then defer to the CIRB and perform only a "facilitated review" of ethical issues that arise because of the local context. The CIRB generally performs the continuing reviews, amendment reviews, and reviews of serious adverse events for the protocol. ETHICAL CONCERNS Medical research pursues the ethically important goal of developing interventions to improve human health. It does so under the constraint of another goal-protecting research participants. Measures that speed up the ethics review process clearly help with the first goal by reducing the time that it takes to develop health care interventions and allowing resources that would otherwise be taken up by ethical review to be directed toward beneficial research. Expending excessive resources on reviewing studies that pose minimal risks or replicating review by other IRBs is ethically troubling. One concern, however, might be that speeding up ethical review would compromise the welfare of the people it is designed to protect. However, following these measures is unlikely to reduce human subject protections. The categories of research that are exempt or eligible for expedited review are unlikely to include highly unethical studies. For example, studies in these categories almost always pose no more than minimal risk to participants, which should ameliorate concerns about participant harm. Thus, the absolute probability of increased use of these measures leading to more unethical research is low. In addition, IRBs always have constraints on their time and resources, and any time they spend reviewing one protocol takes away time from reviewing others. Institutional review boards should prioritize their time to focus on protocols that are more likely to generate ethical issues but need a way to determine whether a study will raise ethical issues without actually reviewing the full protocol. The regulatory measures we have detailed identify categories of research that are unlikely to be ethically problematic. Using them therefore frees up resources for reviewing riskier research. Research and Reporting Methods Streamlining Ethical Review 656 16 November 2010 Annals of Internal Medicine Volume 153 • Number 10 www.annals.org Downloaded From: http://annals.org/ by a National Institutes of Health User on 08/25/2016 ACTION This article has 2 main goals: to inform biomedical researchers about the measures through which the ethical review of low-risk and multicenter research could be made more efficient under the existing regulations, and to extol the virtues of these measures to researchers, IRBs, and institutional officials. These measures may not only allow valuable research to be carried out more rapidly but also reduce the cost of protocol review and allow IRBs to focus on research that is more likely to be ethically challenging. Researchers cannot act alone. Institutional review board offices and the officials who oversee them must be willing to prioritize time and resources by allowing exemptions and developing efficient procedures to expedite reviews. In addition, the institutions that host research must be willing to trust the ethical review systems at other institutions-and that trust must be built. Finally, regulatory bodies need to reassure the research community that their primary concerns lie not with meeting bureaucratic requirements but with genuinely protecting human participants. That message will help encourage institutions to appropriately streamline their policies and procedures by minimizing concerns about being subject to inappropriate regulatory responses. From the Clinical Center Department of Bioethics and Fogarty International Center, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, and the Office for Human Research Protections, Rockville, Maryland. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this commentary are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services or its operating divisions, the National Institutes of Health and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health. Acknowledgment: The authors thank Ezekiel Emanuel for his helpful comments. Potential Conflicts of Interest: None disclosed. Forms can be viewed at www.acponline.org/authors/icmje/ConflictOfInterestForms.do?msNum
M10 -1459. Requests for Single Reprints: Joseph Millum, PhD, Clinical Center Department of Bioethics and Fogarty International Center, National Institutes of Health, 10 Center Drive, Building 10, Room 1C118, Bethesda, MD 20892-1156; e-mail, [email protected]. Current author addresses and author contributions are available at www .annals.org. References 1. Levine RJ. Institutional review boards: a crisis in confidence [Editorial]. Ann Intern Med. 2001;134:161-3. [PMID: 11177321] 2. Satel S. Clinical trials, wrapped in red tape. New York Times. 8 August 2009:A19. 3. Fost N, Levine RJ. The dysregulation of human subjects research [Editorial]. JAMA. 2007;298:2196-8. [PMID: 18000206] 4. Menikoff J. Where's the law? Uncovering the truth about IRBs and censorship. Northwestern Univ Law Review. 2007;101(2):791-799. 5. Gunsalus C, Bruner E, Burbules N, Dash L, Finkin M, Goldberg J, et al. The Illinois white paper: improving the system for protecting human subjects: Counteracting IRB mission creep. Qualitative Inquiry. 2007;13:617-649. 6. Wagner RM. Ethical review of research involving human subjects: when and why is IRB review necessary? Muscle Nerve. 2003;28:27-39. [PMID: 12811770] 7. Bell J, Whiton J, Connelly S. Evaluation of NIH Implementation of Section 491 of the Public Health Service Act, Mandating a Program of Protection for Research Subjects. Arlington, VA: James Bell Assoc; 1998. 8. Federal policy for the protection of human subjects. Final rule. Fed Regist. 1991;56:28003-18. [PMID: 10112214] 9. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Protections of human subjects. 45 CFR Part 46, Subpart A (1991). 10. Office for Human Research Protections. Guidance on Research Involving Coded Private Information or Biological Specimens. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; 2008. Accessed at www.hhs.gov/ohrp /humansubjects/guidance/cdebiol.htm on 21 September 2010. 11. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Protections of human subjects. 45 CFR §164.514(b) 2002. Accessed at http://edocket.access.gpo.gov /cfr_2002/octqtr/pdf/45cfr164.514.pdf on 21 September 2010. 12. Protection of human subjects: categories of research that may be reviewed by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) through an expedited review procedure- FDA. Notice. Fed Regist. 1998;63:60353-6. [PMID: 10187395] 13. Byrne MM, Speckman J, Getz K, Sugarman J. Variability in the costs of institutional review board oversight. Acad Med. 2006;81:708-12. [PMID: 16868423] 14. Larson E, Bratts T, Zwanziger J, Stone P. A survey of IRB process in 68 U.S. hospitals. J Nurs Scholarsh. 2004;36:260-4. [PMID: 15495496] 15. Infectious Diseases Society of America. Grinding to a halt: the effects of the increasing regulatory burden on research and quality improvement efforts. Clin Infect Dis. 2009;49:328-35. [PMID: 19566438] 16. Office for Human Research Protections. Request for information and comments on IRB accountability. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; 2009. Accessed at www.hhs.gov/ohrp/requests/com030509 .html on 21 September 2010. Research and Reporting MethodsStreamlining Ethical Review www.annals.org 16 November 2010 Annals of Internal Medicine Volume 153 • Number 10 657 Downloaded From: http://annals.org/ by a National Institutes of Health User on 08/25/2016 Current Author Addresses: Dr. Millum: Clinical Center Department of Bioethics and Fogarty International Center, National Institutes of Health, 10 Center Drive, Building 10, Room 1C118, Bethesda, MD 20892-1156. Dr. Menikoff: Office for Human Research Protections, 1101 Wootton Parkway, Suite 200, Rockville, MD 20852. Author Contributions: Conception and design: J. Millum, J. Menikoff. Drafting of the article: J. Millum, J. Menikoff. Critical revision of the article for important intellectual content: J. Millum, J. Menikoff. Final approval of the article: J. Millum, J. Menikoff. Annals of Internal Medicine www.annals.org 16 November 2010 Annals of Internal Medicine Volume 153 • Number 10 W-219 Downloaded From: http://annals.org/ by a National Institutes of Health User on 08/25/

Three Conceptions of Practical Authority Daniel Star and Candice Delmas* Joseph Raz's much discussed service conception of practical authority has recently come under attack from Stephen Darwall, who proposes that we instead adopt a second-personal conception of practical authority.1 In sharp contrast to both Darwall and Raz, we believe that the best place to begin understanding practical authority is with a pared back conception of it, as simply a species of normative authority more generally, where this species is picked out merely by the fact that the normative authority in question is authority in relation to action, rather than belief. We call this the minimalist conception of practical authority.2 We do not wish to deny that there might turn out to be substantive properties of practical authority that are peculiar to it (apart from the mere property of being the species of authority that is concerned with action), but, unlike both Raz and Darwall, we do not believe that such features play a fundamental role in defining or delimiting practical authority. We hope that this third conception of authority will appear particularly attractive coming, as it will, on the heels of a comparison of the alternatives. We begin, in section I, with a discussion of Darwall's and Raz's accounts of practical authority (readers who are already very familiar with the details of the debate between Darwall and Raz may wish to skip this section). Next, in section II, we consider what we take to be Darwall's dialectically strongest criticism of Raz, concerning which we end up siding with Raz. Finally, in section III, we focus on the concept of authority afresh, and suggest that our alternative conception of practical authority provides a better starting place for future discussions of authority than either of the (2011) 2(1) Jurisprudence 143–160 143 * Daniel Star is an assistant professor of philosophy at Boston University, USA; Candice Delmas is a PhD candidate in philosophy at Boston University, USA. 1 We are grateful to Stephen Darwall for visiting the Boston University Ethics Reading Group to discuss his work on practical authority with us, and for his feedback on an early draft of our paper. We would also like to thank an anonymous referee, whose comments were very helpful. 2 More specifically, Daniel Star, as the author of section III of the present paper, calls this the minimalist conception of authority. He is developing a fuller account of this conception of authority in separate work, where he aligns the authority of normative reasons in general with the authority of evidence, using the reasons as evidence account of normative reasons first defended in Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star, 'Reasons: Explanations or Evidence?' (2008) 119 Ethics 31–56. This enables him to provide an alternative explanation for the existence of preemptive and exclusionary reasons to the one that Raz has provided, as part of an account of reasons that allows for preemptive and exclusionary reasons to play a more general role than Raz believes that they play, thereby providing a unified explanation of the fact that they appear not only in the practical domain, but also in the epistemic domain. other conceptions. Our sketch of this minimalist conception includes a short discussion of the relation between it and some very general and highly plausible claims about normativity. I. DARWALL AND RAZ ON PRACTICAL AUTHORITY Raz and Darwall both seek to explain the grounding of claims of practical authority, which they take to be authority of the kind one person has over the will of another, in relation to the other person's actions. Darwall argues that practical authority can only be justified from the second-person standpoint, which we take up whenever we address or acknowledge a moral claim or demand. Raz, on the other hand, contends that legitimate practical authority is grounded in the fact that a legitimate authority's directives enable any person who is subject to that authority to better conform to their own reason than they would otherwise be able to. Neither of these claims is immediately perspicuous, so we must begin by explaining them. Darwall outlines and defends his original account of practical authority in The Second-Person Standpoint. As he understands it, practical authority involves a certain type of relation between an addresser A and an addressee B, such that a directive that originates from A gives B a special type of reason for acting as A demands, ie a 'second-personal' reason. Second-personal reasons spring from claims or demands that address an agent, and presuppose the addresser's authority to make such claims, as well as the addressee's 'second-personal competence', ie a capacity to acknowledge the claim as valid, and to act accordingly. 'When someone attempts to give another a second-personal reason,' Darwall writes, 'she purports to stand in a relevant authority relation to her addressee.'3 Practical authority involves not merely a logical (or metaphysical) relation-rather, it is 'a standing in a relationship'.4 That being said, certain things do logically follow from any authority claim, with respect to what the addresser and the addressee owe each other. In particular, if A has authority with respect to B, then not only do A's directives generate reasons for B to follow those directives, but they also mean that B is morally responsible for acting or failing to act on these reasons, and answerable to A if she does not so act. The claims and demands we make on one another presuppose, and take place from within, a structure of reciprocal address dubbed the 'second-person standpoint'. Darwall argues that 'to enter intelligibly into the second-person stance and make claims on and demands of one another at all ... you and I must presuppose that we share a common second-personal authority, competence, and responsibility simply as free and rational agents'.5 If I make a claim on you, I imply that I have the authority to do so, and that you have the competence to recognise my claim as valid, and 144 Jurisprudence 3 Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint (Harvard University Press, 2006) 4, emphasis added. 4 Stephen Darwall, 'Authority, Accountability, and Preemption' (2011)2(1) Jurisprudence 103–19, 109 (this issue). In The Second-Person Standpoint (n 3), Darwall similarly writes, 'whether a reason is second-personal is a matter not of logical relations but of personal relations' (11). 5 Darwall (n 3) 5, emphasis added. thus respond appropriately. And if you accept my claim as valid, you thereby acknowledge that I have grounds for complaint, and perhaps compensation, if you do not do as I demand. The second-person standpoint thus provides the key to the distinction between second-personal reasons and practical reasons that are not second-personal: unlike other practical reasons, (i) second-personal reasons are grounded in, and addressed from within, certain normative authority relations that the addresser takes to hold between her and her addressee; and (ii) second-personal reasons make a distinctive kind of claim on the will in that they commit both parties to seeing each other as free and rational beings, ie 'self-originating sources of claims' (to use a phrase from Rawls that is in the epigraph of the first chapter of Darwall's book). We just said that, on Darwall's picture, reasons for action created by practical authorities are distinct from practical reasons of other sorts in that they are grounded in certain authority relations, and, before that, that these authority relations can only be understood in terms of second-personal reasons. This sounds quite circular! In fact, Darwall not only explicitly recognises this circularity, but positively celebrates it: 'These notions-second-personal authority, valid claim or demand, second-personal reason, and responsibility to ... comprise an interdefinable circle; each implies all the rest.'6 This is to say that the second-person standpoint is constituted by a circle of four irreducibly second-personal notions, such that, wherever there is genuine practical authority, the application of three other concepts is appropriate: first, there must be a valid claim or demand; second, the subject must be accountable or responsible to the authority; and third, there must be a second-personal reason for acting in conformity with the claim under consideration (and so discharging the corresponding responsibility). Furthermore, according to the irreducibility thesis at the core of Darwall's account of the second-person standpoint, the core second-personal notions are irreducible, in that their legitimate application can neither be adequately explained by, nor wholly generated by, non-second-personal considerations. He stresses that this means that 'there is no way to break into this circle from outside it'.7 No proposition that does not already involve second-personal notions can entail any that does. An important implication of this thesis is that 'No authority to make claims and demands can be based entirely on non-second-personal reasons'.8 Note that the legitimacy of a claim need not depend on the particular, unique position of the person who makes it. Second-personal addresses, according to Darwall, do not only occur between someone who holds a right (such as, to use Darwall's example, the right not to have one's foot stepped on) and another particular person who might violate it. He distinguishes two main aspects of the second-personal conception of practical authority. The first is a particular right-holder's special standing to demand that people respect her rights, and to hold those who violate them accountable. The second is the authority anyone has, 'as a representative of Three Conceptions of Practical Authority 145 6 Ibid, 12. 7 Ibid. 8 Darwall, 'Authority, Accountability, and Preemption' (n 4) 105. the moral community', to blame any wrongdoer, or to hold him or her responsible through reactive attitudes such as indignation.9 Darwall thinks we focus on the first aspect of practical authority whenever we are considering moral rights, and on the second aspect of practical authority whenever we are considering moral obligation more generally. With respect to both aspects, practical authority essentially requires the standing to hold accountable, and is intimately connected to the possession of reactive attitudes-one typically holds people accountable through manifesting reactive attitudes such as blame and resentment, and one can hold oneself responsible through manifesting attitudes such as remorse and guilt. By their nature, reactive attitudes essentially address charges to their objects, and they 'involve or presuppose a view of their objects as having some competence to understand or appreciate the charge'.10 What arguments does Darwall provide in support of his overall theory? A good deal of his argumentation in The Second-Person Standpoint is done from within the second-personal circle, by thinking through crucial moral concepts-eg rights, persons, dignity-and arguing that each necessarily relies on the four irreducible second-personal notions. We take it that the coherence, intuitive appeal and elegance of Darwall's theory are supposed to weigh in its favour. Darwall also provides support for his view by arguing against rival theories, especially those that suppose or affirm that claims of practical authority can be justified on the basis of non-second-personal reasons. For instance, in the ninth chapter of his book, he argues that Kantian attempts to vindicate morality from within the first-person standpoint of a deliberating agent cannot succeed. In a series of recent articles, Darwall attacks another prominent non-second-personal-this time third-personal-account of practical authority, namely, Raz's service conception. Before we discuss the arguments that form the basis of this attack, we need to very briefly describe this alternative conception. In contrast to Darwall's account of what is needed to justify claims of practical authority, Raz's account is clearly not second-personal. According to Raz, practical authority is normally justified if: (1) the subject is likely to better conform with reasons which already, independently, apply to her if she intends to accept the authority's directives and treat them as valid; and (2) the relevant situation is one where it is better that the agent conforms with the reasons that externally apply to her, rather than decide for herself what to do without the aid of an authority.11 Raz dubs the first of these conditions the normal justification thesis (NJT), and the second the independence condition. We will follow Darwall in focusing on the NJT here. According to Raz, agents that are subject to an authority that satisfies these conditions will find themselves with new, derivative reasons for action. These 'preemptive' reasons are reasons that follow directly from the authority's directives and are to be considered without considering independent reasons that might con146 Jurisprudence 9 Ibid, 107. 10 Ibid, 109. 11 Joseph Raz, 'The Problem of Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception' (2006) 90 Minnesota Law Review 1003–44, 1014. It should be said that Raz's own exact statement of the independence condition is a little unclear. flict with them: a reason of this type 'is not to be added to all other relevant reasons when assessing what to do, but should exclude and take the place of some of them'.12 For example, a person driving down a highway might, very plausibly, be thought to have a preemptive reason to drive no faster than a sign-posted speed limit, where this reason also speaks against her attempting to independently determine the fastest speed at which it might be safe for her to drive. Very plausibly, such a person better conforms with independent reasons that already apply to her in the long term by treating the speed limit as authoritative than she would if she considered nonauthority-based reasons, with respect to the issue of determining the fastest speed at which she might drive. And on Raz's account of practical reasons, this means not merely that she should treat the speed limit as if it provides a genuine reason for action, but instead that the speed limit provides a genuine reason for action (a reason that can be classified as preemptive) in virtue of the fact that the person who follows it better conforms with independent reasons in the long term. Raz says he broadly understands practical authority to be 'authority with power to require action'.13 That being said, he thinks that exercises of practical authority are distinct from exercises of coercive power, in that they include 'an appeal for compliance by the person(s) subject to the authority ... an invocation of the duty to obey'.14 Whether a duty to obey really exists for a subject depends on whether the relevant putative authority actually possesses the right to rule it claims to have. If it does, then its authority is de jure; otherwise, it is merely de facto. It is important to note that the mere possession of a legitimate justification for the use of force on the part of a de facto authority is not enough to make it an authority de jure.15 According to the service conception, the authority must serve the governed, protect and promote their interests, and generally help them secure better conformity with reason. On Raz's account, a political authority cannot normally be legitimate unless it is effective at getting people to obey its commands through changing the reasons that apply to its subjects: Three Conceptions of Practical Authority 147 12 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford University Press, 1986) 46. The relation between preemptive reasons and 'exclusionary' reasons is complicated, and the complications will be ignored here. Suffice to say that Raz thinks that it is usually fine to focus on the above type of characterisation of preemptive reasons alone when considering the nature of authority, but he also thinks that he can tell a deeper story about preemptive reasons where we understand them to be 'protected' reasons, where a protected reason is a fact that constitutes a first-order reason to do a particular act and an exclusionary reason 'not to fail to [do this particular act] for a certain range of excluded reasons' (Joseph Raz, 'On Respect, Authority, and Neutrality: A Response' (2010) 120 Ethics 279–301, 298). For a definition of 'exclusionary reason' as a second-order reason to refrain from acting on a firstorder reason, see Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (Princeton University Press, 1990 [1975]) 39. 13 Joseph Raz, 'Authority and Justification' (1985) 14 Philosophy and Public Affairs 3–29, 3. 14 Raz, The Morality of Freedom (n 12) 25–26. 15 Raz dissociates the commonly entangled concept of justification of the use of force from that of authority by discussing an example: 'I do not exercise authority over people afflicted with dangerous diseases if I knock them out and lock them up to protect the public, even though I am, in the assumed circumstances, justified in doing so' (Raz (n 13) 5.) One can think that the measures taken by a local political authority during an epidemic are morally justified without thereby judging that the government is legitimate. [I]n most cases the normal justification cannot be established unless the putative authority enjoys some measure of recognition, and exercises power over its subjects. There is a strong case for holding that no political authority can be legitimate unless it is also a de facto authority. For the case for having any political authority rests to a large extent on its ability to solve co-ordination problems and extricate the population from Prisoner's Dilemma type situations.16 Governments can generally only succeed in meeting conditions of legitimacy if they are successful in the use of force against those who flout certain of their directives. In turn, subjects could not have reasons to accept directives as binding if political authorities did not have power to force compliance, which is crucial to any state's ability to solve coordination problems. Normally, for a political authority to fulfill its function it must have the capacity to replace other reasons for action that people might have, and thus reliably guide coordinated action. Of course, it is important to recognise that Raz does not wish to claim that the power to require action is essential to justifying every kind of practical authority. Much of the time, he focuses his discussion on authority in the political domain, but his account is ultimately meant to have very general application. Nonetheless, power is connected to the capacity to create preemptive reasons in normal political cases, where it contributes to the justification of the authority in place. In contrast, Darwall does not think that the possession of de facto authority is even relevant to establishing a claim to practical authority. This can be inferred from his theory:17 just because someone is powerless, it does not even generally follow that she does not have a valid claim that others follow her directives (to respect her rights, say). Raz's NJT constitutes a straightforward challenge to Darwall's irreducibility thesis, since the latter must be incorrect if the NJT is correct.18 Recall that on Darwall's alternative conception of practical authority, one is only in a position to be an authority in relation to another person when one has the normative standing to make a morally valid second-personal demand of the other person. So, for example, if someone is stepping on my foot, I have the standing to authoritatively assert my right that he not do so, and you have a different type of standing to demand that he not do so, due to the fact that you are 'a representative of the moral community, whose members understand themselves as holding one another to a (moral) demand not to step on each other's feet'.19 Neither type of standing is something one could acquire on the basis of the expected consequences of compliance with a directive, even given a putative authority's superior knowledge: 'The standing itself neither is, nor simply follows from, any form of third-personal or epistemic authority.'20 148 Jurisprudence 16 Raz, The Morality of Freedom (n 12) 56. 17 Darwall expressly defended the point as he answered questions following his presentation at the Boston University Ethics Reading Group, 12 February 2010. It is also suggested in a footnote in the article we are responding to (Darwall, 'Authority, Accountability, and Preemption' (n 4) 116 n 40). 18 A conflict between the Irreducibility Thesis and the NJT would not arise (or would not arise in the same way) if Darwall were to claim that all normative reasons are second-personal, but this is clearly something he does not wish to do. 19 Stephen Darwall, 'Authority and Second-Personal Reasons for Acting' in David Sobel and Steven Wall (eds), Reasons for Action (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 134–54, 136. 20 Darwall (n 3) 13. The objection that Darwall is concerned to forestall can be put like this: if the reasons with which a subject would better comply with another's directives are not second-personal themselves, then a person could acquire authority over someone else owing entirely to non-second-personal considerations; hence the irreducibility thesis is false. Darwall must therefore take issue with the NJT, as providing something like a sufficient condition for practical authority.21 Darwall responds to this objection in three recent papers, where he continues to argue that no claims of practical authority can be exclusively justified by non-secondpersonal reasons. He mainly criticises Raz's NJT as a general condition of authority, attempting to show that it is only plausible when the reasons with which the subject might best comply already themselves assume background accountability relations that are critical to establishing the authority's legitimacy. To wit, the NJT only succeeds when the dependent reasons are second-personal reasons-but then it fails to provide any basis for a third-personal account of practical authority. In his 'Authority and Second-Personal Reasons for Acting',22 Darwall purports to show that Raz's account fails to capture an essential aspect of practical authority, namely, its intrinsic connection to the standing to hold accountable. In 'Authority and Reasons: Exclusionary and Second-Personal',23 Darwall credits Raz for discovering that practical authority involves the capacity to create preemptive reasons, but argues that the NJT fails as a standard for determining when it is the case that genuine preemptive reasons are actually present. The article we are responding to, 'Authority, Accountability, and Preemption' (in the present issue of this journal), draws on these two earlier articles. Darwall emphasises here that he agrees with Raz that the capacity to create preemptive reasons is a mark of practical authority, but also stresses that, unlike Raz, he believes that this capacity requires the second-personal relation of accountability. This thought is summed up by a slogan: 'No preemptive reasons without the standing to hold accountable'.24 In his attempts to rebut the Razian challenge to the Irreducibility Thesis, Darwall's recent arguments basically rely on two main moves: (1) the drawing of a wrong kind of reasons diagnosis; and (2) the provision of purported counterexamples to the NJT which, if they are genuine counterexamples, might best have their status as counterexamples explained by (1). Darwall hopes to elicit some firm intuitions or judgments about the particular cases he discusses. We mostly focus on these cases and intuitions in the next, critical section of the paper, since we do not deny that they initially carry some weight, and because, prima facie, they are dialectically neutral (hence are less likely to lead to a charge that Darwall is begging the question). The wrong kind of reasons diagnosis is not dialectically neutral, since acceptance of it requires one to reject the third-person standpoint (or, at least, view it as having litThree Conceptions of Practical Authority 149 21 In fact, Raz does not intend the NJT to be a sufficient condition, since he also puts weight on the independence condition, but we take it that Darwall thinks of this second condition as being of only subsidiary importance. 22 Darwall (n 19). 23 Stephen Darwall, 'Authority and Reasons: Exclusionary and Second-Personal' (2010) 120 Ethics 1– 21. 24 Darwall, 'Authority, Accountability, and Preemption' (n 4) 106. tle importance when it comes to justifying moral judgments), and follow Darwall into the irreducible circle at the heart of the second-person standpoint.25 This diagnosis is already at centre stage in Darwall's book, where he calls it 'Strawson's Point'. Darwall takes Strawson to have demonstrated in 'Freedom and Resentment'26 that there are reasons of the right kind and reasons of the wrong kind when it comes to the justification of moral practices. In particular, desirability is a reason of the wrong kind to warrant the attitudes and actions involved in holding someone responsible. 'To be a reason of the right kind,' Darwall contends, 'a consideration must justify the relevant attitude in its own terms.'27 So, for instance, Mill's claim that a practice of protecting certain putative rights would maximise benefits and minimise suffering, even if true, would not show that we actually have such rights.28 The claim that only an internal perspective is permissible when attempting to justify a reactive attitude might be true, but we should not forget that Darwall's particular use of the wrong kind of reasons diagnosis will be considered highly questionable by many moral philosophers (especially, but not only, consequentialists of various stripes). While Raz continues to defend the view that practical authority involves the capacity to create preemptive reasons, he rejects the idea that practical authority involves a standing to hold accountable. In a long reply to Darwall, Raz criticises Darwall's analysis of the concepts of 'standing' and 'accountability', as well as his account of rights and duties.29 He also makes it clear that he takes their projects to be very different: My explanation of authority is an attempt to explain authority over people of the kind that governments claim to have over their subjects, parents over their children, and so on. It does not purport to be part of an account of rights and duties in general, as Darwall's own writings on authority are.30 Raz understands Darwall to be concerned with the permissions moral agents have to demand performance of (already existing) duties, or compensation for their breach, while he himself is interested in the power to impose new duties on people; that is, the capacity to create preemptive reasons. Although the underpinnings of their projects are very different, Darwall does not think of Raz as focusing on a different concept of authority than the one that he is interested in, so we do have a deep disagreement here, and not just a superficial verbal dispute (as might occur if two people were simply using different concepts, rather than arguing about different conceptions of one concept). Both Raz and Darwall claim to be elucidating the ordinary 150 Jurisprudence 25 To avoid confusion, it should be said that we do not mean to be committed to anything at all to do with the more commonly referred to 'wrong kind of reasons problem' for buck-passing accounts of evaluative properties (and this is not Darwall's concern, either, despite his potentially confusing use of the same phrase). 26 PF Strawson, 'Freedom and Resentment' in Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and Action (Oxford University Press, 1968) 71–96. 27 Darwall (n 3) 16. 28 Darwall, 'Precis: The Second-Person Standpoint' (2010) 81(1) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 216– 28, 218. 29 Raz, 'On Respect, Authority, and Neutrality' (n 12). 30 Ibid, 290. concept of authority, and not some more circumscribed concept.31 The service conception offers an attractive and plausible account of political authority. And if Raz is correct that political authority can normally be justified on the basis of considerations such as actual power and the desirability of subjects treating directives as binding, then the irreducibility thesis must be false. II. DEFUSING DARWALL'S ARGUMENT AGAINST THE NORMAL JUSTIFICATION THESIS Darwall contends that meeting the NJT is neither necessary nor sufficient for establishing that some person or institution is a legitimate authority. This disagreement with Raz might be thought to incorrectly rest on a presupposition that the NJT provides a complete account of legitimacy. Yet, as we noted in the first section of this paper, the NJT offers an account of the way legal and political authority is normally justified: it is not the only way to justify a claim that someone has legitimate authority; as Raz says, 'it is ... the normal one'.32 Nonetheless, we can assume from Raz's recent response to Darwall that the cases that Darwall suggests are counterexamples are normal enough that they are not to be dismissed as counterexamples merely on the grounds of abnormality.33 Darwall provides a series of apparent counterexamples to the proposition that the NJT lays down the conditions for determining when a putative authority's directives actually provide subjects with preemptive reasons. To take one such example: even though it may be desirable for me to treat an alarm clock's authoritative voice recording ('You must get out of bed now!') as a binding order, this does not mean that its directive actually preempts the reasons I have to stay in bed. I do not, Darwall claims, now possess a preemptive reason to get out of bed that would have me exclude reasons to fall back to sleep. Nor does it follow that the alarm clock has acquired authority over me or that I can be blamed for my failure to comply with its directive. What the alarm clocks lacks, according to Darwall, is the standing to issue directives to others and the capacity to hold them accountable, so it simply cannot have the capacity to create preemptive reasons. Furthermore, he claims that it will make no difference to our judgement regarding the lack of such a standing, and the practical authority that would go with this standing if it were there, if we instead imagine that I have hired a person to come by my bed and provide me with an 'authority experience'.34 Three Conceptions of Practical Authority 151 31 Darwall has confirmed in email correspondence that he aims to be giving an account of the ordinary concept of authority. We take ourselves to be discussing three conceptions of one concept in this paper, and not three different concepts, although we are inclined to think (with Raz) that Darwall's account of authority would work better if it were repackaged as an account of a more limited concept. Raz seems to be suggesting that Darwall might be using a different concept of authority in 'On Respect, Authority, and Neutrality' (n 12) 290–2, but we do not think this matters too much for our purposes, given that Darwall does not view things this way. 32 Raz, The Morality of Freedom (n 12) 53. 33 Raz, 'On Respect, Authority, and Neutrality' (n 12) 297–301. 34 The examples, as well as the quoted phrase, are from Darwall, 'Authority, Accountability, and Preemption' (n 4) 113–16. We might here deny the verisimilitude of Darwall's intuitions, and hold that the alarm clock, or at least a person doing the job of an alarm clock, could have practical authority over B. Suppose B were to hire a personal life coach to help him improve his work ethic and discipline. The coach's orders to get out of bed at 7 am would then clearly satisfy the NJT and be genuinely binding on B. Darwall would reply that it would be very odd to think that we can hold B morally accountable to his coach, and that the coach thus lacks the standing to create preemptive reasons.35 We suspect the intuitions Darwall relies on here do not withhold scrutiny, unless one has already accepted that interpersonal moral authority is the one true kind of practical authority. Darwall denies that talk of authority and accountability, rights and duties, is appropriate in cases involving prudence, but we believe that he does not provide sufficient (non-question-begging) reasons to cordon off practical authority to the exclusive sphere of interpersonal morality. One could, on the contrary, quite plausibly criticise B for failing to comply with his coach's orders, from the point of view of prudence (rather than morality), and construe the coach as possessing the capacity to create preemptive reasons to the extent that they are in B's own interest (even if one would not go so far as to blame B for any failure to follow his coach's directives). B might thereby be taken to have sufficient reason to accept his coach's directives as legitimate, and the coach in turn would have practical authority over B. On our minimalist conception of authority we would further add that since such a coach would have practical authority over B, we don't see any reason to suppose an alarm clock could not have practical authority (in the most general sense) over B. As Darwall is aware, Raz considered in earlier work how best to respond to a variation on the criticism that Darwall provides.36 Raz considers a case of a man who goes to a cooking class and decides not to follow his teacher's instructions at some point during the class. To the criticism that it does not look like the teacher has the authority to demand that the man in the cooking class follow his instructions-even when his directives are the kind that should provide preemptive reasons according to the NJT-Raz replies that we can explain away this intuition. What is needed, he thinks, is for us to bear in mind that being able to make autonomous decisions is plausibly an important aspect of wellbeing (one might add that spontaneity and creativity further constitute important goods that would be ignored if the teacher were to be dictatorial in his response). However, Darwall thinks that even if we alter the case to make it one where all the man who attends the class wants is to cook as well as possible, we still will not come to accept that the teacher possesses the authority to demand compliance with his directives.37 We would like to provide a different response that complements, rather than contradicts, the response we just took from Raz: we think it is important to bear in mind 152 Jurisprudence 35 One might also be concerned that the fact that the life coach was willingly employed to give directives, and did not just appear out of nowhere to give such directives, is playing a role in relation to our intuitions. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this concern. We address it below. 36 See Raz, The Morality of Freedom (n 12) 64–65. 37 Darwall (n 19) 151. that what might be fuelling counter-authority intuitions in such cases (that is, cases that involve prudential, rather than moral, reasons), to the extent that people might be inclined to share Darwall's intuitions, may be general ignorance about what is genuinely in the best interests of other people. Plausibly, we are rarely, if ever, in a good epistemic position vis-à-vis the truth about what is best for other adults' lives, especially when we limit our attention to cases where what is at issue are various ways of improving another individual's life.38 This is because we are very unsure about what is the correct, principled way to weigh the factors that contribute to wellbeing, and even whether wellbeing depends on preference-satisfaction, or the balancing of goods on an objective list, or factors that might be specified by some other general theory of wellbeing. We also very often have at least some degree of ignorance about all the prudentially relevant non-evaluative facts-especially the relevant preferences of the person we are considering. However, if we simply imagine a teacher being in a state of complete knowledge about what is actually best for her adult student, and the adult student being epistemically justified in accepting that the teacher is knowledgeable in this way, then we submit that it would not be counterintuitive to think of her as being a genuine practical authority in relation to the student (the type of authority the student really ought to follow, regardless of whether moral blame is an appropriate attitude in a case of noncompliance). Of course, given Raz's extremely attractive contention that part of what makes a life go well is the exercise of autonomy,39 the teacher who is in a position to actually know what is best for a student in some particular context would very often thus know that the student should make his own mistakes or creative decisions-this knowledge could itself be the basis of a legitimate, authoritative directive to be self-guided ('Be yourself!').40 And if the teacher knows that what is best for her student is that he make his own decision, she would also rightly conclude that it would be a mistake for the student to fail to conform to the directive to be self-guided. The student would be demonstrating bad faith were he to pretend that the teacher was actually prompting him to choose X over Y, rather than make a decision for himself. Three Conceptions of Practical Authority 153 38 What is at issue in the cases we are wishing to focus on is not an obvious threat to another person's life or well-being-since, in such cases, people might, very plausibly, be thought to possess knowledge about what is in another person's self-interest-but, instead, ways to improve a healthy person's wellbeing. In cases where it is really clear that some act will radically undermine a person's well-being, we do not share Darwall's intuition that a directive cannot be authoritative. For example, when I yell at you to look out for the ice giving way on the river under your feet, my demand that you do so is, we think, quite authoritative (assuming we are not talking about a case of rational suicide), and this demand can be authoritative even if you are a complete stranger to me. Darwall might well reply that you are under no obligation to me to look out for the ice giving way; even so, you ought to pay attention to what I am saying, and you ought to look out for the ice giving way, and that, we contend, is enough to make my demand practically authoritative. 39 Raz, The Morality of Freedom (n 12) 390–5; Raz (n 11) 1015–16. 40 It is not clear what sense Darwall can make of such a directive, and how it appears authoritative to us: the teacher is clearly not undermining or interfering with the student's autonomy in this case. To flesh out the case a little, we might add that following the teacher's directive-that the student be selfguided-will lead the student away from a tendency to make bad faith decisions, hence making him better conform with reason in the long term. We are suggesting here that one's intuitions will most clearly shift if one attends to the case just described, and if one thinks about it in relation to practical authority in general. Focusing on a teacher who possesses this kind of knowledge should lead anyone who begins by sharing the intuitions that help Darwall build his case against Raz away from those intuitions. Once the reader's intuitions have shifted, we would also suggest that he or she consider the possibility that not only agents in the right kind of epistemic position can possess practical authority in cases involving the prudential reasons of other agents, but that even alarm clocks (as in the earlier example that Darwall discusses) might possess such authority, in virtue of them reliably issuing directives that make agents better conform with reasons that already apply to them. If we are right about this, even the directives of alarm clocks can constitute preemptive reasons. We do not have space to argue for this radical version of Raz's NJT here,41 but we believe it fits very well with the minimalist conception of authority outlined below. There is a further dialectical move open to a defender of Darwall at this point. Our example of the lifestyle coach, or, indeed, Raz's example of the cooking teacher, might be thought to be problematic examples to use when arguing against Darwall, precisely because they are cases where a contractual relationship is entered into. It could be conceded by someone sympathetic to Darwall's approach that such coaches or teachers do possess practical authority, but that they only do so in virtue of the contractual relationship or promise entered into at the beginning of the relationship. And contracts or promises are clearly phenomena that are well suited to admit of a second-personal analysis, if anything is. Suppose we distinguish between two cases: (1) unbeknownst to you, a stranger has somehow been collecting highly accurate information about you, and he now comes to you to provide you with a potentially life-changing directive; (2) you have voluntarily employed a lifestyle coach to collect highly accurate information about you, and, having collected this information, he now comes to you to provide you with a potentially life-changing directive. It is tempting to suppose that even if Darwall were to concede that the putative authority in (2) is a genuine authority, while denying that the putative authority in (1) is a genuine authority, he would still be in a dialectically stronger position than Raz, because he could explain the difference between (1) and (2) in second-personal terms (there is a contract or promise at play only in (2)), and because many people might intuitively judge that the stranger in (1) has no practical authority over you, no matter how accurate and detailed his information is about you. However, such a conclusion would actually be much too quick, because Raz has available to him a perfectly good alternative explanation as to why the person in (1) would not count as a practical authority. For Raz, it is crucial that certain epistemic conditions be met, both by any putative authority and by the person who is being directed to follow that putative authority (although these conditions are not the same on each side of this relation). What is lacking in (1), and is present in (2), is epistemically well-grounded trust in 154 Jurisprudence 41 Daniel Star intends to argue for it elsewhere. the putative authority.42 We take it that expert lifestyle coaches (or cooking teachers, if you prefer) that we have employed will indeed be capable of being excellent epistemic authorities in the relevant domains, otherwise we would not (or should not) employ them. In any case, Raz can claim that their directives are only authoritative if both they and we meet appropriate epistemic conditions, and these conditions will normally not be met in cases like (1); hence we have an alternative explanation for the judgement that the stranger in (1) is not a practical authority. Given our earlier suggestions in this section as to how the intuitions that favour Darwall might be undermined, we think the dialectic now supports Raz, rather than Darwall. Throughout this section we have been focusing on the intuitions that Darwall thinks he can rely on to undermine Raz's account of authority. However, we should not forget that Darwall does not merely rely on intuitions in the counterexamples he provides; he also provides an explanation of where Raz is going wrong, ie the wrong kind of reasons explanation. However, we thought it best to focus on basic intuitions above, precisely because this wrong kind of reasons explanation is a type of explanation that itself relies on non-dialectically-neutral intuitions to function well. We think Darwall's strongest dialectical move in his recent papers was to attempt to elicit particular intuitions by providing purported counterexamples, and that, given this goal, he chose his examples well. We just also happen to think this dialectical move is not, in the end, a successful one. III. THE MINIMALIST CONCEPTION OF PRACTICAL AUTHORITY What is the fundamental role of the concept of authority under contention meant to be?43 Raz tells us that the problem that he is focusing on when writing about authorThree Conceptions of Practical Authority 155 42 Raz thinks that there are epistemic conditions that must be met by any people that might be thought to be subject to an authority in order for the putative authority to count as legitimate with respect to those people (see eg 'The Problem of Authority' (n 11) 1025–6). Spelling out these epistemic conditions in a precise way is a very tricky business for the Razian: if he makes them too weak, it will seem implausible that there can be any practical authority in play (we fear that the mere condition of knowability, which Raz provides in 'The Problem of Authority', has this weakness), but if he makes them too strong, then it will turn out that what is really at play is mere epistemic authority, rather than practical authority (see the very interesting conclusion to 'On Respect, Authority, and Neutrality' (n 12) 300–1). We do not believe that the minimalist conception of authority necessarily suffers from this problem, since there may be nothing mere about epistemic authority on this conception (especially if it is further developed in the manner alluded to in n 2 above). 43 We are using 'concept', 'conception', and 'role of the concept' as follows: first, we follow Rawls and others in using 'concept' to refer to any particularly central idea that all genuine participants in a philosophical dispute agree is the idea that they are providing alternative accounts of, and in using 'conception' to refer to any one of a number of differing accounts of the same idea (so Rawls takes it that his opponents will share his concept of justice, but will disagree with him as to whether justice as fairness is an accurate conception of justice; see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, rev edn 1999 [1971]) 5); second, to give an account of the role of a concept is not, in itself, to provide the correct conception of that concept, but to endeavour to make sure that disputants have fixed on a particular concept, rather than some other concept, by providing some account of the role that the concept plays in our thinking-if the reference of a concept is not first fixed in this way, then, ity is simply 'the problem of the possible justification of subjecting one's will to that of another, and of the normative standing of demands to do so'.44 At first glance, this statement of the basic issue seems to be a very good place to start, and we think that Darwall would agree with it. Raz thinks that to claim that someone or something is an authority in relation to oneself is, first and foremost, to claim that they stand in a certain normative or justificatory relation to one's will (or merely purport to, in the case of merely de facto authority). Raz claims that this feature of practical authority sets it apart from epistemic authority. Whereas the will plays an essential role in relation to action, it plays no such role in relation to belief, for we do not ordinarily choose what to believe.45 We do not deny that there is a difference here, but we are suspicious of the idea that the right place to begin analysing the concept of authority is with a statement of the problem of authority that entails, from the get-go, that there is a radical break between practical and epistemic authority. We would like to suggest instead that although the above way of pinning down what exactly the problem of authority is meant to be initially seems promising, the problem might instead be better stated in a more general way that involves simplifying Raz's statement as follows: the problem of authority is the problem of the possible justification of one being subject to directives originating outside of oneself. In the case of forming beliefs based on testimony, for example, the problem takes the particular form of determining when it is rational to believe the assertions of another, and the will of the other is relevant insofar as it might be directed by a desire to straightforwardly inform one of some truth, or, alternatively, by a desire to mislead. We contend that whether or not one's own will plays a role in one's being subject to the will of another is a secondary matter, so far as authority is concerned. Once one distinguishes between being legitimately subject to directives that originate outside of oneself, and being legitimately subject to the will of another in a way that involves one's own will, it becomes very attractive to think of the type of authority that involves a relation between the wills of individuals as being simply a particular species of normative authority in general. It seems sensible to view practical authority as normative authority with respect to action in particular, since 'in a way that involves one's own will' appears to be a mere qualification of a more general, attractive statement of the province of normative authority. What about the move from 'subjecting ... to that of another['s will]' to 'being subject to directives originating outside of oneself'? Again, we take this to be a move that simply hinges on noticing that there is a more general problem in this territory than one that centres on the will of the other.46 156 Jurisprudence for all we know, we might be talking past each other altogether, ie engaging in a merely verbal dispute (since it might then be the case that we are actually using two or more different concepts, rather than comparing different conceptions of a single concept). 44 Raz (n 11) 1003, emphasis added. 45 Ibid, 1034. 46 Once one makes this move, it becomes less problematic to confer authority on the alarm clock in the case discussed above. Raz would not accept this move of focusing on normative authority in general in order to understand practical authority, because he thinks one type of normative authority, epistemic authority (which he often calls 'theoretical authority'), is very different from practical authority in the following way: unlike practical authority, epistemic authority goes merely with being authoritative on some subject matter, rather than with having authority over another.47 If he were right about this, he would be right to resist our move of viewing practical authority as simply a species of normative authority in general; indeed one might then suspect that statements concerning 'epistemic authority' and statements concerning 'practical authority' involve the deployment of different concepts of authority altogether (this would be surprising, since it would suggest that the word 'authority' is ambiguous, when it does not seem to be). To make his case that epistemic authority does not involve having authority over another, he uses an example, but what he says about this example strikes us as misleading at best. Raz writes, 'For example, some people are authorities on eighteenth-century farming methods, but they do not have authority over anyone. I know nothing about eighteenth-century farming methods and should take what they say as authoritative, but they do not have authority over me.'48 We think it is true that on the assumption that one knows nothing about eighteenth-century farming methods and one has no reason to form any beliefs about eighteenth-century farming methods (apart from superficial beliefs such as that one is not interested in eighteenth-century farming methods), what an expert on such matters has to say about them will have no bearing, and plausibly should not have any bearing, on any of the beliefs one will form. But suppose one suddenly becomes interested in eighteenth-century farming methods; assuming that one is then in the business of forming beliefs about eighteenth-century farming methods (the reader can fill in the story to the requisite level of seriousness), surely the experts on the topic do indeed now have authority over oneself, with respect to the beliefs one forms about eighteenth-century farming methods. Context matters when considering who has authority over oneself. Practical authority is no different from epistemic or theoretical authority in this respect. No military sergeant presently has authority over your actions (let us assume); but, presumably, there is a possible context in which a military sergeant would have such authority over you. Since practical authority is no different than epistemic authority in this respect, we believe Raz fails to establish that only practical authority is authority over someone. In the same passage, Raz also claims that: (1) the distinction between merely de facto authority and legitimate authority does not exist in the case of theoretical authorities; and (2) only in the case of practical authority do we say that someone 'has authority' (rather than just 'is an authority'). We would suggest that (2) is an Three Conceptions of Practical Authority 157 47 Raz (n 11) 1034. Darwall likewise contends that epistemic authority is fundamentally different from practical authority, but he locates the difference in the first being fundamentally third-personal, while the second is essentially second-personal; see The Second-Person Standpoint (n 3) 12. 48 Raz (n 11) 1034. interesting, but ultimately superficial fact about our language (admittedly, it does sound a little odd to say 'that teacher has the authority to make little Jack believe that 1+3=4'). So far as (1) is concerned, we are a little surprised to find Raz making what seems, on the face of it, to be a straightforwardly false claim. Some Creationists are de facto epistemic authorities on the topic of fossils, for they strongly influence the beliefs of large numbers of followers who take them to be authoritative on the topic of fossils, but they nonetheless fail to be de jure epistemic authorities. To be fair to Raz, he might wish to claim that the correct thing to say about this example is that the Creationists are not epistemic authorities of any kind, not even de facto; however, this also seems false-if you were writing a book on Creationist teachers you might quite naturally write, 'their statements regarding fossils were authoritative with respect to the beliefs of their followers'; and you would be expressing a different kind of thought if you wrote, 'their statements regarding fossils were wrongly taken to be authoritative by their followers'. If the reader still suspects that there is a crucial difference here, then perhaps that is because he or she is misled by the fact that in many contexts theoretical authorities may disagree on some topic, or the fact that in many contexts (such as in university classrooms) it is important for adults to think and reason about even the most seemingly settled of questions. That these facts can only mislead at this point should be obvious if one recalls the point that Raz makes that beliefs are not formed in a direct, voluntary matter. It may be that the will can play an important role in placing oneself inside or outside of a context where a particular expert has epistemic authority over one's beliefs (this may sometimes be rational to do, and sometimes irrational), but the will cannot (rationally) play a direct role in resisting epistemic authority, once one is in the relevant type of context. It is true that a good theory of authority will need to adequately respect the autonomy of individual agents (this is a concern that plays a very prominent role in Darwall's criticisms of Raz, as we saw), but this is equally true in both the practical and epistemic domains: when it comes to the preemptive reasons that play a central role in Raz's service conception of authority, for instance, Raz would not want us to think that such reasons provide us with absolute duties to defer to others, or could ever be so strong or all-pervasive that they would undermine our rational capacities (since the whole point of such reasons is to allow us to better conform with reason in the long term). On the contrary, individuals will need to be able to rely on their own capacity for rational judgement to ensure that their suspension of any attempt to respond to certain types of reasons directly (rather than through the derivative reasons that authorities provide) is not inappropriate. Similarly, the ability to respond to epistemic authorities appropriately requires both a capacity to trust others, and a capacity to be able to judge when it is appropriate to suspend trust and call evidence into question. How are we to understand the relation of authority de jure to normativity in general? We take it that the most basic category of normative facts are facts about what one ought to do, ought to believe, or ought to care about, etc (or ought not do, ought not believe, or ought not care about, etc). One ought to help people in need, and ought not believe that the world is flat. Within this category of ought-facts, some such 158 Jurisprudence facts are more basic than others: if utilitarianism were true, for instance, then the most general practical normative fact would be that one always ought to maximise total wellbeing; the fact that one ought to now help a particular person in need would be a derivative normative fact, whose truth would be explained by contingent, wholly non-normative, facts (to do with pleasures, pains, and the causes thereof), in conjunction with the utilitarian principle that states the fundamental practical normative fact. It is the job of normative ethical theory to articulate and defend principles that state the most basic or fundamental normative facts. There are also facts about what normative reasons there are to do one thing or another. The concept of a reason stands to the concept of ought in the following two ways: (1) judgements about reasons are typically inputs to practical reasoning, whereas judgements about oughts are typically outputs; and (2) reasons are typically weighed up against each other, whereas oughts are (at least typically) verdictive, or all-things-considered. We take these to be basic truisms about the relation of normative reasons to oughts that are independent of any particular account of reasons. If I have promised to meet you to return your oboe to you at 2 pm today, and I encounter a person in dire straits at 1.50 pm, on my way to meet you, I might weigh the reason I have to meet you against the reason I have to stop and help the person in need. I might rationally judge that one of these reasons is stronger than the other, then conclude that I ought to help the person in dire need. Notice that it is an elementary fact about the phenomenology involved in such cases that I do not typically view the force of these reasons as resting inside of myself (whether in my will or my desires), but rather in external facts having to do with other people being in need, promises being made to others etc.49 Crucially, normative reasons, like oughts, have a quality of external authoritativeness about them.50 This is where one should start when thinking about authority, ie with the authority of normative facts. The fact that a person in front of me is in dire straits (in the imagined scenario) is a reason to help her whose normative authority rests, at least in part, in this very external fact. If I asked 'but why help her?' you would be right to say, 'can't you see, she is in pain!'. The fact of her pain is (or gives rise to) a directive that I must, if I am reasonable, appropriately respond to.51 Recall that at the beginning of this secThree Conceptions of Practical Authority 159 49 By pointing this out, we are not trying to rule out the type of Humeanism that claims that all normative reasons rest ultimately on the psychology of the agent for whom they are reasons. Whether or not such Humeanism is tenable is beyond the scope of this paper. For the best recent defence of this type of Humeanism, see Mark Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions (Oxford University Press, 2007). 50 Defenders of Humean theories, at least if they possess the kind of sophistication that is required to make such theories plausible, need not deny this, nor need they view this quality as completely superficial, for they can agree with non-Humeans that the authority of reasons lies outside of one's conscious self, since, according to them, this authority will (in many cases, at least) be based in mental states that are distant, opaque and inflexible, compared to one's present, occurrent desires or one's present, active will. 51 Since reasons are (at least typically) pro tanto, they can be outweighed, so it is possible that the appropriate response will not be to act as the reason directs me to act; this will be because of countervailing considerations, and it would typically be inappropriate for me to fail to recognise, either in my deliberations or after the fact, that an overridden directive of which I am aware does still have some claim on me. tion of the paper we offered up a minimalist conception of practical authority, according to which the problem of authority is the problem of the possible justification of one being subject to directives originating outside of oneself. Now we can see that this is simply the problem of how it is that some facts provide agents with normative reasons for action, where attending to those reasons can lead agents to make correct judgements about what they ought to do, and where these reasons do not (or do not prima facie) rest on properties internal to the agent. Normative reasons are facts that constitute directives for rational agents. Some such facts will be facts about commands issued by entities (eg people or institutions), and in such cases their verbal directives may provide normative reasons of a derivative kind, but we should not begin by restricting the notion of a directive to that of a verbal directive. IV. CONCLUSION We have argued that, in different ways, both Darwall's and Raz's conceptions of authority are based on too narrow an understanding of the problem of authority. This problem may be best construed as a problem that arises not first and foremost as a problem for one's will in relation to other people's wills, but as a problem of determining when one should align one's beliefs or actions with normative directives that have their source outside of oneself. We have not attempted to provide a general solution to this problem, and we have not attempted the more particular goal of explaining the nature or grounding of preemptive reasons, but we believe that whatever authority such reasons have is likely to be more general than Raz supposes, for we can look for features of this authority in the realm of belief, as well as the realm of action. Darwall's second-personal account of authority is even narrower than Raz's. We find much more attractive and plausible an approach to the problem of authority that would start with a very general understanding of the authority genus, and then locate particular species of it. We have nothing against thinking of second-personal moral authority as one type of practical authority, but we do not believe that Darwall has provided us with adequate reasons to limit our understanding of practical authority in general to the second-personal standpoint, just as we do not believe that Raz has provided us with adequate reasons to limit normative authority to practical authority, or, indeed, the particular type of practical authority that he attempts to provide an analysis of with the two conditions that make up the service conception. 160 Jurisprudence

Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2012) 599–604Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Consciousness and Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate /concogThe myth of phenomenological overflow Richard Brown CUNY LaGuardia, 31-10 Thompson Ave., Long Island City, NY 11101, United States a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c tArticle history: Available online 22 July 2011 Keywords: Higher-order thought Consciousness Phenomenological overflow Mesh argument Methodological puzzle1053-8100/$ see front matter  2011 Elsevier Inc doi:10.1016/j.concog.2011.06.005 E-mail address: [email protected] 1 Lau's paper and commentaries on it were original used with permission. The video of Lau's original ke consciousnessonline.wordpress.com/2010/02/19/sens 2 On Lau's specific version of higher-order theory (L or, as he prefers to put it, an estimate of whether the higher-order theory will not concern us here; our cur consciousness.In this paper I examine the dispute between Hakwan Lau, Ned Block, and David Rosenthal over the extent to which empirical results can help us decide between first-order and higher-order theories of consciousness. What emerges from this is an overall argument to the best explanation against the first-order view of consciousness and the dispelling of the mythological notion of phenomenological overflow that comes with it.  2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.In this paper I will examine the dispute between Hakwan Lau, Ned Block, and David Rosenthal over the extent to which empirical results can help us decide between first-order and higher-order theories of consciousness.1 According to the higher-order view, having a representation in the relevant first-order brain area (e.g. V1, V2, V3) is not enough for there to be a conscious experience. For that to happen, one needs to also have higher-order representations that are about the first-order representations (presumably in the prefrontal cortex). For instance, on Rosenthal's specific version of the theory (Rosenthal, 2005), in order to make a first-order perceptual state conscious, one needs to have a thought-like state to the effect that one is in that particular perceptual state. This is because to be conscious of something one needs to mentally represent it. Rosenthal calls this the Transitivity Principle which states that ''mental states are conscious only if one is in some way conscious of them,'' (Rosenthal, 2005, p. 3). In contrast a first-order theory maintains that one can have conscious perceptions in the absence of any kind of higher-order awareness. I will argue that Block's mesh argument (Block, 2007, 2008), all things considered, actually supports the higher-order approach to consciousness, rather than the first-order view that Block introduced it to support. Lau presented data he took to provide evidence for a version of the higher-order theory.2 Following standard signal-detection theory (Green & Swets, 1966), Lau distinguishes between d0 (pronounced 'd prime') and perceptual certainty. D0 is a measure of how much information is captured by a given system. We can think of a person as a signal transducer and see how much information versus noise there is in the signal. Lau presents subjects with stimuli that are just at threshold, so that the visual stimuli are designed to be just barely consciously visible. Participants are then asked to press a button when they have seen the visual stimuli. That enables us to see how successful subjects are, as measured by their d0 score. A high d0 score indicates that they have a high success rate discriminating the stimulus while a low d0 occurs when they have a low accuracy rate. In addition, we can also ask subjects how certain they are that they have seen a stimulus; we can call this second result judgments of perceptual certainty.. All rights reserved. ly presented at the NYU workshop on perception October 31st, 2009. This session was video recorded and ynote and those of the commentaries, and discussion can be viewed at Consciousness Online: http:// ory-awareness-and-perceptual-certainty/. au, 2008) the higher-order state consists of an estimate of the probability of being in the first-order state first-order signal represents something real or is just noise. The differences among various versions of the rent focus is simply whether there is evidence that higher-order activity of some kind is responsible for 600 R. Brown / Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2012) 599–604Lau's basic idea is that d0 gives us a measure of what first-order sensory states there are in the person while perceptual certainty judgments give us a measure of the higher-order state that is present. In a recent study Lau used transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to disrupt functioning in the prefrontal area (Lau & Passingham, 2006), and this had the result of lowering perceptual certainty while leaving d0 unaffected. Importantly they were able to find two points with the same d0 scores and a difference in the perceptual certainty judgments. That is, subjects were matched with respect to discriminating the stimulus but with TMS stimulation they were relatively unsure whether they had seen anything or not. Without the TMS subjects had higher perceptual certainty judgments. The fMRI data revealed that there was a difference in the activity of dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) but not in early visual areas in association with the difference in subjective perceptual uncertainty. And on the higher-order hypothesis, visual areas would subserve first-order visual states, whereas dlPFC would subserve a higher-order awareness, in this case related to degree of perceptual certainty. These results seem to suggest that higher-order activity of some sort is necessary for phenomenal consciousness. When the prefrontal area is disrupted, subjects lose their perceptual certainty but are still able to process the stimuli unconsciously. It is plausible to think that the first-order state is responsible for their performance on the task while the higher-order state is responsible for their awareness of the first-order state. Without the relevant higher-order state subjects have no conscious experience. Block responds that this is not evidence for the higher-order approach. The reason is that he has an alternative interpretation of the data. On Block's view there can be phenomenally conscious states that one does not have cognitive access to. In the case Lau presents, subjects have a phenomenally conscious sensory state, but are unable to access it and so unable to report it. dlPFC is disrupted in Lau's experiment, and since this is the area of the brain we would expect to subserve higher-order judgments about one's experience, that disruption explains why they are unable to report their experience. To many this sounds like a contradiction but Block has mounted a more general argument that there can be phenomenological overflow or that there is more in our conscious phenomenology than we can access. He appeals to the classic Sperling results (Sperling, 1960) as well as more recent results from Landman and Sligte (Landman, Spekreijse, & Lamme, 2003; Sligte, Scholte, & Lamme, 2008; Sliste, Scholte, & Lamme, 2009) as evidence. Let us look at each paradigm in turn. In the Sperling experiments subjects are presented with a 3  4 array of letters which is flashed very quickly on a computer screen. Subjects report that they see a bunch of letters arranged in a block but are unable to say what most of the letters are. Things change, however, if a tone cuing subjects to report one single row of four letters comes after the display ceases to be visually present. In that case they are able to report the letters in the cued row. Block reasons as follows. We have evidence that subjects have an experience of all of the letters. That is the only way that they would be able to report the letters when they are cued (remember, the cue comes after the stimulus is no longer visually present) and subjects report that they see all of the letters. So the best explanation, according to Block, is that they have phenomenally conscious experience that overflows the higher-order awareness that enables reports of the letters specific identities. However, this is too quick. The higher-order approach has a ready response to this challenge.3 On Rosenthal's view when one sees the Sperling stimulus one has a first-order mental state that represents all of the letters and their spatial relationships. Because of the conditions of presentation, one's higher-order state represents the first-order state as some letters arranged in a block formation. So the first-order state, which represents all the letters, is conscious but not in respect of all its detail; it is conscious only in respect of its more generic properties. That is because, on the higher-order approach, the higher-order state may make us aware of the first-order state in respect to some of its properties but not all of them.4 This explanation of the phenomenon has received some experimental support (see De Gardelle, Sackur, & Kouider, 2009). What this means is that in addition to the properties which figure into my conscious experience there are also non-conscious qualitative properties, which are precisely those properties of the relevant first-order state of which I am unaware. This response is importantly different from that of Stanislaus Dehaene (Dehaene, Nacchache, Sackur, & Sergent, 2006). On Dehaene's view we suffer from the so-called refrigerator-light fallacy. Often when our mental states are conscious we have a rich phenomenology. So we assume that this rich phenomenology is present even when we are unaware of the relevant mental states; that is analogous to assuming the refrigerator light is on even when the refrigerator door is shut, since it is on whenever we can tell directly whether it is on. On Rosenthal's view there is no illusion. Conscious perceptual experience coincides with what subjects are able to report, though there is often additional perceptual content that is not conscious and which subjects cannot report. On Rosenthal's view what it is like for these subjects is very much like what it is like to be seeing a group of blurry objects. One consciously sees all of the shapes or letters but does not consciously see all of the specific identities of the letters. Any apparent overflow is explained along the following lines. Subjects see some blurry letters and figure one of two things: Either the letters are actually blurry, or they're well defined and it is distance, or something else, that makes them look blurry. Unlike Dehaene's account the proposal is not that subjects are inferring that there is phenomenology they do not have cognitive access to; they are inferring that there may be something that they are not seeing as well as they could.3 As David Rosenthal argued in his comments. 4 Rosenthal has also deployed the same line of response to Dretske's famous use of change blindness against higher-order theories (Dretske, 2007). In socalled cases of change blindness subjects fail to notice changes that happen right in front of them. Dretske argues that in such cases subjects have a conscious experience of the difference without being conscious of the difference, which looks like a violation of the transitivity principle. Rosenthal has responded (2005, p. 114) that we are conscious of the things in respect of which the two scenes differ, but we are not conscious of those things as the things that make those scenes different. Thus there is no conscious state of which we are not conscious of being in only ones of which we are conscious of some but not all of its properties. R. Brown / Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2012) 599–604 601So we seem to have arrived at a stand still. Each is able to give a story that is consistent with the empirical data. On the one hand we have Block's model, which includes phenomenological overflow. On that model we have phenomenology going with the first-order systems and access to those first-order systems going with the higher-order prefrontal areas. On the other hand we have Rosenthal's and Lau's higher-order models, which deny phenomenological overflow. The phenomenology is constituted-and so exhausted-by the higher-order access to the first-order states. Yet each model holds that there are two systems, one with high capacity and one with a relatively lower capacity. Thus each model is consistent with all of the empirical data and each licenses a mesh between psychological and neuroscientific results; the only difference between the models is whether it makes sense to describe what is overflowing reportability as phenomenology, as against non-conscious first-order qualitative states.5 Block has recently taken to stressing the Landman and Sligte paradigm as a superior way to make the argument for phenomenological overflow. In the Landman set up subjects are presented with an array of rectangular gradient patches in specific orientations ordered in a circle. They then have a grey interstimulus mask after which another array which either does or does not have one of the rectangle's orientations changed (50% of the time it does, 50% does not). The interestingly new tweak in this set up is that the stimulus is set up so as to evoke what Block calls ''a positive afterimage''. In essence this is a phenomenally conscious experience of the stimulus that persists for a brief period after the actual stimulus is no longer present. As Block notes, Sligte and Landman have found that this is divided into two phases. In the first of these phases the afterimage is indistinguishable from the experience subjects have when viewing the actual stimulus. After a brief period (roughly between 100 and 300 ms; see Block, 2007, p. 490) the experience becomes ghostly and faded but still distinctly visible according to subjects' reports (this phase can last up to four seconds with training (see Sligte et al., 2008). Subjects are usually very bad at detecting the change unless there is a cue during the interstimulus period consisting of a line which points to the place where the rectangle that will or will not change would be located. When the cue is presented during the period when the conscious experience is reported to persist subjects are much better at detecting whether there was a change. So in these cases, Block argues, we have clearer evidence for phenomenological overflow. The subjects are having phenomenally conscious experiences and in the first, no cue, condition they cannot report the orientations of more than 4 of the rectangles. With the cue they are much better. So Block reasons that they have a phenomenally conscious experience that represents the arrangement of rectangles and their specific orientations, since we can report the position of any cued rectangle. However there is more that is phenomenally conscious than what we can report since Landman et al. calculated that subjects could track at most the orientations of four of the rectangles (Block, 2007, p. 488). Subjects say that they see all or most of the rectangles so why should not we conclude that they are right and that there is overflow? Block acknowledges that one response is to deny that the subjects are right when they say that they really do see all of the rectangles and their specific orientations; perhaps, as before, they suffer from a refrigerator light fallacy. Block gives four reasons against this. These are: (1) that subjects are normal, (2) that they say they are basing their judgments on their visual experience, (3) Block finds it hard to picture what the phenomenology is actually like if one denies phenomenological overflow, and finally (4) that there is also some empirical evidence that the visual system constructs an image, thus corroborating subjects' reports that they are making these judgments based on a conscious visual image. This final consideration is motivated by a variation on the classic experiments that suggests that subjects have access to both size and orientation information.6 Let us look at these in reverse order. There may be evidence for some kind of visual image as the basis for subject's ability to perform but there is no evidence that the image is conscious in respect of all of its details. On Rosenthal's model there can be unconscious qualitative character. This is arguably what happens in standard subliminal vision-e.g., masked priming, and also (what is different) in blindsight. When this qualitative character occurs unconsciously there is nothing that it is like for the subject. Rosenthal has argued extensively for what he calls the homomorphism account of sensory qualities (Rosenthal, 2005), which is precisely meant to be an account of what qualitative character could be specified in a way that does not appeal to consciousness. So the mere fact that subjects have access to information about size as well as orientation may show that there is a visual image that is constructed and being used to generate the comparisons but it cannot show that the image is conscious with respect to these properties, which is what is needed. What about the third consideration? Block has argued that he does not quite get what the alternative is supposed to be. He distinguishes between general and specific phenomenal content. As he says, both parties agree that there is some general content ''letters arranged in a grid,'' or ''rectangles arranged in a circle'' but what specific content is there? That is, what exactly is it like for the subject as they look at the rectangles but cannot report their orientations? In particular Block is vexed about what the story would be pre and post cue. If the idea is that there is no specific phenomenology before the cue, but there is afterwards that is very odd and also does not seem to match up with what subjects report (i.e. they do not report any weirdness in their experience). But we have already seen the answer that has been given by the higher-order camp. What it is like is like having the experience of a bunch of indeterminate letters arranged in a grid. There is no (conscious) specific5 In fact, Rosenthal has himself suggested that there may be merely a terminological dispute between himself and Block (Rosenthal, 2002). As he says, If we agree, however, not to worry about which mental phenomena deserve the honorific title 'consciousness,' it may seem that there is nothing left about which Block and I disagree. We might even agree to apply the term 'conscious', in a special sense, to states that exhibit only thin phenomenality [i.e. non-conscious qualitative character]. Though we are in no way aware of those states, being in them does result in our being conscious of various things. So those states do have an essential connection with consciousness (Page 660). 6 See page 309 in Block (2008) for details on the Landman et al. variation. 602 R. Brown / Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2012) 599–604content in these cases, on the Rosenthal model. Or to put it in another way, the specific content is the content of the firstorder states but we are only conscious of them in some respect but not others. So, in answer to Block's question about what it is like for one to be a subject in these experiments on the higher-order approach we can say that it is similar to what it is like when things actually are fuzzy-when one has only some detail because of the optical situation. There is a similar what it is like in the two cases. When the cue comes one's attention is drawn to the location of the rectangle and one is able to make the discrimination. What should we say about these first two considerations? We do have some reason to take the reports of subjects in the experiments seriously. So we do have some reason to believe them when they say that they are basing their judgments on their conscious visual phenomenology. Subjects also say they have a conscious experience of the shapes but deny that they have conscious experience of the identity of all 12 letters or the orientations of all the shapes. So far nothing in what the subjects report suggests that there is any kind of overflow. In fact at this point it is hard to see how they disagree. Loosely paraphrasing Block says that what is conscious but not reportable are the specific identities of the letters or the specific orientations of all of the rectangles (2008). Rosenthal has agreed with him. One is consciously seeing all of the rectangles, just as one does when one sees a fuzzy image, but fails to be conscious of the specific orientations of the rectangles and so cannot report them. This fits exactly what the subjects report. Block argues that subjects base their reports on a conscious visual image of the stimuli. Rosenthal agrees. They consciously see all of the blocks but fail to be conscious of them in respect of all of their properties (i.e. the specific orientations of each rectangle). Given this we have again failed to find any reason to postulate phenomenological overflow. Lau appeals to Rahnev, Maniscalco, Huang, and Lau (2009) as providing evidence for the claim that subjects are mistaken when they say that they see each and every rectangle and its specific orientation. In these experiments subjects were asked to attend to an area and were presented stimuli in the unattended region. At the same time subjects were asked to make judgments about perceptual certainty. What they discovered was that when the d0 of subjects was matched between the attended and unattended conditions subjects gave a higher rating to their perceptual certainty. That is, they felt more confident that they had seen the stimulus in the unattended region even though they were no better at detecting the stimulus.7 This would explain why it is that people feel as though they have more in their conscious experience than they can report. Given this there is no reason to posit phenomenological overflow. Block responds by arguing that these results actually show that the identification of perceptual certainty with phenomenology is mistaken.8 He does not elaborate on the reason, but it should be clear what his reasoning would be. If we identify phenomenology with the activity in the lower visual areas and we find out that those visual areas are incapacitated or otherwise inactive, we should conclude that there is no, or at least very diminished, phenomenology. But it is important to stress that this is on the assumption that phenomenology goes with first-order states, that is, with activity in visual cortical areas. If that were the case then we would have a disassociation between Lau's notion of perceptual certainty and phenomenal consciousness. But this already assumes that Block has successfully argued for phenomenological overflow, and Lau had invoked the Rahnev results to argue against that overflow notion by showing that his model could account for any temptation to posit phenomenological overflow. We should also note that the same kind of reasoning that Block endorses suggests that we should take the reports of subjects in the Rahnev experiments seriously as well. In Rahnev forthcoming it is noted that subjects are themselves very surprised that they were wrong. This is taken to suggest that they really feel as though they were seeing things in the unattended location even though the first-order activity was very low, suggesting that they did not have the relevant first-order states. Given this it is perfectly understandable why subjects in the Landman and Sligte paradigms say that they see all of the rectangles as well as their specific orientations. Attention is directed to the location of the cue and because of this the Rahnev effect kicks in and subjects overestimate how much they see in the unattended region. Overall, then, we have seen that there is no reason to believe in phenomenological overflow. It is not entailed by the reports given by subjects in Landman and Sligte experiments nor is it entailed by reports from the Sperling cases. We can explain why people may feel as though they see more than what they can report. Given this the higher-order approach seems to provide the better mesh. It is able to make sense of the putative cases of phenomenological overflow without postulating any such overflow and it is able to explain why subjects report what they do in Rahnev cases. The opposing view has to claim that subjects in the Rahnev cases are wrong when they say that they saw things in the unattended location. This will save one's view but it seems unlikely for the very reasons that Block gives. Given this the overall best explanation would be the one that rejects phenomenological overflow; we simply have no reason to think it exists and no need of it in our theoretical machinery. As noted at the beginning of this paper, many people find the idea of phenomenal consciousness in the absence of any kind of awareness to be close to contradictory. I have not made much of this in my previous argument since I wanted to evaluate the empirical evidence for the claim. After all, nature retains the right to trump our intuitions. But now that we have seen that there is no reason to postulate phenomenological overflow we should briefly re-examine the issue. The strangeness7 This is what Lau calls Fake Phenomenology, which is roughly the idea that the higher-order state represents the first-order state as being determinate but not representing the details (cf Grush, 2007). So in the Landman case Lau might hold that the higher-order states represents something like ''I am seeing a bunch of rectangles arranged in a circle and I am aware of each rectangle's orientation.'' In the Landman cases the relevant first-order state is actually present, in the Rahnev cases it is not. 8 In his video commentary. R. Brown / Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2012) 599–604 603is brought out by asking what it could mean to say that there is phenomenology that we have no cognitive access to? On the face of it, it sounds like we are being asked to believe that there are phenomenally conscious mental states that one is in no way aware of being in but yet there is none the less something that it is like to be in that state. But what sense can we make of a phenomenally conscious state that one is in no way aware of being in? A state is phenomenally conscious when there is something that it is like for the creature to be in that state. When there is nothing that it is like for the creature then there is no phenomenal consciousness. So when we are told that there are phenomenally conscious states that we are in no way aware of what we are really being told is that there is something that it is like for me and that I am in no way aware of what it is like for me. This sounds like a contradiction. How can it be like something for me to have a state when, if asked, I would deny that there is anything that it is like for me? Block has recently acknowledged that there is awareness of some sort involved in every phenomenally conscious experience (Block, 2007, 2008, 2009) and so has come to accept some version of the transitivity principle. But he has resisted the move to a higher-order form of awareness. Instead he has alternated between a deflationary and a self-representational account of the kind of awareness that he thinks we can say is involved in phenomenal consciousness. Following Sosa (Sosa, 2002) he argues that just as I smile my own smiles, I also experience my own experiences just in the having of them. And perhaps that is all there is, Block argues, to the way in which we're aware of our conscious experiences. He has more recently moved from this deflationary reading of awareness to talking about a 'same-order' or self-representational account of the awareness of our own phenomenal consciousness. On this account the phenomenally conscious experience represents itself in some way, but this same-order self-representation is, according to Block, distinct from any kind of higher-order awareness. Let us quickly examine these two proposals. The terms, 'same-order' and 'self-representational' have also been used by Kriegel (2009), and so one may think that Block has moved to this kind of view. But this would be incorrect. On Kriegel's view both the first-order and higher-order content contribute to the overall phenomenology of one's conscious experience. As Kriegel formulates it, the first-order state contributes the specific content of one's phenomenal consciousness whereas the higher-order awareness is that which makes it a phenomenally conscious state in the first-place. The two aspects are bound into a unitary mental state by some psychologically real process. But it is arguable that this is just a variant of the higher-order approach. The higher-order awareness here is a distinct state that has to be bound into a composite with the first order-order state. It is also not clear how stable this position is. If the first-order state can occur without the higher-order awareness then we need to know what it will be like for the subject. For instance, consciously seeing red, on this view, would involve a representation, say in V4 being bound to activity in, say, dlPFC (say, via all of these neurons in different places firing in the same frequency (Brown, 2006). The activity in V4 makes it the case that I am consciously seeing red whereas the dlPFC activity makes it the case that I am consciously seeing anything at all. We can then ask what it would be like for someone who just had the activity in V4. If the answer is 'nothing' then how can the first-order state determine what it is like for me when I am conscious of it? On the other hand if it is like seeing red for me then it is not clear how the higher-order awareness can be the factor that determines that it is a phenomenal experience at all. By contrast, the kind of self-representation that Block is interested in is stipulated to be distinct from the kind of awareness appealed to by Kriegel or Rosenthal. But if the notion of self-representation at work here is not at least something like that of Kriegel's what could it be? Perhaps it is nothing more than the deflationary notion of awareness? Perhaps the basic intuition that Block has is that the notion of awareness has be such that we get it simply by having the relevant experience in the first place. The problem with either self-representational or deflationary accounts of awareness is that they do not seem to be able to make sense of the idea of this kind of awareness coming and going. A mental state can be conscious at one time and unconscious at another and if we are to take Block's recent proposal seriously that would amount to me having an experience that self-represents and then does not self-represent; but how is this possible if we do not have something like higher-order awareness in mind? The problem is even worse for the deflationary notion. On the deflationary account I am aware of my experiences just in the having of them; so how could I have an experience and yet fail to be aware of it? The result is that qualitative states are always conscious. Perhaps those like Block do not worry about this apparent mystery. They may see it as the nature of phenomenal consciousness: As with the notion of a quale, there is no such thing as its occurring without being conscious. But this is hardly a congenial position for those that are physicalists. If consciously seeing red, for instance, is just a certain kind of activation or recurrent processing in early visual areas then we certainly have cases where this activation is too low to generate a conscious experience, or so it would seem and in such cases we would have to say that the state self-represents itself at one time and does not at another time. But what could that mean on the present account? So this notion of self-representation is very mysterious. In the absence of some kind of account and without evidence to the contrary what reason do we have for denying that the awareness is some kind higher-order activity? One can dig in one's heels and insist that there is phenomenological overflow in some substantive sense and that these states represent themselves in some mysterious way, and this will save one's theory, but it begins to become clear that this is an ad hoc move made to save a theoretical claim. There is no compelling non-question begging reason to think that there is something that both outstrips our ability to report and threatens the higher-order approach to consciousness. What emerges from this is an overall argument to the best explanation against the first-order view of consciousness and the dispelling of the mythological notion of phenomenological overflow that comes with it. Block argues that if subjects are 604 R. Brown / Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2012) 599–604right when they say that they see all of the objects then there must be some phenomenally conscious experience that they cannot report. But this is a myth because it relies on the assumption that subjects must have specific phenomenal contents in order for what they say to be true. If Rosenthal is right that the subjects are aware of all of the shapes but not in respect of all of their properties then taking their reports seriously does not entail that there is phenomenological overflow. All that overflows may be non-conscious qualitative character. Secondly any temptation to posit specific phenomenological overflow is mitigated by results like those reported in the Rahnev cases. That data suggests that when we attend to one location we subjectively inflate the phenomenology in the unattended location such that one would feel as though one had seen all of the shapes and their specific orientations even if one had not. Finally, some kind of awareness is required for phenomenal consciousness to account for the distinctive 'for-me-ness,' or ''me-ishness'' as Block has called it. Once one has accepted that this is the case, the most plausible candidate is some kind of higher-order awareness. To put it the other way, what reason is there to prefer the self-representational view? Without a worked out account of what notion of self-representation is in play and how it works, it is hard to say. On the other hand, there is ample empirical and philosophical support for the higherorder approach (Brown & Lau, forthcoming; Lau & Rosenthal, forthcoming) and it elegantly explains the notion of awareness in play in terms of higher-order states representing the relevant first-order states. In short, then, phenomenological overflow is an interesting theoretical possibility but we just do not have any evidence for it and there are better, less mysterious, options on the table.9 References Block, N. (2007). Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30, 481–548. Block, N. (2008). Consciousness and cognitive access. In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Vol. cviii, Part 3). Block, N. (2009). Comparing the major theories of consciousness. In M. S. Gazzaniga (Ed.), The cognitive neurosciences IV. MIT Press. Brown, R. (2006). What is a brain state? Philosophical Psychology, 19(6), 729–746. Brown, R., & Lau, H. (forthcoming). In A. Pautz & B. Stoljar (Eds.), The emperor's new phenomenology? Empirical support for empty higher-order representations. Themes from Ned Block. MIT press. De Gardelle, V., Sackur, J., & Kouider, S. (2009). Perceptual illusions in brief visual presentations. Consciousness and Cognition, 18(3), 569–577. Dehaene, S., Nacchache, L., Sackur, J., & Sergent, C. (2006). 'Conscious, preconscious, and subliminal processing: A testable taxonomy'. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10, 204–211. Dretske, F. (2007). What change blindness teaches about consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives, 21(1), 215–222. Green, D. M., & Swets, J. A. (1966). Signal detection theory and psychophysics. New York: Wiley. Grush, R. (2007). A plug for generic phenomenology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30, 504–505. Kriegel, U. (2009). Self-representationalism and phenomenology. Philosophical Studies, 143, 357–381. Landman, R., Spekreijse, H., & Lamme, V. A. F. (2003). Large capacity storage of integrated objects before change blindness. Vision Research, 43(2), 149–164. Lau, H. (2008). A higher order Bayesian decision theory of consciousness. Progress in Brain Research, 168, 35–48. Lau, H., & Rosenthal, D. (forthcoming). Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness. Trends in Cognitive Science. Lau, H., & Passingham, R. (2006). Relative blindsight in normal observers and the neural correlate of visual consciousness. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 103(49), 18763–18768. Rahnev, D., Maniscalco, B., Huang, E., & Lau, H. C. (2009). Inattention boosts subjective visibility: Implications for inattentional and change blindness. Journal of Vision, 9(8), 157. Rosenthal, D. (2002). How many kinds of consciousness? Consciousness and Cognition, 11, 653–665. Rosenthal, D. (2005). Consciousness and mind. New York: Oxford University Press. Sligte, I. G., Scholte, H. S., & Lamme, V. A. F. (2008). Are there multiple visual short-term memory stores? Plos One, 3(2), 1–9. Sligte, I. G., Scholte, H. S., & Lamme, V. A. F. (2009). V4 activity predicts the strength of visual short-term memory representations. Journal of Neuroscience, 29(23), 7432–7438. Sosa, E. (2002). Privileged access. In Q. Smith & A. Jokic (Eds.), Consciousness: New philosophical perspectives (pp. 273–294). Oxford University Press. Sperling, G. (1960). The information available in brief visual presentations. Psychological Monographs, 74, 1–29.9 Thanks to David Rosenthal, Jacob Berger, Hakwan Lau, Ned Block, Bruce Bridgeman, and Pete Mandik for very helpful comments on previous drafts. Earlier versions of this paper were presented in the Psychology Department at Columbia University March 22, 2010 and at the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness June 24th 2010 as ''Consciousness and the Tribunal of Experience''.

RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI FILOSOFIA E PSICOLOGIA DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2015.0009 ISSN 2039-4667; E-ISSN 2239-2629 Vol. 6 (2015), n. 1, pp. 120-129 M. Grasso Dipartimento di Filosofia, Comunicazione e Spettacolo, Università Roma Tre, via Ostiense, 134 00154 Roma (I) E-mail: [email protected] () Ricerce The Metaphysics of Free Will: A Critique of Free Won't as Double Prevention Matteo Grasso Ricevuto: 30 novembre 2014; accettato: 10 marzo 2015 █ Abstract The problem of free will is deeply linked with the causal relevance of mental events. The causal exclusion argument claims that, in order to be causally relevant, mental events must be identical to physical events. However, Gibb has recently criticized it, suggesting that mental events are causally relevant as double preventers. For Gibb, mental events enable physical effects to take place by preventing other mental events from preventing a behaviour to take place. The role of mental double preventers is hence similar to what Libet names free won't, namely the ability to veto an action initiated unconsciously by the brain. In this paper I will propose an argument against Gibb's account, the causal irrelevance argument, showing that Gibb's proposal does not overcome the objection of systematic overdetermination of causal relevance, because mental double preventers systematically overdetermine physical double preventers, and therefore mental events are causally irrelevant. KEYWORDS: Free Will; Free Won't; Metaphysics; Mental Causation; Double Prevention. █ Riassunto La metafisica del libero arbitrio: una critica al veto cosciente come duplice inibizione – Il problema del libero arbitrio è intimamente legato alla rilevanza causale degli eventi mentali. Secondo l'argomento dell'esclusione causale si afferma che gli eventi mentali, per essere causalmente rilevanti, debbano essere identici a quelli fisici. In tempi recenti Gibb ha avanzato l'ipotesi che gli eventi mentali hanno rilevanza causale in quanto duplici inibitori. Secondo Gibb gli eventi mentali permettono il verificarsi di effetti fisici, impedendo che altri eventi mentali inibiscano il verificarsi di un certo comportamento. Il ruolo di duplice inibitore degli eventi mentali è quindi simile a quanto Libet chiama veto cosciente, ossia la capacità di posizione di veto nei confronti di un'azione inconsapevolmente avviata dal cervello. In questo articolo intendo proporre un argomento contrario all'approccio di Gibb, l'argomento dell'irrilevanza causale, in cui si sostiene come la proposta di Gibb non riesca a superare l'obiezione della sistematica sovradeterminazione della rilevanza causale dal momento che gli eventi mentali come duplici inibitori sovradeterminano sistematicamente quelli fisici e quindi gli eventi mentali sono causalmente irrilevanti. PAROLE CHIAVE: Libero arbitrio; Veto cosciente; Metafisica; Causazione mentale; Duplice inibizione.  █ Introduction FREE WILL IS ONE OF the most ancient and debated problems of philosophy. It is at the centre of our conception of responsibility, and is deeply linked with the causal relevance of mental events. Not every action is free: traditionally, two conditions are thought to be necessary for a free action. First, the principle of alternative possibilities claims that Ricerche Creative Commons Attribuzione4.0 Internazionale The Metaphysics of Free Will 121 being free requires the ability to do otherwise, i.e. at least two different courses of action should be available for each free choice. If a magician hypnotises me and makes me bark like a dog, my barking is not the result of a free decision, because I could not have done otherwise. Second, the condition of autodetermination or "control" requires that the mental states (thoughts, desires, beliefs, etc.) of the subject must be causally relevant for the outcome of the action. This condition distinguishes decisions that are taken randomly from decisions coherent with the reasons and the desires of the subject. According to illusionists, sceptics and hard determinists, the principle of alternative possibilities is impossible to satisfy in a deterministic world, since in such a word the state of the universe at a certain time is necessarily determined by the conjunction of the laws of nature and the state of the universe at a previous time, so that no alternative course of action is actually possible. Traditionally, the experiments on conscious will performed by the neuroscientist Benjamin Libet1 have been taken to support the view that, if decisions are reached unconsciously by the brain and in advance of subjects' awareness, then the principle of alternative possibilities can never be satisfied. However, contrary to this interpretation, Libet2 claims that even if there is experimental evidence against freedom, free will can be preserved in the form of the subject's ability to inhibit unconsciously originated actions, employing the so-called free won't. Other scholars have proposed accounts of free will that reject the principle of alternative possibilities. In particular, the proponents of the source models of control claim that autodetermination is sufficient for actions to be free, allowing agents to be morally responsible for their conduct.3 According to these authors, as long as the subject's action arises from her mental states (intentions, desires, beliefs, etc.), she is a genuine source of her action, independently of the deterministic nature of the world. Sure enough the subject is not the ultimate source of her action, but for compatibilism this form of autodetermination is sufficient to ensure free will and moral responsibility. As I will argue, source models of control rest on the implicit metaphysical assumption that mental events are causally relevant as (mediated) sources of actions, and this claim is problematic because the causal efficacy of mental events has been criticized by the causal exclusion argument. Recently, Sophie Gibb has defended the causal relevance of mental events claiming that free won't represents a case of mental double prevention.4 This new approach is original and promising, and in this paper I will assess Gibb's theory, focusing on both the strengths and possible weaknesses. In the first section of this article I will present Libet's theory of free won't. In the second and third sections I will present Gibb's criticism to the causal exclusion argument5 and Gibb's theory of mental double preventers. In the fourth section I will raise an argument against Gibb's account of the relevance of mental events as double preventers, that I will call the causal irrelevance argument. I will argue that the critique of the closure principle based on double prevention is fruitful and worth developing, but that it doesn't lead to a better ground for explaining the causal relevance of mental events, and that Gibb's theory of mental double prevention might rather be a useful ground for a compatibilist account of free will. █ Determinism, free will, and free won't The contemporary debate on free will has recently received new nourishment from cognitive neuroscience. Sceptical positions about free will have been reinvigorated by a particular interpretation of the experiment conducted by the neurophysiologist Benjamin Libet.6 In his famous experiment, Libet wanted to examine the temporal relationship between the decision to perform a motor action and the cerebral activity underlying this decision. Libet asked the experimental subjects to look Grasso 122 at a clock showing a moving dot, relax, and wait for the urge to move their wrist. The subjects had to decide freely and without preparation to move their wrist, noticing the position of the dot on the clock at the moment in which they became aware of their decision. In the meantime, Libet recorded specific brain activities of the subjects with an EEG (electroencephalogram), and the precise timing of the final movement with an EMG (electromyogram). Notably, Libet discovered that the socalled readiness potential, a negative brain potential originating in the supplementary motor area (SMA) during motor preparation, preceded the subjects' conscious decision to move their wrist by 350 milliseconds (on average). This result saw many draw the conclusion that the brain unconsciously makes the decision before the subject becomes aware of it, that the subject's decisions are determined by unconscious processes, and that free will is just an illusion.7 The general idea is that actions are free only if we can decide in advance what we intend to do, and then our intention is translated into action by brain processes and neural impulses. But since Libet's experiment shows that decisions are unconsciously determined in advance, one is brought to conclude that subjects' decisions are always determined by previous neural activities. If so, the subject is never able to do otherwise, and therefore the first condition of a free action, the principle of alternative possibilities, is never satisfied. Even if this interpretation has gained more and more consensus during the years, Libet draws a different conclusion from the experiment, arguing that the results leave hope for a theory of free will.8 In fact, even if the subject becomes conscious of the decision to act only 350 milliseconds after the appearing of the readiness potential, this conscious awareness precedes the outcome of the action (i.e. the movement of the wrist) by approximately 200 milliseconds. In this time the subject still has the opportunity to stop the action, exercising her capacity to veto. Even if the subject feels the urge to move her wrist and she is planning to do so, immediately before the action she might decide to stop the movement, inhibiting the motor preparation that would have caused the action. Libet concludes that even if we are not endowed with free will, our actions are not completely determined because we possess free won't. Hence, to a certain extent, the fact that our actions are not completely determined would preserve free will by maintaining the subject's ability to do otherwise. █ The causal exclusion argument Other attempts have been made to maintain agents' freedom even without alternative possibilities, grounding free will exclusively on the condition of autodetermination.9 Classical compatibilism claims that an agent is free even if she cannot do otherwise, as long as her mental states (reasons, beliefs, intentions, desires, etc.) play a relevant role in the determination of the action, i.e. if the condition of autodetermination is satisfied. Notably, Frankfurt has provided a compelling argument for this claim.10 In Frankfurt's example, a rational subject (Jones) has decided to perform a particular action. Someone else (Black) wants Jones to perform the same action. However, in order to obtain what he wants without showing his hand, Black waits until the moment in which Jones takes his decision, planning to intervene only if Jones decides to do otherwise from what Black wants him to do. There is a variety of possibilities regarding Black's means of intervention: he might threaten Jones and force him to act the way he wants, he might hypnotise him, give him a potion, or manipulate him with a brain-stimulation device. However, Frankfurt wants us to concentrate on the case in which Jones, by his own will, decides to act in the way Black wants him to, so that Black does not need to intervene at all. Frankfurt argues that in this case Jones cannot do otherwise (because had he decided to do otherwise, Black would have intervened, forThe Metaphysics of Free Will 123 cing him), but nevertheless Jones is free and responsible for the result of his action, because it is autodetermined (in fact Black doesn't have to intervene). The example aims to show that there can be free will (and moral responsibility) without alternative possibilities. Sceptics usually resort to Libet's results to claim that if our brain decides in advance then we cannot do otherwise, and therefore there is no free will. Clearly, the rejection of the principle of alternative possibilities might seem a good basis for claiming that, even in the light of the results of Libet's experiments, that conflict with it, agents possess free will. However, this move of grounding free will completely on autodetermination is not unproblematic, because brings us to confront the problem of the mental causation. As recently discussed by Sophie Gibb,11 the idea of the causal efficacy of mental events is contrasted by the so-called causal exclusion argument, which has been defended among others by Kim12 and Papineau.13 The argument moves from the fact that the following four claims are each individually plausible, but inconsistent if taken altogether: (1) Relevance: Mental events are causally relevant in the physical domain. (2) Closure: Every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause. (3) Exclusion: There is no systematic causal overdetermination. (4) Distinctness: Mental events are not physical events. According to the causal exclusion argument, from the conjunction of (2) and (3) follows that, if we wish to maintain (1), we ought to reject (4). In other words: if mental events are causally relevant (relevance), if every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause (closure), and if there is no systematic overdetermination (exclusion), then mental events are identical with physical events (negation of distinctness). A similar objection has been raised by Kim to the theory of emergent mental properties. In Making Sense of Emergence, Kim argues that emergent properties are necessarily epiphenomenal. If all physical effects have sufficient physical causes, and no physical effects are caused twice over by distinct physical and mental causes, there cannot be any irreducible mental causes. Therefore, if emergent properties are irreducible to their constituters (distinctness) and they are causally efficacious (relevance), then physical effects have both a physical and a mental cause. But these multiplication of causes is useless, and therefore physical events end up being causally overdetermined (which is in contrast with exclusion). On the other hand, if emergent irreducible properties have no causal efficacy, then they are epiphenomenal.14 The conclusion that mental causes are identical with physical causes is incompatible with the idea that mental events are causally relevant by themselves, so that the source models of control come across the following problem: in a deterministic world, not only can the subject not do otherwise, but she also has no autodetermination, for mental events are not causally determining her actions.15 There are at least four different ways to dodge the conclusion of the causal exclusion argument.16 The first is to deny relevance, by claiming that mental events are not causally relevant in the physical domain. This strategy results in eliminativism, epiphenomenalism, or non-interactive dualism. Another possibility is to reject closure, hence embracing a form of interactive dualism (or causal pluralism). Another one is to deny or rephrase exclusion. Many forms of non-reductive physicalism try to do just this, putting the emphasis on the metaphysical relationship (of supervenience, constitution, grounding, emergence, etc.) between mental and physical events, claiming that mental events are in some way irreducible to physical events. Finally, following the causal exclusion argument, reductive physicalism simply denies Grasso 124 distinctness. However, the solutions just described might not be the only ones. Gibb suggests that the four claims might be consistent altogether, if mental events aren't described as causes of physical events, but rather only as enabling conditions.17 In order to argue in favour of the causal relevance of mental events Gibb proposes an analogy between mental causation and physical double prevention.18 █ Causal closure and double prevention Interesting issues concerning the metaphysics of causation emerge if one considers double prevention. Cases of double prevention involve the prevention of a prevention, i.e. cases in which a physical effect, which would have been prevented by a preventer, is carried out because a further (double) preventer prevents the first preventer from preventing the effect. Consider the following example offered by Gibb:19 in order to win a prize at a fairground, a player named Fred throws a ball aiming to break a bottle. However, the game is rigged: the bottle is protected by a barrier, which prevents the ball from hitting the bottle. A button controls the removal of the barrier. Sally, who is running the fairground attraction, suddenly takes pity on Fred, and activates the button. Therefore, the pressing of the button by Sally prevents the barrier from preventing the breaking of the bottle caused by the hit of the ball thrown by Fred. The question raised by Gibb is therefore: is the pressing of the button (i.e. the double preventer) a cause of the breaking of the bottle? According to the leading theory of causation among contemporary analytic metaphysicians – Lewis' counterfactual dependence theory of causation20 – double prevention is a form of causation. However, Mumford and Anjum have argued that if double prevention is causation, then a series of counterintuitive implications arise.21 First, it would follow that causation would not be an intrinsic matter, i.e. a process regarding only the causal relata, but it would involve all the conditions that allow the causal process to take place. Second, if double prevention is a form causation then cause and effect need not be connected by a continuous chain of events, since causation as double prevention relies upon a "nonevent", namely the merely possible prevention that would have impeded the effect. Connectedly, causation by double prevention would imply that there can be causation by absence, i.e. that the mere absence of something can actually be causally powerful. Finally, it would entail that there can be causation at a distance. In fact, cases could be imagined in which the double preventer is spatiotemporally remote. Considering the objections to double prevention as a form of causation, one could conclude that double preventers are not causally relevant. However, Gibb claims that it is possible to distinguish between the causal role of the physical causes (such as the momentum and hardness of the ball), which I will call causal efficacy, and the causal role of the enabling conditions (such as the removal of the barrier), which I will call causal relevance. There is a fundamental difference between causing an event (such as in normal causation) and permitting an event to be caused (such as in cases of double prevention). A double preventer does not cause the event that it prevents from being prevented, but it permits or allows the event to be caused.22 Based on these considerations, a further objection to the causal exclusion argument comes from the observation that causes are not always sufficient for their effects. In the bottle example, all the events that are physical causes of the breaking of the bottle are not collectively sufficient for the breaking of the bottle, if considered in the absence of the relevant enabling conditions. Even if not causally efficacious, Sally's pressing of the button is causally relevant and it should appear in the explanation of why Fred's ball broke the bottle, because it plays the essential role of permitting the cause to bring about its effect, The Metaphysics of Free Will 125 which is as important as the role of the cause itself. This claim represents a more general objection to the formulation of closure, because if the physical causes are not sufficient for the manifestation of their effect, then it is not true that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause. The role of enabling conditions is necessary. Given that mental evens struggle with causal efficacy, Gibb's proposal is that they might be causally relevant nonetheless as enabling conditions. In order to argue for that, Gibb proposes a theory of mental double prevention. █ Free won't as double prevention: Critical remarks Double preventers might be causally relevant even if not causally efficacious. According to Gibb, this fact could be useful to prove the causal relevance of mental events. Hence, she draws an analogy between double prevention, mental causation, and free will, according to which Libet's theory of free won't can be revived using the concept of double prevention.23 A mental event doesn't directly cause a bodily movement, but permits a certain bodily movement to take place by allowing a neural event to cause that bodily movement. Even if not a cause, the mental event is causally relevant because it permits the causal relation by preventing a mental event that would have prevented the causal chain from the neural event to the bodily movement. To see this, consider the following example:24 in Fred's brain a neural event, call it n1, corresponds to a mental event m1, the desire to grab the beer on the table, and n1 causes the bodily movement b1, raising his arm to grab the beer on the table. To do so, n1 causes an intermediate neural event n2, corresponding to the motor preparation that leads to b1 (grabbing the beer). In this scenario the two neural events n1 and n2 constitute the complete cause of b1. However, in Fred's mind there is also a contrasting mental event m2, the desire to grab the remote control, which could prevent the behaviour b1. According to Gibb, m1 is not a cause of b1, but it is nonetheless causally relevant because it enables n2 to cause b1, by preventing m2 from preventing b1. In other words: m1 is the manifestation of the subject's ability to veto m2. In the physical case, the analysis of double prevention as causally relevant (even if not as a form of causation) is straightforward and convincing. However, problems emerge when double prevention is used in the context of psychophysical interaction. In Gibb's example, every mental event M is linked with a neural event N, and the causal relevance of m1 is defined as its ability to prevent m2 from preventing n2 to cause b1. But it should be noticed that on the main picture there is no symmetrical correspondence between the psychophysical pair of events (m1, n1) and the psychophysical pair of events (m2, n2): while n1 is the neural event corresponding to the mental event m1 (the desire to grab the beer), n2 is the intermediate neural event that brings about the behaviour b1 (the motor preparation to grab the beer), and not the neural event corresponding to m2 (the contrasting desire to grab the remote). It should be stressed that if in Fred's mind there is the contrasting desire m2, there should be in Fred's brain a contrasting neural event, call it n1*, corresponding to the desire to grab the remote m2, and consequently a neural event n2*, corresponding to the intermediate neural event (i.e. motor preparation to grab the remote) that brings about the behaviour b2. Given this picture of the psychophysical events involved in the decision, it could be argued against Gibb that in causing the intermediate event n2 to cause b1, n1 does not only play the role of causing the behaviour b1, but it prevents also the neural event n2* from preventing n2 to cause b1. As in the previous example of the bottle and the barrier, physical events, and more precisely neural events in this case, are completely sufficient to explain double prevention, so that there is no need for mental events to be causally relevant, not even as enabling conditions. Grasso 126 To show why this is the case it is sufficient to appeal one more time to the principle of exclusion. The principle claims that there is no systematic causal overdetermination, and for the same reasons why there should be no systematic overdetermination of causal efficacy, there should be no systematic overdetermination of causal relevance. But this seems to be the case in the above example, because for every mental double preventer which could be judged causally relevant for the physical effect as a necessary enabling condition, there is systematically a set of corresponding physical (neural) events that are causally relevant as necessary enabling conditions (i.e. the physical double preventers), which alone are sufficient to explain the manifestation of the effect. These objections can be summarised in the following argument, which I will call the causal irrelevance argument: (1) If mental events are not identical to physical events, then they are not causally relevant (causal exclusion argument)25 (2) There are mental double preventers26 (3) Double prevention is not a form of causation27 but double preventers are causally relevant (as enabling conditions)28 (4) Mental events are causally relevant29 However (5) Mental double preventers systematically overdetermine physical double preventers (6) There is no systematic overdetermination (of causal relevance) (exclusion) (7) Mental events are causally irrelevant Gibb's argument for the causal relevance of mental events (and against the causal exclusion argument) involves propositions (1) to (4). The causal irrelevance argument consists in contrasting this conclusion with objections (5) & (6), to reach the conclusion that mental events are not only causally inefficacious, but also causally irrelevant (7). Since Gibb's proposal is explicitly connected with Libet's theory of free won't, it should be noticed that the objection that I propose against Gibb's model is analogous to the objection to Libet's original argument, only translated to the metaphysical ground. Libet's theory of free won't was contrasted with the conceptual counterargument that, if the subject's decision to move is related to specific brain processes that are initiated before and determine the decision itself, then there is no reason to think that the decision not to move (or the decision to veto the decision to move) would not be related to specific brain processes that are initiated before and determine this decision as well. Moreover, recent neuroscientific evidence supports this objection. According to Brass and Haggard, Libet could not find any identifiable neural correlate of the veto process, and therefore he suggested that it could involve a form of downward causation.30 They conducted an experiment to test this hypothesis and their study shows a significant role of the dorsal fronto-median cortex (dFMC, Brodmann's area 9) in intentional inhibition of action. For the authors, given the results of their experiment, Libet's free won't hypothesis becomes unnecessary, because the data identify a clear neural basis for inhibiting intentions and thus show that there is a specific neural correlate of the veto process. This could be seen as an experimental confirmation of the conceptual hypothesis that, since the initiation of action is unconscious, there is no reason to think that the initiation of inhibition should follow different rules.31 █ Conclusions Mental causation is the central issue of the problem of free will. Gibb's approach to mental causation based on double prevention The Metaphysics of Free Will 127 is original and worth exploring for different reasons. First, double prevention is relevant for the debate on causation in general. In fact, as we have seen, the counterfactual dependence theory of causation32 encounters many problems when applied to such cases. An account based on the distinction between causes and enabling conditions would likely prove more satisfying. Second, an account of mental causation based on double prevention seems to be an original and fruitful way of approaching the causal exclusion argument. In particular, the formulation of the principle of closure, which claims that every physical effect has sufficient physical causes, might be criticized, since cases of double prevention show that physical causes are not always sufficient for their effect in the absence of relevant enabling conditions. Nevertheless, drawing upon double prevention to account for the causal relevance of mental events is not unproblematic. Limiting the causal relevance of mental events to their enabling role of physical effects might avoid the objection of epiphenomenalism or causal overdetermination raised against the causal efficacy of mental events. However, a similar objection of overdetermination could be casted upon the enabling role of mental events as well. The causal exclusion argument might be reformulated against the causal relevance of mental events in the form of the causal irrelevance argument. Its main objection is that as long as mental events are linked with physical events, both the causal role and the enabling role of double preventers can be explained exclusively within the physical domain. If mental double preventers systematically overdetermine physical double preventers, and if there is no systematic overdetermination of causal efficacy (causes) or causal relevance (enabling conditions), then mental double preventers must be either identical to physical double preventers, or causally irrelevant. Finally, even if double prevention might not be a useful basis for an account of mental causation, weaker perspectives might be worth exploring. A sketchy idea is that mental double prevention could serve as a basis for a compatibilist theory of free will. If mental events are constantly supervening on (grounded on, or constituted by) physical events, and if they are systematically overdetermined by them, then they might not be causally relevant, but they might still be relevant in some other respect. This approach would be close to Frankfurt's hierarchical mesh compatibilism.33 The core idea is that freedom is based on mental events that are nested within more encompassing elements of the self. In particular, Frankfurt distinguishes between firstorder and second-order desires, and mental double preventers in the form of veto processes may be seen as second-order desires (desires which have as their objects desires of the first-order). However, Frankfurt's theory has been under intense scrutiny and at least two issues have emerged. The first is the hierarchical problem, according to which Frankfurt's theory is incomplete, because as there can be a conflict at the level of the subject's first-order desires, there can also be a conflict at the higher-order levels.34 The second and more serious is the mesh problem, according to which how an agent came to have a particular mesh of first and second-order desires does matter.35 It is beyond the purpose of this paper to propose a detailed account of compatibilism based on double prevention. Nonetheless, there are good reasons to think that it seems more suitable. The concept of mental double prevention is useful for exploring in deeper detail the relationship between contrasting mental events, especially desires of different orders. Sure enough, one of the challenges of a mesh account based on double prevention would be to face the problems of Frankfurt's theory, and a lot of work has to be done on that. In any case, Gibb's metaphysical account of mental causation is a good example of how a priori arguments can have a fundamental role in advancing research on complex issues Grasso 128 such as free will. This path is original and promising, and it brings new life to philosophical debate on mental causation. Gibb's work proves that metaphysics still has a fundamental role in reflecting on these issues, even in an era in which cognitive neuroscience is literally invading philosophy. The approach to the problem of free will based on the metaphysical analysis of mental causation is probably the most promising, and this direction of research is the one to which this paper hopes to contribute. Acknowledgements I wish to thank Sofia Bonicalzi, Alessio Bucci, Joe Dewhurst, and Neri Marsili for the comments to the draft of this paper, Mariaflavia Cascelli, Angelo Cei, Matteo Morganti, and Emanuele Rossanese for the insightful discussion during the WIP seminar at Roma Tre University. █ Notes 1 See B. LIBET, C.A. GLEASON, E.W. WRIGHT, D. K. PEARL, Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activities (Readinesspotential): The Cerebral "Time-on" Factor, in: «Brain», vol. CVI, n. 3, 1983, pp. 623-642. 2 See B. LIBET, Mind Time. The Temporal Factor in Consciousness, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA) 2004. 3 Examples of source models of controls are H. FRANKFURT, Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility, in: «Journal of Philosophy», vol. LXVI, n. 23, 1969, pp. 829-839; J.M. FISCHER, The Metaphysics of Free Will, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford 1994. 4 See S.C. GIBB, Mental Causation and Double Prevention, in: S. GIBB, E. J. LOWE, R. INGTHORSSON (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013, pp. 193-214. 5 Versions of the causal exclusion argument were proposed by J. KIM, Mind in a Physical World, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA) 1999; J. KIM, Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2005; D. PAPINEAU, Philosophical Naturalism, Blackwell, Oxford 1993; D. PAPINEAU, Thinking About Consciousness, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002. 6 See B. LIBET, C.A. GLEASON, E.W. WRIGHT, D.K. PEARL, Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activities (Readinesspotential), cit.; B. LIBET, Mind Time. The Temporal Factor in Consciousness, cit. 7 See D. WEGNER, The Illusion of Conscious Will, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA) 2002. 8 See B. LIBET, Mind Time. The Temporal Factor in Consciousness, cit. 9 See H. FRANKFURT, Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility, cit.; J.M. FISCHER, Responsibility and Control, in: «Journal of Philosophy», vol. LXXIX, n. 1, 1982, pp. 24-40; J.M. FISCHER, The Metaphysics of Free Will, cit. 10 See H. FRANKFURT, Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility, cit. 11 See S.C. GIBB, Mental Causation, in: «Analysis», vol. LXXIV, n. 2, 2014, pp. 327-338. 12 See J. KIM, Mind in a Physical World, cit.; J. KIM, Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, cit. 13 See D. PAPINEAU, Philosophical Naturalism, cit.; D. PAPINEAU, Thinking About Consciousness. cit. 14 See J. KIM, Making Sense of Emergence, in: «Philosophical Studies», vol. XCV, n. 1-2, 1999, pp. 3-36. 15 There is still the possibility to claim that mental events are causally relevant even if identical with physical events, because if they supervene on physical events then they borrow their causal power, however this move introduces the more problematic issue of defending the metaphysical reality of mental events devoid of causal powers, i.e. epiphenomenalism. For objections to epiphenomenalism see J. KIM, Making Sense of Emergence, cit. For modern versions of epiphenomenalism see W. ROBINSON, Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004. 16 See S.C. GIBB, Mental Causation, cit. 17 Ivi. 18 See S.C. GIBB, Mental Causation and Double Prevention, cit. 19 Ivi. 20 See D. LEWIS, Causation, in: «Journal of Philosophy», vol. LXX, n. 17, 1973, pp. 556-567. 21 See S. MUMFORD, R.L. ANJUM, Double Prevention and Powers, in: «Journal of Critical Realism», vol. VIII, n. 3, 2009, pp. 277-293. 22 See S.C. GIBB, Mental Causation and Double Prevention, cit. 23 Ivi. 24 The example is slightly modified with respect to Gibb's original one, in which the contrasting desi- The Metaphysics of Free Will 129 re is the desire to stay still. 25 See J. KIM, Mind in a Physical World, cit.; D. PAPINEAU, Thinking About Consciousness, cit. 26 See S.C. GIBB, Mental Causation and Double Prevention, cit. 27 See S. MUMFORD, R.L. ANJUM, «Double Prevention and Powers», cit. 28 See S.C. GIBB, Mental Causation and Double Prevention, cit. 29 Ivi. 30 See M. BRASS, P. HAGGARD, To Do or Not to Do: The Neural Signature of Self-control, in: «The Journal of Neuroscience», vol. XXVII, n. 34, 2007, pp. 9141-9145. 31 Ivi. 32 See D. LEWIS, Causation, cit. 33 See H. FRANKFURT, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, in: «Journal of Philosophy», vol. LXVIII, n. 1, 1971, pp. 5-20. 34 See G. WATSON, Free Agency, in: «Journal of Philosophy», vol. LXXII, n. 2, 1975, pp. 205-220. 35 See J.M. FISCHER, M. RAVIZZA, Responsibility and Control: An Essay on Moral Responsibility, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1998.

AVICENNA ON THE INDEMONSTRABILITY OF DEFINITION RICCARDO STROBINO Avicenna on the Indemonstrability of Definition* INTRODUCTION The reception of Aristotle's theory of demonstration in the Kit∞b a∂-∂if∞' (Book of the cure), Avicenna's most comprehensive philosophical summa, is documented by a large section, entitled Kit∞b al-burh∞n (Book of demonstration), which features in the logical part of the ¶if∞' and is devoted to the analysis of demonstration and definition. The Kit∞b a∂-∂if∞' consists of four parts covering a great deal of the philosophical legacy, especially Aristotelianism, inherited from Antiquity. This huge work encompasses four main areas␣ : logic (al-man¥iq), physics (a¥-¥ab±√iyy∞t), mathematics (ar-riy∞∑iyy∞t), and metaphysics (al-il∞hiyy∞t). The logical section of the ¶if∞' is divided, in turn, into nine subsections corresponding to the treatises in which Avicenna provides his philosophical commentary and analysis of the texts that make up the Aristotelian Organon (with the addition of Porphyry's Isagoge, the Rhetoric and the Poetics that are included in the Arabic Organon)1 . The nine logical books deal with the following topics␣ : Porphyry's Isagoge (al-madπal), the book of categories (al-maq≤l∞t), the book of interpretation (al-√ib∞ra), the book of syllogism (al-qiy∞s), the book of demonstration (al-burh∞n), the book of dialectic (al-øadal), the book of sophistic (as-safsa¥a), the book of rhetoric (al-πi¥∞ba) and, eventually, the book of poetic (a∂-∂i√r). Each of them addresses the topic of the corresponding book of the Organon. For instance, the book of syllogism (kit∞b al-qiy∞s) deals with Avicenna's doctrine of syllogistic reasoning and draws primarily on the content of Aristotle's Prior Analytics (at-ta∫l±l∞t al-≤lá). * The analysis of Avicenna's doctrines are based on my translation of chapters I, 1, IV, 2 and - less systematically - of other scattered passages from Avicenna's Kit∞b al-burh∞n. This work has been carried out under the helpful guidance of A. Bertolacci, to whom I express my most sincere gratitude. I also wish to thank warmly T. Street for his many valuable comments on an earlier draft of this paper which offered me a better understanding of the text. 1 For a general presentation of the development of Arabic logic see T. STREET, Arabic and Islamic Philosophy of Language and Logic, in E. ZALTA ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2008, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/arabic-islamic-language/ and bibliography therein␣ ; cf. also T. STREET, Logic, in P. ADAMSON, R. C. TAYLOR eds., The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005, pp. 247-265. 114 RICCARDO STROBINO In the case of the fifth section of Avicenna's logic, the Kit∞b al-burh∞n (Book of demonstration), we are in the presence of a treatise covering the content of Aristotle's two books of the Posterior Analytics. The state of present research on this work, as is often the case if we are not to restrict our focus to the examples of metaphysics and psychology, may appear quite discouraging␣ ; the Kit∞b al-burh∞n has been little investigated so far - undoubtedly less than it would deserve even to the eyes of a hasty reader2 . Before taking up the translation of the texts this paper is based upon, to my knowledge, just two chapters, out of a book of significant length (totalling two hundred and eighty-two pages in the Cairo edition of 1956 by √Af±f±3 and consisting of fortyone chapters), were available in western languages4 . Only a chapter of the work (II, 7, on the classfication of sciences) - alien to the Posterior Analytics and interrupting the continuity of the Burh∞n - was translated into Latin and incorporated by Dominicus Gundissalinus in his De divisione philosophiae5 . A cursory reading, however, immediately reveals the extremely high level of Avicenna's conceptual analysis, which results in numerous original contributions reaching much further than a mere piece of literary commentary6 . In this 2 A few essential references on Avicenna's Burh∞n are M. E. MARMURA, The Fortuna of the Posterior Analytics in the Arabic Middle Ages, in M. ASZTALOS, J. E. MURDOCH, I. NIINILUOTO eds., Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy. Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy (S.I.E.P.M.), Helsinki 24-29 August 1987, 2 vols., Helsinki 1990, vol. I, pp. 85-102 (on Avicenna see pp. 89-98)␣ ; M. MAROTH, Die Araber und die antike Wissenschaftstheorie, Brill, Leiden-New York-Köln 1994, (scattered remarks in chapters 3 and 4)␣ ; J. MCGINNIS, Logic and Science␣ : The Role of Genus and Difference in Avicenna's Logic, Science and Natural Philosophy, «␣ Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale␣ », 18, 2007, pp. 165-186 (pp. 173-178 deal with Burh∞n, I, 10). 3 IBN S°N†, A∂-¶if∞', al-Man¥iq, al-Burh∞n, edited by A. √AF°F°, al-Ma¥ba√a al-am±riyya, Cairo 1956. The other edition relevant to the present study is IBN S°N†, Al-Burh∞n min Kit∞b al-∂if∞', edited by √A. BADAW°, Maktaba al-na∫da al-miμriyya, Cairo 1954, 19662. 4 See J. MCGINNIS, D. C. REISMAN, Classical Arabic Philosophy␣ : An Anthology of Sources, Hackett, Indianapolis-Cambridge 2007. The chapters in question are Burh∞n, I, 9, at pp. 147-152 and III, 5, at pp.152-156, respectively. In addition to that, excerpts are widespread in other studies, like M. RASHED, Ibn √Ad± et Avicenne␣ : sur les types d'existants, in Aristotele e i suoi esegeti neoplatonici. Logica e ontologia nelle interpretazioni greche e arabe. Atti del convegno internazionale, Roma, 19-20 ottobre 2001, a cura di V. CELLUPRICA e C. D'ANCONA con la collaborazione di R. CHIARADONNA, Bibliopolis, Napoli 2004, pp. 107-171 (pp. 151-152 contain the French translation of Burh∞n, II, 2, pp. 132, 15 133, 4)␣ ; A. BERTOLACCI, The Reception of Aristotle's Metaphysics in Avicenna's Kit∞b a∂-∂if∞' ␣ : A Milestone of Western Metaphysical Thought, Brill, Leiden-Boston 2006 (Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science, 63), pp. 233-234. 5 See GUNDISSALINUS, De divisione philosophiae, edited by L. BAUR, Aschendorff, Münster 1903, pp. 124-133. 6 On Avicenna's style see especially D. GUTAS, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, Brill, Leiden-New York-Köln 1988, pp. 101-112, 297-318␣ ; and BERTOLACCI, The Reception of Aristotle's Metaphysics cit., pp. 607-612. 115AVICENNA ON THE INDEMONSTRABILITY OF DEFINITION respect, the Burh∞n is a systematic investigation of the doctrines of demonstration and definition, within the general philosophical framework outlined by Aristotle in his Posterior Analytics. The purpose of the present paper is twofold␣ : the prominent leading principles have been, on the one hand, that of providing some new (and raw) materials of research on Avicenna with an English translation of a significant textual unit taken from a work that appears to be of great relevance for the fields of the history of philosophy, logic and epistemology␣ ; and, on the other hand, that of undertaking a preliminary study of its contents and style of argumentation7 . I have decided to organize the analysis as follows. The first section contains a preliminary presentation of the contents of the Book of demonstration in the form of a map of correspondences with Aristotle's text. In the second section, I will present some general introductory remarks on Burh∞n, I, 1, which deals with the goal pursued in the art of demonstration and provides an interesting classification of syllogisms and definitions based on a distinction between judgements and conceptual representations. In the third section, the focus shifts to Burh∞n, IV, 2 and I will discuss, as an example of the way Avicenna elaborates on Aristotelian materials, some passages taken from the second chapter of the fourth treatise, where he faces the problem of the indemonstrability of definition in accordance with Aristotle's treatment of this subject in An. Post., B, 4. Section 3.1 will be therefore devoted to a sketchy presentation of the content of An. Post., B, 4, while section 3.2 will cover Avicenna's views on the topic. In the fourth section, I will conclude the presentation of Burh∞n, IV,2 (whose second part covers a number of issues raised by Aristotle in An. Post., B, 5 and B, 6) by mentioning Avicenna's arguments against the thesis that definition can be acquired through division. 1. THE INDEX OF THE KIT†B AL-BURH†N ␣ : SOME REMARKS ABOUT THE STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK Before undertaking the analysis of chapters I, 1 and IV, 2 it may be useful to present the general structure of the book. A quick glance at the index enables us to weigh up the attention Avicenna pays to different aspects of the Aristotelian analysis of demonstrative science in general. A table of contents of the book of demonstration and the loci paralleli in the Aristotelian source are given as an appendix at the end of the paper. The table contains the 7 A general assessment of the philosophical import of the Burh∞n will require a much more extensive investigation of its contents, which I hope I will be able to take up in the future. 116 RICCARDO STROBINO translation of the index and suggests a network of correspondences between the chapters of Avicenna's Burh∞n and those of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. The purpose of this section is not to give an exhaustive and conclusive account of the matter, but rather to provide a first preliminary contribution to the understanding of the connections between the two works and stimulate the interest toward the content and the study of the Burh∞n. The work is divided into four treatises (maq∞l∞t). Its first striking feature is that, with respect to the content, the first three treatises correspond, roughly speaking, to Posterior Analytics' book Alpha whereas the topics discussed by Aristotle in book Beta are confined to a great extent within the scope of the fourth treatise. A plausible reason we can invoke to explain this asymmetrical approach to the text which inspires Avicenna's investigations about demonstration may be that he seems to be much more interested in the philosophical problems related to the foundation of sciences and the relations between different sciences than in the treatment of technical issues such as those connected with the problem of definition or with the role of middle terms. In this regard, we should not be surprised by another remarkable fact␣ : if taken alone, Avicenna's first two treatises encompass the content of a very limited number of chapters in Aristotle, namely (with few exceptions) the first ten chapters of book Alpha, which in turn represent, to some extent, the theoretical kernel of Aristotle's theory. In addition to that, the first treatise of the Burh∞n deals primarily with the contents of An. Post., A, 1 and A, 2. The first treatise (al-maq∞la al-≤lá) opens with two chapters (fuμ≤l) which are not to be found in Aristotle and explain the goal of the book of demonstration as well as its place in logic. The remaining ten chapters are not always easy to put into correspondence with Aristotle's text. Chapter I, 3 is undoubtedly the counterpart of the opening chapter of the Posterior Analytics, as long as it concerns the thesis that every intellectual teaching and learning depends on some pre-existent knowledge. With some exceptions, the rest of the treatise deals with the general features of the principles of scientific knowledge. In the case of chapters I, 4, I, 11 and I, 12, the reference is to An. Post., A, 2 (enumeration of the principles of syllogism, the features of the premises, the principle of demonstration). Chapter I, 6 of the Burh∞n recalls the problem of how pre-existent knowledge must be understood (the text contains a reference to Meno's paradox which is mentioned by Aristotle in A, 1). It is noteworthy that in the opening treatise there are also relevant connections with a number of general problems discussed by Aristotle in the introductory chapters of book Beta, namely B, 1 and B, 2. Chapters I, 5 and I, 7 of the Burh∞n appear to be an anticipation of the content of IV, 1 and IV, 2, namely the investigation of the types of scientific inquiries and of the scientific principles and middle terms they involve. Both chapters go back to An. Post., 117AVICENNA ON THE INDEMONSTRABILITY OF DEFINITION B, 1 and B, 2. On the other hand, chapter I, 9 might be regarded as an anticipation of the contents of An. Post., B, 19, since it deals with induction and methodic experience. The two remaining chapters of Avicenna's first treatise, namely I, 8 and I, 10 do not seem to have a parallel in Aristotle. The second treatise (al-maq∞la a≥-≥∞niya) deals with An. Post., A, 3-10 with the exception of chapter II, 7 which, as has been noted above, is an insertion concerning the problem of the classification of sciences. The first chapter II, 1 covers the content of An. Post., A, 3. There is no reference to this in the title because the scope may be wider than that of the original, but I have found in the text several references to scepticism and circular proof that might suggest the existence of a link. Chapter II, 2 and II, 3 correspond to An.Post., A, 4. If we leave II, 7 aside, there is almost a one-to one correspondence from this point on to the end of the treatise, for II, 4 deals with An. Post., A, 5, II, 5 with A, 6, II, 6 and II, 8 with A, 7 whereas II, 9 and II, 10 refer to A, 9 and A, 10. So far, I have not been able to identify in Avicenna a parallel to An. Post., A, 8 (concerning the thesis that there can be no scientific knowledge of perishable things). It is likely to be contained in one of the contiguous chapters. It is easier to trace the network of correspondences in the case of the third treatise (al-maq∞la a≥-≥∞li≥a), for it deals with the rest of book Alpha. The feature of this treatise is that the further Avicenna proceeds in the analysis, the more he tends to assemble the Aristotelian texts dealing with homogeneous problems into specific groups clustered on a thematic basis. This happens to be the case for An. Post., A, 11 and A, 12 that are taken into account by Avicenna in III, 1, the same holding as well for A, 14-17, 19-23, 24-26, 27-32, 33-34 which correspond to chapters III, 4, III, 6, III, 7, III, 8 and III, 9 of the Burh∞n. Only the Aristotelian chapters A, 12, 13 and 18 receive a separate treatment in Avicenna's III, 2, III, 3 and III, 5, respectively. Finally, the object of the fourth treatise (al-maq∞la ar-r∞bi√a), as has been said above, is the content of the whole book Beta of the Posterior Analytics. Chapter IV, 1 summarizes the topics of the first three chapters of Beta that are also anticipated, on account of their general character (this holds in particular of B, 1 and B, 2), in the first treatise of the Burh∞n. The second chapter, IV, 2 (which will discussed below in detail), is split into two parts. The first part deals with An. Post., B, 4 (the relation between definition and demonstration), while the second ranges over B, 5 and B, 6 (the relation between definition and division). Again, Avicenna adopts the method of gathering several chapters of the Analytics ␣ : B, 6-9 correspond to IV, 3, B, 1011 to IV, 4, and B, 15-18 to IV, 9. It is the other way around in the case of B, 11 and B, 13 whose exposition and analysis take up more than a single chapter in Avicenna␣ : B, 11 is treated in both IV, 4 and IV, 5, while B, 13 is the object of a separate discussion in IV, 6 and IV, 7. To end, two distinct 118 RICCARDO STROBINO chapters are assigned to B, 14 and B, 19, which correspond to IV, 8 and to the concluding chapter IV, 10 of the Burh∞n. A first glance at the index of the work seems thus to convey the impression that we are in the presence of an original piece of philosophical analysis. Avicenna undoubtedly draws on Aristotelian materials and to an extent that should not be neglected, but still his peculiar arrangement of the topics and the conceptual analysis he provides, as we will shortly see, suggest that this work might be reasonably regarded as a treatise laying down his own views on demonstration and definition rather than (just) as a commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. In the rest of the paper I shall try to provide further grounds in support of this claim. 2. JUDGEMENTS AND CONCEPTUAL REPRESENTATIONS, SYLLOGISMS AND DEFINITIONS␣ : THE DOCTRINE OF KIT†B AL-BURH†N, I, 1 Avicenna's Burh∞n starts, as has been said above, with an introductory chapter (faμl) which has no correspondence in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics ␣ : it is devoted to the clarification of the goal (aeara∑) and utility (manfa√a) of the book of demonstration within the context of logic. These are two of the preliminary questions discussed by Aristotelian commentators of Late Antiquity as prolegomena to the exegesis of individual works by Aristotle. The title of the chapter tells us that it is about the goal being pursued in the art of demonstration. According to Avicenna, knowledge or science (√ilm) that is acquired through thought (fikra) can be obtained in two ways, namely through judgement (taμd±q8 ) and through conceptual representation (taμawwur). In the first case, i.e. when we have rational knowledge of something by virtue of judgements, this knowledge occurs to us by means of syllogisms (qiy∞s∞t), whereas in the second case, i.e. when we know something by possessing a conceptual representation of it, this happens to be the case on account of the fact that we have a definition (∫add). Both judgements and conceptual representations can be articulated, according to a further classification, into different levels (mar∞tib), depending, on the one hand, upon the degree of certainty that they convey (judgements) and, on the other hand, upon the degree of fidelity that they have (conceptual representations) with respect to the set of notions which determine a given concept. As far as judgements are concerned, Avicenna puts forward a threefold classification. The first kind of judgement is certain (yaq±n). Its definitory features are that it must consist of (1) a first belief (i√tiq∞d) relative to the 8 Literally, 'assent' or 'granting assent'. 119AVICENNA ON THE INDEMONSTRABILITY OF DEFINITION content expressed by the judgement itself, and, in addition to that, (2) it must always be accompanied by a second firm belief, namely that the state of affairs corresponding to content of the first belief cannot be otherwise than it is (l∞ yumkinu all∞ yak≤na √alá m∞ huwa √alayh±). In other words, were the second belief to disappear, the judgement would no longer be certain. The second kind of judgement is quasi-certain (∂ab±h bi-l-yaq±n). It consists of a single belief, relative to the content of the judgement, but it does not need to be accompanied by the second kind of belief as in the previous case. An essential feature of quasi-certain judgements is that when we possess the first belief relative to the content, we cannot, simultaneously and in act, believe in the possibility of its denial. The third kind of judgement is persuasive, relative to opinion without [being certain] (iqn∞√± Ωann± d≤na ∏∞lika). As in the first two cases, it implies a belief relative to the content of what is judged, but it also admits of the belief in the possibility of its denial. As has been said above, rational knowledge acquired through judgements depends, according to Avicenna, on the existence of syllogisms (qiy∞s∞t) capable of carrying out such judgements as their conclusions. Therefore, he straightforwardly classifies syllogisms according to such a distinction between different types of judgements. A syllogism will be labelled depending on the type of judgement it brings about. As a result, we will have, for each class of judgements, a corresponding class of syllogisms. Thus, demonstrative (burh∞n±) syllogisms are those producing certain judgements, dialectical (øadal±) or sophistical (muae∞li¥±) syllogisms generate quasi-certain judgements, while persuasive judgements fall within the scope of rhetorical (πi¥∞b±) syllogisms. Avicenna eventually mentions poetic (∂i√r±) syllogisms, which, however, do not bring about any judgement whatsoever, since their purpose is producing imagination which leads the soul to sadness or joy by imitation of good and bad things. To sum up, we can display the notions introduced by Avicenna as follows␣ : Types of judgement Certain Quasi-certain Persuasive, relative to opinion Types of belief (1) Content␣ ; (2) Belief that things cannot be otherwise than they are according to (1) (1) Content␣ ; (2) Possibility of simultaneously denying (1) is not admitted (1) Content␣ ; (2) Possibility of denying (1) is admitted Types of syllogism Demonstrative Dialectical or sophistical Rhetorical 120 RICCARDO STROBINO Avicenna adopts an analogous pattern when it comes to classifying different types of conceptual representation and the correlated notion of definition (properly speaking, as we will shortly see, definition is a specific case of a more general concept, namely that of discrimination through a differentiated phrase (qawl mufaμμal), the latter being in fact the appropriate notion that corresponds to conceptual representation). In order to classify judgements Avicenna has adopted a criterion based on the notion of belief. In the case of conceptual representation things are a little more sophisticated, but still there is a symmetry between the two cases. We are in the presence of a first type of conceptual representation when a given thing is conceptually represented either (1) by means of accidental notions whose aggregate is proper to that thing in particular (bi-l-ma√∞n± l-√ara∑iyyati llat± yaπuμμuh≤ maøm≤√uh∞) and to nothing else - in other words as a proprium - or, on the other hand, (2) by means of accidental notions in a way which is common to it [i.e. to the represented thing] and to other things differing from it (√alá waøh ya√ummuh≤ wa-aeayrah≤). If we replace in (1) and (2) the occurrences of 'accidental notions' with 'essential notions', then we obtain a second twofold type of conceptual representation. We will therefore have conceptual representation of a given thing either (3) by means of essential notions in a way which is proper solely to that thing (bi-l-ma√∞n± ∏-∏∞tiyyati√alá waøh yaπuμμuh≤ wa∫dah≤) or (4) by means of essential notions in a way which is common to it and to other things differing from it (√alá waøh ya√ummuh≤ wa-aeayrah≤). The two types of conceptual representations are therefore characterized according to the distinction between accidental and essential notions that feature in them. Each kind is then subject to a further distinction appealing to the fact that the set of notions, either accidental or essential, relative to what is being represented, pertains uniquely to that thing or is shared as a common set of features with other things as well. In addition to that, Avicenna points out that conceptual representations falling within type (3) are such that they either contain (3.1) the completeness of the essence of the thing (which in turn coincides with an intelligible form corresponding to its existent form) if none of the essential notions is omitted or (3.2) they do not contain the complete essence but just part of it. As a counterpart of conceptual representation - which has been classified into four types (by means of accidental notions, proper and common, and by means of essential notions, proper and common) - Avicenna introduces a corresponding general notion, namely that of a differentiated phrase (qawl mufaμμal) used in the discrimination (tamy±z) and in the determination (ta√r±f) of things. This notion is in turn divided into four types␣ : the first two are grouped under the heading of description (rasm), while the other two 121AVICENNA ON THE INDEMONSTRABILITY OF DEFINITION under the heading of definition (∫add)9 . The discrimination of a given thing may take place either by means of accidental notions (bi-l-√ara∑iyy∞t) or by means of essential notions (bi-∏-∏∞tiyy∞t). Furthermore, both discrimination by means of accidental notions and discrimination by means of essential notions may occur either with respect to the part (√an ba√∑ d≤na ba√∑) or with respect to the whole ( √an al-kull )10 . As a result, the classification of discrimination through differentiated phrase seems to mirror closely the one elaborated in the case of conceptual representation, for the outcome resulting from this analysis shows that the following alternatives are available␣ : (A) discrimination by means of accidental notions with respect to the part, (B) discrimination by means of accidental notions with respect to the whole, (C) discrimination by means of essential notions with respect to the part and, eventually, (D) discrimination by means of essential notions with respect to the whole. Now, Avicenna puts forward his own definition of 'definition' on the basis of this articulated analysis. Case (A) corresponds to what Avicenna calls incomplete description (ar-rasm an-n∞qiμ), case (B) corresponds to the notion of complete description (ar-rasm at-t∞mm), whereas case (C) and case (D) explain the notion of definition␣ : if the discrimination is carried out by means of essential notions with respect to the part, then (C) we will have an incomplete definition (al-∫add an-n∞qiμ). If by contrast the discrimination relies on essential notions with respect to the whole and if, in particular, all essential notions are taken into account and none of them is left behind, then (D) the outcome of this process will be a complete definition (al-∫add at-t∞mm). Again, a synthetic outline of the relations between these notions is given in the table below␣ : Types of conceptual representation Accidental notions/proper Accidental notions/common Essential notions/proper Essential notions/common Types of discrimination Accidental notions/whole Accidental notions/part Essential notions/whole Essential notions/part Types of differentiated phrase Complete description Incomplete description Complete definition Incomplete definition 9 In other words, every qawl mufaμμal is either description or definition, and the latter are of two types each, namely complete or incomplete. 10 I.e. the characterization is either partial or exhaustive. As a result of these distinctions we have two parallel pairs of notions␣ : judgements/syllogisms, on the one hand, and conceptual representations/ 122 RICCARDO STROBINO differentiated phrase (including the most relevant subtype, i.e. definition) on the other hand. Their classification is articulated according to a criterion hinging on a progressive degree of certainty, in the case of the first pair, and on completeness with respect to the notions involved in the representation, in the case of the second pair. The set of notions introduced by this preliminary epistemological analysis is a requisite for the clarification of the goal and utility of the book of demonstration. After laying down this framework, which is meant to provide a theoretical background for his conclusions, Avicenna mentions the role that definition should play, according to Aristotle's contention in the Book of dialectic (Kit∞b al-øadal) that «␣ definition is a phrase indicating the quiddity␣ »11 (al-∫add qawlun d∞llun √alá m∞hiyyati) where 'quiddity' (m∞hiyya or m∞'iyya) stands for the completeness of the essence of the thing, by virtue of which the thing is what it is and the realization of its essence is completed12 (kam∞l ∫aq±qati ∂-∂ay'i llat± bih∞ huwa m∞ huwa wa-minh∞ yatummu ∫uμ≤lu ∏∞tih±). Thus, the set of notions that have been discussed so far helps us understand a very short but relevant passage condensing, as it were, the meaning of the whole chapter, and providing a definite answer to the question what the goal of the book of demonstration is. Avicenna maintains the following␣ : [Text 1] «␣ This book is the one which provides us with those matters (maw∞dd) that, if employed as terms (∫ud≤d) in a syllogism, the [resulting] syllogism conduces to the certain (k∞na l-qiy∞s m≤qi√an li-l-yaq±n) - i.e. the demonstrative syllogism (wa-huwa l-qiy∞s al-burh∞n±) - and it provides us with those matters that, if employed as the parts of a definition (aøz∞' ∫add), the [resulting] definition conduces to the complete conceptual representation (k∞na l-∫add m≤qi√an li-t-taμawwur at-t∞mm) ␣ »13 . So much for the goal of the book. As for its utility, Avicenna concludes the chapter with the following remark␣ : [Text 2] «␣ If we remember the goal of the book, namely providing the methods (¥uruq) that produce certain judgement and true conceptual representation, the utility (manfa√a) of the book is evident, namely the access (tawaμμul) to the certain sciences (al-√ul≤m al-yaq±niyya) and to the true conceptual representations (at-taμawwur∞t al-∫aq±qiyya) ␣ : not only are [these two achievements] useful to us, but also [they are] necessary if we begin to use this 11 ARISTOTLE, Top., I, 5, 101b37␣ ; cf. (Kit∞b al-øadal, I, 5), in ARISTOTLE, Man¥iq Arist≤, edited by √A. BADAW°, 3 voll., Maktabat D∞r al-Kutub al-miμriyya, Cairo 1948-1952, vol. II, p. 474. 12 Burh∞n, I, 1, p. 52 (here and in the following all references to the text of the Burh∞n will be given by providing treatise, chapter and page numbers according to √Af±f±'s edition). 13 Burh∞n, I, 1, p. 53. 123AVICENNA ON THE INDEMONSTRABILITY OF DEFINITION tool (∞la), i.e. logic (man¥iq), and to weigh up by means of this scale (m±z∞n) the theoretical (naΩiriyya) and the practical (√amaliyya) sciences altogether␣ »14 . The conclusion of the introductory chapter, therefore, provides the reader of the Burh∞n with a key to a first grasp of the global architecture of the entire book. In the next section I shall examine a more specific example of how Avicenna elaborates on a peculiar doctrinal problem discussed by Aristotle - the indemonstrability of definition - with the purpose of showing, from a different perspective, that even in contact with genuinely technical issues, Avicenna's contributions always reflect a strongly original character. 3. THE INDEMONSTRABILITY OF DEFINITION IN AN. POST., B, 4␣ : AN EXAMPLE OF AVICENNA'S CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 3.1 The Aristotelian framework As is well known, the second book of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics begins with a series of ten chapters devoted to the analysis of definition which is taken to be a crucial ingredient of demonstrative science. In the first seven chapters, in particular, Aristotle develops an aporetic discussion of several major problems related to the notion of definition. One of them is the relation between definition and demonstration. In chapter B, 3, Aristotle discusses explicitly the issues regarding the connection between definition and demonstration with the aim of showing that␣ : (a) not all demonstrations are definitions, (b) not all definitions are demonstrations and (c) no definition is a demonstration, i.e. the two classes are disjoint. Aristotle provides different arguments in support of these theses. In the following chapter, namely B, 4, he pursues this line of thought by proposing a concise logical argument devised to prove that definition cannot be the object of a demonstration, i.e. of a syllogism15 . The proof proceeds by reductio. By assuming that it is possible to prove a definition by means of a syllogism, we are forced into a petitio principii. Aristotle asks whether there may be a syllogism or a demonstration of the essence. If something can be 14 Burh∞n, I, 1, p. 53. 15 For a discussion of the topic, see D. CHARLES, Aristotle on Meaning and Essence, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000, especially pp. 180-186␣ ; cf. also the notes to B, 4 in J. BARNES, Aristotle ␣ : Posterior Analytics, Oxford University Press, Oxford 19942, pp. 208-210. 124 RICCARDO STROBINO proven by means of a syllogism, it must occur as the conclusion of that syllogism and, therefore, a middle term will be required to connect the two sentences occurring in the syllogism as the premises from which the conclusion is derived. Thus, if definitions were demonstrable, we should supposedly be able to construct syllogisms whose conclusions are definitions, i.e. deductions of the following sort␣ : A a B (major premise) B a C (minor premise) _____ A a def C16 where 'A a def C' is a definition such that A occurs in it as the definiens and C as the definiendum17 . According to what Aristotle says in B, 4, since a definition expresses the essence of a certain entity, it must satisfy two requirements␣ : (1) it must be a proprium of that thing, which means that definiens and definiendum must be coextensive, and (2) the predicative connection between the two terms must be essential. Therefore, if 'A a def C' holds - i.e. if A is truthfully predicated of C as a definition - we are thereby assuming that (i) its subject and its predicate, namely C and A, are coextensive and convertible with each other and that (ii) the predication by means of which one term is said of the other is essential. These are the conditions that must be fulfilled, according to Aristotle, in order for a given sentence to qualify as a definition18 . Now, if a sentence with such features occurs as a conclusion in a syllogism, what happens to the other elements of its logical structure and what can we infer from this assumption␣ ? As has been pointed out, we are assuming first that the two terms A and C convert with each other, i.e. that the corresponding classes of objects are equal␣ : A = C19 . 16 I adopt the reading 'A belongs to every C' (or 'every C is A') for expressions like 'A a C'. If a predication of this kind is a definition I will use the expression 'A adef C'. In the case of essential predications I will write 'A a e C' for 'A essentially belongs to every C' or 'every C essentially is A' (I will discuss later two possible readings of essential predication). 17 Note that the Arabic term ∫add stands both for definiens and for the abstract notion of 'definition', i.e. the predication by means of which something is said of something else as a definition (leaving aside the fact that ∫add also stands for 'term') whereas the definiendum is usually referred to as ma∫d≤d (literally, 'defined'). 18 In other words, definitional predication is the combined effect of coextensiveness plus essential predication. 19 I use a capital italic letter to designate the class corresponding to a term. 125AVICENNA ON THE INDEMONSTRABILITY OF DEFINITION Moreover, the universal predications expressed by the premises imply that, in both cases, the class of objects corresponding to the predicate-term is at least as big as the class of objects corresponding to the subject-term␣ : A ⊇ B and B ⊇ C. Since we have assumed that A = C, it follows that both A = B and B = C will hold, as Aristotle clearly recognizes when he remarks « ␣ all these must convert␣ »20 . With respect to the second requirement, namely that the predicative connection occurring in a definition be essential, if 'A a def C' holds, then it must express an essential predication. But then, if a definition occurs as a conclusion in a syllogism, what can we say about the predications expressed by the two premises␣ ? Is there any particular requirement to be fulfilled in order to ensure that the predication in the conclusion is essential, as it should be by our initial assumption␣ ? According to Aristotle the answer to this question is affirmative ␣ : both premises must express in turn essential predications if we want the conclusion to be of this sort. For, if both premises were to express merely universal affirmative predications, how would the essential character of the predication in the conclusion be secured␣ ? Even if just one of the premises lacks the essential character, there is no guarantee that the conclusion will hold essentially. As Mignucci points out in his commentary on B, 4, this fact depends on the reading we adopt for the clause 'essentially'21 . Two alternatives are available. We may take the expression 'A a e C', i.e. 'every C essentially is A' to be equivalent to the following␣ : (E1) ∀x (Cx → eAx), i.e. 'everything that is C essentially is A'. On the other hand, we may say that the occurrence of the operator in an essential predication should be interpreted as follows␣ : (E2) ∀x (eCx → eAx), i.e. 'everything that essentially is C essentially is A'. Now, let us consider a syllogism of the following sort 20 ARISTOTLE, An. Post., B, 4, 91a16. 21 See M. MIGNUCCI, Aristotele␣ : Analitici Secondi, Laterza, Roma-Bari 2007, pp. 256-257. 126 RICCARDO STROBINO A a e B B a C _____ A ␣ ? C and try to figure out what kind of predication may be expressed by the conclusion when one of the premises, say the major, contains an essential predication whereas the other is merely a universal affirmative predication. An interesting fact is worth noting␣ : the adoption of reading (E1) for the major premise is enough to guarantee that the conclusion expresses an essential predication as well, since the argument could be rephrased into the following equivalent form␣ : ∀x (Bx → eAx) ∀x (Cx → Bx) ____________ ∀x (Cx → eAx) which is a perfectly legitimate inference. By contrast, if (E2) were to be the preferred reading, then the occurrence of an essential predication in only one of the premises of our syllogism would not be enough to obtain an essential predication in the conclusion. As a matter of fact, the inference from the premises to the conclusion would be precluded because of the middle term, which would not be one and the same thing in each premise22 ␣ : 22 This looks like a standard piece of reasoning in modal syllogistic, where the involvement of modal operators that modify the terms (especially the middle) often require a careful assessment of whether a seemingly valid inference is actually valid or not. In the present case, the middle term B stands for what is essentially B in the major premise, while it stands for what simply happens to be B in the minor premise. It should be noted, however, that the issue is more complex than that and it is not unrelated with the problem of the validity of Barbara N-X-N (necessary major/assertoric minor/necessary conclusion). In the above example, a first problem arises if we consider that the major premise is trivially true (on both readings) if nothing happens to be B (either essentially or not). A way out of the problem might be to adopt P. Thom's mixed de dicto/de re semantics (see P. THOM, How to base apodeictic syllogistic on essentialist theory, «␣ Philosophiegeschichte und logische Analyse␣ », 1, 1998, pp. 171-186). For if we rephrase the major as N [∀x (Bx → eAx)] - where 'N' stands for necessity (in the sense of box) - then we get rid of the difficulties connected with the possibly empty extension of the middle term B. But then another issue is likely to arise␣ : if Barbara N-X-N is taken to be valid, then the Aristotelian requirement, from An. Post., B, 4, that both premises express essential predications seems to be redundant␣ : the necessity in the major is enough on its own to guarantee that the conclusion, too, has the form N [∀x (Cx → eAx)], so why should Aristotle advocate for the minor exactly the same logical form of the major␣ ? One way to have your cake and eat it too seems to consist in assuming that there is nothing going on here about the validity of Barbara N-X-N, and conclude that in order for the syllogism to have the desired kind of conclusion, namely N [∀x (Cx → eAx)], the minor premise must be simply supplemented in turn with the de dicto necessity, i.e. N [∀x (Cx → Bx)]. 127AVICENNA ON THE INDEMONSTRABILITY OF DEFINITION ∀x (eBx → eAx) ∀x (Cx → Bx) ____________ no inference. In this respect, it is worth pointing out that Aristotle must have had in mind an interpretation of this kind and it is sensible to maintain that his reading of 'essentially' must have been the second one. To sum up, Aristotle's aim was to show that no definition can be demonstrated through a syllogism. The proof, as has been noted above, is by reductio ␣ : it is assumed, for the sake of argument, that a definition may well occur as a conclusion in a syllogism. If this is the case, then two consequences obtain␣ : first, all terms involved in the syllogism (i.e. major term/definiens, middle term and minor term/definiendum) must be coextensive and convertible with each other and, secondly, the predications expressed by the premisses (as well as by the conclusion) must be essential. As a result, not only does the conclusion possess the features that are required for a sentence to qualify as a definition (convertibility of the terms and essential predication) but also the premises will share these properties with the conclusion. Thus, if 'A a def C' holds, we will also have 'A a def B' and 'B a def C', and consequently the minor premiss - i.e. 'B a def C' - will already contain a definition of the term C. But this is what should have been proved from the very beginning. The outcome of Aristotle's argument is that, as long as the definition of a thing is unique (by virtue of the uniqueness of its essence), if we maintain that a definition can occur as a conclusion in a syllogism, we are bound to beg the question, because, in order to prove the definition of something, we must already have assumed it in one of the premises23 . 3.2 Avicenna on the indemonstrability of definition in Kit∞b al-burh∞n, IV, 2 The title of the second chapter of the fourth treatise of Avicenna's Burh∞n reads «␣ concerning the fact that definition is acquired neither through demonstration nor through division␣ » (f± anna l-∫adda l∞ yuktasabu bi-burh∞nin wa-l∞ qismatin). This text corresponds, roughly speaking, to the contents 23 The point could be also formulated in the following terms␣ : either (i) a syllogism is not strong enough to prove a definition in the conclusion, if at least one of the premises fails to satisfy the requirements of convertibility and essential predication␣ ; or (ii) if the premises satisfy both conditions, the argument, so to say, will be too strong because the minor premise will already contain a definition on its own. 128 RICCARDO STROBINO covered in An. Post., B, 4, 5 and 6 which deal with the relation between definition and demonstration and the relation between definition and division. Avicenna's purpose is therefore providing grounds for the following general twofold thesis␣ : [T1] Definition is acquired neither through demonstration [T2] nor through division. Accordingly, the chapter is thematically divided into two main sections. The first half deals with thesis [T1], while the second discusses thesis [T2]. In this section, I shall make some remarks on the outcome of the arguments put forward by Avicenna with respect to the rejection of [T1]24 . Section §I of Burh∞n, IV, 2 can be divided in turn into two parts. Avicenna sets out by stating the purpose of his analysis, namely to show that definition cannot be acquired through demonstration. This theoretical claim amounts, in turn, to denying that definition can be obtained by means of a middle term (wanaq≤lu inna l-∫adda laysa yuktasabu ay∑an bi-burh∞nin wa-bi-∫addin awsa¥a). The general strategy seems to overlap partially with the arguments displayed by Aristotle in An. Post., B, 4, but Avicenna's treatment contains also several elements of originality. The main idea is that if we want to prove a definition through a syllogism we need to have recourse to a middle term (∫add alawsa¥) that will turn out to cause some trouble, by virtue of its peculiar logical features, as we have seen in the previous section. Most of Avicenna's considerations are devoted precisely to the analysis of the features of the middle term involved in a syllogism that purportedly attempts to prove a definition. More specifically, the first part of section one deals with several types of middle terms that might be regarded as eligible to enter in a demonstration of the sort we are interested in and aims at ruling out each alternative except for definition25 . The second part of section one investigates the consequences of assuming - again in this kind of demonstration - the middle term to be a definition26 . The conclusion is that no type of middle term is suitable to play the role it should in a syllogism devised to prove a definition. If we look at text one below, we can see how clearly Avicenna follows Aristotle's general strategy at the beginning of the chapter␣ : 24 See Burh∞n, IV, 2, pp. 270-274 (§I). From now on, when references to Avicenna's text are given, I will first indicate the reference to the Arabic edition by √Af±f± and then, in round brackets, to the corresponding section or subsection of my translation appended at the end of the paper. 25 See Burh∞n, IV, 2, pp. 270-272 (§I.1). 26 See Burh∞n, IV, 2, pp. 272-274 (§I.2). 129AVICENNA ON THE INDEMONSTRABILITY OF DEFINITION [Text 1] « ␣ We say that definition (∫add) too is not acquired through demonstration (bi-burh∞n), i.e. through a middle term (bi-∫add awsa¥), in such a way that what is defined (al-ma∫d≤d) is minor term (al-aμaear) in the syllogism and the definition is major term (al-akbar). If definition were the sort of thing that is acquired [through demonstration], a middle term would be required and, since the major [term] in the demonstration needs to be convertible with the minor [term], [the major term] would need to be convertible with the middle [term] and the middle term [would need to be] convertible with both of them. Hence the middle [term] would undoubtedly be one of the [following] properties (πaw∞μμ) ␣ : an individualizing property (π∞μμa), a coextensive differentia (faμl), a description (rasm) or a definition. All these [things] are called 'properties' in this passage of the First Teaching because of their being coextensive [with what they are predicated of]␣ »27 . The argument is quite straightforward␣ : being acquired through demonstration means being acquired through a middle term. The reason for this is that if a definition - namely a predication of the form 'A belongs to every C' such that (i) the two terms are convertible with each other and (ii) the connection between them is essential - is to occur as the conclusion of a syllogism, we will need to prove it by means of a pair of premises containing the predicate-term and the subject-term of the conclusion, respectively, and having an appropriately chosen middle term in common. Avicenna is aware of the roles played by the major term and the minor term in a syllogism which should, allegedly, prove a definition. Since the major term is the predicate of the conclusion, then - if the conclusion is a definition - the major term will play the role of definiens in it, while the minor term, which corresponds to the subject of the conclusion, will stand for the definiendum. Within a general framework that, on the whole, parallels Aristotle's view, Avicenna introduces further considerations and broadens the analysis of the role played by the middle term. After concluding that a middle term is required in order to prove a definition, he says that it should fall into one of the following four categories ␣ : (a) individualizing property, (b) coextensive differentia, (c) description or (d) definition. The first two cases, namely (a) and (b), are discussed and ruled out on the basis of an argument that I shall shortly reconstruct. Case (c) is apparently dropped from consideration and never spelled out explicitly, although Avicenna brings it up again at least twice in the course of the chapter, taking its rejection for granted, probably on account of the fact that it should be obvious. These three types of middle term 27 See Burh∞n, IV, 2, pp. 270 (§I.1). 130 RICCARDO STROBINO and the issues arising from their potential use are not considered by Aristotle and their discussion seems to represent an original contribution by Avicenna. Now, why should an individualizing property28 or a differentia not work if it is taken as a middle term␣ ? The answer to this question rests upon the idea that if they did, then a principle that Avicenna reasonably seems to be willing to maintain, i.e. that the definition of property, the definition of differentia and the definition of species are not one and the same thing, would be violated. Let us see how the argument runs␣ : [Text 2] «␣ Nor is it fit that the property and the differentia are the middle term [sought for]. For when you say 'every C is B' and 'every B is essentially such and such' (kullu b k∞∏∞ wa-k∞∏∞ min ¥ar±qi m∞ huwa) - i.e. [something] defined by means of [the predicate] 'such and such' - and you conclude 'every C is essentially such and such' - i.e. [something] defined by means of [the predicate] 'essentially such and such' - it necessarily follows that what is the definition of the property or the definition of the differentia is the definition of the species too␣ »29 . Before the passage in question, Avicenna claims that what is more common - i.e. what has a greater extension - than the thing which is being defined (m∞ huwa a√ammu mina ∂-∂ay'i) cannot not be taken as a middle term between a thing and its definition. The possibility that the middle term is something more general than the object whose definition is sought is ruled out from the outset. By contrast, in the case of property, differentia, description and definition the situation is different, because they are (or can be) all coextensive with the object we want to define. As for the case of property and differentia, consider the following syllogism␣ : X a def B B a C _______ X adef C Avicenna seems to assume, for the sake of argument, that X plays the role of a definition of B, B is either a property or a differentia, and C is a species. Since the definitions of these three notions are not interchangeable, it follows that, if B is either a property or a differentia and C is a species, then X cannot be the definition of both. A reason in support to this claim is provided within 28 The notion is equivalent in this context to the proprium. 29 See Burh∞n, IV, 2, pp. 270 (§I.1). 131AVICENNA ON THE INDEMONSTRABILITY OF DEFINITION the context of an argument that follows the text just quoted above. Avicenna argues that the inadequacy of property and differentia as middle terms in a syllogism that is supposed to prove a definition holds no matter whether we take the expression 'every B' to mean (1) 'everything which is characterized through B' (kullu m∞ huwa mawμ≤fun bi-b) or to mean (2) 'every B insofar as it is B' (kullu b min ∫ay≥u huwa b). The above syllogism would unconditionally force us to admit that the definitions of the three notions coincide [Text 3] «␣ [...] regardless of whether, by saying 'every B', you mean [(a)] everything that is characterized through B, or you mean [(b)] every B insofar as it is B, for the case is not well-grounded. [(a)] In the first respect, [it is not well-grounded] because the particulars [falling] under B might be of different species, and consequently things that are of different species would [turn out to] have one and the same definition, since they are all defined through the major [term], and it is not the case that the middle [term] alone - which is B itself and is a differentia or a property or something else - is defined through [the major term]. [(b)] In the second respect - i.e. when we mean that every B, insofar as it is B, is such, where 'such' indicates [its] quiddity - [it is not well-grounded] because this phrase precludes the [predicative] connection from resulting in the conclusion and changes the middle [term] by modifying it. And if this phrase were capable of yielding the conclusion, then what is the definition of B insofar as it is B would necessarily be the definition of C, whereas [B] is different from [C] in the definition and it is not the definition of [C]. And this is absurd, for although the property and the differentia are said of the species and their definition is predicated of the species, [their definition] is predicated [of the species] not because it is the definition of the species or because their definition is one and the same (so that their definition would be the definition of the species), but rather only because it belongs to the species. And there is a difference between the fact that this thing belongs to something and the fact that it is a definition of it, or [that] their definition is one and the same. Rather, the definition of the nature of the species, the definition of the nature of its differentia and the definition of the nature of its property are distinct␣ : the definition of its differentia is part of its definition, whereas the definition of its property is something in which its definition is included, in potency or in act. Therefore the middle term cannot be property or differentia, according to this point of view␣ ; nor [can it be] description␣ ». The structure of Avicenna's argument is quite clear. By the first alternative (a) - i.e. when we take the C's to be B, but not B as such - as a result it might be the case that the definition of B - i.e. the predicate-term A - is predicated as a definition, in the conclusion, of things that are of different sorts altogether and that simply happen to fall under B. Avicenna makes this point clear when he says that it is not of the middle term alone that the major term132 RICCARDO STROBINO definiens is predicated but also of whatever the minor term stands for30 . In the second case (b), on the other hand, what causes trouble is the incorrect move from the claim that the definition of a property or the definition of a differentia can be predicated of the species, to the conclusion that they are definitions of the species so as to overlap and coincide - i.e. the definition of the property, the definition of the differentia and the definition of the species. The correct view, on the contrary, is that of keeping a clear-cut distinction between the claim that the definition of a property and of a differentia are predicated and belong to a species, and the claim that the definitions of these three notions are identical with one another31 . On these grounds, Avicenna draws the conclusion that the middle term cannot be property or differentia32 . Thus, the achievement of sec. §I.1 is, on Avicenna's general strategy, that three of the four alternative types of middle term have been ruled out. The only option left, at this stage of the argument, is that the middle term is a definition. The second part of the first section of Burh∞n, IV, 2 brings to completion the proof of [T1] - i.e. of the thesis that a definition cannot be demonstrated by means of a syllogism - by dealing precisely with the task of ruling out definition as well, as a potential candidate to play the role of middle term. And this is the context in which Avicenna's strategy more closely resembles that of Aristotle, despite some relevant exceptions. First of all Avicenna notes that the true definition of something is unique33 ␣ : [Text 4] «␣ Thus, it is now clear that the middle term in the syllogism yielding the definition as a conclusion (f± l-qiy∞si l-muntiøi li-l-∫addi) is neither a property nor a differentia nor a description, but rather - if it really has to be something at all - must be another term. As to the fact that one thing has only one true definition (al-∫add al-∫aq±q±), that is apparent if we know what the true definition is and [if] we know that it is equal to the essence of the thing (mus∞win li-∏∞ti ∂-∂ay'i) in two respects. First, from the perspective of predication 30 This remark raises another more general question, namely to what extent the requirements for something to serve as a middle term in a syllogism have to be contracted so that the term can serve as a middle term in a demostration. In this passage the condition of being characterized through B seems too weak. 31 In other words, what counts here is that even though the three notions may coincide extensionally, there is still a relevant intensional difference that should be preserved and that would be deprived of meaning if we were to take the predications in the major premise and in the conclusion of the syllogism to be definitional. 32 In fact not even description. No explicit reason is provided, however, in support of the exclusion of the latter. 33 Unsurprisingly, if we consider the general framework set up in Burh∞n, I, 1 that I have outlined in sec. 2 of the paper␣ : definition expresses the essence of a thing, and it does so by displaying the complete and ordered series of essential features of the thing in question. 133AVICENNA ON THE INDEMONSTRABILITY OF DEFINITION and conversion (min øihati l-∫amli wa-l-in√ik∞si) ␣ ; second, from the perspective of the complete inclusion [in the definition] of every essential notion pertaining to the quiddity, until [the definition] becomes equal to the latter and is an intelligible form equal to its existent form. And it is known that of the single essence there is only one definition of this sort. [For] if [the single essence] were to have a second definition containing essential attributes external to the content of the first definition, then the first definition would not be a definition [which is] equal to the notion of the essence of the thing␣ ; nor [would it be] in general a true definition␣ »34 . In order to understand accurately the development of the argument by means of which Avicenna rejects the eligibility of definition as a potential middle term, it will be useful to highlight some points that are clear in the text. As we will see shortly, in this case as well, the general structure of the argument is straightforward despite the difficulty of some specific points. First, Avicenna, before taking up the task of discussing the problems caused by assuming definition as a middle term, thinks it worth bringing up the Aristotelian tenet according to which the true definition of an entity must be unique. This is the case because the essence of a thing is unique and, since true definitions are devised to represent conceptually essences (at a linguistic and epistemological level, as it were) they must necessarily be unique as their metaphysical counterparts. Moreover, true definitions and essences are correlated in two ways. The first has to do with a twofold logical relation that connects the subject-term and the predicate-term in a given definitory phrase␣ : (1) the predicative link must be essential and (2) definiens and definiendum must be convertible with each other and have the same extension. This is what Avicenna is alluding to, in the above passage, when he says «␣ from the point of view of predication and conversion␣ ». The second kind of connection between true definition and essence lies in that the former must contain the complete collection of notions that fall within the scope of the latter. If these two requirements are satisfied, there is no chance that a given essence corresponds to two distinct true definitions. In this connection two aspects are noteworthy. First, the whole argument about the uniqueness of true definition calls into play, in Avicenna (at the very beginning of section §I.2, where he starts dealing with the problem of definition as a middle term), an implicit but necessary assumption that we should ascribe to Aristotle, too, if we want his argument in B, 4 to be sound and work properly35 . As a matter of fact, if we do not assume that the 34 See Burh∞n, IV, 2, p. 272 (§I.2.1). 35 In this respect see also MIGNUCCI, Aristotele cit., p. 257. 134 RICCARDO STROBINO definition is genuinely unique, there is no problem at all when we realize that in order to prove a definition we must already make use of a definition in the minor premise of the syllogism36 . We cannot accuse someone of begging the question unless the two definitions in question must actually be one and the same. Second, Avicenna mentions two features - essential predication and conversion - that are explicitly present in Aristotle as long as they determine the nature of the premises needed for the alleged proof of a definition (see section 3.1 above). Let us leave aside for a moment these considerations and take into account another passage that contains, in a very condensed formulation, Avicenna's criticism of the use of definition as a middle term. If, on the one hand, it is quite clear that the kind of logical error Aristotle imputes to those who try to prove definitions by means of syllogisms is petitio principii, in the case of Avicenna, there seem to be two alternatives␣ : not only petitio principii but also infinite regress37 . Here is the relevant text␣ : [Text 5] «␣ Frequently, however, they have not gone to the root of this condition, being content with a genus and some discriminating differentiae (fuμ≤l mumayyiza), so that once the discrimination has resulted, they come to a stop even if there are other essential notions that are needed in order for the true definition to be complete. Thus, it might be the case that something has two definitions of this sort␣ : for instance that 'human' is defined one time as 'twofooted walking animal', and another time as 'mortal rational animal', and that 'soul' is [defined as] 'self-moving number' and also [A273] [as] 'what is itself explanatory of being alive', and that 'wrath' is [defined as] 'ebullition of blood in the heart' and also [as] 'desire to undertake revenge' and the like. Thus, if one of these two definitions is taken to be the middle term and the other [is taken to be] the major term, [the outcome] will be a certain syllogistic arrangement. Yet, two things occur therefrom. [(a)] The first is that, in truth, what is acquired is not a complete definition but rather an incomplete definition, i.e. the part of a complete definition. [(b)] The second is that this middle [term] is such that one of the two must obtain␣ : [(ba)] either its being predicated of the minor [term] is such that one 36 As we will see shortly, this raises a different problem, namely that of an infinite regress, but not necessarily a petitio principii. 37 Ross points out that one might be tempted to recognize a potential reference to an infinite regress in the original argument of B, 4, although he then offers convincing arguments to suggest that this is not likely to be the case, at least as far as Aristotle's text is concerned, see W. D. ROSS, Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1949, pp. 617-618. Interestingly, here Avicenna seems to be elaborating on a theoretical option that after all might have appeared, from the logical standpoint, as strong as the recourse to the charge of a petitio principiii, because if one claims to be able to prove a definition through a syllogism, there is still a problem when it comes to the minor premise, which should in turn be proved as well, in such a way that the process, in principle, never comes to an end. 135AVICENNA ON THE INDEMONSTRABILITY OF DEFINITION presupposes in it, as a requirement, that [the middle term] is the definition of [the minor term], the same holding of the major [term] in its being predicated of [the middle term]␣ ; [(bb)] or the predication is, in one of the two cases, only a predication, and one does not say that [the term] is a definition of that of which it is predicated. In which case, if one says, for instance, 'A is definition of B, B is definition of C␣ ; therefore A is definition of C, because the definition of the definition is a definition', one has already deviated from the correct determination (ta√r±f) in various respects. [Preliminary clarification relative to (bb)␣ : the minor premise should be demonstrated] This is because the fact that B is a definition of C has been posited and conveniently assumed without syllogism, whereas the condition in [the process of] defining (ta∫d±d), after the genus has become manifest to the eyes of this opponent, is that [this fact] should be [proved] only through a syllogism. As to [the possibility] that B is not [a definition of C], it has already proved true beforehand that [B] is a definition of C through another syllogism. [Conclusion␣ : the process of definition does not take place through syllogism. The claim that definition can be demonstrated leads either to an infinite regress or to a petitio principii] As to the fact that the method of defining is not producing a conclusion through a syllogism - on the contrary, in the attempt to clarify that notion one cannot rely on a syllogism, otherwise a third definition would be required as an intermediate term and between every two definitions there would always be a definition - one thing would have infinitely many definitions, since it is not possible that the definition between B and C is A, for this would be a circle. Thus, it is now clear that [the process] ultimately gets to middle [terms] that do not admit of any [further] middle [terms] and are, therefore, [middle] terms [that are] not acquired [through demonstration], which is the opposite of what they contend␣ »38 . It is not quite clear whose misbehaviour Avicenna is addressing in this passage, but the condition that has not been sufficiently investigated (or seriously taken into account) is likely to be the uniqueness of true definition. The example may help us understand what Avicenna is trying to do here. The argument runs as follows␣ : let us admit that there are people who can only construct incomplete definitions (i.e. definitions that do not contain the whole set of essential notions belonging to a given thing or, better, to its essence). In this case, a thing may happen to be assigned more than one single definition, say two, for the sake of argument. For instance 'human' can be defined as 'two-footed walking animal' or alternatively as 'mortal rational animal' where the three terms 'human', 'two-footed walking animal' and 'mortal rational animal' are the definiendum and the two definiens, respectively. 38 See Burh∞n, IV, 2, pp. 272-273 (§I.2.2-§I.2.3). 136 RICCARDO STROBINO We can set up a syllogism of the form␣ : A a def B B a def C _______ A a def C where A stands for 'mortal rational animal', B for 'two-footed walking animal' and C for 'human' (it might have been the other way round as well, namely by inversion of A and B). Avicenna's first criticism of this syllogism is that its outcome is not a complete definition but an incomplete one, or in his words, the part of a definition. I can see just one way to make sense of this claim39 . Avicenna is probably assuming that we are discussing with someone who is seeking the complete definition of something, say 'human', but can preliminarily count just on a pair of incomplete definitions - sharing the same genus and differing otherwise by virtue of some discriminating differentiae - of the notion that is being defined. He therefore tries to put two of them together in a syllogism in order to get a conclusion capable of providing a complete definition. Now, Avicenna's claim seems to be that this effort is bound to fail because of the general way syllogisms work. For the middle term (i.e. one of the two incomplete definitions, the other being the major) does not explicitly feature in the conclusion. The only definition occurring in the latter is the one that coincides with the major term, which is in turn, by hypothesis, an incomplete definition. The second criticism is more sophisticated. Avicenna considers two possible situations. Either (1) both the middle term (in the minor premise) and the major term (in the major premise) are predicated as definitions, or (2) in one of the premises, at least, the predication does not imply that the predicate is a definition of the subject. In case (1), we should now be familiar with the problem␣ : the minor premise already provides a definition of the subject of the conclusion and, regardless of whether the true definition is unique or not, this condition is sufficient to invalidate the claim that definitions are provable because in either case, respectively, a petitio principii or an infinite regress is involved. In case (2), by contrast, the difficulty arises because one of the premises would lack the strength required for it to yield (in conjunction with the other premise) a definitional conclusion. To be honest, the text is not always so explicit, but I am confident that the general drift of the section can be understood by appeal to this explanation. Moreover, Avicenna's point 39 Note that in this argument it is implicitly assumed that 'mortal rational animal' is an incomplete definition of 'human'. 137AVICENNA ON THE INDEMONSTRABILITY OF DEFINITION seems to be that it is too wholesale to claim that A is a definition of C because (i) it occurs as a conclusion of a syllogism, whose premises say that A is a definition of B and B is a definition of C, respectively, and because (ii) the definition of a definition is a definition. For it can be argued that the minor premise of this syllogism, which by virtue of its logical features, already provides a definition of C, should be proved in turn by means of another syllogism. The fact that B is a definition of C cannot be assumed without a proof and must have become clear in advance as a conclusion of another syllogism - i.e. before we can use it as a premise to demonstrate that A is a definition of C . Avicenna explains more generally why the process of defining does not coincide with the demonstrative process embodied by syllogistic structures. If the acquisition of a definition were to depend on a syllogism, then it would depend on a structure that, as we have seen, in order to prove the definition in the conclusion, must already contain a definition in one of the premises. This fact alone shows that such a structure is logically unsuitable to the purpose, because the process would never come to an end. For to prove that A is a definition of C, we need to prove that B is a definition of C and this would require us in turn to have recourse to another syllogism having 'B a def C' as its conclusion␣ : B a def D D a def C _______ B a def C This, however, can be done only at the cost of introducing a new middle term, say D, required to prove the minor premise of the first sllogism. And again, this new middle term in turn cannot be simply assumed as a definition of C in the minor premise of the second syllogism. An additional syllogism along with an additional middle term, say E, are required to prove that D is the definition of C␣ : D a def E E a def C _______ D a def C It is easy to recognize the outcome of these assumptions␣ : an infinite series of middle terms or, which is the same, at each step of a 'syllogistic chain' of infinite length, for every pair of definitions a third definition. Hence, Avicenna's conclusion is that the middle term cannot be definition because this would lead to an infinite regress. There are, however, at least two things that need 138 RICCARDO STROBINO to be pointed out with respect to this interpretation. First of all, it fits just one of the two cases mentioned by Avicenna in text 5 above, namely case (1), i.e. when both premises are definitional. What about case (2), i.e. when one of the premises is not definitional␣ ? This situation seems to parallel the one described above within the context of Aristotle's argument␣ : both premises must express essential predications, otherwise the essentiality in the conclusion is not secured. In such a case, Avicenna would simply say that the middle term is incapable of producing the definition as a conclusion of the syllogism. Secondly, after advocating infinite regress, Avicenna adds a clause whose meaning is not entirely clear␣ : «␣ if it is not possible that the definition between B and C is A, for this would be a circle␣ ». The circularity that Avicenna mentions here does not seem to coincide, as one might be inclined to think at first glance, with that of a petitio principii prompted by taking the middle term to be a definition in the minor premise. Rather the point might be tentatively understood as follows␣ : we have established that an infinite regress is involved when we try to demonstrate a definition through a syllogism because of the role played by the middle term. The infinite regress is due to the necessity of introducing at each step a new middle term to prove the minor premise of the immediately preceding syllogism. Now, what if one objected that there is no need to have recourse to a new middle term, and suggested instead to make use of the major term of the original syllogism (since it is convertible by hypothesis with the original middle)␣ ? I take the passage just quoted above to be Avicenna's hypothetical reply to that argument␣ : the middle term between B and C cannot be A, because this would be circular, since in order to prove that every B is C we would be asked to use the premises 'every B is A' and 'every A is C' (where A is the major term of the original syllogism now used as a middle term). Hence we would be assuming 'every A is C', i.e. the conclusion that we wanted to prove from the outset in the first syllogism. So much for infinite regress. Afterwards Avicenna presents an additional argument that is supposed to provide another reason against the idea that the middle term can be a definition. In this case he explicitly says that petitio principii40 (resuming, so to say, the original Aristotelian objection) is the charge against those who employ definition as a middle term in the attempt to prove a definition␣ : «␣ whoever puts definition in between [something and its] definition, is begging the question without being aware [of it]␣ »41 . Thus, as a result of the development of section §I.2, whose aim was ruling out definition 40 Note that whereas in the above example Avicenna uses the term 'circle' (dawr), in this context he usually refers to petitio principii by means of the expression muμ∞dara √alá l-ma¥l≤b l-awwal. 41 See Burh∞n, IV, 2, p. 274 (§I.2.4). 139AVICENNA ON THE INDEMONSTRABILITY OF DEFINITION as a potential middle term, Avicenna seems to put forward at least two reasons against [T1]. Both arguments proceed by reductio, showing that if we assume that it is possible to prove a definition by means of a syllogism and use a definition as the middle term in it, we are forced either to an infinite regress or to a petitio principii. 4. DEFINITION AND DIVISION IN KIT†B AL-BURH†N, IV, 2 Before concluding, I shall now provide an outline of the second section of Burh∞n, IV, 2 and briefly summarize its contents. I will not go through the details of Avicenna's exposition since they would involve a number of theoretical considerations that lie far beyond the scope of the present paper42 . The section deals with another relevant issue concerning definition, namely the fact that it cannot be acquired through division, and partially covers chapters B, 5 and B, 6 of the Posterior Analytics43 . The topics are arranged as follows␣ : a brief introduction␣ ; a comparison of division with circular induction (sec. §II.1)␣ ; a list of three crucial defects that make the method of division incapable of providing definitions (sec. §II.2)␣ ; the presentation of two syllogisms aimed at proving a definition, starting from a division (sec. §II.3)␣ ; the rejection of both syllogisms (sec. §II.4)␣ ; some additional arguments elaborating on An. Post., B, 6 (sec. §II.5). Finally, the chapter ends with a few lines that summarize the constitutive difference between definition and demonstration. 42 The relationship between definition and division and its philosophical implications (in An. Post., B, 5) have been the object of an extensive range of studies. See for instance D. M. BALME, Aristotle's Use of Division and Differentiae, in A. GOTTHELF, J. G. LENNOX eds., Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1987, pp. 69-89␣ ; R. BOLTON, Definition and Scientific Method in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics and Generation of Animals, in GOTTHELF, LENNOX, Philosophical Issues cit., pp. 120-166␣ ; M. DESLAURIERS, Plato and Aristotle on Division and Definition, «␣ Ancient Philosophy␣ », 10, 1990, pp. 203-219␣ ; I. DÜRING, Aristotle's De Partibus Animalium. Critical and Literary Commentaries, Elanders Bocktryckeri Aktiebolag, Göteborg 1943␣ ; A. FALCON, Aristotle's Rules of Division in the Topics␣ : The Relationship between Genus and Differentia in a Division, in «␣ Ancient Philosophy␣ », 16, 1996, pp. 377-387, ID., Aristotle's Theory of Division, in R. SORABJI ed., Necessity, Cause and Blame. Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory, Duckworth, London 1980, pp. 127-145␣ ; W. KULLMANN, Wissenschaft und Methode. Interpretationen zur Aristotelischen Theorie der Naturwissenschaft, De Gruyter, BerlinNew York 1974␣ ; G. E. R. LLOYD, The Development of Aristotle's Classification of Animals, « ␣ Phronesis␣ », 6, 1961, pp. 59-81␣ ; P. PELLEGRIN, Division et syllogisme chez Aristote, «␣ Revue philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger␣ », 171, 1981, pp. 169-187␣ ; and, finally, A. VON FRAGSTEIN, Die Diairesis bei Aristoteles, Hakkert, Amsterdam 1967. 43 The thesis that definition is not acquired as the combined effect of a division and a syllogism is found also in Aristotle's Prior Analytics, I, 31. Again, the relationship between the two notions is discussed at some length by in Avicenna in Qiy∞s, IX, 5, see IBN S°N†, A∂-¶if∞', alMan¥iq, al-Qiy∞s, edited by S. Z†YID, al-Hay'a al-√∞mma li-∂u'≤n al-ma¥∞bi√ al-am±riyya, Cairo 1964, treatise IX, chapter 5, pp. 455-459. 140 RICCARDO STROBINO The Academic method of division is already criticized by Aristotle because of its inability to produce definitions provided with the required character of necessity and uniqueness. If we try to construct a definition by appeal to the method of division, what we really obtain in the end is in fact only a collection of predicates that are progressively assumed and not proved to belong to the thing that is being defined. Avicenna adopts this line of thought, too, as is clear from the opening lines of the section␣ : [Text 1] «␣ For in [the process of] division the existence of something is not posited, but rather [a thing] is only divided (yufaμμalu faqa¥) by saying 'it is this way or it is that way'. And from this it does not follow that one of [the alternatives resulting from] the division is posited by way of necessity, unless one begs the question and [one of them] is posited [as something which is] taken for granted, as if there had been no syllogism␣ »44 . There seems to be a parallel with the former case of the relationship between definition and syllogism. Definitions are the sort of constructs that cannot be obtained by appeal to argument forms (syllogisms) or techniques (division) that would produce them as conclusions. And the reason is that in both cases those argument forms or techniques would either (i) lack the necessary strength to produce suitable conclusions, i.e. such as to be really definitions (indicating univocally the essence of a thing)␣ ; or (ii), if they have that strength, the reason is that there is a petitio principii involved in some way␣ : in other words there is no way to prove a definition, if it is not assumed, in the form of a premise, from the very beginning. These seem to be the general lines of Avicenna's position which make the general framework outlined in this chapter systematic and characterized by a strong theoretical unity. The circularity component of division is stressed in connection with an example of a bad use of induction, where the proof of the conclusion is obtained only on the (vicious) assumption that its predicate applies to the whole extension of the subject-term. So if one wants to have a suitably strong and necessary conclusion, he is forced to beg the question by assuming what he has to prove, for otherwise the conclusion is not proved by way of necessity and remains affected by a degree of arbitrariness. The same holds of division, because this method consists in the progressive assumption, at each step of a sequence, of one single alternative among several (in the simplest case, if the division is a dichotomy, only two) and this is by no means sufficient to secure the uniqueness and necessity of the conclusion when all the features that have been assumed (or posited) during the process are put together in a single definitory phrase. 44 See Burh∞n, IV, 2, p. 274 (§II). 141AVICENNA ON THE INDEMONSTRABILITY OF DEFINITION In this respect Avicenna explicitly points out that (i) after the division has taken place, at each step, the alternative that one picks out is not determined by an inference, but is only posited or conceded␣ ; (ii) there is no guarantee that the mere sum of a number of predicates gives rise to a genuine unity (in this respect he brings up two objections put forward by Aristotle in the De interpretatione45 and adds that the order in which the notions are arranged is strictly relevant, too)␣ ; (iii) some essential features of the defined thing may turn out to be omitted or some features that are inessential to it may turn out to be included in the definitory phrase. In addition to these arguments, that would be by themselves enough to rule out the possibility of acquiring a definition through division, Avicenna considers another interesting case (to reject it) consisting of two syllogisms that, if combined, might be used by someone to prove that a given phrase (or set of predicates) is the definition of something. First, suppose that one constructs a syllogistic argument on the basis of a division in the following way46 ␣ : 1. Every A is either B or not-B [Assume B] 2. Every B is either C or not-C [Assume C] 3. Every C is either D or not-D [Assume D] _____________________________ Every A is B, C, and D He sets out by laying down a first premise based on a dichotomous division, namely 'every A is either B or not-B'. Then he assumes, on independent grounds, that every A is B. Then he introduces a new premise, again based on a further division, this time applied to B (the alternative just picked out), and says that every B is either C or not-C and so on for an arbitrary number of steps (in the example I have used only three predicates). In the end, he will conclude by collecting all choices made at the intermediate steps and obtain an ordered list of predicates. This is what Avicenna has probably in mind when he says␣ : [Text 2] «␣ And if one extends the division to a syllogism by dividing, he will thus repeat (fa-sta≥ná) one of the opposite [alternatives] of one or more divisions and produce, as a conclusion, one single [thing] which is what remains [common] among the divisions␣ ». 45 See ARISTOTLE, De Int., 11. 46 My reconstruction is tentative, Avicenna does not give an explicit example like the one I am using to clarify the argument, see Burh∞n, IV, 2, pp. 276-277 (§II.3-§II.4). 142 RICCARDO STROBINO Now, suppose Avicenna's hypothetical opponent has been able to collect a sufficient number of predicates (in the example B, C and D) to express the essence of A. He may want to prove that the set of those predicates is the definition of A by means of another syllogism␣ : 1. A differentiated phrase, indicating the quiddity and equal to A is the definition of A (major premise) 2. The ordered set of predicates B, C, D is a differentiated phrase, indicating the quiddity and equal to A ____________________________________________________________________ 3. The ordered set of predicates B, C D is the definition of A Again, this seems to be what Avicenna proposes in the following passage␣ : [Text 3] « ␣ In which case, he will aggregate the parts of the definition and extend this syllogism47 further to a[n additional] syllogism by gathering several single substantial predicates until something equal to the thing [which is being defined] results from them . Thus he will say 'the set (øumla) of these predicates is a differentiated phrase, indicating the quiddity, equal [to the thing], and everything which is like that is definition␣ ; therefore this [set of predicates] is definition' ␣ ». For the rejection of the whole argument, Avicenna puts forward two objections against the syllogisms just presented. The first addresses the first syllogism and points out that it is in fact no syllogism at all, since each step presupposes an assumption rather than an inference␣ : when one of the two alternatives is granted (the other being excluded or eliminated), this happens to be the case, so to say, by virtue of the fact that we know in advance which of them is to be preferred. And this in turn depends on the fact that the essence of the thing that is being defined has occurred beforehand to our faculty of estimation (on an independent basis) so that what we are actually doing, in the process of division, is simply spelling it out by displaying in an ordered sequence the set of all notions of which it consists. As to the second objection, Avicenna points out that the conclusion (a given set of predicates is the definition of A) and the minor premise (the set of those predicates is a differentiated phrase indicating the essence of A) of the second syllogism are epistemically equivalent. Therefore, trying to prove the former by means of the latter (together with the definition of definition as the major premise, i.e. the claim that a suitable differentiated phrase is a 47 I.e. the above 'syllogism', based on the division, concluding that every A is B, C, and D. 143AVICENNA ON THE INDEMONSTRABILITY OF DEFINITION definition) amounts to a petitio principii. In other words, the whole point of seeking the definition of A is seeking which differentiated phrase has the property of indicating the essence of A␣ : once this is done, the proof that this particular differentiated phrase, namely 'B, C, and D', is the definition of A is not only a trivial fact, but it is also based on the circular assumption (already present in the minor premise) of what one is supposed to prove. The section ends with an additional series of remarks concerning the involvement, in the second syllogism, of the definition of definition as the major premise. Avicenna's contention, following Aristotle, is that this is of no help for the proof, because the only relevant point remains always that of assessing the status of the minor premise. If the latter is verified, then there is no need to proceed further by calling into play the definition of definition to prove the conclusion, because the proof would be flawed by circularity␣ ; if, on the other hand, the minor premise is not verified, then introducing the definition of definition through the major premise would serve no purpose whatsoever, because it is not by virtue of the information provided in the major that one will grant the minor48 . As a conclusion of the whole chapter, Avicenna mentions the basic distinction between the purpose of definition and that of demonstration. The former is supposed to express the quiddity of a thing, while the latter is concerned with the 'that-ness49 ' (inniya), i.e. with the proof that something belongs to something else. The two tasks fit very well, at an abstract level, in the framework of the types of scientific inquiries outlined by Avicenna in Burh∞n, IV, 1. This, however, lies beyond the scope of this paper and stands in the need of further investigation. CONCLUSION To conclude, I would like to stress once again the elements of originality of Avicenna's investigation as they have emerged from the analyses of his texts. The preliminary translation of the chapters I have taken into account will need further elaboration and, above all, it will be enriched by widening the scope of our knowledge of the whole Burh∞n. For this work, as I have 48 We might also formulate the problem as follows␣ : convincing someone that the set of predicates Y1...Yn is the definition of X (= conclusion of our syllogism) or convincing him that Y 1 ...Y n is a differentiated phrase indicating the essence of X (= minor premise) are two equivalent tasks and they are both accomplished not by means of a syllogism but on independent grounds. For this reason, if one is not willing to grant that Y 1 ...Y n is the definition of X, then he won't be willing to grant as well that Y1...Yn is a differentiated phrase indicating the essence of X. For a similar line, see sec. (§II.5). 49 I.e. Aristotle's to; o{ti. 144 RICCARDO STROBINO suggested, is not just a commentary on Aristotle but an example of original philosophical analysis by Avicenna. Both the introductory chapter and the chapter on the indemonstrability of definition (through syllogisms or division) seem to corroborate this view. In the first case, Avicenna introduces a series of notions (judgement-conceptual representation) and classifications (syllogisms according to the degree of certainty - description-definition according to the completeness of conceptual representation) - alien to Aristotle - which justify and explain the goal and the utility of the book from a very general point of view. In the second case, the topic dealt with is much more specific and clearly follows an Aristotelian pattern. Avicenna's insights, however, are far from being confined within the limits of treatment of his predecessors. This is attested by the generalization of the problem of the middle term, and the inclusion of infinite regress among the logical issues generated by admitting that the middle term can be definition. 145AVICENNA ON THE INDEMONSTRABILITY OF DEFINITION APPENDIX I Table of contents and correspondences between Avicenna's Kit∞b al-burh∞n and Aristotle's Posterior Analytics Chapter I, 1 I, 2 I, 3 I, 4 I, 5 I, 6 I, 7 I, 8 I, 9 I, 10 I, 11 I, 12 II, 1 II, 2 Kit∞b al-burh∞n FIRST TREATISE On the indication of the goal [pursued] in this art On the rank of the Book of demonstration On the fact that every intellectual teaching and learning is due to pre-existent knowledge On the enumeration of the principles of syllogism in general terms On the inquiries and what is connected to them. Clarification of the types of scientific principles and middle terms On how unknown things are grasped from things that are known On absolute demonstration and its two divisions␣ : one of them is the demonstration of the 'reason why' and the other is the demonstration of the 'that' and it is called sign On the fact that the certain knowledge of everything that has a cause comes from the type of its cause␣ ; consideration of the relation between the terms of demonstration On how to discover whatever does not have a cause for its predication in its subjects ␣ : on induction and methodic experience and what makes it necessary On the clarification of how the less general is the cause of the more general being applied to things coming under the less general. Clarification of the difference between genera and matters and between forms and differentiae On the consideration of the premises of demonstration with respect to priority, causality and other conditions On the principle of demonstration SECOND TREATISE On the knowledge of the principles of demonstration, their universality and necessity On the essential predicables which are requisite in the demonstration An. Post. A, 1 A, 2 B, 1-2 A, 1 B, 1 B, 19 A, 2 A, 2 A, 3 A, 4 146 RICCARDO STROBINO II, 3 II, 4 II, 5 II, 6 II, 7 II, 8 II, 9 II, 10 III, 1 III, 2 III, 3 III, 4 III, 5 On the fact that the demonstrative premises are universal, on the meaning of 'prior' and completion of the discourse on 'essential' [On how we may be given the 'prior' and the 'universal' and yet think we are not given them] no title in √Af±f±'s edition (on ms. S) On the verification of the necessity that the premises of syllogisms have and on their relation On the subject-matters of sciences, their principles and inquiries, and on the connection of their principles and inquiries with their predicable definitions On the difference between sciences and their similarity in detail On the transfer of a demonstration from one science to another and on its [i.e. of the second science] receiving of the particulars which are under the universals and the receiving of the definition alike On the verification of the relation between demonstrative and dialectic premises to their inquiries, and on how there is a difference between the two sciences in the presentation of the 'reason why' and of the 'that' [There is no way to ground demonstrations in the sciences on their principles] no title in √Af±f±'s edition THIRD TREATISE On the principles, the correlated and uncorrelated questions and on how the principles whose obtainment is necessary - and in particular the first principle - occur in the sciences On the difference between mathematical and non-mathematical sciences with respect to dialectic and on the fact that mathematics is far from error whereas what is other than mathematics is not far from error. Clarification of what has been mentioned about analysis and about composition On resuming the discourse on the demonstration of the 'reason why' and [the demonstration] of the 'that' ␣ ; on their similarity and their difference with respect to definitions and on the difference between them in one science and in two sciences On the superiority of some [syllogistic] figures over others and on how invalid syllogisms are made On the mention of how the soul makes use of sensation [to grasp] intelligibles and on the mention of the singular notions and on how they are acquired. On their first composition [i.e. of the singular notions] and on how the analysis of syllogism ends with it [i.e. the first composition] A, 4 A, 5 A, 6 A, 7 A, 7 A, 9 A, 9-10 A, 11-12 A, 12 A, 13 A, 14-17 A, 18 147AVICENNA ON THE INDEMONSTRABILITY OF DEFINITION III, 6 III, 7 III, 8 III, 9 IV,1 IV, 2 IV, 3 IV, 4 IV, 5 IV, 6 IV, 7 IV, 8 IV, 9 IV, 10 On the account of what has been said in the First Teaching with respect to the fact that the parts of syllogisms are finite [in number] and on the intermediate [elements] of affirmation and negation On the fact that universal, affirmative and direct demonstration, is on the whole better than its opposite On resuming the mention of the distinction between the sciences and their coincidence in principles and subject-matters On the state of science and opinion, on their similarity and difference, on the instruction of the intellect, on understanding, intuition, wit, discipline and wisdom FOURTH TREATISE [The inquiries and things that are known through inquiry] no title in √Af±f±'s edition On the fact that definition is acquired neither through demonstration nor through division Again on the fact that definition is not gained through division nor through induction␣ ; on the confirmation of what has been said in these chapters ␣ ; on the relation between some demonstrations and definitions and on recalling common elements between demonstrations and definitions On the fact that parts of some definitions and parts of some demonstrations are commmon and on definitions and types of causes as middle terms On the detailed exposition of how the types of causes fall within definitions and demonstrations in order to understand completely what is common between definition and demonstration On remarking the fact that definition is acquired by means of composition On the fact that the method of division is also useful for definition and in which way␣ ; on the detailed exposition of the method of composition and what falls therein, beginning from the fact that equivocity is avoided On the use of dividing the whole into parts and on the completion of the discourse relative to convertible and non-convertible causes as middle terms and its verification On the verification of what the First Teacher has said with respect to causes as middle terms and, simultaneously, on the way he proceeds, with a clarification On the conclusion of the discourse concerning demonstration A, 19-23 A, 24-26 A, 27-32 A, 33-34 B, 1-3 B, 4-6 B, 6-9 B, 10-11 B, 11 B, 13 B, 13 B, 14 B, 15-18 B, 19 148 RICCARDO STROBINO APPENDIX II Translation of Kit∞b al-burh∞n, chapter IV, 2 NOTE TO THE TEXT The following translation of chapter IV, 2 is based on the text of Avicenna's Kit∞b al-burh∞n edited by Ab≤ √Alá √Af±f±, Cairo 1956 [= A]. The latter has been carefully compared with √Abd ar-Ra∫m∞n Badaw±'s edition, Cairo 1954 (19662) [= B] which I have used as a control text, although the two editions have some remarkable differences, beginning with the list of manuscripts they adopt. Unless noted otherwise, the translation reproduces √Af±f±'s text which, on the whole, seems to me more reliable (albeit merely from the standpoint of the philosophical content␣ : I cannot for the moment say much about the philological state of the text, because I have not seen the manuscripts yet). I have not reported in the footnotes all variants but only the ones that I consider strictly relevant to the meaning. Just to have a rough idea of the state of this text, if we confine ourselves to the chapter in question, 104 variants are to be found (leaving punctuation aside). I have omitted to indicate the explicitation of pronouns whenever their interpretation was clear from the context␣ ; in all other cases I have inserted in square brackets the term that a given pronoun (supposedly) stands for. Also in square brackets are all expressions that needed to be supplemented in order for the translation to become readable and understandable. In general, I have privileged in the translation as often as possible homogeneity and adherence to the Arabic text so that one can grasp at least some of the structural features of the original. This is done on several occasions at the cost of some awkwardness. Whenever a literal translation would have affected the ability to understand the sense of a passage in English, I have opted for less literal solutions to secure intelligibility. I shall not note the numerous cases in which I omit to translate wa at the beginning of a sentence or other particles that do not affect the sense. Unless there is a strong influence of the interpretation of a passage, I have also omitted to indicate all cases in which my punctuation differs from that of √Af±f± and Badaw±. The same holds for the division of the text in sections (= e.g. [§I ...]), subsections (= e.g. [§I.1...], [§II.3...]), paragraphs (= e.g. [§I.2.1...], [§II.3.2...]), and subparagraphs (= e.g. [(a)], [(bb)]), which is entirely mine. Finally, as a general practice, I have made use of «␣ ...␣ » for expressions of direct speech, whereas I always use '...' for the distinction between use and mention or to highlight a word or an expression. 149AVICENNA ON THE INDEMONSTRABILITY OF DEFINITION FOURTH TREATISE Second chapter concerning the fact that definition is acquired neither through demonstration nor through division [§I Definition is not acquired through demonstration (A270,1-274,15)] [§I.1 If definition were the sort of thing that is acquired through demonstration, a middle term would be required. The middle term would be one of the following␣ : (i) property, (ii) differentia, (iii) description or (iv) definition. Cases (i)-(iii) are ruled out (A270,1-272,9)] [A270] We say that definition too is not acquired through demonstration, i.e. through a middle term, in such a way that what is defined is minor term in the syllogism and the definition is major term. If definition were the sort of thing that is acquired [through demonstration], a middle term would be required and, since the major [term] in the demonstration needs to be convertible with the minor [term], [the major term] would need to be convertible50 with the middle [term] and the middle term [would need to be] convertible with both of them51 . Hence the middle [term] would undoubtedly be one of the [following] properties␣ : an individualizing property52 , a coextensive53 differentia, a description or a definition. All these [things] are called «␣ properties␣ » in this passage of the First Teaching because of their being coextensive [with what they are predicated of]54 . Thus, it is not fit55 that what is more common56 than the thing [that is being defined] is a middle term between the thing and its definition. [§I.1.1 First proof (by reductio)␣ : the definitions of property, differentia and species would turn out to coincide (A270,8-271,10)] Nor is it fit that the property and the differentia are the middle term [sought for]. For when you say «␣ every C is B␣ » and «␣ every B is essentially (min ¥ar±q m∞ huwa) such and such␣ » - i.e. [something] defined by means of [the predicate] 'such and such' - 50 convertible (= mun√akisan) ␣ : om. A. 51 with both of them (= √alayhim∞)␣ : √alayhi B. 52 individualizing property (= π∞μμa mufrida)␣ : it will be clear in the following by Avicenna's examples that this expression stands for proprium in this context. 53 coextensive (= mus∞win)␣ : literally 'equal' or 'equivalent'. In the present context I adopt this translation (cf. also MCGINNIS, REISMAN, Classical Arabic Philosophy, cit., p. 151) because it suitably explains the underlying reason of those notions' being associated with one another. 54 See ARISTOTLE, Posterior Analytics (Kit∞b al-burh∞n), in ARISTOTLE, Man¥iq Arist≤, edited by √A. BADAW°, 3 voll., Maktabat D∞r al-Kutub al-miμriyya, Cairo 1948-1952, vol. II, p. 415. 55 The Arabic text has a ay∑an that I omit to translate. 56 more common (= a√amm)␣ : middle terms whose extension is greater than the extension of the thing which is being defined cannot be employed in the purported demonstration of a definition, because they would fail to satisfy the convertibility requirement. 150 RICCARDO STROBINO and you conclude «␣ every C is essentially such and such␣ » - i.e. [something] defined by means of [the predicate] 'essentially such and such' - it necessarily follows that what is the definition of the property or the definition of the differentia is the definition of the species too, regardless of whether, by saying «␣ every B␣ », you mean [(a)] everything that is characterized through B, or you mean [(b)] every B insofar as it is B, for the case is not well-grounded (al-amr aeayr mustaq±m)57 . [(a)] In the first respect, [it is not well-grounded] because the particulars [falling] under B might be of different species, and consequently things that are of different species would [turn out to] have one and the same definition, since they are all defined through the major [term], and it is not the case that the middle [term] alone - which is B itself and is a differentia or a property or something else - is defined through [the major term]. [A271] [(b)] In the second respect - i.e. when we mean that every B, insofar as it is B, is such, where 'such' indicates [its] quiddity - [it is not well-grounded] because this phrase precludes the [predicative] connection from resulting in the conclusion and changes the middle [term] by modifying it. And if this phrase were capable of yielding the conclusion, then what is the definition of B insofar as it is B would necessarily be the definition of C, whereas [B] is different from [C] in the definition and it is not the definition of [C]58 . And59 this is absurd, for although the property and the differentia are said of the species and their definition is predicated of the species, [their definition] is predicated [of the species] not because it is the definition of the species or because their definition is one and the same (so that their definition would be the definition of the species), but rather only because it belongs to the species. And there is a difference between the fact that this thing belongs to something60 and the fact that it is a definition of it, or [that] their definition is one and the same. Rather, 57 I assume, in the translation, that by the clause al-amr aeayr mustaq±m Avicenna means the following␣ : it is not right (hence 'the case is not well-grounded') to claim that on a convenient reading of 'every B' the above objection fails, because no matter how 'every B' is taken, the argument shows that in either case the definition of the property or the definition of the differentia would turn out to be the definition of the species. It has been pointed out to me by T. Street that one would have expected mustaq±m to mean something like 'direct' (instead of 'right' or 'well-grounded'), albeit not in the standard sense that the term has in the syllogistic. In the first case (a) the problem would lie in that we are trying to link the defined with the definition through a term that may be true of a number of species, while in the second case (b) B is reduplicative in the major and not in the minor in such a way that the middle term is not in fact one and the same in the two premises. Thus, the idea might be that in both cases the link between the defined and its definition is not directly proved through the middle. For another occurrence of the clause aeayr mustaq±m in a different context (bi-øaw∞b aeayr mustaq±m) see Burh∞n, I, 6, p. 73. 58 whereas ... definition (= wa-huwa aeayruh≤ f± l-∫addi wa-aeayru ∫addih±). The meaning of this passage is made explicit in the translation, but it should be said that the Arabic original is much more ambiguous, because of the presence of a number of pronouns. 59 and (= wa) ␣ : om. A. 60 to something (= li-∂ay'in) ␣ : li-∂-∂ay'i A. 151AVICENNA ON THE INDEMONSTRABILITY OF DEFINITION the definition of the nature of the species, the definition of the nature of its differentia and the definition of the nature of its property are distinct␣ : the definition of its differentia is part of its definition, whereas the definition of its property is something in which its definition is included, in potency or in act. Therefore the middle term cannot be property or differentia, according to this point of view␣ ; nor [can it be] description. [§I.1.2 Second proof␣ : either the middle term [(a)] would not provide the definition or [(b)] it would make the major premise false (A271,11-272,9)] I say, resuming [the discussion] from the very beginning, that a middle [term] of this sort [is such] that either [(a)] it does not provide the definition, or [(b)] the major [premise] is false. For one of the two must obtain␣ : either [(a)] you say, for instance, «␣ everything laughing61 or everything rational is a mortal rational animal␣ », then fall silent, so that consequently one concludes that every human is a mortal rational animal, without adding a clarification that this is its definition. And consequently the definition's being predicated of the subject of the conclusion is not more obscure than its being predicated of the middle term, but rather it is sometimes even more evident␣ : for we know that what is laughing is a mortal rational animal only because we know that it is human. And it is now clear to you, with regard to the status of the differentia, that the definition of the species' being predicated of [the differentia] needs to be more obscure that its being predicated of the species, if you remember some fundamental principles that precede. Or [(b)] you say «␣ everything laughing or everything rational is defined as mortal rational animal␣ » and [you add] that this phrase [is] its quiddity, in which case this premise is false␣ : for the meaning of your phrase 'everything laughing' or 'everything rational' can be understood in two ways that are implicit in it. The first is [(ba)] 'everything laughing, in as much as it is laughing' or 'everything rational, in as much as it is rational', while the other is [(bb)] 'everything which is laid down [as a subject] of 'laughing'' and 'everything which is laid down [as a subject] of 'rational'' [A272] without being the essence of 'laughing' or the essence of 'rational' [respectively]. Both ways are included in our phrase 'everything laughing' or 'everything rational'. [Rejection of (ba)] Then, this definition is not a definition of 'laughing in as much as it is laughing and is essentially such'62, nor is it [a definition] of 'rational63 in as much 61 Originally I had chosen to translate the Arabic ∑a∫∫∞k as 'capable of laughter' so as to make it explicit that it is used as an example of proprium in this context. However, there are good reasons - as has been pointed out to me by T. Street - to think that this would create problems of fit with Avicenna's work on the Prior Analytics where the term ∑a∫∫∞k is clearly meant to have to do with the fact of laughing rather than the potential to do it. Otherwise the sentence 'no man is ∑a∫∫∞k ' could not be true, and Avicenna wants it to be, given his understanding of the mu¥laqa temporality, which is to say, true by virtue of the fact that every man is at least once not ∑a∫∫∞k. 62 essentially such (= ∏∞tun ∑a∫∫∞kun)␣ : literally the Arabic means «␣ [in as much as it is] a laughing essence␣ » (cf. also below ∏∞tun n∞¥iqun = rational essence). I cannot offer any better translation than this. 63 nor ... rational (= l∞ li-n-n∞¥iqi)␣ : l∞ n-n∞¥iqi A. 152 RICCARDO STROBINO as it is rational and is essentially such', but rather it is [a definition] of a certain thing - i.e. human - among those to the essence of which 'laughing' occurs64 [as a property] and which are constituted because 'rational' is predicated of them. Therefore, it is not valid to say that this notion65 is predicated of 'laughing' or [of] 'rational' as a definition. [Rejection of (bb)] As for the second way - i.e. that one means whatever is truthfully laid down [as a subject] of 'laughing' or 'rational' - this is its definition and one thereby means 'human' and refers to it in thought. Thus, if this is clear, there is no need of a clarification through the major [premise], but rather [it is] in fact the major [premise which] turns out to be clear, once that is clear. And if we do not refer to it, but refer instead to each single [subject], we are speaking falsely. And if we do none of these things, the major [premise] is not granted. [§I.2 The middle term in a syllogism devised to prove a definition can only be a definition. Rejection of this latter alternative (A272,10-274,15). §I.2.1 The true definition of something is unique (A272,10-272,16)] Thus, it is now clear that the middle term in the syllogism yielding the definition as a conclusion is neither a property nor a differentia nor a description, but rather - if it really has to be something at all - must be another term66 . As to the fact that one thing has only one true definition, that is apparent if we know what the true definition is and [if] we know that it is equal to the essence of the thing in two respects. First, from the perspective of predication and conversion␣ ; second, from the perspective of the complete inclusion [in the definition] of every essential67 notion pertaining to the quiddity, until [the definition] becomes equal to the latter and is an intelligible form equal to its existent form. And it is known that of the single essence there is only one definition of this sort. [For] if [the single essence] were to have a second definition containing essential attributes external to the content of the first definition, then68 the first definition would not be a definition [which is] equal to the notion69 of the essence of the thing␣ ; nor [would it be] in general a true definition. 64 of ... occurs (= li-∂ay'in m∞ mimm∞ ya√ru∑u li-∏∞tih± ∑a∫∫∞kun) ␣ : a∂-∂ay'i mimm∞ ya√ru∑u li- ∏∞tih± annah≤ ∑a∫∫∞kun B. 65 The notion in question is 'mortal rational animal', i.e. the major term (definiens) in the purported syllogistic demonstration of the definition of 'human' (definiendum) which in turn makes use in our example either of 'laughing' or of 'rational' as a middle term. 66 another term (= ∫addan ∞πara)␣ : theoretically, given the ambiguity of ∫add (= 'term', but also 'definition') one might wonder whether in the present case it might actually be better rendered as 'definition'. After all Avicenna has just gone through a number of arguments devised to rule out the first three types of middle terms (property, differentia and description), to the effect that the last option at hand is indeed definition. However, the qualification of ∫add, made by means of ∞∫ar, prompts me to adopt a more generic translation␣ : it is in fact to another type of term, as opposed to the three just excluded, that one is forced to appeal at this stage. 67 essential (= ∏∞tiyyin)␣ : lah≤ add. B. 68 then (= la)␣ : om. B. 69 to the notion (= li-ma√ná)␣ : li-ma√∞n± B 153AVICENNA ON THE INDEMONSTRABILITY OF DEFINITION [§I.2.2 Some people construct incomplete definitions␣ : in this improper sense one thing may have two definitions (A272,17-273,2)] Frequently70 , however, they have not gone to the root71 of this condition, being content with a genus and some discriminating differentiae, so that once the discrimination72 has resulted, they come to a stop even if there are other essential notions that are needed in order for the true definition to be complete. Thus, it might be the case that something has two definitions of this sort␣ : for instance that 'human' is defined one time as 'two-footed walking animal', and another time as 'mortal rational animal', and that 'soul' is [defined as] 'self-moving number73 ' and also [A273] [as] 'what is itself explanatory of being alive74 ', and that 'wrath' is [defined as] 'ebullition of blood in the heart' and also [as] 'desire to undertake revenge' and the like. [§I.2.3 A syllogism making use of such definitions as the middle term and as the major term, respectively, is either (a) incapable of producing a complete definition as a conclusion, or (b) is bound to cause logical mistakes␣ : (ba) petitio principii, or (bb) infinite regress (A273,3-273,13)] Thus, if one of these two definitions is taken to be the middle term and the other [is taken to be] the major term, [the outcome] will be a certain syllogistic arrangement. Yet, two things occur therefrom. [(a)] The first is that, in truth, what is acquired is not a complete definition but rather an incomplete definition, i.e. the part of a complete definition. [(b)] The second is that this middle [term] is such that one of the two must obtain␣ : [(ba)] either its being predicated of the minor [term] is such that one presupposes in it, as a requirement, that [the middle term] is the definition of [the minor term], the same holding of the major [term] in its being predicated of [the middle term]75 ␣ ; [(bb)] or the predication is, in one of the two cases, only a predication76 , and one does not say that [the term] is a definition of that of which it is predicated. In which 70 frequently (= ka≥±ran m∞) ␣ : i∏an add. B. 71 have not gone to the root (= yastaqμ≤) ␣ : i.e. they have not closely investigated or thoroughly examined. 72 discrimination (= tamy±z)␣ : tamayyuz B. 73 self-moving number (= √adad mu∫arrik li-∏∞tih±)␣ : √adad mu∫arrik bi-∏∞tih∞ A. The reading bi-∏∞tih∞ is adopted on the basis of ms. Ø, as of √Af±f±'s edition. Cf. also the Arabic translation of the Organon (p. 416 [An. Post., 91a38-39]) where the corresponding passage is translated as √adad mu∫arrik li-∏∞tih±. 74 what ... alive (= mabda' li-l-∫ay∞ti li-∏∞tih±)␣ : mabda' li-l-∫ay∞ti bi-∏∞tih∞ A. For the expression li-∏∞tih±, see the textual remark in the previous footnote which holds in the present case, too (p. 416 [An. Post., 91a38]). Cf. also Barnes' translation of the corresponding Greek expression (as √Af±f± recognizes, p. 272, f. 9, the definition occurs in Aristotle). 75 In other words, with regard to both premises it is assumed that predications are definitional. 76 No matter what premise we may want to consider, Avicenna is pointing at those situations in which one of the premises does not consist of a definitional predication, but rather of a predication tout court. 154 RICCARDO STROBINO case, if one says, for instance, «␣ A is definition of B, B is definition of C␣ ; therefore A is definition of C, because the definition of the definition is a definition␣ », one has already deviated from the correct determination (ta√r±f) in various respects. [Preliminary clarification relative to (bb)␣ : the minor premise should be demonstrated] This is because the fact that B is a definition of C has been posited and conveniently assumed without syllogism, whereas the condition in [the process of] defining (ta∫d±d), after the genus has become manifest to the eyes of this opponent, is that [this fact] should be [proved] only through a syllogism. As to [the possibility] that B is not [a definition of C], it has already proved true beforehand that [B] is a definition of C through another syllogism77 . [Conclusion␣ : the process of definition does not take place through syllogism. The claim that definition can be demonstrated leads either to an infinite regress or to a petitio principii] As to the fact that the method of defining is not producing a conclusion through a syllogism - on the contrary, in the attempt to clarify that notion78 one cannot rely on a syllogism, otherwise a third definition would be required79 as an intermediate term80 and between every two definitions there would always be a definition - one thing would have infinitely many definitions, since it is not possible that the definition between B and81 C is A, for this would be a circle. Thus, it is now clear that [the process] ultimately gets to middle [terms] that do not admit of any [further] middle [terms] and are, therefore, [middle] terms [that are] not acquired [through demonstration], which is the opposite of what they contend. [§I.2.4 Further arguments against the thesis that syllogisms can provide definitions (A273,14-274,11)] It is now clear that taking the middle [term] as a definition of the minor [term], and taking the major [term] as a definition of the middle [term], will be just a convenient 77 The passage is quite puzzling. Both editions read wa-amm∞ all∞ yak≤na b, while ms. S, as of √Af±f±'s edition, omits the final b (so that the sentence would become wa-amm∞ all∞ yak≤na, where we should probably take the clause 'l∞ yak≤na' to refer to the immediately preceding passage 'an l∞ yak≤na ill∞ bi-qiy∞sin'). I assume that the reading with b is correct and take the passage to mean the following␣ : it cannot be maintained that B is a definition of C unless another syllogism (with a new middle term) has proved it already. The role of this argument at this stage, however, remains unclear. 78 notion (= al-ma√ná)␣ : om. A. 79 otherwise ... required (wa-ill∞ la-u∫t±øa ilá ∫addin ≥∞li≥in yak≤nu ∫addan mutawassi¥an)␣ : I have been forced to interpret tentatively the text at this crucial passage, because both editions do not seem to be entirely reliable. Badaw±'s text reads wa-ill∞ lamm∞ [u]∫t±øa, supplementing a lamm∞ after wa-ill∞ which does not seem to fit the sense, since it inserts a further level of grammatical subordination in the sentence. On the other hand, √Af±f± reads wa-ill∞ l∞ ∫[a]t±∫ (the last letter being probably a typo for the correct reading ø) or wa-ill∞ la-[u]∫t±øa, but there is no explicit indication as to the editor's intention to justify this choice. 80 term (= ∫addan)␣ : om. A. 81 and (= wa) ␣ : om. A. 155AVICENNA ON THE INDEMONSTRABILITY OF DEFINITION assumption. For, again, the question is one and the same␣ : is this (h∞∏∞ ∂-∂ay') a definition of a thing82 or a definition of its definition␣ ? And it has not proved clear that it is a definition of its definition, or, [which is the same], it is clear that it is a definition of the thing. [(a)] Hence, this is also another way in which one can deviate from the correct determination (ta√r±f), if one posits that A is definition of the definition of C, while it is doubtful whether A is definition of C. This [happens to be the case] if one posits that A is definition of B and B is definition of C. But if one does not posit B as a definition of C, then it is not known whether its definition83 is a definition of C or not. However, it is said that its definition is something predicated of C, in the same way as [one says] that the definition of the differentia, of the genus and of the property are something predicated of the species without being definition of the species. [(b)] This syllogism [moreover] does not provide the definition, if it has not been posited [from the outset] that A is definition of B. For, once it is known that A belongs to the definition of B, it does not need to be the definition of B␣ : not every inseparable attribute (l∞zim) and every essential predicate are a definition84 . [(c)] [A274] And if it is said in the end, as a conclusion of this kind of clarification, that A is definition of C, then it will be something which has already been somehow posited without being produced as the conclusion of a syllogism. Accordingly, whoever puts definition in between [something and its] definition85 is begging the question without being aware [of it], in the same way as whoever says «␣ soul is selfmoving number␣ » - if that were to be a definition - and then says «␣ everything which is self-moving number is the perfection of a natural body endowed with organs␣ ». And one does not thereby mean to demonstrate solely the predication and the position [of the thesis], but [one also intends] to demonstrate that the major [term] is a definition of the minor [term], as if one were to say «␣ the thing whose quiddity, true nature and definition are 'being self-moving number' [takes as] its definition and true nature 'being the perfection of a natural body endowed with organs'␣ ». But the definition of this thing is the very [thing that is being] sought. Therefore, if it were clear that the definition of the thing whose definition is 'being self-moving number' - of which it is actually known that it is the soul and nothing else, and whose [definition] is being sought85 - is 'perfection of a natural body', then this [definition] would not be sought. And this is not like when the middle [term] is not a definition of the minor86 [term], 82 a definition of a thing (= ∫addun li-∂-∂ay'i)␣ : ∫addu ∂-∂ay'i A. 83 Viz. the definition of B, which in this case would be the major term A. 84 every inseparable ... predicate (= kullu l∞zimin wa-ma∫m≤lin ∏∞tiyyin) ␣ : kullu l∞zimin ma∫m≤lun ∏∞tiyyun B. On B's reading the text would mean, therefore, 'not every inseparable attribute, which is [also] an essential predicate, is a definition'. 85 A tentative translation of the Arabic expression man wassa¥a l-∫adda li-l-∫addi. 86 a ... minor (= ∫addin li-l-aμaeari)␣ : ∫addi l-aμaeari B. 156 RICCARDO STROBINO because in that case the minor [term] is not the middle [term] itself and [does not coincide with] its true nature, but rather it is another thing of which [the middle term] is predicated. As for what is defined, it is the very thing which has the definition. [§I.2.5 Conclusion␣ : there is no middle between a thing and its essence (A274,12-15)] Hence, this passage should be understood in this manner, and the business concerning the true nature [of something] goes back to the fact that whoever seeks a middle87 between the definition and the defined thing is thereby seeking a middle term between the thing and its true essence (∫aq±qa ∏∞tih±), which is absurd. Rather, there is no middle whatsoever␣ : the middle is [to be found] only between some entities and other things which are not the essences (∫aq∞'iq) of those entities unless by accident, according to what we have clarified elsewhere. [§II Definition is not acquired through division (A274,16-278,17)] Then it is said that neither does the method of division prove that A is the definition of C. On the contrary, there is no syllogism whatsoever [proving] something through division, as we made evident in the preceding [logical] art (fann)88 . For in [the process of] division the existence of something is not posited, but rather [a thing] is only divided (yufaμμalu faqa¥) by saying [A275] « ␣ it is this way or it is that way␣ ». And from this it does not follow that one of [the alternatives resulting from] the division is posited by way of necessity, unless one begs the question and [one of them] is posited [as something which is] taken for granted, as if there had been no syllogism. [§II.1 Circular induction (A275,2-11)] This [approach], in a way, is similar to circular induction. For, if it is doubtful to us whether every C is B, someone might make it evident that this is the case because every C is A and every A is B, and then set out to clarify that every A is B, by observing and saying «␣ [It is the case that every A is B] because D is B, H89 is B and Z is B␣ » - i.e. the particulars [falling] within the category of C - «␣ therefore every A is B␣ ». Hence, one might say [in reply] - if he wants to accept nothing but what is necessary - that what [falls] under A is not only D, H and Z, but also C, to the effect that if you 87 middle (= mutawassi¥an)␣ : cf. also MCGINNIS, REISMAN, Classical Arabic Philosophy cit., pp. 147-148, where the term is occasionally translated as 'connection'. 88 The preceding logical art, i.e. the syllogistic, corresponds also to the immediately preceding section (fann) of the logical part of the ¶if∞', namely the Kit∞b al-qiy∞s ␣ : Avicenna deals with the relationship between division and syllogism in the fifth chapter of the ninth treatise (the same is true of Aristotle who deals with the topic both in An. Post., B, 5 and An. Pr., A, 31). 89 H (= h) ␣ : om. A. 157AVICENNA ON THE INDEMONSTRABILITY OF DEFINITION grant that D, H and Z - among the things that are A - are90 B, it does not necessarily follow that every A is B. Thus, it might be that what has not been observed or enumerated is different from what has been observed and enumerated so that it might be [in turn] that what is B are only some of the A's - that is D, H and Z - and that the C with respect to which we have raised an objection is different. And if you assume, in the induction, that C, too, is B, in such a way that [C] does not turn out to remain a particular with respect to A unless B has already been predicated of it91 , you have already begged the question and assumed that C is B [in the attempt] to clarify that A is B, in order to clarify [in turn] that C is B, which is absurd. [§II.2 Three defects of division in producing the definition (A275,12-276,14)] In the same way that such an induction [neither] posits what is sought nor makes it necessary, or begs the question92 , so too [does the process of] dividing (taqs±m) ␣ ; and this passage needs to be understood accordingly. For when one has made the division [claiming] that 'human' is either 'animal' or 'not-animal' (rather␣ : 'inanimate body'), and then posits that it is 'animal', and then says that 'animal' is either 'walking', 'swimming', 'creeping' or 'flying', and then posits, for instance, that it is 'walking' and then says «␣ therefore 'human' is 'walking animal'␣ », he is open to criticism in three respects, in producing the definition as a conclusion from this set [of predicates]␣ : [(a)] The first is that when he has made the division, [it is not the case that] one of the two alternatives turns out to be determined for him through the division, but rather he posits it circularly and by way of concession. [(b)] [A276] The second is that he aggregates what is separate (mutafarriq)93 and the defect occurs in this [case] in various ways. [(ba)] The first of these is that, sometimes, the phrase can be true [if one takes it] separately (mutafarriqan) and false [if one takes it] jointly (muøtami√an)94 . [(bb)] The second is that, sometimes, it can be that an essentially unique nature does not derive, through aggregation, from distinct things. And these two things are mentioned in the Peri Hermeneias95 . [(bc)] The third is that, sometimes, it can be that the aggregation does not occur according to the 90 are (= huwa) ␣ : om. B. The huwa is correctly supplemented by √Af±f± according to the sense of the passage. 91 I.e. of C. 92 In sum, the method described above has two possible outcomes␣ : either it is not strong enough to prove the conclusion or it is too strong, in the sense that the conclusion must be assumed as a premise, which makes the argument circular. The same, says Avicenna, holds in the case of division, when one tries to use it as a method for proving definitions. 93 But also 'distinct' or 'disgregate'. I will use 'separate' for this root in the following. 94 Which is to say that all predicates can be true of the subject if taken one by one, but it might not be the case that their conjunction, in a strong sense, is true of the subject (ie. that it is its definition). 95 Cf. ARISTOTLE, De int., 11, 20b37-38 and in general the whole chapter. 158 RICCARDO STROBINO recommended order which should be complied with in the definition, so as to observe in it96 which differentiae need to be put first and which of them need to be postponed (this [obtains] when a number of differentiae are put together). So these are the three ways in which the second respect is subdivided (yan∂a√ibu)97 , that is the error of aggregating what is separate. And, by virtue of these three ways, it is guaranteed that the occurrence of division [should be] through [features that are] essential and primitive in the division, according to what you have already learned, namely␣ : that into which a thing as such is divided, not on account of something more particular than [the thing itself]. Yet, despite this, in that [process] there is no syllogism of the definition, because of what you know. [(c)] The third among the defects in producing the definition as a conclusion from these [predicates] is that it is only an aggregate and one does not indicate that it is a definition. For not every collection of essential [properties] conforming to correctness in the ordering is a definition␣ : sometimes something necessary is lacking or there is something in excess, in such a way that it is difficult or unlikely that a jump or an extension of the essential [properties] does not occur, in the division, towards98 something which is alien to the essence99 . For in the division all of that may occur␣ : for instance that 'laughing', 'wide-nailed' or 'erect of stature' may enter in it. [§II.3 Two purported syllogisms of division (A276,15-277,3). §II.3.1 First syllogism (A276,15-16)] If clarifying the occurrence of caution with respect to that100 [matter] causes too much trouble, one has already left behind the requirement of division101 . And if one extends the division to a syllogism by dividing, he will thus102 repeat (fa-sta≥ná) one of the opposite [alternatives] of one or more divisions and produce, as a conclusion, one single [thing] which is what remains [common] among the divisions103 . 96 Viz. in the recommended order. 97 On the notion of in∂i√∞b (= branching) which came to mean something like dichotomous division, see T. STREET, §≤s± on Avicenna's Logical Connectives, « ␣ History and Philosophy of Logic␣ », 16, 1995, pp. 257-268. 98 towards (= ilá)␣ : i.e. 'so as to include'. 99 alien to the essence (= π∞riø min al-øawhar) ␣ : or also 'extraneous to the substance [that is being defined]'. 100 with respect to that (= √an h∞∏∞)␣ : faqa¥ add. B. 101 The sense of this passage is likely to be that the previous criticisms cannot be overlooked and must be seriously taken into account␣ : if one is reluctant to do it then he is not fully aware of what the appropriate criteria of division are. 102 thus (= fa)␣ : ≥umma B. 103 what remains [common] among the divisions (= al-baq± mina l-aqs∞mi)␣ : Suppose the division has a tree structure␣ : 'what remains common among the divisions' is the path which leads from the starting point of the division down to the last differentia, i.e. the path that contains all differentiae that have been progressively assumed (by repeating them␣ : cf. above the use of isti≥n∞'). 159AVICENNA ON THE INDEMONSTRABILITY OF DEFINITION [§II.3.2 Second syllogism (A276,17-277,3)] In which case, he will aggregate the parts of the definition104 and extend this syllogism further to a[n additional] syllogism by gathering several single substantial predicates105 [A277] until something equal to the thing [which is being defined] results from them . Thus he will say «␣ the set (øumla) of these predicates is a differentiated phrase106 , indicating the quiddity, equal [to the thing], and everything which is like that is definition␣ ; therefore this [set of predicates] is definition␣ ». Thus, he does not achieve anything when he makes an attempt to prove the definition through division and through syllogism together with the latter. [§II.4 Criticisms against the two syllogisms (A277,4-278,2). §II.4.1 Reply to the first syllogism (A277,4-9)] As to the first syllogism, [one does not achieve anything] because in truth it is no syllogism at all, since the parts of the definition by themselves clearly [belong] to the defined [thing], since107 its essence108 has occurred (∫aμala) to [the faculty of] estimation [as] an aggregate, and its delimitation109 has been necessary. For the parts of that aggregate clearly [belong] to the aggregate and no clarification is required. Thus, if one thinks that a clarification is [indeed] required, their clarification110 does not amount to the elimination (raf√) of the remaining [alternatives of the] divisions, since their proof111 is more clear than the elimination of the remaining [alternatives of the] divisions or just as obscure. For it is more clear that 'rational' [belongs] to 'human' - once it is known what 'rational' is - than the fact that 'human' is not 'irrational'. And the repetition (isti≥n∞') [of the antecedent] needs to be more clear than the conclusion, not similar to or more obscure than the latter. 104 the definition (= al-∫add) ␣ : ∫ud≤d A. 105 single substantial predicates (= ma∫m≤l∞tin øawhariyyatan mufradatan) ␣ : al-ma∫m≤l∞ti mufradatin øawhariyyatin A. 106 differentiated phrase (= qawl mufaμμal) ␣ : I found it quite difficult to translate this locution (which might also be, according to another vocalization 'qawl mufaμμil ' , i.e. 'differentiating phrase'). I have opted for 'phrase' to translate 'qawl' and 'differentiated' to render the participial expression derived from the Arabic root f-μ-l. Be this as it may, the idea is that a qawl mufaμμal (resp. mufaμμil) is an articulated linguistic expression which contains in it some predicates corresponding to differentiae (fuμ≤l). Note that qawl stands also for the Greek lovgõ. 107 since (= i∏)␣ : A closes the preceding sentence with a period and premits a 'wa' to the 'i∏', which would make the passage less intelligible. 108 Viz. the essence of the defined. 109 delimitation (= ta∫d±d) ␣ : note that the root is the same as that of ∫add = definition, term. 110 I have translated literally the expression 'bay∞nuh∞' (= 'their clarification' or 'the clarification relative to them') which is likely to mean in this context 'the clarification of the fact that the parts of the aggregate clearly belong to it'. 111 Again, as above, the expression might be explicited␣ : the proof of their (i.e. the parts') belonging to the aggregate. 160 RICCARDO STROBINO [§II.4.2 Reply to the second syllogism (A277,10-278,2)] As to the second syllogism, again one does not achieve anything and that is because our query (¥alabun∞) whether 'mortal rational animal' [is] a definition of 'human' and our query whether 'mortal rational animal' is a differentiated phrase equal to 'human' [and] indicating its quiddity do not differ in obscurity and clarity. Thus, if we were to know that 'mortal rational animal' is a differentiated phrase equal to 'human' [and] indicating its quiddity, we would definitely not seek the definition of 'human', but rather we would only seek this differentiated expression which [abides] by this condition. Therefore, in the same way as we do not grant that this is a definition of 'human', so [neither] do we grant that it is a phrase which [abides] by this condition in such a way that it is taken to be a definition, since we have taken 'phrase [which abides] by this condition' as a middle term112 that somehow begs the question in potency, leaving act aside113 . I mean that frequently, in other passages, putting the definition of something as a middle [term]114 in the syllogism does not amount to begging the question in act, if the differentiation (tafμ±l) is more widely known than the aggregation. As far as this passage is concerned, [however], the differentiation is what is sought, that is the obscure thing. Therefore, since putting the definition of something as a middle [term] does not [generally] amount to begging the question, then [in] this [case] it also does not amount to begging the question in act. Yet, since in the present passage the potency of putting [the definition] as a middle [term] is like the potency of putting the major term as a middle [term], then it does amount to begging the question in potency, in that passage. However, on this [account], the definition of the definition has already been taken to [belong] to the definition115 without mediation (w∞si¥a), in the same way as 'mortal rational living [being]' has been taken, without [appeal to] a syllogism, to be something which belongs to 'human' [and is] equivalent to it - which is what is sought. And [the question is]␣ : as a result of what does the definition of the definition clearly belong to the definition␣ ? 112 since ... term (= wa-aπa∏n∞ l-qawla bi-h∞∏ihi l-∫∞li ∫addan) om. B. 113 Recall the structure of the second syllogism presented in sec. II.3.2 above␣ : 1. 'The set (øumla) of these predicates is a differentiated phrase, indicating the quiddity, equal [to the thing] (= Minor premise), 2. Everything which is like that [i.e. a differentiated phrase etc.] is definition (= Major premise)␣ ; 3. Therefore this [set of predicates] is definition (= Conclusion)' Here the expression 'differentiated phrase etc.' is actually the middle term of the syllogism. 114 The expression corresponds to the Arabic taws±¥u ∫addi ∂-∂ay'i ∫addan. 115 to the definition (= li-l-∫addi)␣ : om. A. I am not entirely sure that the clause should be retained. 161AVICENNA ON THE INDEMONSTRABILITY OF DEFINITION [§II.5 Further arguments116 (A278,3-17)] Then here is another thing, namely that the one who masters the art (μin∞√a)117 needs to have a rule for knowing correct definition as opposed to incorrect definition, in the same way as he needs to have a rule for knowing correct syllogism as opposed to incorrect syllogism. And in the same way as it is not required that the one who syllogizes be [(a)] one who syllogizes118 and, besides that, [(b)] also demonstrate [(ba)] that he is syllogizing, [(bb)] that the argument he has made up [conforms] to the syllogistic rule and [(bc)] that it produces the conclusion, except [when arguing] with those who annoyingly make use of sophistical arguments and ignore the rules of syllogism, so the one who defines is required to define according to that rule, without employing it in act [when he is defining]. And, in general, in the same way as the one who syllogizes simply syllogizes (yaq±su faqa¥) and does not syllogize about the fact that he is syllogizing by saying «␣ every argument (qawl), among those whose nature is such and such, is a syllogism␣ », so it is required that the one who defines only define and not that he define definition119 by saying «␣ every phrase (qawl), which is such and such, is a definition␣ ». On the contrary, it needs to be already known in the first place what syllogism is and what definition is. And in the same way as the one who denies that this is the case120 - when someone confronts him with something that should count as a demonstration and takes much trouble to indicate that it is a demonstration, by appeal to the fact that the definition of demonstration [belongs] to it - can say [in reply] «␣ if I were to grant that this [characterization by means of 'such and such'] is the definition of demonstration, or [to put it better] that, if121 it is the definition of demonstration, then it belongs to this argument, then I would grant that this argument is a demonstration␣ ; but, since I do not grant that this [argument] is a demonstration, how could I grant that the definition of demonstration [belongs] to this argument␣ ? ␣ » - such122 is the condition of the one who denies definition123 , for he can say [in reply] «␣ if I were to grant that this [characterization by means of 'such and such'] is the definition of definition, or 116 See ARISTOTLE, An. Post., B, 6. 117 the one ...art (= μ∞∫ibu μ-μin∞√ati) ␣ : in other words, the logician. 118 that ...syllogizes2 (= an yak≤na l-qayy∞su qayy∞san)␣ : an yak≤na l-q∞'isu yaq±su qiy∞san B 119 definition (= al-∫add)␣ : f± l-∫addi add. B. 120 Namely that something is a demonstration in the circumstances envisaged by the following incidental clause (I have been forced to rephrase the sentence slightly because of the complexity of the Arabic original). 121 if (= in)␣ : wa add. B. 122 The 'such' translates an occurrence of ka-∏∞lika which is related to the kam∞ at the beginning of the argument (cf. eight lines above). 123 Which is to say 'if someone denies that a certain phrase with certain features is a definition'. 162 RICCARDO STROBINO [to put it better] that, if124 it is the definition of definition, then it belongs to this thing125 , then I would grant that [this phrase] is a definition, and that it is a definition of that thing126 . [§III Conclusion (A278,18-19)] In general, as a matter of fact, definition is about the quiddity of something, whereas demonstration is about the fact that something [belongs] to something [else]127 ␣ ; [now] the that-ness (inniya) of something is alien to its quiddity and external to it ␣ ; [thus] it is not unlikely that in such cases one ignores what [something] belongs to128 , as you have learned, and hence seeks it through demonstration. 124 if (= in)␣ : I have corrected the text removing a 'wa' that both A and B premit to the conditional conjunction 'in'. This would not fit the sense of the passage since it introduces a concessive clause. 125 I.e. to a certain phrase. 126 I have intentionally left the translation ambiguous, as it is in the original␣ : 'wa-annah≤ li-∏∞lika ∂-∂ay'i ∫addun'. I am inclined to think that the pronoun '-h≤' refers to the demonstrative 'h∞∏∞' of the previous line (which I have translated 'this [characterization by means of 'such and such']). The expression 'li-∏∞lika ' thus would refer to 'li-h∞∏ihi ∂-∂ay'i' of the previous line where I take this to mean, in turn, 'to this phrase', i.e. the minor term of this meta-syllosigm␣ ; cf. above, in the previous example, the parallel use of 'qawl'. 127 the fact ... something2 (= inniyati ∂-∂ay'i li-∂-∂ay'i)␣ : ∞nniya B. Literally the 'that-ness of something to something'. The term 'inniya' often occurs alone in the treatise (cf. for instance the preceding chapter Burh∞n, IV, 1) and corresponds to the Aristotelian to; o{ti question. 128 what ... to (= li-∂-∂ay'i)␣ : a∂-∂ay'i B. The clause points out that in the case of demonstration the object of inquiry is what a given predicate belongs to, so that what is ignored is the li-∂-∂ay'i referred to in the technical locution inniyati ∂-∂ay'i li-∂-∂ay'i. 163AVICENNA ON THE INDEMONSTRABILITY OF DEFINITION ABSTRACT The paper provides some introductory comments and a preliminary translation of Avicenna's Burh∞n, IV, 2. I shall first set the stage by outlining the structure of the book (sec. 1). I will then briefly introduce (sec. 2) a number of notions that are dealt with in the first treatise of the Burh∞n (e.g. definition, description). Burh∞n, IV, 2 is split into two parts␣ : the first focuses mainly on Aristotle's An. Post., B, 4, whereas the second covers some of the topics of B, 5 and B, 6. Accordingly, sec. 3 will be devoted to a cursory presentation of Aristotle's arguments in An. Post., B, 4 along with a more detailed discussion of its Avicennan counterpart, focusing on the indemonstrability of definition␣ ; sec. 4, finally, will be a presentation of the second part of the chapter, concerning the relationship between definition and division. An English translation of the entire chapter is appended to the paper and is accompanied by some notes.

THREE WAYS OF RESISTING RACISM There are undoubtedly more than three ways of resisting racism, but I will talk about three markedly different strategies to do so. Two of these are very widespread, but the third, arguably the most successful one, is much less so. The twowidespread strategies of resisting racism are, broadly speaking, the antirealist and the realist ones. The first one is to deny the existence of races and thus block even the possibility of racist claims. The second one is to grant that races exist but give some kind of considerations about the fact-value gap in order to block the move from talking about racial differences to talking about value differences. I will attempt to outline a way of resisting racism that is weaker than the first but stronger than the second. My claim is that even if we accept that races exist, we can still deny that there are projectible racial differences. And this is enough to block the possibility of racist claims without bringing in the slippery topic of value differences. I will use some considerations from philosophy of biology to argue for this third way of resisting racism. Biological considerations have been widely used both in support of the antirealist and in support of the realist strategy: both in favor of the claim that races do not exist and in favor of the claim that they do (and of course biology, or rather what is considered to be biology, has also been used in support of racist claims). I am not sure that biological considerations can help us to decide the ontological question about the existence of races once and for all. But I will argue that biological considerations can be used to show that even if races exist, projectible racial differences don't. 1. The First Way The first, and simplest, way of resisting racism would be to deny that races exist (Livingstone 1962, Diamond 1993, Appiah 1992, Appiah and Gutman 1997, Molnar 1992, Zack 1993, 2002, Harding 1993). If there are "Three Ways of Resisting Racism" by Bence Nanay, The Monist, vol. 93, no. 2, pp. 255–280. Copyright © 2010, THE MONIST, Peru, Illinois 61354. no races, then any racist statement would be meaningless. As David Hull says, "if races do not exist in any significant sense, then it is hard to see how one race can be superior to other races" (Hull 1998, 366, see also Hull 1986). Here, again, we need to distinguish a number of strategies. Antirealism about race often takes the form of a version of social constructivism: the claim that race is merely a social construct (there are many versions of this claim, but the most influential ones include Appiah 1992, Goldberg 1993). Social constructivism about race comprises a negative and a positive claim: that race has no objective reality and that racial concepts refer to socially constructed categories (Andreasen 2000, 654–55, see also Mallon 2004, 2006). What is important from our point of view is the negative thesis that races have no objective reality: they do not exist. It is not clear what is supposed to be meant by the claim that races do not exist. Awidespread and intuitively plausible way of reading this claim would be to say that classifying individuals in races does not "carve nature at its joints." In short, race is not a natural kind. Racial concepts do not pick out natural kinds, but merely artificial kinds, like the concept of democrats. The division between democrats and nondemocrats does not carve nature at its joints. Nor, so the race-skeptic concludes, do racial terms. But there are a number of ways in which we can deny that race is a natural kind. I will consider four widespread arguments. (i) One can argue that no natural kinds exist. Therefore, race, supposedly a natural kind, does not exist either. This is the strategy recently endorsed by Ian Hacking (Hacking forthcoming, Hacking 2007). Resisting realism about natural kinds is a sweeping claim and very few philosophers (let alone racists) would be open to endorse it. Thus, building a way of resisting racism on such a claim does not seem the best way of beating racism. (ii) The second argument against the claim that race is a natural kind uses a somewhat weaker premise. There may or may not be natural kinds in general. But biological kinds are not natural kinds. Hence, race, supposedly a biological kind, is not a natural kind either. This would be a less radical argument than the previous one as it would deny realism about natural kinds only with regards to the biological domain, remaining silent about nonbiological natural kinds. But why should we accept that biological kinds behave differently from nonbiological ones? What is so special about the biological domain? BENCE NANAY256 It is a widely held view that biological kinds are indeed very different from nonbiological kinds (Mayr 1959/1994, Dupré 2002, Hull 1986). But this difference does not concern the question of realism about biological/nonbiological kinds, but the other grand question about natural kinds: essentialism. It has been argued that there is an asymmetry between the biological and the nonbiological domains as far as essentialism is concerned. Water, according to many (Putnam 1975, Kripke 1980), is defined by an essential property, namely, that of being composed of H2O molecules. All and only members of this natural kind have the property of being composed of H2O molecules and this is true across possible worlds. In contrast, it is not true of biological categories that there is an essential property that all and only members of them have in all possible worlds- essentialists and anti-essentialists all seem to agree on this (see, for example, Dupré 2002, Ghiselin 1974, and Hacking 2007 in the former camp as well as Ellis 2001 and Wilkerson 1995 in the latter). I will say more about what essentialism about biological kinds imply in Section IV. Here it is enough to point out that anti-essentialism about biological kinds does not imply antirealism about biological kinds. Thus, even if the arguments for biological anti-essentialism were fully convincing, and, as we shall see in the next section, they may not be (see Okasha 2002, Griffiths 1999, Walsh 2006), we could not conclude that we should reject realism about biological kinds. In fact, all the classic accounts of biological anti-essentialism presupposed realism about biological kinds (Mayr 1959/1994, Hull 1965, Dupré 2002). But if this is so, then strategy (ii) does not seem to have much support. (iii) The third argument is that while there may or may not be biological natural kinds in general, subspecies, and, among them, human races are not natural kinds. This is John Stuart Mill's famous strategy (Mill 1843, for a thorough analysis of Mill's account of race see Hacking 2005 and Hacking 2007). According to Mill, "real Kinds" (what we now call natural kinds) share an "endless number" of properties, which are independent of one another. But subspecies (and human races) are not real Kinds: members of one subspecies do not share an "endless number" (or even a vast number) of properties. Species are real Kinds, subspecies are not. Argument (iii) can be and has been formulated without any reference to Mill's somewhat idiosyncratic terminology. It has been argued that regardless of how one defines species, if one does that in such a way that the THREE WAYS OF RESISTING RACISM 257 division between species is clear-cut, then the division between subspecies will be blurry (Wilson and Brown 1953, Edwards 1954, Livingstone 1964, Gould 1977, see also Hull 1998, esp. pp. 363–64 for a good summary). As a result, as Wilson and Brown conclude, the concept of subspecies "outlived its usefulness" (Wilson and Brown 1953, 108). Take, for example, the influential 'biological species concept': the view that species are "groups of actually or potentially interbreeding natural populations which are reproductively isolated from other such groups" (Mayr 1942, 120; Mayr 1963, 19). If this is the way we should think about species, then what could be the definition of subspecies? Clearly, attempts to give such a definition along the lines of 'groups of actually or potentially interbreeding natural populations which are somewhat reproductively isolated from other such groups' will only give us blurry and unclear ways of defining subspecies. This more general formulation of argument (iii) is also inconclusive. First, although many natural kind terms have sharp boundaries, nothing guarantees that this must be so. Nothing has been said against the possibility that natural kind terms have vague boundaries (if we think about natural kinds the way Boyd's 'homeostatic property cluster theory' does, for example, then they generally have vague boundaries, see Boyd 1999). Second, to return to the example of the biological species concept, it seems possible to give a definition of subspecies within this conceptual framework without making this concept too vague. Ernst Mayr himself defines subspecies as "an aggregate of phenotypically similar populations of a species inhabiting a geographic subdivision of the range of that species and differing taxonomically from other populations of that species" (Mayr 2002, 89). Darwin's famous characterization of subspecies as species in the making (Darwin 1858, 52) also survives objections akin to (iii)-although it is extremely problematic as a claim about human subspecies, that is, races (Dobzhansky 1937, Appiah 1992). (iv) The fourth argument uses an even weaker premise. Subspecies in general may or may not be natural kinds, but human races are definitely not natural kinds. The main consideration here is the famous observation that the genetic difference between human races is smaller than the genetic difference within human races (Lewontin 1970, Lewontin et al. 1984, Nei and Roychoudhury 1993, but see Sesardic 2000 who questions the validity of this argument). Many social scientists and philosophers used these consideraBENCE NANAY258 tions as the basis for their antirealism about race (see esp.Appiah 1992, 1996). The Achilles heel of (iv) is that it is not clear that genetic features have any special status in deciding whether something is a natural kind. It has been pointed out that the genetically coded and the developmental part of evolutionary explanations cannot and should not be detached from each other (Griffiths and Grey 1994, Oyama et al. 2001, cf. Godfrey-Smith 2000, Nanay 2002, Sterelny, Smith and Dickison 1996). More precisely, according to 'developmental system theory', there is no sharp distinction between 'genetic' and 'environmental' developmental causes. But if this is so, then facts about comparative genetic similarity cannot by themselves settle the question whether human races are natural kinds. As we have seen, none of arguments (i)–(iv) seem unproblematic. But even if we grant what they are supposed to show: that human races are not natural kinds, it still does not block the possibility of racist claims. The most important way of salvaging a realist conception of race while denying that race is a natural kind is to insist that race is a cultural (and not a biological) category. The claim is that racial classifications are not based on anything biological: it is not something biological that makes it the case that a certain individual is a member of a certain race, but something about the culture, behavior, or habits of this race and this individual. Racial concepts latch onto something real in the world, but this 'something real' is not defined in biological but in cultural terms. There is an obvious worry about this strategy of resisting racism. Even if race does not have biological reality, if it has cultural reality, then racist claims can be reformulated accordingly. This version of racism is often called 'cultural racism'.Although many racist claims are founded on some kind of assumptions about the biological nature of race, this is not a necessary feature of the racist discourse. One could make racist claims while referring to races as culturally (and not biologically) defined categories. While denying that racial classification has any biological foundation defuses some racist rhetoric, it is helpless in the face of others. 2. The Second Way So suppose that we accept that races exist. How can we now resist racism? The standard strategy here is to point out that the existence of racial differences does not imply any kind of value difference. This is the second way of resisting racism.1 THREE WAYS OF RESISTING RACISM 259 BENCE NANAY260 We have seen in the last section that there are a number of ways of arguing that races do not exist. Similarly, there are a number of ways of arguing that races exist. First, one can resist any of the four arguments (i)–(iv) in favor of the claim that race is not a natural kind. Many of these considerations are supported by biological arguments. Ernst Mayr, probably the most important evolutionary biologist of the second half of the last century, goes as far as saying that "those who subscribe to [the view that races do not exist] are obviously ignorant of modern biology" (Mayr 2002, 89) and later: "Recognizing races is only recognizing a biological fact" (Mayr 2002, 90). Similar views have been expressed by most biologically inclined theorists of race (just a couple of examples: Kitcher 1999; Andreasen 1998, 2000; Hardimon 2003). It is worth noting that at least some of them hold that this view, biological realism about races, does not exclude a version of social constructivism (Andreasen 2000), which I analyzed in the last section as the default antirealist strategy). But even if one denies that races are natural kinds, one can still assert that they exist: that they are not just our arbitrary way of grouping individuals. This is the view Ian Hacking and Philip Kitcher have argued for recently (Hacking 2005, Kitcher 2007). They claim that race is a "statistically useful" (Hacking) or "pragmatically useful" (Kitcher) category. Their argument rests on the recent phenomenon of 'race-based medicine' (on why this widely used term is question-begging, see Hacking 2005, 109). It has been discovered recently that some heart medications work much better on members of some races than on others. It is not clear whether this statistical correlation is due to genetic or cultural (say, nutritional) reasons. Hacking points out that the correlation between race and the efficacy of these medicines is not only statistically significant, it is also statistically useful: as he dramatically states, "race is a matter of life and death" (Hacking 2005, 108). Thus, even if race is not a natural kind, it is a statistically significant and statistically useful class. It exists although it is not a natural kind.2 If one is persuaded by any of these realist arguments about race, the question arises: what logical space remains for resisting racism within this realist framework? The antirealist had a short and simple argument against racism: if races do not exist, racist rhetoric is impossible. But what can the realist say? The standard strategy here is to point out that the existence of racial differences does not imply any kind of value difference. An important version of this strategy is to hold that different races are better at different things. As Ernst Mayr, one of the champions of the biological concept of race, says: [N]othing could be more meaningless than to evaluate races in terms of their putative "superiority." Superiority where, when, and under what circumstances? During the period of the development of the human races, each one became adapted to the condition of its geographic location. Put a Bushman and an Eskimo in the Kalahari Desert and the Bushman is very much superior. (Mayr 2002, 91) Race A may be better at Xing than race B, but race B may be better at Ying than race A. And who are we to tell that the ability to X is somehow more valuable than the ability to Y? This strategy is of course vulnerable to being exploited by racist theorizing. If different races are better at different things, then maybe some races are better at those things that really count, whereas other races are better at useless things-a strategy implicitly employed in Entine (2000) as well as by a number of contributors to the debate that became known as the 'IQ controversy' (Block and Dworkin 1976). And from here, racism is a short and easy step away. An interesting version of realism about race needs to be discussed separately as it seems to provide a different and maybe more promising way of resisting racism. The view is the following. There are races and they can be identified with the help of biological considerations. But the racial categories that biology gives us are not the same as our everyday folk concepts of race (Pigliucci-Kaplan 2003).3 As David Hull states: [T]he subdivisions of Homo sapiens that experts recognize do not come close to coinciding with the "races" of ordinary people. Several groups of people who are considered Caucasoids by anthropologists would rouse all the anxiety and hostility in ordinary white racists that blacks do. Their skin is black. They look black. But technically, they are Caucasoids. But such observations are not likely to persuade the members of the admissions committee of an all-white country club. (Hull 1998, 365) If the biologically grounded concept of race is different from the everyday concept of race, then there is a new and promising strategy for resisting racism. The concepts exploited in racist statements are folk concepts. Thus, biologically grounded racial categories cannot give us any justifications THREE WAYS OF RESISTING RACISM 261 for racist claims-these categories are different from the ones exploited in racist rhetoric. This view is a version of realism about race: it states that there are biologically defined races, but it could also be considered to be a version of antirealism as far as the folk conception of race is concerned: these folk concepts do not pick out any 'real' categories in nature. Although this version of realism about races seems more promising than other realist attempts, it is unlikely to block racist rhetoric. Take the argument presented in Entine (2000). The structure of Entine's argument is that race A is (on average) better at Xing (which he implicitly judges to be a not very valuable ability) than race B. The concepts of 'race A' and 'race B' are folk concepts (I'll use scare-quotes to indicate this), thus, his claim is not about categories that have any biological reality (PigliucciKaplan 2003, 1167). But the empirical considerations Entine uses are about categories that are supposed to have biological reality: some biologically defined race C within 'race'A that is (on average) much better at Xing than 'race' B. Thus, even if we embed this biologically defined race C in a class that has no biological reality ('race'A), if non-C members of A are not much worse at Xing than members of B, then it will still be true that 'race'A is better at Xing than 'race' B, in spite of the fact that neither 'race' A not 'race' B have any biological reality. And from here it would be easy to argue that this difference between these two 'races' is a value difference. Disambiguating the biological and the folk conception of race still does not block all racist arguments. To sum up, the general worry about the entire second strategy of resisting racism is that once we have acknowledged the existence of racial differences, it will be very difficult to block arguments that present these racial differences as value differences. So far, the roadmap for resisting racism looks like this: Question 1: Do races exist? No: Racism is a nonstarter Yes: Question 2: Is the difference between races a value difference? No: Racism is a nonstarter Yes: This is where racism starts BENCE NANAY262 3. The Third Way Some may be dissatisfied by both of these options. One may think that denying the existence of races is too strong a strategy and biologists may give us some reason to question its feasibility. But one may also think that construing the difference between races as value-free is too weak a strategy and it could easily slide into racism. We need a third strategy that is neither too strong nor too weak. I will argue that there is another, much less-explored way of resisting racism. If we accept that races exist, the next question we should ask is whether there are projectible racial differences. And it is only if we respond affirmatively that the question of value neutrality arises. The third way of resisting racism is to deny that racial differences exist. So the road map will be the following: Question 1: Do races exist? No: Racism is a nonstarter Yes: Question 2: Are there projectible racial differences? No: Racism is a nonstarter Yes: Question 3: Is the difference between races a value difference? No: Racism is a nonstarter Yes: This is where racism starts It is important to note the structure of my argument. I am not committed to saying that races exist. Maybe they don't; maybe some of the arguments (i)–(iv) I outlined in section I are correct. But even if they do exist, we have a way of resisting racism without resorting to the strategy of insisting that racial differences are not value differences. Even if races do exist, there are no projectible racial differences. But how can we accept that races exist and still deny that there are projectible racial differences? Here we need to differentiate between two ways of talking about the difference between groups of individuals. THREE WAYS OF RESISTING RACISM 263 Suppose that the claim is that raceA is better at Xing than race B (there is no shortage of overtly or covertly racist claims of this kind; a recently popular one can be found in Herrnstein and Murray 1994). Thus, the claim is that As are better Xers than Bs. What does this mean? It can mean two things. First, it can mean that the worst A is still better than the best B at Xing. Or, second, it can mean that on average, As are better Xers than Bs. The first of these two options is not viable: racial differences are not of this kind. There is no alleged 'racial difference' that would follow this pattern. It has been repeatedly pointed out that there is always an overlap between the properties of members of two different races-regardless of which properties we are talking about: the worst Xer of the 'better Xer race' is always worst than the best Xer of the 'worse Xer race' (Mayr 1959/1994, Molnar 1992-interestingly, this is also acknowledged by those who are flirting with racism, see Herrnstein and Murray 1994). Thus, although we may be able to talk about differences of this kind between some groups of people, we can't talk about racial differences this way. Thus, we are left with the second option, namely, that on average, As are better Xers than Bs. But what does this mean? In order to decide what this claim means, we need to ask a further question: what makes it the case that, on average, As are better Xers than Bs. Here, again, we have two options. The first option would be to say that there is something about As in general that makes it the case that on average As are better Xers than Bs. In other words, As are better Xers than Bs qua being As. The second option would be to say that there is nothing aboutAs in general that makes it the case that on average As are better Xers than Bs. As are not better Xers than Bs qua being As. It just happens to be the case that if we take the average Xing capacity of As and the average Xing capacity of Bs, the former is higher. Take the first option briefly. If As are better Xers than Bs qua being As, then the difference between As and Bs in terms of Xing potential is a projectible difference (see Goodman 1955, 82ff; Quine 1969 on the concept of projectibility). And the projectibility of racial differences is exactly what seems to be needed for making racist claims: racist claims are supposed to be about certain properties of members of a certain races qua being members of that race. Racist claims are supposed to apply to BENCE NANAY264 those members of the race in question who have not been born yet (again, this is a clear assumption in Herrnstein and Murray 1994). A natural way of filling in the details of this first option to explain what makes it the case that on average As are better Xers than Bs is the following: there is a property As have and Bs do not have that makes it the case that As are better at Xing than Bs (on average). Thus, the picture is the following. There is a property, call it P, that is such that all and only members of race A have instantiations of P. Members of race B do not have instantiations of P. And it is the having instantiations of P that makes it the case that As, on average, are better Xers than Bs. This property, P, could be a genetic property, a phenotypic biological property, or a nonbiological, say, behavioral or cultural property. Importantly, P is a property that not only current members of race A have, but all past and future members, otherwise racial differences would not be projectible. Also, if we veer away a bit from the actual world, members of race A should not stop having property P, as, again, this would jeopardize the projectibility of these racial differences. In short, P is an essential property of race A. I said it is a natural way of filling in the details of the first option to explain what makes it the case that on average As are better Xers than Bs. It is not the only way. Richard Boyd argues that there is no property that all and only members of a species have in common. According to his 'homeostatic property cluster theory', the members of a kind share a cluster of similar properties, but no single property is necessary for membership in this kind (Boyd 1999). It is important to note, however, that Boyd's 'homeostatic property cluster theory' is also a version of essentialism (at least according to him). The arguments I give about the essentialist way of talking about racial differences in the next section can all be rephrased in terms of Boyd's terminology. Property P does not have to be something observable, like skin color. Essential properties, at least according to Putnam and Kripke, are rarely observable: the essential property of water, that is, its molecular structure, for example, is not observable (at least not without some very special equipment). So property P, in claims of projectible racial differences, does not have to be an observable property: it can also be some unobservable property or even the propensity to have another, observable, property P*. THREE WAYS OF RESISTING RACISM 265 BENCE NANAY266 It is important to clarify the structure of my argument. More specifically, it needs to be emphasized again that the racial differences that the presence or lack of property P underwrites do not have to be absolute. Again, the projectible racial differences in question are differences of average Xing capacity. Some As are worse Xers than some Bs, but on average As are better Xers than Bs. I argue that in order for these racial differences to be projectible, there needs to be a property that All As have and all Bs lack that accounts for this difference in average Xing capacity. An analogy would be the following. Suppose that American coins, on average, land heads more often than British coins. It's not the case that they all land heads and British coins all land tails; just that on average, there is a difference. If this difference is a projectible one, there must be a property P that makes this the case. And this property is being headbiased: a property that, per hypothesi, American coins have but British coins don't. Again, P does not have to be, and indeed in this case, it is not, an observable property. In other words, the first option of answering the question about what makes it the case that As are better at Xing than Bs implies a version of essentialism. Property P, which makes it the case that As are better at Xing than Bs is supposed to be an essential property of raceA: a property all and onlymembers of raceAhave. I will criticize this first option in the next section. But before proceeding, I want to rule out the second option for answering the question about what makes it the case that As are better at Xing than Bs. The second option for answering this question would be to say that there is no property that As have and Bs lack that would make it the case that As are better at Xing than Bs. But the momentary distribution of As' Xing ability and Bs' Xing ability is such that if we take the average of the Xing ability of those people who we know to be members of A and we also take the average of the Xing ability of those people who we know to be members of B, the former is higher than the latter. There is nothing wrong with this strategy, but it will not yield any projectible racial differences either. It is important to notice that we can only compare the average Xing ability of those As and those Bs that we have observed. But if this is so, then this comparison will give no justification for saying anything about the Xing abilities of a new or unknownA. Hence, it will not give any justification for saying anything about the Xing abilities of As in general. It will not give any justification for saying anything about the Xing abilities of As qua As. It will only give justification for saying something about the Xing abilities of those members of A (or B) who have been observed. Thus, this option, while viable, would be utterly useless for making racist claims. If racial differences were to boil down to differences of this kind, this would make racist claims impossible. But the first (essentialist) option for answering the question about what makes it the case that As are better at Xing than Bs could indeed be used for making claims about As quaAs. Thus, I need to examine whether the first option for answering this question is a viable one. 4. Realism and Essentialism The essentialist option for answering the question about what makes it the case that As are better at Xing than Bs was the following. There is a property, P, that is such that all and only members of raceAhave P. Members of race B do not have P. And it is having P that makes As better Xers than Bs. I call this option the essentialist one, as P, conceived this way would count as an essential property of raceA. I would like to remain neutral about what this property, P, could be: it could be a genetic property, a phenotypic biological property, or a nonbiological, say, behavioral or cultural property. I aim to point out that this option for answering the question about what makes it the case that As are better at Xing than Bs does not work because there is no property P that would be able to play the role it is supposed to play according to the essentialist proposal. More specifically, there is no property P that would both be such that all and only members of race A have it (and do so necessarily) and that would also be responsible for the difference in the Xing abilities of As and Bs. In other words, the essentialist option is not viable. There are no projectible racial differences. Let me pause for a moment to clarify the structure of the argument. The claim I defend in this paper is that even if races exist, there are no projectible racial differences. And we have seen that there are two distinct ways of defending the claim that races exist: the first one is to claim that races are natural kinds: presumably biological categories. The second way of defending realism about race is to claim that race is not a biological but a cultural category: racial concepts latch onto something real in the world, but this 'something real' is not defined in biological but in cultural terms. Although the first strategy is more widespread (and, as a result, I will spend more time addressing it), the second strategy should not be ignored. Depending on the way we think of the reality of races, that is, whether we think of them as biological or cultural categories, the essenTHREE WAYS OF RESISTING RACISM 267 tialist way of explaining racial differences will also be different. If race is not a biological but a cultural category, then the essential property that all and only members of race A have is presumably not a biological, but a cultural property (otherwise it is hard to see why race would not be a biological category). But what could possibly be a cultural or behavioral property that all and only members of raceA have and do so in all possible worlds? Supposing that in twenty generations, members of race A will have the same cultural or behavioral property as they do now would imply extreme pessimism about the possibility of social change. The world and our society can change and so can the cultural and behavioral properties of members of race A. One could argue that we may be able to salvage this cultural version of an essentialist way of explaining racial differences if we consider potential essential properties such as being subject to a certain kind of social interaction/discrimination. Thus, the property all and only members of race A would have is the property of being treated by others in a certain way in virtue of being perceived to be a member of race A. The problem with this suggestion is, again, that it would imply extreme pessimism to suppose that this property is one that all and only members of race A have in the past, present and future, as it would imply denying the possibility that the way someone is being treated by others in virtue of being perceived to be a member of race A cannot change. If we want to maintain hope in the possibility of social change, then this property is unlikely to be an essential one. But maybe we should modify this attempt to salvage the cultural version of an essentialist way of explaining racial differences and consider the potential essential properties not of being subject to a certain kind of social interaction/discrimination, but rather of being a descendent of people who were subject to a certain kind of social interaction/discrimination. The problem with this suggestion is that this property, although, arguably, all and only members of race A have it and this may even be so necessarily, it is unlikely to be a property that would do much causal work. And as we have seen, according to the essentialist way of explaining racial differences, there is a property that is both such that all and only members of race A have it (and do so necessarily) and that makes it the case that As are better at Xing than Bs. It is unclear how the property of being a descendent of people who were subject to a certain kind of social interaction/ discrimination could make it the case that As are, and will always be, better Xers than Bs. BENCE NANAY268 So much about the cultural version of the essentialist way of explaining racial differences. This leaves us with the mainstream version of realism about races, according to which races are biological categories. According to the essentialist way of explaining racial differences, there is a property that members of this biological category have in common that would make it the case that As are better at Xing than Bs. Here my strategy will be the following. If we accept the widespread anti-essentialist claims about the biological domain, then we are done: if races are biological categories and if, as the biological anti-essentialists claim, biological categories do not have essential properties, then races do not have essential properties. Thus, we cannot explain racial differences in an essentialist fashion. We can conclude the argument here. The problem is that not everyone accepts anti-essentialism about the biological domain, so I will address possible ways of resisting the 'anti-essentialist consensus' and point out that although some of them may be viable in general, they cannot provide us with essential properties for races. First we need to be clear about what 'essential properties' are. One big question about natural kinds in general is whether they have essential properties: properties all and only members of a natural kind have in all possible worlds. Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke argued that they do (Putnam 1975, Kripke 1980). However, biology has always been considered to be a problem case for essentialism or at least a potential exemption. According to the traditional and rather strong "anti-essentialist consensus" (Okasha 2002, 195, Walsh 2006, 325) among biologists and philosophers of biology, at least regarding biological kinds, essentialism is false (Dupré 1993, 2002, Hull 1965, Ghiselin 1974, Hacking 2007). Putnam and Kripke may be right about chemical kinds, but biological kinds do not have (and cannot have) any essential properties (Wilkerson 1995, Ellis 2001). It is not an easy task to pin down what is meant by essentialism about biological kinds. A couple of preliminary remarks need to be made. First, there are a number of potential definitions for essentialism about kinds. I will use the most general of these. Richard Boyd identified a widespread and fairly strong version of essentialism, according to which natural kinds "must possess definitional essences that define them in terms of necessary and sufficient, intrinsic, unchanging, ahistorical properties" (Boyd 1999, 146). Essential properties in, say, chemistry may all be intrinsic, unchanging and ahistorical. But it is not clear that essential biological properties need to satisfy any of these three requirements. In fact, a rather easy way of arguing THREE WAYS OF RESISTING RACISM 269 against essentialism about biological kinds is to point out that biological properties are extrinsic, historical, and they change over time, because biological entities are evolving over time. I don't think arguments of this kind will defeat essentialism about biological kinds. A new wave of biological essentialists all seek to specify essential properties of biological kinds that are extrinsic and that are neither unchanging nor ahistorical.4 The simple argument from the observation that biological entities are evolving over time cannot be used to argue against these versions of biological essentialism. Thus, if we want a target that is worth arguing against, we need to weaken this strong definition of essentialism. As most of the new essentialists, I am also happy to go along with David Hull's characterization, according to which "each species is distinguished by one set of essential characteristics. The possession of each essential character is necessary for membership in the species, and the possession of all the essential characters sufficient" (Hull 1994, 313). I will use Hull's definition as my starting point for characterizing kind-essentialism in what follows. Third, essentialism about kinds is a complex thesis that goes beyond the simple claim that there are some properties that all and only members of a natural kind have in all possible worlds. Marc Ereshefsky specified three tenets of any version of essentialism about kinds: One tenet is that all and only the members of a kind have a common essence. A second tenet is that the essence of a kind is responsible for the traits typically associated with the members of that kind. For example, gold's atomic structure is responsible for gold's disposition to melt at certain temperatures. Third, knowing a kind's essence helps us explain and predict those properties typically associated with a kind. (Ereshefsky 2007, section 2.1) The essentialist option for accounting for racial differences seems to have to endorse all three of the tenets of essentialism. All and only members of race A have property P and it is property P that is causally responsible for (thus, it can also help us to explain) the difference in the average Xing ability of As and Bs. The second and the third tenets of essentialism are often underrated, so it is important to point out that they are as important as the first one. The third tenet of essentialism is the following. "Knowing the essence of a kind [. . .] allows us to predict and explain the properties associated with the members of a kind. For instance, the atomic structure of gold provides the basis for explaining why gold conducts electricity, and it allows us to BENCE NANAY270 THREE WAYS OF RESISTING RACISM 271 predict that a particular chunk of gold will conduct electricity" (Ereshefsky forthcoming, 1). Or, as Philip Kitcher says, "natural kinds are distinguished by some special underlying feature that explains the behavior of members of this kind-like atomic number, for example, in the case of the elements" (Kitcher 2007, 294; Dupré 2002, 176–81; Wilson et al. forthcoming; see also Platts 1983 for a classic summary and Okasha 2002, p. 203 for some critical remarks). Explanations come in many forms (see Van Fraassen 1980 for a classic analysis) so in order for the third tenet to be meaningful at all, we may need to add that this explanation is supposed to be a causal explanation. The second tenet is about causal responsibility: as Ereshefsky says, "a kind's essence causes the other properties associated with that kind. The essence of the natural kind gold, for example, is gold's atomic structure. [. . .] the atomic structure of gold causes pieces of gold to have the properties associated with that kind, such as dissolving in certain acids and conducting electricity (Ereshefsky forthcoming, 1). What we say about this second tenet depends on what we say about the relata and properties of (singular) causation. If one holds that properties play no causal role (as Davidson (1970) suggests), then we have reason to doubt the second tenet-not only in the case of biological kinds, but in the case of any kinds. But let us, for the sake of argument, grant that properties play a role in causation, either as constituents of the relata (as long as these relata are taken to be facts, states of affairs or Kimian events) or as the properties in virtue of which one event causes another one (Nanay 2009). The question we now need to ask is whether the alleged essential properties are causally relevant. Why are the second and the third tenets of essentialism relevant in our discussion of the essentialist way of explaining racial differences? After all, if an explanation of why As are better Xers than Bs qua being As falls short of some essentialist premises, it could still give us projectible racial differences. The reason why the second and the third tenet matter is that whatever property of As makes it the case that As are better Xers than Bs, it should make it the case that As are better Xers than Bs: it should be causally relevant in bringing about this racial difference. And it should also help us to explain the existence and projectibility of this racial difference. It is important to note that even if we refrain from positing that the essential property would be such that all and only members of a kind would possess it, like Richard Boyd's 'homeostatic property cluster theory' would, the second and the third tenets are still very important (maybe even more so). Boyd explicitly states that "the homeostatic clustering of properties [. . .] is causally important" (Boyd 1999, 143). We have seen that it is easy to use the supposed "anti-essentialist consensus" about biology to argue against the essentialist way of explaining racial differences. As essentialism about the biological domain is held to be false and as race is by supposition a biological category, if we put these two claims together, what we get is that the essentialist way of explaining racial differences does not work. The problem with this strategy is that the "anti-essentialist consensus" is not as strong as it may seem. First, it is not clear that there are any knock-down arguments against essentialism about biological kinds (but see Nanay (forthcoming a) and Nanay (forthcoming b) for some possible candidates). It has been pointed out that some of the classic anti-essentialist arguments do not in fact work (Sober 1980, 356; Okasha 2002, 195–96; Walsh 2006, 431). More importantly, in the last couple of years, more and more philosophers have argued for a version of essentialism about biological kinds. Paul Griffiths, for example, argues that biological kinds have "essential relational properties"-not essential intrinsic properties, and claims that if we accept that essential properties can be relational, then all the traditional considerations against essentialism about biological kinds lose their appeal (Griffiths 1999, 209; for a similar claim, see Okasha 2002; the idea of using relational properties for defining biological kinds, not necessarily in an essentialist manner, comes from Matthen 1998, Millikan 1999, and Elder 1995). Instead of trying to find a convincing argument for anti-essentialism about biological kinds in general, my aim here is to establish a much narrower point about the possibility of an essentialist account of explaining racial differences. And my claim is that even if it is true of some biological categories that there is an essential property such that all and only members of a certain biological category have this property and they do so necessarily, races are not among biological categories of this kind. My claim is that the relational properties that have been proposed as potential essential properties of biological kinds either fail to be such that all and only members of race A have them and they do so necessarily, or if they don't, then they are unlikely to be causally efficacious. In other words, BENCE NANAY272 these potential essential relational properties either fail to satisfy the first tenet of essentialism, or if they do so, they still fail to satisfy the other two tenets of essentialism; most importantly, they are unlikely to play any causal role. Here are the three most plausible candidates that have been proposed for being the essential relational properties of some biological categories (Okasha 2002, 210): "being a member of a group that is able to interbreed successfully with one group of organisms and not another;" "being a member of a group that occupies a particular ecological niche;" and "being a member of a particular segment of the genealogical nexus." These properties are supposed to be essential properties that all and only members of a certain species, as opposed to races, have. But it is easy to see that regardless of whether these are in fact good candidates for essential properties for species, they will not qualify as essential properties for races. The first property is clearly not viable as an essential property for races as a member of a race can interbreed with any other races. The second property is not an option either as members of the same race may occupy very different ecological niches. Similarly, it is not true that all and only members of a race are "members of a particular segment on the genealogical nexus." Thus, those properties that seem to be the most likely candidates for being the relational essential properties for biological categories cannot be used to provide an essential property for races: it will not be true that all and only members of a race have these and they do so necessarily. But this does not mean that there are no properties that all and only members of a race have (and they do so necessarily). Here are a couple of possible examples. A simple candidate for a property that is undoubtedly such that all and only members of raceApossess it, and they do so necessarily, is the property of being a member of raceA, but this property cannot be used for explaining the existence and projectibility of racial differences. To say that what makes it the case that As are better at Xing than Bs is that As are members of race A is no explanation at all: it is just reiterating the claim that racial differences are projectible without explaining what makes them projectible. Here is a better candidate for a better potential candidates for a relational essential property that all and only members of raceA possess. Take the relational property of being a member of a population with such and such evolutionary history (suggested by Griffiths 1999). To fit the question about THREE WAYS OF RESISTING RACISM 273 racial differences, we should modify the property slightly: the candidate essential property then is of being a member of a race with such and such evolutionary history. Putting aside the question whether races have (uniform) evolutionary history at all, it seems plausible to suppose that this is a property that all and only members of race A have. So the first tenet of essentialism seems fine. But the second and the third tenet are unlikely to be satisfied: it is not clear how an individual's, a*'s, property of being a member of a race with such and such evolutionary history could be causally efficacious (see Nanay (forthcoming a) for a detailed argument). Various properties of the evolutionary history of a*'s token lineage may be causally relevant in bringing about a*'s properties and especially those properties that are responsible for a*'s Xing abilities. But the property of being a member of a race with such and such evolutionary history is not causally efficacious? It is important to emphasize that I do not deny that relational properties in general can be causally efficacious in making it the case that As are better at Xing than Bs. What I aimed to point out is that those properties that have been given as candidates for relational properties that all and only members of a race have lack this causal efficacy. There are causally efficacious properties of individuals. And there are properties that all and only individuals of race A have. But there does not seem to be any overlap between these two sets of properties. The essentialist way of explaining why As are better at Xing than Bs took the form of a conjunction: There is a property, call it P, that is such that all and only members of race A have instantiations of P. And it is the having instantiations of P that makes it the case that As, on average, are better Xers than Bs. I aimed to show that there is no candidate for property P that would satisfy both conjuncts. The essentialist account of explaining why As are better Xers than Bs fails. 5. Races Without Racial Differences What can we then say about Xing capacities and the differences thereof? The first thing we should say is that comparisons between Xing abilities should be made between the Xing abilities of individuals. Individuals have Xing abilities, races don't. Thus, we can say that a*, who is a member of race A may be better at Xing than b*, a member of race B. BENCE NANAY274 THREE WAYS OF RESISTING RACISM 275 But it makes no sense to make comparisons between the Xing potential of races. Races, even if we accept that they exist, do not have Xing potentials. We can, of course, talk about the average Xing capacity in race A-nothing could stop the statistically minded from doing so. But it is important to keep in mind that 'the average Xing capacity in race A' is about the average Xing capacity of the observed members of race A. It is purely our statistical abstraction that we arrive at on the basis of a limited number of observations of members of race A. It does not say anything about how unobserved members of race A will perform X. We do not get projectibility on the basis of statistical averages (Mayr 1959/1994). A final worry about the claim that there are no projectible racial differences is that it is not clear how it squares with the recent discussion about what is known as 'race-based medicine'. As we have seen in Section II, it has been shown that some heart medications work more reliably on members of one race than on members of another race. What is this, if not a clear and very important racial difference? My response is that this is not a racial difference at all. The medication works on a certain individual, a*, because of a*'s specific properties. And it fails to work on another individual, b*, because b* has some other properties. We don't know what kind of properties these are, genetic, environmental or nutritional. Hopefully, science will find out one day. But regardless of what kind of property is causally responsible for the fact that this medication works in the case of some people but not others, we have no reason to suppose that the medication works in the case of a* in virtue of the fact that a* is a member of race A. If it turns out that the property in virtue of which some people can be treated with this medication successfully is a nutritional or an environmental property, then this property is clearly independent of the question of what race this person belongs to. And if the property is a genetic one, then the difference is not a racial difference either, since it has been pointed out that genetic difference between human races is smaller than the genetic difference within human races (Lewontin 1970, Lewontin et al. 1984, Nei and Roychoudhury 1993). Either way, there is a difference between people in the way the medicine works, but we have not reason to suppose that there is a difference between races. And if we can't talk about racial differences, then we can't make racist claims either. BENCE NANAY276 6. Conclusion: Resisting Sexism This paper was about a new strategy for resisting racism. But if we accept this strategy, that of denying that there are projectible racial differences, even if there are races, it could be applied to other important domains. Most importantly, it could also be used to resist sexism. If the argument I presented here is correct, then we can run a parallel argument that would give us a newway of denying the existence of not racial but of sex differences. In other words, the argument presented in this paper could be modified in such a way that we can conclude that statements such as men are (on average) better at Xing than women will make no sense. As in the case of racial differences, this claim comes with a proviso: if it turned out that each woman has an instantiation of property, P, and no men have instantiations of this property and if P is not a purely nominal property (such as being a woman), then we can say that there is a sex difference: women have P, whereas men don't. But it is extremely unlikely that we find any such property. Even the existence/lack of a Y chromosome has shown to be a contingent marker of being a man/woman. Note that the first strategy of resisting racism, the strategy of denying that there are races cannot be extended to sexism in a straightforward manner. If, however, we accept the argument I gave in this paper for resisting racism, the argument for resisting sexism comes for free. The possibility of applying my argument against racism in the case of sexism seems to indicate that it is a more robust strategy than the others. The third way of resisting racism may give more trouble to the racist than the other two.5 Bence Nanay Syracuse University NOTES 1. It is worth noting that the first and the second ways of resisting racism are not mutually exclusive. David Hull, for example, gives an antirealist as well as a realist argument in the very same paper: the structure of his claim is that races do not exist, but even if they did, they would not coincide with what our everyday racial concepts pick out (Hull 1998). 2. Hacking and Kitcher claim that race is pragmatically (or statistically) useful in a biological, or medical, context. But it could also be argued that race is pragmatically useful in a social context (Shelby 2006; Kitcher 2007, 311). Affirmative action would not be possible without having at least some form of realism about race and nor would any kind of sociological research into the effects of racial discrimination. Further, as Shelby emphasizes, race may foster solidarity among people who suffer the consequences of injustices of the past (or the present). These arguments need not (and in fact, usually do not) rely on a biological concept of race, but they do presuppose some form of realism about race. 3. This duality may also be in the background of Linda Alcoff's distinction between race and ethnicity, although according to Alcoff the relationship between the two are much more complex, as ethnicity has been notoriously racialized at least in some countries (Alcoff 2005). 4. Griffiths 1999; Boyd 1999; Okasha 2002; see Walsh 2006 and Devitt ms for a different way of resurrecting essentialism about natural kinds and Nanay forthcoming a, Nanay forthcoming b, and Ereshefsky ms. for objections to these projects. 5. This paper grew out of the discussion at my Ph.D. seminar on natural kinds at Syracuse University. I'm grateful for Linda Alcoff's comments. REFERENCES Alcoff, Linda Martín 2005. 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THREE WAYS OF RESISTING RACISM 279 Walsh, Denis M. 2006. "Evolutionary Essentialism," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57: 425–48. Wilkerson, T.E. 1995. Natural Kinds. Aldershot: Avebury. Wilson, Edward O. and William Brown 1953. "The Subspecies Concept and Its Taxonomic Application," Systematic Zoology, 2: 97–111. Wilson, Robert A, Matthew J. Barker, and Ingo Brigandt forthcoming. "When Traditional Essentialism Fails: Biological Natural Kinds," Philosophical Topics, forthcoming. Zack, Naomi 1993. Race and Mixed Race, Philadelphia: Temple University Press. ---. 2002. Philosophy of Science and Race. London: Routledge. BENCE NANAY

Diametros 52 (2017): 96–106 doi: 10.13153/diam.52.2017.1061 96 TWO CRITICISMS AGAINST MATHEMATICAL REALISM – Seungbae Park – Abstract. Mathematical realism asserts that mathematical objects exist in the abstract world, and that a mathematical sentence is true or false, depending on whether the abstract world is as the mathematical sentence says it is. I raise two objections against mathematical realism. First, the abstract world is queer in that it allows for contradictory states of affairs. Second, mathematical realism does not have a theoretical resource to explain why a sentence about a tricle is true or false. A tricle is an object that changes its shape from a triangle to a circle, and then back to a triangle with every second. Keywords: Abstract World, Concrete World, Mathematical Realism, Mathematical Object, Tricle. 1. Introduction According to mathematical realism1, mathematical entities, such as numbers, triangles, and functions, exist in the abstract world, and a mathematical sentence is true or false, depending on whether the abstract world is as the mathematical sentence says it is. This definition captures the views defended by mathematical realists in the rationalist vein, such as Gottlob Frege and Kurt Gödel,2 and the views defended by mathematical realists in the empiricist vein, such as Willard Quine, Hilary Putnam, Michael Resnik, Mark Colyvan, and Alan Baker.3 Both rational and empirical mathematical realists hold the same metaphysical and semantic theses of the preceding definition of mathematical realism. They, however, diverge on the issue of how we can acquire knowledge about mathematical objects. Rational mathematical realists contend that we can acquire mathematical knowledge with the use of the cognitive faculty, mathematical intuition. On their account, our mind can somehow grasp mathematical objects This paper improved a lot thanks to an anonymous referee's meticulous and insightful comments. This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2016S1A5A2A01022592). 1 Balaguer (2016); Busch, Morrison (2016): 436; Linnebo (2017). 2 Cf. Frege (1884); Gödel (1947). 3 Cf. Quine (1948, 1980, 1992); Putnam (1971); Resnik (1997); Colyvan (2001); Baker (2005, 2009, 2012, 2016). Seungbae Park ◦ Two Criticisms against Mathematical Realism 97 existing in the abstract world. By contrast, empirical mathematical realists contend that we can acquire mathematical knowledge via confirming mathematical statements with empirical evidence. In order to defend this epistemological thesis, they have constructed sophisticated arguments called the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument4 and the enhanced indispensability argument.5 This paper focuses not on the epistemological issue of how we can acquire mathematical knowledge but on the metaphysical issue of whether mathematical objects exist in the abstract world or not, arguing that the abstract world does not exist. If the abstract world does not exist, it is problematic for mathematical realists to say that mathematical sentences are rendered true or false by the abstract world, and that we can acquire mathematical knowledge via confirming mathematical sentences with observational evidence. In short, mathematical realism collapses along with the metaphysical thesis. The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, I display the properties of mathematical objects, comparing them with concrete objects, under the framework of mathematical realism. In Section 3, I unfold two objections to mathematical realism. In Section 4, I introduce an alternative position that competes with mathematical realism. This paper is intended to be helpful to those who defend alternative positions, such as mathematical inferentialism6 and mathematical fictionalism7. 2. Mathematical Objects In order to understand what mathematical realism asserts, we need to understand first what the abstract world is in comparison to the concrete world. The concrete world is inhabited by concrete entities, such as cats, trees, and electrons. Concrete entities are temporal and spatial, so it is adequate to attribute spatial and temporal predicates to them. It is not a category mistake, for example, to say that a cat is her e , and that it fo ugh t with a dog ye ster d ay . In contrast, the abstract world is inhabited by abstract entities, such as mathematical objects and propositions. Abstract entities are atemporal and aspatial, so it is inadequate to attribute spatial and temporal predicates to them. It is a category mistake, for example, to say that number one exists h ere , or that one plus one wa s two yes ter d ay . 4 Quine (1948, 1980, 1992); Putnam (1971); Resnik (1997); Colyvan (2001). 5 Baker (2006, 2009, 2012, 2016). 6 Park (2017). 7 Field (1980, 1989); Balaguer (1996, 1998, 2001, 2009); Rosen (2001); Yablo (2002); Leng (2005a, 2005b, 2010). Seungbae Park ◦ Two Criticisms against Mathematical Realism 98 Concrete and abstract entities differ from each other in another important respect. Concrete entities are causally efficacious, so they can interact with one another, as the aforementioned example of the cat and the dog illustrates. By contrast, abstract entities are causally inert, so they can interact neither with one another, nor with concrete entities. After all, an interaction requires space and time. To say that two objects interact with each other in the abstract world implies that they interact with each other in no place and in no time, which in turn implies that they do not interact with each other. Therefore, it is a contradiction to say that abstract entities interact with one another. Benjamin Callard,8 however, argues that mathematical objects, although abstract, can be causally efficacious in that they can produce mathematical knowledge in human beings.9 This paper rejects Callard's characterization of mathematical objects, and operates under other philosophers' characterization of them. Daniele Molinini, Fabrice Pataut, and Andrea Sereni take mathematical realism as asserting that mathematical objects are "thought to be abstract, non spatial, non temporal and non causal."10 Øystein Linnebo also takes mathematical realism as asserting that mathematical objects are abstract, and "an object is said to be abstract just in case it is non-spatiotemporal and (therefore) causally inefficacious".11 All these philosophers take mathematical realism as maintaining that mathematical objects are not causal. Mathematical realists posit the existence of the abstract world to secure the objectivity of mathematics. They argue that a mathematical sentence is true or false just as objectively as a concrete sentence is true or false. A concrete sentence, 'The Earth is round,' is true not because we think that it is true, but because the concrete world is as the sentence says it is. Likewise, a mathematical sentence, '1+1=2,' is true not because we think that it is true but because the abstract world is as the mathematical sentence says it is. If you believe that '1+1=3,' you have a false belief about the abstract world. 8 Callard (2007). 9 See Azzouni (2008) and Sereni (2016) for responses to Callard. It requires a separate paper to explore this debate. 10 Molinini, Pataut, Sereni (2016): 318. 11 Linnebo (2017). Seungbae Park ◦ Two Criticisms against Mathematical Realism 99 3. Two Criticisms 3.1. The Queer World Let me now raise an objection against mathematical realism. The abstract world is queer, to say the least. Consider a line and a point not on it. Euclidean geometry claims that only one line can be drawn that goes through the point without intersecting the original line. In contrast, Lobachevskian geometry claims that an infinite number of such lines can be drawn, while Riemannian geometry claims that no such line can be drawn. An interesting question arises. How many such lines can be drawn in the abstract world? Mathematical realists would say that no such line, one such line, and infinitely many such lines can be drawn in the abstract world, given that they believe that all the three geometries are true of the abstract world. To say so, however, is to admit that the abstract world allows for contradictory states of affairs. Mathematical realists might reply that the abstract world has three distinct regions: the Euclidean region, the Lobachevskian region, and the Riemannian region. The three regions obey the rules of Euclidean, Lobachevskian, and Riemannian geometries, respectively. Therefore, it is not problematic to say that the three geometries are all true of the abstract world. The preceding reply, however, has two problems. First, it is ad hoc to claim that the abstract world has the three distinct regions. This claim is advanced purely for the sake of diverting my objection that the abstract world allows for contradictory states of affairs. Mathematical realists have to offer an independent account of how many regions there are in the abstract world. In other words, they should set the three geometries aside and give a story of how many regions there are in the abstract world. Second, given that there is no space in the abstract world, it is not clear whether it makes sense to say that the aspatial world has the three distinct regions. It appears contradictory to say that something does not have width, length, and height, but it is composed of different regions. Mathematical realists might argue that my objection to mathematical realism confuses abstract and concrete regions. There are no concrete regions in the abstract world, but there are abstract regions in the abstract world. Abstract regions are different from concrete regions in that abstract regions do not have width, length, and height, but concrete regions have width, length, and height. There are abstract regions in the abstract world, just as there are concrete regions in the concrete world. This reply, however, can be reduced to absurdity. If the notion of abstract region is coherent, so should be the notion of abstract blood. So it should also be legitimate to say, for example, that a triangle and a square collided with each Seungbae Park ◦ Two Criticisms against Mathematical Realism 100 other, and as a result they shed blood, but that their blood is not concrete but abstract, meaning that it does not occupy space and time, and hence does not have width, length, height, and color. Our intuition says, however, that this talk of the abstract blood is absurd. If it is absurd, however, so is the talk of the abstract region. Both 'abstract blood' and 'abstract region' are empty expressions referring to nothing. Mathematical realists might retort that my preceding objection to mathematical realism is built upon the assumption that geometrical objects are mathematical objects. If geometrical objects are not mathematical objects, my objection loses its bite.12 I am, however, following mathematical realists when I treat geometrical objects as mathematical objects. Fabrice Pataut13 takes Baker's14 enhanced indispensability argument for mathematical realism as implying that numbers and p o l y go n s exist. According to Balaguer, mathematical realism holds "that the argument for the existence of mathematical objects is entirely general, covering all branches of mathematics, including geometry, so that on this view, we already have reason to believe in lines and shapes, as well as numbers."15 Note that these philosophers treat geometrical objects as mathematical objects. In my view, all geometrical objects are mathematical objects. No geometrical object can be a concrete object. Of course, there are concrete objects that resemble geometrical objects. Strictly speaking, however, they are not geometrical objects. For example, a string resembles a line, but it is not a line. After all, a string occupies space, whereas a line, by definition, does not. Mathematical realists might now give up the contention that the abstract world consists of different regions, and contend that there are three abstract worlds. One of them makes Euclidean geometry true, another makes Lobachevskian geometry true, and the last one makes Riemannian geometry true. On this account, mathematical realism is not saddled with the view that there is only one abstract world which makes all the true mathematical sentences true. This move, however, is also ad hoc, multiplying abstract worlds solely for the sake of diverting my objection that the abstract world allows for contradictory states of affairs. If such a move were legitimate, a similar move should also be legitimate in empirical science. For example, Galileo observed the phases of Venus, 12 As the anonymous referee for this journal pointed out. 13 Pataut (2016): 352. 14 Baker (2005, 2009). 15 Balaguer (2016). Seungbae Park ◦ Two Criticisms against Mathematical Realism 101 thereby refuting the Ptolemaic theory. Imagine, however, that Ptolemaic scientists replied that the Ptolemaic theory is still true because there is another concrete world which makes the Ptolemaic theory true. We would say that it is absurd to multiply concrete worlds to save the Ptolemaic theory. Analogously, we would say that it is absurd to multiply abstract worlds to save mathematical realism. Mathematical realists might argue that there are infinitely many abstract worlds, just as there are infinitely many concrete worlds.16 Some physicists today seriously consider the multiverse hypothesis according to which there are infinitely many universes. The support for the multiverse hypothesis came from three independent researches: the researches on eternal inflation, dark energy, and string theory.17 If it is reasonable to suppose that there are infinitely many concrete worlds, it would also be reasonable to suppose that there are infinitely many abstract worlds. If there are infinitely many abstract worlds, Euclidean geometry would be true of some of those abstract worlds. So would be Lobachevskian geometry and Riemannian geometry. Hence, it is not ad hoc to suggest that the three geometries are true of different abstract worlds. No scientist has yet presented direct experimental evidence for the multiverse hypothesis, and the hypothesis is contentious in the physics community.18 Set this scientific issue aside, however, and suppose for the sake of argument that there are infinitely many concrete and abstract worlds. If mathematical realists appeal to the existence of infinitely many abstract worlds to divert my preceding objection, it is not clear on what grounds they can say that it is false that 1+1=3. After all, there might be some abstract worlds that make '1+1=3' true. What is the guarantee that there are no such abstract worlds? Recall that mathematical realists postulate the existence of the abstract world to ensure that a mathematical sentence is objectively true or false. They have achieved the objectivity of mathematics at the cost of obfuscating the distinction between true and false mathematical sentences. This obfuscation comes with an enormous practical disadvantage. Imagine that some students state in their mid-term exam that 1+1=3, and as a result, teachers give them failing grades. The students protest that it is true that 1+1=3 because some of the infinitely many abstract worlds make it true. It is not clear how teachers, if they are mathematical realists believing in the existence of infinitely many abstract worlds, can persuade their students that their mathematical beliefs are false. 16 Again, I am addressing here the referee's remark. 17 Greene (2011). 18 Ibidem. Seungbae Park ◦ Two Criticisms against Mathematical Realism 102 3.2. Tricle Let me now turn to a different sort of objection to mathematical realism. Imagine that there is an object that changes its shape from a triangle to a circle, and then back to a triangle with every second. Let me call it a 'tricle' (triangle + circle). It is true that a tricle does not have four straight edges. But why is that true? What makes the sentence, 'A tricle does not have four straight edges,' true? Mathematical realists owe us an answer to this perplexing question. Mathematical realists are in a dilemma. They can say either that a tricle is a mathematical object, or that it is not a mathematical object. On the one hand, if they say that it is a mathematical object, they owe us an answer to the question of how many straight edges it has in the abstract world. They cannot say that it has three straight edges at some times and none at other times, for time does not pass in the abstract world. On the other hand, if they say that it is not a mathematical object on the grounds that it is temporal, they face a disconcerting issue of what counts as a mathematical object. Recall that Callard19 claims that an object is a mathematical object, even if it can be causally efficacious. Why is it that an object is not a mathematical object if it is temporal, but it is a mathematical object even if it can be causal? Mathematical realists might suggest that a tricle is a mathematical object existing in the abstract world, and that my objection to mathematical realism confuses mathematical time with concrete time. Mathematical objects exist outside of concrete time, but they exist inside of mathematical time. So it makes sense to say that a tricle changes its shape with the flow of mathematical time, and that it has three straight edges at some mathematical times, but none at other mathematical times, in the abstract world. This reply would be tempting to those who invoke the abstract world and the abstract regions to argue that a mathematical sentence is objectively true or false. The reply, however, can be reduced to absurdity just like the previous reply that concerns abstract regions. If the notion of mathematical time is coherent, it should also be legitimate to say, for example, that a triangle and a square co l l i d e d with each other y es ter day , but that the collision is not a concrete collision but an abstract collision. The difference between them is that the former involves deformation while the latter does not. Also, the term 'yesterday' does not refer to a point in concrete time, but it refers to a point in mathematical time. Our intuition says, however, that this talk of abstract collision is absurd. If it is absurd, however, 19 Callard (2007). Seungbae Park ◦ Two Criticisms against Mathematical Realism 103 so is the talk of the mathematical time. Both 'abstract collision' and 'mathematical time' are empty expressions referring to nothing. Mathematical realists might now suggest that the aforementioned sentence, 'A tricle does not have four straight edges,' is analytically true, i.e., it is true solely by virtue of the definitions of the words in it. This suggestion, however, is not available to mathematical realists, for it undermines mathematical realism. Mathematical antirealists can make the same suggestion about a mathematical sentence like '1+1=2.' That is, this mathematical sentence is true not in virtue of the way the abstract world is but solely in virtue of the definitions of the words in the sentence. Thus, it is otiose to posit the existence of the abstract world.20 The only way for mathematical realists to defuse my preceding objection is to present a relevant difference between 'A tricle does not have four straight edges' and '1+1=2.' Why is it that the former sentence is true solely by virtue of the definitions of its words, whereas the latter is true in part by virtue of the way the abstract world is? I leave the task of answering this question to mathematical realists. 4. Mathematical Inferentialism My two objections to mathematical realism sketched in the previous section surround the thesis that mathematical objects exist in the abstract world. As mentioned earlier, mathematical realism posits the existence of the abstract world in order to ensure that a mathematical sentence is objectively true or false. This section introduces an alternative position that secures the objectivity of mathematics without postulating the existence of the abstract world. Mathematical inferentialism21 holds that the concrete world exists whereas the abstract world does not, a mathematical sentence does not even purport to describe the abstract world, it facilitates deductive inferences from some concrete sentences to other concrete sentences, 22 it is true if and only if only true concrete sentences can be derived from it along with other concrete sentences, and it is false if and only if a false concrete sentence can be derived from it along with other concrete sentences.23 20 A referee brings my attention to the Fregean tradition according to which a mathematical statement is both analytic and true of the abstract world. An examination of this tradition, however, has to await another occasion. 21 Park (2017): 71–74. 22 The referee observes that Field (1980, 1989) also stresses that mathematics facilitates deductive inferences. 23 Thus, mathematical inferentialism is different from if-thenism explicated in Balaguer (2015). Seungbae Park ◦ Two Criticisms against Mathematical Realism 104 To take an example, the mathematical sentence, '1+1=2,' facilitates the deductive inference from the concrete sentences, 'Alice gave me an orange' and 'Bob gave me an orange,' to another concrete sentence, 'Alice and Bob gave me two oranges in total.' It is true that 1+1=2 because the conjunction of the mathematical sentence and true concrete sentences entails only true concrete sentences, and never entails a false concrete sentence. It is false that 1+1=3 because the conjunction of the mathematical sentence and true concrete sentences entails false concrete sentences like 'Alice and Bob gave me three oranges in total.' Given that a concrete sentence is true or false in virtue of the way the concrete world is, it is ultimately the concrete world that makes '1+1=2' true and '1+1=3' false. A mathematical sentence is true not because we think that it is true but because the conjunction of it and true concrete sentences issues only true concrete sentences. Thus, mathematical inferentialism ensures that a mathematical sentence is objectively true or false without positing the existence of the abstract world. Moreover, given that it is ultimately the concrete world that makes a mathematical sentence true or false, we can know whether a mathematical sentence is true or false by observing the concrete world. Recall that it is true that 1+1=2, and false that 1+1=3 because when conjoined with the concrete sentences, 'Bob gave me an orange' and 'Alice gave me an orange,' the former entails the true concrete sentence, 'Alice and Bob gave me two oranges in total,' while the latter entails the false concrete sentence, 'Alice and Bob gave me three oranges in total.' We can know whether these concrete sentences are true or false by observing the concrete world. So we can know whether they entail true or false concrete sentences or not, i.e., whether they are true or false. Under the framework of mathematical inferentialism, there is no epistemological puzzle over how we acquire mathematical knowledge.24 5. Conclusion This paper has raised two objections to mathematical realism. First, the abstract world is queer in that it allows for contradictory states of affairs, so it does not exist, and it is problematic to suggest that the abstract world makes mathematical sentences true or false. Second, mathematical realism does not have a theoretical resource to explain why a sentence about a tricle is true or false. Mathematical realism is vulnerable to these objections because it invokes the abstract world which allegedly makes mathematical sentences true or false. There is, however, an 24 The referee points out that several issues can be raised against mathematical inferentialism. 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International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences. ISSN 2250-3226 Volume 5, Number 2 (2015), pp. 109-120 © Research India Publications http://www.ripublication.com Purely Logical Philosophy In An Isolated System Kai Jiang Address: 2-2-1401, Fengze Street, Fengtai District, Beijing, China, 100070 Affiliation: none Email: [email protected] Telephone: 86-898-66194699 Abstract After Parmenides proposed the duality of appearance and reality, details have not been well developed because the assumption was insufficient for logical reasoning. This paper establishes a foundation with an isolated system, which contains all causes and effects within itself. This paper seeks to establish a purely logical philosophy, including reality and phenomena, good and evil, truth and fallacy. Freedom is proposed as the basis for reality. All beings in an isolated system can be classified into two sets: variable phenomena and constant realities. Realities are the only reasons for phenomena, and phenomena are the only results of realities. The sum of certain realities constitutes a reality, and the sum of all realities is good. Good creates most of the phenomenal world. A reality is universalizable; a phenomenon is never universalizable. Good is the only reality which is close to universality and keeps on universalizing. Truth is the simplest knowledge about universal or approximately universal beings. The universality of a reality measures the percentage of phenomena accompanied by this reality. There are two levels of truth: truth about all realities, and truth about the good. Key words: logic about isolated systems, pure logic, reality, universalizability. Introduction This paper is part of the work to unify all logical knowledge into one logical theory. Rationality is the most tested relationship in the world and the foundation of daily experience. For example, the logical relation between eating food and easing hunger has been tested countless times, though it is often unconscious because of habit. Therefore, establishing a purely logical foundation for philosophy and for all logical knowledge is a worthy undertaking. 110 Kai Jiang The author has previously constructed a logic of isolated systems1 to unify the sciences. An isolated system comprises a set of beings independent from beings outside the system. In an isolated phenomenal system, the causes and effects of every phenomenon exist within the system. There can be no input or output between this and other beings or systems. At present, the Universe is the only observable candidate for an isolated system. This paper assumes that there is a unique reason for the isolated nature of the Universe and attempts to find the main logical results of this fact in philosophy. From the beginning, philosophers proposed a single cause for the phenomenal world, namely reality. Parmenides discovered the duality of appearance and reality,2 which is the starting point of this paper. This assumption greatly simplified the effort to explain the world using pure logic. Then, the discovery of various scientific laws organized the causal laws in the world and partially proved the possibility of explaining the world according to its unique reality. In this paper, reality is a single, closed set, not many sets; hence it is called unique. The set is a continuum of infinite realities. Metaphysics aims to solve the most fundamental problems logically;3 however, it is unsuccessful because it is not, and never has been, purely logical. Various experiential propositions and illogical beliefs have been proposed as foundations- such as mind, human beings, and god-which came from the deficiency of a purely logical foundation. Hence, metaphysics has never been purely metaphysical. An isolated system is purely logical; hence it provides a purely logical foundation (this is especially effective for a priori problems, which usually deal with reality). Through the other properties shown in the paper,-such as universality, eternality, creativity, and closure-logic about isolated systems provides some clues for discovering realities. For example, phenomena are not eternal and need to be created, otherwise they would be eternal realities. Then, knowledge about realities can be established in two ways. First, from universality, realities can be found by comprehensive induction: summing up all phenomena. The author has described some similarities among the Universe, society, and thinking.4 For example, gravitation catalyzes stars in the pursuit of the largest negative action; a similar mechanism catalyzes subjects in thinking in the pursuit of largest knowledge, cities in society in the pursuit of largest happiness, and large companies in economy in the pursuit of largest profit. Repulsion between like charges corresponds to competition in other pursuit systems. System growth corresponds to space expansion, social development, and knowledge progress. An isolated system always pursues the largest possible freedom. However, only the Universe succeeds in its pursuit. The results partially prove the feasibility of science unification, which is a necessity or a decisive experiment for pure logic. 1 Jiang, K. ―Logic about Isolated System-Mathematical Foundation for Science Unification,‖ Global Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics, 9.2 (2013): 151?168. 2 Solomon, Robert C. The Big Questions: a Short Introduction to Philosophy. Stamford: Cengage Learning. 2006. 117–122. 3 Gracia, Jorge J. E. Metaphysics and its Task. Albany: Suny Press, 1999. 70–80. 4 Jiang, Logic. Purely Logical Philosophy In An Isolated System 111 Second, tracing back to the beginning of the phenomenal world is helpful in making many purely logical derivations. Because there were no phenomena at the beginning, reality must be the creator of all phenomena. The reality creating the most phenomena is called good. This is one of the purely logical definitions of good. The sum of all realities also provides a purely logical definition and, as proved afterward, these two are identical. Free spatial transformation5 provides a model to explain this creation. If coordinates in a three dimensional space have the freedom to move, the system shares some common dynamical properties with the Universe. As the preliminary result, the largest freedom is tentatively posited as the good which created the Universe. The continuum from the least freedom to the largest freedom is tentatively posited as the basis of reality and this serves as the starting point for the present paper. Logic about isolated systems represents pure logic. Pure logic excludes experience and does not contain variables of phenomena; thus it reaches universality and eternality. Experiences are phenomena in the middle of the logical process of phenomena creation; therefore, as the starting point of logic, the beginning of an isolated system is much better than experiences. Human beings have failed to succeed in purely logical arguments because they have not found the correct starting point: the beginning of the isolated system. We have long believed that logic is a mere tool which helps us deduce valuable results from experience. However, using logic in this way, it is impossible to establish a purely logical theory and to correctly deduce the fundamental or metaphysical results, which should be rationality's ultimate goal. Logic and irrationality cannot coexist logically. The belief that there are some unexplainable experiences, such as the existence of physical matter, is illogical. If the world is composed of two nonintersecting parts, the logical and the illogical, there will be boundaries between the two parts to designate the applicable conditions. Boundaries between phenomena are unacceptable in pure logic, because all boundaries which can be dated back to the beginning of the isolated system must be explained purely logically. Where is the boundary? How precise is it? It is impossible to find a purely logical answer for these problems. Furthermore, how can illogic in the illogical part be limited? Following limitations requires the existence of logic. Therefore, an isolated system must be completely logical or illogical. If science-that is, logical knowledge-is not empty in the Universe, the illogical part must be empty. It is difficult to accept that all successful scientific predictions are illusive or accidental. Therefore, a purely logical theory is a logical necessity for science. Basic Concepts In this paper, all beings in an isolated system are classified into two categories: realities and phenomena. Realities are invariant beings. Phenomena are variable beings. All phenomena together form the phenomenal world. Groups of similar kinds 5 Jiang, Logic. See also Jiang, K. ―Free Spatial Transformations-Movability and Decomposability of Point,‖ Global Journal of Mathematical Sciences: Theory and Practical 2.3 (2010): 129–141. 112 Kai Jiang of phenomena form phenomenal systems, such as a society, thinking, and the Universe. The world includes many systems. The Universe is the natural world. Other observable systems include society and thinking. All beings in a system are classified into variable phenomena and constant realities. When accompanying a phenomenon, a reality is called existent reality; otherwise it is called nonexistent reality. Variation in an isolated system must be logical. If a being becomes another being, neither one is the reason behind the alternation-something accompanying them is. Therefore, a phenomenon cannot change itself, and realities must be the creators of phenomena and the reason behind the alternation of phenomena. Hence, realities must universally exist in all phenomena. For example, freedom can change phenomena and there is some degree of freedom in every phenomenon. However, this does not mean that reality is unique. If a being is a reality, its opposite ought to be a reality too. It is difficult, if not impossible, to find a being- such as good, freedom, equality, or logic-with no opposite. If a being can be described qualitatively or even quantitatively, there will be opposite ends. It is the result of the closure of realities. So, the combination of the being and its opposite should also constitute a reality. Hence, it is reasonable to suppose that reality is a continuum of realities. For example, freedom, unfreedom, and their combination form the continuum of freedom and limitations. Realities are composed of goods and evils. If good and evil are defined as social concepts, they are not universalizable and must be considered phenomena. However, the fact that reality is not unique provides room for the co-existence of good and evil. If good is absolute and invariant, its variable must be reality only. Good is proposed to be the sum of all realities, (close to the symmetrical centre of realities.) It is the simplest construction from realities, but it is also the best because all realities are equal in the construction. In an isolated system, there must be reason for every limitation. There was no reason, and therefore no limitation, before the beginning of an isolated system, therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that all realities existed at the beginning. Moreover, reality at the beginning must have created phenomena, and it is reasonable to suppose that good is the most creative reality. It is possible to create phenomena from good. For example, a reality might be the same as its corresponding phenomenon initially, and split into two different things afterwards. The creation of phenomena represents the creation of freedom. It is reasonable to suppose that good is the best reality for creating phenomena. If the largest freedom is good, and good creates increasingly more phenomena, good is self-enlarging. This is in accordance with the largest freedom principle.6 Freedom is largest in an isolated system. However, the details of this principle are complex and some problems remain unsolved. For example, in order to pursue freedom, there must be interaction between individuals, whereas there is a best distribution for the field of interaction, and the Universe is the only system reaching the maximum, as shown in the least action principle. By this definition, the action of a 6 Jiang, Logic. Purely Logical Philosophy In An Isolated System 113 particle is normally a negative number; hence the largest freedom becomes the least negative freedom. Realities other than good form various evils. A phenomenal system accompanied by pure good is a perfect phenomenal system; one that is accompanied by evils is an imperfect phenomenal system. For example, if the greatest possible degree of freedom represents good, every limitation is an evil. In fact, every evil can be interpreted as the imposition of various limitations. Good and Evil Because reality is not unique, there will be various combinations of realities, and it is possible to treat good as one of them. A combination of realities is still a reality. Therefore, realities must be either singular or continuous. For example, a combination of limitations (as a sort of reality) is still a limitation, and the sum of all limitations is freedom. If the good is invariant, it must be a function or combination of realities. If there were only one reality, good would be identical with the reality, and there would be no evil. Therefore, proving the existence of evil partially proves the existence of more than one reality, if good and evil belong to reality. The subjective world is also part of the phenomenal world. If there were no evil, it would be impossible to think evilly. The fact that one can think evilly proves the existence of evil. Both good and evil belong to the continuum of realities from extreme evil to good, such as from non-freedom to freedom. Realities that are not explicitly good ought to be classified as evil, because their universality is close to zero. Freedom helped the author establish the property. The Universe reaches the good, or the largest freedom, and although systems like society do not reach the good, good overwhelmingly prevails over evil. There are two important characteristics of good. First, as mentioned, good created the world. Second, good is the most universal reality. Good interacts with everybody whenever and wherever; hence it is reasonable to suppose that it is simple and familiar to everybody. However, its consequences are unimaginably complex, because it is responsible for the creation of most of the phenomenal world (as will be shown in a later section, evil does create some phenomena). Freedom satisfies these conditions. (This experiential method is helpful in discovering good but not recommended here because the existent familiar beings in society are full of evils.) Phenomena accompanied by good are much more common than those accompanied by evil. In reality, every individual reality is equal. However, in the phenomenal world, inequality between good and evil grows with time. If good were the most important property for reality, there should be no evil, and all realities should have the same universality. However, the fundamental task of reality is the creation of phenomena. For the phenomenal world, since good is not a certain choice, the best possible result is arbitrarily close to good. That an imperfect system can be improved toward the good, together with the fact that the Universe expands, constantly broadens the gap in universality between good and evil. Hence, 100% is the upper limit for universality of good. 114 Kai Jiang Good dominates the phenomenal world. Living creatures on the earth belong to the few phenomena associated with evil. The majority of phenomena are associated with good. Human beings are not the centre of the world. We try to find our truth, to make ourselves higher than other phenomena, (as shown in the expression intelligent life'), even the aim of other phenomena. Consequently, we have chosen many evils, some even deliberately, such as the delineation of nations and the use of violence, (the former limits our freedom of motion; the latter endangers life itself, which represents the total freedom of a person). On the other hand, there is no corresponding phenomenon in the Universe. In order to create a perfect society, we must broaden our view from the narrow scope of our own lives to encompass all phenomena in the world and learn what good is. Human beings usually link reality and good with various gods, leading to some illogical beliefs, such as the following. The advantage of good does not come from forbidding evils; moreover, it is impossible to list all evils. Legal systems based on prohibitions never establish a perfect society. Justice and administration usually fight evil with evil, and sometimes fight good, too. Good does not force phenomena to be good, because enforcement is a phenomenon and good does not contain any phenomenal value. In fact, good helps evils unintentionally. When good creates phenomena, it also creates an environment in which evil systems can develop and grow. When a new system originates in an isolated system, the latter might limit the former to being evil (as if some phenomena in the latter become reality in the former). For example, senescence and death limit our freedom, forming part of the inborn defect that makes society imperfect. However, all evils can be overcome. The isolated system provides resources for both good and evil. For example, although spatial distance is a disadvantage for human beings' freedom, society has been advancing toward the good by improving transportation technology and communication technology. Good and evil are not pure opponents. They may also help each other. Evils help create more phenomena. For example, an economic system fraught with evil still creates phenomena and sometimes even achieves economic growth. Evil systems will eventually turn to good. The condition is that every system will pursue good finally, either by instinct or by evolution, as the evolution of the human species has shown. If time and conditions allow, any given species will evolve into a perfect system one day. That most of the observable systems are not successful in the pursuit of freedom does not mean most systems are imperfect, because our observation is too limited. Good creates imperfect phenomenal systems, which will turn to good finally if they exist long enough. Because of its uniqueness and invariance, there is no room for good to play games with infinite evils. In society, evil is embodied in countless discriminations which limit freedom. Some are well known, like racial discrimination. Most are under cover, like the traditional sanctions against many behaviours, such as improper clothing. Acceptable styles are fairly similar to each other, and most styles cannot enter daily life (such as ancient styles and the costumes of other nations). Every reality is independent. There are no allies among realities; hence they offset each other. Individual evils might even help good to triumph over evil. For instance, Purely Logical Philosophy In An Isolated System 115 personal discrimination toward others' interests is called selfishness, and each person provides a unique selfishness, a unique evil. With all these billions of evils competing with each other, the resulting balance is not too far from no discrimination at all. This explains the invisible hand in market mechanism, the mechanism by which a free market may benefit a society; however, such a society is still imperfect, because every person is accompanied by evil. This example shows the variety of evils, (considering that the sum of several selfishnesses, like altruism, is still an evil). If the largest freedom is good, the return of good is more freedom and the return of evil is more limitation. However, the return is systematical. It is not certain that the return will be distributed according to personal good, although freedom in whole system increases. No matter how good individuals are, if there is evil in the system, it is not certain that they will get their reward. For example, evils often lead to the plunder of rewards. Some plunders are unintentional, like mortality (the dead cannot be rewarded), but many are malicious. For example, personal equality is an evil plundering freedom. Equality of personal freedom, or income (as in communism), clearly violates the good, the largest freedom. The correct equality is equality of unit freedom: every unit of freedom is equal, wherever or whoever the freedom is located. (Money is a measurement for freedom, but full of flaws.) The chosen evils in society reduce some freedom from each person-the sum is equal to the loss of thousands of lives every day-and the value of a life is roughly measured by a person's total freedom in his or her whole life. However, few grieve for the lost freedom. This example shows how common evil is in society. As in economy and thinking, an isolated system is a series of conversions between reason freedom, (or present freedom, called cost') and result freedom (or future freedom, called revenue'). Good permits conversion when return (revenue minus cost) is not only positive but also the largest it can be, so that freedom increases forever. The optimal behaviour is this: when cost and revenue are fixed, time is the least; when time and cost are fixed, revenue is the highest; when time and revenue are fixed, cost is the least. Good systematically enhances the rate of return; evil reduces it. Economic returns come from good, not just from factors of production. Products turn into some other products through production; hence production represents a form of product freedom. However, there are many possible evils which might destroy the freedom. Perfecting the economy will push the natural growth rate of economy to a much higher level. There are two ways for a phenomenal system to defend the good. First, everyone chooses good. Second, if accompanied by all realities simultaneously and equally, every phenomenon will be associated with good. This is just a theoretical possibility for society, whereas it is the mechanism behind the perfection of an isolated system. By treating realities equally, society can avoid the imperfections that derive from nurture, like discrimination, whereas it cannot avoid those from nature, like death, where technology is decisive. 116 Kai Jiang Universalizability and Universality Universalizability and universality are different. A being is universalizable when it is applicable to every phenomenon. Universality of a given reality measures the percentage of phenomena accompanied by this reality. For example, both equality of unit freedom and equality of an individual are universalizable. The former is good and close to universal; the latter is evil and only exists partially in society. Every reality is universalizable; good is arbitrarily close to universality; a phenomenon is not universalizable. The converse propositions are also true, and thus it is possible to distinguish phenomenon, reality, and good. As a whole, realities are universal. Nevertheless, a single reality can never be universal. If realities do not contain any variables of phenomena, they cannot change with phenomena. Time is a phenomenon; thus, reality is eternal. In fact, eternality manifests universality across time. An isolated system is a whole. Unification is part of good; hence there are phenomena linking any two sets in the system. All reasons and results in an isolated system must interconnect with each other and form a whole; otherwise, there will be more than one isolated system. Therefore, logical knowledge in an isolated system must be unified, and subjects cannot be separated. Because realities are universalizable, realities in different subjects must be interchangeable. It is impossible to give a purely logical reason for the boundary between subjects, including both position and precision. Without experiences to provide the initial concepts, how could the differences between subjects be defined? And how many independent subjects are there? It must be one of the most important numbers in the world, because it would be an eternal number in pure logic, therefore belonging to reality. The most tempting answer is one', because pure logic studies an isolated system, and one is, by far, the only number with privilege in pure logic. Moreover, it is impossible to find a purely logical principle guiding the distribution of realities among these subjects. For the same reason, realities have no power in relation to phenomena. For instance, prediction is never an ability of realities. Prediction involves discerning which phenomena are predictable, and the only logical choices are either all' or none'. Otherwise, it would be necessary to give purely logical reasons for boundaries between predictable phenomena and unpredictable phenomena, which is unacceptable. If the phenomenal world had been predictable at the beginning, prediction would be good and exist nearly universally in the phenomenal world. This is certainly untrue, (we cannot see the future at least). Furthermore, if quantitative prediction belongs to reality, its precision must be a reality too. What degree of precision could be considered purely logical? The clear answer to this question is 100% accuracy', but this has never happened and hence precision cannot belong to reality. There are some misunderstandings about universality. An evil can be universal in a system at a moment, but never eternally. Present universality and real universality are different concepts. If a being is eternal in a system after some time, or universal after any given time, it is real universality and must belong to good. Present nonexistence might be the true universal being. For example, nations exist universally in contemporary society; however, they are evils because they limit freedom and will be nonexistent in the future. Unification of nations and markets, which is the best method Purely Logical Philosophy In An Isolated System 117 for the pursuit of freedom, belongs to good and will be the only form in future society. Even if a reality does not accompany any observable phenomenon, it is more important than observable phenomena. For example, knowledge about an unobserved evil is more important than knowledge about traffic at a given crossroad. Every reality will be accompanied by some phenomena, despite the fact that most cannot be observed by humans. Hence it is necessary to establish some rules for judging the good. If a proposition belongs to good or truth, the necessary condition is that both its universal form and its eternal form must be true. For example, the eternal version of the formula zebra belong to the Equid family' is zebra will, after some time, belong to the Equid family eternally, and the universal form is zebra belong to the Equid family in almost every phenomenal system'. These statements are not true; thus they are not part of good or truth. Therefore, a relationship of subordination between any two phenomena cannot be eternal or universal, unless it is a definition. For example, if the Equid family is defined as the set of zebra, donkeys and so on, even if a zebra becomes a bird in the future, it still belongs to the Equid family. In a cause-and-effect relationship, if the cause does not belong to the good, the relation can be neither eternal nor universal. For example, the sun is the reason for daylight on earth, whereas the sun can be replaced by another star or even artificial device. On the other hand, good is the unique reason for a perfect system. A correct understanding of eternity and universality helps unveil the good. No phenomenon can be the creator of reality. Human beings ought to have a common sense of the following: realities, let alone good, cannot be invented or created. There is no special good for human beings. Imitating the Universe,7 therefore, is a way to approach the good. The limit of human ability is to create a phenomenal system, like society, or even a man-made system, like artificial intelligence. Because of the infinity of evil and uniqueness of good, trying to construct good artificially is almost sure to end in evil. For most traditions and laws, it is impossible to find their counterparts in the Universe. For example, from experience, particles do not behave politely; hence, courtesy is an evil. From pure logic, courtesy reduces behavioural freedom, although it helps to reduce violence-an evil which seriously restricts freedom. This example also shows two methods of selecting good. Obviously, few traditions belong to good. Because of its inherent accumulation, history always includes more and better thoughts than modernity. If the half-life of evil is two hundred years, during an average life-span of seventy years, seventy-eight percent of evils will be preserved. It is fairly stable. On the other hand, after a thousand years, ninety-seven percent of evils will be displaced. If a being-including traditions, arts, buildings, laws, thoughts, and so on-does not belong to good, any effort to maintain it forever will fail in the end. However, people cannot improve their abilities in selecting good and escaping evils before discovering what good is. Although society is presently full of evil and short on good, good constitutes the majority of history. When observing social history after a billion years, it would be 7 Jiang, K. Truth Evolutionism-Imitating the Universe to Establish a Perfect Society. Hong Kong: Science Education Publishing Company, 2005 [in traditional Chinese]. 43–47. 118 Kai Jiang obvious that good and its results formed the trunk of history, while evil and its results formed many burrs at the beginning of history, and vanished quickly. By selecting good or evil, human beings can expedite or defer the process. For example, they can accelerate or delay the unification of the market, the end of a war, and so on. There are two explanations for the sheer perfection of the Universe. First, the Universe might be the original isolated system; therefore, it must be good. Second, it might reach perfection by overcoming all evils. Invariance of individual realities does not mean invariance of the actual reality. Some phenomena can choose realities to accompany itself, such as society and thinking. The mechanism is unclear, perhaps in relation to the fact that human beings participate in several phenomenal systems simultaneously. However, the possibility that every phenomenon can choose realities for itself cannot be ruled out, because if the chosen reality is good, it is unnecessary to change it. The Universe neither shows itself to be alive nor proves the failure of determinism. It shows its perfection. It cannot be disproved that the Universe can choose other natural laws or be imperfect, because the largest freedom is the only mission of good and an isolated system. Truth About Realities and Good Realities and phenomena form logical loops. Phenomena are results of realities; realities offer phenomena reason. Nothing can have reason prior to reality or results after phenomena. Identical hypothesis: For two beings, A and B, if A provides the only reasons for B, and B provides the only results for A, they ought to be different aspects of the same thing. If this is true, both phenomena and realities should be the details, or local structures, of good. According to importance or universality, beings can be classified into three classes: good, evil, and phenomena. Thus, there is different utility for propositions. Propositions with universality are the first class; those approaching universality are the second class; those with universalizability are the third class; those about phenomena are the fourth class. Fallacies are not accounted for here, as they are not directly pertinent to our discussion. In this paper, truth is defined as the simplest form of knowledge about all beings. There are two parts to truth. One is the simplest expression of general relations between all phenomena and all realities, like the existence of reality and evil. The other is the simplest knowledge about the good. Truth should not be defined as all true propositions, because the value of propositions about particular phenomena and evils is too little. Truth ought to be at least close to universality. Recognizing this will help human beings to distribute their effort correctly to earn the largest return. Good is the only invaluable being because its usage approaches 100%. It is reasonable to suppose that truth should be composed of finite propositions. Then, the utility of each truth proposition must be infinitely high because total phenomena or freedom are infinite. (Even if truth includes infinite propositions, if it is Purely Logical Philosophy In An Isolated System 119 countable infinity, as natural numbers are, the utility of each proposition is still infinitely high.) However, a proposition with infinite high utility is not guaranteed to be truth; it might be an inference of truth instead. Knowledge about certain beings is the most valuable when these beings exist eternally and everywhere, and when infinite knowledge can be simplified into finite expressions. There are two categories of science. In the first, a subject studies a phenomenal system using the scientific method. In the second, the most important subject, close to ontology, studies truths using the scientific method, and its utility is infinitely higher than that of the other subjects. However, the most important is often also the most difficult. In pure logic, a scientific topic is weighted by utility. If the utility is high enough, it merits more time, patience, labour, money, attention, and so on. For example, ontology has been long underdeveloped because there have been few forcible results, whereas the reason is not convincing in pure logic: the weight of utility is ignored. Relative to evil and fallacy, good and truth are scarce. Hence it is difficult to discover them. Sociologists and economists ought to look for a social system which will last forever, but most of them are studying present and historical systems, which are full of evils. Research about evil cannot be the most valuable. By now, human beings have accumulated a lot of knowledge; but only truths should be preserved forever. For any subject, asking the following questions would be helpful: (1) are discoveries in this subject universal or universalizable? And (2) can they be established purely logically? These questions can be employed to keep researchers from studying mere phenomena and evils. In the process of discovering truth and good, logic is superior to experience, because phenomena often show the opposite of reality. From experience, humans discovered that the Universe is fully controlled by natural laws, and that society will be a mess without laws. However, it was logic that revealed that the greatest freedom requires precise laws.8 Conclusions To understand the basic attributes of an isolated system, logic is uniquely necessary. This paper has endeavoured to reach truth in a purely logical way. Many properties of realities are conducive to the discovery of truth, including universality, eternity, creator, closure, and symmetry. Philosophers have treated reality as one or two beings (that is, through monism or dualism), while it is more logical to treat it as one continuum of multiple realities. The theory detailed in this paper can be simplified into the following propositions: a) In an isolated system, beings include and only include realities and phenomena. b) Realities are the only reasons for phenomena. c) Phenomena are the only results of realities. d) A phenomenon chooses one reality guiding it to the next phenomenon. 8 Jiang, Logic. 120 Kai Jiang e) The sum of any two realities is a reality. f) Realities include and only include good and evils. g) Good is the sum of all realities. h) Good is arbitrarily close to universality in phenomena. i) Good creates phenomena better than anything else does. j) Truth-the simplest expression for knowledge that is arbitrarily close to universality-is finite. k) An isolated system cannot be separated into two or more unrelated parts. For phenomenal systems that are able to choose realities, such as society and thinking, following these logical rules can guide them away from evil and wrong knowledge. Meanwhile, some fundamental problems remain. The most important of these is the establishment of physics on pure logic, such as why there is 3-D space. In addition, the relationship between reality and phenomenon is not clear enough. Are they two different beings or different aspects of one being? The latter helps solve the former, because sufficient knowledge about truth is prerequisite to deducing precise laws about an isolated system.

Developing the Explanatory Dimensions of Part-Whole Realization (Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies) Ronald Endicott Department of Philosophy & Religious Studies North Carolina State University Campus Box 8103, Raleigh, NC 27695 [email protected] Since the turn of the century philosophers have focused largely on one part-whole theory of realization, and that is Carl Gillett's "dimensioned" theory. So I think it is instructive to examine its details, remove its problems, and use what remains as a platform to develop a plausible partwhole theory of realization. I begin with some desiderata for a theory of realization that its key terms should be defined and that it should be explanatory. I then argue that Gillett's (2002, 2003) original theory violates these conditions because, beyond some basic metaphysical components, its explanatory force rests upon an unspecified "in virtue of" relation. I then examine Gillett's (2007, 2013) later version that appeals instead to theoretical terms tied to "mechanisms." Yet I argue that it too violates the desiderata, since it defines realization for mechanisms in terms of two undefined terms – "implementation" and "grounds" – whose explanatory credentials have not been established. Thus I drop these ideas in favor of an explicit constraint that the parts and properties provide a mechanistic explanation. I also distinguish a special mechanistic theory from a preferred general theory that incorporates other kinds of part-whole explanations, and I compare the latter to a similar idea from Robert Cummins (1983) that has been neglected in recent discussions of realization, namely, his general property analysis rather than his functional analysis. Finally, I defend the preferred theory against possible objections based on issues that arise regarding certain metaphysical demands on a theory of realization versus facts about good scientific explanation. 1. Desiderata for a Theory of Realization. Hilary Putnam (1960, 1967) popularized the terminology of realization within the philosophical community. Yet, aside from a connection Putnam made with the idea of a one-to-one mapping, most philosophers believe that his use of "realization" was a mere placeholder for some as yet unspecified relation. Putnam was not alone. As Jaegwon Kim put the point: "the term 2 'realization' was introduced and quickly gained wide currency, chiefly on the basis of computational analogies," with few making an "explicit effort to explain what the realization relation consisted in" (1997, p.186). So one desideratum for a theory of realization is that it should not use key terms that are undefined. Call this the "Definition" condition. Of course one cannot be expected to define all terms. What counts as a "key" term depends upon the context of inquiry. For example, if the goal is to understand inter-level realization rather than broader questions about the nature of objects or properties, and if the theory says that "a property G realizes a property F if and only if G and F are instantiated by an object x and G superproduces F," then "superproduces" is a key term that should be defined but arguably not "property," "object," or "instantiates." As well, most philosophers believe that a good theory of realization should provide a physically acceptable explanation for non-fundamental phenomena (Lepore and Loewer 1989; Poland 1994; Kim 1998; Morris 2010). This is why most philosophers do not think that concepts of supervenience are sufficient to express a physically acceptable view, since they are consistent with the brute laws of emergentism (Schiffer 1987; Kim 1990, 1993a; Horgan 1993). This also applies to mereological supervenience, since that doctrine could be true even if micro parts determine macro wholes in a fundamentally unexplained way (Kim 1998, pp.18, 117). So another desideratum for a theory of realization is that it should provide an adequate explanation for its target phenomena. Call this the "Explanation" condition. In the next two sections I will argue that Gillett's original theory as well as his later revised theory fail to satisfy the Definition and Explanation conditions. 2. Dimensioned Realization. Gillett uses "flat" theories as a foil for his own "dimensioned" theory. According to Gillett, flat theories require that the same object x possess both realized F and realizing G properties, and that the causal powers that F bestows upon its instances "match" the causal powers that G bestows upon its instances (Gillett 2002, pp. 317-18) in a sense that includes causal role (Block 1980; Kim 1998) and subset views (Wilson 1999; Shoemaker 2001). Gillett then argues that flat theories do not represent actual cases of realization in the sciences because they leave out realization by parts, which he illustrates by the case of the diamond lattice whereby properties of 3 the constituent carbon atoms explain the hardness of a diamond (2002, pp.318-20). He thus offers his dimensioned theory: [D] Property/relation instance(s) G1-Gn realize an instance of a property F, in an individual x, if and only if x has powers that are individuative of an instance of F in virtue of the powers contributed by G1-Gn to x or x's constituent(s), but not vice versa (2002, p.322, with a change in variables; also 2003, p.594). Philosophers have offered a number of criticisms, many of which I will discuss later. But even opponents believe that [D] represents a new turn-of-the-century revolution brought about by philosophers like Gillett who finally addressed the nature of realization directly (Polger 2007, pp.233-34; Kim 2010, p.265; Walter 2010, p.207). Now I applaud Gillett's emphasis upon partwhole dimensions, for I agree that flat theories cannot stand alone. Thus, even when a functionalrole theory employs the notion of a structural property that implies parts for its instances, the fact that a structural property occupies a functional role is best explained by a part-whole mechanistic explanation (see Endicott, forthcoming, against role-occupant iterations that do not rest upon whole-to-part decompositions). But Gillett's dimensioned theory requires major development. I begin with a lesser interpretive problem. 1 Gillett wants to offer an egalitarian definition that covers both flat and dimensioned cases (2002, p.322). Accordingly, the either/or convention governing the use of parentheses around the plural ending indicates that "property/relation instance(s) G1-Gn" on the left-hand side of the biconditional in [D] should be taken to refer to either a single instance of the realizing kind described by a flat theory or a plurality of part instances of the dimensioned kind emphasized by Gillett. But if the same terms "G1-Gn" are 1 Another lesser problem is an ambiguity between properties and property instances. Thus, on the left-hand side of the biconditional, the wording of "an instance of a property F" makes it clear that "F" stands for a property, yet the absence of the preposition in "property/relation instance(s) G1-Gn" seems to indicate that the terms "G1-Gn" stand for instances. See also the shift between properties and instances when Gillett describes a flat theory's structure "COMBO" (2002, p.320). But this ambiguity is ultimately harmless, since realization can be defined for either category (see Endicott 2010). 4 expanded in the same way on the right-hand side of the biconditional, then the theory is compatible with the view that the entire explanatory burden could be carried by the single flat realizer (disjunctions can be made true by just one of the disjuncts). That result seems contrary to the spirit of a part-whole theory. That result also seems contrary to Gillett's argument that a flat theory's role-occupying or subset-inclusive structural property COMBO must have its instances decomposed in a whole-to-part way (2002, p.320), since by that argument any flat claim within [D] should be underwritten by a part-whole analysis. So this suggests a different interpretation of [D] that takes the terms "G1-Gn" on the right-hand side of the biconditional to refer solely to part properties. 2 Of course a simpler alternative is to offer a pure dimensioned theory shorn of flat elements. Then, if an egalitarian compromise is desired, one may say that realization fits either a flat definition or the pure dimensioned definition and leave it at that. Indeed, if one wants to know what theoretical advance [D] makes over older ideas, then one should set aside the traditional flat ideas that Gillett wants to improve upon. Hence Gillett's theory has four remaining elements: (i) property instantiation; (ii) a metaphysics of causal powers; (iii) partwhole determination; and (iv) some in virtue of relation. Now my main argument against [D] is that Gillett has merely added an unspecified and hence unexplanatory in virtue of relation to some familiar dry goods in metaphysics that most would acknowledge to be insufficiently explanatory (I will examine Gillett's later theory that replaces the "in virtue of" with other notions in the next section). So, taking each element of [D] in turn, (i) Gillett understands realization in terms of properties and relations being instantiated. But philosophers commonly used "realization" and "instantiation" in the same context and often interchangeably (Searle 1980, pp.418-23; Pylyshyn 1980, p. 29; Horgan 1984, p.460). Moreover, an appeal to instantiation carries no serious explanatory weight in the present context, since emergentists also believed that their properties and relations were instantiated. (ii) Gillett also frames his theory in terms of a metaphysics of causal powers. But that is a general metaphysical idea that has been popular since Sydney Shoemaker's (1980) causal theory of properties, and it 2 Cf. Ronald Endicott's (2011, p.196) synthesis of flat functional-role and dimensioned views that defines functional realization in terms of a three-place relation whereby an object's occupier Gi realizes its functional F in virtue of properties G1-Gn possessed by its parts. This conjoins rather than disjoins the two ideas. 5 too is compatible with emergentism as long as the whole has causal powers that are unexplained by the causal powers of its parts. (iii) Gillett embraces part-whole determination. He does not explicitly state the point about determination in [D], but it is implied. For example, Gillett wants to subsume flat views under [D]. Yet they imply determination. 3 More central to the dimensioned theory, Gillett refers to "constituent(s)" in the definition, yet he says elsewhere that the pertinent compositional relations included within the scope of his theory are all forms of "synchronic noncausal determination" (Gillett 2007, p.200). Indeed, both Kenneth Aizawa and Gillett say plainly that "realization is a transitive ontological determination relation" (Aizawa and Gillett 2009, p.195). But part-whole determination is just mereological supervenience, a view made popular by Kim and conceded to be insufficiently explanatory (Kim 1993a, 1998). Finally, (v) Gillett appeals to an in virtue of relation. He says that "x has powers that are individuative of an instance of F in virtue of the powers contributed by G1-Gn to x or x's constituent(s)" (2002, p.322, again with a change in variables; also 2003, p.594). Yet that too is a familiar theme. As Kim said about the shortcomings of supervenience: Much of the philosophical interest that supervenience has elicited lies in the hope that it is a relation of dependency ... Often it is thought, or claimed, that a thing has a supervenient property because, or in virtue of the fact that, it has the corresponding base property, or that its having the relevant base property explains why it has the supervenient property ... Clearly property covariation [mere determination by supervenience] by itself does not warrant the use of "because," "in virtue of," etc., in describing the relationship any more than it warrants the attribution of dependence (1990, p.147; see also Heil 1992, p.65). 3 E.g., the flat causal-role functionalist theory of realization implies that the instantiation of a realizer property G determines the instantiation of the realized F, for if it is a matter of law that G stands in causal relations R, and if F is defined as the property possessed by an object when it has some property that stands in R, then it will be a matter of law that whenever an object has G it has F (see Tye 1995, pp.41, 47-48). 6 So, putting aside the flat elements in [D], Gillett's theory is merely instantiated mereological supervenience expressed with a metaphysics of causal powers plus some in virtue of relation that Kim and many others said was missing from supervenience. But the point is not just that Gillett's theory represents a lack of theoretical progress. Kim (1990) cashed in his talk of "because" and "in virtue of" by appealing to a functional-role explanation, and he subsequently (1998) defined realization explicitly in terms of a functional-role theory. In contrast, Gillett's unspecified "in virtue of" is the key difference that distinguishes his theory from a familiar and explanatorily deficient set of ideas. As a result, [D] does not satisfy the two desiderata I presented for a theory of realization. It violates the Definition condition because it leaves its key theoretical term undefined. And it violates the Explanation condition because its key undefined term does not raise the expressed dimensioned ideas to the level of an explanatory theory. Certainly "in virtue of" does not indicate any relevant features of an explanation (it is like offering a theory of causation by saying that "an effect y exists because of x" without indicating how "because of" should be understood, say, in terms of a counterfactual analysis, or ideas about manipulability, or mechanisms, or a transfer of energy, and so on). Now, in response, one might think my criticism can be blunted by Gillett's clarification regarding his intentions in providing [D]. He says: First, I offer it as an account of the notion of realization implicit in scientific theorizing, and not any folk concept. Second, I take realization to be a basic metaphysical notion whose nature is intimately bound up with a family of notions. In particular, I ultimately believe that realization and constitution are interdefined and I thus offer my definition as a nonreductive, but I hope illuminating, account of its connection to other basic notions (2002, p.322, fn.8). But these remarks do not help. Beginning with the second, suppose realization's in virtue of concept is a basic metaphysical notion that is interdefined with a basic concept of constitution. If so, Gillett has offered nothing more than a view Kim briefly entertained in the early 1990s before he settled on a functional-role approach. Specifically, after rehearsing the problems for supervenience, and after noting that ethical notions of same-subject supervenience can be explained in assorted ways, Kim turned to mereological supervenience as a non-ethical, objective 7 relation in the world and postulated a fundamental form of dependence: "This supervenience relation does not seem to be explainable in terms of any of the candidate explanations we have just canvassed for valuational supervenience. It seems likely that mereological supervenience represents a metaphysically fundamental, sui generis form of dependence" (1993a, p.166). I see little difference between mereological supervenience, a metaphysics of causal powers, and a sui generis form of dependence, versus an instantiated mereological supervenience, a metaphysics of causal powers, plus some metaphysically primitive in virtue of relation. Moreover, put aside the component in virtue of concept and consider the suggested nonreductive link between the containing concept of realization and a basic concept of constitution. But constitution is likewise intimately bound up with mereological supervenience. Consequently, if the link to a basic concept of constitution was insufficient to transform the idea of mereological supervenience plus causal powers into a viable theory, that same link to constitution should be insufficient to transform the idea of an instantiated mereological supervenience, causal powers, plus some as yet unspecified in virtue of relation into a viable theory. Finally, consider Gillett's first clarification that his concept of realization is something implicit in scientific theories, not some folk notion. Very well, the scientific theories Gillett has in mind should throw some light on what he intends (I will discuss his examples later). But the trouble is that, beyond the aforementioned generic ideas, Gillett's definition does not express anything of explanatory value about the scientific theories in question, or the explanations provided by them, and thus it fails as an account of realization that those explanations supposedly imply. For example, philosophers distinguish many different kinds of part-whole explanations in the sciences, including explanations of historical processes versus aggregates versus morphological compositions versus systematic mechanisms (Levins 1970; Haugeland 1978; Cummins 1983; Wimsatt 1986, 2006; Bechtel and Richardson 1993; Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000; Winther 2011). I will have more to say about the differences later. But Gillett's "in virtue of" does not express what is distinctive about any part-whole explanation in the sciences, just like invoking the common-language "because of" does not expresses what is distinctive about any causal explanation in the sciences. One must articulate the relevant features of the desired range of cases that will both identify the kind of scientific explanations at issue 8 and distinguish them from others, and then represent those features in a philosophical definition or analysis. 4 I suspect that most philosophers have looked past this issue because they were more interested in the contrast between multiple-subject dimensioned theories versus single-subject flat theories. Indeed, the fact that Gillett presented his dimensioned theory as an explicit contrast to flat theories effectively drew attention to the matter of dimensioned parts versus flat wholes rather than any differences or deficiencies regarding Gillett's particular part-whole theory versus others, say, Kim's (1993a) mereological supervenience with an added primitive dependence, or Cummins' (1983) property instantiation theory, of which I will say more later. But one philosopher did briefly raise a problem about Gillett's use of "in virtue of." Thomas Polger, Gillett's main critic, says in a footnote of a paper devoted to a different criticism that [D] is "less than perspicuous" and offers a streamlined definition that "eliminates the 'in virtue of' locution": "Property/relation instance(s) G1-Gn realize an instance of a property F, in an individual x, if and only if G1-Gn are properties of x or x's constituent(s) and G1-Gn contribute the powers that are individuative of an instance of F to x but not vice versa" (2007, pp.237-38, fn.8, with a change in variables). Polger then says that "even with this adjustment, it is hard to see how the account explains realization" (loc. cit.), and he briefly goes on in the same footnote to state that the mere fact that parts contribute powers to a whole does not explain how this happens. I agree. But I have not viewed Gillett's use of "in virtue of" merely as a point of unclarity that should be removed so that a more perspicuous formulation of his theory may be assessed. I have stressed that it is unfortunately the central idea that serves to distinguish Gillett's theory from some old dry goods in metaphysics that are inadequate for explanation. I have also offered a more extensive critique that takes into account Gillett's clarifications, arguing that links to fundamental metaphysical notions such as constitution as well as illustrations of scientific explanations do not obviate the need to replace "in virtue of" with a theoretically useful concept that provides some information about the kinds of part-whole explanations at issue. 4 Aizawa and Gillett recently refer to [D] as a "thumbnail sketch" (2009, p.186, fn.9). But providing a sketch does not preclude the obligation to provide enough information in the definition to identify the pertinent kinds of part-whole explanation. 9 3. Dimensioned Realization for Mechanisms. In a later work (2007) Gillett develops his theory. This new theory deserves a close look not only because most philosophers have focused upon the original [D], but also because Gillett no longer uses the unspecified "in virtue of." Gillett starts with a definition of "comprising powers": [C] (Comprising) Powers C1-Cn, had by individuals y1-yn (or individual x), comprise the power Cf, had by individual x under background condition B, if and only if the mechanisms grounded by the triggering and manifestation of powers C1-Cn, under triggering conditions Bt1-Btn and background condition B, would together implement the mechanisms grounded by the triggering and manifestation of Cf, under triggering conditions Bt1-Btn and background condition B, but not vice versa (2007, p.202, with variables changed; the same definition is repeated in 2013, p.324, fn.20). 5 Gillett then defines realization on the model of [D] with a clause about such comprising powers: [Dm] (Realization) Property instances G1-Gn, in individuals y1-yn (or individual x), realize a property instance F, in individual x under background conditions B, if and only if the powers contributed by G1-Gn to y1-yn (or x), which are constituents/parts of x, together comprise the powers individuative of F, in x under B, but not vice versa (2007, p.202, with variables changed; the same definition is repeated in 2013, p.323). Consonant with the larger issue Gillett addresses regarding compositional reduction in the sciences, I read [Dm] as a pure part-whole theory rather than a disjunction of flat and dimensioned ideas. Accordingly, Gillett dropped the set of parentheses around the plural ending of "instances" on the left-hand side of the biconditional which allowed the realizer in [D] to be a single instance of the kind described by a flat theory. Instead, the only disjunction he employs in 5 The reference to triggering conditions in [C] creates a problem for [Dm], since the latter does not mention them. In any case, I will count them in [Dm]'s background conditions. 10 the definiendum of [Dm] concerns the location of the property instances G1-Gn, either "in individuals y1-yn (or individual x)," where I assume the latter is implied by a pertinent interpretation of the part-whole relation (in the sense of spatial location, if instances G1-Gn are "in" parts y1-yn, and those parts are "in" the whole x, then the instances G1-Gn are "in" the whole x). 6 But the most important change is that Gillett replaced the "in virtue of" with technical terms about comprising powers in [Dm] that are tied to "mechanisms" in [C]. As a result, Gillett's new theory [Dm] contains (i) property instantiation; (ii) a metaphysics of causal powers; (iii) partwhole determination (relative to background conditions); and the claim that (ivm) mechanisms grounded by the triggering and manifestation of powers C1-Cn together implement the mechanisms grounded by the triggering and manifestation of the target power Cf. Yet Gillett's modified theory has serious problems. Gillett says in [C] that mechanisms grounded by powers C1-Cn associated with the part properties "implement" the mechanisms grounded by the power Cf associated with the target property of the whole. But once again Gillett leaves this key term undefined. Hence, because [C] provides the analysis of the comprising powers cited in [Dm], Gillett ultimately defines "realization" by means of an undefined "implementation." This is at best unhelpful, since "implementation" stands equally in need of explication. This is at worst circular, since "implementation" is often used in the place of "realization," both among philosophers (Searle 1990, p.26; Chalmers 1996, p.309) and computer scientists (von Neumann 1956, p.43; McDermott 1976, p.144). Moreover, Gillett cannot assume any standard interpretation of "implementation" in the literature, since philosophers and computer scientists typically treat implementation as a one-to-one mapping between certain abstractly conceived items like machine tables or descriptions and the concrete states in a physical machine, or that same mapping plus the appropriate counterfactually supporting causal structure in the physical machine (see Chalmers 1996; Rapaport 1999). In contrast, a part-whole mechanistic explanation requires a one-to-many relation between a concrete whole and its concrete parts, such as a brain 6 Also, there is but one disjunction in the definiens about what receives the powers from the parts, namely, the "powers [are] contributed by G1-Gn to y1-yn (or x)," and I assume this only means that the multiple property instances contribute powers either directly to the parts y1-yn or indirectly to the whole x by their direct contributions to the parts. 11 system and its neural parts. 7 A similar argument could be made regarding Gillett's reference in [C] to mechanisms being "grounded" by the triggering and manifestation of powers, since Gillett leaves that term undefined too. Yet grounding is another way to think about inter-level relations, and it is often taken to be a metaphysical primitive that would be ill-suited for the kind of explanatory project that is expected from a theory of realization (see Jessica Wilson 2014). 8 So, given that ideas about mere parts and wholes and causal powers are insufficiently explanatory, then the addition of two undefined inter-level terms will not yield an explanatory theory. [Dm] does not satisfy the Definition condition, since it leaves key theoretical terms undefined. And [Dm] does not satisfy the Explanation condition, since its undefined ideas fail to express any relevant features that explain the powers of a whole by the powers of the parts. Now Gillett does not mention the issue of circularity regarding "implementation" or "grounds" directly, but he briefly states in a footnote that some readers may be concerned that the "interdefined nature" of [C] and [Dm] "may raise problems of circularity," and he then says: 7 E.g., in the case of neurotransmission, the explanation proceeds by breaking down the signaling function of a neuron into various processes involving certain parts, including the reception of neurotransmitter molecules, the opening of ion channels in a neuron's membrane, and the entrance of positively charged ion atoms through those channels into the cell body, all of which are crucial to the cell's depolarization (for more details, see Doyle, et. al. 1998; Jensen, et. al. 2012). 8 In a later paper Gillett (2013, p.312) says that a "process" is an individual manifesting a power that results in an effect, and he says that an individual "grounds" that process when its powers so result in an effect (2013, ibid.). This seems to be a different claim than what is made in [C] (2007). In [C] (2007) the triggering and manifestation of powers ground the individual mechanism. But in (2013) the individual mechanism grounds the triggering and manifestation of powers (presumably because the individual is a part of that larger process). Either way, the grounding remains undefined. 12 In response, it should be noted that I am offering an account in the metaphysics of science that simply seeks to articulate the nature of compositional concepts in the sciences, rather than trying to replace these scientific notions with other concepts. Furthermore, our basic concepts in some area are often inextricably intertwined and my account merely reflects this feature in the scientific case we have considered. For we have seen that concrete scientific cases posit "packages" of compositional relations between powers, properties, individuals, and mechanisms (2007, p.203, fn.13). His remark about articulating "compositional concepts in the sciences" and his remark that such basic concepts are "inextricably intertwined" are very much like the two clarifications Gillett made about [D] (2002, p.322, fn.8) that I discussed earlier regarding scientific theories and a postulated interdefined link between realization and constitution. But there are two differences worth noting. First, because Gillett makes a direct appeal to "mechanisms" in [C], which he did not do in [D], [Dm]'s "implementation" is explicitly tied to mechanisms within the definition. Second, Gillett introduces even more nonreductive interdefined links with basic notions – not just between realization and constitution as before – but now a larger package of relations that includes "constitution for individuals," "comprising between powers," "implementation for processes," and "realization between properties" (2007, p.196, fn.6). But these clarifications do not help. To begin, even though Gillett refers to "mechanisms" in [C], and thus by implication in [Dm], the definition does not actually state that realization occurs because the mechanisms are subject to a mechanistic explanation. Rather, Gillett utilizes the concepts already mentioned, saying that mechanisms grounded by powers C1-Cn should together "implement" the mechanisms grounded by Cf. That will imply a theory of realization based upon mechanistic explanation only if one defines "implementation" in terms of a mechanistic explanation, which Gillett does not do. Of course I believe Gillett wants [Dm] to express a part-whole mechanistic explanation, once the schema is appropriately filled in. He uses the term "mechanistic explanation," and he cites a number of familiar works that both promote and analyze mechanistic explanation (2007, p.194, fn.7). And of course mechanisms are subject to mechanistic explanation. But the problem is that Gillett's theory does not say that realization is a form of 13 mechanistic explanation. Instead, and again, its central inter-level ideas are the explanatorily inadequate generic notions of parts and wholes and causal powers plus the newly introduced but undefined ideas about implementation and grounds. Also, in case one thinks that my point is mere "nitpicking" and that Gillett's reference to mechanisms in [C] should suffice, recall that Putnam too spoke about mechanisms – paradigm computing machines. Yet when it came to formulating a theory of realization or implementation for those machines, Putnam spoke of mappings and otherwise left the substantive theory of realization wide open. Gillett has done the same thing with his modified theory of realization, only he speaks in terms of implementation and grounds. Turning then to Gillett's clarification via a larger package of relations, the appeal to "constitution for individuals," "comprising between powers," "implementation for processes," and "realization between properties" (and grounding for mechanisms?) only widens the circle of ideas but does not break it. For the fact remains that "realization" rests upon key undefined ideas which ensure that [Dm] fails to satisfy the Definition and Explanation conditions. 9 Finally, I want to compare my argument to the only criticism in the literature specifically directed at Gillett's modified theory [Dm]. Polger (2010) cites Gillett's (2007) theory, and he makes three claims: (a) it is merely a "descriptive" theory that says when or that an ontological dependence relation holds, not an "explanatory" theory that helps one to understand why or how that dependence occurs (2010, pp.200-202); (b) it is problematic because, unlike the authors he cites, Gillett's theory is insensitive to the difference between aggregates and mechanisms (2010, pp. 204-7); and (c) given these problems, one should prefer a flat functional-role theory (2010, pp.199, 210), although Polger concedes that a dimensioned approach provides an apparently a 9 Gillett adds in a more recent work that the parts in a constitution relation have "spatio-temporal, powerful, and/or productive" relations to each other (2013, p.311). But Gillett does not define the kind of "spatio-temporal relations" in question or indicate how they would either exclude unexplained emergent cases or capture the desired range of scientific explanations. Also, by "powerful" Gillett (2013, p.312) only means the notion of causal powers introduced by Shoemaker. And by "productive" Gillett (2013, p.312) only means the power of an individual to be triggered and manifested to produce an effect – all of which are ideas already expressed in [C] and [Dm]. 14 more plausible account of "vertical" or part-whole constitutive mechanistic explanation (2010, p.199-200). Now I agree with Polger on (a), although my reasons for rejecting the explanatory adequacy of [Dm] are different than his. Briefly, Polger interprets [Dm] like Gillett's original egalitarian theory [D] that applies when the individuals are mereologically related and when they are not (Polger 2010, p.200). He then argues that [Dm] does not indicate which, among the available options – identity or composition via some spatially overlapping matter or a properpart-to-whole relation – is the relation that is explanatorily relevant (2010, pp.200-2). 10 I read [Dm] differently as a pure proper-part-to-whole theory, as I stated previously. But, regardless, Polger does not mention anything about Gillett's reliance upon the undefined notion of implementation that provides the basis for my criticism that the theory violates the Definition and Explanation conditions. Our arguments are quite different. Regarding (b), whereas I agree that [Dm] is insensitive to the distinction between aggregates and mechanisms, yet contrary to Polger I think the fact that Gillett means something much broader by "mechanistic explanation" than those he cites within the recent mechanistic movement within philosophy is actually a point in favor of Gillett's view. As I will argue in the next section, if one wants a general theory of realization that extends beyond the special sciences like biology and cognitive science, then one cannot be restricted to the mechanisms described in those special sciences. Finally, regarding (c), rather than fall back on a flat functional-role view because of problems with [Dm], I will construct a better part-whole dimensioned theory in the next section. Moreover, although I do not have the space to develop the argument here, I also think this part-whole theory provides a needed supplement for the kind of flat functional-role theory that Polger prefers (see Endicott, forthcoming). 10 Polger (2010, p.2002) also seems to tie this point to Shapiro's (2004) argument that, for purposes of functional analysis, one should discriminate among the parts and properties that combine to determine a functional property. However, Shapiro's argument applies even after one has set aside the options of identity and spatially-overlapping constitution and settled upon a relation of proper parts to whole. That is, among an object's proper parts, some will be relevant to a functional analysis and others not. 15 4. Realization via Special Mechanisms and General Structures Although Gillett's dimensioned theories [D] and [Dm] have problems, I believe his reference to mechanisms and his many discussions of mechanistic explanation point in the right direction. Specifically, I suggest that a better part-whole theory of realization can be formulated if one drops the undefined terms and incorporates an explicit clause about mechanistic explanation. I think one should also resist reading Gillett's system of "constitution for individuals," "comprising between powers," and "realization between properties" in a metaphysically extravagant way that implies substantively different relations in the world. As a good Aristotelian, I think one may understand the relations between properties and powers by the relations between the individuals that possess them. I thus recommend that one drop Gillett's [C] and then revise [Dm] along the lines suggested: [PWme] Properties/relations G1-Gn instantiated by an individual x's proper parts y1-yn realize a property/relation F instantiated by that individual x, under background conditions B, if and only if, x instantiates F and x's proper parts y1-yn instantiate G1-Gn; it is necessary that if y1-yn are proper parts of x, and y1-yn have G1-Gn, and B holds, then x has F; and y1-yn having G1-Gn, along with their causal powers, provide a mechanistic explanation for x having F, along with its causal powers, under B, but not vice versa. Unlike Gillett's [D], [PWme] is a pure part-whole theory. It is also simpler than Gillett's [D] and [Dm], since it is framed in terms of properties that are instantiated by individuals, leaving talk of property instances, or similar items such as event structures, tropes, and states of affairs to one side (such things may exist when an object instantiates a property, but there is no need to refer to them). But the important difference is that [PWme] contains an explicit reference to mechanistic explanation. So [PWme]'s main elements are: (i) property instantiation, (ii) a metaphysics of causal powers, (iii) part-whole determination (relative to background conditions), and now the further constraint that (ivme) the parts and their properties and relations provide a mechanistic explanation for the target property of the whole. Now this kind of theory is not unprecedented. There are flat mechanistic theories of realization, for example, functional-role theories that speak of the occupier as the mechanism for 16 the role-defined property (Kim 1993b; Tye 1995). But there are also part-whole mechanistic theories of realization. Thus, Robert Cummins' (1975) offered a part-whole functional analysis, of which mechanistic explanation is a more specific species (Craver 2001 develops Cummins' functional analysis into a current and highly influential account of mechanistic explanation). I will have more to say about Cummins' views shortly. As well, Laurence Shapiro (2004) cites Cummins' functional analysis as a constraint on what may count as a realization, thus implying a theory like [PWme]. Also, Matthew Haug (2010) recently describes something like [PWme] by speaking of realization in terms of mechanistic explanation, and by citing (2010, p.320) authors who promote notions of mechanistic explanation that are tailored to functionally organized systems in biology and cognitive sciences (Bechtel and Richardson 1993; Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000; Craver 2007). Nevertheless, different philosophers mean different things by "mechanistic explanation," which leads to different theories of part-whole mechanistic realization. This key term must be explained. Thus, most contemporary philosophers of science understand mechanistic explanation in a special way for functionally organized biological, engineering, and cognitive systems. There are multiple lines of influence for this view, but one traces back to Richard Levins' (1970) distinction between "aggregate," "composed," and "evolved" systems. According to Levins, aggregate systems are such that "the properties of the whole are statistics of the properties of parts" (1970, p.76). So the mass of a pile of sand would be a property of an aggregate, since it is explained by a simple summation principle applied to the mass of each part. But, according to Levins, composed systems require more than simple statistical methods, even though "the properties of the parts can be completely specified by study in isolation," as illustrated by an engineering circuit (1970, p.77). Finally, Levins says that evolved systems are such that the parts are not "obviously separable" (1970, p.77), by which he means that, unlike mere composites, their functions can only be specified by relations to other parts within the system. 11 Inspired by 11 Likewise, William Bechtel and Robert Richardson (1993, p.26) distinguish between aggregate systems for whom intersubstitution of parts holds, component systems for whom intersubstitution fails but the functional behavior of a part is intrinsically determined, and integrative systems for whom intersubstitution fails but the functional behavior of a part is determined by a broader systemic organization, such as feedback among subsystem parts. I also think that John 17 Levins, William Wimsatt (1986, pp.260-68) then offered four criteria that define aggregativity vis-à-vis a system property targeted for explanation by the parts, and he proposed that the degree to which a case fails to meet these criteria provides an opposing classification of a system as a mechanism. I will mention two criteria. As Wimsatt would later formulate them: (InterSubstitution). Invariance of the system property under operations rearranging the parts in the system or interchanging any number of parts with a corresponding numbers of parts from a relevant equivalence class of parts ... (Linearity). There are no Cooperative or Inhibitory interactions among the parts of the system which affect this property (2006, p.676). So the mass of a pile of sand is a system property of an aggregate because one grain can be interchanged with another without affecting the overall mass of the pile, and also because there are no cooperative or inhibitory interactions between the grains of sand. In contrast, familiar mechanisms like computing machines and assorted neural systems fail to meet these conditions. Thus, neurotransmission is not subject to intersubstitution of parts, for if the excitatory neurotransmitter molecules in the dendrites are switched with the ion channel molecules in the cell body there will be no neurotransmission (see again fn. 7). Also the targeted function of a nueron does not exhibit simple linearity, as Wimsatt defines it, since there are both excitatory and inhibitory interactions, depending upon neighboring neurons and what kind of neurotransmitters they release. Mechanistic explanations must therefore utilize principles that apply to such functionally organized systems. And mechanisms display other features. For example, as Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000, p.11) describe them, mechanisms involve a functional process, in the case of neurotransmission, how the parts of the neural system work from a start-up condition whereby a pre-synaptic neuron releases neurotransmitter molecules, an Haugeland's (1978) distinction between "morphological" versus "systematic" explanations is roughly equivalent to the latter two cases, i.e., composed systems (e.g., explaining how a cup holds coffee and how a fiber-optics bundle preserves the data it received) and then the functionally organized systems (e.g., explaining how an automobile engine works and how the brain does its information processing). 18 intermediate stage whereby a post-synaptic cell receives the neurotransmitters, to an end-state condition whereby the post-synaptic neuron depolarizes and thus transmits a signal. They also involve multiple-level, nested hierarchies, which they illustrate with the same case of neurotransmission: "the activation of the sodium channel is a component of the mechanism of depolarization, which is a component of the mechanism of chemical neurotransmission, which is a component of most higher-level mechanisms in the central nervous system" (2000, p.13). And they observe that explanations of such mechanisms typically bottom out in the lowest level of interest for a given scientist, research group, or field (loc. cit.). Let "mechanism" thus mean a functionally organized, multiple-level, nested hierarchical system with cooperative parts that cannot be substituted for one another. Of course not every case is either a pure aggregate or a pure mechanism, which is why Levins spoke of a middle ground for "composites" and why Wimsatt spoke about forms of aggregativity and degrees of satisfaction for the criteria. One may thus count organizational complexity as a matter of degree, conceiving of each case on a continuum with pure aggregates as a limiting case on one end, assorted composites in the middle, and paradigm systematic mechanisms as a limiting case at the other end. One may also adopt the same convention for their explanations. Thus, by this scheme, "mechanistic explanation" contrasts with other part-whole explanations that target less functionally organized systems. Indeed, this division has now become entrenched within the philosophy of science. But not everyone equates mechanistic explanation with the explanation of functionally organized systems, as described above. For example, Gillett uses "mechanism" very broadly to cover any case where there is a composite object whose causal powers are explained by the powers of its parts. Thus, in the same paper where Gillett (2007) introduces [Dm], he offers the definition as a way to make sense of a broad range of "compositional" cases in the sciences, not just those involving paradigm mechanisms like computing machines and machine-like biological systems. In accordance with this broad usage, Aizawa and Gillett (2009, p.183) reject competing accounts of realization if they fail to acknowledge "all the kinds of scientific explanations that reveal 'causally relevant properties.'" Yet aggregates are compositional cases in the sciences, and their mass is surely a causally relevant property. The same is true for assorted other properties of composites, such as "density, refractive index, conductance, etc." (Aizawa and Gillett 2009, 19 p.191). Indeed, Gillett's oft-used example of the diamond lattice (Gillett 2002; Aizawa and Gillet 2009) is not a mechanism in the special sense described above. Recall that Polger (2010) views this as a problem. But Gillett is not wrong to speak in this fashion. Philosophers and scientists have spoken for centuries about a "mechanistic view of the universe," not just a mechanistic view of neural systems. They have also spoken about "mechanics" as a branch of physics, not biology. Émile Durkheim (1893) even spoke of "mechanistic" social groups with exactly the opposite meaning from what is intended by the recent mechanistic movement in biology and cognitive science – for him the "organic," not the "mechanistic," displays an interdependence of constituent members. But however one wants to mark the distinctions, some distinctions should be made. Thus I will adopt the convention that distinguishes "mechanistic explanation" in a special sense that is confined to highly organized functional systems from "compositional explanations" and "aggregate explanations" that extend to less functionally organized systems, pace the Levins-Wimsatt scheme. I will also interpret [PWme] as a special theory for such mechanisms. Hence one may now consider a more general theory: [PWacme] Properties G1-Gn instantiated by individual x's proper parts y1-yn realize a property F instantiated by that individual x, under background conditions B, if and only if, x instantiates F and x's proper parts y1-yn instantiate G1-Gn; it is necessary that if y1-yn are proper parts of x, and y1-yn have properties G1-Gn, and B holds, then x has F; and y1-yn having G1-Gn, along with their causal powers, provide something within the spectrum from aggregate to composite to mechanistic explanation for x having F, along with its causal powers, under B, but not vice versa. So [PWacme] contains (i) property instantiation, (ii) a metaphysics of causal powers, (iii) part-whole determination (relative to background conditions), and now a more general condition (ivacme) that appeals to aggregate, or composite, or mechanistic explanations. [PWacme] thus meets the two desiderata for a theory of realization I introduced earlier. It does not resort to key undefined terms like "in virtue of" or "implements" to supplement its core metaphysical components. And it expresses the fairly well understood concepts of part-whole 20 explanation in the sciences covered by the Levins-Wimsatt scheme of classification. I also prefer [PWacme] over a specialized theory like [PWme] for the simple reason of generality. [PWacme] is defined to include [PWme]'s special mechanistic explanations, and hence nothing is lost by adopting [PWacme] and much is gained by incorporating other part-whole explanations. Indeed, given that highly functionally organized systems decompose into simpler systems, mechanistic explanations are always underwritten by compositional and aggregate explanations. 12 This provides yet another reason to prefer the general [PWacme] over the special [PWme]. And of course, in light of my previous criticism, I prefer [PWacme] over Gillett's [Dm]. Even though Gillett's broad view of mechanistic explanation covers a similarly broad range of cases, [PWacme] alone is explicitly defined in terms of the said types of explanation and it does not invoke key undefined concepts. [PWacme] is thus a mixed theory that has the explanatory virtues of mechanistic theories as well as the larger scope desired by Gillett. Finally, I should point out that the result is much like a part of Cummins' (1983) view of realization that has been neglected in recent discussions of realization – not his functional analysis but his more general property theory. To wit, Cummins says that property theories explain what it is for a system to have a property (rather than why a system changes from one state to another). In the case of dispositions, they do this by analyzing the system into simpler dispositions. They are thus whole-to-part decompositional theories. 13 Moreover, as Cummins conceives it, a complete explanation by this kind of theory involves two stages: an analysis of the property and then an account of how the property is instantiated (1983, 31). This too is decompositional. So a property instantiation theory explains how a property of a system S is 12 Interestingly, it might not be true that compositional explanations are always underwritten by simple aggregate explanations, e.g., if quantum-entangled states are not determined by the intrinsic physical properties of the individual particles but rather arise non-locally, exemplifying a kind of non-separability (see Maudlin 1998). 13 Cummins says that property theories fall under the general "analytic strategy" exhibited in the sciences (1983, p.17). Compare how Nancy Cartwright summarizes the "analytic method" in physics: "to understand what happens in the world, we take things apart into their fundamental pieces; to control a situation we reassemble the pieces, we reorder them so they will work together to make things happen as we will" (1999, p.83). 21 instantiated by means of "the properties of S's components and their mode of organization" (1983, p.15). In short, that is a part-whole dimensioned theory of realization. Now, what is important for present concerns, Cummins distinguishes three kinds of property theory. There is a general "property analysis" under which Cummins includes such things as Einstein's explanation of the photoelectric effect whereby metals have a disposition to emit electrons when they absorb light as well as the explanation of Archimedes' Principle that specifies the disposition of water to exert an upward buoyant force on a submerged body (1983, pp.19-21). There is also Cummins' well-known "functional analysis" as a special case of this general property analysis when the property is a disposition or capacity and when that capacity is understood functionally by its role within a containing system (a function, he adds, that can be specified by a program or a flow chart (1983, p.28)). 14 Then there is a more special kind of functional analysis, which Cummins calls an "interpretive analysis," that views a more narrow range of functionally organized systems in terms of a semantic interpretation of their supposed symbols, pace the symbol system hypothesis for computing machines (1983, pp.34ff.). So consider the general property theory, including both the analysis and the instantiation theory. Cummins acknowledges that there are instantiation and composition laws (1983, pp.7, 17-18), although he rightly emphasizes that the force of an explanation via a property instantiation theory derives from the parts and their mode of organization rather than the mere fact of a covering law or part-whole determination. So, taking all this together, Cummins offers a general part-whole property instantiation theory [GPI] that contains (i) property instantiation, (ii) a metaphysics of capacities or dispositions, (iii) part-whole determination or instantiation laws, and the condition that (ivpi) the parts provide an explanation of a target property of the whole. If one includes the special functional and interpretational explanations under this general property instantiation theory, the result is something very much like [PWacme]. There are differences. For example, the inclusive [GPI] incorporates a ternary distinction between property, functional, and interpretive analysis. [PWacme] is informed by a ternary distinction between aggregate, composite, and mechanistic explanation. They are not equivalent. 14 Although Cummins presents his functional analysis as a way to understand the function of a part in terms of a containing system (e.g., the heart vis-à-vis the circulatory system), it is also a way to thereby understand a function of the whole in terms of the functions of the parts. 22 [PWacme] is more detailed at the low end of the spectrum by distinguishing aggregates from other composites, whereas [GPI] is more detailed at the high end of the spectrum by distinguishing symbol systems from other functional systems. There is also a substantive difference, given that Cummins' (1983) interpretive analysis reflects a kind of instrumentalism for special science explanations that appeal to encoded symbols that I do not endorse and that I did not include in my gloss on mechanistic explanation (Cummins moved to a more realismcompatible view in 1996). Nonetheless, the theories are much in the same spirit by explicitly tying realization/instantiation to part-whole explanations in the sciences. Of course there are other ways to categorize the vast array of existing part-whole explanations in the sciences. For example, within the special range of mechanistic explanations one might distinguish between mere functionally organized symbol systems and those that are program-controlled (see Piccinini 2010). My point in offering [PWacme], with its LevinsWimsatt scheme of classification, is to supply a good part-whole dimensioned theory of realization that meets the Definition and Explanation conditions, not to establish that it is the only kind of part-whole theory that will meet those conditions. 5. Problems, Issues, and Conclusions. In spite of the popularity of theories of realization based upon forms of scientific explanation, legitimate questions could be raised about their use as a theory of realization. I will discuss four that are relevant to [PWacme]. The first issue concerns explanations that appeal to wide facts versus narrow theories framed in terms of an individual's causal powers. Thus Robert Wilson (2001) would take issue with [PWacme]'s focus on the individual and its parts, endorsing instead a theory of wide realization that appeals to assorted semantic, social, and historical items outside the individual. And Polger (2007) would take issue with [PWacme]'s focus on causal properties, endorsing instead a broad notion of functional realization that subsumes paradigm cases such as the realization of abstract automata or machine tables that are not individuated by causal powers. Yet, in response, perhaps one could extend [PWacme] in the desired directions, creating a wide part-whole theory that includes both external objects as parts of larger wholes along with any additional principles needed to explain a property of such extended wholes in terms of their parts. For example, in the case of historical evolution, one might treat a species as an extended spatio-temporal individual, and then explain the evolution of a species in terms of the selection 23 of traits among these member parts (Hull 1989; Winther 2011). To illustrate with the Giant Panda, one could view early member-parts with their small radial sesamoid bones as an initial temporal stage of the extended individual species, later member-parts with their larger bones as intermediate stages where selection occurred, and the present member-parts as a final stage where the members enjoy the larger bones that function as thumbs. Similarly, in the case of semantic externalism, one might postulate an extended mind that encompasses represented objects, and then explain the mind's beliefs in terms of relations between the parts that are represented and the parts that represent them. Or, what I think is the safer course, one could leave [PWacme] unchanged and simply to take it to provide a limited picture of the world that is compatible with wide theories. For example, in the case of wide semantic content, questions about the meaning of symbols within a cognitive system might be answered by a different kind of theory even when questions about the syntax of the symbols are answered by an individualistic theory about the parts, their causal properties, and their relations (see Endicott 2012 for an illustration). The second issue concerns a possible conflict between realism and explanation. Some maintain, I think rightly, that scientific explanations are relative to the specific interests of the scientists who employ them (Wimsatt 1974; Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000), or that they involve not only metaphysical facts in the world but also facts about understanding and communication (van Fraassen 1980; de Recht 2009). Someone might then worry that a theory like [PWacme] has the unwanted consequence that realization is mind dependent, as if the realization of a dinosaur's circulatory system by its parts actually depended upon the existence of explanatory practices by understanding minds that will exist in the future. Yet, in response, perhaps one could resist the irrealism by resorting to a purely metaphysical sense of explanation according to which facts explain things regardless of any cognitive or communicative features (e.g., Strevens 2000, p. 6, gives precedence to the metaphysical notion). But suppose good scientific explanations involve both. How does one avoid any unwanted mind dependence? Note that even if an explanation is relative to one's interests, it does not follow that the items designated by an explanation are interest relative or subjective. What is selected for attention may be objective facts in the world (see Lipton 1991, pp.123-25). Moreover, one may avoid any unwanted mind-dependence with the help of a counterfactual analysis. For [PWacme], one could stipulate that properties G1-Gn "provide an explanation" for F means only that G1-Gn would 24 allow one to better understand their relation to F if they were included in the pertinent part-whole explanations. The third issue concerns a possible conflict between explanation and lawful determination. On the one hand, determination implies sufficient conditions. If x determines y, then x is a sufficient condition for y. On the other hand, it is a consequence of several plausible views about explanation that, among the multitude of factors that are jointly sufficient to produce some outcome, an explanation is typically selective inasmuch as it presents only a smaller group of factors that are especially relevant for the outcome in question. Consider Bas van Fraassen's (1980) example that spraying the plant with defoliant explains why it died even though the former is not a sufficient condition for the latter, given other factors and other contrasts that one might have in mind when asking why the plant died. Or consider Carl Craver's (2007) notion of constitutive relevance which does not require that the parts and properties cited in a mechanistic explanation enable one to derive the targeted phenomenon. As a consequence, on these and many other views, the items cited in an explanans typically do not supply a sufficient condition for the items targeted in the explanandum. One might then worry that the selectivity of explanation is inconsistent with the part-whole determination assumed by [PWacme]. Yet, in response, [PWacme] is wholly consistent. It may be true that the explanatorily relevant parts y1-yn and their part properties G1-Gn cited in condition (ivacme) do not supply a sufficient condition for x having the target property F, either individually or collectively, and yet it may also be true that what supplies a sufficient condition is those same lesser parts y1-yn having G1-Gn, given assorted background conditions B, pace condition (iii). For example, whereas typical explanations for neurotransmission highlight facts about how positively charged ion atoms enter into the cell body and cause it to depolarize, these explanations assume a host of things that are required for a sufficient condition – that the myelan sheath which surrounds the axons has not been damaged or deteriorated, that the atoms are built from proper physical parts like quarks and leptons rather than immaterial monads that may defeat the function of a neuron at will, and so on. For convenience, let B represent an "ideal scientific text" that includes all such assumptions about the place of the pertinent parts and properties within the world (cf. Railton 1981). If B is so understood, then determination is guaranteed via a realization law of the form I have already employed in [PWacme]: it is necessary that if parts y1-yn have properties G1-Gn, and B holds, then the whole x has F. 25 The fourth and final issue concerns part-whole determination and the potential for a promiscuous amount of multiple realization. Thus, Laurence Shapiro (2004, pp.44-57) argued that Gillett's original theory [D] trivializes the notion of multiple realization because there are a multitude of factors combine to determine the instantiation of a property. For example, in the case of neurotransmission, such facts include a solitary quark within the neural cell, and not just parts that are especially salient in the explanation for neurotransmission, such as having enough ion atoms enter through the cell's ion channels to cause depolarization. Thus, Shapiro argued, a change with respect to that solitary quark will count as an alternate realization on Gillett's view, rather than a change in something more functionally relevant to neurotransmission like the mechanism of ion channels. One might then worry that [PWacme] suffers from the same problem, being a development of Gillett's dimensioned view that accepts part-whole determination. Yet, in response, this is a point at which the main difference between Gillett's theories and my preferred theory pays dividends, for by [PWacme] only the parts y1-yn and their properties G1-Gn that serve in one of the pertinent part-whole scientific explanations will count as a realization. For example, a mechanistic explanation for neurotransmission typically bottoms out well before the level of fundamental physics. So a solitary difference in the presence or absence of one quark in the neural cell body is typically irrelevant to the explanation. Indeed, Shapiro suggests that one may solve the problem by viewing realization in terms of the select group of parts that serve a Cummins-style functional analysis of the target system property. I suggest the same thing with respect to the selective group of parts and properties highlighted for attention in the explanations described by [PWacme]. No doubt there are more issues to consider. But, when measured against potential problems based upon familiar philosophical questions and debates, I believe that [PWacme] stands as a plausible theory of realization. So, in summary, I have argued that Gillett's dimensioned theories [D] and [Dm] are inadequate because they rest upon undefined terms like 'in virtue of" and "implement" that are not explanatory in the way expected from theories of realization. But I agree with Gillett's emphasis upon part-whole dimensions as well as the aim to capture a wide range of scientific explanations. I have therefore proposed a special part-whole mechanistic theory [PWme] as well as a preferred general part-whole theory [PWacme] that replace the stated undefined terms with an explicit reference to the appropriate range of explanations in the sciences. 26 Acknowledgments I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that I address the issue of potentially excessive multiple realization in the final section. I also thank Carl Gillett and Thomas Polger for many discussions of realization. References Aizawa, K., and Gillett, C. (2009). 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Implementation is semantic interpretation, The Monist 82: 109-130. 29 Schiffer, S. (1987). Remnants of meaning. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. Searle, J. 1980. Minds, brains, and programs, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3: 417-57. _____. 1990 Shapiro, L. (2004). The mind incarnate. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. Shoemaker, S. (1980). Causality and properties, in P. van Inwagen, ed., Time and cause (pp. 109-35). Dordrecht: Reidel. _____. (2001). Realization and mental causation, in C. Gillett & B. Loewer, eds., Physicalism and its discontents (pp.23-33). Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press. Strevens, M. Depth: An account of scientific explanation. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. Tye, M. (1995). Ten problems of consciousness. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. Van Fraassen, B. (1980). The scientific image. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Von Neumann, J. (1956). Probabilistic logics and the synthesis of reliable organisms from unreliable components, in C. Shannon and J. 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Words and Images: An Essay on the Origin of Ideas, by Christopher Gauker. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Pp. xii + 302. H/b $38.40. Christopher Gauker's Words and Images: An Essay on the Origin of Ideas pursues two ambitious and original projects. First, Gauker develops and defends the Sellarsian thesis that public language is the medium of conceptual thought, all thought that involves distinguishing between particulars on the basis of the kinds to which they belong. Concepts, on Gauker's view, are not expressed or conveyed by means of language. Rather, concepts are words and phrases used in meaningful acts of speech (p. 257). Second, Gauker undertakes to show that dispositions to produce and consume sentences containing ordinary, empirical words, like 'icicle', 'window', and 'blackbird', can be learned on the basis of a kind of imagistic thinking that does not involve the application of concepts. (Imagistic representations include both 'receptive' perceptions as well as 'prospective' mental imagery.) Since these words, when used in intersubjective communication or inner speech, according to Gauker, just are the concepts icicle, window, and blackbird, an account that explains how speakers acquire the aforementioned dispositions also functions as an account of concept learning. In the course of pursuing these projects, Gauker also outlines a radically pragmatist theory of language. Language is portrayed not as a means of conveying thoughts from one speaker to another, but rather as a tool for optimizing the performance of multi-agent tasks. More specifically, overt acts of speech are instruments that enable one agent to guide from outside, as it were, how another agent engages in prospective, imagistic planning. By making assertions, an agent can instill in those who hear her imagistic representations of their situation that permit each participant to carry out her part of a collaborative project in an optimal way (p. 242). On Gauker's view, the only genuine representations in the mind are nonconceptual, imagistic ones. Language does not augment or 'upgrade' our endogenous, imagistic mindware with novel representational resources à la Andy Clark (see Clark's 'Magic Words' in Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary Themes, edited by P. Carruthers and J. Boucher, Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 162–83), but instead enables human beings to create and manipulate imagistic representations in ways that would otherwise be impossible. In this respect, Gauker's view sharply departs from other strong cognitive conceptions of language (for discussion, see Peter Carruthers, 'The Cognitive Functions of Language', Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25 (2002), pp. 657–726). Chapters one through four critically examine alternative, languageindependent theories of concepts and are intended to clear the ground for positive developments in the second half of the book. Chapter one begins by raking the empiricist view that concepts are 'abstracted' from perceptions over Mind, Vol. 123 . 491 . July 2014  Mind Association 2014 902 Book Reviews at O hio U niversity on O ctober 19, 2014 http://m ind.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from a briar patch of objections. It also poses challenges to 'contemporary Lockeans', including Eleanor Rosch, Jean Mandler, and Jesse Prinz. Chapter two argues against the Kantian theory of concepts and also criticizes Lawrence Barsalou's view that 'conceptualizations take the form of simulations that create the experience of "being there" with category members' ('Situated Simulation in the Human Conceptual System', Language and Cognitive Processes, 18 (2003), p. 543). Chapter three targets Paul Churchland's and Peter Gärdenfors's perceptual similarity space theory of concepts. Chapter four explores different manifestations of the view that concepts are building blocks of language in the work of Wilfrid Sellars, Jerry Fodor, and Robert Brandom. Critical discussions in this chapter are highly insightful, self-standing contributions to the interpretation of all three authors. Many philosophers will be receptive to efforts, beginning in chapter five, to show that nonconceptual, imagistic cognition supports various kinds of problem-solving in human beings and other animals. Although Gauker says that he finds 'no precedent in the history of philosophy ' for this view (p. xi), it is hardly new. An influential treatment of the idea that non-human animals rely on mental imagery to guide practical decision-making can be found, for example, in Aristotle (see Martha Nussbaum, Aristotle's De Motu Animalium, Princeton University Press, 1978), and there is an obvious sense in which the assumption that 'constructive mental imagery ... can do much of the work traditionally ascribed to conceptual thought' (p. xi) is central to both classical and contemporary empiricism. This would be true, even if, as Gauker argues, Locke and his heirs wrongly conflate the building blocks of imagistic cognition with those of conceptual thought. Central to Gauker's discussion of imagistic cognition is the idea of a perceptual similarity space (PSS). In a PSS, the axes used to locate a perceived object or scene are dimensions of perceptible variation. These include both basic perceptible attributes, like color, shape, scent, and texture, as well as higher-order attributes, like overall resemblance in appearance to a cat or a chair (pp. 159–60). Imagistic representations of particulars, on this approach, correspond to points or 'marks' in PSS, where the distance between two points in PSS is inversely related to the perceived similarity of the particulars to which they correspond. Gauker argues that languageless minds are incapable of drawing boundaries in PSS, however vague, that correspond to boundaries between kinds of objects ('perceptual experience, and imagistic thought more generally ', he writes, 'draw no functional boundaries between one kind of thing and another' (p. 1)). A squirrel, for example, can use its inner similarity spaces to decide whether a branch is close enough to jump to, but this is not the kind of boundary, he says, that concepts characterize. Concepts rather characterize boundaries 'that [do] not vary with the vicissitudes of the animal's current states and needs' (p. 111). It is specifically the need to decide whether or not to use a word in intersubjective discourse, Gauker says, that first tenders the Mind, Vol. 123 . 491 . July 2014  Mind Association 2014 Book Reviews 903 at O hio U niversity on O ctober 19, 2014 http://m ind.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from mind with a reason to draw stable, functional boundaries between regions of PSS. I find this suggestion implausible. One reason is that non-discursive, imagistic cognition can be used to guide actions that depend for their successful performance on the presence of a stable kind or individual in the perceived environment. Whether a squirrel initiates eating or caching behaviour, for instance, may depend on the distance between its imagistic representation of a currently perceived particular and its stored, imagistic representation of an acorn. Whether or not a bowerbird performs its dance in the presence of another bird may depend on the latter's perceived similarity to a female of the species. These quick examples fall short of showing that regions of PSS are full-fledged concepts, but they provide reason to think that kindsensitive boundaries in animal cognition may arise prior to words that mark them. Another reason is that Gauker understands imagistic cognition to include the capacity to form dynamic imagistic representations (DIRs) of objects. A DIR of a certain dog, for example, is a set of perceptual memories and imaginative representations that enable one to recognize the dog across changes both in spatial point of view and the dog's posture. According to Gauker, imagistic cognizers are only able to construct DIRs for individuals or particulars, for example, for Asta and Toto, but not for the kind dog or fox terrier (p. 159). This claim, for which no argument is given, strikes me as ad hoc. It is also seems at variance with psychological theories according to which viewpoint-dependent, perceptual representations are used by the visual system for purposes of highlevel object recognition (for discussion, see Stephen Palmer, Vision Science: Photons to Phenomenology, MIT Press, 1999, Ch. 9). Chapter six presents an account of the conditions under which imagistic representations in perceptual similarity space (PSS) accurately represent an object or scenario's location in objective quality space. According to the account, 'A mark in perceptual similarity space is a candidate for accuracy relative to a set of dimensions of perceptual similarity space if and only if for each dimension in the set, the mark lies in a region of perceptual similarity space in which [variation along] that dimension is a true measure of variation along the dimension of objective quality space that corresponds to it'. (p. 202) Given this provision, marks in PSS corresponding to the Müller–Lyer arrows, for example, do not even qualify as candidates for accuracy relative to the perceptual length dimension (p. 203). If, however, the possibility of error is taken to be intrinsic to representation (p. 192), then it also implies that we do not strictly speaking represent the Müller–Lyer arrows as having certain lengths in visual experience. That seems rather counter-intuitive. Chapter seven presents a highly idealized, philosophical account of the conditions under which an agent will be disposed to produce and accept sentences when engaged with others in simple forms of co-operative Mind, Vol. 123 . 491 . July 2014  Mind Association 2014 904 Book Reviews at O hio U niversity on O ctober 19, 2014 http://m ind.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from problem-solving. (Think of conversations between Wittgenstein's builders, but with the addition of sentential connectives and quantifiers to their pragmatic language game.) Since the account does not presuppose that the agent has spoken language in the past, it does double-duty, Gauker says, as an account of language learning (p. 220). The role of imagistic cognition in the account can be illustrated by what Gauker calls the Betweenness Rule (p. 234). According to the rule, an agent will be disposed to utter 'That's a dog' in response to a scenario X if imagining the utterance, while perceiving X results in a hybrid perceptual–imaginative representation whose corresponding point in PSS is between its two nearest neighbours in the cluster of points representing previously encountered scenarios labeled with 'That's a dog', but is not between its two nearest neighbours in the set of points representing previously encountered scenarios labeled with 'That's not a dog'. The notion of labeling here is a technical one: an utterance s labels a perceived scenario X when s is part of X and the agent associates the demonstratives in s with representations of particular objects in X (p. 231). (Gauker offers no explanation of how a young child might learn to make such associations.) Other rules in chapter seven cover the production and acceptance of negations, disjunctions, conditionals, and sentences containing universal quantifiers. It is not immediately evident how the account of communication presented in chapter seven is supposed to function as an account of language (concept) learning. Most of the rules laid out in the chapter explicitly assume the presence of certain capacities for imagistic cognition, for example, capacities for generating imagistic representations of goal states (p. 224) and for imagistic planning (p. 225–7), and do not address developmental issues at all. As far as I can tell, the only place Gauker does constructively address the topic of language learning in the chapter is in a discussion of the Betweenness Rule on p. 232. There he mentions that his account of when an agent will be disposed to utter an atomic sentence s assumes (1) that the agent has already previously encountered (and remembers) a number of scenarios labeled with 's' and a number of other scenarios labeled with 'not-s' and (2) that representations of scenarios labeled with 's' in the agent's PSS are arranged in a cluster of a certain kind. While the chapter has plenty to say about how speakers might decide what to say when collaborating in the pursuit of a shared goal, its account of how words - and, so, concepts - are first acquired is surprisingly thin. It is also entirely speculative: Gauker admits that he has no empirical evidence that the processes of imagistic cognition he describes do in fact underlie the acquisition of language and its use (p. 221). Complaints aside, Gauker has written a rich and thought-provoking book deserving of careful study. I fully agree with him that philosophers of mind have tended to underestimate or even to overlook the powers of nonconceptual, imagistic cognition. The investigation of imaginative and Mind, Vol. 123 . 491 . July 2014  Mind Association 2014 Book Reviews 905 at O hio U niversity on O ctober 19, 2014 http://m ind.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from perception-based forms of reasoning contained in Words and Images is a valuable step in the right direction. ROBERT BRISCOEDepartment of Philosophy Ohio University 202 Ellis Hall Athens, OH 45701 USA [email protected] doi:10.1093/mind/fzu108 Advance Access publication 19 September 2014 Mental Causation and Ontology, edited by S. C. Gibb, E. J. Lowe, and R. D. Ingthorsson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. viii + 272. H/b £42.00. This volume brings together new essays on mental causation from some of the most notable figures in the contemporary debate on the topic. Most of the essays are concerned with the question of how minds can be causally efficacious. This is discussed in relation to issues about physicalism, theories of causation, the ontology of properties, causal powers, and free will. The volume is a remarkable collection and it presents the cutting edge of contemporary debate surrounding mental causation. The investment of a close reading will be rewarded. The particular problem of mental causation that I shall focus on in this review is the exclusion problem, which is purported to demonstrate that nonreductive physicalism (NRP), namely the type of physicalism that takes mental properties to be distinct from physical properties, cannot accommodate the causal efficacy of mental properties. According to NRP, mental properties are realized by physical properties. However, as it follows from the principle of causal closure, any event that appears to be caused by a mental property instance is also causally necessitated by a physical event, presumably by the instance of its realizing property. According to the exclusion principle, no event has (simultaneous) multiple sufficient causes unless it is genuinely causally overdetermined. Therefore, either mental properties and their realizers causally overdetermine their effects systematically, or mental properties are causally excluded by their realizers. The responses to the exclusion problem vary. Sydney Shoemaker (Ch. 2) argues that a proper account of the realization relation solves the problem. Peter Menzies (Ch. 3) suggests that the right theory of causation gives us resources to replace the exclusion principle with a more plausible one which yields different consequences. David Papineau (Ch. 5) and David Robb (Ch. 9), on different grounds, resist NRP and take mental properties to be physical properties. Paul Noordhof (Ch. 4) thinks that some of these Mind, Vol. 123 . 491 . July 2014  Mind Association 2014 906 Book Reviews at O hio U niversity on O ctober 19, 2014 http://m ind.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from

Utilitas http://journals.cambridge.org/UTI Additional services for Utilitas: Email alerts: Click here Subscriptions: Click here Commercial reprints: Click here Terms of use : Click here Fairness and the Strengths of Agents' Claims NATHANIEL SHARADIN Utilitas / FirstView Article / January 2016, pp 1 14 DOI: 10.1017/S0953820815000527, Published online: 26 January 2016 Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0953820815000527 How to cite this article: NATHANIEL SHARADIN Fairness and the Strengths of Agents' Claims. Utilitas, Available on CJO 2016 doi:10.1017/S0953820815000527 Request Permissions : Click here Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/UTI, IP address: 128.230.69.24 on 27 Jan 2016 Fairness and the Strengths of Agents' Claims N A T H A N I E L S H A R A D I N Syracuse University John Broome has proposed a theory of fairness according to which fairness requires that agents' claims to goods be satisfied in proportion to the relative strength of those claims. In the case of competing claims for a single indivisible good, Broome argues that what fairness requires is the use of a weighted lottery as a surrogate to satisfying the competing claims: the relative chance of each claimant's winning the lottery should be set to the relative strength of each claimant's claim. In this journal, James Kirkpatrick and Nick Eastwood have objected that the use of weighted lotteries in the case of indivisible goods is unacceptable. In this article, I explain why Kirkpatrick and Eastwood's objection misses its mark. INTRODUCTION When it comes to the question of how agents' claims to goods should be arbitrated, one natural answer is that we are required to treat each agent's claim fairly. This is the answer that John Broome has defended, together with a particular account of what the requirements of fairness amount to.1 According to a recent article by James Kirkpatrick and Nick Eastwood in this journal, Broome's account faces a problem when it comes to cases of competing claims to indivisible goods.2 In this article, I'll explain why Kirkpatrick and Eastwood's objection to Broome misses its mark. Here is the plan for the remainder of the article. First, I'll distinguish between divisible and indivisible goods and explain how Broome's account of fairness is supposed to yield a verdict in cases of competing claims to divisible and indivisible goods. Then, I'll explain Kirkpatrick and Eastwood's objection to the way Broome handles cases of competing claims to indivisible goods. I'll argue that there is a problem with Kirkpatrick and Eastwood's objection. The problem is that the objection misses its mark: it leaves Broome's account of the requirements of fairness unscathed. 1 John Broome, 'Fairness', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91 (1990), pp. 87– 101. 2 James Kirkpatrick and Nick Eastwood, 'Broome's Theory of Fairness and the Problem of Quantifying the Strengths of Claims', Utilitas 27.1 (2015), pp. 82–91. Utilitas: page 1 of 14 doi:10.1017/S0953820815000527 2 Nathaniel Sharadin DIVISIBLE AND INDIVISIBLE GOODS, THE PROPORTIONAL SATISFACTION OF COMPETING CLAIMS, AND WEIGHTED LOTTERIES Let's begin by fixing terms. When it comes to the kinds of goods on which agents sometimes have claims, we can distinguish between divisible and indivisible goods. Divisible goods are goods that can be divided into parts such that each part retains its status as a good. Paradigmatic cases of divisible goods include: money, food, and so on. $1000 is good, and while $500 is less good, it still is a good. A full pie might be 'better' than a single slice, but even a single slice is still a good. In other words, divisible goods are goods that can be divided such that the resultant parts retain some value. Indivisible goods cannot be so divided: when indivisible goods are divided into parts, the parts fail to retain their status as goods. Paradigmatic cases of indivisible goods include: organs, medical care, shelter, and so on. A donor heart is good, but half a donor heart is not simply half as (or even much less) good – it isn't any good at all. Equally, half an appendectomy isn't at all good. It's possible to complicate this distinction between divisible and indivisible goods, but such complications are irrelevant for present purposes. But let me make one proviso. Notice that, given certain assumptions about a particular case, paradigmatically divisible goods might count as indivisible, and vice versa. This is because whether a particular thing (this money, that organ) counts as a divisible or indivisible good depends on whether the good-making features of the thing in question allow for divisibility. In other words, it depends on what the particular instance of the thing is supposed to be good for. For instance, if what makes this $1,000 good is that it will allow an agent to purchase life-saving medical care (and any less than $1,000 will not do so), then, in a case like this, $1,000 counts as an indivisible good – even though, intuitively, it is the sort of good we can easily divide. Similarly, if what makes that donor heart good is that it will be useful for research (and half the heart will do just as well), then, in a case like this, a donor heart counts as a divisible good – even though, intuitively, it is not the sort of good we can easily divide. Going forward, I'll ignore this complication, instead adopting the convenient simplification that goods like donor hearts are indivisible because they are good for being transplants and that, conversely, goods like money are divisible because they are good for being all-purpose (rather than specific) means for accomplishing agents' ends. Since we sometimes face competing claims to goods, then, together with the observation that goods are sometimes divisible and sometimes not, this means that an account of how claims to goods should be Fairness and the Strengths of Agents' Claims 3 treated must be able to handle two sorts of cases: (i) competing claims to divisible goods and (ii) competing claims to indivisible goods.3 Let me briefly explain Broome's account by showing how it is designed to yield a verdict in (i)–(ii). Cases of competing claims for a divisible good, i.e. cases where more than one agent has a claim to the divisible good, are straightforward. Suppose that we have some bushels of grain, and that both Ann and Bryant have an equally strong claim to the grain. Since fairness requires that agents' claims to (divisible) goods be satisfied in proportion to the relative strengths of those claims, what fairness requires in a case like this is that we give half the grain to Ann and half the grain to Bryant. In this case, Ann's claim is satisfied because the proportional strength of her claim to the grain is 1/2 and she receives 1/2 of the grain; the same is true, mutatis mutandis, for Bryant. Cases of competing claims for indivisible goods are more difficult. For, in the case of competing claims for an indivisible good, apportioning the good in accordance with the relative strengths of the competing claims is impossible. That is, although we could perhaps in principle divide up the good, doing so would destroy its status as a good: who wants half an appendectomy? So: what to do? Broome's suggestion is that the requirements of fairness can be met by using a weighted lottery as a surrogate. Instead of apportioning the good in accordance with the relative strengths of the competing claims, we should deliver the good – in full – to the winner of a weighted lottery wherein the probability of each claimant's winning the lottery is apportioned to the relative strength of her respective claim.4 So, for example, if Ann's claim to the donor heart is twice as good as Bryant's, then what fairness requires is that the donor heart be given to the winner of a lottery where the probability of Ann's winning is 2/3 and the probability of Bryant's winning is 1/3. It'll be useful in proceeding to have some formal characterization of these ideas and of Broome's account more generally, so let me take just a moment to provide that now. We can say that the strength of some agent, A's, claim to some good, G, can be represented by a twoplace strength function S(A,G) where the output of S is a real number between 0 and 1, where 0 is the lowest possible degree of strength and 1 is the highest. Intuitively, if S(A,G) = 0, then A has no claim at all on G. And if S(A,G) = 1, then no other agent is such that they have a better 3 There are also cases of non-competing claims to (divisible and indivisible) goods, but these cases won't concern me here. They also aren't the target of Broome's account. See Broome, 'Fairness', pp. 94–5. 4 Broome, 'Fairness', p. 100. 4 Nathaniel Sharadin claim to G than A.5 Let's also say that for any good G, the number of equal parts into which G can be divided such that each part retains its status as a good is represented by a one-place function P(G) where the output of P is a real, positive, finite number equal to or greater than 1. Intuitively, if P(G)>1, then G is a divisible good; and if P(G) = 1, then G is an indivisible good. With these two ideas in hand, and restricting our attention to cases where the good is at most finitely divisible, and the number of agents with claims to the good is finite and greater than 1 (i.e. cases of competing claims to goods), Broome's account of the requirements of fairness can be stated as two exhaustive requirements like so:6 Requirement 1: For all agents A1 . . . n, where P(G) > 1: Ax's share of G = S(Ax,G)S(A1,G)+ [...] S(An,G) ∗ P(G) Requirement 2: For all agents A1 . . . n, where P(G) = 1: Ax's chance of winning a lottery for G = S(Ax,G)S(A1,G)+ [...] S(An,G) ∗ P(G) Requirement 1 expresses the requirements of fairness for cases of competing claims to divisible goods. What it says is that an agent's share of a good should be proportional to the strength of the claim the agent has on that good. Requirement 2 expresses the requirements of fairness for cases of competing claims to indivisible goods. What it says is that an agent's chance of winning a lottery for the good should be proportional to the strength of the claim the agent has on that good. Putting things this way makes explicit Broome's idea that, in cases of indivisible goods, a weighted lottery functions as a kind of surrogate satisfaction for claims.7 For notice that the right-hand term in both Requirement 1 and Requirement 2 is the same. The difference is that, in cases of indivisible goods, since agents cannot be given a share of the good proportional to the strength of their claim to it, they are instead given a 'share' in the lottery: they are given a chance of winning the lottery proportional to the strength of their claim. This account of the requirements of fairness when it comes to the claims agents have on goods is simple, attractive and complete. Recently, however, it has come under attack. James Kirkpatrick and Nick Eastwood have recently offered an argument designed to show 5 This is not to say that, when S(A,G) = 1 no other agent is such that they have an equally good claim to G. 6 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out the need to restrict the requirements to cases of a finite number of competing claims to (at most) finitely divisible goods. 7 Broome, 'Fairness', pp. 95–6. Fairness and the Strengths of Agents' Claims 5 that Broome's account is unacceptable on the grounds that the use of weighted lotteries in the case of competing claims for indivisible goods is somehow problematic. In other words, they think that Requirement 2 is unacceptable. In the following section, I'll present this argument and explain how it goes wrong. THE CALCULATION OBJECTION Kirkpatrick and Eastwood's objection to Broome begins by asking us to consider a case such as: Medicine-1: Both Ann and Bryant have a claim to a medicine that cannot be divided without rendering it ineffective. If Ann does not receive the medicine, she will die. If Bryant does not receive the medicine, he will lose a finger.8 According to Broome's account, what we should do is enter Ann and Bryant into a weighted lottery where their respective chances of winning the lottery are apportioned to the relative strength of their claims to the (lifeor finger-saving) medicine and where the winner will receive the medicine. The problem, according to Kirkpatrick and Eastwood, is that it is radically unclear how to assign those chances. According to them, this is because it is radically unclear how to assign values to the strength of Ann and Bryant's claims. Platitudes such as 'Ann's claim is much stronger than Bryant's' will not help, for the fact that Ann's claim is much stronger than Bryant's doesn't tell us anything about what, precisely, the strength of Ann's claim is and what, precisely, the strength of Bryant's claim is.9 And that is what we need to know, if we are to do what Broome's account of fairness tells us to do, viz. assign each a discrete chance of winning a weighted lottery for the medicine. In other words, we need a way to calculate the (correct) chances to assign in the weighted lottery. The situation is worsened, according to Kirkpatrick and Eastwood, once we notice the possibility of further sorts of cases, such as: Medicine-2: Both Ann and Charles have a claim to a medicine that cannot be divided without rendering it ineffective. If Ann does not receive the medicine, she will die. If Charles does not receive the medicine, he will lose an arm.10 8 Kirkpatrick and Eastwood, 'Quantifying', p. 86. Kirkpatrick and Eastwood borrow this example from Brad Hooker, 'Fairness', Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (2005), pp. 329-52, at 349. 9 Kirkpatrick and Eastwood, 'Quantifying', pp. 87–8. 10 Kirkpatrick and Eastwood, 'Quantifying', p. 88. 6 Nathaniel Sharadin Intuitively, just as in Medicine-1, Ann has the strongest claim to the medicine. But equally intuitively, Charles has a stronger claim than Bryant did in Medicine-1; so, Charles should be assigned a higher chance of winning the lottery than Bryant was in Medicine-1. But according to Kirkpatrick and Eastwood, 'The difficulty comes when one tries to calculate how much more an arm should count for than a finger.' And because, according to them, 'there does not seem to be an accurate way of calculating this difference', and because 'fairness cannot require of an agent the impossible or the nearly impossible . . . we have reason to doubt that fairness can require us to calculate the percentages of weighted lotteries.'11 Call this the calculation objection to Broome's account of fairness. In the next section I'm going to explain why, if it works, the calculation objection actually shows far more than that Requirement 2 is in trouble. I'll then explain the problem with the calculation objection: it is misdirected. THE EXTENDED CALCULATION OBJECTION AND MISSING THE MARK The first thing to notice about the calculation objection is that, if it works, it shows far more than Kirkpatrick and Eastwood intend it to show. To see this, notice that the calculation objection is designed by Kirkpatrick and Eastwood as an objection to Broome's Requirement 2 – the requirement governing claims to indivisible goods. Put in terms of that requirement, the complaint is that we have no way of calculating S(A,G) (i.e. the strength of an agent's claim to a good) for any of the agents involved. This means that, beyond mere guesswork, we have no way of assigning to any agent the chance of her winning the weighted lottery. What this is supposed to show is that Requirement 2 cannot be correct: it requires us to do something it is impossible to (accurately) do, and since fairness cannot require of us that we do something impossible, Requirement 2 is unacceptable. But putting things this way reveals that, if it works, the calculation objection is not just an objection to Requirement 2, it is also an objection to Requirement 1 – the requirement governing claims to divisible goods. This is because, according to Requirement 1, in order to calculate an agent's fair share of a divisible good we shall also need to calculate S(A,G). But if the complaint in the case of Requirement 2 and indivisible goods is that we cannot calculate S(A,G), the same goes for Requirement 1. In other words, either we are at a loss for calculating S(A,G) or we are not. If we are, then we are at a loss whether we are attempting to calculate S(A,G) in order to satisfy Requirement 1 or Requirement 2. If we are 11 Kirkpatrick and Eastwood, 'Quantifying', p. 88. Fairness and the Strengths of Agents' Claims 7 not, then the objection is moot. Call the form of the objection that says we are at a loss to calculate S(A,G) wherever it occurs the extended calculation objection. Now, as far as I can tell, Kirkpatrick and Eastwood do not mean to be deploying the extended calculation objection.12 That is, they do not mean to be objecting to Broome's account of fairness when it comes to the case of competing claims over divisible goods: Indeed, even among other authors equally suspicious of Requirement 2, Requirement 1 is taken for granted as expressing exactly what fairness requires in the case of competing claims to divisible goods.13 But I expect their response would be to embrace this result: if the calculation objection really amounts to the extended calculation objection, then so much the worse for Broome's entire account! So, going forward, I'll concern myself with this (stronger) version of the objection. This way of putting things helps bring into focus what I think is the real problem with the (extended) calculation objection. The objection targets our ability to calculate, in any given case, the degree of strength of an agent's claim to a good (i.e. S(A,G) ). As a first move in response to this objection, notice that in a range of cases, although we might not be able to calculate the exact values of S(A,G) for each agent, we can calculate the relative values of S(A,G), and, given the nature of Requirement 1 and Requirement 2, the relative values of S(A,G) are all we need. For instance, suppose we have: Medicine-3: Both Ann and Amy have a claim to a medicine that cannot be divided without rendering it ineffective. If Ann does not receive the medicine, she will die. If Amy does not receive the medicine, she will die. How strong is Ann's claim to the medicine? How strong is Amy's? Equivalently: what are the values of S(Ann, Medicine) and S(Amy, Medicine)? I admit that I do not know how to assign these values. But notice that Broome's account of fairness does not require us to assign absolute values to the strength of agents' claims to goods. For, on the assumption that Ann's and Amy's claims to the medicine are of equal strength, we can still solve for the appropriate chances to assign Ann and Amy in a weighted lottery. To do this, we simply assign the same real number between 0 and 1 to both S(Ann, Medicine) and S(Amy, Medicine) and churn out the result via Requirement 2.14 The same goes not just in cases of equal strength; similar remarks apply whenever we think there 12 Kirkpatrick and Eastwood, 'Quantifying', p. 86. 13 See, for instance, Hooker, 'Fairness', p. 349. 14 The same is of course true in the case of a divisible good, i.e. a case governed by Requirement 1. 8 Nathaniel Sharadin is a clear relationship between the strength of agents' competing claims for a good. If, for instance, one claim is twice as strong as another, we can equally well satisfy Requirement 2 (or, for that matter, Requirement 1). So even if it is true that in no case can we assign absolute values to the strength of agents' competing claims, the extended calculation objection does not show that it is impossible in all cases to satisfy the requirements of fairness. In particular, we can satisfy the requirements of fairness when we are in a position (as we sometimes are) to assign relative values to the strength of agents' claims. The calculation objection only shows that it is impossible to satisfy the requirements of fairness when we are at a loss for assigning both absolute and relative values to the strengths of agents' claims to goods. Kirkpatrick and Eastwood might well agree with this. Their point, it seems, is that we are often – perhaps most of the time – at a loss for assigning both absolute and relative values to the strengths of agents' claims to goods: most of the time, we find ourselves in situations such as Medicine-1 and Medicine-2, trying to calculate how much more an arm should count for than a finger. So one strategy for resolving the debate in favour of Broome's account would be to show that, pace Kirkpatrick and Eastwood, most of the cases of competing claims to goods we face are more like Medicine-3 than they are like Medicine-1 and Medicine-2, i.e. they are cases where we can (at least) assign relative values to the strengths of agents' claims to goods. I won't pursue this strategy here. Though I think it is true, my interest is not in attempting to convince you that, most of the time, we are able to assign relative or absolute values to the strengths of agents' claims to goods.15 Instead, my point – and this is why Kirkpatrick and Eastwood's objection misses its mark – is that an account of how to do this, i.e. an account of how to assign values to the strengths of agents' claims to goods, is not itself part of an account of the requirements of fairness. The requirements of fairness tell us how we should treat agents' competing claims on goods. Abiding by those requirements in any particular case means we shall need to (accurately) assign (absolute or relative) values to the strengths of agents' competing claims. Kirkpatrick and Eastwood proceed to point out that doing so is at least in some, or, let's grant, in most, cases, impossible. But then, according to them, because 'fairness cannot require of an agent the impossible or the nearly impossible', the requirements of fairness cannot require us to assign values to the strengths of agents' claims.16 Now, I agree that the requirements of fairness cannot themselves plausibly require us to 15 Thanks to an anonymous referee for urging clarity on this point. 16 Kirkpatrick and Eastwood, 'Quantifying', p. 88. Fairness and the Strengths of Agents' Claims 9 do the impossible. But we must be careful here to distinguish between what the requirements of fairness themselves require us to do and what must be true, given what those requirements require us to do, in order for us to be capable of abiding by them. To mark this distinction, call the latter sort of entity the background conditions. Background conditions are the conditions that must hold in order for us to be capable of abiding by some set of requirements – the requirements of fairness, or any other sort of requirement.17 Consider, by way of explanation, two analogies with two very different sets of requirements. First, consider one account of the requirements of rationality for belief.18 According to Bayesian probabilism, agents' beliefs – in particular, their degrees of belief or credences – are rational in so far as they obey two requirements:19 first, the agents' credences must conform to the axioms of the probability calculus (the 'synchronic requirement'); second, agents' credences must evolve in accord with Bayes's rule, e.g. via conditionalization (the 'diachronic requirement').20 According to this simple version of probabilism, conformance with the synchronic and diachronic requirements is necessary and sufficient for the synchronic and diachronic rationality, respectively, of the credences of any particular agent. And in so far as a particular agent's credences do not conform to one or the other requirement – for instance, her credence in a particular proposition and her credence in its negation do not sum to 1, or she uses some rule other than Bayes's rule for updating on incoming evidence – the agent's credences are ipso facto irrational. Focus for the moment on the diachronic requirement. In order to abide by the diachronic requirement, agents must know what, for any particular proposition, their prior credence in that proposition actually is. Rough guesses will not do: it will not do, for instance, to know that you are more confident that the Mets will not win the pennant this season than that they will. You must know exactly how much more confident you are. Otherwise, when you receive new evidence (the Mets come into the All-Star break at better than .500, say) it is impossible for you to correctly update your credences in accordance with Bayes's 17 Thanks to two anonymous referees for suggesting this way of putting things. 18 Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting the analogy with Bayesian requirements of rationality. 19 This is a rather simple version of (extremely) subjective Bayesianism. But I'm not interested in the plausibility of this account per se, only in displaying the analogy with the requirements of fairness. 20 It's not important here what form of conditionalization we think is more plausibly required by rationality, e.g. whether we think Jeffrey conditionalization is superior to simple conditionalization. For more on this issue, see Richard C. Jeffrey, The Logic of Decision (Chicago, 1983). 10 Nathaniel Sharadin rule. The difficulty, to paraphrase Kirkpatrick and Eastwood, comes in calculating how much more confident you are that the Mets will win the pennant than that they will lose. Now, we should happily admit that, because it is unlikely (perhaps impossible) that you know, precisely, what your prior credences actually are, it will be unlikely (perhaps impossible) that you abide precisely by the requirements of rationality. But it would be a mistake to conclude, therefore, that there is something wrong with Bayes's rule, with the requirements of rationality as such. The problem is that the background conditions for rationality in belief have not been met. Or consider one account of the requirements of freedom. According to a broadly republican account of freedom, freedom requires independence from arbitrary power, in particular the arbitrary will of other agents.21 Now, several philosophers – in particular Philip Pettit – have argued that in order to enjoy freedom of this sort, agents must be part of a political society wherein institutions, including especially those institutions surrounding the rule of law, have a certain structure.22 These institutions and their particular shape represent the background conditions for the requirements of agential freedom: absent these, agents will usually (perhaps always) be to some extent subject to the arbitrary will of others, and so, to that extent, unfree. Suppose we discover that the political institutions needed to abide by the requirements of freedom are for some reason unachievable. (Perhaps we find ourselves outside the so-called 'circumstances of justice.'23) We should happily admit that, in such a situation, because it is unlikely (perhaps impossible) that you are independent from the arbitrary will of others, it is unlikely (perhaps impossible) that you are free. But it would be a mistake to conclude, therefore, that there is something wrong with the republican conception of freedom, with the requirements of republican freedom as such. The problem is that the background conditions for freedom have not been met. In general, then, the point is that, just as the ability to accurately assess one's credences and membership in a community governed by the rule of law are background conditions on the requirements of rationality for belief and the requirements of freedom, respectively, so the ability to accurately assign values to the strengths of agents' claims to goods is a background condition on abiding by the requirements of 21 Philip Pettit, A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency (Oxford, 2001). 22 See Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford, 1997) and Pettit, Theory. The exact details of Pettit's account don't matter for present purposes. 23 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971, Cambridge), esp. §22. Fairness and the Strengths of Agents' Claims 11 fairness. Discovering that the background conditions for abiding by the requirements of fairness are not achieved should not shake our confidence in the requirements themselves, any more than discovering that one doesn't live in a society governed by the rule of law should shake one's confidence in a republican conception of what is required in order to be free. Now, perhaps Kirkpatrick and Eastwood will reply by pointing out that, at least unlike the case of the requirements of republican freedom, in the case of the requirements of fairness extreme pessimism about the possibility of achieving the relevant background conditions is warranted. That is, we should be extremely pessimistic about the possibility of our ever achieving the ability to accurately assign values to the strengths of agents' claims to goods. But what should we conclude about some set of requirements if it turns out that the background conditions necessary for abiding by those requirements are not, as a matter of fact, achievable? What I am insisting on is that it would be a mistake to conclude that the requirements themselves are somehow in error. Perhaps what we need, if we discover that the background conditions for abiding by some set of requirements is unachievable, is a set of heuristics, or make-do requirements, designed for our particular circumstances.24 Those make-do requirements, importantly, will be shaped by our understanding of what the genuine requirements in the domain are. For instance, on the discovery that, say, abiding by the Bayesian requirements of rationality is unachievable by us because access to our precise priors is not in the offing, we do not jettison those requirements as the requirements of rationality: instead, what we do is develop heuristic rules that approximate those requirements. Similarly, on the discovery (if it were a discovery) that, say, abiding by Broome's requirements of fairness is unachievable by us because of our utter inability to assign values to the strengths of agents' claims to goods, we do not jettison those requirements as the requirements of fairness: instead, what we do is develop heuristic rules that approximate to those requirements. As I noted above, I am less sceptical than Kirkpatrick and Eastwood are about our ability to develop an account of how to assign values to the strengths of agents' claims to goods, and pursuing this line would take me too far afield here. So I'll leave it at that. What all of this means is that, in the face of cases like Medicine-1 and Medicine-2, what the (extended) calculation objection really does is highlight our need for an account of the strengths of agents' claims. 24 I am not suggesting this is the case with respect to the requirements of fairness since, unlike Kirkpatrick and Eastwood, I am not as pessimistic about our ability to come up with a way to assign values to the strengths of agents' claims to goods. But pursuing such an account is beyond the scope of this article. 12 Nathaniel Sharadin For it is our lack of such an account that makes it impossible for us to satisfy the requirements of fairness in such cases. But if this is right, then, as we have seen, the calculation objection is not really an objection to Broome's account of fairness – it is not appropriately thought of as an objection to the requirements of fairness, but instead as a kind of scepticism about the possibility of achieving the background conditions necessary for abiding by those requirements. And that, as we've just seen, is a different matter. Let me make one more point before concluding. It might be tempting to think that Kirkpatrick and Eastwood's account still shows that there is something especially troubling about Broome's account of the requirements of fairness, since the background conditions necessary for abiding by those requirements seem so demanding. But this would be a mistake. It might be possible to replace Broome's Requirement 2 with a requirement that did not require a way to assign values to the strengths of agents' claims. For instance, we could say that, in the case of competing claims on indivisible goods, we should simply give (all of) the good to the agent with the stronger claim – without entering the agents into a lottery. This manoeuvre might appear to obviate the need for a way to evaluate the strengths of agents' claims to goods, i.e. it might seem to make the background conditions necessary for abiding by the requirements of fairness less demanding.25 But this appearance is misleading. For notice that it is overwhelmingly plausible that claims to divisible goods can also vary in their strength. Moreover, any plausible account of the requirements of fairness must take this fact into account, at least when it comes to divisible goods. It's not plausible, for instance, to suggest that when the strength of two agents' claims to a divisible good vary, we simply give all of the good to the agent with the stronger claim. An account of the requirements of fairness according to which this was true would be a non-starter. But this means that each and every account of the requirements of fairness – Broome's or otherwise – will require, as a part of their background conditions – some way or other of evaluating the strengths of agents' claims to goods, since fairly distributing divisible goods also requires evaluating the strengths of agents' claims. So while it is true that Broome's account requires some way to evaluate the strengths of agents' claims to goods also in the case of indivisible goods, this does not make the background conditions necessary for abiding by Broome's requirements (in particular Requirement 2) any more demanding than any other plausible account of the requirements of fairness. The calculation objection highlights a gap in our understanding of how to 25 Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this line of response. Fairness and the Strengths of Agents' Claims 13 abide by the requirements of fairness, viz. the lack of an account of the strengths of agents' claims. So the calculation objection does not give us any special reason to reject Broome's account of the requirements of fairness. Instead, it gives us reason to develop an account of the strengths of agents' claims to goods – an account that, after all, any account of fairness will require.26 Let me reiterate this last point. I am not arguing, in cases such as Medicine-1 and Medicine-2, that Requirement 2 tells us all we need to know about what it would be fair to actually do. What the calculation objection shows is that this is false: because of the possibility of cases like Medicine-1 and Medicine-2, in order to know what it would be fair to actually do we need, in addition to an account of the requirements of fairness, an account of how to evaluate the strengths of agents' claims to goods. But this should not come as a surprise: every plausible view about the requirements of fairness, in so far as it is sensitive to the fact that the strength of agents' claims comes in degrees, requires such an account. The calculation objection therefore doesn't give us reason to think that Broome's account of the requirements of fairness is false. What it gives us reason to think is that Broome's account of the requirements of fairness is not an account of how to evaluate the strengths of agents' claims to goods. And why would we have thought otherwise? CONCLUSION Broome offers us an account of the requirements of fairness that is simple, attractive and complete: fairness requires that agents' claims to goods be satisfied proportionally to the strength of those claims. In the case of indivisible goods, Broome's account says that we are required to provide agents with a kind of surrogate satisfaction: an 26 It's possible that Kirkpatrick and Eastwood anticipate this line of thought, for they consider and reject two possible methods for assigning absolute values to the strength of agents' claims: the use of authorities and the use of rules. See Kirkpatrick and Eastwood, 'Quantifying', pp. 89–90. The idea in each case would be that, in order to assign the absolute values we need in order to conform to Requirement 2 in cases like Medicine-1 and Medicine-2, we could appeal either to some authority whose job it was to assign such values, or we could follow a rule for assigning the relevant values. They argue quite correctly that neither method is acceptable by Broome's own lights. But the conclusion they draw from this is again incorrect: they conclude that, because Broome's account of the requirements of fairness stands in need of an account of how to evaluate the absolute strength of agents' claims to goods, and because an appeal neither to authority nor to rules is acceptable by Broome's own lights, his account of the requirements of fairness is somehow unacceptable. But this is the wrong conclusion: what we should conclude is that, for any account of the requirements of fairness to be applicable by us to cases like Medicine-1 and Medicine-2, we shall also require an account of how to assign absolute values to the strength of agents' claims. 14 Nathaniel Sharadin entry into a weighted lottery for the good where the agent's chance of winning is itself proportional to the strength of the agent's claim. This account delivers sensible verdicts across cases of competing claims to both divisible and indivisible goods. Kirkpatrick and Eastwood think that Broome's account is unacceptable because, given the possibility of cases where we are at a loss to evaluate the strengths of agents' claims to indivisible goods, we will be at a loss as to how to abide by the requirements of fairness. I've shown that Kirkpatrick and Eastwood's complaint goes not just for cases of indivisible but also for cases of divisible goods. But I've also argued that Kirkpatrick and Eastwood's complaint is misguided: it does not show that anything at all is wrong with Broome's account of what fairness requires: it merely points out – what should be obvious on reflection – that a story about the requirements of fairness is not the same as a story about how we should evaluate the strengths of agents' claims to goods. A story of the latter kind is needed by any account of the requirements of fairness, and we've been given no reason to think that Broome's account is in a worse position with respect to the need for such a story than any other view. [email protected]

THE ROLE OF RELATIVES IN PLATO'S PARTITION ARGUMENT, REPUBLIC 4, 436  9–439  9 MATTHEW DUNCOMBE O of Socrates' central contentions in Plato's Republic is that the soul has parts. One argument for this claim runs from    to   . Before arguing that the soul has exactly three parts, Socrates argues that it has more than one part. I call this the Partition Argument. Commentators often hold that this argument either under-generates or over-generates parts. On the one hand, if the argument does not involve a genuine conflict, necessary for generating parts, then the argument under-generates. On the other hand, if the key move of the argument can be reiterated indefinitely, the argument over-generates. The Partition Argument contains one of Plato's most important discussions of relatives at   – , although scholars rarely consider the significance of this for the argument. In this paper I show that once we see how Plato's © Matthew Duncombe  Nick Denyer and M. M. McCabe commented on this material in its earliest incarnation as the second chapter of my Ph.D. thesis. Audiences in Groningen, Edinburgh, Exeter, and Reading asked helpful questions on the paper in its second life as a talk. David Sedley, Tamer Nawar, and Mabel Wale gave me extensive written feedback when the paper was born again as continuous prose. The editor of this journal kindly suggested some final improvements. Many thanks to you all.  Socrates calls the elements in the soul 'εἴδη' at   ,   ,   , 'γένη' at   ,   , and 'μέρη' at    and   . These are cited by E. Brown, 'The Unity of the Soul in Plato's Republic' ['Unity'], in R. Barney, T. Brennan, and C. Brittain (eds.), Plato and the Divided Self (Cambridge, ), – at . Socrates' usual way of referring to a particular division is with a neuter noun, which could suggest a 'part' in Greek. There is some debate as to whether they are 'parts' in a literal sense or rather 'aspects'. I will not address this question here, since it is not central to the argument of the paper, but on this see R. C. Cross and A. D. Woozley, Plato's Republic: A Philosophical Commentary [Philosophical] (London, ), ; C. Shields, 'Plato's Divided Soul', in M. McPherran (ed.), Plato's Republic: A Critical Guide (Cambridge, ), –; and C. Shields, 'Simple Souls', in E. Wagner (ed.), Essays on Plato's Psychology (Lanham, Md., ), –.  On a terminological point, relatives are items in the world. Relative terms are the linguistic items which express relativity or refer to relatives. Although Aristotle Created on 12 February 2015 at 21.42 hours page 37  Matthew Duncombe wider view of relatives is involved in the Partition Argument, the argument avoids the two problems. I argue for the following three claims. First: both problems arise if desire and rejection can relate to different objects. If desire and rejection each relate exclusively to the same object, then the Partition Argument avoids both problems. Second: Plato thinks that desires, such as thirst, and rejections, such as dipsophobia, both relate to the same object and only that object. He thinks this because desires and rejections are relatives. Each relative relates exclusively to its correlative. In the case of relatives that are intentional mental states, the state correlates with its intentional object. Third: desire and rejection are opposite relatives. In general, opposite relatives need not relate to the same object. However, when Plato discusses how to qualify relatives in Republic , we discover that in the special case where (a) opposite relatives have sorts and (b) those sorts arise because the relatives are qualified in the same way, then the opposite relatives relate exclusively to the same object. Thirst and dipsophobia exemplify this special case. So thirst and dipsophobia are opposites that relate to the same object. In this way, Plato can avoid the two problems with the Partition Argument. Section  outlines the Partition Argument and the two problems. Section  discusses Plato's wider views of relatives and shows that a relative relates exclusively to its correlative. Section  shows why Plato's Partition Argument avoids the problems, as traditionally conceived. . The Partition Argument The Partition Argument has the following structure: coins the expression 'τὰ πρός τι' for relatives, we will see that Plato characterizes this class of entities and anticipates many of Aristotle's claims about it.  'Dipsophobia' names the sort of rejection that corresponds to the sort of desire called 'thirst'. I use 'rejection' to capture the opposite of 'desire'.  I use this expression as a convenient label for whatever an intentional mental state is directed towards, with two caveats. First, in modern discussions of intentionality the intentional object is often discussed as if it were always a single individual, as in 'Caesar loves Cleopatra', where Cleopatra is the intentional object. But in Plato's case, as will become clear, this object can also be general, as in 'Tantalus desires a drink'. Second, to avoid begging any questions, how an object is thought of is not automatically part of the intentional object. 'Tantalus desires a drink' does not in itself imply that Tantalus thinks of the drink in any particular way. Created on 12 February 2015 at 21.42 hours page 38 Relatives in Plato's Partition Argument  () Principle of opposites. If something is a single item, then it cannot act or be acted upon in opposite ways at the same time, in the same respect, and in relation to the same object (  – ) [Premiss]. () Desire and rejection are opposite ways of acting or being affected (  – ) [Premiss]. () Thirst is the desire for drink (  –  ; cf.   – ) [Premiss]. () Principle of qualification. (a) If a term that is 'of something' is qualified, then it is of a qualified something. (b) If a term that is 'of something' is unqualified, then it is of an unqualified something (  – ) [Premiss]. () Thirst unqualified is the desire for drink unqualified [Modus Ponens on (b) and ()]. () Someone, a, is thirsty and at the same time rejects drink (  –) [Premiss]. () a desires drink unqualified and a rejects drink unqualified [Instantiation of () with ()]. () a acts in opposite ways with respect to drink unqualified [Instantiation of () with ()]. () a is not a single item (  –; cf.   –) [Modus Tollens on () and ()]. Assuming that the soul is the locus of desire and rejection, the argument uses a simple mechanism to show that the soul has parts: the principle of opposites. For any X, the following conditions are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for X to have more than one part. Opposites hold of X: (a) at the same time, (b) in the same  This differs from our principle of non-contradiction: first Plato phrases the principle such that an item cannot have opposite properties, while the PNC (roughly) denies that a proposition and its negation can be true together. The second difference is that Plato's principle concerns opposites, whereas the PNC concerns negations: if X is opposite to Y, then X and Y are exclusive, but need not be exhaustive. But if X is the negation of Y, then X and Y are exclusive and exhaustive. See Brown, 'Unity'.  H. Lorenz, The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle [Brute] (Oxford, ), –, discusses this premiss in the most detail of any commentator. In my reconstruction, (a) does not play an explicit role in the statement of the argument. However, in sect. , where I give a slightly more rigorous statement of this principle, we will see that (a) is crucial to the validity of the argument.  For other reconstructions see R. F. Stalley, 'Persuasion and the Tripartite Soul in Plato's Republic', Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy,  (), – at ; Lorenz, Brute, ; and T. Irwin, Plato's Ethics [Ethics] (Oxford, ), . Created on 12 February 2015 at 21.42 hours page 39  Matthew Duncombe respect, and (c) in relation to the same object. The argument undergenerates parts if one of the conditions (a)–(c) is not met, while if all conditions (a)–(c) are repeatedly met, the argument over-generates parts. I will examine each possibility in Sections . and . respectively. .. Under-generation Let me stipulate that when an agent desires something, X, as good, (i) the agent desires X; (ii) the agent believes that X is good; and (iii) the agent desires X because she believes X is good. Plato's pre-Republic dialogues seem to articulate the 'Socratic' view that whenever an agent desires something, the agent desires it in a qualified way, namely as good. But scholars disagree over Plato's moral psychology in the Republic. Traditionalists think the dialogue rejects Socratic psychology, in favour of the view that some desires are good-indifferent. An agent has a 'good-indifferent' desire for X if (i) is satisfied while (ii) and (iii) are not. Such desires may help explain akrasia. If an agent desires X irrespective of whether the agent thinks X is good or bad, the agent may act to acquire X, even against what she takes to be her interests. Against this, revisionists  Prot.   . For the more general claim that what we desire we believe to be good see e.g. Meno   –  , Gorg.   – , and Prot.   – . The Protagoras also gives the famous formulation of the 'Socratic Paradox': 'Now, no one goes towards the bad, or what he believes to be the bad, willingly. Neither is it in human nature to want to go towards what one believes to be bad instead of the good' (  – ). Although finding a satisfying terminology is difficult, I will use 'Socratic' to refer to the moral psychology of the traditionally conceived preRepublic dialogues. This does not imply that the historical Socrates held this view. I use 'Platonic' to refer to the moral psychology of the Republic, whatever that may be, even though the character called 'Socrates' evinces it. We cannot be sure that Plato, in the Republic or elsewhere, holds the 'Platonic' view in propria persona.  R. Parry, Plato's Craft of Justice (New York, ), –, coins the expression 'good indifferent'. As well as Parry, we might give as 'traditionalists' the following scholars: C. D. C. Reeve, Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of Plato's Republic (Indianapolis, ), –; Irwin, Ethics, ; N. Smith and T. Brickhouse, Plato's Socrates (Oxford, ), –; T. Penner, 'Socrates and the Early Dialogues', in R. Kraut (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plato (Cambridge, ), – at ; G. Vlastos, 'Socrates', Proceedings of the British Academy,  (), – at  and ; C. C. W. Taylor, Protagoras (Cambridge, ), . These are cited in G. R. Carone, 'Akrasia in the Republic: Does Plato Change his Mind?' ['Akrasia'], Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy,  (), – at –. I would also include T. Penner, 'Thought and Desire in Plato' ['Thought'], in G. Vlastos (ed.), Plato  (Oxford, ), – at –; N. P. White, A Companion to Plato's Republic (Indianapolis, ), –; P. Hoffman, 'Plato on Appetitive Desires in the Republic' ['Appetitive'], Apeiron,  (), –; and Lorenz, Brute, . Created on 12 February 2015 at 21.42 hours page 40 Relatives in Plato's Partition Argument  defend the view that Plato still held, in the Republic, that there are no good-indifferent desires. The debate just sketched centres on this passage from Republic : [T] Thus, [Glaucon] said, each desire itself is only of that which it is of by nature, but the things (sc. desires) of a certain sort are due to that which has been added. So don't let someone, I said, disturb us when we are not paying attention, [saying] that no one desires drink, but good drink, and not food, but good food. For, [someone might say], all people desire good things, so, if thirst is a desire, then it would be for good drink, or of good whatever it is, and similarly with the other desires. (  –  ) Premisses () and () summarize the results of this passage. Socrates denies that thirst is a desire for good drink. Rather, thirst, like each desire, is for its natural object. In the case of thirst, drink is the natural object. So thirst, it appears, is good-indifferent. Traditionalists build their case that the Republic rejects the Socratic view of desire on this passage. While revisionists have independent evidence for their view (such as Rep.  – ; cf.  –;  –  ;  – ), they also try to reclaim [T]. One revisionist strategy for taming [T] distinguishes two readings of 'thirst is the desire for drink'. Carone writes: 'It is perfectly consistent to claim that thirst qua thirst is for drink while every time we wish to drink we desire drink as good.' That is, divide a conceptual reading from a psychological reading of 'thirst is the desire for drink'. Conceptually, thirst is, by definition, desire for drink,  Revisionists include: G. Lesses, 'Weakness, Reason and the Divided Soul in Plato's Republic', History of Philosophy Quarterly,  (), –; G. R. F. Ferrari, 'Akrasia as Neurosis in Plato's Protagoras', Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy,  (), –; Carone, 'Akrasia'; R. Weiss, The Socratic Paradox and its Enemies (Chicago, ), ch. ; J. Moss, 'Pleasure and Illusion in Plato' ['Pleasure'], Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,  (), – at –; and J. Moss, 'Appearances and Calculations: Plato's Division of the Soul' ['Calculations'], Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy,  (), – at –; possibly also A. W. Price, Mental Conflict [Conflict] (London, ), –. The 'revisionist' reading actually has some supporters who antedate the 'traditionalist' reading: P. Shorey, The Republic [Republic] (Cambridge, Mass., ), ad loc.; J. Adam, The Republic of Plato (Cambridge, ), ad loc.  My translation, following Shorey, Republic, ad loc.  Socrates repeats the same thought, in similar language, at   – .  Moss, 'Pleasure', , for example, calls the evidence provided by [T] 'at very best inconclusive'.  Carone, 'Akrasia', . Cf. Hoffman, 'Appetitive', ; Moss, 'Calculations', . Created on 12 February 2015 at 21.42 hours page 41  Matthew Duncombe so 'thirst is the desire for drink' is true by meaning alone. The psychological reading, on the other hand, could say that whenever some individual thirsts, they desire a drink. As a matter of contingent fact, thirsty individuals always desire a drink as good. But this is an empirical discovery about human psychology. There is no conflict, revisionists say, between the conceptual definition of thirst as the desire for drink and the contingent fact that every time some agent desires a drink, she desires it as a good. The strategy is then to say that (a) thirst, as defined above, is for drink and (b) in any given case of a thirsty person, Tantalus, say, that person desires drink as a good. But (a) is consistent with (b), while (b) is characteristic of Socratic moral psychology. Thus, [T] is consistent with Socratic moral psychology. [T] is an important step in the Partition Argument. This revisionist reading of [T] threatens the Partition Argument with under-generation. The principle of opposites asserts that conflict within the agent, under certain conditions, requires a division in the soul. Socrates pinpoints the conflict between being thirsty and rejecting some available drink. But once the revisionist distinguishes definitional and psychological readings of 'thirst is the desire for drink', that situation may not meet the conditions for generating a part. 'Thirst is desire for drink', read as a definition, is consistent with the psychological truth that Tantalus, despite his unfortunate situation, rejects this drink. So there may not be a genuine conflict when Tantalus thirsts but rejects some actual drink: by definition Tantalus' thirst is thirst for drink, but Tantalus may still reject some particular drink in front of him. Such conflict is necessary to posit parts in the soul. So the Partition Argument undergenerates. .. Over-generation The under-generation problem parallels an over-generation  Carone, 'Akrasia', . This, I take it, is supposed to be a real, rather than nominal, definition.  In fact, Carone herself argues for something stronger: that in the Republic Socrates explicitly endorses the earlier Socratic position. See Carone, 'Akrasia', –.  R. W. Jordan, Plato's Argument for Forms, Cambridge Philological Society, suppl.  (Cambridge, ), –, and R. Robinson, 'Plato's Separation of Reason from Desire', Phronesis,  (), – at , raise the under-generation objection independently of revisionist considerations, although the problem is still based on the ambiguity of the claim 'thirst is the desire for drink'. Created on 12 February 2015 at 21.42 hours page 42 Relatives in Plato's Partition Argument  problem. Suppose that Tantalus' soul does have at least two parts, including an appetitive part. Suppose further that the appetitive part of Tantalus' soul desires to drink. It desires to drink a hot drink because of the presence of coldness. But it also rejects sweetness. So it desires a hot, non-sweet drink. If a hot, sweet drink is available, it seems that the appetitive part both desires and rejects the drink in question. Therefore, according to the principle of opposites, the appetitive part must have two, non-identical parts, one desiring and the other rejecting the drink in question. We could reiterate these moves again and again, to show that, given Plato's principles, the soul has indefinitely many parts. Some press the over-generation problem independently of wider interpretative concerns. But more often commentators use it to motivate the claim that Plato cannot think that just any kind of conflict results in a partition. Some wish to argue that only a specific sort of conflict generates a part in the soul. For example, some claim that only a conflict between a first-order desire and a second-order aversion to that desire generates a part, e.g. desiring to eat meat, say, but being disgusted by that desire. Others argue that the conflict needs to involve a conception of the good in an appropriate way: for example, conflict over what is good or best for the agent. Denying that just any sort of conflict generates a part is the first step towards making the case that the Partition Argument requires a special sort of conflict. Commentators give the over-generation problem as evidence that Plato cannot have inten-  See Penner, 'Thought', –; J. Annas, An Introduction to Plato's Republic [Introduction] (Oxford, ), ; and Reeve, Philosopher-Kings, –. Cross and Woozley, Philosophical, –, discuss and dismiss a similar objection.  At  – Socrates evinces his view that the addition of warmth to the desire for drink will produce the desire for cold drink.  e.g. Penner, 'Thought', –, and Annas, Introduction, .  Irwin, Ethics, –; Price, Conflict, –. This sort of approach is opposed by C. Bobonich, Plato's Utopia Recast [Utopia] (Oxford, ), –, and Lorenz, Brute, –.  T. Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory: The Early and Middle Dialogues (Oxford, ), ; J. M. Cooper, 'Plato's Theory of Human Motivation' ['Motivation'], History of Philosophy Quarterly,  (), –; Price, Conflict, –; Irwin, Ethics, –, takes a slightly different line from his earlier self.  Irwin, Ethics, ; cf. Bobonich, Utopia, . I will not argue against any reading that claims that some specific sort of conflict, e.g. first-order vs. second-order or some conflict involving the good, is needed for a partition. But I take it that the case for such a reading is undermined once we see that there is a satisfactory reading of conflict as between a first-order desire and a first-order aversion. Created on 12 February 2015 at 21.42 hours page 43  Matthew Duncombe ded just any conflict between desires to generate a part. If he had intended that any sort of conflict could generate a part, there would be too many parts in the soul. I have outlined two problems with the Partition Argument. On the one hand, it may under-generate parts; on the other hand, it may over-generate parts. But both problems emanate from the same fact: desires and rejections, e.g. thirst and dipsophobia, need not relate to the same object. We saw that the under-generation problem arises because a necessary condition is not met when applied to the soul. The revisionist reading suggests that thirst may relate to drink, while the corresponding rejection, dipsophobia, may relate, for example, to drink viewed by the agent as a harm. But here a necessary condition on partition is not met, because the opposites thirst and dipsophobia do not relate to the same object, drink: they relate respectively to drink and drink viewed as a harm. If, however, thirst and dipsophobia related exclusively to drink, the under-generation problem would not arise. Over-generation also arises because thirst and dipsophobia may not relate to one and the same object. In addition to relating to drink, each state may relate to sorts of drink, such as hot drink or sweet drink. If a part of the soul desires and rejects a hot, sweet drink, the sufficient conditions generating a partition within the desiring part are met. If the sufficient conditions on generating a part can be repeatedly met, the Partition Argument over-generates parts. But if drink and dipsophobia related only to drink, rather than also to sorts of drink, reiteration would be impossible. So the Partition Argument would not over-generate parts. In short, Plato could solve both problems if he had some principled reason to think that thirst and dipsophobia relate exclusively to the same object. I argue that he did have such a reason. For Plato  Cooper, 'Motivation', .  These are not the only difficulties with the Partition Argument. Some have pointed out that it is hard to see how the partitioned soul is in any sense a unity (e.g. Brown, 'Unity'; Lorenz, Brute, –; Bobonich, Utopia, –). There are also questions over whether the argument is compatible with the exact parts Socrates wants, i.e. reason, appetite, and spirit (see Cooper, 'Motivation', ). Note that, even if Whiting is correct that Plato holds in the Republic that different individuals can have different numbers of parts in their souls, the overand under-generation problems still loom (J. Whiting, 'Psychic Contingency in the Republic', in Barney et al. (eds.), Plato and the Divided Self , – at ). The problems with the argument apply as long as this is the argument that at least one soul has at least two parts. Created on 12 February 2015 at 21.42 hours page 44 Relatives in Plato's Partition Argument  relatives relate only to their objects, a property I call 'exclusivity'. Since thirst and dipsophobia are relatives, each relates exclusively to its object. However, as far as exclusivity shows, opposite relatives could relate to different objects. Mere exclusivity is not sufficient to ensure that thirst and dipsophobia relate to the same object. So I need to attribute a further claim to Plato: in some cases opposite relatives relate exclusively to the same object. Opposites sometimes obey exclusivity. I argue below that Plato's general view of relatives includes a commitment to exclusivity. It turns out that Plato would also accept that opposites sometimes obey exclusivity because of how he thinks relatives are divided into sorts. Given these assumptions by Plato, we can see that for Plato thirst and dipsophobia relate exclusively to the same object and so neither over-generation nor under-generation would trouble him. . Relatives in Plato In this section I argue that Plato endorsed exclusivity and that thirst and dipsophobia must relate to one and the same object. In Section . I will argue that he held exclusivity. Then, in Section ., I show that desire and rejection are relatives. All relatives exhibit exclusivity; desires and rejections are relatives; so, those mental states exhibit exclusivity. In Section . I examine Plato's discussion of qualified relatives. This investigation shows that thirst and dipsophobia relate exclusively to one and the same object. .. Relatives and exclusivity Plato discusses relatives in a range of passages. He often returns to the example of larger and smaller: the larger relates to the smaller. This correspondence tells us that relatives, for Plato, are not single. Each relative has a correlative partner. Nothing could be larger if it were the only item that existed. If something is larger, then there is something in relation to which it is larger, i.e. the smaller. Nonrelative items, on the other hand, can be single. An item can be a human, for example, even if that item is the only thing there is. Plato's examples reflect the natural thought that relatives come in  e.g. Charm.  – ; Parm.  – ; Rep.  –; Sym.  – ; Theaet. –. Cf. Arist. Cat. a–b. Created on 12 February 2015 at 21.42 hours page 45  Matthew Duncombe pairs: the larger is relative to the smaller and the heavier is relative to the lighter. Relatives relate to a correlative. Since desire relates to the desirable and the desirable relates to desire, the two form a relative–correlative pair. But desire is not just a relative. It is also an intentional mental state. In the special case of relatives that are intentional mental states, the correlative is the intentional object of the state. In the Charmides Socrates discusses the claim that 'knowledge is of nothing but itself and other sorts of knowledge' (  –). First, in language reminiscent of Rep.   – , Socrates says that knowledge 'is of something' (τινὸς εἶναι). He asserts that knowledge and its object are like other relative– correlative pairs, giving the examples of larger–smaller, double– half, more–less, heavier–lighter, and older–younger (  – ). Like these relatives, knowledge relates to its correlative (  – ). But the correlative of knowledge is the intentional object of knowledge, learnings. To confirm this point, Socratesmentions two other intentionalmental states, hearing and sight (  – ). Socrates calls the correlative of hearing 'sound' and the correlative of sight 'colour'. Again, each of these is relative, and it relates to its correlative. If the same thought is in the background of Republic , this suggests that the intentional mental states in the Partition Argument relate to their correlative, which is just the intentional object of that state. The intentional states mentioned are relatives and relate to their intentional objects. But do such states relate only to their object? They do because all relatives relate only to their correlative. I argue that Plato endorses this principle: (Exclusivity) IfX andY are a relative and correlative pair, then X relates only to Y. Thus stated, the exclusivity principle appears too strong to be plausible. Suppose we replace 'X' and 'Y' in the above schema with 'father' and 'son'. Father and son appear to be a relative–correlative pair, but father does not only relate to son. Fathers can also be fathers of daughters. To rule out such counter-examples, Plato, like Aristotle (Cat. b–b), stipulates that when both relative and  There is no evidence that Plato explicitly considered, for example, three-place relations, such as 'x is between y and z'.  This principle cannot be expressed in first-order logic because 'X' and 'Y' range over types, as well as individuals. I use italic capitals to indicate this. Created on 12 February 2015 at 21.42 hours page 46 Relatives in Plato's Partition Argument  correlative are properly specified, exclusivity holds of each pair. In the above example, father relates exclusively to its correlative if, and only if, that correlative is given as 'offspring' i.e. 'son or daughter'. The counter-example gets its force because the following statement is ambiguous: (a) a father is relative to this-and-such. The subject, 'a father', could be understood to indicate fathers as such or some particular father. The former would entail (a′) 'For any father, that father is relative to this-and-such'. The latter gives (a′′) 'For some father, that father is relative to this-and-such'. If we replace 'this-and-such' in (a′) with 'son', the result is that (a′) is false. Whether (a′′) is true under the same substitution depends on who that father is. One way to block such counter-examples would be to specify that we are not thinking about any particular father when we make the statement (a), but rather fathers as such. That would be to disambiguate in favour of (a′). Then it is obvious that the correlative is not son, but offspring, because as fathers, fathers relate to offspring, not just sons or just daughters. In short, when the relative is specified as the relative it is, then it relates only to its correlative, which is also properly specified. Plato has this sort of move available to ensure exclusivity because he introduces terminology to identify how and when a relative and correlative are specified. In the Symposium Socrates mentions the case of brother, another relative, and says: 'Is brother, the very thing that it is [αὐτὸ τοῦθ ὅπερ ἔστιν], brother of something or not?' (  –). From this context it is clear that Socrates intends the expression 'the very thing that it is' at   – to rule out all improper ways of using 'brother': he means to specify brother as such. Just a few lines above, at   –, Socrates headed off confusion over the proper correlative of love. Socrates is interested in the relative love as such, not in some particular variety of love, such as love of a father or mother. The relative, love as such, always relates exclusively to its correlative. Socrates clarifies by drawing an analogy with the term 'father' and asks Agathon to imagine he had asked what the correlative of 'father itself ' (αὐτὸ τοῦτο πατέρα) is (  ). He receives the answer  This way of thinking about relatives is foreign to treatments of relatives descended from Frege and Russell, who give an account in extensional terms. But some modern work on propositional attitudes would find these ideas familiar. See W. V. O. Quine, 'Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes', Journal of Philosophy,  (), –. Created on 12 February 2015 at 21.42 hours page 47  Matthew Duncombe 'son or daughter' (ὑέος γε ἢ θυγατρός), which, although a disjunctive expression, picks out an exclusive correlative for father (  ). Father relates to nothing other than a son or a daughter. So the relative, father, under the description 'father', will relate exclusively to its correlative, in this case labelled 'son or daughter'. The 'itself ' (αὐτό) and 'the very thing that it is' (αὐτὸ τοῦθ ὅπερ ἔστιν, transliterated as auto touth' hoper estin) vocabulary, applied in the context of relatives, specifies that we should look at the relative under a certain description, that is, as such. In this case we should look at father as a father rather than, say, as a man or a brother or even a father of sons (cf. Cat. , a–b). When we look at the father in the right way, father relates exclusively to its proper correlative. What that correlative is will be obvious if we read the relative in the general sense. When properly specified, relative–correlative pairs obey the exclusivity principle. This point can also be seen in our Republic  passage. The tell-tale use of hoper estin crops up at the Partition Argument. At    Socrates uses a different grammatical form of hoper estin to refer to the object of knowledge, the knowable, with the periphrasis 'the thing which knowledge is of' (αὐτοῦ οὗπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν). Socrates argues that we could specify knowledge in a certain way. For example, medicine is the specific sort of knowledge that deals with health. However, taken independently of further specification, knowledge is knowledge of the knowable. Moreover, to anticipate my discussion in Section ., Plato confirms that desire, in so far as it is a relative, relates only to its object. Socrates mentions the exclusive object of desire periphrastically at   – , as 'that thing which he desires' (  –), then as 'whatever thing he wants' (  ). These expressions designate a correlative to which desire exclusively relates. In the Partition Argument desire relates only to its correlative. All this suggests that, in general and in the Partition Argument,  Socrates uses this vocabulary of 'itself ', 'the very thing that it is', in his crucial moves in the Partition Argument (see sect. ., [T]).  For further evidence of this use of ὅπερ ἔστιν see my article 'The Greatest Difficulty at Parmenides  –  and Plato's Relative Terms' ['Greatest'], Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy,  (), – at –, which discusses an occurrence at Parm.   . Although controversial, I think that the same idea can be found at Soph.  –. I discuss this in detail in 'Plato's Absolute and Relative Categories at Soph.   ' ['Categories'], Ancient Philosophy,  (), –. A more straightforward example of this use of the ὅπερ ἔστιν terminology is found at Theaet.   . Created on 12 February 2015 at 21.42 hours page 48 Relatives in Plato's Partition Argument  Plato conceives of each relative as having a correlative, to which it relates exclusively. The technical terminology of hoper estin and the concept of exclusivity bound up with it are found across Plato's discussions of relatives and relative terms, including at a crucial point in the Partition Argument. When the relative (and correlative) are properly specified, there will be an exclusive relationship between them. .. Desire and rejection as relatives in Republic  The underand over-generation problems arose because desires and rejections need not relate only to their correlative objects. If desires and rejections were relatives, they would each relate to their proper object because of the exclusivity principle. Then the problems would not arise. I argue below that Plato thinks the mental states in question are relatives, with the attendant formal properties. The evidence suggests that Plato thinks of desire as a relative in the Partition Argument. There is no doubt that relatives are under discussion in   – . Plato's Socrates designates the class as 'a kind such as to be of something' (ὅσα γ ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα οἷα εἶναί του) in language which adumbrates Aristotle's definition of relatives as 'all the things which are said to be just what they are of other things' (ὅσα αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων εἶναι λέγεται) at Cat. , a. Plato tends to identify relatives as a class using similar expressions elsewhere, such as Sym.   –. Moreover, the examples of relative– correlative pairs at Rep. ,   – , track examples of relatives given elsewhere by Plato and, indeed, Aristotle. Finally, in [T] Socrates raised the topic of desire and claimed that desire is only for its natural object. In the exchange that follows Socrates wards off Glaucon's worry that desire may only be for the good, rather than the natural object of desire. Socrates does this by appealing to  Shorey, Republic, ad loc., and Carone, 'Akrasia', , make this point.  Although I cannot argue for the point here, I think that there are important conceptual similarities between the way Plato treats relatives and the way Aristotle does in Cat. , as well as some key differences. Nothing I say will turn on the relationship between Plato's and Aristotle's views. In this paper I do not use Aristotle's explicit statements as evidence for Plato's views, although I do sometimes draw illustrative comparisons with Cat. .  For larger and smaller seeCharm.   – andCat. , a–b; for double and half see Charm.   – and Cat. , a–; for heavier and lighter see Charm.   –; for desire see Sym.    and Charm.   –; for knowledge see Charm.   –, Cat. , a–b, b–, b ff., and Parm.   – . Created on 12 February 2015 at 21.42 hours page 49  Matthew Duncombe the formal properties of relatives at   – . Such a move would make sense only if desire were a relative. As well as this circumstantial evidence, we have direct evidence from the Partition Argument that sorts of desire are relatives. At   – Socrates says that thirst falls into the class of relatives that he has characterized between    and   . Finally, textual parallels tell in favour of my reading, since desire features as a relative in the Symposium (  ) and Charmides (  –). If desire is a relative, then it has the formal, logically relevant, characteristics of that class, in particular, exclusivity. But is the opposite of desire, rejection, also a relative, with all the relevant characteristics? Plato does not say so in so many words, but the context posits a strict parallelism between opposites such as assent and dissent (  –). Desires are in the former class, and rejection is explicitly put in the latter class (  –). Since desires are relatives, it is reasonable to hold that their opposites are as well. Moreover, a necessary condition given for partition is that opposites must relate to the same object (  – ); desire and rejection are the pair of opposites in question, so must relate to the same object. But to relate to any object, both desire and rejection must be relatives. As relatives, desires and rejections, in particular, relate exclusively to their correlatives. .. (Some) opposites relate to the same object So far I have argued that relatives for Plato relate exclusively to their correlatives and Plato considers desires and rejections to be relatives. However, nothing I have yet said shows that opposite relatives always relate exclusively to one and the same object. To see that Plato's Partition Argument does not face the overand undergeneration problems, I must show that he would hold that a particular pair of opposite relatives, in this case thirst and dipsophobia, each relates exclusively to one and the same object, namely, drink. Opposite relatives sometimes relate to the same object, but sometimes do not. Take knowledge, which is a common example of a relative, for both Plato and Aristotle. Knowledge relates to the knowable (to epistēton). The opposite of knowledge is ignorance  Aristotle points out that relatives have opposites (Cat. , b–).  For Aristotle, see Cat. b. For Plato, cf. Parm.   – ; Theaet.   –; Rep.   – and   .  At least, this is Aristotle's stable terminology. Plato seems to be feeling his way Created on 12 February 2015 at 21.42 hours page 50 Relatives in Plato's Partition Argument  (Cat. b–). Ignorance also relates to the knowable: one sense of 'ignorance' is 'not knowing something which one could know'. So in this case both opposite relatives relate to the same object, the knowable. Unfortunately for my argument, not all pairs of opposite relatives are like this. Large and small do not have one and the same correlative. The correlative of large is the small, while the correlative of small is the large, but large and small cannot be the same, since they are opposites. I need to show that Plato thinks that the specific opposite relatives in question, thirst and dipsophobia, relate only to one and the same object. Plato's discussion of qualified relatives helps me to show this. Plato's Socrates introduces and explains the principle of qualification for relatives at   – . Since the Partition Argument deals with sorts of relatives, including the much-larger and the going-to-be-larger, Socrates says something about how such qualified relatives behave. Socrates introduces the principle of qualification thus: [T] But surely of all the things which are of such a kind as to be of something [ὅσα γ ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα οἷα εἶναί του], those that are qualified are of something qualified, so it seems to me, while those that are unqualified are only of things unqualified. (  – ) In my reconstruction of the Partition Argument in Section , I glossed [T] as two conditionals. I can now formulate the conditionals more precisely, using X′ to indicate a sort of X: (A) If (X and Y are a relative–correlative pair) then (X′ is a qualified relative iff Y′ is appropriately qualified). (B) If (X and Y are a relative–correlative pair) then (X is an unqualified relative iff Y is unqualified). somewhat and avoids coining τὸ ἐπιστητόν as the object of knowledge.The expression Plato uses to refer to the proper correlative of 'knowledge' varies between dialogues. At Parm.    the partner is ἀλήθεια; at Charm.  – the partner for knowledge is τὰ μαθήματα, as in Rep. . In Aristotle the partner is ἐπιστητόν (Cat. b). For further discussion see Duncombe, 'Categories', –.  Althoughmost of his examples concern qualifying the correlative, Socrates does also maintain that when the relative is qualified in a certain way, so is the correlative. When discussing thirst as a relative at   – , Socrates makes the point that qualifying by addition can also sometimes qualify the correlative. Qualifying thirst with heat leads someone to thirst for cool drink: qualifying thirst with much leads to the desire for much drink. This is why each of (A) and (B) has a biconditional embedded in the consequent. Created on 12 February 2015 at 21.42 hours page 51  Matthew Duncombe Socrates illustrates the principle of qualification with the example of knowledge and its sorts: [T] But what about knowledges [περὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας]? Isn't it the same way? Knowledge itself is knowledge of learning itself (or whatever one ought to posit knowledge is of). I mean this sort of thing: did not knowledge of making houses come about when it was divided from other knowledges so as to be called house-building? Absolutely. Was this not because it is of a certain kind, which is some different kind from the others? Yes. Therefore, when it came to be of a certain sort, it became itself a certain sort [of knowledge]? And the same is true of the other crafts and knowledges. That's right. (  – ) For now, I focus on the mechanism for qualifying the relative, in this case knowledge. Knowledge itself is the unqualified relative; learning itself is the corresponding unqualified correlative. Here the expression 'itself ' serves to contrast the relative with its sorts, which are qualified somehow or other. The expression could be rendered 'knowledge unqualified'. One sort of knowledge is the (qualified) relative house-building. According to [T], this 'qualification' came about by a specific mechanism. Knowledge came to relate to a sort of learning, making houses. The sort of knowledge, house-building, resulted from this relationship. This is precisely what (A) leads us to expect. Knowledge and learning constitute a relative and correlative pair: when the latter is qualified, as house-making, so too the former is appropriately qualified, as house-building. So much for how to identify sorts of relatives. For his argument,  Plato uses two expressions for the object of knowledge in  , which I take to be equivalent: the first is 'learning' at    and the second is 'whatever we ought to say knowledge is of' (ἐπιστήμη μὲν αὐτὴ μαθήματος αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἢ ὅτου δὴ δεῖ θεῖναι τὴν ἐπιστήμην) at   –. Plato uses 'knowledge itself ' to contrast with some given sort of knowledge. Compare this use with the use we find above where I mentioned that Plato uses the expressions 'itself ' (αὐτό) or 'the very thing that it is' (αὐτὸ τοῦθ ὅπερ ἔστιν) to specify a relative in such a way as to make its correlative exclusive.  The principle of qualification is not true in an unrestricted form. Take master and slave. When we qualify the correlative as a 'good slave', how should we qualify the master? Clearly, not with 'good': a bad or indifferent master might have good slaves. So with what could we qualify the relative? I can think of nothing plausible. So there may be counter-examples to the unrestricted version of the principle, Created on 12 February 2015 at 21.42 hours page 52 Relatives in Plato's Partition Argument  Socrates also needs to establish that the sorts of relatives relate only to their correlatives. This is straightforward. Take a relative and correlative pair, X and Y. Let X′ be a sort of X. By (A), X′ is itself relative. X′ relates to a sort of the correlative Y, namely, Y′. But by the principle of exclusivity, if X′ relates to Y′, then X′ relates exclusively to Y′. For example, knowledge relates to learning. Knowledge ofmaking houses is itself relative, because it relates to learning about house-building. But, by exclusivity, knowledge of makinghouses relates only to house-building. So sorts of relatives relate only to the relevant sorts of correlative. We can specify a relative as qualified or as unqualified. The same applies to the corresponding correlatives. We have just seen how qualified knowledge, house-making, relates to qualified learning, house-building. In one respect house-making is a sort of knowledge, but in another respect house-making is also a relative in its own right. We could call this unqualified house-making. We can infer by (B) that unqualified house-making is relative to unqualified house-building. Indeed, we may wish to contrast unqualified house-making with some sort of house-making. The sort of housemaking that deals with walls is walling and the corresponding sort of house-building is building walls. Walling relates only to building walls; exclusivity applies to relative and correlative pairs whether they are sorts of some other relative–correlative pair or not. Indeed, this point will become crucial below. A key move in diffusing the overand under-generation problems comes when we see that Socrates takes thirst, which is a sort of desire, as unqualified thirst. When so taken, thirst, now unqualified, will relate only to unqualified drink (  –). So far I have argued that sorts of relatives relate only to sorts of although I know of no discussion of them in Plato. For an importantly different view of how relatives are qualified, see Cat. a–.  Plato's idea that there are different ways of specifying a relative, as qualified or as unqualifed, is analogous to Aristotle's thought in Phys. . , a–b, that a cause can be given in different ways. Aristotle invokes the example of the cause of a sculpture. We can specify the cause as 'a sculptor', 'Polyclitus', or indeed 'a man' or 'an animal'. We can pick out the cause in a range of ways. One way of specifying the cause, 'a sculptor', is privileged, because we are trying to explain how a sculpture came about. At Cat. , a–b, Aristotle applies this thinking to relatives. A master of a slave can be specified in various ways: ideally as 'a master', but also as 'a man' or as 'a biped'. Plato's idea here is similar. A relative is only relative to its proper correlative. But what counts as a proper correlative depends on how the relative is specified, either as qualified in some way or as unqualifed. Created on 12 February 2015 at 21.42 hours page 53  Matthew Duncombe correlatives. But to solve the overand under-generation problems, I need to show that sorts of opposite relatives relate exclusively to one and the same correlative. For example, large and small are a relative–correlative pair. But large and small are also opposites. By (A) both large and small have sorts. Call tallness the sort of largeness related to height and shortness the sort of smallness related to height. Now, in general, sorts of opposites are opposite to each other. Pain opposes pleasure, so physical pain and physical pleasure oppose each other. This is true of opposite relatives: tallness and shortness are opposites, in virtue of being sorts of the opposites large and small. Tallness and shortness are also relatives, in virtue of each having a correlative, namely, height. But, because of the principle of exclusivity, both tallness and shortness relate only to height. So tallness and shortness are opposite relatives, but each is relative to the same thing. Opposite relatives can have the same correlative object. To put the above argument in its general form, X and its opposite, un-X, are both relatives. According to (A) both can be divided into sorts by specifying a term they relate to, Y. Sorts of opposites are themselves opposites, so X′ and un-X′ are opposites. The sorts X′ and un-X′ each have the same correlative, Y. X′ and un-X′ relate exclusively to Y, but Y can be, and in this case is, one and the same correlative for both X′ and un-X′. In this case, X′ and un-X′ are opposite relatives but relate to the same thing, Y. The text of the PartitionArgument supports this treatment of opposite relatives. At   –  Socrates discusses opposing drives relevant to the Partition Argument. At   –  he offers an analogy with archery. The archer both pushes and pulls the bow, at the same time. For Socrates' remarks to make sense, both the push and the pull must be relative to the same object, the bow. But this can only be secured with the considerations given above. Pushing is opposite to pulling. I call the sort of pushing relative to a bow 'bowpushing'. Bow-pushing opposes the sort of pulling that relates to  It may seem odd that height, not shortness, is the correlative of tallness. But this is what the principle of qualification dictates: when we identify the sorts of a relative, e.g. large, the sorts are relatives and relate to the sorting concept, in this case height. As I mentioned above, whether we take relatives as qualified or unqualified matters. If we took tall and short as unqualified relatives, rather than as sorts of large and small, presumably tall and short would be a relative–correlative pair.  The action being referred to is obvious to anyone who has seen archery but hard to describe succinctly. When an archer takes aim, she pushes the bow towards Created on 12 February 2015 at 21.42 hours page 54 Relatives in Plato's Partition Argument  the bow, known as 'drawing'. Both bow-pushing and drawing are relatives and so relate only to their object. But in both cases that object is the bow. So there is direct evidence to show that opposite relatives sometimes relate exclusively to the same object in the Partition Argument. We are now in a position to understand how Socrates applies these general considerations of exclusivity and qualification to desire and thirst and, by extension, rejection and dipsophobia, all of which are key to the Partition Argument. Just after his discussion of the principle of qualification, Socrates continues: [T] [i] To return to thirst, then, do you not place it among those things that are such as to be of something and say that it is what it is [τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐστίν] of something? I presume it is thirst . . .? Yes I do, [it is thirst] for drink. [ii] Therefore, thirst of a certain sort is for drink of a certain sort. [iii] But thirst itself is neither of much nor of little nor of good nor her target with one hand and pulls the bowstring towards herself with the other. Both pushing and pulling are done with respect to the bow, not the target. While there is a common term in English for this pulling, namely, 'drawing', there is no common term for the corresponding pushing, so I simply coin 'bow-pushing'.  In discussion,David Sedley pressed the following point about Plato's treatment of qualified opposite relatives. I have defended elsewhere the view that for Plato, like Aristotle, every correlative is also a relative (Duncombe, 'Categories'; Duncombe 'Greatest'; cf. Cat. b–). Just as knowledge relates to the knowable, so the knowable relates to knowledge. I call this reciprocity. Sedley's worry is that exclusivity, reciprocity, and Plato's ideas about opposite relatives are inconsistent. According to Plato, knowledge and ignorance both relate to the knowable. By reciprocity, the knowable relates to knowledge and the knowable relates to ignorance. But, by exclusivity, the knowable can relate to at most one of these. So exclusivity, reciprocity, and Plato's ideas about qualified opposite relatives lead to a contradiction. As far as I can discern, Plato never recognizes this problem. Aristotle, however, rejects Plato's ideas about qualification of relatives (Cat. a–), so may offer a solution. A full discussion of these interesting issues would take us too far from the argument of this paper, but I will briefly note that, in my reconstruction, the Partition Argument does not rely on reciprocity, so, as far as this argument goes, Plato is consistent.  The text here is corrupt. S. R. Slings (ed.), Platonis Respublica (Oxford, ), prints: Τὸ δὲ δὴ δίψος, ἦν δ ἐγώ, οὐ τούτων θήσεις τῶν †τινὸς εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐστίν†; ἔστι δὲ δήπου δίψος (  –). There are two problems with the text as it stands: the first sentence is ungrammatical, and the second sentence is incomplete. My suggestion is that we understand Glaucon's response as having two parts: the ἔγωγε as responding affirmatively to Socrates' first sentence and the πώματος as Glaucon completing the second sentence in the run of the conversation. This seems to reflect a natural enough conversational rhythm, even if not strictly grammatical. That said, the presence of two textual difficulties in as many lines suggests broader difficulties within the text, and so nothing I say hangs on any specific construal of the syntax here. Created on 12 February 2015 at 21.42 hours page 55  Matthew Duncombe of bad, nor, in a word, of any particular sort, but [iv] thirst itself by nature is only of drink itself. (  –) In this passage the principles of exclusivity and qualification work in tandem to make Socrates' argument. In [i] Socrates uses the expression touto hoper estin to suggest that a relative as such relates only to its object. He applies this general thought to the relative thirst. When specified properly, thirst relates only to drink. We might say that thirst as such relates exclusively to drink as such. The principle of exclusivity tells us this about thirst, because thirst is a relative. Next, Socrates invokes the principle of qualification, in [ii] and [iii]. [ii] says that qualified thirst relates to qualified drink, while [iii] says that unqualified thirst relates only to unqualified drink. This rules out that unqualified thirst relates to drink of a certain sort, for example, good drink. Socrates concludes, at [iv], that thirst as such relates only to drink as such, not to thirst qualified somehow. The move to this conclusion relies on both principles. Qualified correlatives are not properly specified correlatives, for the purposes of the principle of exclusivity. So thirst as such relates only to drink as such, not drink qualified in some way. At first, this may seem a little strange. Is thirst not already a sort of desire? If so, how can thirst, a sort of desire, be thirst as such? But we saw above that sorts of relatives can be viewed simply as relatives tout court. Thirst as such is both a sort of desire and relative only to drink. In fact, Socrates applies the hoper estin expression to thirst in order to emphasize that, even though it is a sort of desire, we can still view thirst as such. When we do so, we will see that the principle of exclusivity applies to thirst and that thirst is relative only to drink. I argued in Section . that relatives have an exclusive correlative, and sorts of relatives relate only to an appropriate sort of their correlative. Section . showed that desire and rejection are relatives. Finally, we saw in Section . that opposite relatives can relate to the same object, and indeed must when they are divided into sorts by relating to the same object. We saw that this applies also in the case of thirst. With these resources, we can now see that the Partition Argument, as Plato understood it, neither over-generates nor under-generates parts. Created on 12 February 2015 at 21.42 hours page 56 Relatives in Plato's Partition Argument  . Solving the problems I will first outline my construal of the argument, then show how the argument faces neither problem. I pointed out in Section  that the principle of opposites specifies three individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions on anything, X, having parts: X bears opposite relations (a) to the same thing, (b) at the same time, and (c) in the same respect. The Partition Argument assumes that the locus of drives is the soul, and applies these conditions to the soul of an individual, Tantalus, in my example. We make the plausible assumption that Tantalus sometimes thirsts for drink and is dipsophobic for drink, at the same time. When construed my way, Tantalus' soul meets condition (a) since, when specified as thirst, Tantalus' thirst relates to drink. Drink is the object of thirst because thirst is a sort of desire, identified as desire for drink. We saw in Sections . and . that sorts of relatives, including desires, are identified by the correlative to which they exclusively relate. In the case of mental states such as desires, those correlatives are the intentional object. For similar reasons, Tantalus' dipsophobia relates to drink. So Tantalus' soul has opposite relations to the same object. Condition (b) is met by stipulation: we assumed that Tantalus thirsts and is dipsophobic at the same time. Since the soul is the locus of thirst and dipsophobia, Tantalus' soul does both. It is also easy to see how condition (c) is met on my reading. For (c) to hold of Tantalus' soul, it must thirst for and reject drink in the same respect. Section . showed that sorts of relatives, such as thirst and dipsophobia, when specified as such, relate to their object specified as such. Tantalus' thirst is for drink as such and Tantalus' dipsophobia is for drink as such. In both cases Tantalus' attitude is towards drink as such. Hence, there is no room for Tantalus, or his soul, to thirst for drink in one respect and reject it in another. All the individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions on there being more than one part in Tantalus' soul are met. Construed this way, the argument does not face the overand under-generation problems. To save the Partition Argument from under-generation, Socrates would have to ensure that the same object, under the same aspect, is both desired and rejected, at the same time. Desire and rejection are opposite relatives. We saw in Created on 12 February 2015 at 21.42 hours page 57  Matthew Duncombe Section . that opposite relatives are divided into sorts according to their object. Desire for drink is thirst; rejection of drink is dipsophobia. In virtue of being sorts of opposites, thirst and dipsophobia are opposites. But the principle of exclusivity ensures that thirst and dipsophobia each relate only to drink. The fact that the object of thirst as such and dipsophobia as such is drink as such rules out the possibility that it is desired and rejected under different aspects or at different times. But thirst and dipsophobia are opposite attitudes towards the same object. So there is guaranteed to be a genuine violation of the principle of opposites, which is sufficient to generate a part in the soul. My reading also avoids over-generation. If all conflict in the soul generated a part, then conflict within a part may be sufficient for a partition within that part. Specifically, many readers hold that a thirst for drink and the rejection of some particular drink on offer- say, a hot, sweet drink-would suffice to generate a part within the appetitive part. But now it is easy to see that Plato's Socrates is not committed to anything that would lead to unrestrained over-generation of parts. Thirst as such relates to drink as such. Dipsophobia as such relates to drink as such. An agent cannot have thirst and dipsophobia without psychic conflict. But an agent can thirst and reject a warm drink without conflict. Thirst is relative to drink as such, while the rejection is for warm drink. But drink as such and warm drink are not the same object, so there is not a conflict sufficient to generate a part. . Conclusion The aim of this paper was to show that two principal problems raised against the PartitionArgument can be solved, oncewe understand the notion of relatives at play in the argument. The overand under-generation problems threaten because thirst and dipsophobia may relate to different objects. Plato's conception of relatives blocks this possibility. For Plato, a relative relates to, and only to, its proper correlative. I showed that Plato considers the mental states at stake in the Partition Argument-desire, rejection, thirst, and dipsophobia-to be relatives. 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